text:
    No. 71-179.
    Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-180.
    Spata et ux. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-185.
    Acfalle et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-187.
    Stevenson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-186.
    Local 281, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America et al. v. Backo et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-188.
    Clausen et al. v. Northern Trust Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-189.
    Inland Trucking Co. et al., dba Oshkosh Ready Mix Co., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-191.
    Clutterbuck v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-196.
    Lee et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-199.
    Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works of Maryland et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-202.
    Harkey et al. v. DeWetter, Mayor of El Paso, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-203.
    Fassoulis v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-204.
    Florida v. Englander.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-208.
    McDaniel et al. v. Dudley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-272.
    Georgia et al. v. National Democratic Party et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-207.
    Bieske et al. v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-331.
    Yeager, Principal Keeper v. Smith.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5004.
    Ruby v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5007.
    Ludlow v. New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5010.
    Weaver v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5011.
    Russell v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5012.
    McDuffie v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5013.
    Welton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5015.
    Girard v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5017.
    Waters v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5018.
    Brown v. McLean, Judge.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5020.
    Sheets v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5021.
    Boyden v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5022.
    Grames v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5025.
    Peterson v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5028.
    Pulley v. Norvell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5031.
    Adams v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5037.
    O’Dell v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5038.
    Hanna v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5041.
    Balogh v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5042.
    Stoddard v. Stoddard.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5043.
    Coon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5045.
    Clevenger v. Conte.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5047.
    Harris et al. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia et al.
   Sup.

Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5049.
    Owens v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5048.
    Gornick v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5055.
    Lawrence v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5056.
    DeVorce v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial District, Comanche County Division.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5057.
    Benoit v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5060.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5061.
    Loiodici v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5065.
    Stornini v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5066.
    Curan v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5067.
    Porchia v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5070.
    Rainey v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5072.
    Sullivan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5074.
    Pope v. Williams.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5076.
    Washington v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5077.
    Lilly v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5080.
    Hurd v. DiMento & Sullivan.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5083.
    Prentiss v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5086.
    Guzman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5093.
    Newsome v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5098.
    Reynaud v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-83.
    Wells v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Riverside. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-140.
    Nolte v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-242.
    Adickes et al. v. Murphy et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-326.
    Johnston v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-12.
    Tatasciore v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-351.
    Dillon v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-66.
    Guon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-169.
    Bertrand, Administratrix v. Forest Oil Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-175.
    Fernandez v. Parker, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-103.
    Wilson, Warden, et al. v. Allison.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-174.
    Robbins, Warden v. Rastrom.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-311.
    Swenson, Warden v. Hunter.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-200.
    New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority et al. v. King et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-104.
    Javor et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-144.
    Newsweek, Inc. v. Vandenburg.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-172.
    Woosley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-176.
    Rosenspan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-180.
    Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-185.
    Sanders et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-227.
    No. 70-243.
    Yi Au Lau et al. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Tit Tit Wong et al. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 144 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 445 F. 2d 217.


text:
    No. 70-199.
    Ball v. Board of Trustees of the Kerrville Independent School District et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinon that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-218.
    Smith et al. v. Board of Education of Pinellas County, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-240.
    Anderson v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-246.
    Goulet v. Municipal Court of Pasadena Judicial District, County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-261.
    Scott v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-287.
    No. 70-308.
    No. 70-317.
    Jacks v. New Jersey; Feldman v. New Jersey; and Leuty v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-297.
    Jefferson County Teachers Assn. et al. v. Board of Education of Jefferson County.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-266.
    Tatar v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-330.
    Tharpe v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-347.
    Roberts v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5085.
    Stewart v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5087.
    Olden v. Pope.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5091.
    Wright v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5146.
    Beasley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5185.
    Kelley v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5210.
    Walker v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5307.
    Friedland v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5333.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-10.
    Coley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-57.
    Edwin L. Wiegand Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-68.
    Bailey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-145.
    Pickney et al. v. Oro Dam Constructors et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-147.
    Rheingans v. Mitchell, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-192.
    Johnson v. Oil Transport Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5019.
    Tymcio v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5064.
    Lauchli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-109.
    Vuitch v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-197.
    Kelley v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5231.
    Boyden v. Commissioner of Patents.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5252.
    Holt v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5297.
    Gidmark v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-3.
    Poppenheimer et al. v. Tennessee et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-62.
    Ramirez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-97.
    Orlando et al. v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-125.
    City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Parr.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-211.
    J. C. Penney Co., Inc. v. United States Treasury Department et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-5153.
    Theriault v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-131.
    California v. Eller Telecasting Company of Arizona.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5157.
    Theriault v. Harris, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-5215.
    Linehan v. Minnesota.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-158.
    Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U. S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-165.
    Estate of Lion et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-320.
    Jordan et al. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-313.
    Ambrose Distributing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-5102.
    Bloeth v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-167.
    Sigelbaum v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-209.
    Aiuppa v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-202.
    Kroger Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-338.
    Cotler Drugs, Inc., et al. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-339.
    Southern Railway Co. v. Troutman.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-222.
    Computer Searching Service Corp. v. Ryan, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-274.
    Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-233.
    Helfenbein et al. v. International Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondents to strike petitioners’ supplemental brief and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-244.
    Boshes et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-299.
    United States v. Afran Transport Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-300.
    Nez Perce Tribe of Indians v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-316.
    Nicolas et ux. v. McIntyre, Trustee, et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 8th Sup. Jud. Dist. Motions to dispense with printing petition and brief in opposition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-319.
    Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-126.
    Schneider v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5124.
    Stansberry v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5367.
    Morales v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-45.
    Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-54.
    Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Uarco, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-118.
    Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of General Tire & Rubber Co. and Cleveland Patent Law Assn. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-150.
    Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.
   Sup. Ct. Del. It appearing that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware rests upon an independent and adequate state ground, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-178.
    Danner v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion to dispense with printing respondent’s brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5026.
    Griffin v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion to amend petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5051.
    Chacon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 76,
    No. 153,
    No. 323,
    No. 1273,
    No. 1442,
    No. 1467,
    No. 1469,
    No. 1504,
    No. 1546,
    No. 1547,
    No. 1574,
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America et al. v. Lockridge, Tilton et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, Stafford v. Michigan, Clement A. Evans & Co., Inc. v. A. M. Kidder & Co., Inc., et al., ITT Lamp Division of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Minter, Commissioner of Department of Public Welfare of Massachusetts, Homart Development Co. v. Diamond et al., Giannatti et al. v. County of Los Angeles, Hohensee et al. v. Scientific Living, Inc., et al., General Radio Co. v. Kepco, Inc., Lowe v. Young,
   403 U. S. 274;

