author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    MILLER v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 154.
    Argued March 26, 1968.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      F. Lee Bailey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alan M. Dershowitz.

      Philip C. Griffin, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and William E. James, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan join,

dissenting.

The Court may leave this judgment standing only upon one or more of the following grounds: that there was no constitutional error in petitioner’s trial; that whether or not there was error, objection to it was waived; or that the error was harmless. None of those grounds are persuasive to me, and I would reverse.

The facts of the case are as follows. A short time after midnight on October 8, 1964, petitioner’s husband was killed in the conflagration of the automobile in which he and petitioner had been riding. Later that day, at about 1:30 p. m., petitioner was arrested for murder, and was taken to a county jail, where she was booked on that charge and placed in a cell. She was met at the jail by a lawyer, a family friend who had been called by petitioner shortly after the fire. The night of her arrest petitioner spoke with a police officer for several hours at the jail, answering questions and reciting her version of what she claimed to have been an accidental fire.

In an attempt to prevent questioning of his client, petitioner’s counsel set up, with his associates, a 24-hour-a-day watch of her cell. Thereafter, at about 11 p. m. on October 9, Peggy Fisk, an undercover agent in the employ of the county sheriff’s office, was falsely booked into the jail on a fictitious narcotics charge and placed in petitioner’s cell. Two other prisoners who had shared the cell were later removed. Fisk did not advise petitioner that she was an agent of the sheriff placed in the cell to report on anything petitioner might say. She remained alone with petitioner until October 15, giving oral reports as to their conversations from time to time to the sheriff’s office; a written report was prepared on October 12 and partly on October 14.

On October 13, a complaint was filed formally charging petitioner with murder; petitioner was arraigned that day on the complaint. An indictment was returned on October 20, and the complaint was then dismissed.

It was the State’s theory at trial that petitioner did not love her husband; that she drugged him and then set the automobile on fire; and that she killed him in order to be free to marry one Arthwell Hayton and to collect some $100,000 in insurance proceeds. The defense theory was that the fire was of accidental, rather than incendiary, origin. The defense contended that although petitioner was in love with Hayton until her husband’s death the affair between them had terminated several months earlier, petitioner had given up any thought of marrying Hayton, and had been reconciled with her husband; and that she would not be motivated to kill her husband for the insurance since he earned some $30,000 a year in his dental practice.

Fisk was called as a prosecution witness at trial and testified that petitioner told her in the cell after her arrest for murder that “she did not love her husband but she respected him”; that “she had always loved Mr. Hayton and still loves him”; that “she would receive over a hundred thousand dollars in insurance because of the accidental death”; and that “as soon as this mess was over, that she planned to take [her children] . . . away to Europe with the insurance money.”

The district attorney relied upon and emphasized Fisk’s testimony in his argument to the jury. See infra, at 628-629. After deliberating for more than three days, the jury returned a verdict that petitioner was guilty of murder in the first degree. She was later sentenced to life imprisonment.

I.

Although the issue is not free from difficulty, it seems to me the record clearly reveals petitioner adequately raised and preserved her federal constitutional objection to Fisk’s testimony. That issue arises in the following context.

Toward the close of its case in chief, the prosecution called Fisk as a witness. Petitioner’s trial counsel immediately objected, before Fisk was sworn, to her testimony at that time, on the ground that he had not been given her address prior to her testifying as he had been promised. There then occurred an extended conference in the judge’s chambers.

In chambers, petitioner’s counsel made two objections to Fisk’s testimony. He first discussed the objection raised in the presence of the jury that he had not been given the witness’ address as he had been promised, so that he might interview her. He then presented extensively the constitutional objection to any testimony at all from Fisk, discussing the circumstances giving rise to the contention and citing the relevant cases. The district attorney first explained why he had been unable to provide counsel with Fisk’s address and acknowledged that he had forgotten the request, which was apparently based on the fact that defense counsel had been shown, a month or so earlier, a report of the sheriff concerning the witness in which she had been identified as “Jackie Doe.” He attempted to distinguish the cases cited by petitioner’s counsel, and elaborated somewhat on Fisk’s activities.

As to the first ground of objection, the trial judge said “in view of the circumstances related that Mr. Foley [defense counsel] was promised an opportunity to talk to this witness,” Fisk should be withdrawn at that time. The district attorney agreed to withdraw her. The trial judge then turned to the constitutional ground of objection. It had been clearly disclosed at the conference that Fisk spent almost a week in petitioner’s cell, without disclosing her identity, and would testify concerning statements made to her by petitioner. The district attorney said he would call her as a witness the next day and stated to the judge, as to petitioner’s constitutional objection: “You would have to wait and listen to the voir dire on the stand and see.” The following colloquy, concluding the in-chambers conference, ensued:

“The Court: . . . [Y]ou will have the opportunity to talk to her but on the other objection, we would have to have her sworn and at least testify to the preliminary questions anyway, and have an objection made at the proper time.
“Mr. Foley: You know that isn’t right, your Honor.
“The Court: Unless you want me to look at this [sheriff’s] report and see what she knows. Does this report indicate?
“Mr. Turner [district attorney]: There has to be a foundation laid, an objection made. There is no way to—
“The Court: I think there would have to be. I don’t see how that could be done in the absence of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)

The following day Fisk was called as a witness. The district attorney asked some preliminary questions. Fisk was identified as having been employed the previous October by the county sheriff as an undercover agent, and it was elicited that in the course of that employment she was assigned the task of pretending to be a prisoner in jail with petitioner, where she became acquainted and talked with her. When the district attorney asked Fisk if petitioner had discussed her “domestic problems with her husband,” counsel for petitioner asked if he might “ask a question on voir dire.” He elicited that Fisk had not identified herself as a police agent to petitioner, and had not advised petitioner she could have an attorney present when they talked. Direct examination was then resumed by the district attorney. Fisk then testified concerning petitioner’s statements to her, see supra, at 618.

On cross-examination, petitioner’s counsel elicited answers concerning Fisk’s being placed in petitioner’s cell, reporting to the sheriff, and activities in the cell (see infra, at 626). He also elicited that petitioner had told Fisk the fire was accidental, and, in short, a story concerning her husband’s death consistent with that which petitioner had related to the police at the scene and in questioning at the jail, and consistent with petitioner’s claim of innocence.

In these circumstances respondent contends that it is “obvious” that petitioner’s trial counsel, following his interview with Fisk, made a tactical judgment that her testimony would be helpful, and therefore that the federal claim is not available to petitioner here because it was waived. I find that view unacceptable.

The District Court of Appeal clearly agreed that petitioner’s federal contention based on our decisions in Massiah and Escobedo was valid. 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 144, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720, 740. The court stated it did not reverse the conviction only because it viewed Fisk’s testimony as nonprejudicial. Ibid. However, it went on to say that petitioner waived the point by failing to object when Fisk was called the day following the in-chambers conference, or, to put it another way, that “it is reasonable to assume that defense counsel was willing to have Peggy [Fisk] testify” in the circumstances. 245 Cal. App. 2d, at 143, 53 Cal. Rptr., at 740. I think it significant to note that the Supreme Court of California specifically disapproved the language of the District Court of Appeal in this case with respect to waiver of objections to admission of evidence obtained in violation of “Escobedo-Dorado” by a mere failure to object, see People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 14, 429 P. 2d 177, 180 (1967), and in the same decision cast considerable doubt on the approach of the District Court of Appeal in this case toward presuming or assuming that the failure to object was a considered trial stratagem.

