author: Mb, Justice Rehnquist Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    SALYER LAND CO. et al. v. TULARE LAKE BASIN WATER STORAGE DISTRICT
    No. 71-1456.
    Argued January 8, 1973
    Decided March 20, 1973

      RehNQüist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 735.

      Thomas Keister Greer argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was C. Ray Robinson.

      Robert M. Newell argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Ernest M. Clark, Jr

        Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford Jay Rosen, Joel M. Gora, and David Hall filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Denslow Green for Irrigation Districts Association of California, and by George Basye for California Central Valleys Flood Control Association.

   Mb, Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is another in the line of cases in which the Court has had occasion to consider the limits imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on legislation apportioning representation in state and local governing bodies and establishing qualifications for voters in the election of such representatives. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), enunciated the constitutional standard for apportionment of state legislatures. Later cases such as Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968), and Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50 (1970), extended the Reynolds rule to the governing bodies of a county and of a junior college district, respectively. We are here presented with the issue expressly reserved in Avery, supra:

“Were the [county’s governing body] a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the' organization’s functions.” 390 U. S., at 483-484.

The particular type of local government unit whose organization is challenged on constitutional grounds in this case is a water storage district, organized pursuant to the California Water Storage District Act, Calif. Water Code § 39000 et seq. The peculiar problems of adequate water supplies faced by most of the western third of the Nation have been described by Mr. Justice Sutherland, who was himself intimately familiar with them, in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 156-157 (1935):

“These states and territories comprised the western third of the United States — a vast empire in extent, but still sparsely settled. From a line east of the Rocky Mountains almost to the Pacific Ocean, and from the Canadian border to the boundary of Mexico — an area greater than that of the original thirteen states — the lands capable of redemption, in the main, constituted a desert, impossible of agricultural use without artificial irrigation.
“In the beginning, the task of reclaiming this area was left to the unaided efforts of the people who found their way by painful effort to its inhospitable solitudes. These western pioneers, emulating the spirit of so many others who had gone before them in similar ventures, faced the difficult problem of wresting a living and creating homes from the raw elements about them, and threw down the gage of battle to the forces of nature. With imperfect tools, they built dams, excavated canals, constructed ditches, plowed and cultivated the soil, and transformed dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy orchards. . .

Californians, in common with other residents of the West, found the State's rivers and streams in their natural state to present the familiar paradox of feast or famine. With melting snow in the high mountains in the spring, small streams became roaring freshets, and the rivers they fed carried the potential for destructive floods. But with the end of the rainy season in the early spring, farmers depended entirely upon water from such streams and rivers until the rainy season again began in the fall. Long before that time, however, rivers which ran bank full in the spring had been reduced to a bare trickle of water.

It was not enough therefore, for individual farmers or groups of farmers to build irrigation canals and ditches which depended for their operation on the natural flow of these streams. Storage dams had to be constructed to impound in their reservoirs the flow of the rivers at flood stage for later release during the dry season regimen of these streams. For the construction of major dams to facilitate the storage of water for irrigation of large areas, the full resources of the State and frequently of the Federal Government were necessary.

But for less costly projects which would benefit a more restricted geographic area, the State was frequently either unable or unwilling to pledge its credit or its resources. The California Legislature, therefore, has authorized a number of instrumentalities, including water storage districts such as the appellee here, to provide a local response to water problems.

Some history of the experience of California and the other Western States with the problems of water distribution is contained in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 151-154 (1896), in which the constitutionality of California’s Wright Act was sustained against claims of denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While the irrigation district was apparently the first local governmental unit authorized to deal with water distribution, it is by no means the only one. General legislation in California authorizes the creation, not only of irrigation districts, but of water conservation districts, water storage and conservation districts, flood control districts, and water storage districts such as appellee.

Appellee district consists of 193,000 acres of intensively cultivated, highly fertile farm land located in the Tulare Lake Basin. Its population consists of 77 persons, including 18 children, most of whom are employees of one or another of the four corporations that farm 85% of the land in the district.

Such districts are authorized to plan projects and execute approved projects “for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of water . . . .” Calif. Water Code § 42200 et seq. Incidental to this general power, districts may “acquire, improve, and operate” any necessary works for the storage and distribution of water as well as any drainage or reclamation works connected therewith, and the generation and distribution of hydroelectric power may be provided for. Id., §§ 43000, 43025. They may fix tolls and charges for the use of water and collect them from all persons receiving the benefit of the water or other services in proportion to the services rendered. Id., § 43006. The costs of the projects are assessed against district land in accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract held in separate ownership. Id., §§ 46175, 46176. And land that is not benefited may be withdrawn from the district on petition. Id., § 48029.

Governance of the districts is undertaken by a board of directors. Id., § 40658. Each director is elected from one of the divisions within the district, id., § 39929, and each must take an official oath and execute a bond. Id., § 40301. General elections for the directors are to be held in odd-numbered years. Id., §§ 39027, 41300 et seg.

It is the voter qualification for such elections that appellants claim invidiously discriminates against them and persons similarly situated. Appellants are landowners, a landowner-lessee, and residents within the area, included in the appellee’s water storage district. They brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in an effort to prevent appellee from giving effect to certain provisions of the California Water Code. They allege that §§ 41000 and 41001 unconstitutionally deny to them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that only landowners are permitted to vote in water storage district general elections, and votes in those elections are apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284, and the case was submitted on factual statements of the parties and briefs, without testimony or oral argument. A majority of the District Court held that both statutes comported with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause, and appellants have appealed that judgment directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.

In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), a case in which the Ohio legislative scheme for regulating the electoral franchise was challenged, the Court said:

“[T]his Court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of our Constitution. But we have also held many times that 'invidious’ distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.” Id., at 30.

We therefore turn now to the determination of whether the California statutory scheme establishing water storage districts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

It is first argued that § 41000, limiting the vote to district landowners, is unconstitutional since nonlandown-ing residents have as much interest in the operations of a district as landowners who may or may not be residents. Particularly, it is pointed out that the homes of residents may be damaged by floods within the district's boundaries, and that floods may, as with appellant Ellison, cause them to lose their jobs. Support for this position is said to come from the recent decisions of this Court striking down various state laws that limited voting to landowners, Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), and Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969).

In Kramer, the Court was confronted with a voter qualification statute for school district elections that limited the vote to otherwise qualified district residents who were either (1) the owners or lessees of taxable real property located within the district, (2) spouses of persons owning qualifying property, or (3) parents or guardians of children enrolled for a specified time during the preceding year in a local district school. Without reaching the issue of whether or not a State may in some circumstances limit the exercise of the franchise to those primarily interested or primarily affected by a given governmental unit, it was held that the above classifications did not meet that state-articulated goal since they excluded many persons who had distinct and direct interests in school meeting decisions and included many persons who had, at best, remote and indirect interests. Id., at 632-633.

Similarly, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, decided the same day, provisions of Louisiana law which gave only property taxpayers the right to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility were declared violative of the Equal Protection Clause since the operation of the utility systems affected virtually every resident of the city, not just the 40% of the registered voters who were also property taxpayers, and since the bonds were not in any way financed by property tax revenue. 395 U. S., at 705. And the rationale of Cipriano was expanded to include general obligation bonds of municipalities in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra. It was there noted that not only did those persons excluded from voting have a great interest in approving or disapproving municipal improvements, but they also contributed both directly through local taxes and indirectly through increased rents and costs to the servicing of the bonds. 399 U. S., at 210-211.

