text:
    STELLAS v. ESPERDY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.
    No. 934,
    Misc.
    Decided June 12, 1967.

      Anna Mamalakis Pappas and Omar Z. Ghobashy for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with directions that it be returned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for further administrative proceedings.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SANDOVAL v. UTAH.
    No. 1107,
    Misc.
    Decided June 12, 1967.

      Jimi Mitsunaga for petitioner.

      Phil L. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Utah in light of the representations of the Attorney General that the petitioner was entitled to the transcription of the mechanical recording of the juvenile court hearing at the expense of the Salt Lake County or other governmental entity having jurisdiction.


text:
    HADLEY v. MASSACHUSETTS.
    No. 1179,
    Misc.
    Decided June 12, 1967.

      Louis M. Nordlinger for appellant.

      Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Willie J. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for further consideration in light of Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523.

Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Stewart dissent and would affirm the judgment for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Clark’s dissenting opinion in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S., at 546.


text:
    HEMPHILL v. ILLINOIS.
    No. 1342,
    Misc.
    Decided June 12, 1967.
    Petitioner pro se.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Illinois with instructions to appoint counsel and hear the appeal. Milani v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 12.


text:
    FOX v. OREGON.
    No. 1421,
    Misc.
    Decided June 12, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are- granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Oregon for further consideration in light of Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    June 12, 1967.
    No. 6,
    October Term, 1964.
    Henry v. Mississippi.
   Respondent’s motions that this Court reinstate the judgment of conviction and retax costs are denied. It is noted that the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court states: “If this case were again before us, we would reaffirm our former opinion and judgment.” Further proceedings in the cause should be addressed to any new final judgment which may be entered by the Mississippi courts. Cf. United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233, 245-246; Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85, 99.

Mr. Justice Black concurs in the denial of respondent’s motions.

[For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 381 U. S. 908.]


text:
    No.-.
    Osborn v. United States.

      Maclin P. Davis, Jr., for applicant.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States in opposition.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay and bail presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 838.
    Wyandotte Transportation Co. et al. v. United States.

      Lucian F. Ray for Wyandotte Transportation Co., George B. Matthews for Union Barge Line Corp., and John W. Sims for Cargill, Inc., et al. on the motion.
   C. A. 5th Cir. (Certiorari granted, 386 U. S. 906.) Motion to remove case from summary calendar denied.


text:
    No. 1188,
    Misc.
    O’Brien v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 952.
    Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, Trustee in Bankruptcy.

      Irwin L. Langbein for petitioner on the motion.
   C. A. 5th Cir. (Cer-tiorari granted, 387 U. S. 929.) Motion to dispense with printing record granted.


text:
    No. 31,
    Original.
    Utah v. United States.
   It is ordered that the Honorable J. Cullen Ganey, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall bq charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may direct.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.

[For earlier order herein, see 387 U. S. 902.,]


text:
    No. 32,
    Misc.
    Tettamble v. Missouri,
   386 U. S. 265. Motion of petitioner for further relief denied.


text:
    No. 817,
    Misc.
    Sliva v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1767,
    Misc.
    Walker v. Maxwell, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 1824,
    Misc.
    Herd v. Michigan.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 38.
    Marchetti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. (Certiorari granted, 385 U. S. 1000.) The case is restored to the docket for reargument at the 1967 Term. In their briefs and oral arguments, counsel are requested to discuss, in addition to the questions specified in the original.writ, the following:

(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, to the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the registration and special occupational tax requirements of 26 U. S. C. §§4411, 4412?

(2) Can an obligation to pay the special occupational tax required by 26 U. S. C. § 4411 be satisfied without filing the registration statement provided for by 26 U. S. C. § 4412?-y


text:
    No. 1783,
    Misc.
    Buder v. Kropp, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1766,
    No. 1768,
    No. 1784,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    McKinney v. Wilson, Warden, et al.; Jadwin v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; and Brooks v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 1753,
    Misc.
    Ali, aka Clay, et al. v. Connally et al., U. S. District Judges.

      Hayden C. Covington on the motion.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States in opposition.
   D. C. S. D. Tex. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 1517,
    Misc.
    O’Bryan v. Chandler, U. S. District Judge.

      Harvey L. Davis on the motions.

      Carl L. Shipley for respondent.
   Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 181.
    Grosso v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. (Certiorari granted, 385 U. S. 810.) The case is restored to the docket for reargument at the 1967 Term. In their briefs and oral arguments, counsel are requested to discuss, in addition to the questions previously presented, the following:

(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, to the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the obligation to pay the wagering excise tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 4401?

(2) Is satisfaction of an obligation to pay a wagering excise tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 4401 conditioned upon the filing of a return required under 26 U. S. C. § 6011 and pertinent regulations? If it is not, what information, if any, must accompany the payment of a wagering excise tax obligation in order to extinguish the taxpayer’s liability for that obligation?


text:
    No. 1022.
    Ginsberg v. New York.

      Emanuel Red-field for appellant.

      William Cahn for appellee.
   Appeal from App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument immediately following Nos. 1109 and 1155.


text:
    No. 1259.
    United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville et al.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Richard A. Posner for the United States.

      Paul A. Porter, Dennis G. Lyons, E. William Henry and Frank M. Farris, Jr., for Third National Bank in Nashville et al., and Robert Bloom, Joseph J. O’Malley and Charles H. McEnerney, Jr., for Camp, appellees.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Tenn. Probable jurisdiction noted.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 958.
    Avery v. Midland County et al.

      Lyndon L. Olson for petitioner.

      Reagan H. Legg for respondent Midland County, and W. B. Browder for respondents Brooks et al.
    Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Marshall for the United States, and by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se.

   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1334.
    United States v. Correll et ux.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin, Jack S. Levin and Gilbert E. Andrews for the United States.

      Carl A. Swaf-ford for respondents.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1087.
    Simmons et al. v. United States.

      George F, Callaghan for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Mervyn Hamburg for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1274.
    No. 1287.
    No. 1291.
    No. 1292.
    No. 1293.
    No. 1294.
    No. 1295.
    No. 1302.
    No. 1342.
    No. 1412.
    Continental Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission; Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission; New Mexico et al. v. Federal Power Commission; Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al.; California et al. v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; Hunt Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; Bass et al. v. Federal Power Commission; Federal Power Commission v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; and City of Los Angeles v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. These cases will hereafter be referred to collectively as the “Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.”

Motions to supplement petitions in Nos. 1293 and 1295 granted. Petitions for writs of certiorari granted and cases consolidated for oral argument, eight hours being assigned for the hearing of these cases and any other cases which may be granted with respect to the “Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.” Such time is to be divided among the parties, with four hours allotted to those supporting the order of the Federal Power Commission and four hours to those attacking such order, the division of time among counsel on each side to be settled among themselves. Briefs of those parties supporting the order of the Federal Power Commission shall be filed on or before August 25, 1967, and of those attacking such order shall be filed on or before October 9, 1967.

Bruce B. Merrill, Joseph C. Johnson and Thomas H. Burton for Continental Oil Co., and Cecil N. Cook for Midhurst Oil Corp., petitioners in No. 1274.