In any event, this Court has long held that a waiver of a federal constitutional right is not lightly to be presumed. See, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). In this case counsel clearly apprised the trial court of the basis of his objection, and indeed he cited the specific decisions that clearly supported the claim. Surely there was no bypassing of the state courts on the issue.

Concerning the failure to renew the objection, I note that the trial judge appears clearly to have required petitioner to raise the issue anew in front of the jury and after preliminary questions had been asked of Fisk. On this record those preliminary questions clearly identified her as having engaged in conversations with petitioner as an undercover agent in the jail pretending to be a fellow prisoner. As petitioner’s trial counsel said in a motion for a new trial: “The defendant was then placed in the unfortunate position of being forced to object in front of the jury. If the objection were sustained, the jury might well . . . infer that through a technicality the defendant had managed to keep out of evidence a full confession.”

Thus the most that can be said on this record is that trial counsel — having previously raised the objection— preferred to have Fisk’s testimony admitted rather than objecting to it in- the presence of the jury after Fisk had been identified. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964); People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 727-728, 401 P. 2d 665, 672 (1965). Placing a defendant in that kind of a dilemma with respect to renewing a federal constitutional objection serves no valid purpose. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 422 (1965). And while respondent indicates here that California law permits a defendant to object to the admission of evidence and establish a basis for the objection outside the presence of the jury (citing Schader, supra), that was neither the import of the trial judge’s ruling in this case nor the view of the district attorney at this trial (see supra, at 619-620).

Since the record reveals the trial court and the prosecution were clearly apprised of the constitutional claim, since the state court at least alternatively passed upon the validity of that claim, and since it cannot be said on the record that the failure to renew the objection was anything more than a decision reflecting the trial judge’s ruling that the objection be voiced before the jury, I should think it perfectly clear that the issue was adequately preserved.

II.

Notwithstanding that respondent’s own courts viewed Fisk’s placement and activities in petitioner’s cell as unconstitutional, respondent here attempts to defend the sheriff’s action on two grounds, both of which are patently without substance.

Respondent contends that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated, because Fisk was placed in the cell prior to any formal charge being filed against petitioner. To be sure, it is emphasized in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 204-206 (1964), that the defendant there had been indicted and that an indictment marks a point at which the formal adversary process begins. Thus, the Court held that statements obtained on behalf of the prosecution by a co-conspirator of the defendant during conversations in the former’s automobile, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel since he had been indicted and was already represented by counsel. At the same Term, the failure to honor the right to counsel was recognized at an earlier stage in respect to interrogations, namely, when, among other things, “the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect . . . .” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 490 (1964). That language applies here. Petitioner had been arrested and booked for murder. Clearly, given the circumstances of the fire, if a crime had been committed, petitioner had done it. In practical effect the criminal proceedings had begun, for it is clear from the arrest, from petitioner’s initial questioning, and from the decision to use Fisk that the sheriff’s office had ceased merely a general inquiry into the cause of the fire.

Indeed, in one respect at least, this is a clearer case than Massiah: unlike the defendant there, who had been released on bail, petitioner was in custody without bail, with a consequent lack of freedom to choose her companions. And petitioner, like the defendants in Massiah and Escobedo, was represented by counsel at all times. Moreover, a formal complaint charging petitioner with murder was filed on October 13, and Fisk remained in petitioner’s cell, eliciting information or conversing with petitioner until October 15.

Both state courts, see, e. g., People v. Flores, 236 Cal. App. 2d 807, 46 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 1010 (1966) (jail cell plant); People v. Ludlum, 236 Cal. App. 2d 813, 46 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1965), and lower federal courts, see, e. g., Clifton v. United States, 341 F. 2d 649 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965), have held that the right to counsel as interpreted in Massiah and Escobedo bars the admission of statements obtained at some pre-indictment point, at least when the accusatory stage has been reached and the police have clearly focused upon the subject. However that stage be defined, it was clearly reached here.

Respondent also contends that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated, because Fisk engaged in no “process of interrogations,” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S., at 491, designed to obtain a confession from petitioner, or that statements from her had not been “deliberately elicited,” Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S., at 206. In the State’s view, so long as Fisk acted simply as a listening post, she could testify as to any statements made to her by petitioner. That view was, however, rejected in Massiah itself. The Government in that case pointed to the fact that the record did not reveal that its agent had induced the defendant by persuasion (there based on friendship) to discuss his activities, and urged that “providing a defendant an opportunity to talk” did not violate his right to counsel. See also Beatty v. United States, 389 U. S. 45 (1967), reversing 377 F. 2d 181 (C. A. 5th. Cir.).

At all events, Fisk was not put in the cell to discuss the weather, to console petitioner, or merely to provide her with companionship. Her presence itself was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police agent. While petitioner’s statements to her were not obtained by coercive means, they certainly were not given, in light of the deception, through a knowing and intelligent waiver of petitioner’s rights.

Furthermore, it is clear on this record that Fisk was planted in petitioner’s cell in order to subvert her right to counsel, with the express purpose of attempting to obtain evidence out of her mouth. On one occasion, Fisk was given a newspaper clipping concerning the case and was told to show it to petitioner, which she did with some accompanying statement, such as the press is “ruining you.” On another occasion, pursuant to instructions, Fisk told petitioner of a conversation that she had supposedly overheard in a hall between four men whom she thought were from the district attorney’s office, in which one of the men, as the ruse went, said: “Getting back to the Miller case, Arthwell Hayton came in and blew the top off the case.” Fisk also told petitioner “I put all my trust in Mr. Bland [the sheriff] and maybe it would do some good for you if you tried the same.” Finally, Fisk said that she had at one time been represented by an attorney who “did not do me much good” and indicated that perhaps petitioner should suspect hers.

Such deliberate police deception and subversion of a defendant’s rights should not be condoned. The District Court of Appeal said in this case:

“It is almost incredible that in these days of enlightened treatment by prosecution authorities of persons charged with crime, the Peggy Fisk incident could have occurred. . . .
“The trick attempted by the authorities in which they apparently hoped to obtain incriminating statements from defendant and to get her to throw herself on the alleged mercy of the sheriff and to suspect her own attorney was completely indefensible . . . .” (245 Cal. App. 2d, at 141, 143-144, 53 Cal. Rptr., at 738, 740.)

I agree, and I would not leave standing a judgment reflecting such an egregious violation of Massiah and Escobedo.

III.

Having concluded that petitioner properly preserved her federal constitutional objection to the admission of Fisk’s testimony, and that its admission did indeed violate her constitutional rights, I turn to respondent’s contention that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). Chapman was decided after the decision of the California District Court of Appeal now on review here, and normally a remand would be in order so that the state court might reconsider, in light of that case, its conclusion that the error was harmless. However, since a majority of the Court refuses to decide this case at all, I wish to point out why I cannot regard the error as harmless.