403 U. S. 672;

403 U. S. 443;

402 U. S. 968;

402 U. S. 988;

402 U. S. 933;

402 U. S. 988;

402 U. S. 992;

402 U. S. 1012;

402 U. S. 1008; and

402 U. S. 1006. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1632,
    No. 1654,
    No. 1676,
    No. 1692,
    No. 1746,
    No. 5022,
    No. 5250,
    No. 6545,
    No. 6684,
    No. 6794,
    No. 6857,
    No. 6884,
    No. 6905,
    No. 6909,
    No. 6924,
    No. 6935,
    No. 6951,
    No. 6975,
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    Hughes Tool Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., Ginzburg v. United States, Gambocz v. Ellmyer et al., Macdonald v. Shawnee Country Club, Inc., et al., National Gypsum Co. et al. v. United States Gypsum Co., Speck v. Illinois, Bostic v. United States, Lomax v. United States, Van Hook v. Lloyd, Penitentiary Superintendent, Grijalva v. United States, Castle v. Moseley, Warden, Gunzburger v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Varrella v. Varrella, Wolff v. Buchkoe, Warden, Lane et al. v. Pate, Warden, et al., Hyler et al. v. Reynolds Metals Co. et al., Hillery v. Nelson, Warden, Snyder v. Tennessee,
   403 U. S. 918;

403 U. S. 931;

403 U. S. 919;

403 U. S. 932;

403 U. S. 923;

403 U. S. 946;

402 U. S. 547;

401 U. S. 995;

403 U. S. 920;

402 U. S. 1012;

403 U. S. 908;

403 U. S. 934;

403 U. S. 909;

403 U. S. 909;

403 U. S. 921;

403 U. S. 912;

403 U. S. 921; and

403 U. S. 935. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 89,
    October Term, 1970.
    Lemon et al. v. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania, et al.,
   403 U. S. 602. Motion for supplemental opinion and petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 130,
    No. 132,
    No. 1457,
    No. 1531,
    No. 1550,
    No. 1568,
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    Wenzel v. United States, Millang v. United States, McMillan v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., Davis v. Members of Selective Service Board No. 30 of Dallas, Texas, et al., Silk v. Kleppe, Administrator of Small Business Administration, et al., Bean et al. v. Illinois,
   402 U. S. 981;

402 U. S. 981;

402 U. S. 936;

402 U. S. 999;

402 U. S. 1012; and

402 U. S. 1009. Motions to dispense with printing petitions for rehearing granted. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 299,
    October Term, 1970.
    Cohen v. California,
   403 U. S. 15. Motion of Charles H. Keating, Jr., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1613,
    October Term, 1970.
    Gottesman et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.,
   403 U. S. 911. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 5006,
    No. 5011,
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    Mathis v. New Jersey, Funicello v. New Jersey,
   403 U. S. 946; and

403 U. S. 948. Motions for clarification and petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1447,
    No. 1479,
    No. 1483,
    No. 5102,
    No. 5606,
    No. 6703,
    No. 6806,
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    October Term, 1970.
    Andrews v. United States, Consolidation Coal Co. v. South-East Coal Co., United Mine Workers of America v. South-East Coal Co., Chatfield v. California, Levin v. Probation Department of City of New York, Summers v. Texas, Knuckles et al. v. Prasse, Correction Commissioner, et al.,
   402 U. S. 995;

402 U. S. 983;

402 U. S. 983;

402 U. S. 951;

400 U. S. 907;

403 U. S. 933; and

403 U. S. 936. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1622,
    October Term, 1970.
    WHDH, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.,
   403 U. S. 923. Motion to supplement petition granted. Petition for rehearing denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 6908,
    October Term, 1970.
    Theriault v. Harris, Warden,
   403 U. S. 923. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    October 19, 1971
    No. 71-229.
    United States v. Dionisio et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari as to respondent Smith dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 70-149.
    Steenhoek et al. v. Iowa.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-86.
    Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5024.
    Aquafredda v. New York.
   Appeal from App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5108.
    Cheley et al. v. Parham, Director of Department of Family and Children Services.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. dismissed for failure to docket case within time prescribed by Rule 13 of the Rules of this Court. Shapiro v. Doe, 396 U. S. 488.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5128.
    Gaines v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of suggestion of the Solicitor General in the Memorandum for the United States.


text:
    No. 71-15.
    Connecticut State Board of Parole v. Bey.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut with directions to dismiss as moot. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36.