Murray Christian and H. W. Varner for petitioner in No. 1287.

Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General, George M. Cowden, First Assistant Attorney General, Houghton Brownlee, Jr., Linward Shivers and C. Daniel Jones, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, and A. J. Carubbi, Jr., for the State of Texas; and Boston E. Witt, Attorney General, and William J. Cooley, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Mexico, petitioners in No. 1291.

Robert E. May and Louis Flax for petitioner in No. 1292.

Mary Moran Pajalich and J. Calvin Simpson for petitioners in No. 1293.

Paul W. Hicks, Robert W. Henderson and Donald K. Young for petitioners in No. 1294.

Frederick T. Searls for petitioner Pacific Gas & Electric Co., and John Ormasa for petitioners Pacific Lighting Service & Supply Co. et al. in No. 1295.

J. Evans Attwell and W. H. Drushel, Jr., for petitioners in No. 1302, and for respondents Bass et al. in Nos. 1293 and 1342.

Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Posner, Richard A. Solomon and Peter H. Schiff for petitioner in No. 1342.

Roger Arnebergh for petitioner in No. 1412.

Oliver L. Stone and Thomas G. Johnson for Shell Oil Co.; Warren M. Sparks and Donald R. Arnett for Gulf Oil Corp., et al.; Kenneth Heady and John R. Rebmmn for Phillips Petroleum Co.; Joseph W. Morris and Edwin S. Nail for Amerada Petroleum Corp.; Homer E. Mc-Ewen, Jr., for Sunray DX Oil Co.; Charles E. McGee and John T. Ketcham for Sinclair Oil & Gas Co.; and Francis R. Kirkham and Justin R. Wolf for Standard Oil Co. of Texas, certain respondents in Nos. 1293, 1295, 1342 and 1412.

William K. Tell, Jr., for Texaco Inc.; J. P. Hammond, T. C. McCorkle, William H. Emerson and Carroll L. Gilliam for Pan American Petroleum Corp.; Carroll L. Gilliam for Mobil Oil Corp. et al.; Hawley C. Kerr and Sherman S. Poland for Skelly Oil Co.; Clayton L. Orn, Joseph F. Diver and Jack Fariss for Marathon Oil Co.; Martin Erck and Bernard A. Foster, Jr., for Humble Oil & Refining Co.; Stuart J. Scott and Bernard A. Foster, Jr., for Atlantic Richfield Co.; Gray don D. Luthey for Cities Service Oil Co. et al.; Jerome M. Alper for Reef Corp.; Oscar J. Cadwallader, Jr., for Tidewater Oil Co.; Richard F. Remmers for Sohio Petroleum Co.; and Bernard A. Foster, Jr., and James D. McKinney, Jr., for Dorchester Gas Producing Co. et al., certain respondents in Nos. 1293, 1295 and 1342. Reported below: 375 F. 2d 6.

[For earlier order in No. 1342, see 387 U. S. 902.]


text:
    No. 1474,
    Misc.
    Haynes v. United States.

      Charles Alan Wright for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed m forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Case transferred to appellate docket and set for oral argument immediately following No. 181.


text:
    No. 1562,
    Misc.
    Biggers v. Tennessee.

      Jack Greenberg, Michael Meltsner, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Avon N. Williams and Z. Alexander Looby for petitioner.

      George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Robert F. Hedgepath, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Motion for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Case transferred to appellate docket and set for oral argument immediately following No. 1087.


text:
    No. 1168.
    Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.

      Walter Herzjeld, Cecilia H. Goetz, Richard A. Whiting, Robert J. Corber and Stanley J. Madden for petitioner.

      Robert N. Katz and Walter H. Mayo III for Federal Maritime Commission, and Solicitor General Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Turner for the United States, respondents.

      Edward D. Ransom and R. Frederic Fisher for Pacific Maritime Association, intervenor below.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 522.
    Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co.

      John Raeburn Green and Lewis C. Green for petitioner.

      Lon Rocker for respondent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1312.
    Warn v. Brooks-Scanlon, Inc.

      Marvin S. Nepom for petitioner.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1202.
    Gwin et al., dba Mobile Supply Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

      George E. Stone, Jr., and George F. Wood for petitioners.

      Thomas E. Twitty, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1297.
    Bowers v. Kaiser Steel Corp.

      Edgar Paul Boyko for petitioner.

      George V. Powell for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1316.
    Ames et al., Administrators v. Irvine Co.

      Manuel Ruiz for petitioners.

      William L. Anderson for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1319.
    Brooks v. Hunter et al.

      Homer Brooks, petitioner, pro se.

      F. Joseph Donohue for respondents.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1323.
    Continental Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission.

      Bruce R. Merrill, Joseph C. Johnson and Thomas H. Burton for petitioner Continental Oil Co., Henry B. Weaver, Jr., Stuart J. Scott and Bernard A. Foster, Jr., for petitioner Atlantic Richfield Co., and Edmund D. Buckley for petitioner Tidewater Oil Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1325.
    Grossman et al. v. Stubbs et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1435.
    Gulf Oil Corp. et al. v. Wolowitz.

      Henry T. Rathbun for petitioners.

      William D. Hall and Elliott I. Pollock for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1329.
    Ballou et ux. v. United States.

      Alan R. Vogeler for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin and Carolyn R. Just for the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1331.
    Holland American Line v. Philadelphia Ceiling & Stevedoring Co.

      T. E. Byrne, Jr., for petitioner.

      William J. O’Brien and Victor L. Drexel for respondent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1332.
    National Molasses Co. v. Beebe, Administrator, et al.

      Thomas Byrne, Jr., and Mark D. Alspach for petitioner.

      Gordon W. Gerber for respondent Beebe.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1336.
    Williams v. Texas Farm Products Co.

      William L. Garwood, Robert J. Hearon, Jr., and Benton Musslewhite for petitioner.

      Charles R. Cravens, Jr., for respondent.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 12th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1350.
    Bossier Parish School Board et al. v. Lemon et al.

      Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and William P. Schuler, Assistant Attorney General, for petitioners.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1376.
    Moriarty v. United States.

      Marshall J. Seidman and John J. Duffy for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Visnson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 616.
    Wenzler v. Pitchess, Sheriff, et al.

      Stanley Fleishman for petitioner.

      Byron B. Gentry for respondents.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart would reverse on the basis of Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.


text:
    No. 1216.
    Allyn v. Flannery et al.

      Thomas R. Mulroy and Edward W. Rothe for petitioner.
   App. Ct. Ill.,

1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1015.
    In re T. W. P.

      Tobias Simon and Alfred I. Hopkins for petitioner.

      Earl Faircloth, Attorney General, for the State of Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. and/or Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Petition for writ of certiorari denied upon representation of the Attorney General of Florida that the case is moot.


text:
    No. 1276.
    Re et al. v. United States.

      Daniel H. Greenberg for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to remand and certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 1003,
    Misc.
    Juarez v. California.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Dist. Ct. App.

Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 931.
    Aiello v. New Jersey.

      Joseph S. Accardi for petitioner.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1321.
    Griswold v. Arizona.

      John P. Frank for petitioner.

      Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion to dispense with printing response granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 1339.
    Spevack v. Pike.

      Carleton U. Edwards II for petitioner.

      Francis D. Thomas, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

The Chief Justice is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 270,
    Misc.
    Boyer v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 385,
    Misc.
    Smith v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 583,
    Misc.
    Gray v. United States.

      Benjamin W. Boley and Ralph J. Moore, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Robert S. Erdahl and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1328,
    Misc.
    Kelly v. United States.

      William W. Greenhalgh and James F. Bromley for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 781,
    Misc.
    Daniel v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 946,
    Misc.
    Pritchett v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Earl Fairdoth, Attorney General of Florida, and George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1013,
    Misc.
    Boney v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1111,
    Misc.
    Keeton v. Alabama.
    Petitioner pro se.

      MacDonald Gal-lion, Attorney General of Alabama, and David W. Clark, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1322,
    Misc.
    Gomez v. Oliver, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Raymond M. Momboisse and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1337,
    Misc.
    Thompson v. Thompson et al.

      Jerome L. Markovitz for petitioner.

      Morris M. Wexler for respondents.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1370,
    Misc.
    Foster v. Kentucky.

      David Kaplan for petitioner.

      Robert Matthews, Attorney General of Kentucky, and Harold T. Hotopp, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1371,
    Misc.
    Owen et al. v. Arizona.
    Petitioners pro se.

      Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, and Carl Waag, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1403,
    Misc.
    Tovar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1434,
    Misc.
    Howard v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogo-vin, Joseph M. Howard and Burton Berkley for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1464,
    Misc.
    Castle v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1612,
    No. 1627,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Brown v. United States; and Jones v. United States.

      M. Michael Cramer and H. Thomas Sisk for petitioner in No. 1612, Mise., and Jean F. Dwyer for petitioner in No. 1627, Mise.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States in both cases.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1465,
    Misc.
    Walsh v. United States.

      Paul A. Renne for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1466,
    Misc.
    Lugo v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1485,
    Misc.
    Wilson v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1498,
    Misc.
    Barbour v. United States.

      Sidney Ginsberg for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1532,
    Misc.
    Calland v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1554,
    Misc.
    Monroe v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Mervyn Hamburg for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1583,
    Misc.
    Levine v. United States.

      George L. Saunders, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glazer for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1555,
    Misc.
    Williams v. Indiana.
    Petitioner pro se.

      John J. Dillon, Attorney General of Indiana, and Douglas B. McFadden, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1576,
    Misc.
    Llanes v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Philip R. Monahan for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1595,
    Misc.
    Heliczer et al. v. United States.

      Leon B. Polsky for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1626,
    Misc.
    Powell v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1635,
    Misc.
    Walker v. North Carolina et al.

      James R. Walker, Jr., pro se, and Samuel S. Mitchell and Romallus 0. Murphy for petitioner.

      Thomas Wade Bruton, Attorney General, for respondent State of North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1637,
    Misc.
    Sires v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1641,
    Misc.
    White v. Myers, Correctional Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1638,
    Misc.
    Doherty v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1645,
    Misc.
    Snow v. Rodriguez, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1647,
    Misc.
    Sobota v. Rodriguez, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1648,
    Misc.
    Newsom v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1649,
    Misc.
    Shorts v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1650,
    Misc.
    Bandy v. Willingham, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin and Joseph M. Howard for respondent.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1651,
    Misc.
    Lattimore v. California.
   Ct. App.

Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1657,
    Misc.
    In re Williams.

      Samuel S. Mitchell, Romallus O. Murphy and Herman L. Taylor for petitioner.

      T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, and Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., for State of North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1659,
    Misc.
    Davis v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1660,
    Misc.
    Pina et al. v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1661,
    Misc.
    Zachery v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1662,
    Misc.
    Wilson v. Randolph, Director of Public Safety, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1668,
    Misc.
    Williams, Administrator v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.

      John S. Wrinkle for petitioner.

      W. D. Spears for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1669,
    Misc.
    Davis v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1673,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Idaho et al.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Allan G. Shepard, Attorney General of Idaho, and John S. Simko, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1675,
    Misc.
    Wright v. Oklahoma et al.

      Michael A. Williams for petitioner.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1681,
    Misc.
    Durgin et al. v. Graham et al.
    Petitioners pro se.

      Tom, Fairfield Brown for respondent Lindsay Newspapers, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1682,
    Misc.
    De Welles v. United States.

      A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1696,
    Misc.
    Koebrich v. Oliver, Warden.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1683,
    Misc.
    Broeckel et al. v. Ohio.

      James R. Willis for petitioners.

      John T. Corrigan and Charles W. Fleming for respondent.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1690,
    Misc.
    Hives v. Tittle.

      Ishmael C. Childs for petitioner.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1700,
    Misc.
    Nitti v. United States.

      Terence F. MacCarthy for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1701,
    Misc.
    Ballinger v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1711,
    Misc.
    Dayen v. California.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of L. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1716,
    Misc.
    Bourland v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1718,
    Misc.
    Landman v. Peyton, Penitentiary Superintendent.

      Robert A. Cox, Jr., for petitioner.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1722,
    Misc.
    Wimberley v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1749,
    Misc.
    McCloskey v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1727,
    Misc.
    Schneider v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.

      Zach H. Douglas for petitioner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1732,
    Misc.
    Gallardo v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1740,
    Misc.
    King v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1742,
    Misc.
    Ladd v. Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1748,
    Misc.
    Bryant v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1782,
    Misc.
    Schack v. Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The following petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 677,
    Misc.
    Aguilar v. United States.

      James M. Hall for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 798,
    Misc.
    Taylor v. Tennessee.
    Petitioner pro se.

      George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Robert F. Hedgepath, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn.


text:
    No. 842,
    Misc.
    Earl v. United States.

      James E. Hogan for petitioner.

      Solicitor General

      Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glazer for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir.


text:
    No. 944,
    Misc.
    Mottram v. Robbins, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se.

      James S. Erwin, Attorney General of Maine, and John W. Benoit, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 1st Cir.


text:
    No. 1007,
    Misc.
    Stubbs v. Crouse, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, and J. Richard Foth, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 10th Cir.


text:
    No. 1011,
    Misc.
    Gilbert v. United States.

      James F. Kirkham for petitioner.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 1015,
    Misc.
    Wingfield v. Peyton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Reno S. Harp III, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir.


text:
    No. 1117,
    Misc.
    Posley v. Illinois.

      Gerald W. Getty and James J. Doherty for petitioner.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ill.


text:
    No. 1194,
    Misc.
    Ferguson et al. v. United States.
    Petitioners pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir.


text:
    No. 1195,
    Misc.
    LaBlanc v. Colorado.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Attorney General, and Robert C. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Colo.


text:
    No. 1219,
    Misc.
    Hatch v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept.


text:
    No. 1229,
    Misc.
    Herring v. New Mexico.
   Sup. Ct. N. M.


text:
    No. 1254,
    Misc.
    Williams v. Illinois.
    Petitioner pro se.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ill.


text:
    No. 1281,
    Misc.
    Monroe v. Michigan.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Curtis G. Beck, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Mich.


text:
    No. 1285,
    Misc.
    Bonner v. Minnesota.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Douglas M. Head, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Gerard W. Snell, Acting Solicitor General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Minn.


text:
    No. 1633,
    Misc.
    Luxem v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.


text:
    No. 1674,
    Misc.
    Hensley et al. v. United States.