I have already indicated generally the theories of the prosecution and defense as to Dr. Miller’s death (see supra, at 617-618). The evidence against petitioner was circumstantial. So saying, I do not imply it was necessarily in any sense weak; that fact does, however, help to indicate why the issue of motive was particularly crucial, and one which was central to the trial. Fisk’s testimony definitely supported the State’s case on that issue. Petitioner testified that she loved Hayton until “the minute that Cork [Dr. Miller] was gone,” but that she had given up any idea of marrying Hayton as of the time of an incident that occurred approximately three months prior to her husband’s death. As to that testimony, the district attorney argued to the jury:

“But that’s not what she told the girl [Fisk] up in jail. She told the girl up in jail that she still loved Hayton, felt that he would come to her.”

On rebuttal argument, the district attorney again emphasized Fisk’s testimony:

“He [defense counsel] says the prosecution’s case is based entirely on surmise and conjecture. That’s not true.
■ “Is it surmise and conjecture that Mrs. Miller had been infatuated with Hayton and wanted to marry him?
“There is disagreement as to when this wanting to marry him stopped, but there is no question at all that she wanted to marry him.
“Is it surmise and conjecture that she told the girl up in jail she still loved Hayton and did not love her husband?
“And, of course, right after her husband’s death she is arrested and is in custody, and she tells the girl upstairs that she still loves Hayton.”

To be sure, for almost each point upon which Fisk’s testimony was emphasized there was other supporting evidence. But this Court has always viewed evidence out of a defendant’s own mouth, obtained after the events, as particularly weighty with the jury. See Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). And, as the quotations above indicate, that was plainly the view of the district attorney in this case. Certainly Fisk’s testimony, if believed, made the prosecution’s case much more credible, and undermined petitioner’s defense.

Moreover, the jury deliberated three days before reaching a verdict. It may have spent that time assessing the expert testimony in regard to the causes of fires in automobiles, weighing the prosecution’s experts’ testimony that this fire was of incendiary origin against the testimony of an expert for the defense, who said the fire might well have been accidental. It may have found all that time necessary to resolve the question of guilt or innocence. Or, since it was charged on both first- and second-degree murder, it might have spent that time weighing not guilt and innocence but degree of guilt, even though only the former would have been consistent with the prosecution’s theory. Fisk’s testimony may have been particularly important with respect to the jury’s resolution of that matter. While of course one cannot know definitely what occupied the jury’s time during the three days it deliberated, I am convinced it cannot be said “beyond a reasonable doubt,” Chapman v. California, supra, that there is no “reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85, 86-87 (1963). I would therefore reverse petitioner’s conviction.

       The judge on the same day issued an order prohibiting officials from questioning petitioner unless her attorney was present, and ordered her attorneys to cease sitting outside her cell. Apparently, the police did not inform the judge of Fisk’s continued presence.

       Counsel cited by name and discussed, as did the district attorney, Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P. 2d 361 (1965). The latter decision, grounded on the Federal Constitution, encompasses a claim based on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964).

       The district attorney represented that Fisk, although being with petitioner “for about a week,” did not interrogate petitioner or in any way seek to elicit information from her. Although that representation was undoubtedly made in good faith at the time, it is conceded to be incorrect. See infra, at 626.

       One factor recited by the court as leading it to conclude that petitioner’s counsel desired Peggy Fisk’s testimony was that he “received a copy of Peggy’s reports to her superiors concerning her talks with defendant,” and, apparently, was in a position to balance its advantages and disadvantages. 245 Cal. App. 2d, at 143, 53 Cal. Rptr., at 740. The record does not reveal that sheriff’s report, but it does show that counsel had seen it prior to objecting strenuously at the in-chambers conference to Fisk’s testifying.

       In the Doherty case, the California Supreme Court said, in a situation where counsel might develop facts upon which an objection could be based but did not object (in relation to that court’s Dorado decision), not that it would assume waiver of the point, but rather that “[i]f the People should sustain the burden of establishing the fact of such tactics, we would treat defendant’s stratagem as a waiver of the objection.” 67 Cal. 2d, at 14, n. 4, 429 P. 2d, at 180, n. 4.

       Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438-440 (1963). Compare Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 (1965).

       At the same Term, Massiah was applied to vacate a state judgment affirming a conviction. McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 582 (1964). See also McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965).

        Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 309-310 (1966).

       See n. 12, infra.

       Cf. People v. Robinson, 16 App. Div. 2d 184, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (4th Dept. 1962) (jail cell plant). See also Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1006 (1966).

       Brief for the United States, Massiah v. United States, No. 199, October Term, 1963, at 30.

       Respondent also argues that petitioner did not show that any of her statements as related by Fisk occurred prior to the filing of a formal charge on October 13, or were specifically prompted by the four incidents of deliberate inducements to speak related in the text above. Of course petitioner has no such burden in the circumstances of this case. Besides, petitioner’s counsel asked Fisk, for example, “which day was it that she [petitioner] mentioned insurance money to you, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th or 14th?” Fisk was unable to answer. Moreover, assuming all the statements were made on the first day of Fisk’s deceptive presence in the cell, I would reach the same result.

       In addition to the other cited cases (see supra, at 625) in which the admission of testimony by jail cell undercover agents was held to be unconstitutional, see People v. Arguello, 63 Cal. 2d 566, 407 P. 2d 661 (1965).

       Petitioner’s trial, which began on January 11, 1965, was prior to the effective date of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and therefore that decision is not applicable. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 734 (1966).

       See Fontaine v. California, 390 U. S. 593; cf. Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U. S. 523.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    DeSTEFANO v. WOODS, SHERIFF.
    No. 559.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Anna R. Lavin for petitioner in No. 559.

      John J. Stamos and Elmer C. Kissane for respondent in No. 559.

      Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, and David H. Blunt, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 941.

      Together with No. 941, Carcerano v. Gladden, Warden, on petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Oregon.

   Per Curiam.

Petitioner Carcerano was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced, on May 11, 1962, to life imprisonment. The Oregon Constitution, Art. I, §11, permits a jury to convict in noncapital cases if 10 of the 12 jurors support conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 238 Ore. 208, 390 P. 2d 923, cert. denied, 380 U. S. 923. In 1967, petitioner sought collateral relief under Oregon’s post-conviction statute. The sole ground relied upon was that the State and Federal Constitutions were violated when the jury was told it could return a verdict of guilty even though the members did not unanimously favor that verdict. This issue had not been raised by petitioner on his direct appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court denied relief.

Petitioner DeStefano was found in criminal contempt of an Illinois court and sentenced to three concurrent one-year terms. After affirmance by the Illinois Supreme Court and denial of certiorari by this Court, 385 U. S. 989, petitioner unsuccessfully sought state collateral relief and then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner’s contention was that he was unconstitutionally denied trial by jury. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the Constitution did not require jury trial for state criminal contempt proceedings.

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, we held that the States cannot deny a request for jury trial in serious criminal cases, and in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, that the right to jury trial extends to trials for serious criminal contempts. Duncan left open the question of the continued vitality of the statement in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586, that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial includes a right not to be convicted except by a unanimous verdict. Both Duncan and Bloom left open the question whether a contempt punished by imprisonment for one year is, by virtue of that sentence, a sufficiently serious matter to require that a request for jury trial be honored. These two issues posed in Nos. 941 and 559 must be considered at this time only if the decisions in Duncan and Bloom apply retroactively. We hold, however, that Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois should receive only prospective application. Accordingly, the denials of collateral relief to petitioners must be affirmed regardless of whether, for cases to which the rules announced in Duncan and Bloom apply, the Fourteenth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts and affords a right to jury trial for criminal contempts punished by imprisonment for one year.