Cipriano and Phoenix involved application of the “one person, one vote” principle to residents of units of local governments exercising general governmental power, as that term was defined in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). Kramer and Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50 (1970), extended the “one person, one vote” principle to school districts exercising powers which,

“while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions within the districts, and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here.” 397 U. S., at 53-54.

But the Court was also careful to state that:

“It is of course possible that there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds, supra, might not be required, but certainly we see nothing in the present case that indicates that the activities of these trustees fit in that category. Education has traditionally been a vital governmental function, and these trustees, whose election the State has opened to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in every relevant sense of that term.” Id., at 56.

We conclude that the appellee water storage district, by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is the sort of exception to the rule laid down in Reynolds which the quoted language from Hadley, supra, and the decision in Avery, supra, contemplated.

The appellee district in this case, although vested with some typical governmental powers, has relatively limited authority. Its primary purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body. App. 86. There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses, or trains. Ibid.

Not only does the district not exercise what might be thought of as "normal governmental” authority, but its actions disproportionately affect landowners. All of the costs of district projects are assessed against land by assessors in proportion to the benefits received. Likewise, charges for services rendered are collectible from persons receiving their benefit in proportion to the services. When such persons are delinquent in payment, just as in the case of delinquency in payments of assessments, such charges become a lien on the land. Calif. Water Code §§ 47183, 46280. In short, there is no way that the economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries.

Under these circumstances, it is quite understandable that the statutory framework for election of directors of the appellee focuses on the land benefited, rather than on people as such. California has not opened the franchise to all residents, as Missouri had in Hadley, supra, nor to all residents with some exceptions, as New York had in Kramer, supra. The franchise is extended to landowners, whether they reside in the district or out of it, and indeed whether or not they are natural persons who would be entitled to vote in a more traditional political election. Appellants do not challenge the enfranchisement of nonresident landowners or of corporate landowners for purposes of election of the directors of appellee. Thus, to sustain their contention that all residents of the district must be accorded a vote would not result merely in the striking down of an exclusion from what was otherwise a delineated class, but would instead engraft onto the statutory scheme a wholly new class of voters in addition to those enfranchised by the statute.

We hold, therefore, that the popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds, supra, and succeeding cases are inapplicable to elections such as the general election of appellee Water Storage District.

II

Even though appellants derive no benefit from the Reynolds and Kramer lines of cases, they are, of course, entitled to have their equal protection claim assessed to determine whether the State’s decision to deny the franchise to residents of the district while granting it to landowners was “wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation’s objectives,” Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556 (1947). No doubt residents within the district may be affected by its activities. But this argument proves too much. Since assessments imposed by the district become a cost of doing business for those who farm within it, and that cost must ultimately be passed along to the consumers of the produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas are to some extent likewise “affected” by the activities of the district. Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such “house that Jack built” foundation, however. The California Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice in its control. Since the subjection of the owners’ lands to such liens was the basis by which the district was to obtain financing, the proposed district had as a practical matter to attract landowner support. Nor, since assessments against landowners were to be the sole means by which the expenses of the district were to be paid, could it be said to be unfair or inequitable to repose the franchise in landowners but not residents. Landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district’s costs, and the State could rationally conclude that they, to the exclusion of residents, should be charged with responsibility for its operation. We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precluded California from limiting the voting for directors of appellee district by totally excluding those who merely reside within the district.

Ill

Appellants assert that even if residents may be excluded from the vote, lessees who farm the land have interests that are indistinguishable from those of the landowners. Like landowners, they take an interest in increasing the available water for farming and, because the costs of district projects may be passed on to them either by express agreement or by increased rentals, they have an equal interest in the costs.

Lessees undoubtedly do have an interest in the activities of appellee district analogous to that of landowners in many respects. But in the type of special district we now have before us, the question for our determination is not whether or not we would have lumped them together had we been enacting the statute in question, but instead whether “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify” California’s decision to deny the franchise to lessees while granting it to landowners. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961).

The term “lessees” may embrace the holders of a wide spectrum of leasehold interests in land, from the month-to-month tenant holding under an oral lease, on the one hand, to the long-term lessee holding under a carefully negotiated written lease, on the other. The system which permitted a lessee for a very short term to vote might easily lend itself to manipulation on the part of large landowners because of the ease with which such landowners could create short-term interests on the part of loyal employees. And, even apart from the fear of such manipulation, California may well have felt that landowners would be unwilling to join in the forming of a water storage district if short-term lessees whose fortunes were not in the long run tied to the land were to have a major vote in the affairs of the district.

The administration of a voting system which allowed short-term lessees to vote could also pose significant difficulties. Apparently, assessment rolls as well as state and federal land lists are used by election boards in determining the qualifications of the voters. Calif. Water Code § 41016. Such lists, obviously, would not ordinarily disclose either long- or short-term leaseholds. While reference could be made to appropriate conveyancing records to determine the existence of leases which had been recorded, leases for terms less than one year need not be recorded under California law in order to preserve the right of the lessee. Calif. Civil Code § 1214.

Finally, we note that California has not left the lessee without remedy for his disenfranchised state. Sections 41002 and 41005 of the California Water Code provide for voting in the general election by proxy. To the extent that a lessee entering into a lease of substantial duration, thereby likening his status more to that of a landowner, feels that the right to vote in the election of directors of the district is of sufficient import to him, he may bargain for that right at the time he negotiates his lease. And the longer the term of the lease, and the more the interest of the lessee becomes akin to that of the landowner, presumably the more willing the lessor will be to assign his right. Just as the lessee may by contract be required to reimburse the lessor for the district assessments so he may by contract acquire the right to vote for district directors.

Under these circumstances, the exclusion of lessees from voting in general elections for the directors of the district does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

IV

The last claim by appellants is that § 41001, which weights the vote according to assessed valuation of the land, is unconstitutional. They point to the fact that several of the smaller landowners have only one vote per person whereas the J. G. Boswell Company has 37,825 votes, and they place reliance on the various decisions of this Court holding that wealth has no relation to resident-voter qualifications and that equality of voting power may not be evaded. See, e. g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966).

Appellants’ argument ignores the realities of water storage district operation. Since its formation in 1926, appellee district has put into operation four multi-million-dollar projects. The last project involved the construction of two laterals from the Basin to the California State Aqueduct at a capital cost of about $2,500,000. Three small landowners having land aggregating somewhat under four acres with an assessed valuation of under $100 were given one vote each in the special election held for the approval of the project. The J. G. Boswell Company, which owns 61,665.54 acres with an assessed valuation of $3,782,220 was entitled to cast 37,825 votes in the election. By the same token, however, the assessment commissioners determined that the benefits of the project would be uniform as to all of the acres affected, and assessed the project equally as to all acreage. Each acre has to bear $13.26 of cost and the three small landowners, therefore, must pay a total of $46, whereas the company must pay $817,685 for its part. Thus, as the District Court found, “the benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the land.” 342 F. Supp. 144, 146. We cannot say that the California legislative decision to permit voting in the same proportion is not rationally based.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the three-judge District Court and hold that the voter qualification statutes for California water storage district elections are rationally based, and therefore do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting.

