text:
    No. 71-5255.
    Barker v. Wingo, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1037.] Motion of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of M. Curran Clem to permit Robert W. Willmott, Jr., for leave to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of respondent granted.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-5833.
    Alexander v. Minnesota.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5819.
    No. 71-5847.
    Boyd v. Gaffney, Warden; and Hitchcock v. Eyman, Warden, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-949.
    Garrison et al. v. Brown, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-1013.
    No. 71-5816.
    No. 71-5893.
    No. 71-5897.
    Teitelbaum v. Stone, Secretary of State of Florida; Paige v. Chambers, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals; DeBorde v. Hamilton, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Washington, et al.; and Putnam v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-968.
    Medansky v. Will, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5837.
    Featheringham v. Ashland County Court of Common Pleas et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 71-718.
    McGinnis, Commissioner of Correction et al. v. Royster et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-862.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, Director of Department of Revenue, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-366.
    Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing granted. Order of this Court denying petition for writ of certiorari on November 9, 1971 [404 U. S. 941], vacated. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-692.
    Illinois v. Somerville.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-711.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-829.
    Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-964.
    Pennsylvania v. Ware.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-5908.
    Chambers v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-641.
    Escobar v. California.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of Orange. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-662.
    Rohm et al. v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-734.
    No. 71-5946.
    Rivera v. United States; and Caraballo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-776.
    Harville Rose Service v. Kellogg Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-852.
    C. D. Construction Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-853.
    Greenberg v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-854.
    Deutsch Co., Metal Components Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-867.
    Simich et al. v. Milisavljevic et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-869.
    Deutsch Co., Electronic Components Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-876.
    Nemetz v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-886.
    No. 71-890.
    Strachan Shipping Co. et al. v. City of Galveston; and Rorie v. City of Galveston.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-892.
    Zambrano v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-893.
    Lane v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-896.
    Lozoff v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-897.
    New York District Council No. 9, International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-899.
    Garcia-Guillern v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-902.
    Municipal Light Board of Reading, Massachusetts, et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-905.
    Morse et ux. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-906.
    Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-908.
    Strauss v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-915.
    No. 71-973.
    United States et al. v. Parker et al.; and Kaibab Industries et al. v. Parker et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 448 F. 2d 793.


text:
    No. 71-916.
    Kaufman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-926.
    Stuhl v. 527 Madison Avenue Co.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-933.
    Ohrynowicz v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-945.
    Lemelson v. Topper Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-934.
    Dubelko v. Dubelko.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-948.
    Gipe, Guardian v. Dempsey et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-955.
    Crim, aka Miller v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-958.
    Aktiebolaget Flymo et al. v. Cody et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-961.
    Roberts et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-967.
    Wahl et al. v. Carrier Manufacturing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-985.
    Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., et al. v. Hauk, U. S. District Judge (Boeing Co. et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-987.
    Moody v. Moody.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-989.
    Brown v. Michigan Department of Military Affairs.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1053.
    Jamieson v. American National Safe Deposit Co. et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5442.
    Hays v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5535.
    Mitchell v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5540.
    Reed v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5544.
    Allen v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5545.
    Collins v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5570.
    DiMaggio v. Prudential Savings & Loan Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5583.
    Smith v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5605.
    Cosco v. Meacham, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5815.
    Dunnings v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5817.
    Burns v. Columbia Pictures International Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5822.
    Baskin v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5823.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5824.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5825.
    Joyner v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5826.
    Johnson v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5827.
    No. 71-5996.
    No. 71-6050.
    Bryant v. United States; Feggett v. United States; and Burkhalter v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 F. 2d 394.


text:
    No. 71-5831.
    LeMon v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5832.
    Woodford v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5834.
    Fackelman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5835.
    Freeman v. New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5836.
    No. 71-5988.
    Castaldi v. United States; and McBride et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 453 F. 2d 506.


text:
    No. 71-5838.
    Hinton v. Rodriguez, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5839.
    Freedman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5841.
    McDaniel v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5842.
    Boyd v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5843.
    Lockett v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5844.
    Green v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5846.
    Brunges v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5848.
    Lott v. Oklahoma.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5849.
    Gibbs v. Yeager, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5850.
    Graham v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al. (Aerojet-General Corp. et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5853.
    Timmons v. Pennsylvania et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5856.
    Cacavas v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5857.
    Christian v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5859.
    Wyatt v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5862.
    Huber et al. v. State Board of Bar Examiners of Georgia et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5863.
    Goodman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5864.
    Watson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5865.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5867.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5868.
    Halprin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5869.
    Daniel v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5870.
    MacCollom v. Rollins et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5871.
    Wing v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5873.
    Love et al. v. Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5878.
    Kent v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5879.
    Luckett v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5880.
    Ferenc v. Johnson, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5882.
    Bronson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5883.
    Bible v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5885.
    Iannarelli v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5889.
    Denman et al. v. Scannell et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5884.
    Boulware v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5891.
    Lindsey v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5892.
    Lederman v. New York City Transit Authority et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5894.
    Bartlett, Guardian v. Hollopeter.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5895.
    Kelley v. Sprinkle.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5898.
    Oaks v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5900.
    Novick v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5901.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5902.
    Oliver v. Duggan, District Attorney of Allegheny County, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5903.
    Foreman v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5904.
    Wells v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5907.
    No. 71-5952.
    Hoyt v. United States; and Bowman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 F. 2d 570.


text:
    No. 71-5909.
    Swanson v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-415.
    Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-563.
    Rohrbaugh et al. v. Presbytery of Seattle, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion of Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, a Georgia Nonprofit Corp., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-609.
    No. 71-924.
    No. 71-925.
    Terminal Freight Handling Co. et al. v. Solien, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board; Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al. v. Solien, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board; and Terminal Freight Cooperative Assn. et al. v. Solien, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of Sears, Roebuck & Co. for leave to intervene in Nos. 71-609 and 71-925 denied. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and petitions. Reported below: No. 71-609, 444 F. 2d 699; No. 71-924, 450 F. 2d 353.


text:
    No. 71-874.
    Feltman v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-868.
    Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Association of Southern California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5519.
    Hinnington v. Department of Corrections of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5528.
    Brown v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5609.
    Goodart v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5624.
    Alcala v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5818.
    Marciano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5820.
    Daughdrill, Administratrix v. Diamond M. Drilling Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5829.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5821.
    Malatesta v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5877.
    Smart v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5905.
    Cruz v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-871.
    No. 71-5890.
    Pordum v. United States; and Ludera v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 451 F. 2d 1015.