In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297, the Court stated the considerations that affect the judgment whether a case reversing prior doctrines in the area of the criminal law should be applied only prospectively:

“(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”

All three factors favor only prospective application of the rule stated in Duncan v. Louisiana. Duncan held that the States must respect the right to jury trial because in the context of the institutions and practices by which we adopt and apply our criminal laws, the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression. As we stated in Duncan, “We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial— or any particular trial — held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.” 391 U. S., at 158. The values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Second, States undoubtedly relied in good faith upon the past opinions of this Court to the effect that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not applicable to the States. E. g., Maxwell v. Dow, supra. Several States denied requests for jury trial in cases where jury trial would have been mandatory had they fallen within the Sixth Amendment guarantee as it had been construed by this Court. See Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 158, n. 30. Third, the effect of a holding of general retroactivity on law enforcement and the administration of justice would be significant, because the denial of jury trial has occurred in a very great number of cases in those States not until now accepting the Sixth Amendment guarantee. For example, in Louisiana all those convicted of non-capital serious crimes could make a Sixth Amendment argument. And, depending on the Court’s decisions about unanimous and 12-man juries, all convictions for serious crimes in certain other States would be in jeopardy.

The considerations are somewhat more evenly balanced with regard to the rule announced in Bloom v. Illinois. One ground for the Bloom result was the belief that contempt trials, which often occur before the very judge who was the object of the allegedly contemptuous behavior, would be more fairly tried if a jury determined guilt. Unlike the judge, the jurymen will not have witnessed or suffered the alleged contempt, nor suggested prosecution for it. However, the tradition of nonjury trials for contempts was more firmly established than the view that States could dispense with jury trial in normal criminal prosecutions, and reliance on the cases overturned by Bloom v. Illinois was therefore more justified. Also, the adverse effects on the administration of justice of invalidating all serious contempt convictions would likely be substantial. Thus, with regard to the Bloom decision, we also feel that retroactive application is not warranted.

For these reasons we will not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois. The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted and the judgments are affirmed. R is w order&±

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart would deny certiorari for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 171, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 215.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

dissenting.

1 am of the view that the deprivation of the right to a trial by jury should be given retroactive effect, as I thought should have been done with comparable constitutional decisions. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 640 (dissenting opinion); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 736 (dissenting opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (dissenting opinion).

       Petitioner DeStefano was ordered released on bail by Mr. Justice Clark pending his direct appeals in the Illinois courts and his first petition for a writ of certiorari. He was again granted release on bail by Mr. Justice Clark pending his appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief; this second bail order has continued in force pending consideration of the present petition. Prior to the first bail order, and between the first denial of certiorari and the second bail order, petitioner served a total of 207 days of his concurrent one-year sentences.

       We see no basis for a distinction between convictions that have become final and cases at various stages of trial and appeal. See Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 300-301.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    LEE ART THEATRE, INC. v. VIRGINIA.
    No. 997.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Plato Cacheri-s for petitioner.

      James B. Wilkinson for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. Petitioner, operator of a motion picture theatre in Richmond, Virginia, was convicted in the Hustings Court of Richmond of possessing and exhibiting lewd and obscene motion pictures in violation of Title 18.1-228 of the Code of Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia refused a writ of error.

The films in question were admitted in evidence over objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. The seizure was under the authority of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on the basis of an affidavit of a police officer which stated only the titles of the motion pictures and that the officer had determined from personal observation of them and of the billboard in front of the theatre that the films were obscene.

The admission of the films in evidence requires reversal of petitioner’s conviction. A seizure of allegedly obscene books on the authority of a warrant “issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered . . . obscene,” was held to be an unconstitutional seizure in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731-732. It is true that a judge may read a copy of a book in courtroom or chambers but not as easily arrange to see a motion picture there. However, we need not decide in this case whether the justice of the peace should have viewed the motion picture before issuing the warrant. The procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions was not a procedure “designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,” id., at 732, and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58-59.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Stewart base their concurrence in the judgment of reversal upon Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

A police officer filed a sworn affidavit that he had personally witnessed the commission of a crime, to wit, the possession and exhibition of obscene motion pictures. He was granted a warrant to seize the pictures, and did so.

In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, officers were given a general warrant to seize obscene materials, pursuant to which they selected and seized 11,000 copies of 280 publications most of which were later found non-obscene. With barely a nod to the difference between 11,000 books and magazines selected for seizure by the officers themselves after a warrant had been issued and two obscene movies named in the affidavit, the Court reverses the present conviction on the authority of Marcus.

I think that Marcus was correctly decided, but I cannot discern its application here. Police officers may not be given carte blanche to seize, but they may certainly seize a specifically named item on probable cause, before the work “taken as a whole” has been adjudicated obscene. Any other rule would make adjudication not merely “not as easily arrange[d]” in the case of movies but quite impossible. If the Court means only that the officer should not merely say that he has seen a movie and considers it obscene, but should offer something in the way of a box score of what transpires therein, I consider it absurd to think that a magistrate, armed with the luminous guidance this Court has afforded, will be thus able to make a better judgment of probable obscenity.

Since the petitioner does not contend that the movies in question here were not obscene, I find it unnecessary to reach the point relied on by my Brothers Black, Douglas, and Stewart.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    HOUGHTON v. SHAFER, GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al.
    No. 668,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      William C. Sermett, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Frank P. Lawley, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, and Edward Friedman for respondents.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner was convicted of burglary and is serving a sentence of four to 10 years in a Pennsylvania state prison. In pursuing his appeal pro se petitioner acquired law books, trial records, and other materials with the consent of prison authorities. Before petitioner had filed his appeal brief, prison authorities confiscated these materials because they were found in the possession of another inmate. Petitioner’s efforts to obtain the return of the materials were not successful, and he commenced this action in the United States District Court, claiming that the prison authorities had violated § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13, now 42 U. S. C. § 1983, by depriving him of his legal materials. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that petitioner had not alleged exhaustion of state administrative remedies, citing Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F. 2d 169 (C. A. 3d Cir.). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner’s legal materials were confiscated pursuant to prison rules forbidding the possession of articles not sold through the canteen or approved by the authorities and forbidding the unauthorized loaning of books to another inmate. According to the inmates’ handbook, petitioner could have taken his problem to the “Classification and Treatment Clinic”; it was also his privilege “to address a communication at any time to the Superintendent, the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, or the Commissioner of Correction, and as a final appeal, to the Attorney General.” Petitioner did seek relief from the Deputy Superintendent of his prison, but without result. He was told, he says, to “leave well enough alone.” His mother’s telephone calls and correspondence with prison authorities were likewise unavailing. He has not, however, taken an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General.