text:
    No. A-356 (71-595).
    Nichol, District Attorney of Dane County, et al. v. Kennan et al.
   D. C. W. D. Wis. Application for stay presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied without prejudice to an application for stay to three-judge district court.


text:
    No. 70-18.
    Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 402 U. S. 941.] Motion of Women for the Unborn et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-52.
    United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 908.] Motion of M. F. A. Central Cooperative et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-5102.
    Cunningham v. Brierley, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 70-5418.
    Guy v. United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-32.
    Flood v. Kuhn et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-119.
    Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 68-5014.
    Garrison v. Patterson, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-179.
    Lombardino v. Heyd, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-221.
    Licavoli v. Maxwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-262.
    Carter v. Morehouse Parish School Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5154.
    Blackburn et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5170.
    Golub v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5334.
    Herrera v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5348.
    Mauldin v. Henry et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5356.
    Morefield v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5378.
    Singal v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5384.
    Williams v. Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5407.
    Sanassarian v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-4.
    Frontier Contact Lenses, Inc., et al. v. Plastic Contact Lens Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-38.
    Tucker v. Moller et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-116.
    Caracci v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-120.
    Central Gulf Steamship Corp. v. Sammon.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-130.
    Pacific Westbound Conference et al. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-133.
    Holland v. Holland.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-148.
    John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc., dba Lacey Funeral Home v. Fultz et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-152.
    No. 71-252.
    Elliott et al. v. Hoberman et al.; and Mooney et al. v. Hoberman et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 N. Y. 2d 530 and 970, 267 N. E. 2d 886 and 272 N. E. 2d 81.


text:
    No. 71-165.
    No. 71-303.
    Bridwell, aka Bradley v. United States; and Pauldino, aka Parker v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 443 F. 2d 1108.


text:
    No. 71-171.
    Whitfield et al. v. Klein Independent School District et al.
   Ct. Civ, App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-210.
    Wilson et ux. v. United States.
   C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-211.
    Don Rhoades Corp. v. American Institute of Marketing Systems, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-213.
    Hayes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-216.
    West v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-217.
    Sawyer v. Atlantic Discount Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-220.
    Pope, Administratrix v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-222.
    DeMasi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-223.
    Iannaccone et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-228.
    Transit Casualty Co. et al. v. Security Trust Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-231.
    Spalitta, Guardian v. National American Bank of New Orleans et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-234.
    Thompson et ux. v. Hoffman.
   App. Ct. Ill.,. 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-235.
    Thompson v. County Board of School Trustees of DuPage County et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-236.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-241.
    Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Domeracki.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5009.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5036.
    Salvo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5062.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5088.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5089.
    Dzialak v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5090.
    Logan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari.denied.


text:
    No. 71-5095.
    Quiles v. Fritz, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5106.
    Keeny v. Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5107.
    Welch v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5109.
    Bush v. Morris, District Attorney of Sumter County, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5110.
    Matthews v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5111.
    Lott v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5112.
    Montgomery v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5116.
    Vitoratos v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5117.
    Bogdan v. Rodriguez, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5118.
    Hohlweiler, Administrator v. Pennsylvania Railroad et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5119.
    Hopper v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5122.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5123.
    No. 71-5147.
    No. 71-5227.
    Roots v. United States; McNeil v. United States; and Boney v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5129.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5130.
    Landman v. United States Board of Parole.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5131.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5133.
    McConkey v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5134.
    Dumenigo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5135.
    Rankin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5142.
    Lewis v. Legislative Body of the 91st Congress of the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-148.
    DeBose v. The Loppersum et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 70-5158.
    Southers v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-103.
    Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5155.
    Rigdon v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-152.
    Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local No. 59 v. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-132.
    Motor City Metal Treating, Inc. v. Kolene Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5014.
    Ortega-Mojaro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5050.
    Autry v. Wiley et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5101.
    Warren v. Government National Mortgage Assn. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certi-orari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5149.
    Percy v. South Dakota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 70-263.
    Lee et al. v. Runge.
   Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner Lee infringed respondent’s copyright and a verdict was rendered against her. Petitioner argued that because the congressional power over copyrights and patents stemmed from the same constitutional provision, they both should be governed by the same standard. Thus, petitioner contended that the copyright was invalid because the book in question lacked “novelty,” but the Court of Appeals rejected this argument saying that the appropriate standard for a copyright was “originality” and that the respondent’s book met this criterion. The standard of copyrightability presents an important question concerning the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers. It has not heretofore bebS decided by this Court and, arguably, it was wrongly decided by the courts below.

In 1961, respondent published and copyrighted a book entitled Face Lifting by Exercise. This book explained how isometric facial exercises could be used to preserve the appearance of youth. It was based on respondent’s study of anatomy, physical therapy, and magazine and newspaper articles, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that the ideas it contained constituted anything more than “selecting the last piece to put into the last opening in a jig-saw puzzle.” Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U. S. 327, 335. It was merely a repetition of the existing state of the art. During 1962, petitioner was employed in respondent’s beauty salon and we may assume that it was during this time that petitioner first read respondent’s book and learned of respondent’s facial exercises. In 1965, petitioner published The Joyce Lee Method of Scientific Facial Exercises. It contained a system of facial exercises strikingly similar to respondent’s and, even though it was unquestionably expressed in petitioner’s own language, we may safely conclude that it was based on respondent’s book. An action for copyright infringement was made out, therefore, if the respondent’s copyright was valid and if it embraced the ideas in her book.