text:
    No. 71-907.
    United States v. Thompson.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-960,
    Mullins v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-965.
    Lovisi et vir v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of respondent for leave to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5874.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to file supplemental petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5828.
    Crow v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5888.
    Baxter v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion for leave to amend petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1588,
    October Term, 1970.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al. v. Solien, Regional Director, Natural Labor Relations Board, et al.,
   403 U. S. 905, 404 U. S. 960. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-612.
    Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm’n et al.,
   404 U. S. 1039. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-5171.
    Cunningham v. Wingo, Warden,
   404 U. S. 1064, and ante, p. 948. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-5534.
    Oliver v. Harrison County Clerk et al.,
   404 U. S. 1061. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 24, 1972
    No. A-980.
    Opatz v. City of St. Cloud et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Application for temporary injunction pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    March 27, 1972
    No. 71-891.
    Capital Broadcasting Co. et al. v. Acting Attorney General et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion of John F. Banzhaf III et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae and to dispense with printing granted. Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion or appeal.


text:
    No. 71-919.
    National Association of Broadcasters et al. v. Acting Attorney General et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 71-1030.
    Kiernan et al. v. Lindsay, Mayor of New York, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


author: Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-600.
    State Board of Election Commissioners et al. v. Evers et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss, dismissed for failure to docket case within time-prescribed by Rule 13 (1).

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,

concurring.

I join the Court’s dismissal of this appeal for failure to docket within the prescribed time. I do so despite the fact that the Court apparently has not consistently enforced the provisions of its Rule 13 (1) and, on occasion, has permitted appeals despite untimely docketing. See, for example, another Mississippi voting rights case, Whitley v. Williams, one of the cases decided with Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). Compare Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, 598n (1968), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 84-86 (1947), with Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 385 U. S. 32 (1966); Landry v. Boyle, 393 U. S. 220 (1968); Shapiro v. Doe, 396 U. S. 488 (1970); Stein v. Luken, 396 U. S. 555 (1970); and United States v. Cotton, 397 U. S. 45 (1970).

Because I do not wish this disposition of the case to provide a basis for any inference that I, as one member of this Court, am in agreement with the reasoning set forth in the per curiam opinion of the three-judge District Court, 327 F. Supp. 640 (SD Miss. 1971), I append this comment.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 84 Stat. 315, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, first provides that a State, upon proposing an alteration of voting qualifications and procedures of the kind specified, may institute an action for an approving declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It then goes on as follows:

“Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General’s failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subse-sequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. . . .”

In the present case, the changes in Mississippi’s election laws effected by the legislature in 1970 were submitted to the Attorney General of the United States on July 23, 1970. In September the Mississippi Attorney General received a letter from the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice reading in part as follows:

“The problem posed by these enactments is extremely complex. . . .
• • [W]e have been unable to reach the conclusion that the projected effect would be to deprive Negro voters of rights under the Voting Rights Act.
“Under these circumstances, the Attorney General is not prepared at this time — 60 days after receipt of these statutes — to make any determination of the validity or invalidity of Acts 362 and 363 under the Voting Rights Act. . . . Should our subsequent investigation persuade us that the acts in fact violate the 15th Amendment, the Voting Rights Act or other applicable federal legislation, we will take appropriate legal steps to raise the issues in court, or, if litigation is initiated by others to participate therein in an appropriate manner.
“I want to make clear that no inference of approval or disapproval is to be drawn from the failure of the Attorney General to object within the statutory period. The fact is that we have been unable to reach a decision within the alloted time on the basis of available evidence. ...”

The three-judge District Court granted its injunctive relief on the ground that the pre-clearance requirements of § 5 had not been satisfied. It did not reach the substantive allegations of racial discrimination set forth in the appellees’ complaint. Specifically, the District Court said, “Since Mississippi’s new laws have not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny, they are still in a state of suspended animation.” The court held that until the statutorily suggested favorable declaratory judgment was obtained in the District of Columbia, or the Mississippi laws were resubmitted to the Attorney General and he had specifically approved, “the acts involved in this case may not be given any effect.” 327 F. Supp., at 644.

I am unable so to read § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and I cannot subscribe to the District Court’s reasoning. Section 5, it seems to me, plainly and clearly provides that if the proposal has been properly submitted to the Attorney General, as it was, “and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission,” as he did not, the proposed statutory changes “may be enforced” without the court’s proceeding in the District of Columbia and without resubmission to the Attorney General. Here the proposal was properly submitted to the Attorney General and he took no action by way of interposing an objection within the allowed 60 days. I do not see how the statute can be read or construed in any way other than to the effect that the conditions of its proviso were fulfilled and that the proposed new legislation was therefore enforceable, subject, of course, to the statute’s recognized exception as to any contest on the merits. I see nothing in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 385 (1971), that supports a contrary conclusion. In my view the District Court’s holding, when it equated nonaction by the Attorney General with the interposition by him of an objection, is without foundation in the statute.

With the promulgation on September 10,1971, of “Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Eights Act of 1965,” 36 Fed. Eeg. 18186-18190, 28 CFE §§ 51.1-51.29, and the specific procedure authorized for the Attorney General by § 51.19, the problem should not arise in the future.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I would not dismiss this appeal for nonjurisdictional tardiness in docketing. There is no doubt that we have statutory jurisdiction to hear this case under 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. And, no doubt we may waive our self-imposed Rule 13 (1) inasmuch as “the requirement of docketing within sixty days [is not a] limitation on our power to hear [an] appeal.” United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 86. But, as Mr. Justice Blackmun observes, ante, at 1001, this Court has failed to develop even the shadow of a consistent practice concerning the effect to be given an appellant’s failure to docket within the prescribed time. In some cases the defect has been fatal while in others it has been forgiven. This appeal was docketed 66 days late. Yet in Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, 598, we entertained without explanation an appeal which was 56 days tardy. And, Mississippi’s own experience with the vagaries of our dispensation of waivers has not been an illuminating one. In Whitley v. Williams, decided with Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, another challenge to that State’s voting laws, the State was the appellee and the challenger’s appeal was docketed 60 days out of time. Nonetheless, the infraction was passed over, the case was heard, and the District Court was reversed.

1 cannot acquiesce in an arbitrary practice which permits the Court to sweep unpleasant cases under the rug. Unless we are willing to prescribe criteria for guiding our granting of waivers of the docketing requirement, such as we have done in Rule 19 for exercising our certiorari discretion, then we should either enforce Rule 13 (1) for all or for none.

        Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 385 U. S. 32; Landry v. Boyle, 393 U. S. 220; Shapiro v. Doe, 396 U. S. 488; Stein v. Luken, 396 U. S. 555; United States v. Cotton, 397 U. S. 45; Cheley v. Parham, 404 U. S. 878.