As we understand the submission of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in this Court, the rules of the prison were validly and correctly applied to petitioner; these rules are further said to be strictly enforced throughout the entire correctional system in Pennsylvania. In light of this it seems likely that to require petitioner to appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General would be to demand a futile act. In any event, resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our decisions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180-183; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671; and Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416. On the basis of these decisions, but without intimating any opinion on the merits of the underlying controversy concerning the prison rules, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.


text:
    CHAN KWAN CHUNG v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.
    No. 637.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Abraham Lebenkoff for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Julia P. Cooper for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 1401.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Gordon P. MacDougall and Harvey Gelb for appellants.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Zimmerman, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane, and Jerome Nelson for the United States et al., and Carl Helmetag, Jr., for Penn Central Co., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    GOLDMAN v. NEW YORK.
    No. 1261.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Robert E. Goldman and Stephen R. Wiener for appellant.

      Frank S. Hogan and H. Richard Uviller for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed.


text:
    RHODES v. COOK.
    No. 1283.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      E. A. Niemeier, Frank A. Bauman, John K. Mallory, Jr., and R. Michael Duncan for appellant.

      John F. Wilson for appellee.

      Harry R. Calbom, Jr., for Pay’n Pak Stores, Inc., et al., as amici curiae, in support of appellant.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.


text:
    HARPER v. MICHIGAN.
    No. 1103,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    CARRILLO v. CRAVEN, WARDEN.
    No. 1201,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Edsel W. Haws and John Fourt, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54.


text:
    VIALPANDO v. PATTERSON, WARDEN.
    No. 1208,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Attorney General, and James F. Pamp, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54.


text:
    CATON v. ALABAMA.
    No. 1203,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and John C. Tyson III, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12.


text:
    COOK v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 1233,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Edward Fenig for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Stewart dissent and would deny certiorari.


text:
    HEARD et al. v. RIZZO et al.
    No. 1530,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Lois G. Forer for appellants in No. 1530, Mise. William Kunstler for appellants in No. 1662, Mise.

      Together with No. 1662, Misc., Traylor et al. v. Rizzo et al., also on appeal from the same court.

   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgments are affirmed.


text:
    SINGER v. MYERS, CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT.
    No. 1485,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Peter Hearn for petitioner.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, and Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40.


author: Per Citriam. Mr. Justice Black,

text:
    LOPINSON v. PENNSYLVANIA.
    No. 1133.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Lester J. Schaffer for petitioner in No. 1133, and Howard M. Nazor and Gordon L. Nazor for petitioner in No. 1700, Mise.

      Michael J. Rotko and Arlen Specter for respondent in No. 1133; Mr. Rotko, William H. Wolf, Jr., and Mr.

      Specter for respondent in No. 1095, Mise.; and Joseph E. Mahoney for respondent in No. 1700, Mise.

      Together with No. 1095, Misc., Coyle v. Pennsylvania; and No. 1700, Misc., Pruett v. Ohio, both on petitions for writs of certiorari. No. 1095, Misc., is to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and No. 1700, Misc., to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

   Per Citriam.

The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 1095, Misc., and No. 1700, Misc., are granted and the petitions for writs of certiorari in all three cases are granted. Without reaching the petitioners’ other claims, the judgments are vacated and the cases remanded for reconsideration in the light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 532.

Mr. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 540.

Mr. Justice Black,

dissenting.

In all three of these cases the Court remands to the state courts on one single constitutional claim of petitioners without reaching other constitutional claims raised by them. The result is that after the state courts rule on the single remand issue this Court will undoubtedly be called on to pass on the other issues which the Court refuses to decide. At the very least this means postponement of a final decision in these cases a year or two years or three years, unless, that is, this Court should, on the second review, choose once more to decide the cases piecemeal. Piecemeal dispositions of criminal cases inevitably cause delays and hamper enforcement of the criminal law's and there is a lot of truth in the old adage that delay is a defendant’s best lawyer. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, where a murder sentence was reversed nine years after the murder. It is true that under Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, a certain amount of delay is inevitable in criminal cases, but that is not true in these cases where the issues are squarely presented to us here and now.


text:
    SPENCE et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA.
    No. 759,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Sam, Houston Clinton, Jr., for petitioner in No. 1311, Mise.

      T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Harry W. McCalliard, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent in No. 759, Mise. Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Hawthorne Phillips and Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorneys General, and A. J. Ca-rubbi, Jr., for respondent in No. 1311, Mise. Mr. Martin, Miss White, and Robert C. Flowers, Douglas H. Chilton, and Mr. Zwiener, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent in No. 1823, Mise.

      Together with No. 1311, Misc., Ellison v. Texas, and No. 1823, Misc., Jackson v. Beto, Corrections Director, both on petitions for writs of certiorari. No. 1311, Misc., is to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, and No. 1823, Misc., to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

   Per Curiam.

The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments of the courts below are vacated and the cases remanded for reconsideration in the light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent, for reasons stated in Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 532.

Mr. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 540.


text:
    STREETER v. CRAVEN, WARDEN, et al.
    No. 830,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Deraid E. Oranberg, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54.


text:
    POPE v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 34,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Wallace M. Rudolph for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Ralph S. Spritzer, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death under the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2113(e). The Solicitor General has filed a memorandum for the United States conceding that this death penalty provision “suffers from the same constitutional infirmity” as that found in the Federal Kidnaping Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1201 (a). United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570. Accordingly, the Solicitor General concedes that the petitioner’s “sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded ... for resentencing.” In light of this concession and upon an independent examination of the record, but without reaching any of the petitioner’s other claims, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 591.

Mr. Justice Black dissents for the further reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Lopinson v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 648.


text:
    WHEAT v. WASHINGTON.
    No. 1301,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Charles M. Stokes for petitioner in No. 1301, Mise. Anthony Savage, Jr., for petitioner in No. 1535, Mise.

      James E. Kennedy for respondent in both cases.

      Together with No. 1535, Misc., Aiken v. Washington, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court.

   Per Curiam.

The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Washington are vacated and the cases remanded to that court for reconsideration in the light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510.

Mr. Justice Black dissents.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 532, and Mr. Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 138.

Mr. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 540, and Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 138.


text:
    PUENTES v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 21.
    No. 562.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Ernest Fleischman for appellant.

      Leo F. McGinity for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals of New York for further consideration in light of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for oral argument.


text:
    HOLLAND et al. v. HOGAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, et al.
    No. 653.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Robert Abelow, Marshall C. Berger, and Donald J. Williamson for appellants.

      Frank S. Hogan, H. Richard Uviller, and Michael R. Stack, each pro se, and for Yasgur et al., J. Lee Rankin, Norman Redlich, and Stanley Buchsbaum for Adler, and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, for Lefkowitz, appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for further consideration in light of Gardner v. Broderick, ante, p. 273, and George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, ante, p. 286.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for oral argument.


text:
    HENRY v. LOUISIANA.
    No. 932.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Thomas Barr III for appellant.

      Jack P. F. Oremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and William P. Schuler, Second Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

Mr. Justice Harlan would affirm the judgment of the state court upon the premises stated in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and in his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455.


text:
    MAXWELL, TAX ASSESSOR OF PALM BEACH COUNTY v. GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL ASSN., INC.
    No. 1147.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Charles J. Steele for appellant.

      Chester Bedell for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Portas are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for oral argument.


text:
    SULLIVAN et al. v. LITTLE HUNTING PARK, INC., et al.
    No. 1188.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Allison W. Brown, Jr., Robert M. Alexander, Jack Greenberg, and James M. Nabrit III for petitioners.