The constitutional power over copyrights is found in the same clause that governs the issuance of patents: “The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Many of the same interests underlie both grants of power. The Federalist No. 43. While this Court has not had many occasions to consider the constitutional parameters of copyright power, we have indicated that the introductory clause, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” acts as a limit on Congress’ power to grant monopolies through patents. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 5-6, we said:

“The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts.’ It was written against the backdrop of the practices — eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies — of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of the useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity ‘requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.’ (Citations omitted.)

In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219, we indicated that the copyright power is also governed by this same introductory phrase: “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.’ ” See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 249. In other contexts, we have also shown that patents and copyrights stand on the same footing. E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131,158; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 401. No reason can be offered why we should depart from the plain import of this grant of congressional power and apply more lenient constitutional standards to copyrights than to patents. Indeed, for reasons which will later be considered, a copyright may have to meet greater constitutional standards for validity than a patent. The limitations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., therefore, apply with at least equal force to copyrights. Cf. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 59.

An author’s “Writing” or an inventor’s “Discovery” can, in the constitutional sense, only extend to that which is his own. It may not be broadened to include matters within the public domain. The congressional power to grant monopolies for “Writings and Discoveries” is likewise limited to that which accomplishes the stated purpose of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” No distinction is made in the constitutional language between copyrights and patents and I would not create one by judicial gloss. Where, as here, a writer has published a book which compiles and applies information available to all men, should that writer have a monopoly on the ideas in that book through a copyright issued merely because the words used were the author’s own?

Patents which did not serve the broad goals of furthering scientific advancement and bettering the lot of mankind (Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 154-155 (Douglas, J., concurring)) have been held invalid because they lacked utility, did no more than combine existing inventions, were obvious to someone schooled in the art, or sought to monopolize ideas within the public domain. Graham v. John Deere Co., supra; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., supra; Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248. It is not obvious that respondent’s system of facial exercises was patentable under these standards. It arguably amounted to nothing more than an application of existing knowledge based upon sources available to all men. We have repeatedly held that patents so devoid of novelty were invalid. To create a monopoly under the copyright power which would not be available under the patent power would be to betray the common birthright of all men at the altar of hollow formalisms.

The application of the constitutional standard of “novelty” will not “invalidate the copyright in a substantial portion of all literary works, where novelty as distinguished from originality is a very rare commodity,” as one commentator has suggested. If Johann Spies’ Historia von Dr. Johann Fausten, Christopher Marlowe’s The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus, Goethe’s Faust and all the other countless operatic, symphonic, dramatic, and literary versions of the Faustian legend were published for the first time today, copyright protection could well be extended to all. “[A] copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea — not the idea itself.” Mazer v. Stein, supra, at 217. The manner in which the words or musical notes are combined to recount the Faustian legend could well satisfy the constitutional requirement of novelty even though the broad ideas they describe may be part of the public domain. This question is not before us in the present case, however, because the manner of expression used by petitioner was unquestionably her own and it was only the ideas of respondent that were used.

Serious First Amendment questions would be raised if Congress’ power over copyrights were construed to include the power to grant monopolies over certain ideas. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970). The framers of the Bill of Rights added the guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press because they did not feel them to be sufficiently protected by the original Constitution. This liberty is necessary if we are to have free, open, and lively debate of political and social ideas. The “public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy,” for example, led one court to conclude that photographs of the assassination were not entitled to the full range of copyright protection. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968). The arena of public debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright his speeches or a philosopher his treatises and thus obtain a monopoly on the ideas they contained. We should not construe the copyright laws to conflict so patently with the values that the First Amendment was designed to protect.

Application of the novelty standard does not require that a person whose literary work is used by another be left without a remedy. We deal here only with the extent of Congress’ enumerated constitutional powers. Quite different questions would be raised by actions for unfair competition or conversion of a common-law property interest. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215. Similarly, different questions would be involved had Congress acted pursuant to other enumerated powers. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416. The respondent’s rights are limited to that which is necessary to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” This requires a level of “novelty” which respondent arguably has not satisfied.

I would grant certiorari and set the case for argument.

        Runge v. Lee, 441 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA9 1971):
      “The standard of ‘novelty’ urged by appellants is applicable to patents, but not copyrights. The copyright standard is one of ‘originality’:
      “ ‘The requirements for the “originality” necessary to support a copyright are modest. The author must have created the work by his own skill, labor and judgment, contributing something “recognizably his own” to prior treatments of the same subject. However, neither great novelty nor superior artistic quality is required.’ ” Quoting Doran v. Sunset House Dist. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (SD Cal. 1961), aff’d, 304 F. 2d 251 (CA9 1962).

        Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, dealt only with the statutory standards for copyrightability because the constitutional questions were not raised until oral argument. Respondent’s reliance upon Mazer as an expression of the constitutional standards for copyrights is therefore misplaced. Those cases in which we have considered the constitutional ramifications of the copyright power have not dealt with the standard of copyrightability. E. g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53. See also Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1955).

       Statutory support for the distinction made by the courts below is, at best, flimsy. It is true that the standards of “novelty,” 35 U. S. C. § 102, and “non-obviousness," 35 U. S. C. § 103, are embodied in the patent statutes. “Originality,” however, is not set forth in the copyright laws as a sufficient measure of copyrightability and it owes its development solely to the courts. E. g., Du Puy v. Post Telegram Co., 210 F. 883 (CA3 1914); Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (CA2 1903). A longstanding, but erroneous, pattern of statutory interpretation may not be spared from the force of a constitutional mandate by reason of its longevity. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64.

       M. Nimmer on Copyright 33 n. 7a (1971). Professor Nimmer seems to have retreated somewhat from this view, however. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970). Even if it were assumed that the application of the “novelty” standard curtailed the monopoly afforded by the copyright, it has recently been demonstrated that this would not seriously affect the publishing industry nor would it disserve the interests underlying the copyright power. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970).