        United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 86; Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, 598; Whitley v. Williams, decided with Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544; see also Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481 (Rule 22 (2) waiver).

       This is not a frivolous appeal. Whatever the infirmities of the Mississippi voting statute, there is a strong argument, as Mr. Justice BlackmuN indicates, that the District Court may have erred in using § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, to enjoin its effectiveness.


text:
    No. 71-1003.
    Horse Creek Royalty Corp. et al. v. Southland Royalty Co. et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5915.
    Strickland et al. v. Board of Education, San Francisco Unified School District, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5948.
    Presler v. State Division of Human Rights et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 70-251.
    Joseph v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 820.] After this Court granted the writ of certiorari in this case, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum for the United States on the merits, took a position different from that previously-asserted by the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and in his opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case for consideration in light of the position now asserted by the Solicitor General.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs,

dissenting.

While I think the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded, I would not do so on the Solicitor General's confession of error, but rather for the reason that meaningful administrative and judicial review of Selective Service classification decisions is impossible where the Service does not state reasons for its actions.

Joseph, then classified I-A, applied for a conscientious objector exemption in April 1967. He stated in his conscientious objector form (SSS Form 150) that he believed in a Supreme Being, that he was a member of the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims), and that he had joined Muhammed's Mosque No. 12, in Philadelphia, in April 1965, at the age of 17. He represented the views of the Black Muslims regarding participation in war as follows:

“We believe that we who declared ourselves to be Rightous [sic] Muslims Should not Participate in wars which take the lives of humans. We do not believe this nation should force us to take part in such wars, for we have nothing to gain from it unless America agrees to give us the necessary territory wherein we may have something to fight for.”

Joseph’s board met on June 8, 1967. Based on the information in the SSS Form 150 and in the rest of Joseph’s file, but without the benefit of a meeting with Joseph, the board voted unanimously to retain him in Class I-A, and sent him a notice of classification (SSS Form 110) to this effect. No reasons were given for the classification decision.

The Solicitor General argues from the premise that when the board acted, it effectively “reopened” Joseph’s classification. According to the Solicitor General, the applicable regulations then in force prohibited a board from reopening a classification without first determining that a prima facie case had been made out. See 32 CFR §§ 1625.2, 1625.4. “[N]ot prepared to assume” that the board violated the reopening regulations, the Solicitor General reasons that the fact of reopening must therefore mean that the board had concluded (albeit erroneously) that Joseph had made out a prima facie case, and denied the claim because it questioned his sincerity.

The first difficulty with this argument is that a local board may well have the power to reopen a classification on a lesser showing than a prima facie case. See, e. g., United States v. Stephens, 445 F. 2d 192, 196 (CA3 1971). Second, the Solicitor General’s argument rests on the intent of the board. If the board did not think that it was reopening, there would have been no reason for it to worry about the prima facie case requirements allegedly contained in the reopening regulations. And the Solicitor General concedes that “some confusion” as to whether the June 8 action was a “reopening” developed at trial. Memorandum for the United States 18-19.

Assuming, however, that there was a reopening, the Solicitor General’s argument still fails, for the board’s subsequent handling of Joseph’s claim rebuts any “presumption of regularity” that might otherwise be appropriate. Joseph’s letter requesting an appeal from the June 8, 1967, decision was received by the board July 6, 1967. The request was thus timely under 32 CFR § 1626.2 (c)(1). No action was taken, however, until August 1, 1967, when Joseph was notified that his “statutory rights have expired,” but that he was requested to appear August 10, 1967, for an interview. Joseph appeared as requested, and on August 14, 1967, the board forwarded his file to the appeal board. There is no indication in Joseph’s file that the board took any action as a result of the August 10 “interview.”

The above course of action embodied several violations of the Selective Service regulations. First, Joseph’s statutory rights had not expired on August 1, 1967. His appeal was timely, and was required to be processed in accordance with 32 CFR § 1626.14, which stipulates that “in no event shall [a registrant’s] file be forwarded [to the appeal board] later than five days after the period for taking an appeal has elapsed.” The board violated this regulation by keeping Joseph’s file past July 13, 1967.

Had Joseph requested a personal appearance in the letter written by him and received by the board on July 6, 1967, the board would have been authorized to retain his file. But he did not. The interview which the board granted him was a mere courtesy. As such, it was unauthorized by statute, United States v. Hayden, 445 F. 2d 1365, 1374 (CA9 1971), and could not operate to relieve the board of its statutory obligation to forward Joseph’s file pursuant to the mandate of 32 CFR § 1626.14.

It can also be argued, from the fact that Joseph was given an interview after the board received his letter on July 6, 1967, that the letter was deemed a request to reopen, as well as an appeal. There was testimony at Joseph’s trial that the board’s failure to indicate any action following the interview meant that it had refused to reopen Joseph’s classification. (Testimony of Mr. Plaskow, App. 14.) But where a board refuses a registrant’s written request to reopen his classification, it must so advise him, by letter, and it must place a copy of the letter in his file. 32 CFR § 1625.4. Joseph’s board did not do so.

Whatever force the “presumption.of regularity” might have in the ordinary case, it is a weak reed on which to rest under these circumstances. But the “presumption” is the linchpin of the Solicitor General’s analysis; without it, a number of alternate hypotheses become as plausible as if not more plausible than that offered by the Solicitor General.

For example, it was the Government’s consistent position, until the Solicitor General’s confession in Clay v. United States, 403 U. S. 698, that conscientious objector claims based on Black Muslim teachings did not satisfy the statutory requirement that they be based on “religious training and belief.” The Justice Department letter quoted in Clay, supra, is representative of the Government’s views at the time that Joseph’s claim was under consideration:

“It seems clear that the teachings of the Nation of Islam preclude fighting for the United States not because of objections to participation in war in any form but rather because of political and racial objections to policies of the United States as interpreted by Elijah Muhammad. ... It is therefore our conclusion that registrant’s claimed objections to participation in war insofar as they are based upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam, rest on grounds which primarily are political and racial.” 403 U. S., at 702.

If one is to decide this case by speculation and assumption, a likely analysis is that Joseph’s local board knew of, and followed, the Justice Department’s articulated policy with respect to Black Muslim conscientious objector claims. Joseph stated in his SSS Form 150, “I receive my training from the honorable Elijah Muhammad Last Messenger of Allah Leader and Teacher of the Nation of Islam here in The Wilderous [sic] of North America.” Given the Government’s oft-articulated views as to the insufficiency of such teachings to support a conscientious objector claim, Joseph’s local board may well have denied his exemption for failure to demonstrate it was based on “religious training and belief.” The Solicitor General concedes that such a ground would have been clear error. Memorandum for the United States 14 n. 13. See Clay, supra, at 703.

