text:
    O’KEEFFE, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SIXTH COMPENSATION DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. AEROJET-GENERAL SHIPYARDS, INC.
    No. 71-262.
    Decided December 14, 1971
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner, a Labor Department Deputy Commissioner, rejected an employee’s claim against respondent under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., on the ground that the proofs failed to establish that his disability was related to conditions of his employment. Thereafter petitioner reopened the case pursuant to § 22 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 922. On the basis of testimony by the employee’s personal physician and a commission-appointed doctor; petitioner concluded, contrary to his initial determination, that the disabling condition had in fact been “materially aggravated and hastened” by the circumstances of employment, and awarded him compensation. The District Court sustained the award but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed. 442 F. 2d 508. The Court of. Appeals held that in the absence of changed conditions or new evidence clearly demonstrating mistake in the initial determination, the “statute simply does not confer authority upon the Deputy Commissioner to receive additional but cumulative evidence and change his mind.” 442 F. 2d, at 513.

Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative history supports this “narrowly technical and impractical construction.” Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Norton, 106 F. 2d 137, 138 (CA3 1939). Section 22 of the Act provides:

“Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 919 of this title, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 922.

Thus, on its face, the section permits a reopening within one year “because of a mistake in a determination of fact.” There is no limitation to particular factual errors, or to cases involving new evidence or changed circumstances. The Act at one time did authorize reopening only on the “ground of a change in conditions,” 44 Stat. 1437, but was amended in 1934 expressly to “broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an award . . . when changed conditions or a mistake in a determination of fact makes such modification desirable in order to render justice under the act.” S. Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). The plain import of this amendment was to vest a deputy commissioner with broad discretion to correct mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence initially submitted.

Nor does our construction “render meaningless the provision [of §21 of (the Act, 33 U. S. C. §921] that [a compensation] order becomes final unless proceedings for review are brought within thirty days.” Case v. Calbeck, 304 F. 2d 198, 201 (CA5 1962). The review authorized by § 21 is limited to the legal yalidity of the award; a district court may set aside an award only if it is “not in accordance with law.” Section 21 (b), 33 U. S. C. §921 (b). The 30-day limit of §21 is not “rendered meaningless” by setting a different time limit for a redetermination of fact. Moreover, the absence of a provision in § 21 for the judicial review of evidence confirms the need for a broad discretion in the deputy commissioner, to review factual errors in an effort “to render justice under the act.”

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    SANTOBELLO v. NEW YORK
    No. 70-98.
    Argued November 15, 1971
    Decided December 20, 1971

      Irving Anolik argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Daniel J. Sullivan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Burton B. Roberts.

   Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the sentence recommendation on a guilty plea required a new trial.

The facts are not in dispute. The State of New York indicted petitioner in 1969 on two felony counts, Promoting Gambling in the First Degree, and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree, N. Y. Penal Law §§ 225.10, 225.20. Petitioner first entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney in charge of the case agreed to permit petitioner to plead guilty to a lesser-included offense, Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree, N. Y. Penal Law § 225.15, conviction of which would carry a maximum prison sentence of one year. The prosecutor agreed to make no recommendation as to the sentence.

On June 16, 1969, petitioner accordingly withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser charge. Petitioner represented to the sentencing judge that the plea was voluntary and that the facts of the case, as described by the Assistant District Attorney, were true. The court accepted the plea and set a date for sentencing. A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, petitioner had still not been sentenced. By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel.

Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea. In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. The accuracy of this affidavit is subject to challenge since petitioner had filed and withdrawn a motion to suppress, before pleading guilty. In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes.

These three motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing. On January 9 petitioner appeared before a different judge, the judge who had presided over the case to this juncture having retired. Petitioner renewed his motions, and the court again rejected them. The court then turned to consideration of the sentence.

At this appearance, another prosecutor had replaced the prosecutor who had negotiated the plea. The new prosecutor recommended the maximum one-year sentence. In making this recommendation, he cited petitioner’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Defense counsel immediately objected on the ground that the State had promised petitioner before the plea was entered that there would be no sentence recommendation by the prosecution. He sought to adjourn the sentence hearing in order to have time to prepare proof of the first prosecutor’s promise. The second prosecutor, apparently ignorant of his colleague’s commitment, argued that there was nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim of a promise, but the State, in subsequent proceedings, has not contested that such a promise was made.

The sentencing judge ended discussion, with the following statement, quoting extensively from the pre-sentence report:

“Mr. Aronstein [Defense Counsel], I am not at all influenced by what the District Attorney says, so that there is no need to adjourn the sentence, and there is no need to have any testimony. It doesn’t make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he will do, or what he doesn’t do.
“I have here, Mr. Aronstein, a probation report. I have here a history of a long, long serious criminal record. I have here a picture of the life history of this man. . . .
“ ‘He is unamenable to supervision in the community. He is a professional criminal.’ This is in quotes. ‘And a recidivist. Institutionalization — ’; that means, in plain language, just putting him away, ‘is the only means of halting his anti-social activities/ and protecting you, your family, me, my family, protecting society. ‘Institutionalization.’ Plain language, put him behind bars.
“Under the plea, I can only send him to the New York City Correctional Institution for men for one year, which I am hereby doing.”

The judge then imposed the maximum sentence of one year.

Petitioner sought and obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending an appeal. The Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed petitioner’s conviction, 35 App. Div. 2d 1084, 316 N. Y. S. 2d 194 (1970), and petitioner was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Petitioner then sought certiorari in this Court. Mr. Justice Harlan granted bail pending our disposition of the case.

This record represents another example of an unfortunate lapse in orderly prosecutorial procedures, in part, no doubt, because of the enormous increase in the workload of the often understaffed prosecutor’s offices. The heavy workload may well explain these episodes, but it does not excuse them. The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called “plea bargaining,” is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.

Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. See Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 751-752 (1970).

However, all of these considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor. It is now clear, for example, that the accused pleading guilty must be counseled, absent a waiver. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957). Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, governing pleas in federal courts, now makes clear that the sentencing judge must develop, on the record, the factual basis for the plea, as, for example, by having the accused describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge. The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known. There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 719 (1962); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11. A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.

This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.

On this record, petitioner “bargained” and negotiated for a particular plea in order to secure dismissal of more serious charges, but also on condition that no sentence recommendation would be made by the prosecutor. It is now conceded that the promise to abstain from a recommendation was made, and at this stage the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent breach of agreement is immaterial. The staff lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of “letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing” or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.

We need not reach the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for the plea. He stated that the prosecutor's recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration. The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, i. e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. We emphasize that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing judge.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court and add only a word. I agree both with The Chief Justice and with Mr. Justice Marshall that New York did not keep its “plea bargain” with petitioner and that it is no excuse for the default merely because a member of the prosecutor's staff who was not a party to the “plea bargain” was in charge of the case when it came before the New York court. The staff of the prosecution is a unit and each member must be presumed to know the commitments made by any other member. If responsibility could be evaded that way, the prosecution would have designed another deceptive “contrivance,” akin to those we condemned in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112, and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264.

These “plea bargains” are important in the administration of justice both at the state and at the federal levels and, as The Chief Justice says, they serve an important role in the disposition of today’s heavy calendars.

However important plea bargaining may be in the administration of criminal justice, our opinions have established that a guilty plea is a serious and sobering occasion inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, to confront one’s accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, to present witnesses in one’s defense, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, to remain silent, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358. Since Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, this Court has recognized that “unfairly obtained” guilty pleas in the federal courts ought to be vacated. In the course of holding that withdrawn guilty pleas were not admissible in subsequent federal prosecutions, the Court opined:

“[O]n timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. Such an application does not involve any question of guilt or innocence.” Id., at 224.

Although KerchevaVs dictum concerning grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas did not expressly rest on constitutional grounds (cf. Frame v. Hudspeth, 309 U. S. 632), Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, clearly held that a federal prisoner who had pleaded guilty despite his ignorance of and his being uninformed of his right to a lawyer was deprived of that Sixth Amendment right, or if he had been tricked by the prosecutor through misrepresentations into pleading guilty then his due process rights were offended. In Walker, the petitioner was granted an evidentiary hearing to prove his factual claims in anticipation of vacating the plea. Accord: Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101; Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708. In Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, the defendant alleged that when he threatened to tell his lawyer of private promises made by an Assistant United States Attorney in exchange for a proposed guilty plea, the prosecutor threatened additional prosecutions. Although the Government denied them, the Court held that if the allegations were true, then the defendant would be entitled to have his sentence vacated and the matter was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

State convictions founded upon coerced or unfairly induced guilty pleas have also received increased scrutiny as more fundamental rights have been applied to the States. After Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, the Court held that a state defendant was entitled to a lawyer’s assistance in choosing whether to plead guilty. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471. In Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116, federal habeas corpus was held to lie where a lawyer-less and uneducated state prisoner had pleaded guilty to numerous and complex robbery charges. And, a guilty plea obtained without the advice of counsel may not be admitted at a subsequent state prosecution. White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59. Thus, while plea bargaining is not per se unconstitutional, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 37-38, Shelton v. United States, 242 F. 2d 101, aff’d en banc, 246 F. 2d 571 (CA5 1957), a guilty plea is rendered voidable by threatening physical harm, Waley v. Johnston, supra, threatening to use false testimony, ibid., threatening to bring additional prosecutions, Machibroda v. United States, supra, or by failing to inform a defendant of his right of counsel, Walker v. Johnston, supra. Under these circumstances it is clear that a guilty plea must be vacated.

But it is also clear that a prosecutor’s promise may deprive a guilty plea of the “character of a voluntary act.” Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 493. Cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542-543. The decisions of this Court have not spelled out what sorts of promises by prosecutors tend to be coercive, but in order to assist appellate review in weighing promises in light of all the circumstances, all trial courts are now required to interrogate the defendants who enter guilty pleas so that the waiver of these fundamental rights will affirmatively appear in the record. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238. The lower courts, however, have uniformly held that a prisoner is entitled to some form of relief when he shows that the prosecutor reneged on his sentencing agreement made in connection with a plea bargain, most jurisdictions preferring vacation of the plea on the ground of “involuntariness,” while a few permit only specific enforcement. Note: Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865, 876 (1964). As one author has stated, the basis for outright vacation is “an outraged sense of fairness” when a prosecutor breaches his promise in connection with sentencing. D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 36 (1966).

This is a state case over which we have no “supervisory” jurisdiction; and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure obviously has no relevancy to the problem.

I join the opinion of the Court and favor a constitutional rule for this as well as for other pending or oncoming cases. Where the “plea bargain” is not kept by the prosecutor, the sentence must be vacated and the state court will decide in light of the circumstances of each case whether due process requires (a) that there be specific performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the defendant be given the option to go to trial on the original charges. One alternative may do justice in one case, and the other in a different case. In choosing a remedy, however, a court ought to accord a defendant’s preference considerable, if not controlling, weight inasmuch as the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor’s breach of a plea bargain are those of the defendant, not of the State.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart join,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with much of the majority’s opinion, but conclude that petitioner must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. This is the relief petitioner requested, and, on the facts set out by the majority, it is a form of relief to which he is entitled.

There is no need to belabor the fact that the Constitution guarantees to all criminal defendants the right to a trial by judge or jury, or, put another way, the “right not to plead guilty,” United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 581 (1968). This and other federal-rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but such waivers are not lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed with the “utmost solicitude.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969). Given this, I believe that where the defendant presents a reason for vacating his plea and the government has not relied on the plea to its disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and the right to trial regained, at least where the motion to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment. In other words, in such circumstances I would not deem the earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the defendant’s federal constitutional right to a trial.

Here, petitioner never claimed any automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. Rather, he tendered a specific reason why, in his case, the plea should be vacated. His reason was that the prosecutor had broken a promise made in return for the agreement to plead guilty. When a prosecutor breaks the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver of constitutional rights implicit in the plea. This, it seems to me, provides the defendant ample justification for rescinding the plea. Where a promise is “unfulfilled,” Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 755 (1970), specifically denies that the plea “must stand.” Of course, where the prosecutor has broken the plea agreement, it may be appropriate to permit the defendant to enforce the plea bargain. But that is not the remedy sought here. Rather, it seems to me that a breach of the plea bargain provides ample reason to permit the plea to be vacated.

It is worth noting that in the ordinary case where a motion to vacate is made prior to sentencing, the government has taken no action in reliance on the previously entered guilty plea and would suffer no harm from the plea’s withdrawal. More pointedly, here the State claims no such harm beyond disappointed expectations about the plea itself. At least where the government itself has broken the plea bargain, this disappointment cannot bar petitioner from withdrawing his guilty plea and reclaiming his right to a trial.

I would remand the case with instructions that the plea be vacated and petitioner given an opportunity to replead to the original charges in the indictment.

       Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 provides:
      “A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.”

       If the state court decides to allow withdrawal of the plea, the petitioner will, of course, plead anew to the original charge on two felony counts.

       In 1964, guilty pleas accounted for 95.5% of all criminal convictions in trial courts of general jurisdiction in New York. In 1965, the figure for California was 74.0%. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 9 (1967).

       In 1964, guilty pleas accounted for 90.2% of all criminal convictions in United States district courts. Ibid. In fiscal 1970, of 28,178 convictions in the 89 United States district courts, 24,111 were by pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Report of Director of Administrative Office of U. S. Courts, for Period July 1 through Dec. 31, 1970, Table D-4, p. A-26.

      Mr. Justice Douglas, although joining the Court's opinion (apparently because he thinks the remedy should be chosen by the state court), concludes that the state court “ought to accord a defendant’s preference considerable, if not controlling, weight.” Thus, a majority of the Court appears to believe that in cases like these, when the defendant seeks to vacate the plea, that relief should generally be granted.


author: MR. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    PICARD v. CONNOR
    No. 70-96.
    Argued November 17, 1971
    Decided December 20, 1971

      John J. Irwin, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General,
      Ruth I. Abrams and Charles E. Chase, Assistant Attorneys General, and Garrett H. Byrne.

      James J. Twohig, by appointment of the Court, 402 U. S. 993, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   MR. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reversing the District Court’s dismissal of respondent’s petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus, held that “the procedure by which [respondent] was brought to trial deprived him of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.” 434 F. 2d 673, 674 (1970). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that respondent had not attacked his conviction on the equal protection ground, either in the state courts or in his federal habeas petition:

“[Respondent] did not present the constitutional question to' the Massachusetts court in the particular focus in which this opinion is directed. We suggested it when the case reached us, and invited the Commonwealth to file a supplemental brief. Not unnaturally its first contention was to assert that [respondent] had not exhausted his state remedy . . . .” Ibid.

The Court of Appeals rejected that contention and held that respondent had exhausted available state judicial remedies, as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254, because he had “presented the [state] court with 'an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [his] constitutional claim.’ ” Ibid. We granted certiorari to consider that ruling in light of the command of § 2254. 402 U. S. 942 (1971). We hold that the State’s objection should have been sustained, and we therefore reverse for further proceedings, see Slayton v. Smith, ante, p. 53, without reaching the merits of the constitutional question decided by the Court of Appeals.

A Massachusetts grand jury returned an indictment for murder against Donald Landry “and John Doe, the true name and a more particular description of the said John Doe being to the said Jurors unknown.” After respondent’s arrest, the indictment was amended in a proceeding pursuant to a fictitious-name statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 277, § 19, to substitute respondent’s name for “John Doe.” The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed respondent’s subsequent conviction, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 229 N. E. 2d 267 (1967). Among other grounds of appeal, respondent challenged the legality of the indictment. The gist of respondent’s argument, which he also asserted during various trial proceedings, was that the amending procedure did not comply with the statute as construed by the Massachusetts courts, with the result that he had not been lawfully indicted for the crime. See Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453, 156 N. E. 890 (1927). The only suggestions of a claimed denial of a federal right were statements in respondent’s brief questioning the continuing validity of the holding in Gedzium that the provision of the Fifth Amendment that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury” was inapplicable to the States. Id., at 457, 156 N. E., at 891; see Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884). We have examined the pretrial, trial, and appellate papers and do not discover any indication of an attack upon the prosecution under the indictment as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus. See, e. g., Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224, 229 (1970); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 404-405 (1959); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944). The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, now codified in the federal habeas statute, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254 (b) and (c), reflects a policy of federal-state comity, Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 419-420 (1963); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939), "an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State the initial `opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights." Wilwording v. Swenson, ante, p. 249, at 250. We have consistently adhered to this federal policy, for "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation." Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950) (overruled in other respects, Fay v. Noia, supra, at 435-436). It follows, of course, that once the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. See, e. g., Wilwording v. Swenson, supra, at 250; Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40, 42-43 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 447-450 (1953).

We emphasize that the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts. If the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent “unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution,” Ex parte Royall, supra, at 251, it is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas applicant has been through the state courts. The rule would serve no purpose if it could be satisfied by raising one claim in the state courts and another in the federal courts. Only if the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. See Darr v. Burford, supra, at 203; Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 401-403 (1900).

Respondent challenged the validity of his indictment at every stage of the proceedings in the Massachusetts courts. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, 434 F. 2d, at 674, this is not a case in which factual allegations were made to the federal courts that were not before the state courts, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Boodie v. Herold, 349 F. 2d 372 (CA2 1965); Schiers v. California, 333 F. 2d 173 (CA9 1964), nor a case in which an intervening change in federal law cast the legal issue in a fundamentally different light, see, e. g., Blair v. California, 340 F. 2d 741 (CA9 1965); Pennsylvania ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 339 F. 2d 598 (CA3 1964). We therefore put aside consideration of those types of cases. The question here is simply whether, on the record and argument before it, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had a fair opportunity to consider the equal protection claim and to correct that asserted constitutional defect in respondent’s conviction. We think not.

Until he reached this Court, respondent never contended that the method by which he was brought to trial denied him equal protection of the laws. Rather, from the outset respondent consistently argued that he had been improperly indicted under Massachusetts law and, to the extent he raised a federal constitutional claim at all, that the indictment procedure employed in his case could not be approved without reference to whether the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand jury indictment applied to the States. He adverted to the Fourteenth Amendment solely as it bore Upon that submission. The equal protection issue entered this case only because the Court of Appeals injected it.

We are thus unable to agree with that court that respondent provided the Massachusetts “court with ‘an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [his] constitutional claim.’ ” 434 F. 2d, at 674. To be sure, respondent presented all the facts. Yet the constitutional claim the Court of Appeals found inherent in those facts was never brought to the attention of the state courts. The Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the arguments respondent offered; we cannot fault that court for failing also to consider sua sponte whether the indictment procedure denied respondent equal protection of the laws. Obviously there are instances in which “the ultimate question for disposition,” United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F. 2d 749, 751 (CA7 1966), will be the same despite variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its support. A ready example is a challenge to a confession predicated upon psychological as well as physical coercion. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 16 (1963). Hence, we do not imply that respondent could have raised the equal protection claim only by citing “book and verse on the federal constitution.” Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F. 2d 750, 758 (CA9 1958); see Kirby v. Warden, 296 F. 2d 151 (CA4 1961). We simply hold that the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the state courts. The claim that an indictment is invalid is not the substantial equivalent of a claim that it results in an unconstitutional discrimination. See Rose v. Dickson, 327 F. 2d 27, 29 (CA9 1964); Morris v. Mayo, 277 F. 2d 103 (CA5 1960). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

With all respect, T think that in this case we carry the rule of exhaustion of state remedies too far. Con-nor’s name was added to the indictment after it was returned by the state grand jury, he being substituted for “John Doe.” He raised in his brief before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts his claim that such a substitution denied him that quantum of due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment “in that he was put to trial without having been indicted by a Grand Jury.” He did not refer to the Equal Protection Clause which is also a part of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that is a nicety irrelevant to the maintenance of healthy state-federal relations on which the Court makes the present decision turn. The concept of due process is broad and expansive, and “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499. We have thus held that the denial of equal protection, vis., invidious discrimination, may be “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Ibid. As Mr. Justice Brennan said in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 388 (concurring opinion), “The question that the Court treats exclusively as one of due process inevitably implicates considerations of both due process and equal protection.” That is likewise true here.

Moreover, a due process point is plainly raised where an accused claims that no grand jury found “probable cause” to indict him, that its only finding concerned someone unknown at the time.

If Connor had complained of a coerced confession, or of perjured testimony, and the facts on which he relied were developed in the state court, the constitutional questions would surely have been sufficiently raised without reference to the precise constitutional provisions involved. The situation here is no different.

The judges to whom that issue of law is tendered are learned men who we must assume are knowledgeable as to the meaning of due process. A law student who tendered a brief that left due process at large would certainly not be worthy of an “A.” But the nicety of analysis which we associate with scholarship has no functional role to play in this area of exhaustion of state remedies. When we go to that extreme, we make a trap out of the exhaustion doctrine which promises to exhaust the litigant and his resources, not the remedies.

I fear that our reluctance to backstop the Court of Appeals in the present case is symptomatic of this Court’s trend to sidestep all possible controversies so, as it hopes, to let them disappear. Of course we should remit a litigant to his state tribunal if facts have emerged which were not known at the time of the trial or if intervening decisions have outdated the earlier state decision. No such situation exists here. The facts are simple and uncontested : Connor’s name was substituted for John Doe after the indictment was returned. The point of law is clear now and will be no clearer on the remand. Its vulnerability tested by due process was as obvious when the case was before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as it now is. I think the Court of Appeals acted responsibly in ruling on it. We should decide the merits here and now. Endless repetitive procedures are encouraged by today’s ruling on exhaustion of remedies. I would bring this litigation to an end today by applying the exhaustion-of-remedy rule to terminate rather than multiply procedures that now engulf the state-federal regime.

