source: Caselaw Access Project

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    ILLINOIS v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, et al.
    No. 49,
    Orig.
    Argued February 29, 1972
    Decided April 24, 1972

      Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Fred F. Herzog argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs was William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois.

      Harry O. Slater argued the cause for defendants. With him on the brief for defendant City of Milwaukee were John J. Fleming and Richard F. Maruszewski. Michael S. Fisher and Burton A. Scott filed a brief for defendant City of Kenosha. Jack Harvey, Edward A. Krenzke, and Louis J. Roshar filed a brief for defendant City of Racine. Mr. Fleming and Harvey G. Odenbrett filed a brief for defendant Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee. Ewald L. Moerke, Jr., filed a brief for defendant Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee.
   Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a motion by Illinois to file a bill of complaint under our original jurisdiction against four cities of Wisconsin, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. The cause of action alleged is pollution by the defendants of Lake Michigan, a body of interstate water. According to plaintiff, some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste materials are discharged daily into the lake in the Milwaukee area alone. Plaintiff alleges that it and its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges, but that the defendants do not take such actions. Plaintiff asks that we abate this public nuisance.

I

Article III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: “In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” Congress has provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 that “(a) the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between two or more States.”

It has long been this Court’s philosophy that “our original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly.” Utah v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95. We construe 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1), as we do Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, to honor our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only in appropriate cases. And the question of what is appropriate concerns, of course, the seriousness and dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had. We incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer. Washington v. General Motors Corp., post, p. 109.

Illinois presses its request for leave to file saying that the agencies named as defendants are instrumentalities of Wisconsin and therefore that this is a suit against Wisconsin which could not be brought in any other forum.

Under our decisions there is no doubt that the actions of public entities might, under appropriate pleadings, be attributed to a State so as to warrant a joinder of the State as party defendant.

In Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, Missouri invoked our original jurisdiction by an action against the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of Chicago, seeking an injunction to restrain the discharge of raw sewage into the Mississippi River. On a demurrer to the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, Illinois argued that the Sanitary District was the proper defendant and that Illinois should not have been made a party. That argument was rejected:

“The contention . . . seems to be that, because the matters complained of in the bill proceed and will continue to proceed from the acts of the Sanitary District of Chicago, a corporation of the State of Illinois, it therefore follows that the State, as such, is not interested in the question, and is improperly made a party.
“We are unable to see the force of this suggestion. The bill does not allege that the Sanitary District is acting without or in excess of lawful authority. The averment and the conceded facts are that the corporation is an agency of the State to do the very things which, according to the theory of the complainant’s case, will result in the mischief to be apprehended. It is state action and its results that are complained of — thus distinguishing this case from that of Louisiana v. Texas [176 U. S. 1], where the' acts sought to be restrained were alleged to be those of officers or functionaries proceeding in a wrongful and malevolent misapplication of the quarantine laws of Texas. The Sanitary District of Chicago is not a private corporation, formed for purposes of private gain, but a public corporation, whose existence and operations are wholly within the control of the State.
“The object of the bill is to subject this public work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the method of its construction and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health of a neighboring State and its inhabitants. Surely, in such a case, the State of Illinois would have a right to appear and traverse the allegations of the bill, and, having such a right, might properly be made a party defendant.” 180 U. S., at 242.

In New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, the State of New York brought an original action against the State of New Jersey and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, seeking an injunction against the discharge of sewage into Upper New York Bay. The question was whether the actions of the sewage agency could be attributed to New Jersey so as to make that State responsible for them. The Court said:

“Also, for the purpose of showing the responsibility of the State of New Jersey for the proposed action of the defendant, the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, the bill sets out, with much detail, the acts of the legislature of that State authorizing and directing such action on their part.
“Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments of the bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant sewerage commissioners constitute such a statutory, corporate agency of the State that their action, actual or intended, must be treated as that of the State itself, and we shall so regard it.” 256 U. S., at 302.

The most recent case is New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369. The action was originally brought by the State of New Jersey against the City and State of New York for injunctive relief against the diversion of waters from Delaware River tributaries lying within New York State. Pennsylvania was subsequently allowed to intervene. The question presented by this decision was the right of the City of Philadelphia also to intervene in the proceedings as a party plaintiff. The issues raised were broad:

“All of the present parties to the litigation have formally opposed the motion to intervene on grounds (1) that the intervention would permit a suit against a state by a citizen of another state in contravention of the Eleventh Amendment; (2) that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has the exclusive right to represent the interest of Philadelphia as parens pa-triae; and (3) that intervention should be denied, in any event, as a matter of sound discretion.” 345 U. S., at 372.

We denied the City of Philadelphia’s motion to intervene, saying:

“The City of Philadelphia represents only a part of the citizens of Pennsylvania who reside in the watershed area of the Delaware River and its tributaries and depend upon those waters. If we undertook to evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we could, in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the distribution of water within the Commonwealth. . . .
“Our original jurisdiction should not be thus expanded to the dimensions of ordinary class actions. An intervenor whose state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state.” 345 U. S., at 373.

We added:

“The presence of New York City in this litigation is urged as a reason for permitting Philadelphia to intervene. But the argument misconstrues New York City’s position in the case. New York City was not admitted into this litigation as a matter of discretion at her request. She was forcibly joined as a defendant to the original action since she was the authorized agent for the execution of the sovereign policy which threatened injury to the citizens of New Jersey. Because of this position as a defendant, subordinate to the parent state as the primary defendant, New York City’s position in the case raises no problems under the Eleventh Amendment.” 345 U. S., at 374-375.

We conclude that while, under appropriate pleadings, Wisconsin could be joined as a defendant in the present controversy, it is not mandatory that it be made one.

It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship, political subdivisions are citizens of their respective States. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179; Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 122. If a political subdivision is a citizen for diversity purposes, then it would make no jurisdictional difference whether it was the plaintiff or defendant in such an action. That being the case, a political subdivision in one State would be able to bring an action founded upon diversity jurisdiction against a political subdivision of another State.

We therefore conclude that the term “States” as used in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(1) should not be read to include their political subdivisions. That, of course, does not mean that political subdivisions of a State may not be sued under the head of our original jurisdiction, for 28 U. S. C. § 1251 provides that “(b) the Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (3) all actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State . . .

If the named public entities of Wisconsin may, however, be sued by Illinois in a federal district court, our original jurisdiction is not mandatory.

It is to that aspect of the case that we now turn.

II

Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

The considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount provided in § 1331 (a). See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121; Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 492; Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 116 F. 2d 604, 606; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 117-119 (2d ed. 1970); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369. The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the “laws” of the United States within the meaning of § 1331(a). We hold that it does; and we also hold that § 1331 (á) includes suits brought by a State.

Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the four members of this Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 393 (dissenting and concurring), who reached the issue, concluded that “laws,” within the meaning of § 1331 (a), embraced claims founded on federal common law:

“The contention cannot be accepted that since petitioner’s rights are judicially defined, they are not created by 'the laws ... of the United States’ within the meaning of § 1331 .... In another context, that of state law, this Court has recognized that the statutory word 'laws’ includes court decisions. The converse situation is presented here in that federal courts have an extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law .... These rules are as fully ‘laws’ of the United States as if they had been enacted by Congress.” (Citations omitted.)

Lower courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e. g., Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 388 F. 2d 609, 611-612 (CA2 1967); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F. 2d 662 (CA4 1959); Mater v. Holley, 200 F. 2d 123 (CA5 1952); American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 180-182 (1969).

Judge Harvey M. Johnsen in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 240, stated the controlling principle:

“As the field of federal common law has been given necessary expansion into matters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not here), the ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them from sources outside the State’s own territory, now would and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal common law and so directly constituting a question arising under the laws of the United States.”

Chief Judge Lumbard, speaking for the panel in Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F. 2d 486, 492, expressed the same view as follows:

“We believe that a cause of action similarly ‘arises under’ federal law if the dispositive issues stated in the complaint require the application of federal common law .... The word ‘laws’ in § 1331 should be construed to include laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as by congressional legislation. The rationale of the 1875 grant of federal question jurisdiction — to insure the availability of a forum designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward, and specially suited to the vindication of, federally created rights — is as applicable to judicially created rights as to rights created by statute.” (Citations omitted.)

We see no reason not to give “laws” its natural meaning, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., supra, at 393 n. 5 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring), and therefore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.

As respects the power of a State to bring an action under § 1331 (a), Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 470-472, is controlling. There Kansas had sued a number of corporations in its own courts and, since federal rights were involved, the defendants had the cases removed to the federal court. Kansas resisted, saying that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because of Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which gives this Court "original Jurisdiction” in "all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party.” The Court held that where a State is suing parties who are not other States, the original jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive (id., at 470) and that those suits “may now be brought in or removed to the Circuit Courts [now the District Courts] without regard to the character of the parties.” Ibid. We adhere to that ruling.

Ill

Congress has enacted numerous laws touching interstate waters. In 1899 it established some surveillance by the Army Corps of Engineers over industrial pollution, not including sewage, Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, a grant of power which we construed in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482, and in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U. S. 224.

The 1899 Act has been reinforced and broadened by a complex of laws recently enacted. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1151, tightens control over discharges into navigable waters so as not to lower applicable water quality standards. By the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., Congress “authorizes and directs” that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act” and that “all agencies of the Federal Government shall. .. identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmak-ing along with economic and technical considerations.” Sec. 102, 42 U. S. C. § 4332. Congress has evinced increasing concern with the quality of the aquatic environment as it affects the conservation and safeguarding of fish and wildlife resources. See, e. g., Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119, 16 U. S. C. § 742a; the Act of Sept. 22, 1959, 73 Stat. 642, authorizing research in migratory marine game fish, 16 U. S. C. §760e; and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 661.

Buttressed by these new and expanding policies, the Corps of Engineers has issued new Rules and Regulations governing permits for discharges or deposits into navigable waters. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act in § 1 (b) declares that it is federal policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution.” But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters. While the States are given time to establish water quality standards, § 10 (c)(1), if a State fails to do so the federal administrator promulgates one. §10 (c)(2). Section 10(a) makes pollution of interstate or navigable waters subject “to abatement” when it “endangers the health or welfare of any persons.” The abatement that is authorized follows a long-drawn-out procedure unnecessary to relate here. It uses the conference procedure, hoping for amicable settlements. But if none is reached, the federal administrator may request the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the United States for abatement of the pollution. §10 (g).

The remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available. “It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 457. When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law, as Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, recently held.

The application of federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act. Congress provided in § 10 (b) of that Act that, save as a court may decree otherwise in an enforcement action, “[s]tate and interstate action to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not ... be displaced by Federal enforcement action.”

The leading air case is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, where Georgia filed an original suit in this Court against a Tennessee company whose noxious gases were causing a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops in Georgia. The Court said:

“The caution with which demands of this sort, on the part of a State, for relief from injuries analogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521. But it is plain that some such demands must be recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved. When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241.” 206 U. S., at 237.

The nature of the nuisance was described as follows:

“It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether for the injuries which they might be suffering to their property they should not be left to an action at law.” Id., at 238.

Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the same theme. Rights in interstate streams, like questions of boundaries, “have been recognized as presenting federal questions.” Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110. The question of apportionment of interstate waters is a question of “federal common law” upon which state statutes or decisions are not conclusive. Ibid.

In speaking of the problem of apportioning the waters of an interstate stream, the Court said in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98, that “through these successive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate common law.” And see Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 (escheat of intangible personal property), Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 405 (suit by bill in the nature of interpleader to determine the true domicile of a decedent as the basis of death taxes).

Equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream has often been made under the head of our original jurisdiction. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589; Kansas v. Colorado, supra; cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 562. The applicable federal common law depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case.

“Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former — these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.” 325 U. S., at 618.

When it comes to water pollution this Court has spoken in terms of “a public nuisance,” New York v. New Jer sey,, 256 U. S., at 313; New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U. S. 473, 481, 482. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520-521, the Court said, “It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a State upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a casus belli for a State lower down, unless removed. If such a nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi the controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a suit in this court.”

It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution. While federal law governs, consideration of state standards may be relevant. Cf. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 146-147. Thus, a State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.

We deny, without prejudice, the motion for leave to file. While this original suit normally might be the appropriate vehicle for resolving this controversy, we exercise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues-

So ordered.

       It is equally well settled that a suit between a State and a citizen of another State is not a suit between citizens of different States for the purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482, 487.

       See also H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A 104 (1947): “The original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 3, section 2, of the Constitution is not exclusive by virtue of that provision alone. Congress may provide for or deny exclusiveness.”

       The contrary indication in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 498 n. 3, was based on the preoccupation of that litigation with public nuisance under Ohio law, not the federal common law which we now hold is ample basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a).

       The powers granted the Secretary of the Interior under the Eederal Water Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903, were assigned by the President to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15623.

       While the various federal environmental protection statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision. What we said in another connection in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457, is relevent here:
      “The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a) ? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.” (Citations omitted.) See also Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691, 713-714; Note, 56 Va. L. Rev. 458.

       Thus, it is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply federal law. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237; cf. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 289; The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton). As Mr. Justice Harlan indicated for the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 421-427, where there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common law. See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363; D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 249 (2d ed, 1970); Woods & Reed, supra, n. 5, at 703-713; Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183. Certainly these same demands for applying federal law are present in the pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States.

       Those who maintain that state law governs overlook the fact that the Hinderlider case was written by Mr. Justice Brandéis who also wrote for the Court in Erie B. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the two cases being decided the same day.

       In North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374, the Court said:
      “[W]here one State, by a change in its method of draining water from lands within its border, increases the flow into an interstate stream, so that its natural capacity is greatly exceeded and the water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the latter State has such an interest as quasi-sovereign in the comfort, health and prosperity of its farm owners that resort may be had to this Court for relief. It is the creation of a public nuisance of simple type for which a State may properly ask an injunction.”

       “Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources outside its domain. The more would this seem to be imperative in the present era of growing concern on the part of a State about its ecological conditions and impairments of them. In the outside sources of such impairment, more conflicting disputes, increasing assertions and proliferating contentions would seem to be inevitable. Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights. And the logic and practicality of regarding such claims as being entitled to be asserted within the federal-question jurisdiction of § 1331 (a) would seem to be self-evident.” Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 241-242.

       The rule of decision being federal, the “action . . . may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose,” 28 U. S. C. §1391 (b), thereby giving flexibility to the choice of venue. See also 28 U. S. C. § 1407.
      Whatever may be a municipality’s sovereign immunity in actions for damages, see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L. F. 919,94L-948; Note, 4 Suffolk L. Rev. 832 (1970), actions seeking injunctive relief stand on a different footing. The cases are virtually unanimous in holding that municipalities are subject to injunctions to abate nuisances. See cases collected in 17 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §49.51 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1968). See also Wis. Stat. Ann. §59.96 (6) (b) (1957) as respects the suability of metropolitan sewerage commissions.
      While the kind of equitable relief to be accorded lies in the discretion of the chancellor (Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334), a State that causes a public nuisance is suable in this Court and any of its public entities is suable in a federal district court having jurisdiction:
      “[I]t is generally held that a municipality, like a private individual, may be enjoined from maintaining a nuisance. Thus in a proper case a municipal corporation will be restrained by injunction from creating a nuisance on private property, as by the discharge of sewage or poisonous gases thereon, or, in some jurisdictions, by the obstruction of drainage of waters, or by discharging sewage or filth into a stream and polluting the water to the damage of lower riparian owners, or by dumping garbage or refuse, or by other acts. Likewise, a municipality may be enjoined from creating or operating a nuisance, whether the municipality is acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, impairing property rights. And, if a nuisance is established causing irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law it may be enjoined irrespective of the resulting damage or injury to the municipality.” 17 McQuil-lin, supra, § 49.55.


text:
    WASHINGTON et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. et al.
    No. 45,
    Orig.
    Argued February 28-29, 1972
    Decided April 24, 1972
    Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Fredric C. Tausend, Special Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, William L. Dwyer and David G. Knibb, Special Assistant Attorneys General; William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, and Robert S. Atkins and David C. Landgraf, Assistant Attorneys General; Gary Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, and Malcolm P. Strohson, Assistant Attorney General; Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, John Moore, Deputy Attorney General, and William Tucker, Assistant Attorney General; Bertram T. Kanbara, Attorney General of Hawaii, and George Pai, Deputy Attorney General; W. Anthony Park, Attorney General of Idaho, and Richard Greener, Deputy Attorney General; Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa; Kent Frizzell, Attorney General of Kansas, and Richard Hayse, Assistant Attorney General; James S. Erwin, Attorney General of Maine; Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Neal Colicchio, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas M. Head, Attorney General of Minnesota; John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri; Helgi Johanneson, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Paul M. Sand, First Assistant Attorney General; Paul W. Brown, Attorney General of Ohio, and Donald Weckstein, Assistant Attorney General; Herbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General of Rhode Island; James M. Jeffords, Attorney General of Vermont, and John D. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General; Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, and Anthony F. Troy, Assistant Attorney General; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, Gene Hal Williams, First Deputy Attorney General, and James G. Anderson III, Assistant Attorney General.

      Lloyd N. Cutler argued the cause for defendants. With him on the briefs were Howard P. Willens, Jay F. Lapin, Louis F. Oberdorfer, James S. Campbell, Julian 0. Von Kalinowski, and Paul G. Bower for Automobile Manufacturers Assn., Inc.; Walter J. Williams and Forrest A. Hainline, Jr., for American Motors Corp.; Tom Killefer, William E. Huth, G. William Shea, and Philip K. Verleger for Chrysler Corp.; Robert L. Stern and Carl J. Schuck for Ford Motor Co.; Ross L. Malone, Robert A. Nitschke, Hammond E. Chaffets, Joseph Du-

      Coeur, Marcus Mattson, and Richard F. Outcault, Jr., for General Motors Corp.
    Brief for Alabama et al. as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file bill of complaint was filed by J. Lee Rankin, David I. Shapiro, and Jerome S. Wagshal, and by the following Attorneys General for their respective States: William J. Baxley of Alabama, John E. Havelock of Alaska, Evelle J. Younger of California, Robert L. Shevin of Florida, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Francis B. Burch of Maryland, A. F. Summer of Mississippi, Robert List of Nevada, David L. Norvell of New Mexico, Louis J. Lejkowitz of New York, Larry Derryberry of Oklahoma, J. Shane Creamer of Pennsylvania, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Gordon Mydland of South Dakota, Crawford C. Martin of Texas, and Robert W. Warren of Wisconsin.
   Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiffs are 18 States who, by this motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, seek to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction under Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Named as defendants are the Nation’s four major automobile manufacturers and their trade association.

Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy among the defendants to restrain the development of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment. They allege that the conspiracy began as early as 1953 but was concealed until January 1969. Count I of the proposed complaint charges a violation of the federal antitrust laws. Count II charges a common-law conspiracy in restraint of trade independently of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring the defendants to undertake “an accelerated program of spending, research and development designed to produce a fully effective pollution control device or devices and/or pollution free engine at the earliest feasible date” and also ordering defendants to install effective pollution control devices in all motor vehicles they manufactured during the conspiracy and as standard equipment in all future motor vehicles which they manufacture. Other prophylactic relief is also sought.

The proposed complaint plainly presents important questions of vital national importance. See, e. g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Our jurisdiction over the controversy cannot be disputed. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230. For reasons which will appear, however, we deny leave to file the bill of complaint.

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations is a horizontal conspiracy among the major automobile manufacturers to impede the research and development of automotive air pollution control devices. See generally L. Jaffe & L. Tribe, Environmental Protection 141-180 (1971). It is argued that the facts alleged in support of the statutory and common-law claims are identical and that they could be elicited as well by a Special Master appointed by this Court as by a federal district court judge, and that resort to a Special Master would not place a burden on this Court’s time and resources substantially greater than when we hear an antitrust case on direct appeal from a district court under the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29. And it is argued that the sheer number of States that seek to invoke our original jurisdiction in this motion is reason enough for us to grant leave to file.

The breadth of the constitutional grant of this Court’s original jurisdiction dictates that we be able to exercise discretion over the cases we hear under this jurisdictional head, lest our ability to administer our appellate docket be impaired. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19; Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 497-499; H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 258-260 (1953); Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691; Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 694-700. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, su-pra, at 18-19, where Massachusetts sought to invoke our original jurisdiction in order to collect a tax claim, we said:

“In the exercise of our original jurisdiction so as truly to fulfill the constitutional purpose we not only must look to the nature of the interest of the complaining State — the essential quality of the right asserted — but we must also inquire whether recourse to that jurisdiction ... is necessary for the State’s protection. ... To open this Court to actions by States to recover taxes claimed to 'be payable by citizens of other States, in the absence of facts showing the necessity for such intervention, would be to assume a burden which the grant of original jurisdiction cannot be regarded as compelling this Court to assume and which might seriously interfere with the discharge by this Court of its duty in deciding the cases and controversies appropriately brought before it.”

By the same token, we conclude that the availability of the federal district court as an alternative forum and the nature of the relief requested suggest we remit the parties to the resolution of their controversies in the customary forum. The nature of the remedy which may be necessary, if a case for relief is made out, also argues against taking original jurisdiction.

Air pollution is, of course, one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in modern experience. Congress has not, however, found a uniform, nationwide solution to all aspects of this problem and, indeed, has declared “that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.” 81 Stat. 485, 42 U. S. C. § 1857 (a)(3). To be sure, Congress has largely preempted the field with regard to “emissions from new motor vehicles,” 42 U. S. C. § 1857f-6a (a); 31 Fed. Reg. 5170 (1966); and motor vehicle fuels and fuel additives, 84 Stat. 1699, 42 U. S. C. § 1857f-6c (c)(4). See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083 (1970); Hill, The Politics of Air Pollution: Public Interest and Pressure Groups, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 37, 4VA5 (1968); Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to Felt Necessities, 22 Hastings L. J. 661, 674-676 (1971). It has also pre-empted the field so far as emissions from airplanes are concerned, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1857Í-9 to 1857Í-12. So far as factories, incinerators, and other stationary devices are implicated, the States have broad control to an extent not necessary to relate here. See Stevens, supra, passim; Comment, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1474 (1970). But in certain instances, as, for example, where federal primary and secondary ambient air quality standards have been established, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1857c-4 and 1857c-5, or where “hazardous air pollutant [s]” have been defined, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-7, there may be federal pre-emption. See 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-8 et seq. Moreover, geophysical characteristics which define local and regional airsheds are often significant considerations in determining the steps necessary to abate air pollution. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 (1967); Coons, Air Pollution & Government Structure, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 48, 60-64 (1968). Thus, measures which might be adequate to deal with pollution in a city such as San Francisco, might be grossly inadequate in a city such as Phoenix, where geographical and meteorological conditions trap aerosols and particulates.

As a matter of law as well as practical necessity corrective remedies for air pollution, therefore, necessarily must be considered in the context of localized situations. We conclude that the causes should be heard in the appropriate federal district courts.

The motions of the States of North Dakota and West Virginia to be joined as parties plaintiff are granted. The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied and the parties are remitted without prejudice to the other federal forum.

It is so ordered.

MR. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.

       Fifteen States originally moved for leave to file a bill of complaint. We subsequently granted leave to the State of Idaho to intervene as plaintiff. 403 U. S. 949. By today’s decision we also grant leave to the States of North Dakota and West Virginia to be joined as parties plaintiff.

       A third count of plaintiffs’ proposed complaint also charged “a public nuisance contrary to the public policy of the Plaintiff States . . . [and] the federal government.” Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint 12. In a memorandum filed with this Court Feb. 19, 1972, however, plaintiffs struck this count from their proposed complaint; but Idaho, the intervenor, did not join in that motion. In light of our disposition of Counts I and II of the bill of complaint, Idaho’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint solely for Count III should be denied a fortiori. Should any of the plaintiffs desire to renew the public nuisance count of the bill of complaint in the District Court, they are free to do so under our decision today in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, ante, p. 91.

       In addition to the 18 States which are plaintiffs, 16 other States and the City of New York have filed a brief as amicus curiae supporting plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.

       Because federal motor vehicle emission control standards apply only to new motor vehicles, States also retain broad residual power over used motor vehicles. Moreover, citizens, States, and local governments may initiate actions to enforce compliance with federal standards and to enforce other statutory and common-law rights. 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2.

       National primary ambient air quality standards are those “which in the judgment of the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] ... are requisite to protect the public health . . . 42 U. S. C. § 1857c — 4 (b) (1). Secondary ambient air quality standards are those “requisite to protect the public welfare,” 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-4 (b)(2), which “includes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being.” 42 TJ. S. G. § 1857h (h). For implementation plans for primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, see 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5.
      Rules and regulations setting ambient air quality standards have been promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency. 36 Fed. Reg. 22384 (1971).

       It was in recognition of this fact that Congress directed the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to “designate as an air quality control region any interstate area or major intrastate area which he deems necessary or appropriate for the attainment and maintenance of ambient air quality standards.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-2 (c).

       Multi-district litigation apparently involving the same factual claims as are presented here has been consolidated in the District Court for the Central District of California and pretrial proceedings are already under way. See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F. Supp. 1349 (Jud. Panel on Multidist. Lit. 1970).


text:
    NEBRASKA v. IOWA
    No. 17,
    Orig.
    Argued March 29, 1972
    Decided April 24, 1972
    Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Howard H. Moldenhauer, Special Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska, argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General, and Joseph R. Moore, Special Assistant Attorney General.

      Michael Murray, Special Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Manning Walker, Special Assistant Attorney General.
   Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.

Both Iowa and Nebraska filed Exceptions to the Report submitted by the Special Master in this original action brought by Nebraska against Iowa for construction and enforcement of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943.

The Missouri River is the boundary between the two States. In 1892, in another suit brought by Nebraska against Iowa, this Court held that the boundary line in the river at Carter Lake, Iowa, was to be located according to the principle that the boundary “is a varying line” so far as affected by “changes of diminution and accretion in the mere washing of the waters of the stream,” but not where the river is shifted by avulsion: “By this selection of a new channel the boundary was not changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the centre line of the old channel; . . . unless the waters of the river returned to their former bed, [such center line] became a fixed and unvarying boundary, no matter what might be the changes of the river in its new channel.” Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 370 (1892); the decree is in 145 U. S. 519 (1892). The Compact adopts this line at Carter Lake, and for the rest of the boundary fixes the line in “the middle of the main channel of the Missouri river,” defined as the “center line of the proposed stabilized channel of the Missouri river as established by the United States engineers’ office, Omaha, Nebraska, and shown on the alluvial plain maps of the Missouri river from Sioux City, Iowa, to Rulo, Nebraska, and identified by file numbers AP-1 to 4 inclusive, dated January 30, 1940, and file numbers AP-5 to 10 inclusive, dated March 29, 1940, which maps are now on file in the United States engineers’ office at Omaha, Nebraska, and copies of which maps are now on file with the secretary of state of the State of Iowa and with the secretary of state of the State of Nebraska.” The “proposed stabilized channel” refers to a project begun in the early 1930’s by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to tame the river along its entire length by containing it within a designed channel. The work had been partially completed by 1943, but was suspended when World War II intervened. When work resumed in 1948, the channel was partly redesigned, and by 1959 the river had been confined in the newly designed channel.

The States determined in 1943 to agree by compact upon a permanent location of the boundary line when experience showed that “the fickle Missouri River . . . refused to be bound by the Supreme Court decree [of 1892]. In the past thirty-five years the river has changed its course so often that it has proved impossible to apply the court decision in all cases, since it is difficult to determine whether the channel of the river has changed by ‘the law of accretion’ or ‘that of avulsion.’ ” Eriksson, Boundaries of Iowa, 25 Iowa J. of Hist, and Pol. 163, 234 (1927). The Special Master found, on ample evidence, and we adopt his findings, that by 1943 the shifts of the river channel had been so numerous and intricate, both in its natural state and as a result of the work of the Corps of Engineers, that it would be practically impossible to locate the original boundary line.

The fixing of the permanent boundary by Compact resulted in some riparian lands formerly in each State being located within the other State. This created the problem of the effect to be given by the new State to titles, mortgages, and other liens that had arisen under the laws of the other State. Sections 2 and 3 of the Compact were designed to solve this problem. Under § 2 each State “cedes” to the other State “and relinquishes jurisdiction over” all such lands now located within the Compact boundary of the other. Under § 3, “[tjitles, mortgages, and other liens” affecting such lands “good in” the ceding State “shall be good in” the other State.

The instant dispute between the States arose when Iowa in 1963 claimed state ownership of some 30 separate areas of land, water, marsh, or mixture of the three wholly on the Iowa side of the Compact boundary. The eighth and part of a ninth such areas were formed before 1943. The 21st and part of a 22d were formed after 1943. Iowa's claim was based on Iowa common law that private titles to riparian lands run only to the ordinary high-water mark on navigable streams and that the State is the owner of the beds of all navigable streams within the State and is also the owner of any islands that may form therein. McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 (1856); Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa 714, 84 N. W. 950 (1901). The areas formed before 1943 lie south of Omaha and those formed after 1943 lie north of Omaha. Two of the pre-1943 areas are Nottleman Island and Sehemmel Island. Each is the subject of an action to quiet title brought by Iowa in Iowa courts. The defense in each case is that there exist “titles . . . good in Nebraska” to the islands that, under § 3 of the Compact, Iowa obligated itself to recognize to be “good in Iowa” as against any claim of Iowa under its doctrine of state ownership.

Thus, the controversy between the States in this case centers around the proper construction of their Compact. The Special Master’s Findings and Conclusions generally favor Nebraska’s position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that formed before July 12, 1943, and Iowa’s exceptions are addressed to them. On the other hand, the Findings and Conclusions favor Iowa’s position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that formed after July 12, 1943, and Nebraska’s exceptions are primarily addressed to them. We overrule all exceptions, save two, of Nebraska’s addressed to printing errors in the Report, except as we sustain, infra, Iowa’s Exceptions IV and V insofar as the Special Master recommended that an injunction issue, and except as mentioned in n. 8, infra.

The Special Master construed the word “cedes” in § 2 as meant by the States to describe all areas formed before July 12, 1943, regardless of their location with reference to the original boundary, whose “[tjitles, mortgages, and other liens” were, at the date of the Compact, “good in” the ceding State, and ruled that, under § 3, the other State is bound to recognize such “[tjitles, mortgages, and other liens” to be “good in” its State, and not to claim ownership in itself. Iowa urges, in its Exceptions II and III, that this construction is erroneous and that §§ 2 and 3 should be construed as relating only to areas formed before July 12, 1943, that can be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence to have been on the Nebraska side of the original boundary before the Compact fixed the permanent boundary. We overrule Iowa’s Exceptions. Iowa’s construction would require the claimant who proves title “good in-Nebraska” also to shoulder the burden of proving the location of the original boundary before 1943, as well as proving that the lands were on the Nebraska side of that boundary. That, said the Special Master, and we agree, “would be placing a burden upon the land owner which the states themselves refused to undertake in 1943 and agreed would not be necessary. The states would in effect be saying to the land owners, ‘we could not prove where the boundary was in 1943 but now, after we have waited 27 years, we are going to make you prove where it was at your expense even though we know it is impossible.’ ”

Iowa’s Exceptions IV and V concern the Special Master’s findings that the State of Iowa does not own Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island. The Special Master found that the proofs sufficed to establish title “good in Nebraska” to Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island, but did not suffice to prove title “good in Nebraska” to the other areas claimed by Iowa that were formed before 1943. He found, and we agree, that titles “good in Nebraska” include private titles to riparian lands that under Nebraska law, differing from Iowa law, run to the thread of the contiguous stream. Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 104 N. W. 1061 (1905), 74 Neb. 580, 109 N. W. 744 (1906). He found further that titles “good in Nebraska” embrace titles obtained by 10 years’ open, notorious, and adverse possession under claim of right without any requirement of a record title; under Iowa law, a claim must be under “color of title,” requiring some type of record title to commence the period of adverse possession.

The Special Master recommended that as to areas formed before July 12, 1943, §§ 2 and 3 should be construed as limiting the State of Iowa to contesting with private litigants in state or federal courts the question whether the private claimants can prove title “good in Nebraska,” and when private litigants prove such title, as obliging Iowa not to interpose Iowa’s doctrine of state ownership as defeating such title. We agree, and to that extent overrule Iowa’s Exceptions IV and Y. As to Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island, however, the Special Master recommended that, in addition to a judgment that titles “good in Nebraska” have been proved as to those islands, so that Iowa is precluded from claiming title thereto under its doctrine of state ownership, this Court should enjoin the State of Iowa, its officers, agents, and servants from further prosecution of the cases now pending in the Iowa courts. We see no reason for an injunction at this stage. We are confident that the State of Iowa will abide by our adoption of the Special Master’s conclusion that in any proceeding between a private litigant and the State of Iowa in which a claim of title good under the law of Nebraska is proved, the State of Iowa will not invoke its common-law doctrine of state ownership as defeating such title. Iowa’s Exceptions IV and V are therefore sustained insofar as the Special Master recommended that an injunction issue.

Nebraska’s basic Exception is to the Findings and Conclusion of the Special Master that ownership of areas that have formed since July 12, 1943, should be determined under the law of the State in which they formed, the boundary fixed by the Compact being the line that determines in which State they formed. This pertains to the 21 areas and part of a 22d that lie north of Omaha. See n. 4, supra.

Although the Special Master recommended, and we agree, that claimants of title to these areas as against Iowa may also have the opportunity to show title “good in Nebraska” on the Compact date, July 12, 1943, Nebraska offered no proof to support such a claim as to any of the areas. Nebraska does contend, however, that any accretions to Nebraska riparian lands that cross the Compact boundary line into Iowa, caused when the river moves gradually and imperceptibly, should be declared to accrue to the Nebraska riparian owner under Nebraska law, since under Nebraska law the boundary of the Nebraska owner moves with the thalweg or main navigable channel, regardless of which State the movement is in. The Special Master rejected that contention. We agree that the contention is without merit for the reasons stated in Tyson v. State of Iowa, 283 F. 2d 802 (CA8 1960). That was a condemnation action by the United States in which the question was the ownership of an island at Tyson Bend, one of the areas north of Omaha to which Iowa claims ownership. See n. 4, supra. The island had formed between the designed channel and a main channel created when the river escaped from the designed channel between 1943 and 1948. The island had then become connected to the Nebraska shore when the designed channel filled with sediment after a 1952 flood. The Corps of Engineers determined to dredge a canal in the designed channel to place the river back in the designed channel. Condemnation of an easement on the island was necessary to carry the project forward, and the question of ownership of the island had to be settled to determine who was entitled to compensation. The Tyson claimants claimed the land as an accretion to Nebraska land or river beds belonging to them. The State of Iowa claimed it as an island formed over the state-owned river bed in Iowa under the Iowa doctrine of state ownership. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the ownership of the island should be determined by the law of the State in which the land was situated, that is, by the law of Iowa, since the island was on the Iowa side of the Compact boundary. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected the same contention urged upon us by Nebraska, holding, in agreement with the District Court in the case, that “the Nebraska law of accretion did not operate to create riparian rights within the territorial limits of Iowa.” 283 F. 2d, at 811. Hence, whether the Nebraska riparian owner has title to the accretions that cross the boundary into Iowa is determined by Iowa law. Nebraska argues that Tyson was wrongly decided. We do not agree. Tyson is consistent with what the Court said in Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 175-176 (1918):

“How the land that emerges on either side of an interstate boundary stream shall be disposed of as between public and private ownership is a matter to be determined according to the law of each State, under the familiar doctrine that it is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to them. . . . But these dispositions are in each case limited by the interstate boundary, and cannot be permitted to press back the boundary line from where otherwise it should he located.” (Emphasis added.)

The States may submit a proposed decree in accord with this opinion. If the States cannot agree, the Special Master is requested, after appropriate hearing, to prepare and submit a recommended decree.

It is so ordered.

       Iowa Code 1971, p. lxiv; Iowa Acts 1943, c. 306; Nebraska Laws 1943, c. 130; Act of July 12, 1943, 57 Stat. 494.
      Leave to file the action was granted in 1965. 379 U. S. 876 (1964); 379 U. S. 996 (1965). There have been successive Special Masters. See 380 U. S. 968 (1965); 392 U. S. 918 (1968); 393 U. S. 910 (1968). Senior Judge Joseph P. Willson completed the case after extensive hearings and filed his Report on November 9, 1971. 404 U. S. 933 (1971). The Exceptions of the States were orally argued before this Court on March 29, 1972.
      Iowa’s Exception I renews the objection to the Court’s jurisdiction that was overruled when leave to file was granted. We overrule the Exception. “Just as this Court has power to settle disputes between States where there is no compact, it must have final power to pass upon the meaning and validity of compacts.” West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 28 (1951); Const. Art. III, § 2; 28 U. S. C. § 1251.

       Report 63, 65, 67, 68, 80.

       Each State Legislature adopted a statute to evidence its agreement to the Compact. Sections 2 and 3 of each statute create obligations reciprocated by the other State in §§ 2 and 3 of its statute. In the Iowa statute the sections are:
      “Sec. 2. The State of Iowa hereby cedes to the State of Nebraska and relinquishes jurisdiction over all lands now in Iowa but lying westerly of said boundary line and contiguous to lands in Nebraska.
      "Sec. 3. Titles, mortgages, and other liens good in Nebraska shall be good in Iowa as to any lands Nebraska may cede to Iowa and any pending suits or actions concerning said lands may be prosecuted to final judgment in Nebraska and such judgments shall be accorded full force and effect in Iowa.”

         The areas formed before 1943 are Nottleman Island, Schemmel Island, St. Mary’s Bend, Auldon Bar, Copeland Bend, State Line Island, Wilson Island, Deer Island, and a portion of Winnebago Bend. Report 106, 165.
      The areas formed since 1943 are Dakota Bend, Omadi Bend, Between Omadi and Browers Bends, Snyder Bend, Glover’s Point Bend, Rabbit Island, Upper Monona Bend, Monona Bend, Blackbird Bend, Tieville Bend, Upper Decatur Bend, Middle Decatur Bend, Lower Decatur Bend, Louisville Bend, Blencoe Bend, Little Sioux Bend, Bullard Bend, Soldier Bend, Sandy Point Bend, Tyson Bend, and California Bend. Id., at 107.

       On March 18, 1963, Iowa filed, in the District Court for Mills County, State of Iowa v. Darwin Merrit Babbit et al., Equity No. 17433 to quiet title to Nottleman Island. On March 26, 1963, Iowa filed, in the District Court of Fremont County, State of Iowa v. Henry E. Sehemmel et al., Equity No. 19765 to quiet title to Sehemmel Island. Proceedings in the actions have been suspended pending our decision.

       Exceptions of the State of Nebraska, No. 6, p. 8, and No. 12, p. 11. Iowa concedes that the Exceptions are well taken. Iowa Reply 5, 7. The errors will be deemed corrected as suggested by the Exceptions.

       Report 88-89.

         Id., at 174. The Special Master found, alternatively, that if his construction of §§2 and 3 was not accepted, nevertheless the landowners met the burden of proving that Nottleman and Schemmel Islands were actually on the Nebraska side of the original boundary. Since we agree with the Special Master’s construction, we consider no Exceptions addressed to those findings.

       In Iowa’s Reply, filed January 19, 1972, Iowa for the first time in this protracted litigation retracts its concession, made often and throughout the proceedings, that Kinkead established this principle of Nebraska law. In its Reply, at 15-16, Iowa contends that “the common law of the State of Nebraska did not in fact give the Nebraska riparian owners along the Missouri River title or ownership of the bed of the navigable channel of the river, and they acquired no property right to such bed until it was abandoned by the river.” Our reading of the Nebraska cases satisfies us that the argument is frivolous.

       Report 68-69. Claimants to titles to areas of Nottleman Island rested at least in part on the Nebraska law of adverse possession. Report 121-126.

        Id., at 174-175.

        Id., at 201; see n. 5, supra.

        Id., at 193.

        Id., at 192.