       I recognize that if copyright protection prevented only literal copying, the clever plagiarist could avoid its sanctions by changing irrelevant words. Protecting the manner of expression, however, cannot be allowed to become the tail that wags the dog.


text:
    No. 70-5331.
    Hull v. United States.
   Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

On the morning of September 22, 1968, the petitioner and a companion, both Americans, were walking westward along Highway 94 near Tecate, California, and were three-fourths of a mile from the Mexican border. Two federal customs agents stopped them, learned their identities, directed the pair to walk in roadside dust, and concluded that their shoeprints were similar to those the officers had seen only hours earlier in sand “traps” some 50 yards south of the highway. Suspecting the two of smuggling contraband, the agents detained them while reinforcements arrived and backtracked in search of contraband which officers believed might have been' hidden along the pair’s path. During the probe two knapsacks containing marihuana were found at a spot 100 yards east of the point where the two had been stopped and near the trail which officers believed had been left by the petitioner and his companion. The officers then formally arrested them and afterwards traced what they suspected to be the pair’s footprints to a railroad tunnel nearer the border leading into Mexico.

The two were convicted of smuggling marihuana, in a trial before a jury. The Government was unable to produce direct evidence that the defendants had actually crossed the border via the railroad tunnel. In fact, all the agents could claim was that they had traced what they believed to be the defendants’ footprints into the mouth of the tunnel. Furthermore, no direct evidence was adduced to show, assuming the pair had crossed the border, that they had crossed with marihuana. Given the lack of direct evidence on any of these matters, however, the Government understandably desired to be more persuasive.

To shore up its case the Government introduced, over objection, testimony of an agent that the locality of these events had been “possibly the hottest spot on the Mexican border for smuggling.” He was permitted to tell of his participation in six prior, unrelated investigations of other persons’ smuggling activities. On four of these occasions, said the officer, arrestees had been tracked by their footprints and had been found possessing marihuana. On two other occasions, aliens had been caught unlawfully entering the United States. Apparently, the point the prosecution wished to convey was that using the tunnel was a favorite modus operandi for sneaking aliens and hemp into the United States. The Government now attempts to justify this testimony on the theory that it tended to rebut the possibility that the pair had merely been hitchhiking. As a second justification, the Government contends the remarks helped establish the “signcutting” credentials of the agent by showing that his tracking skills had proved successful on prior occasions.

1 would reverse the case and order a new trial.

The witness’ view on the criminal tendencies of persons found near the border was not relevant to any fact at issue in the trial. It was merely an attempt to construct a supposed class of suspect persons to which it appeared the petitioner belonged. Courts have been hesitant to admit statistical evidence of this nature because of the ease with which it can be abused. Only after many years of improvements were evidences of fingerprints, firearms ballistics, and radar data admitted in prosecutions. And, evidence of blood tests for identification purposes or polygraph readings still face an uncertain future in our courts. We have here an attempt by the Government to impute to a class of persons criminal tendencies simply on the strength of one custom agent’s anecdotal experiences in four prior investigations. The attempt was not relevant since a rational juror could not have sensibly used the information.

The jury might have suspected the two simply as marihuana users who had been hitchhiking along the highway and who had hidden the contraband upon seeing the customs agents’ automobile. Under these circumstances it would have been understandable for the Government to desire to show that a high proportion of persons found with hemp near the Mexican border in fact had recently brought their supply personally from Mexico. It may well be that such is the case. But that proposition does not follow from the four instances recalled by the customs agent. In Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 30 (1969), we noted the increasing harvests of domestic crops of marihuana. And, of course, it would not follow that all possessors even of foreign grown cannabis personally import their supply. In short, the Government offered an unbalanced and incomplete picture of the ways in which persons under circumstances such as these had obtained their marihuana.

It is no answer that the defendant was free to challenge the Government’s general view of statistical probabilities by presenting other explanations of the circumstances or by impeaching the Government’s expert witness. We should not impose upon an accused the burden of independently generating probabilistic evidence and employing experts to study the criminal tendencies of a subgroup of the population. The Government should live up to higher standards and not be allowed to convict people of crimes on suspicion alone.

I would reverse and order a new trial.

       A “trap” is a sandy area brushed smooth at regular intervals and used to alert border patrols that persons have recently traversed the area on foot.

       “Signcutting” is the art of tracking the path of persons traveling in open spaces.

       Judicial history is replete with examples of misapplied statistics in criminal eases. One prominent example was the conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus in France in 1899. He was accused of writing state secrets and conveying his inscriptions to German spies. The prosecution attempted to show that Dreyfus had penned the letter, by introducing lexicographical experts’ opinions. The prosecutor was successful in persuading the jury that there had been an “amazing” frequency of graphical similarities between the letters and others known to have been written by Dreyfus. But, as a panel of experts later pointed out, there was nothing statistically remarkable about the existence of the similarities. For the view that counsel for Dreyfus and the government commissioner failed to comprehend any of the witness’ mathematical speculation, see A. Charpentier, The Dreyfus Case 52-53 (J. May transl. 1935). A more recent American case is that of People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P. 2d 33 (1968), in which the prosecutor at trial said he showed that only one in 12 million people could, as the defendant did, match the description of the perpetrator of a robbery. The California Supreme Court ultimately pointed out, among other criticisms of the mathematical demonstration, that in a population of 24 million the prosecutor’s assumption would lead to the conclusion that there were two persons matching the description, which alone should have established reasonable doubt. These cases and others misapplying statistics are discussed in Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1338 (1971).

       As to the case of breathalizers, radar trackings of automobiles, polygraphs, blood tests for identification purposes, fingerprinting and ballistics tests, see C. McCormick, Evidence, c. 20 (1954); Pinkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on Trial By Mathematics, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1810 (1971); Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971); and Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1970).

       See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 401, 51 F. R. D. 315, 342.


text:
    No. 71-80.
    Beto, Corrections Director v. Hernandez.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-93.
    Howard et al. v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-206.
    Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, Trustee, et al.
   Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The petitioner, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., publishes credit reports available by private subscription. Because Altoona Clay Products, Inc., was a sizable concern it became a subject of analysis by the petitioner. From time to time the petitioner issued confidential financial studies of Altoona which were requested by the subject’s creditors and suppliers.

In early January 1963, one of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.’s, employees discovered in the judgment index of Blair County, Pennsylvania, an unsatisfied entry of $60,000 against Altoona Clay Products Company, a predecessor and defunct enterprise which had been operated by those controlling the subject. On January 3, 1963, the petitioner issued an analysis concerning Altoona, noting this find, but failing to state that the unpaid judgment was against an entirely different firm, at least technically, so that its creditors and suppliers were led to believe that the outstanding liability was owed by Altoona. The error was retracted by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., in April 1963, but respondent Grove, a trustee in bankruptcy presiding over Altoona’s estate, claims that the financial demise of his ward was worked during the interim misunderstanding.

After protracted litigation initiated in the District Court on diversity jurisdiction, involving a prior appeal and remand, a jury, applying Pennsylvania libel law, awarded $110,000 in “general damages” to the trustee in bankruptcy. No special damages were found. The District Court, however, entered a judgment n. o. v. in favor of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., on the ground that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), proscribed libel judgments under such circumstances of innocent error.

The respondent appealed this order to the Third Circuit, which reversed, reinstating the verdict and holding that “the doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan does not extend to private credit reports, and that any allegations of defamation concerning such reports are properly subject to the libel laws of the several states.” 438 F. 2d 433, 438. The opinion issued by the Third Circuit distinguished New York Times on three grounds: (a) unlike Sullivan, the subject of these private reports, Altoona, had no access to the same medium to correct the error; (b) unlike the civil rights struggle, the confidential nature of these nonpublic reports fell outside the realm of public debate; and (c) unlike New York Times, the dispute here was factual in nature, not a difference of opinion.

I would grant certiorari and hear argument on the question whether we should reverse the Third Circuit’s holding, not because it misreads the New York Times case, but because libel and slander awards are no longer constitutionally permissible elements of American law.

It is clear that the First Amendment would proscribe any attempt to enact a federal libel law, notwithstanding the Alien and Sedition Act (1 Stat. 596) to the contrary. I do not suppose that anyone considered at the time of its adoption whether the Fourteenth Amendment meant that state courts could no longer participate in libel and slander awards. But I have expressed the idea before that “constitutional law is not frozen as of a particular moment of time.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 90 (1966). Thus, after it was settled in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First’s freedoms of expression, it followed, in my view, that state libel laws were displaced by the same prohibition that had forbidden federal libel laws.

Accordingly, it is difficult to see how it is within our province to hold that both intentional and reckless falsehoods are outside constitutionally protected discussion. That question has been decided to the contrary by constitutional draftsmen believing that even false statements perform an important function. Whether intentional, whether false, all opinions and allegations in this forensic community are catalytic elements which tend to cause us to react, to rethink, and to reply. And even if deliberate untruths were unworthy of protection, it would be counterproductive, as Madison warned, enunciating his views on the Sedition Act, to attempt to adjudicate which were true and which were not:

“Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the Government contemplates with awful reverence and would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. However desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press., they have never yet been devised in America.” 6 Writings of James Madison, 1790-1802, p. 336 (Hunt ed. 1906).

Thus under our system the libeled may rebut their accusers and presumably those who care about the debate will listen; but repair to the courts for damages no longer is constitutionally permissible.

The wisdom of an absolute prohibition against libel recoveries has been demonstrated by the subsequent experience with the rule announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. Although the common law of libel had fallen into relative disuse, it was revived by the Civil Rights Movement of the last decade which generated heated accusations and, in turn, resort by the defamed to sympathetic state courts to penalize with spectacular awards “outside agitators” who had published criticisms. In the New York Times case, the plaintiff obtained a half-million-dollar judgment from an Alabama jury against the New York Times which had published an advertisement in support of civil rights workers in Alabama, which seemed to be critical of Sullivan. Thus for the first time after it had become clear that First Amendment freedoms were incorporated into the Fourteenth,' this. Court considered the extent to which awarding libel damages had to yield to the protection of a free press.

Mr. Justice Black, in my view, correctly stated that “the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment” is that the press has an “unconditional right to say what [it] pleases about public affairs.” Id., at 297 (emphasis added). The majority, however, felt it necessary to “balance” the state interests underlying libel awards against the countervailing constitutional values of free expression, producing an actual-malice test to be applied where public officials were criticized. Id., at 283. I have continually reiterated my agreement with Mr. Justice Black, but, even if a balancing approach were appropriate, I also believe that the seven years since New York Times demonstrate that an improper balance was struck.

There is a strong argument that the reasons which led the New York Times majority to reject broader liability of publishers a fortiori should also have compelled absolute immunity for defamatory comment. If the common-law tests had been too elusive to protect First Amendment interests then the actual-malice test has proved neither to be more precise nor to be a better guardian. Proof of knowledge that a statement is false requires slippery proof of a mental state, as does a showing of reckless disregard. Seldom is evidence clear on these issues and a local jury asked to “weigh all the circumstances” can continue under this evanescent test to penalize unpopular speech. The formula is not made stronger by placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff or by requiring “convincing clarity” in the degree of proof. These haunting defects have been implicitly recognized on at least ten recent occasions, including the New York Times case, wherein majorities declined to remand for further jury proceedings but instead in each case examined the record, weighed the evidence, found it insufficient, and absolved the publisher.

Moreover, the rationale for permitting even limited liability seems dubious. The actual-malice standard, it is said, permits liability because “calculated falsehoods” are not constitutionally protected. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964). But, as mentioned earlier, even untrue remarks may have positive effects upon the quality of our re-examination process. Moreover, if the rough-and-tumble of debate is the best vehicle for producing approximations of factual truth or preferred opinion, then courts have no business making premature and interim evaluations of contested statements’ merits.

Finally, a factor which the New York Times majority failed to gauge properly was the interest of judicial administration in avoiding continuing readjustment of constitutional doctrine. On 16 occasions since and including that case this Court has attempted to clarify the appropriate balance from circumstance to circumstance. The narrow focus on “public officials” was broadened to include “public figures” and most recently has been expanded to statements of “general or public interest.” The latter, more blurred focus, as Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart recently observed, will further require this Court to poll itself with increasing regularity to determine what events are of sufficient general or public interest to deserve protection. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29, 62, 81 (1971). Thus in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), an obscure family’s captivity by escaped convicts propelled them into the “public spotlight,” and, similarly, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra, a majority felt that an arrest of a magazine salesman was sufficiently “public” to endow a radio station with greater protection for an erroneous newscast that his arrest had been for selling obscene material. It is evident that this ad hoc approach has backed the Court into the same subjective quagmire which has trapped the judiciary in the obscenity cases.

Decisions subsequent to New York Times have both tightened the actual-malice test and expanded its displacement of the common law. The logical extension of these decisions should in time eliminate entirely libel and slander recoveries from American jurisprudence.

I am unpersuaded by the notion that because the petitioner’s publications were commercial in nature they deserved less or no First Amendment protection. It is true that Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), held that business advertisements and commercial matters fell outside sanctioned expression, but as I suggested in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 513-515 (1959) (concurring opinion), that holding was ill-conceived and has not weathered subsequent scrutiny. Only two years after Valentine we held that a municipality could not apply its flat license tax to an evangelist who earned his livelihood by selling religious tracts door to door. Similarly, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 499 (1952), disposed of the view that because cinemas were profit enterprises their films were somehow deprived of full First Amendment status. And, in the field of libel we were unanimous in the New York Times case in rejecting the argument that because defamatory comment had been printed as an advertisement for profit it was less deserving of protection. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 265-266. Surely we have eroded Valentine to the extent that it held a commercial form of publication negated the applicability of the First Amendment. Nor, in my view, should commercial content be controlling. The language of the First Amendment does not except speech directed at private economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than political expression. When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking is at least as effective an institution as are our various governments in furthering the social interest in obtaining the best general allocation of resources. W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 249-256 (1961); A. Braff, Microeconomic Analysis 259-275 (1969); R. Dorfman, Prices and Markets 128-136 (3d ed. 1967).

The financial data circulated by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., are part of the fabric of national commercial communication. There is no doubt that an adverse credit rating can injure a subject. But one injured can inform his suppliers and creditors that a report is misleading. Indeed, in this case, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., was willing to print a retraction. It is difficult to credit the claim that the “general damages” suffered by the respondent resulted from the short-term confusion between the mis-publication and the retraction. In any event, in my view, it has been predetermined that such speculative costs of unfettered communication are preferable to the chill upon free expression that libel laws impose.

I would grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument.

       Of the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, Mr. Justice Holmes said, “I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).

       The issue presented in New York Times had also been considered by the Court in Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U. S. 642 (1942) (equally divided vote).

        Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), which relied on New York Times to invalidate a criminal libel statute, thereby precluding a jury retrial. That the actual-malice test provides inadequate protection against whimsical juries has been pointed out by four Justices. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53, 70-71 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 293 (Black, J., concurring), 297-298 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result); Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, at 81 (Douglas, J., concurring).

       In addition to the citations in n. 3, see Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U. S. 295 (1971); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U. S. 356 (1965).

        New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra.

        Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra.

        Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 43.

       It is evident that the transition from “public official” to “public figure” to “events of public or general interest” has substantially broadened the instances in which the actual-malice test is applicable. At the same time the actual-malice test has been tightened by virtually eliminating reckless disregard as a component. The Court in Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S., at 83, 84, defined “reckless disregard” to mean a “ ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity.’ ” But even though the Court in the abstract has gone far toward eliminating libel, in practice, juries remain able to justify libel penalties under the nebulous “actual malice” test.

       Presumably the credit reports published by the petitioner facilitate through the price system the improvement of human welfare at least as much as did the underlying disagreement in our most recent libel opinion, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra, arising out of a squabble over whether a vendor had sold obscene magazines.


text:
    No. 71-215.
    In re Avallone.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 648, No. 1257,
    Misc., October Term, 1959.
    October Term, 1970.
    In re Wilson, Saville et al. v. United States,
   362 U. S. 947; and

403 U. S. 955. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 883,
    Misc., October Term, 1967.
    Parker v. Maryland et al.,
   390 U. S. 982, 1018, 393 U. S. 903, 397 U. S. 1003. Motion for leave to file fourth petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 498,
    October Term, 1967.
    Colorado River Water Conservation District et al. v. Four Counties Water Users Assn. et al.,
   389 U. S. 1049, 390 U. S. 976. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    October 26, 1971
    No. 71-170.
    Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary in Virginia et al. v. Norris et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Va.


text:
    No. 71-271.
    Lawson et al. v. Board of Education of the Vestal Central School District et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that question of jurisdiction should be postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. A-247.
    Reale v. International Business Machines Corp. et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Application for extension of time within which to file petition for writ of certiorari presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that the application should be granted. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 70-2.
    United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels or Super 8mm. Film et al. (Paladini, Claimant).
   Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 403 U. S. 930.] Motion of Christopher W. Walker for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-6.
    Swarb et al. v. Lennox et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U S. 991.] Motion of David A. Scholl for leave to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of appellants granted. Motion of Pennsylvania Credit Union League for reconsideration of order denying leave to argue orally as amicus curiae denied. Motion of American Bankers Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of Pennsylvania Land Title Assn, for leave to argue orally as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 70-34.
    Sierra Club v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Motion of County of Tulare for leave to argue orally as amicus auriae denied.


text:
    No. 70-54.
    Victory Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Law.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 936.] Motion of American Trial Lawyers Assn, for leave to file an untimely brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-5009.
    Jackson v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 973.] Motion of American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 70-5039.
    Fuentes et al. v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 906, sub nom. Fuentes v. Faircloth.] Motion of Bruce S. Rogow for leave to permit C. Michael Abbott to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of appellants granted.


text:
    No. 70-5138.
    Parham et al. v. Cortese et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 402 U. S. 994, sub nom. Epps v. Córtese.] Motion of David A. Scholl for leave to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of appellants granted.


text:
    No. 71-119.
    Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 880.] Motion to expedite granted.


text:
    No. 71-259.
    Kazubowski et al. v. Dolar, aka Kazubowski, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-273.
    Vick v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-107.
    Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-162.
    Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v. Roth.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-247.
    Rabe v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-145.
    Wooldridge v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5161.
    Patton v. Chew, Director, Probation and Parole Board of Virginia, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-154.
    Pruett v. Texas et al.
   Ct. Crina. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5165.
    Meade v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5166.
    Haire v. Sarver, Corrections Commissioner.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5178.
    Royster v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5180.
    Hinkle v. Smith, Governor of Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5187.
    Riley v. New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5204.
    Streets v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5208.
    Keyes v. Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5217.
    Heath v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5220.
    Jacobs et al. v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5229.
    Golden v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5246.
    Johnson v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5236.
    Hooks v. Colbath.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5274.
    Mendez v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5296.
    Burry v. Haskins, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5317.
    Jones v. Austin, Secretary of State of Michigan.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5347.
    Chapman v. Cardwell, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5401.
    No. 71-5027.
    No. 71-5161.
    Newland v. United States; Harrison et al. v. United States; and Schaefer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 441 F. 2d 1204.


text:
    No. 71-151.
    Wasoff v. American Automobile Insurance Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-161.
    Kerr v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-195.
    Consolidation Coal Co. et al. v. Disabled Miners of Southern West Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-219.
    Hawkins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-242.
    Rogers et al. v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-233.
    General Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local Union No. 563, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-253.
    Bonistall v. Braden et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-255.
    Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. v. Cord et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-260.
    McGregor, dba McGregor World Travel Service v. Air Transport Association of America et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-261.
    American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Harrah’s Club, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-268.
    No. 71-5315.
    Eckert v. United States; and Zamora v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 445 F. 2d 974.


text:
    No. 71-267.
    Gargallo v. Gargallo.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-270.
    Ken Aker, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank.
   Cir. Ct. W. Va., Kanawha County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-274.
    Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. Scott et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-275.
    Antonello et al. v. City of San Diego.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-277.
    Price v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-278.
    Bodnar v. Bodnar et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-280.
    School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc., et al. v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-281.
    Black et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-282.
    Stonehill et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-283.
    Gore et al. v. American Motorists Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-286.
    S. F. H., Inc., formerly Sam Fortas Housefurnishing Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5016.
    Plotts v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5033.
    Mori v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5068.
    Youngblood v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5082.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5091.
    Teague v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5092.
    El v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5096.
    Friedland v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5136.
    Magee v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5137.
    Vestal v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5138.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5140.
    Starr v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5143.
    Wax v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5145.
    Scherer v. Davis.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5146.
    Mirin, dba Strip Cab Co. v. Taxicab Authority of Clark County, Nevada.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5151.
    Chapa v. British Petroleum Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5152.
    DeFlumer v. Mancusi, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5162.
    Young v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5200.
    Perry v. Jones, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5201.
    Funchess v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should’ be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5214.
    Yancie v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-125.
    Langone v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-209.
    Ball v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Orange. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-225.
    Kiraly v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-250.
    Baker v. Monroe County Bar Assn.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5125.
    Dorrough v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-212.
    Hoover Academy, Inc. v. Wright et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5148.
    Tinch v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-251.
    Bertuccelli v. Bellamy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-258.
    Briggs, Superintendent of Schools, et al. v. Calloway.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-264.
    Booth v. Lemont Manufacturing Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing appendix granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-276.
    Zelker, Correctional Superintendent v. Randazzo.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5132.
    Thompson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    November 1, 1971
    No. 71-117.
    Charleston v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-5388.
    Smith v. Metzner, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    November 5, 1971
    No. A-483.
    Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc., et al. v. Schlesinger, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for injunction presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, set down for oral argument at 9:30 a. m. on November 6, 1971.