       308 D. Supp. 843 (Mass. 1970).

       Title 28 U. S. C. §2254 provides in pertinent part:
      “(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that' the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
      “(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”

       Respondent does not contend that there are no available state judicial remedies through which he can present the equal protection claim. It appears that Massachusetts provides postconviction procedures adequate to adjudicate that, claim, either by motion for a new trial, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 278, § 29; see Earl v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 181, 248 N. E. 2d 498 (1969), or by writ of error, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 250; see Cortellesso v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 514, 238 N. E. 2d 516 (1968); Crowell v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 288, 225 N. E. 2d 330 (1967); Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 366, 376 n. 9, 203 N. E. 2d 811, 819 n. 9 (1965).

       “If the name of an accused person is unknown to the grand jury, he may be described by a fictitious name or by any other practicable description, with an allegation that his real name is unknown. An indictment of the defendant by a fictitious or erroneous name shall not be ground for abatement; but if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it shall be entered on the record and may be used in the subsequent proceedings, with a reference to the fact that he was indicted by the name or description mentioned in the indictment.”

       Although the Massachusetts Constitution does not expressly provide for grand jury indictments, the Massachusetts courts have construed Art. XII of the Declaration of Rights to require that “ 'no person . . . shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless he shall have been previously charged on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.’” Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344-345 (1857).

       In arguing his first assignment of error:
      “[T]he dismissal in the Gedzium case of the applicability of the Fifth Amendment provision . . . would appear to be in need of reexamination, in the light of the development by the United States Supreme Court ... of the doctrine of applicability of guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Brief for Connor in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 13.
      In arguing his third and fourth assignments of error:
      “As set forth supra in the argument in support of the first Assignment, the indictment of ‘John Doe’ was a nullity because it was a general indictment, not limited to any identifiable individual. Since this is a capital case, the defendant Connor was prosecuted in violation of his constitutional right to due process in that he was put to trial without having been indicted by a Grand Jury.” Id., at 14.

         Nor did respondent’s federal habeas petition assert a denial of equal protection. The petition alleges that “[h]e was brought to trial without indictment or presentment in violation of the Fifth Amendment and of the Massachusetts Constitution, . . . [of] the statutory provisions of [the fictitious-name statute], and of the rule of the common law that an indictment in a capital case . . . forbids any amendment to such an indictment.” In his memorandum in support of the petition, respondent argued that the Massachusetts indictment procedure “must be administered in accordance with the principles pertaining to the Grand Jury as established by the law of the land, i. e., in accordance with due process as created by the common law and adopted by our Constitution. ... In accordance with these principles, since the indictment did not name nor describe [respondent], it was, as to him, a nullity, and remained so after amendment.” The District Court, noting that respondent had “argued indiscriminately on the basis of the statutes and constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as well as upon federal grounds,” 308 F. Supp., at 845 n. 2, considered respondent’s contention to be “that the amendment of the indictment to substitute Connor’s name for John Doe was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.” The court rejected that contention on the ground “that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not make applicable to the states the grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 845.

       See n. 2, supra.

       The decision of the Court of Appeals prompted respondent, for the first time in any court, to advance the argument in this Court that “since indictment is the only process provided for the finding of probable cause in Massachusetts prior to trial, its denial in Connor’s case alone was undoubtedly a violation of Connor’s federal rights not only as to due process, but also equal protection, under the Fourteenth Amendment, as stated by the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court.” Brief for Respondent 15.

       Respondent reiterated these contentions in his federal habeas petition. See n. 7, supra.

       The Court properly says that respondent tendered the validity of Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453, 156 N. E. 890, to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That, however, was in his first assignment of error. But in his third and fourth assignments of error he alleged that he was prosecuted “in violation of his constitutional right to due process in that he was put to trial without having been indicted by a Grand Jury.”

       The overlap is, of course, not total. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499. But the extent to which the two concepts merge has been a subject of debate since Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, an architect of the Fourteenth Amendment, used the phrases “due process” and “equal protection” interchangeably on the floor of Congress. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1088-1089. See, e. g., Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 182, Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 362, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341. Compare Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45.
      There is apparently a similar controversy in India, whose constitution also contains both a due process and equal protection clause. See, e. g., Narain, Equal Protection Guarantee and the Right of Property Under the Indian Constitution, 15 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 199.

        Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F. 2d 750 (CA9), which the Court cites, is instructive. Daugharty was an indigent state prisoner. He appealed the denial of state habeas corpus to the intermediate state appellate court, but that court dismissed the appeal because Daugharty could not afford to supply an appellate transcript. He then moved the state supreme court for an order requiring that he be supplied a transcript free of charge, and when that motion was denied, sought federal habeas corpus. The District Judge denied the application for a writ on the grounds Daugharty had failed to exhaust state remedies. Despite the fact that Daugharty never even mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment, much less the Equal Protection Clause, the Court of Appeals held that his motion in the state supreme court satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
      “In moving the Oregon Supreme Court for an order requiring that a transcript be supplied without expense to him, Daugharty called attention to his inability to pay for such a record. This provided that court with all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional principle upon which appellant relies. . . . [E] xhaustion of state remedies is not to be denied because the Fourteenth Amendment was not specifically mentioned.” Id., at 758.
      Analogously, the Court of Appeals said in the instant case:
      “Petitioner did not present the constitutional question to the Massachusetts court in the particular focus in which this opinion is directed. We suggested it when the case reached us, and invited the Commonwealth to file a supplemental brief. Not unnaturally its first contention was to assert that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedy, citing Needel v. Scafati, 1 Cir., 1969, 412 F. 2d 761, cert. denied 396 U. S. 861, . . . and Subilosky v. Common-wealth, 1 Cir., 1969, 412 F. 2d 691. We find these cases inapposite. This opinion considers neither facts, as in Needel, nor precedent, as in Subilosky, that was not available to the Massachusetts court when petitioner was before it. Petitioner presented the court with `an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon [his] constitutional claim.’ United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 7 Cir., 1966, 359 F. 2d 749, 751; cf. Wilbur v. Maine, 1 Cir., 1970, 421 F. 2d 1327. That is enough to satisfy the requirements of the exhaustion . . . doctrine. Sullivan v. Scafati, 1 Cir., 1970, 428 F. 2d 1023, 1024 n. 1. We therefore turn to the merits." 434 F. 2d 673, 674.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

text:
    TOWNSEND et al. v. SWANK, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID OF ILLINOIS, et al.
    No. 70-5021.
    Argued November 8, 1971
    Decided December 20, 1971

      Michael F. Lefkow argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants in No. 70-5021. M. James Spitzer, Jr., argued the cause pro hac vice for appellants in No. 70-5032. With him on the briefs was Melvin B. Goldberg.

      Donald J. Veverka, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Francis T. Crowe, Bernard Genis, and David E. Bradshaw, Assistant Attorneys General.

      Solicitor General Griswold and Richard B. Stone filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases.

      Together with No. 70-5032, Alexander et al. v. Swank, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al., also on appeal from the same court.