      I. Philip Sipser, Paul O’Dwyer and Dcm Jack Combs for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glazer for the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir.


text:
    No. 1709,
    Misc.
    Talbot v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal.


text:
    No. 1743,
    Misc.
    Johnson v. Louisiana.

      Benjamin E. Smith for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 1747,
    Misc.
    Rhetta v. Field, Mens Colony Superintendent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.


text:
    No. 514,
    Misc.
    Potter et al. v. California.

      William A. Dougherty for petitioners.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and James H. Kline, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion for leave to supplement petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 888,
    No. 16.
    No. 98.
    No. 500.
    No. 768.
    No. 915.
    No. 1011.
    No. 1143.
    No. 1165.
    No. 1166.
    No. 1178.
    No. 1258.
    No. 1217,
    October Term, 1965.
    Misc.
    United Biscuit Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, Austin v. Kentucky, Anders v. California, Fenix & Scisson, Inc. v. United States, Sullivan et ux. v. United States, Muncy et vir v. General Motors Corp., Armored Carrier Corp. v. United States et al., Madison v. United States, Calhoun v. Hertwig, Trustee, et al., Jordan et al. v. United States, Muth, Administratrix, et al. v. Atlass et al., Powell v. Committee on Admissions and Grievances et al., Forrest v. United States,
   383 U. S. 926;

386 U. S. 767;

386 U. S. 738;

386 U. S. 1036;

387 U. S.905;

386 U. S. 1037;

386 U. S. 778;

386 U. S. 1037;

386 U. S. 1033;

386 U. S. 1033;

386 U. S. 1037 ;

386 U. S. 1035; and

386 U. S. 995. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1324,
    No. 1411,
    No. 1597,
    No. 1623,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Oppenheim et al. v. Sterling et al., Lipka, Administratrix, et al. v. United States et al., Blanchard, dba Inferno Co. v. Texsteam Corp. et al., Bryans v. United States,
   386 U. S. 1011;

387 U. S. 935;

387 U. S. 936; and

387 U. S. 903. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 665.
    Klein v. Klein,
   385 U. S. 973, 1032. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 801,
    Misc., October Term, 1965.
    Corcoran v. Yorty et al.,
   see, e. g., 384 U. S. 982. Motion for leave to file fourth petition for rehearing denied.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    BOHANNAN v. ARIZONA ex rel. SMITH, ATTORNEY GENERAL.
    No. 204.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      John P. Frank for appellant.

      Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, and Gary K. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dispense with printing the motion to dismiss is granted. The motion to dismiss is also granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

dissenting.

Appellee applied in the court below for a writ of quo warranto. The petition asked that appellant be ousted “from the office he presently holds as Member of the State Board of Public Welfare of the State of Arizona, and [that] his office [be declared] vacant so that a successor may be qualified as provided by law.” Appel-lee referred in its petition and brief to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-447, which provides that any official who violates the statutory prohibition against having an interest in contracts made by him in his official capacity “shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, and is forever disqualified from holding any office in this state.” Appellee, however, asked the court below only to require appellant “to show cause why his position as a Member of the State Board of Public Welfare should not be declared vacant and why he should not be found to unlawfully hold said office, so that a successor may be qualified as provided by law.”

Appellant filed a motion to quash the application on the ground that under the statutory scheme removal from office could be imposed only upon one who had been found guilty in a criminal proceeding of violating the statutory provisions. That motion was denied. Appellant then answered the application, acknowledging that certain mortgage transactions between the Arizona Retirement Board and the Associated Mortgage and Investment Company took place while he was a member of the former and president and director of the latter. Oral argument was denied, the case being decided on the briefs.

Up to that point, therefore, the matter was presented as a question of state law — it was contended that the state statutes did not permit removal from office prior to a criminal conviction. The court, however, not only ruled that appellant should be excluded from his office as a Member of the State Board of Public Welfare but also “forever disqualified from holding any public office in the State of Arizona.” To reach this conclusion, the court construed the Arizona statutes to require a criminal conviction if a fine or imprisonment were to be imposed on the public official, but only a “judicial determination of the fact upon which the disqualification rests,” if disqualification were the sanction to be imposed. The quo warranto proceeding before the court was held to offer a sufficient “judicial determination of the fact” to exclude appellant from the office he held and to bar him permanently from public office.

In his petition for rehearing appellant challenged on federal constitutional grounds the court’s use of the civil quo warranto proceeding to disqualify him permanently from public office. He asserted that the statute, as construed by the court, permitted the permanent barring of a person from public office in a civil proceeding lacking vital elements of due process. Appellant also contended that the statute, as construed, constituted a bill of attainder since it operated to inflict punishment without the constitutional safeguards of a judicial trial.

It seems obvious that until the court had interpreted the statute in appellant’s case to allow permanent disqualification in a quo warranto proceeding in which the petition asked only for a show-cause order and that appellant be discharged from his present office, appellant had, as a practical matter, no reason to raise the federal claims he presents to this Court. Appellee did not ask for a declaration of permanent disqualification in its petition for quo warranto. The Arizona statute that expressly provides for the judgment to be entered in a quo warranto case, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2045, does not mention permanent disqualification from office. That section provides only that “when a defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping or intruding into or unlawfully holding an office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall be given that the defendant be excluded from the office, franchise or privilege. The court may also impose upon defendant a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, which, when collected, shall be paid into the state treasury.”

If a federal question arises because of an unexpected construction of a state statute by the highest state court, the question is timely raised for purposes of review by this Court if it is presented in the petition for rehearing. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673.

A declaration that a person is permanently barred from any future public office raises constitutional issues that simple removal from office does not. Such a declaration sweeps broadly and may destroy the individual's right to a livelihood in the field of his greatest competence. The serious nature of any such holding demands that the rules of procedural due process be complied with strictly. I believe that the issues raised are substantial and were properly presented below. Probable jurisdiction should be noted, or at the very least we should take the case and hear it argued, postponing the question of jurisdiction to the merits.


text:
    BRENNER, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS v. HOFSTETTER.
    No. 46.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Sanders and Morton Hollander for petitioner.

      Paul N. Kokulis and Lawrence A. Hymo for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Upon consideration of the respondent’s suggestion of mootness the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with directions to dismiss the appeal to that court as moot.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    KELLY v. LANE, WARDEN.
    No. 256,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    TV PIX, INC., et al. v. ALLARD et al., COMMISSIONERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF NEVADA.
    No. 79.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      George M. McMillan and Paul A. Richards for appellants.

      Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General of Nevada, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court to give that court an opportunity to consider the appellants’ motion to file a supplemental complaint based upon changes in the relevant Nevada law.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    STRICKLAND v. MISSISSIPPI.
    No. 269,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas

text:
    PETRONIA et al. v. ALASKA.
    No. 108.
    Decided October 9, 1967.
    /. Duane Vance for appellants.