The vices of this case are fourfold.

First. Lessees of farmlands, though residents of the district, are not given the franchise.

Second. Residents who own no agricultural lands but live in the district and face all the perils of flood which the district is supposed to control are disfranchised.

Third. Only agricultural landowners are entitled to vote and their vote is weighted, one vote for each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation as provided in § 41001 of the California Water Code.

Fourth. The corporate voter is put in the saddle.

There are 189 landowners who own up to 80 acres each. These 189 represent 2.34% of the agricultural acreage of the district. There are 193,000 acres in the district. Petitioner Salyer Land Co. is one large operator, West Lake Farms and South Lake Farms are also large operators. The largest is J. G. Boswell Co. These four farm almost 85% of all the land in the district. Of these, J. G. Boswell Co. commands the greatest number of votes, 37,825, which are enough to give it a majority of the board of directors. As a result, it is permanently in the saddle. Almost all of the 77 residents of the district are disfranchised. The hold of J. G. Boswell Co. is so strong that there has been no election since 1947, making little point of the provision in § 41300 of the California Water Code for an election every other year.

The result has been calamitous to some who, though landless, have even more to fear from floods than the ephemeral corporation.

I — I

In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204, 209, we set out the following test for state election schemes which selectively distribute the franchise:

“Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise.”

Provisions authorizing a selective franchise are disfavored, because they “always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives.” Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 627. In order to overcome this strong presumption, it had to be shown up to now (1) that there is a compelling state interest for the exclusion, and (2) that the exclusions are necessary to promote the State’s articulated goal. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701; Kramer v. Union School District, supra. See also Police Jury of Vermillion Parish v. Hebert, 404 U. S. 807; Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172, aff’d, 400 U. S. 884. In my view, appellants in this case have made a sufficient showing to invoke the above principles, and the presumption thus established has not been overcome.

Assuming, arguendo, that a State may, in some circumstances, limit the franchise to that portion of the electorate “primarily affected” by the outcome of an election, Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 632, the limitation may only be upheld if it is demonstrated that “all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the [franchise] includes.” Ibid. The majority concludes that “there is no way that the economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries.”

But, with all respect, that is a great distortion. In these arid areas of our Nation a water district seeks water in time of drought and fights it in time of flood. One of the functions of water districts in California is to manage flood control. That is general California statutory policy. It is expressly stated in the Water Code that governs water districts. The California Supreme Court ruled some years back that flood control and irrigation are different but complementary aspects of one problem.

From its inception in 1926, this district has had repeated flood control problems. Four rivers, Kings, Kern, Tule, and Kaweah, enter Tulare Lake Basin. South of Tulare Lake Basin is Buena Vista Lake. In the past, Buena Vista has been used to protect Tulare Lake Basin by storing Kern River water in the former. That is how Tulare Lake Basin was protected from menacing floods in 1952. But that was not done in the great 1969 flood, the result being that 88,000 of the 193,000 acres in respondent district were flooded. The board of the respondent district — dominated by the big landowner J. G. Boswell Co. — voted 6^4 to table the motion that would put into operation the machinery to divert the flood waters to the Buena Vista Lake. The reason is that J. G. Boswell Co. had a long-term agricultural lease in the Buena Vista Lake Basin and flooding it would have interfered with the planting, growing, and harvesting of crops the next season.

The result was that water in the Tulare Lake Basin rose to 192.5 USGS datum. Ellison, one of the appellants who lives in the district, is not an agricultural landowner. But his residence was 15% feet below the water level of the crest of the flood in 1969.

The appellee district has large levees; and if they are broken, damage to houses and loss of life are imminent.

Landowners — large or small, resident or nonresident lessees or landlords, sharecroppers or owners — all should have a say. But irrigation, water storage, the building of levees, and flood control, implicate the entire community. All residents of the district must be granted the franchise.

This case, as I will discuss below, involves the performance of vital and important governmental functions by water districts clothed with much of the paraphernalia of government. The weighting of votes according to one’s wealth is hostile to our system of government. See Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172, aff’d, 400 U. S. 884. As a nonlandowning bachelor was held to be entitled to vote on matters affecting education, Kramer v. Union School District, supra, so all the prospective victims of mismanaged flood control projects should be entitled to vote in water district elections, whether they be resident nonlandowners, resident or nonresident lessees, and whether they own 10 acres or 10,000 acres. Moreover, their votes should be equal regardless of the value of their holdings, for when it comes to performance of governmental functions all enter the polls on an equal basis.

The majority, however, would distinguish the water storage district from “units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body,” Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 485, and fit this case within the exception contemplated for “a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents.” Id., at 483-484. The Avery test was significantly liberalized in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50. At issue was an election for trustees of a special-purpose district which ran a junior college. We said,

“[S]ince the trustees can levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the operations of the junior college, their powers are equivalent, for apportionment purposes, to those exercised by the county commissioners in Avery. . . . [T]hese powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions . . . and have suffi- dent impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here.” Id., at 53-54. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)

Measured by the Hadley test, the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District surely performs “important governmental functions” which “have sufficient impact throughout the district” to justify the application of the Avery principle.

Water storage districts in California are classified as irrigation, reclamation, or drainage districts. Such state agencies “are considered exclusively governmental,” and their property is “held only for governmental purpose,” not in the “proprietary sense.” They are a “public entity,” just as “any other political subdivision.” That is made explicit in various ways. The Water Code of California states that “[a] 11 waters and water rights” of the State “within the district are given, dedicated, and set apart for the uses and purposes of the district.” Directors of the district are “public officers of the state.” The district possesses the power of eminent domain. Its works may not be taxed. It carries a governmental immunity against suit.- A district has powers that relate to irrigation, storage of water, drainage, flood control, and generation of hydroelectric energy.

Whatever may be the parameters of the exception alluded to in Avery and Hadley, I cannot conclude that t.bis water storage district escapes the constitutional restraints relative to a franchise within a governmental unit.

II

When we decided Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and discussed the problems of malapportionment we thought and talked about people — of population, of the constitutional right of “qualified citizens to vote,” (id., at 554) of “the right of suffrage,” (id., at 555) of the comparison of “one man’s vote” to that of another man’s vote. Id., at 559. We said:

“Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.” Id., at 562.

It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within the framework of political representation of people. Corporations were held to be “persons” for purposes both of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, it is unthinkable in terms of the American tradition that corporations should be admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot voting rights to its corporations, weighting each vote according to the wealth of the corporation? Or could it follow the rule of one corporation, one vote?

It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it would change our whole concept of the franchise. California takes part of that step here by allowing corporations to vote in these water district matters that entail performance of vital governmental functions. One corporation can outvote 77 individuals in this district. Four corporations can exercise these governmental powers as they choose, leaving every individual inhabitant with a weak, ineffective voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution.

       The history of the vast Central Valley Project in California is recounted in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950).

       4 Waters and Water Rights §345.3 (R. Clark ed. 1970).

       The actual adoption of district projects is long and involved. After a district undertakes a project, it must be approved by the California Department of Water Resources. Calif. Water Code § 42200 et seq. A report and the estimated cost of the project must be submitted to the California State Treasurer, who undertakes an independent investigation before declaring the project abandoned or approving the report. Id., § 42275 et seq. If the report is approved, a “special election” is called. I'd., § 42325 et seq. In order for the project to be finally adopted, a majority of the votes and a majority of the voters must approve it. Id., §§ 42355-42550.

       There is no evidence that the appellee district engages in the generation, sale, or distribution of hydroelectric power.

       Calif. Water Code § 41000 provides:
      “Only the holders of title to land are entitled to vote at a general election.”

       Calif. Water Code §41001 provides:
      “Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars ($100), or fraction thereof, worth of his land, exclusive of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights therein, in the precinct.”

       The board has the power to employ and discharge persons on a regular staff and to contract for the construction of district projects. Calif. Water Code § 43152. It can condemn private property for use in such projects, id,., §§ 43530-43533, and may cooperate (including contract) with other agencies, state and federal. Id., § 43151. Both general obligation bonds and interest-bearing warrants may be authorized. Id., §§ 44900-45900.

       Appellants strongly urge that districts have the power to, and do, engage in flood control activities. The interest of such activities to residents is said to be obvious since houses may be destroyed and, as in the case of appellant Ellison, jobs may disappear. But Calif. Water Code § 43151 provides that any agreement entered into with the State or the United States must be “for a purpose appertaining to or beneficial to the project of the district. ...” And the statute which assertedly gives support to the flood control activities, id.,
        § 44000, simply states that a district “may cooperate and contract with the state ... or the United States” for the purpose of “flood control.” Id.., § 44001. Thus, any flood control activities are incident to the exercise of the district’s primary functions of water storage and distribution.

       Appellants point out that since the flood of 1969, the district has received about $250,000 in flood relief funds from the Federal Government and that the residents, like other American citizens, have paid their share of that money and are therefore entitled to vote. Cf. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970). But their status as district residents bears no more relation to the flood relief money than that of any other-United States citizen and would seem to provide no more compelling reason for granting such residents the right to vote than the citizenry at large.

       As was pointed out in n. 3, small landowners are protected from crippling assessments resulting from district projects by the dual vote which must be taken in order to approve a project. Not only must a majority of the votes be cast for approval, but also a majority of the voters must approve. In this case, about 189 landowners constitute a majority and 189 of the smallest landowners in the district have only 2.34% of the land.

       Calif. Stat. 1921, c. 914, § 58.

       Calif. Water Code § 44001.

        Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983.

         Since 1938, sharecroppers have been included in federal regulations defining “farmers” who are entitled to vote on referenda concerning marketing quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

        “Farmers engaged in the production of a commodity. For purposes of referenda with respect to marketing quotas for tobacco, extra long staple cotton, rice and peanuts the phrase ‘farmers engaged in the production of a commodity’ includes any person who is entitled to share in a crop of the commodity, or the proceeds thereof because he shares in the risks of production of the crop as an owner, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper (landlord whose return from the cfop is fixed regardless of the amount of the crop produced is excluded) on a farm on which such crop is planted in a workmanlike manner for harvest: Provided, That any failure to harvest the crop because of conditions beyond the control of such person shall not affect his status as a farmer engaged in the production of the crop. In addition, the phrase ‘farmers engaged in the production of a commodity’ also includes each person who it is determined would have had an interest as a producer in the commodity on a farm for which a farm allotment for the crop of the commodity was established and no acreage of the crop was planted but an acreage of the crop was regarded as planted for history acreage purposes under the applicable commodity regulations.” 7 CFR § 717.3 (b).

       Calif. Water Code § 39060.

        Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District v. Ohrt, 31 Cal. App. 2d 619, 623, 88 P. 2d 763, 765.

       Calif. Govt. Code § 811.2.

       Section 43158. See also id., § 39061.

        In re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 322, 28 P. 272, 278.

       Calif. Water Code § 43530.

        Id., § 43508.

       Calif. Govt. Code §§811.2, 815.

       Calif. Water Code §§ 42200, 43000, 43025, 44001.

        Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 28.

         Pembina Comolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 188-189; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 397.

       Calif. Water Code § 41004.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. v. TOLTEC WATERSHED IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
    No. 71-1069.
    Argued January 8, 1973
    Decided March 20, 1973

      Henry A. Burgess argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.

      Fred W. Phifer argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.

        Melvin L. Wvlf, Sanford Jay Rosen, Joel M. Gora, and David Hall filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Per Curiam.

In this case, we are confronted with an issue similar to the one determined today in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, ante, p. 719. Appellee Toltec Watershed Improvement District was established after referendum held pursuant to Wyoming’s Watershed Improvement District Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§41-354.1 to 41-354.26 (Supp. 1971). After formation, appellee sought a right of entry onto lands owned by appellant Associated Enterprises, Inc., and leased by Johnston Fuel Liners, for the purpose of carrying out studies to determine the feasibility of constructing a dam and reservoir. When Associated Enterprises resisted, the district sought to enforce its right in state court. Arguing that the statutes authorizing the referendum violated the Equal Protection Clause since under § 41-354.9 only landowners are entitled to vote and under § 41-354.10 a watershed improvement district cannot be determined to be administratively practicable and feasible unless a majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the acreage in the district, favor its creation, appellants maintained that the district was illegally formed. The trial court agreed that had the district been formed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, appellants would have a good defense under state law to the asserted right of entry, but it held against them on the merits. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. 490 P. 2d 1069.

Appellants urge here that the provisions entitling only landowners to vote and weighting the vote according to acreage violate the Equal Protection Clause. Like the California water storage district, the Wyoming watershed district is a governmental unit of special or limited purpose whose activities have a disproportionate effect on landowners within the district. The district's operations are conducted through projects and the land (is assessed for any benefits received. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-354.17, 41-354.21, 41-354.22. Such assessments constitute a lien on the land until paid. Id., § 41-354.23.

We cannot agree with the dissent's intimation that the Wyoming Legislature has in any sense abdicated to a wealthy few the ultimate authority over land management in that State. The statute authorizing the establishment of improvement districts was enacted by a legislature in which all of the State's electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented. Under the act, districts may be formed only as subdivisions of soil and water conservation districts. Id., § 41-354.3. And a precondition to their formation referendum is a determination by a board of supervisors of the affected conservation district, popularly elected by both occupiers and owners of land within the district, that the watershed improvement district is both necessary and administratively practicable. Id., §§41-354.7, 41-354.8; Wyoming Conservation Districts Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-234 et seg., § 11-243 (Supp. 1971). As in Salyer, supra, we hold that the State could rationally conclude that landowners are primarily burdened and benefited by the establishment and operation of watershed districts and that it may condition the vote accordingly. The judgment appealed from is, therefore,

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

I

For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, ante, p. 735, I cannot agree that the voting provisions of Wyoming's Watershed Improvement District Act pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, I dissent.

At issue is Wyoming’s Watershed Improvement District Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§41-354.1 to 41-354.26 (Supp. 1971). Appellee Toltec Watershed Improvement District was established as a result of a referendum held pursuant to this Act, May 12, 1969.

The purposes of the Wyoming Act are “to provide for the prevention and control of erosion, floodwater and sediment damages, and the storage, conservation, development, utilization, and disposal of water.” Id., § 41-354.2. These are not purposes related only to special, narrow interests of landowners. As noted in the Salyer Land Co. case, flood control is a purpose that affects at least everyone in a watershed district, whether he be owner, lessee, or a resident not engaged in farming, grazing, or other agricultural activity.

In June 1970, appellee sought a right of entry onto lands owned by appellant Associated Enterprises, and leased by appellant Johnston Fuel Liners, for the purpose of carrying out foundation studies for a dam site. When appellant Associated Enterprises resisted, Toltec sought to enforce its right of entry in state court. The trial court agreed with appellants that if Toltec had been illegally formed, they would have a good defense to the asserted right of entry, but held against them on the merits, despite appellants’ objections that the referendum which authorized the creation of the watershed improvement district violated the Equal Protection Clause, the franchise being limited to property owners, and the votes being weighted by the amount of property owned. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

1 conclude that the presumption set out in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204, has not been overcome, for “[p]lacing voting power in property owners alone can be justified only by some overriding interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize.” Id., at 209. Here, the suggestion was made below that property owners are those “primarily concerned” with the affairs of the watershed district. But assuming, arguendo, that a State may, in some circumstances, limit the franchise to that portion of the electorate “primarily affected” by the outcome of an election, Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 632, the limitation may only be upheld if it is demonstrated that “all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the '[franchise] includes.” Ibid.

Other than the bald assertion by the court below that it “makes sense” to limit the franchise in watershed district referenda to property owners, there is nothing in the record to support the exclusion. Appellant Johnston is a lessee of land in the District. Why a lessee is “substantially less interested” in the creation of a watershed district than is a titleholder is left to speculation. And mere speculation is insufficient to justify an infringement on the right to vote, a right which is “the essence of a democratic society,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555.

Moreover, we recently stated that “a percentage reduction of an individual’s voting power in proportion to the amount of property he owned would be [constitutionally] defective. See Stewart v. Parish School Board, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (ED La.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 884 (1970).” Gordon v. Lance, 403 U. S. 1, 4 n. 1.

II

It is argued, however, that unlike “units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body,” Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 485, a watershed improvement district is “a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents,” id., at 483-484. The court below sought to make such an analysis.

The Avery test, however, was significantly liberalized in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50. At issue was an election for trustees of a special purpose district which ran a junior college. We said,

“[S]ince the trustees can levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the operations of the junior college, their powers are equivalent, for apportionment purposes, to those exercised by the county commissioners in Avery. . . . [TJhese powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions . . . and have sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here.” Id., at 53-54. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)

Measured by the Hadley test, the Toltec Watershed Improvement District surely performs “important governmental functions” which “have sufficient impact throughout the district” to justify the application of the Avery principle. The District may: levy and collect special assessments, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-354.13 (A); acquire and dispose of property, § 41-354.13 (B); exercise the power of eminent domain, § 41-354.13 (C); and borrow money and issue bonds, § 41-354.13 (E) — all to exercise flood control. § 41-354.2.

The lower court characterized these functions as “proprietary” in nature, rather than “governmental.” But that is a meaningless distinction when control of public affairs is at issue. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701; Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1176, aff’d, 400 U. S. 884. It is hardly to be argued that a public body with the power to take land by eminent domain, to issue bonds, to levy taxes, and to provide plans for flood control does not “perform important governmental functions.”

It is also inconceivable that a body with the power to destroy a river by damming it and so deprive a watershed of one of its salient environmental assets does not have “sufficient impact” on the interests of people generally to invoke the principles of Avery and Hadley.

It is said that there is a difference between an election to create a special-purpose district, and an election either to authorize the district to issue bonds, or to elect district officers. In my view, such a distinction is not tenable.

“Our exacting examination [of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise] is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are not.” Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 629.

As we said in Hadley:

“If the purpose of a particular election were to be the determining factor in deciding whether voters are entitled to equal voting power, courts would be faced with the difficult job of distinguishing between various elections. We cannot readily perceive judicially manageable standards to aid in such a task. It might be suggested that equal apportionment is required only in ‘important’ elections, but good judgment and common sense tell us that what might be a vital election to one voter might well be a routine one to another.” 397 U. S., at 55.

The mere creation of the Watershed Improvement District subjects residents of the area to constraints. The District may condemn land without further electoral approval; and it has the power to finance improvements through special taxes levied against land to be benefited by the improvements without further electoral approval. While such assessments fall in the first instance on the landowner, lessees and tenants would be substantially affected, as well. And its power to reshape or control the watershed and to provide flood control enables it to turn rivers into flumes or to destroy them by erecting dams to build reservoirs. Dams may be vital or they may be disastrous. The sedimentation rate in some areas is so fast as to reduce the life of dams to a few decades. Dams may destroy valued fish runs. Dams substitute a reservoir for a river and wipe out the varied life of a river course, including its wildlife, canoe waters, camping and picnic grounds, and nesting areas of birds. This reshaping of the face of the Nation may be disastrous, no matter who casts the ballots. The enormity of the violation of our environmental ethics, represented by state and federal laws, is only increased when the ballot is restricted to or heavily weighted on behalf of the few who are important only because they are wealthy.

The issues I tender are disposed of by the suggestions that the members of the Legislature of Wyoming passed the Act now challenged, that they represented the people of Wyoming, and that they could therefore put the landowners in command of the environmental problems tendered by this case. That would, of course, be true if the case presented no federal question. But adherence to Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny makes the federal rule dominant, viz., that important governmental functions may not be assigned to special groups, whether powerful lobbies or other discrete groups to which a state legislature is often beholden.

I would reverse the judgment below.

       Establishment of a Watershed Improvement District entails several steps. First, a petition proposing the creation of such a district must be filed with the board of supervisors of the soil and water conservation district in which the proposed watershed district will lie. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-354.5. The petition must set forth the boundaries of the proposed district and reasons justifying its creation, and must be signed by a majority of the landowners in the proposed district. Ibid.

      On receipt of the petition, the board of supervisors must call a public hearing, which “[a]ll owners of land within the proposed watershed improvement district and all other interested parties shall have the right to attend . . . and to be heard.” Id., § 41-354.7 (A). The board of supervisors may, after such hearing, determine that there is no need for the creation of the district. If so, the petition is forthwith denied. Id., § 41-354.7 (C).
      If the supervisors do think there is a need, however, they must further determine whether the proposed district is “administratively practicable and feasible.” Id., § 41-354.8. “To assist the board of supervisors in this determination,” a referendum must be held in the proposed district “upon the proposition of the creation of such district.” Ibid. Only owners of land lying within the boundaries of the proposed district may vote in this referendum. Id., § 41-354.9 (B). If a majority of the landowners representing a majority of the acreage within the district do not vote against creation of the district, the board of supervisors is permitted to determine that the district is administratively practicable and feasible, and to declare it created. Ibid.

      Once created, a watershed improvement district has broad powers. It may exercise the power of eminent domain, levy and collect assessments, and issue bonds. Id., §§41-354.13 to 41-354.14.

       The Watershed Improvement District Act itself contemplates that nonlandowners are interested in the proposed creation of a district, by giving them the right to appear and be heard at the public hearing required by the Act prior to the referendum. See n. 1, supra. No reason is advanced why a person not owning property can be sufficiently interested in the district to be given a forum, yet is not sufficiently interested to be allowed to implement the views he expresses at that forum through the ballot box.

       Landowners are often able to pass property taxes through to their lessees and tenants. D. Netzer, Economies of the Property Tax (1966). This is especially true in urban areas where the demand for rental housing is price inelastic, but there is no reason why it may not also be true in rural areas, as well.


author:
Mr. Justice Stewart
      Me. Justice Powell,

text:
    ROSARIO et al. v. ROCKEFELLER, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 71-1371.
    Argued December 13, 1972
    Decided March 21, 1973
    Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, BlackmüN, and RehNquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, BreNNAn, and Marshall, JJ., joined, -post, p. 763.

      Burt Neubome argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Melvin L. Wulf and Seymour Friedman.

      A. Seth Greenwald, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for respondents Rockefeller et al. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lejkovñtz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshovntz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Irving Galt, Assistant Attorney General. Joseph J aspan filed a brief for respondents Meisser et al. David N. Dinkins, pro se, filed a brief for respondents Dinkins et al.
   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

For more than 60 years, New York has had a closed system of primary elections, whereby only enrolled members of a political party may vote in that party’s primary. Under the State’s Election Law, a registered voter enrolls as a party member by depositing an enrollment blank in a locked enrollment box. The last day for enrollment is 30 days before the general election each year. Section 186 of the Election Law provides that the enrollment boxes shall not be opened until the Tuesday following the general election, and party affiliations are then entered on the State’s official registration books. The voter is then duly enrolled as a member of his party and may vote in a subsequent primary election.

The effect of § 186 is to require a voter to enroll in the party of his choice at least 30 days before the general election in November in order to vote in the next subsequent party primary. If a voter fails to meet this deadline, he cannot participate in a party primary until after the following general election. Section 187 provides an exemption from this waiting period for certain classes of voters, including persons who have attained voting age after the last general election, persons too ill to enroll during the previous enrollment period, and persons who moved from one place to another within a single county. Under § 187, these classes of voters may be specially enrolled as members of a party even after the general election has taken place.

The petitioners are New York residents who became eligible to vote when they came of age in 1971. Although they could have registered and enrolled in a political party before the cutoff date in 1971 — October 2 — they failed to do so. Instead, they waited until early December 1971 to register and to deposit their enrollment blanks. At that time, they could not be specially and immediately enrolled in a party under § 187, since they had attained the voting age before, rather than after, the 1971 general election. Hence, pursuant to § 186, their party enrollment could not become effective until after the November 1972 general election. Because of New York’s enrollment scheme, then, the petitioners were not eligible to vote in the presidential primary election held in June 1972.

The petitioners filed these complaints for declaratory relief, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that § 186 unconstitutionally deprived them of their right to vote in the June primary and abridged their freedom to associate with the political party of their choice. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, granted them the declaratory relief sought. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding § 186 constitutional. 458 F. 2d 649. We granted certiorari, but denied the petitioners’ motion for summary reversal, expedited consideration, and a stay. 406 U. S. 957 (1972).

The petitioners argue that, through § 186, New York disenfranchised them by refusing to permit them to vote in the June 1972 primary election on the ground that they had not enrolled in a political party at least 30 days prior to the preceding general election. More specifically, they contend that § 186 has operated to preclude newly registered voters, such as themselves, from participating in the primary election of the party of their choice. According to the petitioners, New York has no “compelling state interest” in its delayed-enrollment scheme so as to justify such disenfranchisement, and hence the scheme must fall. In support of this argument, the petitioners rely on several cases in which this Court has struck down, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, state statutes that disenfranchised certain groups of people. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Common, 398 U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972).

We cannot accept the petitioners’ contention. None of the cases on which they rely is apposite to the situation here. In each of those cases, the State totally denied the electoral franchise to a particular class of residents, and there was no way in which the members of that class could have made themselves eligible to vote. In Carrington, for instance, the Texas Constitution disabled all servicemen from voting in Texas, no matter how long they had lived there. In Kramer, residents who were not property owners or parents were completely precluded from voting in school board elections. In Cipriano and Kolodziejski, the States prohibited non-property owners from ever voting in bond elections. In Evans, Maryland refused to permit residents at the National Institutes of Health, located within its borders, ever to vote in state elections. And in Dunn, Tennessee totally disenfranchised newly arrived residents, i. e., those who had been residents of the State less than a year or residents of the county less than three months before the election.

Section 186 of New York’s Election Law, however, is quite different. It did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners belong — newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a party before the previous general election. Rather, the statute merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had to meet in order to participate in the next primary. Since the petitioners attained voting age before the October 2, 1971, deadline, they clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party of their choice before that date and been eligible to vote in the June 1972 primary. Indeed, if the petitioners had not been able to enroll by the October 2, 1971, deadline because they did not attain the requisite age until after the 1971 general election, they would have been eligible for special enrollment under § 187. The petitioners do not say why they did not enroll prior to the cutoff date; however, it is clear that they could have done so, but chose not to. Hence, if their plight can be characterized as disenfranchisement at all, it was not caused by § 186, but by their own failure to take timely steps to effect their enrollment.

For the same reason, we reject the petitioners’ argument that § 186 violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen party’s next primary.

Indeed, under the New York law, a person may, if he wishes, vote in a different party primary each year. All he need do is to enroll in a new political party between the prior primary and the October cutoff date. For example, one June he could be a registered Republican and vote in the Republican primary. Before enrollment closed the following October, he could enroll in the Democratic Party. Since that enrollment would be effective after the November general election and before the following February 1, he could then vote in the next Democratic primary. Before the following October, he could register to vote as a Liberal, and so on. Thus, New York’s scheme does not “lock” a voter into an unwanted pre-existing party affiliation from one primary to the next.

The only remaining question, then, is whether the time limitation imposed by § 186 is so severe as itself to constitute an unconstitutionally onerous burden on the petitioners’ exercise of the franchise or on their freedom of political association. As the- dissent acknowledges, the State is certainly justified in imposing some reasonable cutoff point for registration or party enrollment, which citizens must meet in order to participate in the next election. Post, at 765. Hence, our inquiry must be whether the particular deadline before us here is so justified.

The cutoff date for enrollment prescribed by § 186 occurs approximately eight months prior to a presidential primary (held in June) and 11 months prior to a non-presidential primary (held in September). The petitioners argue that this period is unreasonably long, and that it therefore unduly burdens the exercise of their constitutional rights. According to the petitioners, § 186 requires party enrollment before prospective voters have knowledge of the candidates or issues to be involved in the next primary elections. The requirement is especially onerous, the petitioners say, as applied to new voters, who have never before registered to vote or enrolled in a political party.

It is true that the period between the enrollment deadline and the next primary election is lengthy. But that period is not an arbitrary time limit unconnected to any important state goal. The purpose of New York’s delayed-enrollment scheme, we are told, is to inhibit party “raiding,” whereby voters in sympathy with one party designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine the results of the other party’s primary. This purpose is accomplished, the Court of Appeals found, not only by requiring party enrollment several months in advance of the primary, on the theory that “long-range planning in politics is quite difficult,” 458 F. 2d, at 653, but also by requiring enrollment prior to a general election. The reason for the latter requirement was well stated by the court below:

“[T]he notion of raiding, its potential disruptive impact, and its advantages to one side are not likely to be as apparent to the majority of enrolled voters nor to receive as close attention from the professional politician just prior to a November general election when concerns are elsewhere as would be true during the 'primary season/ which, for the country as a whole, runs from early February until the end of June. New persons have the effrontery or the foresight to enroll as say, ‘Republicans’ so that they can vote in a primary some seven months hence, when they full well intend to vote ‘Democratic’ in only a few weeks. And, it would be the rare politician who could successfully urge his constituents to vote for him or his party in the upcoming general election, while at the same time urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the opposite party’s primary. Yet the operation of section 186 requires such deliberate inconsistencies if large-scale raiding were to be effective in New York. Because of the statute, it is all but impossible for any group to engage in raiding.” Ibid.

It is clear that preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 345; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 145 (1972). In the service of that goal, New York has adopted its delayed-enrollment scheme; and an integral part of that scheme is that, in order to participate in a primary election, a person must enroll before the preceding general election. As the Court of Appeals stated: “Allowing enrollment any time after the general election would not have the same deterrent effect on raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position of asking to be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending to vote immediately for another.” 458 F. 2d, at 653. For this reason, New York’s scheme requires an insulating general election between enrollment and the next party primary. The resulting time limitation for enrollment is thus tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary. Cf. Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972).

New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 primary election or from associating with the political party of their choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their enrollment, which they chose to disregard.

Accordingly, the judgment below is

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Powell,

with whom Me. Justice Douglas, Me. Justice Beennan, and Me. Justice Maeshall join, dissenting.

I

It is important at the outset to place New York’s cutoff date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents prospective voters from registering for a party primary some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 months before a nonpresidential one. The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a “lengthy” one. Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. And New York concedes that only one other State — Kentucky—has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on persons with prior party affiliations. Confronted with such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court’s opinion unconvincing.

The right of all persons to vote, once the State has decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally with one’s peers is the essence of a democratic society. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments of public officials, the citizen should never be given just cause to think that he was denied an equal right to elect them.

Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, as well as on the closely related right to associate with the party of one’s choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as required by New York law, eight months prior to the presidential primary. We are told that petitioners “clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party of their choice” before the cutoff date and been eligible to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons “chose not to,” and that their disfranchisement re-suited from “their own failure to take timely steps to effect their enrollment.”

If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree. Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable registration cutoff prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen’s failure to register may be presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can hardly be used to justify denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1930); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, supra; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Common, 398 U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.

The majority excuses the challenged statute because it does not “absolutely” disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. The State likewise contends this is “not a disenfranchising statute.” The Court apparently views this statute as a mere “time deadline” on petitioners’ enrollment that disadvantages no identifiable class and that postpones through the next primary rather than denies altogether petitioners’ voting and associational rights. I cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to vote totally disfranchises a class of persons who, for quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than eight months to the primary date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, moreover, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associational rights before a constitutional breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious burden or infringement on such “constitutionally protected activity” is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.

II

The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told only that the cutoff date is “not an arbitrary time limit unconnected to any important state goal”; that it is “tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary.” The Court does not explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant burdens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the party of one’s choice.

The Court’s formulation, though the terminology is somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal protection “rational basis” test. One may agree that the challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legitimate interest of New York in preventing party “raiding.” But this Court’s prior decisions simply do not permit such an approach. Rather, they recognize that:

“[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.

See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).

Voting in a party primary is as protected against state encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock v. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941). And the Court has said quite explicitly that “if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.’ ” Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337, quoting Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 627 (emphasis added in Dunn). See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 704; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, at 205, 209. Likewise, the Court has asserted that “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs” is “among our most precious freedoms,” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 30, and must be carefully protected from state encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963).

The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute, burdening as it does fundamental constitutional rights, can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for by our prior cases. The asserted state interest in this case is the prevention of party “raiding,” which consists of the movement or “crossover” by members of one party into another’s primary to “defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they care to advance.” The typical example is a member of one party deliberately entering another’s primary to help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his own party’s nominee might win more easily in the general election. A State does have an interest in preventing such behavior, lest “the efficacy of the party system in the democratic process — its usefulness in providing a unity of divergent factions in an alliance for power — would be seriously impaired,” Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F. 2d 649, 652 (CA2). The court below held flatly that the state interest in deterring “raiding” was a “compelling” one. Ibid.

The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The importance or significance of any such interest cannot be determined in a vacuum but, rather, in the context of the means advanced by the State to protect it and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. The state interest here is hardly substantial enough to sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears to be based, that most persons who change or declare party affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate the system which is not likely to be widespread.

Political parties in this country traditionally have been characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership. And citizens generally declare or alter party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary simply because it presents candidates and issues more responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies in his State, runs contrary to the fundamental rights of personal choice and expression which voting in this country was designed to serve.

Whatever state interest exists for preventing crossovers from one party to another is appreciably lessened where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no previous affiliation with any political party. The danger of voters in sympathy with one party “raiding” another party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls short of the overriding state interest needed to justify denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary of their choice.

Ill

In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the State, in pursuing its legitimate interest,

“cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with ‘precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 (1967), and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 631. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means.’ Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).”

The Court indicates that placing the enrollment deadline before the preceding general election serves well the state interest in discouraging party “raiding.” This fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures. A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case would not leave the party structure of New York helpless and vulnerable to “raiding” activities. Other States, with varied and complex party systems, have maintained them successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New York.

Partisan political activities do not constantly engage the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive than issues and the qualities of individual candidates. The crossover in registration from one party to another is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a desire to raid or distort a party’s primary. To the extent that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of organized effort which depends for its success upon some relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters. This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary date draws near. If New York were to adopt a more reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be protected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by New York would make the franchise and opportunities for legitimate party participation available to those who constitutionally have the right to exercise them.

       See N. Y. Election Law § 131. The State’s first comprehensive primary law was enacted in 1911.

       Section 186 provides, in pertinent part:
      “All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment box shall remain in such box, and the box shall not be opened nor shall any of the blanks be removed therefrom until the Tuesday following the day of general election in that year. Such box shall then be opened by the board of elections and the blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom by the board, and the names of the party designated by each voter under such declaration, provided such party continues to be a party, as defined in this law shall be entered by the board, opposite the name of such voter in the appropriate column of the two copies of the register containing enrollment numbers for the election district in which such voter resides. . . . Such enrollment shall be complete before the succeeding first day of February in each year.” This section finds its roots in the 1911 law. Laws 1911, c. 891, § 19.

       Section 187 provides, in pertinent part:
      “Application for special enrollment, transfer or correction of enrollment. 1. At any time after January first and before the thirtieth day preceding the next fall primary, except during the thirty days preceding a spring primary, and except on the day of a primary, a voter may enroll with a party, transfer his enrollment after moving within a county, and under certain circumstances, correct his enrollment, as hereinafter in this section provided.
      “2. A voter may enroll with a party if he did not enroll on the day of the annual enrollment (a) because he became of age after the preceding general election, or (b) because he was naturalized subsequent to ninety days prior to the preceding general election, or (c) because he did not have the necessary residential qualifications as provided by section one hundred fifty, to enable him to enroll in the preceding year, or (d) because of being or having been at all previous times for enrollment a member of the armed forces of the United States as defined in section three hundred three, or (e) because of being the spouse, child or parent of such member of the armed forces and being absent from his or her county of residence at all previous times for enrollment by reason of accompanying or being with such member of the armed forces, or (f) because he was an inmate or patient of a veterans’ bureau hospital located outside the state of New York at all previous times for enrollment, or the spouse, parent or child of such inmate or patient accompanying or being with such inmate or patient at such times, or (g) because he was incapacitated by illnéss during the previous enrollment period thereby preventing him from enrolling.”

       The petitioners themselves admit this failure. The present consolidated case originated in two complaints, one by the petitioner Rosario and other named plaintiffs, on behalf of a class, and one by the petitioner Eisner. Paragraph 6 of Rosario’s complaint stated that “[e]aeh of these plaintiffs could have registered and enrolled on or before October 2nd, 1971, the last date of registration for the November 1971 elections. They each did not do so.” Similarly, Eisner’s complaint stated, in paragraph 5: “Plaintiff, Eisner, first became eligible to vote on December 30, 1970, upon the attainment of his twenty-first birthday.” Whether the petitioners failed to enroll before the deadline because of inadvertence, because of lack of interest in the essentially local 1971 general election, or for other reasons is not clear, since none of them advances any explanation for this failure to enroll.

       Although the June primary election has been completed and the petitioners will be eligible to vote in the next scheduled New York primary, this case is not moot, since the question the petitioners raise is “ 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911).

       Not only would the petitioners have been eligible for the 1972 primary, but, since they were eligible in 1971 for special enrollment under § 187, they could have, if they had timely registered and enrolled, participated in the September 14, 1971, primary.

       The District Court held that the petitioners’ failure to enroll before the cutoff date was not truly voluntary, because it was not done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. But this argument could well be made any time a State imposes a time limitation or cutoff point for registration or enrollment. The petitioners do not claim that they were unaware of New York’s deadline for enrollment.

       The dissent states that “[t]he Court apparently views this statute as a mere 'time deadline’ on petitioners’ enrollment . . . that postpones through the next primary rather than denies altogether petitioners’ voting and associational rights.” Post, at 766. And it argues that our decisions “have never required a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associational rights before a constitutional breach is incurred.” Post, at 766-767. But the dissent mis-characterizes our view of § 186. We do not uphold the statute on the ground that it is merely a prohibition on voting in one particular primary, rather than a permanent ban on voting. That is neither our point nor the effect of the law. The point is that the statute did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in any election, including the 1972 primary, had they chosen to meet the deadline established by the law.

       The petitioners also argue that § 186 establishes a durational residence requirement unconstitutional under Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and violates the right to travel under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Since the exemption in § 187 applies only to persons whose new residence is within the same county as their old residence, persons who arrive in New York State or move from one county to another after the cutoff date, and deposit their enrollment blank at that time, are barred by the delayed-enrollment scheme from voting in the next primary election. According to the petitioners, this constitutes an unconstitutional durational residence requirement and is violative of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-l.
      The petitioners, however, lack standing to raise these contentions. They make no claim that they are recently arrived residents of the State or that they have moved from one county to another nor even that they have changed their residence at all within the period relevant here. The petitioners cannot represent a class to which they do not belong.

       The petitioners contend that New York already has less drastic means to prevent raiding — means that would accomplish the State’s goal yet would permit the registrant who inadvertently failed to enroll in time to vote in the primary. Specifically, the petitioners point to § 332 of the State’s Election Law, which provides that the party enrollment of any voter may be challenged by any party member and, upon the determination by the chairman of the party’s county committee that the voter is not in sympathy with the principles of the party, may be canceled by a justice of the State Supreme Court after a hearing. That section, however, is clearly too cumbersome to have any real deterrent effect on raiding in a primary. Every challenge to a would-be raider requires a full administrative and judicial inquiry; proof that the challenged voter is not in sympathy with the party’s principles demands inquiry into the voter’s mind; and even if the challenge is successful, it strikes from the enrollment books only one name at a time. In the face of large-scale raiding, § 332 alone would be virtually ineffectual. We agree with the Court of Appeals that “[i]n requiring that the state use to a proper end the means designed to impinge minimally upon fundamental rights, the Constitution does not require that the state choose ineffectual means.” 458 F. 2d, at 654.

       October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners’ enrollment could have been effective. June 20,1972, was the date of New York’s presidential primary. Thus, the deadline was actually some eight and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresidential years, the cutoff runs from early October until the following September.

        Ante, at 760.

       The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey, Texas, and Ohio permit previously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 53, §§ 37, 38 (Supp. 1973); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, §§ 5-30, 7-43, 7-45 (1971); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23-45 (1964); Tex. Election Code, Art. 13.01a (Supp. 1972-1973); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3513.19 (1960).
      California and Pennsylvania permit previously unaffiliated voters to declare an initial party preference up to the close of registration immediately preceding the primary. Calif. Elections Code §§ 22, 203, 311-312 (1961) (registration closes in California 53 days before a primary); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §§ 623-17, 951-16 (1963 and Supp. 1972-1973) (registration closes in Pennsylvania 50 days before a primary).
      Michigan permits any registered voter to participate in the primary of his choice. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.570, 168.575 to 168.576, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 6.1570, 6.1575-6.1576 (1972). See Brief for Petitioners 32-33.

       Tr. of Oral Arg. 34.

        Ante, at 757, 758. See also ante, at 762, where the Court refers to § 186 as merely imposing “a legitimate time limitation on their [petitioners’] enrollment, which they chose to disregard.”

       See ante, at 757:
      “Section 186 of New York’s Election Law, however, is quite different. It did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners belong — newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a party before the previous general election. Rather, the statute merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had to meet in order to participate in the next primary.”
      Similarly at 758:
      “For the same reason, we reject the petitioners’ argument that § 186 violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen party’s next primary.”
      And at 762:
      “New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 primary election or from associating with the political party of their choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their enrollment, which they chose to disregard.”
      In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a “time limitation” from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an absolute ban on their associational rights.

       Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.

        Ante, at 757 and n. 6, supra.

        Ante, at 760.

        Ante, at 762.

       Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.

        Ante, at 761.

       Petitioners also suggest other “less drastic” means of protecting the State’s interest: greater reliance on the summary disenrollment procedures of § 332 of the State’s election law and loyalty oaths, restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish them, limitation of the statute’s operation to persons with preexisting party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-21. I make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in protecting the State’s interest or on their potential infringement of constitutionally protected rights. Their presence, however, points to the range and variety of other experimental techniques available for New York to consider.


text:
    January 22, 1973
    No. 72-524.
    Maryland People’s Party et al. v. Mandel, Governor of Maryland, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Md.

Mr. Justice Brennan would dismiss the appeal as moot.


text:
    No. 72-638.
    Lake Charles American Press v. Francis.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas would postpone question of jurisdiction to hearing of case on the merits. Mr. Justice Brennan would dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction, being of the view that the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court was based on an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 72-5119.
    Ross v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973).


text:
    No. 59,
    Orig.
    United States v. Nevada et al.
   Motion of Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint set for oral argument in due course.