   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants, two college students and their mothers, brought this class action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that § 4M.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, § 4-1.1 (1967) and the implementing Illinois Public Aid Regulation 150 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, because inconsistent with § 406 (a) (2) (B) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §606 (a)(2)(B), also violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Under the Illinois statute and regulation needy dependent children 18 through 20 years of age who attend high school or vocational training school are eligible for benefits under the federally assisted Aid to ramifies With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seg., but such children who attend a college or university are not eligible. Section 406 (a)(2) of the Social Security Act, on the other hand, defines “dependent child” to include a child . . (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment.” A three-judge district court held that neither constitutional contention had merit and sustained the validity of the Illinois statute and regulation. 314 F. Supp. 1082 (1970). We noted probable jurisdiction, 401 U. S. 906 (1971). We hold that the Illinois statute and regulation conflict with § 406 (a) (2) (B) and for that reason are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We therefore reverse on that ground without reaching the equal protection issue.

I

Section 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act provides that state participatory plans submitted under the AFDC program for the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) must provide “that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” (Emphasis supplied.) In King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), we considered whether a State participating in an AFDC program may, consistently with the Supremacy Clause, adopt eligibility standards that exclude from benefits needy dependent children eligible for benefits under applicable federal statutory standards. There was before us in that case a regulation of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security that treated a man who cohabited with the mother of needy dependent children in or outside the home as a nonabsent “parent” within the federal statute. Since aid can be granted under § 406 (a) of the Federal Act only if a “parent” of the needy child is continually absent from the home, Alabama's regulation resulted in the ineligibility of the children for benefits. We held that the Alabama regulation defined “parent” in a manner inconsistent with § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act and therefore that in “denying AFDC assistance to [children] on the basis of this invalid regulation, Alabama has breached its federally imposed obligation to furnish ‘aid to families with dependent children . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals _’ ” 392 U. S., at 333.

Thus, King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We recognize that HEW regulations seem to imply that States may to some extent vary eligibility requirements from federal standards. However, the principle that accords substantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the department entrusted with its administration is inapplicable insofar as those regulations are inconsistent with the requirement of § 402 (a) (10) that aid be furnished “to all eligible individuals.” (Emphasis supplied.) King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 333 n. 34.

II

It is next argued that in the case of 18-20-year-old needy dependent children, Congress authorized the States to vary eligibility requirements from federal standards. In other words, it is contended that Congress authorized the States to discriminate between these needy dependent children solely upon the basis of the type of school attended. Our examination of the legislative history has uncovered no evidence that Congress granted the asserted authority. On the contrary, we are persuaded that the history supports the conclusion that Congress meant to continue financial assistance for AFDC programs for the age group only in States that conformed their eligibility requirements to the federal eligibility standards.

Section 406 (a) (2) (B) makes dependent 18-20-year-olds eligible for benefits whether attending a college or university, or attending a course of vocational or technical training. The only discretion written into the statute permits a State to determine, “in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,” whether a particular student, without regard to whether his attendance is at a college or vocational school, is a student “regularly attending” a bona fide school. This particularization of the area of state authority is itself cogent evidence that Congress did not also authorize the States to limit eligibility to students attending vocational school.

Nor is there anything in the legislative history of the evolution of § 406 (a) (2) (B) to support appellees' argument. That history does show that whenever Congress extended AFDC eligibility to older children — from those under 16 to those 16-17, and finally to those 18-20— Congress left to the individual States the decision whether to participate in the program for the new age group. There is no legislative history, however, to support the proposition that Congress also gave to the individual States an option to tailor eligibility standards within the age group, and thus exclude children eligible under the federal standards.

The original Social Security Act provided aid only to dependent children under the age of 16. 49 Stat. 629. A 1939 amendment extended aid to children age 16-17 “regularly attending school,” 53 Stat. 1380. The States were not, however, required to extend their AFDC programs to the 16-17-year age group. See H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 28-29 (1939). But if a State chose to do so, not a word in the legislative history suggests that it might limit its choice to students attending schools selected by the State, and exclude children of the age group attending other schools.

In 1956 Congress deleted the school attendance requirement and provided for benefits for all dependent children of the 16-17 age group. 70 Stat. 850. The Senate Report on this bill stated that the bill would “permit Federal sharing in assistance to such children” and also that the bill would “make some additional needy children eligible for aid.” S. Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1956). (Emphasis supplied.) The Conference Report stated that the bill would “eliminate the requirement that a needy child between 16 and 18 years of age must be regularly attending school in order to be eligible for aid to dependent children.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2936, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1956). Significantly, nothing in the legislative history of that change indicates that the States were at liberty to continue to limit eligibility to 16-17-year-olds attending school.

The first provision for the age group 18-20 came in 1964 when benefits were authorized but limited to children attending high school or vocational school. 78 Stat. 1042. As in the case of the 1939 amendments extending aid to children 16-17 regularly attending school, the States had the choice whether to participate in this new program; S. Rep. No. 1517, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1964), expressly stated that “extension of the program in this manner would be optional with the States.” When in 1965 Congress amended § 406 (a) (2) (B) in the form now before us nothing was said to indicate that States that had adopted the 1964 program limited to children attending vocational schools were free to continue that limited program and not extend it to children 18-20 attending a college or university. The relevant Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 404, pt. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 147 (1965), implies the contrary, stating:

“Under existing law States, at their option, may continue payments to needy children up to age 21 in the aid to families with dependent children program, providing they are ‘regularly attending a high school in pursuance of a course of study leading to a high school diploma or its equivalent, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment.’ The committee added an amendment extending this provision so as to include needy children under 21 who are regularly ‘attending a school, college, or university.’ ”

Moreover, the Report notes that one of the purposes of the extension was to bring AFDC in line with the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. Under that program an insured’s child is eligible for insurance benefits if he is a full-time student finder 22 years' of age, and under §402 (d)(7) this includes a student attending a college or university. S. Rep. No. 404 attributed to the provision under both programs a purpose to “assure, as far as possible, that children will not be prevented from going to school or college because they are deprived of parental support.” S: Rep. No. 404, supra, at 147. This theme carried through the Conference Committee Report: “This- 'amendment would broaden the type of schools .that children over the age of 18 and under the age of 21 may attend and receive aid to families with dependent children payments in which the Federal Government will participate.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 682, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1965).

In sum, when application of AFDC was extended to a new age group — in 1939 to 16-17-year-olds and in 1964 to 18-20-year-olds — Congress took care to make explicit that the decision whether to participate was left to the individual States. However, when application of AFDC within the age group was enlarged- — in 1956 to all 16-17-year-olds and in 1965 to 18-20-year-olds attending college or a university — the evidence, if not as clear, is that financial support of AFDC programs for the age group was to continue only in States that conformed their eligibility requirements to the new federal standards. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of this construction to avoid the necessity of passing upon the equal protection issue. “Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641 (1969). Notwithstanding the view of the majority of the District Court, 314 F. Supp., at 1088-1089, we think there is a serious question whether the Illinois classification can withstand the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause. The majority justified the classification as designed to attain the twin goals of aiding needy children to become employable and self-sufficient, and of insuring fiscal integrity of the State’s welfare program. We doubt the rationality of the classification as a means of furthering the goal of aiding needy children to become employable and self-sufficient; we' are not told what basis in practical experience supports the proposition that children with a vocational training are more readily employable than children with a college education. And a State’s interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its welfare program by economically allocating limited AFDC resources may not be protected by the device of adopting eligibility requirements restricting the class of children made eligible by federal standards. That interest may be protected by the State’s “undisputed power to set the level of benefits . . . .” King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 334. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).