      Edgar Paul Boyko, Attorney General of Alaska, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas

is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    MORGAN et al., dba M & T GUM MACHINE CO. v. ALABAMA.
    No. 170.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Robert B. Stewart for appellants.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and Willard W. Livingston and William H. Burton, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    LATTIMER v. CRYSTAL CLEAR, INC., et al.
    No. 235.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Leonard P. Henderson for appellant.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    NEW JERSEY CHAPTER, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS, et al. v. NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL PLANNERS et al.
    No. 273.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Roberts B. Owen and John W. Douglas for appellants.

      Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Elias Abelson, Deputy Attorney General, for New Jersey State Board of Professional Planners, and Adrian M. Foley, Jr., for Goodkind et al., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    NELLES v. BARTLETT, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF MICHIGAN, et al.
    No. 327.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      S. James Clarkson for appellant.

      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Eugene Krasicky, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    WATSON, dba MAINE-WIDE ADJUSTERS v. STATE OF MAINE COMMISSIONER OF BANKING.
    No. 332.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Sanford Jay Rosen, Marvin Karpatkin, Melvin L. Wulf and Malcolm S. Stevenson for appellant.

      James S. Erwin, Attorney General of Maine, George C. West, Deputy Attorney General, and Jerome S. Matus, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    HAMRICK v. ALABAMA.
    No. 345.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      William B. McCollough, Jr., for appellant.

      MacDonald Oallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and Robert P. Bradley and Walter S. Turner, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    SMITH v. ARIZONA.
    No. 26,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, and Carl Waag, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Arizona in light of Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart dissent.


text:
    RHOADES et al. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON TOWNSHIP et al.
    No. 225.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Franklin C. Salisbury for appellants.

      William C. Bennett, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, John P. McCord, Deputy Attorney General, and Edward Friedman for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and William B. Ball for Paul et al., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas

is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    HOHENSEE et al. v. MINEAR.
    No. 190,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Jo V. Morgan, Jr., for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    COBB v. GEORGIA.
    No. 51,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Michael Melts-ner and Howard Moore, Jr., for petitioner.

      Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, and George D. Lawrence, Solicitor' General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545.


text:
    PHILLIPS v. INDIANA.
    No. 288,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      William C. Erbecker for appellant.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    TROUTT v. CARL K. WILSON CO. et al.
    No. 57,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.

      Thomas F. Turley, Jr., for appellant.

      W. L. Moore and W. D. Dodson for appellee Burson, Commissioner of Employment Security for the State of Tennessee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    GARVIN v. MASSACHUSETTS.
    No. 74,
    Misc.
    Decided October 9, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author: Per Curiam. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan

text:
    PRICE, DBA HOWARD PRICE & CO. v. STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA et al.
    No. 176.
    Decided October 9, 1967

      Carney M. Layne and Charles W. Yeager for appellants in both cases.

      C. Donald Robertson, Attorney General of West Virginia, and George H. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees in both cases.

      Together with No. 177, Wetherall et al. v. State Road Commission of West Virginia et al., also on appeal from the same court.

   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeals are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as petitions for writs of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan

are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    BITTER v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 201.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Ray T. McCann for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner was tried on 18 counts of violating the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341, and one count of using an assumed name, a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1342. On the third day of trial, the Government rested its case. This was earlier than it had announced or than petitioner had anticipated. At recess time petitioner sought leave of the court to go to his office in order to gather additional evidence for the defense. Permission for this was granted. Forty-five minutes were allotted for the recess.

Petitioner, who had previously appeared promptly at every session of the trial, was this time tardy by 37 minutes in returning to court. Without warning, hearing, or explanation, the trial judge ordered petitioner into custody for the balance of the trial. Attempts by petitioner's counsel to offer explanations for petitioner’s lateness were to no avail.

Defense counsel was then advised that petitioner would be kept in custody in a county jail located some 18 miles from the court. In fact, petitioner was taken about 40 miles distant, to a different jail. Counsel’s endeavors throughout the trial to obtain petitioner’s release proved fruitless. Petitioner remained in custody for the duration of the trial. He was convicted on seven counts of mail fraud and given a sentence of one year and one day on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He was also fined a total of $3,500.

Petitioner contended that his incarceration was unjustified and that it materially interfered with his right to counsel and severely impeded his defense. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. 374 F. 2d 744 (1967). We grant certiorari and reverse.

A trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial. For this purpose, he has the power to revoke bail and to remit the defendant to custody. But this power must be exercised with circumspection. It may be invoked only when and to the extent justified by danger which the defendant’s conduct presents or by danger of significant interference with the progress or order of the trial. See Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961) (memorandum of Mr. Justice Harlan in chambers); Carbo v. United States, 288 F. 2d 282 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961); Christoffel v. United States, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 341, 196 F. 2d 560 (1951).

The record in this case shows only a single, brief incident of tardiness, resulting in commitment of the defendant to custody for the balance of the trial in a jail 40 miles distant from the courtroom. In these circumstances, the trial judge’s order of commitment, made without hearing or statement of reasons, had the appearance and effect of punishment rather than of an order designed solely to facilitate the trial. Punishment may not be so inflicted. Cf. Rule 42 of Fed. Rules Grim. Proc. (governing the contempt power). We therefore hold that the order was unjustified and that it constituted an unwarranted burden upon defendant and his counsel in the conduct of the case.

Accordingly, we grant certiorari and reverse the judgment.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      It does not appear whether defendant was at large on bail at the time of the order remitting him to custody. But the same principle would apply if he had been at liberty on his own recognizance. Cf. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (1964 ed., Supp. II).


text:
    ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 330.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Thomas F. Call for petitioner.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for certiorari is granted. Petitioner’s conviction is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In proceedings before the Court of Appeals pursuant to our previous remand, Levine v. United States, 383 U. S. 266, the Court of Appeals granted petitioner’s co-defendant Levine a new trial based upon a disclosure by the Government that, after the return of the indictment, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation monitored conversations between Levine and Levine’s attorney. But the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for the same relief or, alternatively, for a remand to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was prejudiced by the monitoring; the Court of Appeals stated, however, that the motion was denied “without prejudice to such application by him to the District Court as may be appropriate.” In the circumstances of this case, and in light of the acknowledgment of the Solicitor General in his brief in opposition that “the F. B. I. logs pertaining to the monitored conversations” are available, we think the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s alternative motion for an evidentiary hearing in the District Court. We therefore vacate petitioner’s conviction and remand to the District Court with direction to afford petitioner such an evidentiary hearing. Depending upon its findings, the District Court will either reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be appropriate. See United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 242.

Vacated and remanded.

Mr. Justice Black dissents.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    WOOD v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 27,
    Misc.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner was found guilty by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia of refusing to report for civilian employment, in violation of § 12 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462. Before trial he filed an affidavit with the court requesting assigned counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A. The court considered the affidavit, questioned petitioner and disapproved the request. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis, assigned counsel to assist petitioner in his appeal and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari.