There is also the possibility that Joseph’s board thought him to be a selective objector, because his statement of belief left open the possibility that he might fight if “America agrees to give us the necessary territory wherein we may have something to fight for.” The Solicitor General strenuously insists that this is indeed the correct analysis of Joseph’s claim.

Finally, there is the difficulty inherent in accepting the Solicitor General’s assumption that Joseph’s claim was not denied for failure to meet any of the statutory criteria, but for insincerity. It is well settled that mere disbelief in the sincerity of a registrant, based on no objective evidence of insincerity, will not suffice to deny a conscientious objector claim once a prima facie case is made out. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389; United States v. Hayden, supra, at 1373. The “evidence of insincerity” pointed to by the Solicitor General is ambiguous at best. He notes that Joseph joined the Muslims a year before he first registered for the draft, and two years before filing for his conscientious objector exemption, but that he made no claim to conscientious objector status in his Classification Questionnaire, and no subsequent claim of late crystallization. By themselves, these facts seem insufficient. Joseph was a 17-year-old high school dropout when he became a Muslim. His lack of sophistication and minimal writing skills are apparent from his communications with the board. If we are to assume with the Solicitor General that Joseph’s board found he made out a prima facie case, I should think it also follows that the board, having gone thus far, would make further inquiries into Joseph’s sincerity rather than rely on such an ambiguous and inartful record.

These speculations should not be taken to mean that I think the Solicitor General’s analysis should be rejected. It is perhaps no less probable than the alternatives that I have suggested. The point is that it is no more probable.

Joseph’s local and appeal boards might have denied his claim because he was thought to be insincere, because his Black Muslim beliefs were not thought to be religious, because he was thought to be a selective objector, or perhaps for some other reason not apparent from the record. Viewing this bare record from our perspective, there is simply no way to decide why it was that Joseph’s claim was denied.

The conviction must be reversed, therefore, not because Joseph made out a prima facie case and is thereby entitled to reasons, but because without a statement of reasons, it is impossible even to tell if Joseph’s prima facie showing was a relevant factor in the administrative process. I would require the Selective Service to provide a concise statement of reasons whenever a requested classification is denied, and whatever the administrative level at which the denial takes place.

       Joseph argues persuasively, however, that this statement is nothing more than the Muslim equivalent of a Jehovah’s Witness’ declaration that he will fight in defense of “Kingdom Interests.” Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385. See Brief for Petitioner 23-25.

       Other alleged indicia of insincerity need little comment. Many smokers would take issue with the Solicitor General’s attempt to demean Joseph’s statement that his ability to give up smoking was a demonstration of his faith. And, the statement by an unknown Army official that a psychological interview of petitioner revealed him to have “a mature attitude and interest in the Armed Forces” is simply meaningless without more information as to the nature of the interview in question and the particular responses on which the Army’s conclusory remark was based. Moreover, the interview took place over five months before petitioner first filed his conscientious objector claim, and thus certainly cannot be taken as representing his views at the time his conscientious objector claim was denied.

       The “de novo” review undertaken by the appeal board suffers from this same deficiency. We do not know why the appeal board affirmed the lower board’s action, for it, too, gave no reasons. And, the appeal board is just as much in the dark as we are with respect to the basis for the lower board’s action. “The Appeal Boards are no more entitled to speculate as to the basis for Local Board action than are reviewing courts.” United States v. Speicher, 439 F. 2d 104, 108 (CA3 1971). The appeal board, of course, should also be required to give reasons, for the proposition “[t]hat judicial review of two administrative agency actions unsupported by reasons is somehow less futile than judicial review of one such action,” id., at 107, is clearly untenable.

       This analysis is unchanged by the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act is not directly applicable to agency action under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. See 50 U. S. C. App. § 463 (b). It remains a “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . [that if] the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197.
      Thus, in analyzing an NLRB decision dealing with the process of certifying labor representatives, a process expressly exempt from the formal procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 554 (a) (6), the Court squarely held that the Board’s determination could not stand unless supported by a statement of reasons:
      “When the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must ‘disclose the basis of its order’ and ‘give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.’ Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 197. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167-169; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U. S. 81, 93. Although Board counsel in his brief and argument before this Court has rationalized the different unit determinations in the variant factual situations of these cases on criteria other than a controlling effect being given to the extent of organization, the integrity of the administrative process requires that ‘courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action . . . .’ Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, supra, at 168; see Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196. For reviewing courts to substitute counsel’s rationale or their discretion for that of the Board is incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review. Such action would not vindicate, but would deprecate the administrative process for it would ‘propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.’ Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., supra, at 196.” NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 438, 443-444 (footnote omitted).


text:
    No. 71-5840.
    Lenhard v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. In his memorandum for the United States in response to petition for writ of certiorari in this case, filed February 1,1972, the Solicitor General asserted a position different from that previously asserted by the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. We therefore grant the petition, vacate the judgment, and remand case to that court for consideration in light of the position now asserted by the Solicitor General.


text:
    No. 70-5056.
    St. Clair v. Selective Service Local Board No. 35, Brooklyn, New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Fein v. Selective Service System, ante, p. 365.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 71-316.
    Blatt v. Local Board No. 116, Fredericksburg City Selective Service System, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Fein v. Selective Service System, ante, p. 365.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 71-448.
    Morgan v. Melchar et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Fein v. Selective Service System, ante, p. 365.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. A-986.
    Washington State Labor Council, AFL-CIO v. Jertberg et al.
   D. C. W. D. Wash. Application for temporary stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 40,
    Orig.
    Pennsylvania v. New York et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 404 U. S. 988.]
   Motion of State of Pennsylvania for additional time for oral argument granted and a total of 45 minutes allotted to each side for oral argument, the time to be allocated by the parties.


text:
    No. 45,
    Orig.
    Washington et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 402 U. S. 940.]
   Motion of plaintiffs for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 71-492.
    Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1037.] Motions of Homart Development Co. and American Retail Federation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of Homart Development Co. for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-506.
    United States et al. v. Midwest Video Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of State of Illinois for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-1016.
    No. 71-1040.
    Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.; and United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motions of Brooklyn Union Gas Co., Public Service Commission of State of New York, Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., and Pipeline Intervenors for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-5933.
    Tanner v. Twomey, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-5571.
    Rodriquez v. Cady, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-5936.
    Gaglie v. United States District Court for Central District of California.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-1021.
    Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri et al. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-640.
    San Diego Unified School District v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-803.
    Mason v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-901.
    Groob v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-912.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-921.
    Fischetti et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-935.
    Chason v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-937.
    No. 71-5961.
    Holmes v. United States; and Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 F. 2d 249.


text:
    No. 71-952.
    Kovtun et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-990.
    Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., formerly Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1009.
    Lindauer v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1015.
    Schroeder et ux. v. Busenhart et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1020.
    Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Somportex Ltd. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1061.
    Arneson Products, Inc., et al. v. Blumenfeld.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5906.
    Anstead v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5911.
    Overton v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5913.
    Robinson, aka Beasley v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5917.
    Cronan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5919.
    Mendoza v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5922.
    Johnson v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5921.
    Mahaffey v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5926.
    Jones v. Crouse, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5927.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5928.
    Drakeford v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5929.
    Watts v. New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5931.
    Schoore v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5935.
    Lewis v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5940.
    Schroeder v. Buchkoe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5942.
    Arriagada v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5943.
    Brayton et al. v. Hollopeter et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5944.
    Kyle v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5945.
    Dowell v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5950.
    Dollar v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5951.
    Tatro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5953.
    Kennedy v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5954.
    Castro v. Yeager, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5955.
    Gafford v. Warden, Leavenworth Penitentiary, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5958.
    Holmes v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5959.
    Calhoun v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5963.
    Tyler v. Parks et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6252.
    Ray v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-558.
    Heyd, Sheriff v. Bastida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-605.
    Henry et al. v. Claiborne Hardware Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-806.
    Wehinger v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-615.
    Chapman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. It appearing the state court decision is not final, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

Petitioner operates a bookstore in Fremont, California. On two occasions, a police officer visited the store and purchased four magazines and one paperback novel. While in the store the second time, the officer also “looked at parts” of 12 additional magazines and 14 other paperback books which were on petitioner’s shelves. Based upon a reading of the four magazines, portions of the book, and the officer’s conclusory affidavit, a magistrate issued an ex parte search warrant authorizing the seizure of the publications the officer had earlier purchased or perused. The warrant was executed and 78 copies of 35 different titles were seized. Among the items seized were 19 copies of nine magazines not specified in the warrant and apparently not previously evaluated by a magistrate.

Petitioner was charged with the sale or distribution of obscene matter in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2. Petitioner made a motion under §§ 1538.5,1539, and 1540 of the Cal. Penal Code to suppress the evidence and to return the property seized. The municipal court ordered the return of the books which had not been specified in the warrant and of one book which it found not to be obscene. It denied petitioner’s motion in all other respects. On appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court ordered the suppression of those items which had been seized without a prior adversary hearing on their obscenity vel non but affirmed the municipal court with regard to the materials which had been purchased. The State then appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Department and vacated in part the judgment of the municipal court, thereby allowing the admission into evidence of all the items except the one which had been determined not to be obscene. 17 Cal. App. 3d 865, 95 Cal. Rptr. 242. The Supreme Court of California denied a hearing and petitioner now seeks a writ of certiorari.

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts is limited to “[fjinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . 28 U. S. C. § 1257. The finality requirement, which has been with us since the Judiciary Act of 1789, §25, 1 Stat. 85, is “[djesigned to avoid the evils of piecemeal review,” Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62, 67, and is founded upon “considerations generally applicable to good judicial administration.” Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124. Our decisions make clear, however, that “this provision of the statute [has long been given a] practical rather than a technical construction.” Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546. Thus, where denial of review would effectively foreclose our later consideration of a federal claim, California v. Stewart, 383 U. S. 903, 384 U. S. 436, 498 n. 71; Hill v. Chicago & Evanston R. Co., 140 U. S. 52, 54; where postponement of review would seriously erode a federal policy, Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550; Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3; or where determination of preliminary questions might avoid subsequent litigation, Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 558, we have determined that the requirement of finality had been satisfied. Similarly, where the subsequent proceedings in state court would deny the federal right for the vindication of which review was sought, we have concluded that the case was final. See, e. g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (speedy trial); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (double jeopardy); Colombo v. New York, ante, p. 9 (double jeopardy). And, as Mr. Justice White indicated for the Court in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, supra, at 558, we have found the policies underlying § 1257 satisfied where the matter to be reviewed was entirely “separate and independent” from those to be raised in the subsequent state proceedings.

In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, a case strikingly similar to the present one, we determined that the finality requirement had been met. There, the trial court had sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded for trial. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for eight members of the Court, concluded that we had jurisdiction under § 1257:

“The State has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment is not a 'final judgment’ and therefore not appealable under § 1257. The State argues that since the Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion (which would include a trial), the Supreme Court’s judgment cannot' be considered ‘final.’ This argument has a surface plausibility, since it is true the judgment of the State Supreme Court did not literally end the case. It did, however, render a judgment binding upon the trial court that it must convict Mills under this state statute if he wrote and published the editorial. Mills concedes that he did, and he therefore has no defense in the Alabama trial court. Thus if the case goes back to the trial court, the trial, so far as this record shows, would be rio more than a few formal gestures leading inexorably towards a conviction, and then another appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court for it formally to repeat its rejection of Mills’ constitutional contentions whereupon the case could then once more wind its weary way back to us as a judgment unquestionably final and appealable. Such a roundabout process would not only be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would also result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due to congested dockets. The language of § 1257 as we construed it in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U. S. 379, 381-383, does not require a result leading to such consequences. See also Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 548-551; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 72-74. Following those cases we hold that we have jurisdiction.” 384 U. S., at 217-218. (Footnotes omitted.)

In a concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, I said:

“We deal here with the rights of free speech and press in a basic form: the right to express views on matters before the electorate. In light of appellant’s concession that he has no other defense to offer should the case go to trial, and considering the importance of the First Amendment rights at stake in this litigation, it would require regard for some remote, theoretical interests of federalism to conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction because of the unlikely possibility that a jury might disregard a trial judge’s instructions and acquit.
“Indeed, even had appellant been unwilling to concede that he has no defense — apart from the constitutional question — to the charges against him, we would be warranted in reviewing this case. That result follows a fortiori from our holdings that where First Amendment rights are jeopardized by a state prosecution which, by its very nature, threatens to deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights, a federal court will take the extraordinary step of enjoining the state prosecution.” 384 U. S., at 221. (Citations omitted.)

The issues petitioner tenders are important ones. They go to the constitutionality of mass seizures of materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment, Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717; the need for a prior adversary hearing before protected materials are condemned as obscene, Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636; Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra; the procedural burdens which must be overcome to secure the return of protected materials, United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363; cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51; the sufficiency of the officer’s affidavit, the seizure of materials not specified in the warrant, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 569 (Stewart, J., concurring); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192; and, of course, the obscenity vel non of the publications.

No significant question of fact or law remains for trial. It seems beyond argument that petitioner possessed the publications in question “for sale or distribution.” Cal. Penal Code § 311.2. Petitioner’s only viable defenses appear to be whether the publications were constitutionally protected and whether their seizure in some way was procedurally defective. These issues were passed upon by the courts below and are now before us for decision.

The purpose of furthering economy in judicial administration would plainly be served by deciding these questions now rather than by sending petitioner through the formalities of a trial and months — if not years — of repetitious appellate review before allowing him to present to this Court again the very issues that are here now. California has sought to conserve its judicial resources by providing pretrial appellate review of suppression hearings. Where the admissibility of evidence is the only real issue, this policy generally results either in the prompt dismissal of the charges without trial or in a plea bargain and guilty plea. The interests in the smooth working of our federal system and our accommodation of California’s interests in pretrial adjudication of dispositive questions of law dictate that we not postpone our consideration of the federal questions now presented.

This is not a case involving only a pretrial motion to suppress. Rather, the motion now before us embraces all of the evidence the prosecution will introduce at trial and common to all of these items is the issue of their obscenity vel non. Mills v. Alabama, supra, teaches that where First Amendment rights are involved, compliance with procedural formalities before allowing their vindication in this Court is not necessary unless those procedures are meaningful.

I would follow Mills and grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and put the case down for argument.

       It does not appear that the respondent appealed from that portion of the municipal court’s order suppressing the books which had not been specified in the warrant or which had been found not to be obscene. The Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the admissibility of those books which had not been specified in the warrant and vacated the municipal court’s order to the contrary.

       “This is a separate and independent matter, anterior to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action. Moreover, we believe that it serves the policy underlying the requirement of finality in 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to determine now in which state court appellants may be tried rather than to subject them, and appellee, to long and complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings.” 371 U. S., at 558.

       Even if the California courts refuse to reconsider their earlier rulings, petitioner will be free to present the same claims now raised in the present petition for a writ of certiorari. R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 102 (4th ed. 1969).


text:
    No. 71-816.
    Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Kansas Electric Supply Co., Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-938.
    Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1008.
    Hawkins v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5912.
    Williamson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant the petition and set case for argument.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioners were suspected of maintaining an illicit whiskey still in violation of federal tax statutes. To secure evidence against them the Treasury Department planted in their midst an undercover agent who posed as a truck driver of their vendee. After gaining their confidence, this agent on 17 occasions in 1968, after our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, telephoned either petitioner James Williamson or a coconspirator, one Hutcheson, for the ostensible purpose of finalizing arrangements for the delivery of their product. During their conversations, the agent was in a position to shape and guide the content and direction of their discussions and to elicit damaging admissions. All of these communications were intercepted and recorded by another federal officer who acted without a warrant and without the petitioner’s knowledge but, of course, with the full cooperation of the Treasury plant. After the officers obtained satisfactory evidence against the pair, they were arrested, indicted, and convicted after a trial, at which all of the recordings were played, over objection, for the jury.

As I have discussed before, electronic eavesdropping early crept into our law as a means of combating “fifth column” activities during wartime. Later, it was said that this weapon was essential in the battle against organized crime. Now we learn that the omnipresent electronic ear is stalking the hill country in search of moonshiners. Apparently, no suspect is too unimportant to escape its reach.

Nor is any person too important to be excluded from the Government’s dossiers. Information recently presented to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights discloses that subjects of Army intelligence operations have included Senators Fred Harris, Harold Hughes, Edward Kennedy, George McGovern, and Edmund Muskie. The list also included five United States Representatives and four Governors. Indeed, the electronic ear was said to have turned on a Justice of this Court. The Subcommittee found that the cata-logue of organizations that had been subjected to surveillance embraced the NAACP, the ACLU, Operation Breadbasket, the Urban League, and the States' Rights Party. Its hearings also revealed that Army spies had infiltrated Resurrection City, the Poor People’s Campaign, both nominating conventions in 1968, black studies programs, and anti-war groups.

Senator Ervin, who chaired these hearings, warns this Court in an amicus brief in another case, that “it is not an exaggeration to talk in terms of hundreds of thousands of individuals, organizations, events, and dossiers.”

After related hearings concerning federal wiretapping, Senator Edward Kennedy only months ago warned his colleagues of “the frightening possibility that the conversations of untold thousands of citizens of this country are being monitored on secret devices which no judge has authorized and which may remain in operation for months and perhaps years at a time.”

Although the problem is an enormous and recurring one, our decisions have not articulated a coherent response. Ironically, if petitioner James Williamson had confided in a genuine confederate rather than in a spy, there would be no doubt that the warrantless seizure of his telephonic communications would have offended Katz v. United States, supra. It was said, however, by a plurality in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, that speakers simply must assume the risk that their confidants may tattle, and, therefore, they should assume the further risk that every word they utter will be instantaneously fed into a recorder. Yet there is a significant “qualitative difference” between electronic surveillance and conventional police stratagems such as eavesdropping and disguise. Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 465 (dissenting opinion). That chasm cannot be bridged simply by invoking the conclusory proposition that one must assume the risk of being subjected to electronic surveillance. Under that reasoning we might also have held that Katz should have assumed the risk that his telephone booth was bugged. Obviously, citizens must bear only those threats to privacy which we decide to impose.

The ruse employed by the Government in this case has still a further offensive characteristic. Here the agents had the opportunity not only to destroy a petitioner’s privacy but to interrogate him in a clandestine fashion without the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, without the assistance of counsel, and without knowledge that every word he spoke would be replayed to a court. Yet under the plurality reasoning in White such deception is permitted. Thus, both Katz and Miranda can be circumvented through the simple expedient of injecting a secret agent into a suspect situation.

I would grant this petition.

      See Appendix I to my dissent in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 766-767. I have expressed in more detail than here my opposition to various forms of electronic spying in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347; Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41; Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323; Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U. S. 458; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505; On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747.

       N. Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1972, p. 1, col. 3.

        Id., at cols. 3-4. The list named Representatives Philip Crane, John Rarick, and Don Edwards, and former Representatives Adam Clayton Powell and Allard Eowenstein.

        Id., at col. 4. The list named Governors Sargent of Massachusetts and Curtis of Maine; former Governors Hoff of Vermont and Kerner of Illinois; and Lieutenant Governor Hayes of Vermont.

        Id., at col. 4.

       Amicus Curiae Brief submitted by Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, in Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288, O. T. 1971, p. 10.

       Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 197-198 (1971).

        Id., at 197.

         Id., at 198-200.