Reversed.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result reached by the Court, but add this brief comment. In dealing with these cases — and the other AFDC cases on the Court's docket — it seems appropriate to keep clearly in mind that Title IY of the Social Security Act governs the dispensation of federal funds and that it does no more than that. True, Congress has used the “power of the purse” to force the States to adhere to its wishes to a certain extent; but adherence to the provisions of Title IV is in no way mandatory upon the States under the Supremacy Clause. The appropriate inquiry in any case should be, simply, whether the State has indeed adhered to the provisions and is accordingly entitled to utilize federal funds in support of its program. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420 (1970). I agree that the answer to that inquiry here must be in the negative; I therefore concur in the result reached by the Court.

       Section 4-1.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §4-1.1 (1967), provides:
      “Child Age Eligibility. The child or children must be under age 18, or age 18 or over but under age 21 if in regular attendance in high school or in a vocational or technical training school. 'Regular Attendance,’ as used in this Section, means attendance full time during the regular terms of such schools, or attendance part time during such regular terms as may be authorized by rule of the Illinois Department for the purpose of permitting the child to engage in employment which supplements his classroom instruction or which otherwise enhances his development toward a self-supporting status.”
      Illinois Department of Public Aid Regulation 150 provides:
      “Age Requirements:
      “A. D. C. Dependent children under 18 years of age, unless 18 through 20 years of age and in regular attendance in high school or vocational or technical training school. (This does not include 18 through 20 year old children in college.)”

       Appellant Loverta Alexander lives with her son Jerome in Chicago. Jerome reached his 18th birthday in August 1968 and enrolled in junior college about a month later. In early October a Cook County welfare officer notified Mrs. Alexander that the AFDC benefits received by her since 1963 would be terminated as of November 1, 1968. Though Mrs. Alexander was able to obtain general assistance benefits from the State, the termination of AFDC payments resulted in a loss of $23.52 per month in the family’s income. The only reason given by the State for the termination was that Jerome had reached his 18th birthday and was not attending high school or vocational school
      Appellant Georgia Townsend is the sole support of Omega Minor, her only child. Mrs. Townsend, who is disabled, received AFDC benefits for herself and her daughter from 1953 through 1960. Thereafter she received an AFDC grant for Omega, and benefits for herself under the Aid to the Disabled provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et seq. In September 1966, Omega enrolled in junior college. Two months later a Cook County welfare officer notified Mrs. Townsend that Omega’s monthly AFDC payment would be canceled as of January 1967. While Mrs. Townsend’s disability payments were increased to meet her own needs, the loss of AFDC benefits resulted in a reduction of $47.94 per month in family income. Again the only reason given was the failure to comply with the Illinois statute and regulation.
      This action was brought by Mrs. Alexander under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the termination of her AFDC benefits. Mrs. Townsend intervened as a plaintiff on behalf of herself and her daughter Omega, and as a member of the class described in Mrs. Alexander’s complaint. The three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, held that appellants’ complaint stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, and was a proper class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23. Those holdings are not challenged in this Court.

       See e. g., HEW’s so-called “Condition X” embodied in a regulation found in 45 CFR § 233.10 (a) (1) (ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 3866:
      “The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.” See also HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, 4210 (1962); Note, Welfare’s “Condition X,” 76 Yale L. J. 1222 (1967).

       See HEW Handbook, swpra, n. 3, pt. IV, “Green Sheets,” G-3220 (1965); cf. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 682, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 69-70 (1965).

       The United States, as amicus curiae, cites sections of the Social Security Act as supporting Illinois’ contention that its college-vocational school distinction is authorized. For example, the United States refers to § 406 (a) which originally defined “dependent child” to include a child living with his “father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, or aunt.” 49 Stat. 629. A statement by Senator Harrison during debate on this provision, 79 Cong. Rec. 9269, is said to establish that the States were not required to extend assistance for every relative listed in the section. Section 407 (b) is also cited as explicitly reserving to the States a choice whether to participate in certain parts of the AFDC program. But these are express authorizations to depart from federal eligibility standards; there is no express authorization in this case.

       It appears that some States and the District of Columbia continued to limit payments to 16-17-year-olds attending school and to handicapped children prevented from doing so. HEW Public Assistance Report No. 50, Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans under the Social Security Act (1964. ed.).

       HEW itself states: “Within the age limit set by the State, there should be a choice of attending a school, college, or university or taking a course of vocational or technical training for gainful employment.” HEW; Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, supra, n. 3, pt. IV, “Green Sheets,” G-3220 (1965).

       The concurring opinion below acknowledged that the reasonable basis for the classification would not be apparent if incentives to learn white- and blue-collar trades and the supply and demand for professional and labor positions were the same. The opinion concluded, however, that the classification could be reasonable in the context of a labor market in which “the skills of manual laborers are in short supply,” because in such a market, “as a means of utilizing limited state funds in an effort to channel persons into those employment positions for which the society has great need, the statutory discrimination between college students and post-high school vocational trainees is not purely arbitrary or invidious, but rather, a rational approach designed to correct a perceived problem.” 314 F. Supp., at 1091. Apart from the fact that nothing appears about the nature of the market, a classification that channels one class of people, poor people, into a particular class of low-paying, low-status jobs would plainly raise substantial questions under the Equal Protection Clause.


author: Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice Blackmun,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. CAMPOS-SERRANO
    No. 70-46.
    Argued October 14, 1971
    Decided December 20, 1971

      William Bradford Reynolds argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Roger A. Pauley.

      John J. Cleary, by appointment of the Court, 401 U. S. 990, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, Joel M. Flaum, First Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Illinois as amicus curiae urging reversal.
   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent was convicted in a federal district court of possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1546, and sentenced to a three-year prison term. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, 430 F. 2d 173, holding that because of the circumstances under which Government agents had acquired the card from the respondent, it had been unconstitutionally admitted against him at the trial under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. We granted certiorari. 401 U. S. 936. We do not reach the constitutional issue, however, for we have concluded that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed upon a discrete statutory ground. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandéis, J., concurring). We hold that possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card is not an act punishable under 18 U. S. C. § 1546.

The statutory provision in question prohibits, inter alia, the counterfeiting or alteration of, or the possession, use, or receipt of an already counterfeited or altered “immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States.” This offense originated in Section 22 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which covered only an “immigration visa or permit.” The words “other document required for entry into the United States,” were added in 1952 as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. §402 (a), 66 Stat. 275. The legislative history of the 1952 Act, however, does not make clear which “other” entry documents the Congress had in mind.

Alien registration receipt cards were first issued in 1941. They are small, simple cards containing the alien’s picture and basic identification information. They have no function whatsoever in facilitating the initial entry into the United States. Rather, they are issued after an alien has entered the country and taken up residence. Their essential purpose is to effectuate the registration requirement fór all resident aliens established in the Alien Registration Act of 1940.

Until 1952, alien registration receipt cards could not even be used to facilitate re-entry into the United States by a resident alien who had left temporarily. Such an alien was required to obtain special documents authorizing his re-entry into the country, such as a visa or a re-entry permit. However, in 1952 — less than a month before final enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act — the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated a regulation that allowed resident aliens to use their registration receipt cards for re-entry purposes as a permissible substitute for the specialized documents. The apparent reason for this regulation was to minimize paper work and streamline administrative procedures by giving resident aliens the option of using for re-entry a document already issued and serving other purposes. Thus, the registration receipt cards may now be used in lieu of a visa or a re-entry permit on condition that the holder is returning to the United States after a temporary absence of not more than one year.

The Court of Appeals held that the limited, merely permissible, re-entry function of the alien registration receipt card is sufficient to make it a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. 430 F. 2d, at 175. We cannot agree. It has long been settled that “penal statutes are to be construed strictly,” Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co,, 347 U. S. 284, 296, and that one “is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it,” Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356, 362. “[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222. In § 1546, Congress did speak in “clear and definite” language. But, taken literally and given its plain and ordinary meaning, that language does not impose a criminal penalty for possession of a counterfeited alien registration receipt card. Alien registration receipt cards may be used for re-entry by certain persons into the United States. They are not required for entry.

The canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, of course, “does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.” United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 510. If an absolutely literal reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a less literal construction must be considered. In this spirit, we read § 1546 in conjunction with 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a) (13) — another part of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act — which provides that, under most circumstances, an “entry” into the United States is defined to include a “re-entry.” We have held in the past that Congress did not intend these terms to be taken entirely synonymously. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449. But Congress clearly did intend a significant overlap, and we cannot say that a document usable for “entry” into the United States under § 1546 does not include some documents usable for “re-entry.” Nor do we hold that § 1546 applies only to those documents absolutely “required” in order to enter or re-enter the country. To do so would undermine the congressional purpose behind § 1546, since the Immigration and Naturalization Service has not required that presentation of any one particular document be the exclusive condition of crossing our borders.

While the apparent congressional purpose underlying § 1546 would thus seem to bar an uncompromisingly literal construction, the precise language of the provision must not be deprived of all force. The principle of strict construction of criminal statutes demands that some determinate limits be established based upon the actual words of the statute. Accordingly, a “document required for entry into the United States” cannot be construed to include any document whatsoever that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, from time to time, decides may be presented for re-entry at the border. The language of § 1546 denotes a very special class of “entry” documents — documents whose primary raison d’etre is the facilitation of entry into the country. The phrase, “required for entry into the United States,” is descriptive of the nature of the documents; it is not simply an open-ended reference to future administrative regulations.

If, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service were to allow the presentation of identification such as a driver’s license at the border, the nature of such a license would not suddenly change so that it would fall into the category of a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. To be sure, if a counterfeit driver’s license were presented to secure entry or re-entry into the country, the bearer could be prosecuted under 8 U. S. C. § 1325, which provides for the punishment of “[a]ny alien who . . . obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation . . . .” But mere possession of a counterfeit driver’s license, far from the border, could not be prosecuted under § 1546. The reason is that a driver’s license is not essentially an “entry” document. Rather, its primary purpose is to allow its bearer lawfully to drive a car, and the bearer’s possession of a counterfeit license, far from the border, could not be assumed to be related to the policies underlying the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.

The same analysis applies to the alien registration receipt card. Its essential purpose is not to secure entry into the United States, but to identify the bearer as a lawfully registered alien residing in the United States. It is issued to an alien after he has taken up residence in this country. It is intended to govern his activities and presence within this country. The card has been given a convenient, additional function as a permissible substitute for a visa or re-entry permit in facilitating re-entry into the United States by a resident alien. But, unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, an alien registration receipt card serves this function in only a secondary way. Unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, it is not, by its nature, a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546.

This construction of the language of § 1546 is conclusively supported by that section’s statutory context. In the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress clearly regarded alien registration receipt cards as serving policies separate and distinct from those served by pure “entry” documents. Although, in 1952, those cards could be used as substitutes for visas or re-entry permits, the Congress chose to deal with them separately. In 8 U. S. C. § 1306 (c) and § 1306 (d), it specifically provided for the punishment of one “who procures or attempts to procure registration of himself or another person through fraud” and of one who counterfeits an alien registration receipt card. The fact that the Congress did not rely on § 1546 to ensure the integrity of alien registration receipt cards indicates that it did not believe that they were covered by that section. Moreover, there is a very specific overlap between § 1546 and § 1306. Both sections explicitly prohibit counterfeiting, and both explicitly prohibit fraud in the acquisition of documents. Unless we assume that § 1306 is mere sur-plusage, we must conclude that § 1546 covers only specialized “entry” documents, and not alien registration receipt cards specifically covered in § 1306.

For these reasons the judgment is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White join,

dissenting.

The Court today affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals “upon a discrete statutory ground” and does not reach the questions with respect to which certiorari was granted. This statutory ground was rejected by the District Court when it denied a defense motion to dismiss the indictment. It was also rejected by the Court of Appeals. 430 F. 2d 173, 175-176. I would reject it here.

The statutory issue to which the Court retreats is whether an alien registration card is a "document required for entry into the United States,” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1546. The Court holds, somewhat to the surprise of the litigants I am sure, that the card is not such a document, and that Campos-Serrano’s indictment, therefore, charged no offense under the statute. I feel that this conclusion has no support either in the statutory language and meaning or in the legislative history, and is certainly not supported by the practice, long in effect, at our Nation’s borders.

I

The parent of § 1546 is § 22 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1924. 43 Stat. 165. That statute did not refer to “any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States,” as § 1546 does today. Instead, it spoke only of “any immigrant visa or permit.” Nevertheless, even under the definition of “permit” in this older and narrower statute, Congress specifically included a temporary re-entry paper issued to and used by a resident alien who wished to leave the country for a period of less than one year. Clearly, therefore, the statutory scheme, as far back as 1924, contemplated that knowing possession of an altered document useful only for re-entering the United States was punishable as a felony.

The registration card came into being with Title III of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 673. At first it served only for identification of the alien who had complied with the registration requirements. Section 30 of the 1940 Act, however, authorized the use of a separate “border-crossing identification card” by a resident alien in order to enable him to return to the United States after temporary travel to a contiguous country.

An INS regulation filed May 29, 1952, provided that a registration card, issued on or after September 10, 1946, “shall constitute a resident alien’s border crossing card” and could be used by the alien in effecting re-entry into the United States provided he had not visited any foreign territory other than Canada or Mexico. 17 Fed. Reg. 4921-4922. This was the first time a registration card, as such, was recognized as a re-entry document. But it was so recognized. Five years later its use was expanded with respect to re-entry from nations that were not contiguous. 22 Fed. Reg. 6377 (1957). Its use for this purpose has continued to the present time. 8 CFR §211.1 (b) (1971).

In addition to this administrative practice, the statutory language itself was expanded. Section 22 (a) of the 1924 Act was repealed in 1948 and simultaneously re-enacted without significant change as 18 U. S. C. § 1546 and as part of that year’s general recodification of the federal criminal laws. 62 Stat. 771, 865. Finally, § 1546 was amended to its present form by § 402 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 275.

There is no room for dispute that the 1952 change served to broaden, not to contract, the number of documents within the prohibition of § 1546. The 1924 reference to “any immigration visa or permit” is obviously but a lesser part of the later and still current phrase, “any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry.” See United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 484 n. 3 (SD Cal. 1960), rev’d in part on other grounds, sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F. 2d 545 (CA9), cert. denied, 366 U. S. 948 (1961). From 1924 until the 1952 legislation, narrower statutory language nevertheless had covered a document used solely for re-entry. Surely nothing in the expanded language of 1952 suggests congressional intent thenceforth to confine the statute to initial-entry documents. Indeed, congressional intent to the contrary, that is, to enlarge the coverage of § 1546, is evident not only from the statute’s words but, as well, from the definition of “éntry” in the 1952 Act, § 101 (a) (13), 66 Stat. 167, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (13):

“The term 'entry’ means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise, except . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

From this it inevitably follows that the phrase “document required for entry” embraces a document used for re-entry into the United States. One document of that kind is the alien registration card.

This brief but clear administrative and legislative history, it seems to me, reveals and proves the intent of Congress and the meaning and reach of the statute. The alien registration card, Form 1-151, became one of a number of documents specified and accepted and required for re-entry.

The Court’s opinion, as I read it, seems to accept most of all this, that is, that there is no § 1546 distinction between “entry” and “re-entry,” and that an alien registration card is a document “required” for entry into the United States. Ante, at 298.

Having made this broad and, to me, sensible reading of § 1546, the Court, however, then reverses direction and conveniently restricts § 1546 to “a very special class of 'entry’ documents — documents whose primary raison d’etre is the facilitation of entry into the country,” and it accuses the INS of standing to gain “an open-ended reference to future administrative regulations” if the Government were to prevail here. The reasons for this change of direction are not apparent to me. The Court’s comparison of the registration card to a driver’s license in this context is wide of the mark. A driver’s license has nothing to do with immigration. A registration card has everything to do with immigration. It is authorized under the immigration statutes. It is required of a resident alien. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1306. And for almost two decades it has been a re-entry document.

II

The fact that there may be some overlapping between § 1546 and 8 U. S. C. § 1306 (d) does not prevent the application of § 1546 to the alien registration card. Section 1306 (d) came into being as § 266 (d) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 226. It does refer specifically to “an alien registration receipt card,” whereas § 1546 has no such specific reference. The two sections, however, have different purposes and relate to different aspects of immigration. Section 266 (d) was a part of the Act's chapter that concerned “Registration of Aliens.” It has to do with the implementation and protection of the alien registration scheme. It reached counterfeiting alone. Section 1546, on the other hand, is concerned with entry into the country and with the integrity of documents used in effecting entry. It is not restricted to counterfeiting. It also reaches knowing possession and alteration.

The Court’s exclusion of the alien registration card from the reach of § 1546 leaves entirely free from punishment the alteration of a card and the possession of a card with knowledge of its altered or counterfeit character. Surely Congress did not intend to leave that loophole.

I therefore dissent from the Court’s affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals upon the “discrete statutory ground.” I would decide that issue as the Court of Appeals decided it and I would go on to reach the questions we anticipated when we granted the petition for certiorari.

       The applicable portion of § 1546 reads as follows:
      “Whoever . . . knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, or document, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained ....
      “Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

       The sentence was suspended, and the respondent was placed on probation for three years “on condition that he return to Mexico and not return to the United States illegally.” Pursuant to this sentence, he was remanded to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation under a previous order. It appears that he is now in Mexico. Clearly, the fact that the respondent is now out of the country does not render this case moot. He is still under the sentence of the District Court and on probation subject to conditions imposed by the District Court. Should he violate those conditions, he will be subject to imprisonment under his continuing criminal sentence.

        Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189, is irrelevant to this case. There, the -petitioner fled voluntarily from the United States and successfully resisted extradition. We, therefore, declined to consider the merits of his case, just as we have declined over the years to consider the merits of criminal cases in which the party seeking review has escaped “from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366; Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692; Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97. “While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles [the party] to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, at 366. In the present case, by contrast, the respondent has not fled from the restraints imposed by the District Court pursuant to this conviction. Rather, he is living under those restraints today.

       “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”

       Accord, United States v. Fernandez-Gonzalez (64 CR 101, ND Ill.) (unpublished opinion). Contrary to the suggestion in the dissenting opinion, our decision on this issue of statutory construction will hardly come as a “surprise” to the parties. The issue was presented to and decided by the Court of Appeals. It was argued and fully briefed before this Court by both parties.

       43 Stat. 165.

       See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. The only one of these reports to make any mention whatsoever of the changes in § 1546 was H. R. Rep. No. 1365. It simply stated that “necessary amendments [are made] to other laws .... Most of those amendments are in the nature of conforming changes.” Id., at 88. It seems most likely that the purpose of the new language in § 1546 was to reach the specialized border-crossing identification cards, authorized as a substitute for a visa or a permit in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. See n. 9 and n. 12, infra. At the time H. R. Rep. No. 1365 was published, the alien registration receipt card had no “entry” or “re-entry” function.

       The Appendix filed by the Government in this case contains a reproduction of an alien registration receipt card, Form 1-151 of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

       See 54 Stat. 673. The statutory provisions for the registration of aliens are now contained in 8 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1306.

       Provision for the use of re-entry permits was made in the Immigration Act of 1924, § 10, 43 Stat. 158. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 required that an alien present one of three special documents — a visa, a re-entry permit, or a border-crossing identification card — in order to come into the United States. 54 Stat. 673.

       The 1952 INS regulation provided that the alien registration receipt card could be used as a permissible substitute for a visa or a re-entry permit in effecting a re-entry into this country from a contiguous country. 17 Fed. Reg. 4921. In 1957, this permissible use of the alien registration receipt card was expanded to include re-entry from noncontiguous nations. 22 Fed. Reg. 6377. The present INS regulation appeals in 8 CFR §211.1 (b).

       8 CFR §211.1 (b).

       Visas and re-entry permits are the specialized “entry” documents for which the alien registration receipt card is a permissible substitute under present INS regulations. See n. 10, supra.

      Border-crossing identification cards are like visas and re-entry permits, and unlike alien registration receipt cards, in that they are specialized documents whose sole purpose and function is to regulate the crossing of our national borders. Hence; the likelihood that Congress in 1952 wished to expand the coverage of § 1546 to reach border-crossing identification cards, see n. 6, supra, supports our holding. The expansion mandated by Congress was simply within the class of specialized “entry” documents.

       The prohibition of counterfeiting in § 1546 is contained in the first paragraph of that section. See n. 1, supra. The prohibition of fraud in the acquisition of documents is contained in the third paragraph of § 1546, which reads as follows:
      “Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or for admission to the United States personates another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without disclosing his true identity ....
      “Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

       “ `[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115-116. See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308. To be sure, the overlap between § 1546 and § 1306 is only partial, since § 1546 goes farther than § 1306—prohibiting the possession of counterfeit documents as well as the counterfeiting of documents. But the Congress would hardly have thought it necessary to create any overlap at all, if it had believed alien registration receipt cards were covered by § 1546.

       “1. Whether the court below unduly extended Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, by holding, on the facts of this case, that agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were required to give respondent warnings before asking him to produce his alien registration card.
      “2. Whether an alien registration card is a ‘required record’ which an alien must produce upon request irrespective of whether he is ‘in custody.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 2.

       Sections 28 (k) and 10 of the 1924 Act, 43 Stat. 169 and 158.

       The face of the card, Form 1-151, bears the recital, “This card will be honored in lieu of a visa and passport on condition that the rightful holder is returning to the United States after a temporary absence of not more than one year and is not subject to exclusion under any provision of the immigration laws.”

       Overlapping in federal criminal statutes is not unknown. See, for example, Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343 (1965); Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958); Achilli v. United States, 353 U. S. 373 (1957); Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 (1957); Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943)

       The loophole is not closed by 8 U. S. C. § 1325, as the respondent would assert. Section 1325 concerns a very different offense, namely, the actual misuse of the entry document in obtaining entry to the United States. Section 1546, on the other hand, relates to potential misuse of the entry document after gaining entry to the country.