Before this Court the Solicitor General has conceded that the record does not convincingly show that there was adequate inquiry into the question of petitioner’s financial ability to retain counsel, in that “the trial court should have explored the possibility that petitioner could afford only partial payment for the services of trial counsel and that counsel be appointed on that basis, as the Criminal Justice Act permits (see 18 U. S. C. § 3006(A) (c) and (f)).” The Solicitor General urges, however, that there is no basis for believing that petitioner suffered prejudice from the District Court’s error, an argument we find unpersuasive.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Solicitor General’s Memorandum and the relevant criteria of the Criminal Justice Act.

Mr. Justice Black dissents.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    COLEMAN v. ALABAMA.
    No. 162,
    Misc.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Jack Greenberg, Michael Meltsner and Orzell Billings-ley for petitioner.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and Leslie Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.

On our previous remand, we held that petitioner was entitled to “his day in court on his allegations of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand and petit juries sitting in his case.” 377 U. S. 129, 133. Petitioner was thereupon afforded an evidentiary hearing on his allegations. Although the evidence was in dispute regarding the inclusion of Negroes in the grand and petit jury venires in the county in which petitioner was indicted and tried, it appeared that no Negro served on the grand jury which indicted or the petit jury which convicted petitioner. It further appeared that up to the time of petitioner’s trial, no Negro had ever served on a grand jury panel and few, if any, Negroes had served on petit jury panels. This “testimony in itself made out a prima facie case of the denial of the equal protection which the Constitution guarantees.” Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 591. In the absence of evidence adduced by the State adequate to rebut the prima facie case, petitioner was therefore entitled to have his conviction reversed. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 87-88; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 481; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406; Norris v. Alabama, supra.

On our independent examination of the record, we are unable to discover any evidence adduced by the State adequate to rebut petitioner’s prima facie case. The Alabama Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s denial of relief, acknowledged that the evidence indicated “a disparity” and stated only that “that disparity can be explained by a number of other factors.” 280 Ala. 509, 512, 195 So. 2d 800, 802. The only factors mentioned, however, were that Negroes had moved away from the county and that some may have been under the statutory disqualification of having suffered a felony conviction. In the circumstances of this case these factors were not in our view sufficient to rebut petitioner’s prima facie case.

The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


text:
    JONES v. GEORGIA.
    No. 174,
    Misc.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., for petitioner.

      Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Marion 0. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.

Petitioner appealed his conviction for murder to the Georgia Supreme Court where he sought reversal on the ground, among others, that the evidence relevant to his claim of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand and petit juries drawn in the county established a prima facie case of the denial of equal protection within our decision in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction stating that Whitus was distinguishable because “public officers are presumed to have discharged their sworn official duties. . . . Under the testimony in this case we can not assume that the jury commissioners did not eliminate prospective jurors on the basis of their competency to serve, rather than because of racial discrimination.” 223 Ga. 157, 162, 154 S. E. 2d 228, 232.

We hold that the burden upon the State to explain “the disparity between the percentage of Negroes on the tax digest and those on the venires,” Whitus, supra, at 552, was not met by the Georgia Supreme Court’s reliance on the stated presumptions. See Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion.

It is so ordered.

      The record supports the following comparison of the salient facts in Whitus and in petitioner’s case:
      Over 21 population Whitus 42.6% Negro men Petitioner’s case 30.7% Negro
      Jury Commissioners White (apparently) White
      Source of juror names Tax Digests separated and identified as to race 3 Tax Digests, two of which separated and identified as to race
      Taxpayers 27.1% Negro 19.7% Negro
      Negro jurors 9.1% grand jury venire 7.8% petit jury venire 5.0% of jury list and box (1 Negro was on the grand jury which in-dieted petitioner)
      Rebuttal evidence by State None None


text:
    SKOLNICK v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY et al.
    No. 91,
    Misc.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard A. Michael, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded in order that the District Court may enter a fresh decree from which appellant may, if he wishes, perfect a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97.


text:
    RAYMOND v. TOFFANY, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES OF NEW YORK.
    No. 572,
    Misc.
    Decided October 16, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    UNITED STATES v. MERCANTILE TRUST CO. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al.
    No. 87.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Solicitor General Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Turner for the United States.

      James M. Douglas and William G. Guerri for appellee Mercantile Trust Co. National Association.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court in United States v. First City National Bank of Houston, 386 U. S. 361.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Black,

text:
    ASSOCIATED PRESS v. WALKER.
    No. 306.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      William, P. Rogers, Leo P. Larkin, Jr., Stanley Go-dofsky, Arthur Moynihan, Earl T. Thomas, John T. Guyton and Billy R. Pesnell for petitioner.

      W. Scott Wilkinson and Clyde J. Watts for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is reversed and the cáse is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130.

Mr. Justice Black,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,

concurs in the result for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Black's separate opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 170.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan

text:
    LORDI, DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF NEW JERSEY v. EPSTEIN et al., trading as STRATFORD INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO CO.
    No. 322.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Joseph A. Hofjman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

      Charles H. Tuttle for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan

would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White

text:
    LESTER C. NEWTON TRUCKING CO. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 328.
    Decided October 16, 1967.

      H. Charles Ephraim for appellant.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane and John E. Faulk for the United States et al.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White

would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Fortas,

text:
    PINTO, PRISON FARM SUPERINTENDENT v. PIERCE.
    No. 284.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Thomas P. Ford, Jr., for petitioner.
   Per Curiam.

Respondent was indicted by the grand jury of Essex County, New Jersey, on July 2, 1959, for the crime of robbery while armed. Following a plea of not guilty, he was tried before a jury, convicted and sentenced to a term of from 16 to 23 years in the New Jersey State Prison. On June 6, 1966, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Judge determined from the transcript of respondent’s trial that the trial court had heard in the presence of the jury testimony regarding the voluntariness of an incriminating statement sought to be introduced by the' prosecution, held that under prior decisions of this Court this procedure violated respondent’s constitutional rights and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and petitioner, the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Prison Farm, seeks a writ of certiorari.

The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. This Court has never ruled that all volun-tariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), held that a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing. A confession by the defendant found to be involuntary by the trial judge is not to be heard by the jury which determines his guilt or innocence. Hence, because a disputed confession may be found involuntary and inadmissible by the judge, it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside the presence of the jury. In this case, however, the confession was held voluntary and admitted as evidence suitable for consideration by the jury. In addition, there is no claim that because the hearing was held in the presence of the jury it was inadequate or had any other unfair consequences for the respondent.

Finally, it is clear that the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury. At his trial the court asked defense counsel whether there was any objection to the testimony being taken in the presence of the jury. Defense counsel replied, “None whatsoever.” The court continued, “As you know, it can be taken in their presence or outside of their presence, and that is a matter of discretion with the Court but I am inquiring of you if you have any objections. If you did I would hear you but I assume you have none.” Again counsel replied, “I have none.” The evidence regarding voluntariness, which included testimony by respondent, was then taken, after which the court ruled that the statement was voluntary.

Since trial counsel consented to the evidence on vol-untariness being taken in the presence of the jury, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus.

Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice Fortas,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result because of trial counsel’s consent to the taking of evidence on voluntariness in the presence of the jury. Otherwise, I disagree. The rule of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), should be more than ritual. It was not intended to assure a determination by the judge at the cost of diluting the jury’s role in the determination of voluntariness and the weight to be given to admissions. “Just as questions of admissibility of evidence are traditionally for the court, questions of credibility, whether of a witness or a confession, are for the jury.” Id., at 386, n. 13. See also id., at 378, n. 8, and cf. id., at 404 (separate opinion of Black,- J.).

Jackson v. Denno means that the judge and the jury must each make an independent judgment of volun-tariness of an admission, the judge for purposes of admissibility and the jury for evidentiary acceptability, credibility, and weight. A telescoped hearing before judge and jury, in which the judge finds voluntariness for purposes of admissibility, in reality reduces the jury function to an echo. Hearing the evidence simultaneously with the judge, the jury is not apt to approach disagreement with him. I believe that the procedure here sanctioned, by reducing the effectiveness of the jury, gravely impairs the constitutional principle of excluding involuntary confessions which Jackson v. Denno sought to serve.

The jury is the traditional and preferred arbiter of facts. The procedure countenanced here, by dicta, sanctions, in effect, a direction to the jury to accept and give full credence to the admission — because the judge, hearing the same testimony, has ruled that the admission is voluntary.

      The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently announced that from September 11, 1967, hearings on admissibility shall be outside the presence of the jury if the defendant so requests. See State v. Broxton, 49 N. J. 373, 386, n. 2, 230 A. 2d 489, 496, n. 2 (1967).

       In United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36 (1951), relied upon by the trial court, reversal of a conviction was affirmed because the trial judge, after hearing some evidence concerning voluntariness with the jury present, refused to permit the defendant to testify on the subject.
      The other cases cited by the District Court granted writs of habeas corpus in cases in which trial judges had made no independent determination of voluntariness. See, for the citations to those eases, United States ex rel. Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D. C N. J. 1966).


author:
Per Curiam. Me. Justice Black
      Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    BEECHER v. ALABAMA.
    No. 92,
    Misc.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III and Michael Meltsner for petitioner.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and Leslie Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

On the morning of June 15, 1964, the petitioner, a Negro convict in a state prison, escaped from a road gang in Camp Scottsboro, Alabama. On June 16, a woman’s lifeless body was found not more than a mile from the prison camp. The next day, the petitioner was captured in Tennessee; he was then returned to Jackson County, Alabama, where he was indicted, tried, and convicted on a charge of first degree murder. The jury fixed his punishment at death. After the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed his conviction, he filed this petition for certiorari, contending that a coerced confession was used as evidence at his trial, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The uncontradicted facts of record are these. Tennessee police officers saw the petitioner as he fled into an open field and fired a bullet into his right leg. He fell, and the local Chief of Police pressed a loaded gun to his face while another officer pointed a rifle against the side of his head. The Police Chief asked him whether he had raped and killed a white woman. When he said that he had not, the Chief called him a liar and said, “If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you.” The other officer thep fired his rifle next to the petitioner’s ear, and the petitioner immediately confessed. Later the same day he received an injection to ease the pain in his leg. He signed something the Chief of Police described as “extradition papers” after the officers told him that “it would be best ... to sign the papers before the gang of people came there and killed” him. He was then taken by ambulance from Tennessee to Kilby Prison in Montgomery, Alabama. By June 22, the petitioner’s right leg, which was later amputated, had become so swollen and his wound so painful that he required an injection of morphine every four hours. Less than an hour after one of these injections, two Alabama investigators visited him in the prison hospital. The medical assistant in charge told the petitioner to “cooperate” and, in the petitioner’s presence, he asked the investigators to inform him if the petitioner did not “tell them what they wanted to know.” The medical assistant then left the petitioner alone with the State’s investigators. In the course of a 90-minute “conversation,” the investigators prepared two detailed statements similar to the confession the petitioner had given five days earlier at gunpoint in Tennessee. Still in a “kind of slumber” from his last morphine injection, feverish, and in intense pain, the petitioner signed the written confessions thus prepared for him.

These confessions were admitted in evidence over the petitioner’s objection. Although there is some dispute as to precisely what occurred in the petitioner’s room at the prison hospital, we need not resolve this evidentiary conflict, for even if we accept as accurate the State’s version of what transpired there, the uncontradicted facts set forth above lead to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner’s confessions were involuntary. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741-742.

The petitioner, already wounded by the police, was ordered at gunpoint to speak his guilt or be killed. From that time until he was directed five days later to tell Alabama investigators “what they wanted to know,” there was “no break in the stream of events,” Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707, 710. For he was then still in pain, under the influence of drugs, and at the complete mercy of the prison hospital authorities. Compare Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433.

The State says that the facts in this case differ in some respects from those in previous cases where we have held confessions to be involuntary. But constitutional inquiry into the issue of voluntariness “requires more than a mere color-matching of cases,” Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 442. A realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case compels the conclusion that this petitioner’s confessions were the product of gross coercion. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no conviction tainted by a confession so obtained can stand.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted and the judgment is reversed.

Me. Justice Black

concurs in the judgment of the Court reversing the conviction in this case but does so exclusively on the ground that the confession of the petitioner was taken from him in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which Amendment was made applicable to the States by .the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).

Mr. Justice Brennan,

whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas join.

I concur in the judgment of reversal. This confession was taken after our decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. Under the test of admissibility stated in Malloy, the facts plainly compel the Court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s confession was inadmissible because involuntary. We said in Malloy, at 7:

“. . . the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions since 1897, when, in Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, the Court held that ‘[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” ’ Id., at 542. Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was ‘free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. . . .’ Id., at 542-543; see also Hardy v. United States, 186 U. S. 224, 229; Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14; Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147, 150.”

       The petitioner also makes other Fourteenth Amendment claims. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not reach them.

       Although this confession was not introduced at trial, its existence is of course vitally relevant to the voluntariness of petitioner’s later statements. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U. S. 532, 540-541.

       Because part of the evidence bearing on the voluntariness of the confessions was introduced in a hearing on the petitioner’s motion for new trial, the State suggests that “[h]is complaint that the confession was improperly admitted now comes too late." That suggestion is clearly untenable. The petitioner objected when the confessions were first introduced; having overruled the objection, the trial court rejected the State’s claim that the issue could not be reviewed on a new trial motion; and the Supreme Court of Alabama found no state procedural bar to reaching the merits of the voluntariness claim and deciding it on the complete record. There can thus be no doubt here that the issue was raised "in [an] appropriate manner,” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286-287. In any event, since the state court deemed the federal constitutional question to be before it, we could not treat the decision below as resting upon an adequate and independent state ground even if we were to conclude that the state court might properly have relied upon such a ground to avoid deciding the federal question. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 98.

       The investigators claimed at trial that they had told the petitioner, during their 90-minute talk with him, that he was under no obligation to speak and that anything he said could be used against him. One of the investigators stated that he had asked the petitioner whether he wanted an attorney, and had received a negative reply. Although the prepared statements that the petitioner signed refer to no such warnings, and although the conversation in question took place on the date of this Court’s decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, the state courts accepted the investigators’ accounts of that conversation and rejected the petitioner’s contrary testimony as “not at all persuasive.”


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    ROBERTS v. LaVALLEE, WARDEN.
    No. 193,
    Misc.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Warren H. Greene, Jr., for petitioner.

      Leon B. Polsky for the Legal Aid Society of New York, as amiaus curiae, in support of the petition.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner is an indigent. He was charged with robbery, larceny, and assault in New York. When his case was called for trial, petitioner asked that the court furnish him, at state expense, with the minutes of a prior preliminary hearing, at which the major state witnesses had testified. A New York statute provided that a transcript of the hearing would be furnished “on payment of . . . fees at the rate of five cents for every hundred words.” N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 206. The trial court denied the request for a free transcript.

Petitioner was convicted of the crimes charged and sentenced to a term of 15-20 years in prison. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. We denied a petition for certiorari. The issue under the Federal Constitution of the denial of the preliminary hearing transcript was raised by petitioner at each stage of these proceedings.

Petitioner next applied for habeas corpus in the Northern District of New York. His petition was denied, the court believing that petitioner had no federal constitutional right to a free transcript of his preliminary hearing. Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Montgomery, 18 N. Y. 2d 993, 224 N. E. 2d 730 (1966). That case holds that the statutory requirement of payment for a preliminary hearing transcript, as applied to an indigent, is a denial of equal protection and unconstitutional, under both the Federal and State Constitutions.

On petitioner’s appeal from the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that petitioner should apply to the state courts for relief under the doctrine of Montgomery. The court acknowledged that petitioner had already exhausted his state remedies. But it thought the “constitutional necessity for federal court intervention” was “open to doubt” and that “the question ought to be decided in favor of permitting a state court determination in the first instance.” Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to renewal of the questions presented by petitioner after further proceedings in the courts of New York.

Petitioner sought certiorari. We grant the writ, and we vacate the judgment below.

Our decisions for more than a decade now have made clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution. See, e. g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956). Only last Term, in Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966), we reiterated the statement first made in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708, 709 (1961), that “to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.” We have no doubt that the New York statute struck down by the New York Court of Appeals in Montgomery, as applied to deny a free transcript to an indigent, could not meet the test of our prior decisions.

Nor do we believe there can be any doubt that petitioner adequately made known his desire to obtain the minutes of his preliminary hearing. We agree with Judge Medina, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that the demand was “clear and unequivocal.”

In Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), we considered the statutory requirement, under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, that a petitioner exhaust his state remedies before applying for federal habeas corpus relief. We concluded that Congress had not intended “to require repetitious applications to state courts.” 344 U. S., at 449, n. 3. We declined to rule that the mere possibility of a successful application to the state courts was sufficient to bar federal relief. Such a rule would severely limit the scope of the federal habeas corpus statute.

The observations made in the Brown case apply here. Petitioner has already thoroughly exhausted his state remedies, as the Court of Appeals recognized. Still more state litigation would be both unnecessarily time-consuming and otherwise burdensome. This is not a case in which there is any substantial state interest in ruling once again on petitioner’s case. We can conceive of no reason why the State would wish to burden its judicial calendar with a narrow issue the resolution of which is predetermined by established federal principles.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

As the Court states, petitioner was told that if he wished a transcript of his preliminary hearing he would have to pay for it. The Court fails to add, however, that petitioner and his counsel were both present at the preliminary hearing, that they were furnished a free transcript of the grand jury testimony of the state witness in question but made no use of this transcript at trial, and that at no time has petitioner suggested any use to which the preliminary hearing transcript could have been put, although he is in a position to know what it contains.

The decisions cited in the majority opinion fall far short of declaring that any document related to the criminal process, no matter how demonstrably trivial its significance, must be supplied free to indigents simply because the State is willing to make it available to others able to pay for it. Rather than formulate such an undiscriminating rule, a rule that predictably may lead to a narrowing of the availability of documents that a State is not constitutionally required to furnish to any criminal defendant, I would at least undertake to examine the importance of the particular document in question.

This examination is not necessary in the present case, however, for, as the Court’s opinion recognizes, there exists an adequate basis under state law for affording petitioner the relief that he seeks here. Believing, as did the Court of Appeals, that federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the administration of justice in state courts, particularly when this involves reaching federal constitutional questions unnecessarily, see Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, I would affirm the decision below.

In addition, in the circumstances depicted by this record, I consider the Court’s disposition of this case improvident even under the postulates of its opinion. I understand the Court to require the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and hence the setting aside of the state conviction, without any further investigation of whether the constitutional error now found to have been committed by the state courts actually prejudiced this defendant. Since there appears every likelihood that further examination would reveal that the denial of a preliminary hearing transcript to this petitioner was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, at 24, the case should have been sent back to the Court of Appeals with instruction to remand to the District Court for a hearing to determine the possibility of prejudice. Cf. Roberts v. United States, ante, p. 18. Due respect for state criminal processes requires at least this much.


text:
    BEATTY v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 338.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Robert S. Vance for petitioner.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent.


text:
    SAYLES v. WIEGAND, PRESIDENT, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF METROPOLIS BUILDING ASSOCIATION, et al.
    No. 491.
    Decided October 23, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Stewart

text:
    MERCER et al. v. HEMMINGS et al.
    No. 406.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Bruce Bromley, John H. Pickering, John R. Hupper, Hervey Yancey and Victor M. Earle III for appellants.

      Chester Bedell for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stewart

is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case assigned for oral argument.


text:
    BENNETT v. MISSISSIPPI.
    No. 460.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Hardy Lott and R. Cunliffe McBee for appellant.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan

text:
    POTOMAC NEWS CO. v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 164.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Stanley M. Dietz for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

Mr. Justice Harlan

concurs in the judgment of reversal upon the premises stated in his separate opinion in. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, 457.

The Chief Justice dissents.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    CONNER v. CITY OF HAMMOND.
    No. 259.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Leonard B. Levy and Stanley Fleishman for petitioner.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Twenty-first Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

Mr. Justice Harlan

would affirm the judgment of the state court upon the premises stated in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    UNITED STATES v. ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA et al.
    No. 271.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert A. Hammond III and Howard E. Shapiro for the United States.

      Herbert A. Bergson, Howard Adler, Jr., Donald L. Hardison and William K. Unverzagt for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

Upon consideration of the joint suggestion of mootness and motion to vacate, the judgment of the District Court of January 20, 1967, is vacated as moot and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    CENTRAL MAGAZINE SALES, LTD. v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 368.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Richard Lipsitz for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

Mr. Justice Harlan

concurs in the judgment of reversal upon the premises stated in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, 457.

The Chief Justice believes this case is controlled by Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, and the judgment should be affirmed in accordance with the principles enunciated in the opinion of the Court in that case.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Per Curiam. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Fortas

text:
    GARBER v. KANSAS.
    No. 393.
    Decided October 23, 1967.

      Marvin M. Karpatkin, E. Dexter Galloway and Melvin L. Wulf for appellant.

      Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General of Kansas, and J. Richard Foth, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

      Leo Pfejjer for the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, as amicus curiae, in support of appellant.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Fortas

are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.