      John Chas. Harris for respondents.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is vacated. The case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for further consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ante, p. 409.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ante, p. 449.


text:
    HOPPER et al. v. LOUISIANA.
    No. 1291.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Camille F. Gravel, Jr., for petitioners.

      Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, William P. Schuler, Second Assistant Attorney General, Harry H. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, and Lawrence L. McNamara for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is vacated. The case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, and Roberts v. Russell, ante, p. 293.

Mr. Justice Black dissents.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 138 (1968).


text:
    CLARK WALTER & SONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 1404.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Howard T. Rosen and William J. O’Shaughnessy for appellant.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Zimmerman, and Howard E. Shapiro for the United States, and Donald B. Kipp and James C. Pitney for Western Electric Co. et al., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Fortas are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for oral argument.


text:
    COPAS v. SCHMIDT, SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES OF WISCONSIN.
    No. 45,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and William A. Platz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to substitute Wilbur J. Schmidt, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, as the party respondent is granted. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are also granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for further consideration in light of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128.


text:
    WADE v. YEAGER, WARDEN.
    No. 857,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      John G. Thevos for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123.

Mr. Justice Black dissents.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent for reasons stated in Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 138 (1968).


text:
    TOLES v. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
    No. 933,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Paul C. Summitt for respondents.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington with directions to dismiss the petition as moot.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.


text:
    WEST v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 1127,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      William A. Dougherty for petitioner.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard D. Huffman, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing as provided in Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538, and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted and the case set for oral argument.


text:
    CARROLL v. TEXAS.
    No. 1224,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Don Gladden and Sam Houston Clinton, Jr., for petitioner.

      Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, and Howard M. Fender, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    McDANIEL v. NORTH CAROLINA.
    No. 1599,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      T. Wade Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and George A. Goodwyn, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for further consideration in the light of Harrison v. United States, ante, p. 219.

Mr. Justice Black dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Harrison v. United States, ante, p. 226.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Harrison v. United States, ante, p. 226.

Mr. Justice White dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Harrison v. United States, ante, p. 228.


text:
    ROBINSON v. TENNESSEE.
    No. 1625,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Jack Greenberg, Michael Meltsner, and Anthony G. Amsterdam for petitioner.

      George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is reversed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436; Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U. S. 346, at 360 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    TAGGART v. NEW YORK.
    No. 1668,
    Misc.
    Decided June 17, 1968.

      Leon B. Polsky for appellant.

      Thomas J. Mackell and Peter J. O’Connor for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for failure to file the notice of appeal within the time provided by Rule 11.

Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.


text:
    June 10, 1968.
    No. 69.
    Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.,

      Cecelia H. Goetz and Richard Whiting on the motion. Solicitor General Griswold and Robert N. Katz for the Federal Maritime Commission et al., R. Frederic Fisher for Pacific Maritime Assn., and William W. Schwarzer for Marine Terminals Corp., in opposition.
   390 U. S. 261. Upon consideration of motion of petitioner to amend judgment and retax costs, the judgment heretofore issued in this case on April 1, 1968, is amended to tax one-half of the costs in favor of petitioner and against respondents Pacific Maritime Assn, and Marine Terminals Corp.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1706,
    No. 1725,
    No. 1746,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Fletcher v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; Hill v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction; and Campbell v. Clark, Attorney General, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 661.
    Allen et al. v. State Board of Elections et al.

      Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Oliver W. Hill, 8. W. Tucker, and Henry L. Marsh III for appellants.

      Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, and R. D. Mcllwaine III, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold and Assistant Attorney General Poliak filed a memorandum for the United States by invitation of the Court.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Va. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction in this case postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 1058.
    No. 1059.
    No. 1174.
    Fairley et al. v. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, et al.; Bunton et al. v. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, et al.; Whitley et al. v. Williams, Governor of Mississippi, et al.

      Denison Ray and Lawrence Aschenbren-ner for appellants in Nos. 1058 and 1059.

      Armand Derf-ner, Alvin J. Bronstein, and Richard B. Sobol for appellants in No. 1174.

      Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, pro se, and William A. Attain and Will S. Wells, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees in all three cases.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Poliak, Louis F. Claiborne, Francis X. Bey-tagh, Jr., and Nathan Lewin filed a memorandum for the United States, as amicus curiae, by invitation of the Court.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. Miss. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction in these cases postponed to hearing of the cases on the merits. Cases consolidated and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument.

Reported below: No. 1058, 282 F. Supp. 164; No. 1059, 281 F. Supp. 918.


text:
    No. 1365.
    Leary v. United States.

      Robert J. Haft for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari granted limited to Questions I and IV, presented by the petition which read as follows:

“I. Whether the registration and tax provisions in 26 U. S. C. Sections 4741 (a), 4742 and 4744 (a), as applied to Petitioner, violate his privilege against self incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights thereunder as amplified by this Court in three recently decided cases: Marchetti v. U. S., 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. U. S., 390 U. S. 62 (1968); and Haynes v. U. S., 390 U. S. 85 (1968).”
“IV. Whether Petitioner was denied due process under the Fifth Amendment by the application, under the circumstances of this case, of the provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 176a, providing that an inference may be drawn respecting the illegal origin and nature of marihuana solely from possession thereof.”


text:
    No. 1380.
    Presbyterian Church in the United States et al. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion of William P. Thompson, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al., for leave to file a brief, as amici curiae, granted. Certiorari granted.

George Wilson McKeag on the motion.

Robert B. Troutman and Charles L. Gowen for petitioners.

Richard T. Cowan for Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, and Owen H. Page for Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church et al., respondents.


text:
    No. 1378.
    Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen et al. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.

      Lester P. Schoene and Neal P. Rutledge for petitioners.

      Paul A. Porter, Dennis G. Lyons, Daniel A. Rezneck, and Adam G. Adams II for respondent.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 399.
    Price v. National Labor Relations Board et al.

      Kenneth C. McGuiness and Stanley R. Strauss for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come for National Labor Relations Board, and Bernard Kleiman, Elliot Bredhoff, Michael H. Gottesman, and George H. Cohen for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 4028, respondents.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 627.
    Cornell et al. v. United States.

      Marvin M. Karpatkin and Alan H. Levine for petitioners.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1089.
    Block et al. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France.

      Lee S. Kreindler, William H. Schroder, and Hugh M. Dorsey, Jr., for petitioners.

      E. Smythe Oambrell and Charles A. Moye, Jr., for respondent.

      Solicitor General Griswold submitted a memorandum for the United States, as amicus curiae, by invitation of the Court.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1349.
    Buchanan v. Oregon.

      Harold V. Johnson, Jr., for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1353.
    Elmo Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.

      George Stephen Leonard for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, James Mcl. Henderson, and Dcmiel H. Hanscom for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1355.
    Bedding, Curtain & Drapery Workers Union, Local 140 of United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Leonard B. Boudin and Victor Rabinowitz for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come, and Allison W. Brown, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1373.
    Probro, Inc., dba Lakewood Club v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of California.

      Ellis J. Horvitz and Samuel Goldfarb for petitioner. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Kenneth Scholtz, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1356.
    Gray v. Johnson et al.

      Frank T. McCoy for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Martz, and A. Donald Mileur for respondents Johnson et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1357.
    Pilkinton v. Pilkinton.
   C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1360.
    American Cyanamid Co. v. Nopco Chemical Co.