        Id., at 201, 296.

        Ibid.

       Amicus Brief, supra, n. 6, at 8.

       Letter to members of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, from Senator Edward Kennedy, Dec. 17, 1971, pp. 2-3.


text:
    No. 71-5934.
    Carroll v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5956.
    Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors of Riverside County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5957.
    Carrasco-Favela v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

text:
    No. 71-931.
    Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et al. v. D. C. Federation of Civic Assns. et al.
   C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

concurring.

I concur in the denial of certiorari in this case, but solely out of considerations of timing. Questions of great importance to the Washington, D. C., area are presented by the petition, not the least of which is whether the Court of Appeals has, for a second time, unjustifiably frustrated the efforts of the Executive Branch to comply with the will of Congress as rather clearly expressed in § 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 827. If we were to grant the writ, however, it would be almost a year before we could render a decision in the case. It seems preferable, therefore, that we stay our hand. In these circumstances Congress may, of course, take any further legislative action it deems necessary to make unmistakably clear its intentions with respect to the project, even to the point of limiting or prohibiting judicial review of its directives in this respect.

      Certain of the provisions of § 23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 were apparently enacted in response to the decision in D. C. Federation of Civic Assns., Inc. v. Airis, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 125, 391 F. 2d 478, in which it was held that the planning and construction of this project had to be carried out in strict compliance with the procedural requirements of Title 7 of the D. C. Code. Section 23 (a) of the Act provides that “ [n] otwithstanding any other provision of law, or any court decision ... to the contrary, the Secretary of Transportation and the government of the District of Columbia shall . . . construct” certain specified “routes on the Interstate System within the District of Columbia.” (Emphasis added.) In §23 (b), Congress singled out four particular projects, including this one, for special treatment by providing that work on those projects was to commence “[n]ot later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this section.” In an earlier phase of the litigation involved in the instant petition, the Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners’ contention that § 23 rendered inapplicable the pre-construction planning and public hearing requirements set-out in various sections of Title 23 of the United States Code. D. C. Federation of Civic Assns., Inc. v. Volpe, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 162, 434 F. 2d 436. On remand following that decision, the District Court found that the petitioners had complied with all applicable provisions of Title 23 except those of § 128 relating to public hearings and those of § 109 relating to safety standards and other requirements. The Court of Appeals, in the decision that we are now being asked to review, reversed in part-, holding that the petitioners had failed to comply with a number of additional pre-construction provisions of Title 23.


text:
    No. 71-941.
    Ferrara et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to defer consideration and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-956.
    Freeman, Guardian, et al. v. Flake et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Today the Court declines to decide whether a public school may constitutionally refuse to permit a student to attend solely because his hair style meets with the disapproval of the school authorities. The Court also denied certiorari in Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 404 U. S. 1042, which presented the same issue. I dissented in Olff, and filed an opinion. For the same reasons expressed therein, I dissent today. I add only that now eight circuits have passed on the question. On widely disparate rationales, four have upheld school hair regulations (see Freeman v. Flake, 448 F. 2d 258 (CA10 1971); King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F. 2d 932 (CA9 1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1970); and Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F. 2d 697 (CA5 1968)), and four have struck them down (see Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 779 (CA4 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069 (CA8 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (CA1 1970) ; and Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034 (CA7 1969)).

I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, on an issue of importance bearing on First Amendment and Ninth Amendment rights.


text:
    No. 71-5923.
    Fairman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for testing physical evidence and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-999.
    Dixon, Treasurer of Illinois, et al. v. Castle, Senior Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5567.
    Miller v. Salisbury, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to amend

petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5577.
    McGregor v. Schmidt, Secretary, Department of Health and Social Services of Wisconsin, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 70-161.
    No. 70-5211.
    No. 71-183.
    No. 71-659.
    Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Wright et al., Wright et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians et al. v. County of Riverside, California, DeVilliers v. Atlas Corp.,
   ante, p. 208;

ante, p. 208;

ante, p. 933; and

ante, p. 933. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-28.
    United States v. Generes et vir,
   ante, p. 93. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-267.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Scrivener, dba AA Electric Co.,
   ante, p. 117. Motions to dispense with printing and to dispense with taxation of costs granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    April 3, 1972
    No. 70-20.
    Canniffe et al. v. Burg.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Mass.


text:
    No. 70-80.
    Davis, Governor of Vermont, et al. v. Kohn et ux.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Vt.


text:
    No. 71-628.
    Cody, Elections Commissioner, et al. v. Andrews et ux.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. N. C.


text:
    No. 70-76.
    Donovan, Secretary of State of Minnesota, et al. v. Keppel et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Minn.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.


text:
    No. 70-51.
    Whitcomb, Governor of Indiana, et al. v. Affeldt et ux.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ind. Motion of appellees for leave to dispense with printing motion to affirm granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 70-59.
    Amos, Secretary of State of Alabama, et al. v. Hadnott et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala. Motion of appellees for leave to dispense with printing motion to affirm granted. Motion of appellants to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 70-68.
    Virginia State Board of Elections v. Bufford et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Va. Motion of appellees for leave to dispense with printing motion to affirm granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 71-650.
    Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co.
   Affirmed on appeal from C. A. 8th Cir.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart dissent from affirmance.


text:
    No. 71-674.
    Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-950.
    Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo, dismissed. Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 375 U. S. 39 (1963).

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from the dismissal of the case and would affirm, believing that the appeal is properly taken.


text:
    No. 71-1039.
    Anderson et al. v. Calvert, Comptroller of Public Accounts of Texas, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 3d Sup. Jud. Dist. Motion of appellants for leave to dispense with printing reply brief granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-1001.
    Berberian v. Rhode Island.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. R. I. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-16.
    Cocanower v. Marston, Recorder for Maricopa County, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Ariz. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dunn v. Blumstein, ante, p. 330.


text:
    No. 70-81.
    Fitzpatrick et al. v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dunn v. Blumstein, ante, p. 330.


text:
    No. 70-5076.
    Lester et al. v. Board of Elections for the District of Columbia et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dunn v. Blumstein, ante, p. 330.


text:
    No. 71-5690.
    Ferguson et al. v. Williams, Governor of Mississippi, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Miss. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dunn v. Blumstein, ante, p. 330.


text:
    No. 70-5080.
    Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., ante, p. 538.


text:
    No. 70-5395.
    Roberts et al. v. Harder, Commissioner of Welfare of Connecticut.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., ante, p. 538.


text:
    No. A-974.
    In re Resignation of Gerber.
   Albert B. Gerber, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, having resigned as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice in this Court.


text:
    No. 70-223.
    Central Hardware Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certi-orari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of respondent Retail Clerks Union for additional time for oral argument granted and 10 minutes allotted for that purpose. Petitioner also allotted 10 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 70-283.
    Adams, Warden v. Williams.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae grafited.


text:
    No. 71-452.
    Healy et al. v. James et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 983.] Motion of Associated Students of San Francisco State College et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-857.
    Evco, dba Evco Instructional Designs v. Jones, Commissioner of Bureau of Revenue, et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 953.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing appendix and to proceed on original record granted.


text:
    No. 71-492.
    Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1037.] Motion of American Retail Federation for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-1016.
    No. 71-1040.
    Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.; and United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motion of Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-1017.
    No. 71-1026.
    Gravel v. United States; and United States v. Gravel.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 916.] Motion of counsel for Gravel for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of the United States Senate for leave to permit Sam J. Ervin, Jr., to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and a total of 30 minutes allotted for that purpose. The Solicitor General is allotted 30 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-1031.
    Tonasket v. Washington et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 71-5564.
    Stewart et al. v. White et al., Judges.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-889.
    Couch v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1022.
    United States v. Basye et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-685.
    No. 71-691.
    Lehnhausen, Director, Department of Local Government Affairs of Illinois v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. et al.; and Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. Shapiro et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N. E. 2d 592.


text:
    No. 71-651.
    California v. Krivda et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-951.
    Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 71-559 [United States v. Fuller, certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1037].


text:
    No. 68-5028.
    Tyler v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5028.
    Scaife v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5036.
    Prowse v. Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5068.
    Lucas v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5057.
    Billings v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5059.
    Barner v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5148.
    Olsen v. Ellsworth et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-642.
    Parrott v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-813.
    Favro v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-817.
    Cardenas v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-836.
    Wood et al. v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-840.
    Boring v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-923.
    Cecire et al., Trustees v. Stewart, Superintendent of Insurance.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-

tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-944.
    Saletko v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-957.
    Shalla v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-959.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-971.
    Fisons Ltd. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-974.
    Conrad, Executrix v. Judson et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-988.
    Vaughn v. Hufnagel, Executor, et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-996.
    Snook v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1004.
    General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 et al. v. Allied Foods, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1018.
    Maloney v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1029.
    Reisman v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1033.
    Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1034.
    Embry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1037.
    Silvertrust, Executor, et al. v. Redke.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1038.
    City of Thousand Oaks v. Van Nuys Publishing Co., Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1046.
    Griffith v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1055.
    Anderson v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1079.
    Hay v. Truscott et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5035.
    Samperi v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5309.
    Jordan v. Procunier, Corrections Director.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5355.
    Moses v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5465.
    Crosswhite v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5585.
    Martin v. Pate, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5587.
    Plair v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5755.
    Monsour v. Cady, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5964.
    Lauchli v. Harris, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5965.
    Bethea v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5967.
    Jenson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5968.
    Huggins v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5969.
    Bamberger v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5971.
    Kimmons v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5973.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5975.
    Savage v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5976.
    Nicholson v. Wolff, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5977.
    Zovluck v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5978.
    Tiner v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5979.
    Pacheco v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5980.
    Watts v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5981.
    Pelow v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5982.
    Marcelin v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5984.
    Walker v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5986.
    Carlson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5987.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5993.
    Dadurian v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5994.
    Fentress v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5995.
    Brewer v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5997.
    Archer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5999.
    Masters et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6000.
    DunLeavay v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6002.
    Wood v. Circuit Court of Warren County, Tennessee, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6003.
    Strickland v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6004.
    Hooks v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6005.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6006.
    Maggard v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6007.
    Fentress v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6008.
    Lauchli v. Poos, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6009.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-22.
    M. F. A. Central Cooperative et al. v. Bookwalter, District Director of Internal Revenue, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-525.
    Lusby v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-716.
    Smitherman v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion to dispense with printing petition and motion of respondent for leave to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-766.
    Carter, Director, Missouri Division of Welfare, et al. v. Like et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-978.
    McConnell v. Anderson et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-994.
    Epstein v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-995.
    Davis v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1054.
    Smith, Administratrix v. Southern Pacific Co.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5449.
    Quick v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5450.
    Camm v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5550.
    Manuel v. Salisbury, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5970.
    Nielsen v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 71-5560.
    Miller v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Petitioner had a pistol on his person when he was arrested in Portland, Oregon, on January 28, 1970. Two prosecutions were brought against him based on this single act of possession. The first was a complaint filed January 29, 1970, for violation of § 14.32.040 of the Code of the City of Portland, which makes it a crime to carry a concealed weapon. The second was an indictment handed down April 20,- 1970, for violation of Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.270, whch makes it a felony for “any person who has been convicted of a felony against the person or property of another” to carry a concealed weapon.

On April 29, 1970, the petitioner was convicted of the ordinance violation. He thereupon entered a plea of double jeopardy to the felony indictment. The plea was sustained in the trial court and the indictment dismissed. The Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed, 5 Ore. App. 501, 484 P. 2d 1132. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review.

I would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse. In my view the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (concurring opinion). Under this “same transaction” test of “same offense” the trial court properly sustained petitioner’s double jeopardy plea.


text:
    No. 71-993.
    Lovisi v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of respondent to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5726.
    Hunt, aka Adams v. Georgia et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5989.
    Theriault et al. v. Silber et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black-mun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5990.
    Sinclair v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-554.
    No. 71-657.
    No. 71-694.
    No. 71-709.
    No. 71-730.
    No. 71-742.
    No. 71-744.
    No. 71-765.
    Liepman v. California, Hawaiian Land Co., Ltd. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, Louisiana State Department of Highways v. Dardar et al., Sumida et al. v. Yumen et al., Williams v. United States, Gould et ux. v. American Water Works Service Co., Inc., et al., Addonizio v. United States, Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Wilson et al.,
   ante, p. 963;

ante, p. 907;

ante, p. 918;

ante, p.964;

ante, p. 954;

ante, p. 920;

ante, p. 936; and

ante, p. 949. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-789.
    No. 71-796.
    No. 71-904.
    No. 71-5470.
    No. 71-5547.
    No. 71-5582.
    No. 71-5588.
    No. 71-5718.
    No. 71-5738.
    Jacobs v. United States, Kastenbaum v. United States, Great Fidelity Investment Co. et al. v. Martin et al., Beasley v. United States, McCray v. United States, Gerardi v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al., Tarlton v. United States, Becker v. United States, Acarino v. Mishler, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court,
   ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 952;

ante, p. 944;

ante, p. 914;

ante, p. 926;

ante, p. 932; and

ante, p. 956. Petitions for rehearing denied.