      W. Brown Morton, Jr., and John T. Roberts for petitioner.

      Jerome G. Lee, George B. Finnegan, Jr., John D. Foley, and Otto G. Obermaier for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1362.
    Canada v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1367.
    Preston Products Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.

      John W. Cummiskey and Stephen C. Brans-dorfer for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold for respondent National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 1368.
    Belvins v. United States.

      Billy L. Evans for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1370.
    Cave v. United States.

      Verne Lawyer for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.'
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1374.
    An Article of Device . . . Diapulse Manufacturing Corp. of America v. United States.

      Milton A. Bass and Solomon H. Friend for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Paul R. Walsh for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1381.
    Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, Hong Kong (Trustee) Ltd. v. Superior Court of California in and for the City and County of San Francisco (Parry et al., Real Parties in Interest).

      William H. Orrick, Jr., for petitioner.

      David B. Caldwell for Parry et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1383.
    RePass v. Vreeland et al.

      Milton Diamond for petitioner.

      Peter A. Williams for respondents.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1388.
    Knox Glass, Inc. v. Bowser & Campbell et al.

      Thomas W. Pomeroy, Jr., and Judd N. Poffinberger, Jr., for petitioner.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1395.
    Nickerson v. United States.

      Darrell J. Skelton for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1452.
    Scarselletti v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1411.
    Lunow v. Fairchance Lumber Co. et al.

      Leslie L. Conner and James M. Little for petitioner.

      Gene H. Henry, Clayton B. Pierce, and Edgar R. Fenton for respondents.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 765.
    Wills v. United States.

      Kenneth A. MacDonald for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 1324.
    Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.

      Kenneth C. McGuiness for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come for respondent National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 1361.
    Summit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. United States.

      Melvin B. Lewis for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari and would reverse judgment of the lower court.


text:
    No. 831,
    Misc.
    Richardson v. Nelson, Warden, et al.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Derald E. Granberg and James B. Cuneo, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1178.
    Franzen v. Township of Elk et al.

      Joseph Pierce Lodge and Henry D. O’Connor for petitioner.

      Joseph Narrow for respondents Township of Elk et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 1329.
    Southern California Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission.

      Rollin E. Wood-bury, Harry W. Sturges, Jr., William E. Marx, and William R. Connole for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Richard A. Solomon, Peter H. Schiff, Robert L. Russell, and Israel Convisser for respondent.

      James W. McCartney for Transwestern Pipeline Co., intervenor below, in opposition.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1354.
    Oelschlaeger v. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

      Samuel W. McIntosh for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Martz, and Roger P. Marquis for respondents.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1358.
    De Lucia v. Attorney General of the United States.

      Jack Wasserman for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Charles Gordon for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 961,
    Misc.
    Patillo v. California.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Walter R. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1026,
    Misc.
    James v. Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert M. Snader, Deputy Attorney General, for Real Estate Commissioner, real party in interest.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1077,
    Misc.
    Beattie v. California.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Edward P. O’Brien, and Louise H. Renne, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1081,
    Misc.
    Bonner v. Illinois.

      Sam Adam, R. Eugene Pincham, and Earl E. Strayhorn for petitioner.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and John J. O’Toole and Donald J. Veverka, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1119,
    Misc.
    Ruiz v. Florida.

      Earl Faircloth, Attorney General of Florida, and Harold Mendelow, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1364,
    Misc.
    Sheppard v. California et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1121,
    Misc.
    Riley v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.

      John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of Washington, and William E. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1137,
    No. 1138,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Beachum v. New Mexico; and Williams v. New Mexico.

      Boston E. Witt, Attorney General of New Mexico, for respondent in both cases.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 78 N. M. 390, 432 P. 2d 101.


text:
    No. 1147,
    Misc.
    Deese v. Louisiana.

      Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and William P. Schuler, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1148,
    Misc.
    Waddy v. Russell, Warden.

      Karl P. Warden for petitioner.

      George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Ed B. Davies for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1130,
    Misc.
    Oldham v. Bishop, Penitentiary Superintendent.

      Joe Purcell, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Don Langston, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1236,
    Misc.
    Sutton v. Texas.

      Charles W. Tessmer for petitioner.

      Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Robert C. Flowers and Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorneys General, and A. J. Carubbi, Jr., for respondent.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1187,
    Misc.
    Vickers v. United States.

      Nelson Woodson for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1309,
    Misc.
    Hodge v. Tennessee.

      William Earl Badgett for petitioner.

      George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Robert F. Hedgepath, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Term. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1337,
    Misc.
    Lewis v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1369,
    Misc.
    Salinas v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1374,
    Misc.
    Curcio v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1414,
    Misc.
    Browne v. Burke, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1428,
    Misc.
    Fairhurst v. United States.

      Herman I. Pollock for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1515,
    Misc.
    Lowe v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1551,
    Misc.
    Fort v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1557,
    Misc.
    Berkery v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1558,
    Misc.
    Mitchell v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1559,
    Misc.
    Burr v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1561,
    Misc.
    Larranaga v. Rodriguez, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1567,
    Misc.
    DuRain v. Wingo, Warden.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1569,
    Misc.
    Williams v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1570,
    Misc.
    Piche v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1576,
    Misc.
    Bailey v. Smith, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1579,
    Misc.
    Silva v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1584,
    Misc.
    Boone v. Peyton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1580,
    Misc.
    Foose v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1583,
    Misc.
    Haynes v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1585,
    Misc.
    Cook v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1586,
    Misc.
    Tollett v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1587,
    Misc.
    Hull v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1588,
    Misc.
    Eason v. Dickson, Chairman, Adult Authority of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1598,
    Misc.
    Keller v. New York.

      Leon B. Polsky for petitioner.

      Frank S. Hogan and H. Richard Uviller for respondent.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1600,
    Misc.
    Johnson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1601,
    Misc.
    Sears v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1603,
    Misc.
    Furtak v. McMann, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1609,
    Misc.
    Zimmerman v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction.

      H. Thomas Howell for petitioner.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1612,
    Misc.
    Rozier v. Fordon, Parole Administrator, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1617,
    Misc.
    Nelson v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1618,
    Misc.
    Johnson v. United States.

      Frank L. Cowles, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1619,
    Misc.
    Schack v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1620,
    Misc.
    Craig v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1622,
    Misc.
    Furtak v. New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1630,
    Misc.
    Cancel v. Delgado.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1631,
    Misc.
    Rodriguez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1636,
    Misc.
    Patrick v. Peyton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1633,
    Misc.
    Mosden v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1644,
    Misc.
    Schack v. Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1645,
    Misc.
    Ruiz v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1650,
    Misc.
    Searfoss v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1651,
    Misc.
    Furtak v. McMann, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1660,
    Misc.
    Welsh v. Nelson, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1661,
    Misc.
    Nelson v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1663,
    Misc.
    Carbray v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1688,
    Misc.
    Winegar v. Kropp, Warden.

      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 852,
    Misc.
    Kolomyski v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 1758,
    Misc.
    McDermott v. Maroney, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 851,
    October Term, 1966.
    Miller v. United States,
   386 U. S. 911. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 303,
    Misc., October Term, 1966.
    No. 528.
    Curry v. United States, Berguido et al. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
   385 U. S. 873, 387 U. S. 949; and

390 U. S. 996, 391 U. S. 909. Motions for leave to file second petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 497.
    No. 1185.
    Hanner v. DeMarcus et ux., Joffe v. Joffe,
   390 U. S. 736; and

390 U. S. 1039. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 105.
    No. 223.
    Bass et al. v. Federal Power Commission, Mittelman v. United States,
   390 U. S. 747; and

389 U. S. 835. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 1163.
    Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky, Governor of the Virgin Islands, et al.,
   390 U. S. 1041. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    June 14, 1968.
    No. 714,
    Misc.
    Munkelwitz v. Hennepin County Welfare Department.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court. Harlan E. Smith for petitioner. George M. Scott and Henry W. McCarr for respondent. Reported below: 276 Minn. 554, 150 N. W. 2d 24.


text:
    June 17, 1968.
    No. 17,
    Orig.
    Nebraska v. Iowa.
   It Is Ordered that the Honorable Charles J. Vogel, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case in the place of the Honorable Walter L. Pope, resigned. The Special Master shall have the authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may ‘deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may direct.

It Is Further Ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.

[For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 380 U. S. 968.]


text:
    No. —.
    Hujus v. Washington.

      William B. Holland for applicant.
   Super. Ct. Wash., Island County. Application for supersedeas bond presented to Mr. Justice Black, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 73.
    In re Ruffalo,
   390 U. S. 544, 391 U. S. 961. The judgment heretofore issued in this case on May 28, 1968, is amended to omit the provision therein taxing costs in favor of petitioner against the Ohio State and Mahoning County Bar Associations.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 133.
    Alderman et al. v. United States,
   390 U. S. 136, 985, sub nom. Kolod v. United States.

Motion of the United States to modify our order of January 29, 1968, 390 U. S. 136, restored to calendar for reargument at 1968 Term. Counsel requested to include among issues to be discussed in briefs and oral arguments the following:

(1) Should the records of the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio’s place of business be subjected to in camera, inspection by the' trial judge to determine the necessity of compelling the Government to make disclosure of such records to petitioners, and if so to what extent?

(2) If in camera inspection is authorized or ordered, by what standards (for example, relevance and considerations of injury to persons or to reputations) should the trial judge determine whether the records are to be turned over to petitioners?

(3) What standards are to be applied in determining whether each petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of the information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio’s place of business? More specifically, does petitioner Alderisio have standing to object to the use of any or all information obtained from such electronic surveillance whether or not he was present on the premises or party to a particular overheard conversation? Also, does petitioner Alderman have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio’s business establishment?

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 813.
    No. 1134.
    No. 1138.
    Shapiro, Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut v. Thompson. Washington et al. v. Legrant et al. Reynolds et al. v. Smith et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. (Probable jurisdiction noted, 389 U. S. 1032);

Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. (Probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U. S. 940.) These cases are restored to the calendar for reargument.


text:
    No. 1469.
    Palmieri v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. (Certiorari granted, 391 U. S. 934.) Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Phillip Goldman, Esquire, of Miami, Florida, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 950.
    No. 973.
    Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen et al. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al.; and Hardin, Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al.

      Robert V. Light on the motion.
   Appeals from D. C. W. D. Ark. (Probable jurisdiction noted, 390 U. S. 941.) Motion for additional time for oral argument denied.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1301.
    Iaquinta v. New York City Employees Retirement System et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 390 U. S. 1009.]
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion to vacate order of dismissal and for leave to docket appeal denied.


text:
    No. 1331,
    Misc.
    Boone v. Copinger, Warden.

      Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and Alfred J. O’Ferrall III, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in opposition.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 1684,
    No. 1819,
    No. 1831,
    No. 1855,
    No. 1857,
    No. 1869,
    No. 1875,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    LundBerg v. Buchkoe, Warden; Kohlfuss v. Reincke, Warden; Meunier v. Wisconsin; Smith v. Lloyd, Correctional Superintendent; Neely v. Rockview Correctional Institution Superintendent; Rodriguez v. Nelson, Warden, et al.; and Harris v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 1665,
    Misc.
    Cord v. Smith et al.

      Milo V. Olson, William K. Woodbum, and Edward D. Neuhoff on the motion.
    Respondent Lyndol L. Young, pro se, in support of the petition for certiorari.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari, mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 1627,
    Misc.
    Boyden v. Curtis, U. S. District Judge.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States in opposition.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 1604,
    No. 1675,
    No. 1708,
    No. 1709,
    No. 1854,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Lawrence v. Texas et al.; Biggs v. Campbell, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court; Bailey v. MacDougall, Corrections Director; Dailey v. Smith; and Biggs v. Does et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 1638,
    Misc.
    Sepulveda-Casados v. Suttle, U. S. District Judge.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States in opposition.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1724,
    Misc.
    McLoughlin Manufacturing Corp. et al. v. Wright, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.

      Earl D. Yaffe and Jacob E. Yaffe on the motion.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ord-man, Dominick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come for respondents Wright et al. in opposition.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 688.
    Street v. New York.

      David T. Goldstick, Osmond K. Fraenkel, John J. McAvoy, Alan H. Levine, and Melvin L. Wulf for appellant.

      Aaron E. Koota and Harry Brodbar for appellee.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 1277.
    United States v. Nardello et al.

      Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Vinson for the United States.

      F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., for appellees.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 885.
    No. 1007,
    Misc.
    Ivanov v. United States; and Butenko v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir.

Motion to amend petition and petition for writ of certiorari in No. 885 granted. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari in No. 1007, Misc., granted, and case transferred to appellate docket. Cases set for oral argument immediately following reargument in No. 133, Alderman et al. v. United States, supra, p. 919. Grants of certiorari in both of these cases limited to the following questions:

On the assumption that there was electronic surveillance of petitioner or a codefendant which violated the Fourth Amendment,

(1) Should the records of such electronic surveillance be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge to determine the necessity of compelling the Government to make disclosure of such records to petitioner, and if so to what extent?

(2) If in camera inspection is to be authorized or ordered, by what standards (for example, relevance, and considerations of national security or injury to persons or reputations) should the trial judge determine whether the records are to be turned over to the defendant?

(3) What standards are to be applied in determining whether petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of information obtained from such illegal surveillance? More specifically, if illegal surveillance took place at the premises of a particular defendant,

(a) Does that defendant have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the illegal surveillance, whether or not he was present on the premises or party to the overheard conversation?

(b) Does a codefendant have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the illegal surveillance, whether or not he was present on the premises or party to the overheard conversation?

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and these petitions.

Edward Bennett Williams for petitioner in No. 885.

Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, and Lee B. Anderson for the United States in both cases.

Reported below: 384 F. 2d 554.


text:
    No. 495,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Hooey, Judge.

      Joe S. Moss for respondent.

      Solicitor General Griswold filed a memorandum for the United States by invitation of the Court (390 U. S. 937).
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket.


text:
    No. 753,
    Misc.
    Harris, U. S. District Judge (Walker, Real Party in Interest) v. Nelson, Warden.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Deráld E. Granberg and Charles B. B. Kirk, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket.


text:
    No. 1053,
    Misc.
    Frank v. United States.

      John B. Ogden for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket.