text:
    No. 1065,
    Misc.
    Glouser et al. v. United States.
    Petitioners pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 1055,
    No. 1159,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Hilbrich v. United States; and Uselding v. United States.

      George L. Saunders, Jr., for petitioner in No. 1055, Misc. James E. Knox, Jr., for petitioner in No. 1159, Misc. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 341 F. 2d 555.


text:
    No. 1060,
    Misc.
    Pope v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1067,
    Misc.
    Worley v. Haynes, Prison Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1068,
    Misc.
    Hall v. Crouse, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1073,
    Misc.
    Jefferson v. McGee, Correctional Administrator, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1074,
    Misc.
    James v. Tennessee.

      Earl E. Leming for petitioner. George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Thomas E. Fox, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1084,
    Misc.
    Carbone v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1098,
    Misc.
    Douglas v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Super. Ct. Wash., Walla Walla County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1103,
    Misc.
    In re Schawartzberg.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1110,
    Misc.
    Bellitto et al. v. Ohio.
    Petitioners pro se. John T. Corrigan for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1112,
    Misc.
    Fernandez v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1114,
    Misc.
    Hoerler v. Heinze, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1116,
    Misc.
    Evans v. Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors of Ohio.

      John H. Bustamante for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1120,
    Misc.
    Ganger v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1126,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Crain Brothers, Inc.

      Louis C. Glasso for petitioner. Carl E. Glock for respondent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1129,
    Misc.
    Madison v. Maxwell, Warden.

      William J. Davis for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1122,
    Misc.
    Clark v. Payne.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1128,
    Misc.
    Boruski v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox and Philip A. Loomis, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1130,
    Misc.
    Nelms v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: - Ct. Cl. -.


text:
    No. 1133,
    Misc.
    Hairston v. Myers, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1135,
    Misc.
    Mallory v. Myers, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1136,
    Misc.
    Watson v. Commercial Credit Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1138,
    Misc.
    Azzone v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1144,
    Misc.
    Francis v. Brown, Governor of California, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1145,
    Misc.
    Coronado v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1149,
    Misc.
    O’Neill v. Rundle, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1150,
    Misc.
    Macfadden v. Heinze, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1153,
    Misc.
    Carter v. Harris, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for respondent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1154,
    Misc.
    Boruski v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox and Philip A. Loomis, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1160,
    Misc.
    Carroll v. Eyman, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1161,
    Misc.
    Herring v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1164,
    Misc.
    Howard v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1174,
    Misc.
    Blake v. Heinze, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1176,
    Misc.
    Forester et ux. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.

      Otto B. Mullinax and L. N. D. Wells, Jr., for petitioners. Lucian Touchstone for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1186,
    Misc.
    Heard v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1177,
    Misc.
    Headrick v. Illinois.

      John R. Snively for petitioner.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1191,
    No. 1256,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Dunn v. United States; and Luciano v. United States.
    Petitioners pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 343 F. 2d 172.


text:
    No. 1193,
    Misc.
    Robinson v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1196,
    Misc.
    Finley v. Heinze, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1197,
    Misc.
    McMorris v. Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Appellate Department, et al.

      S. Carter McMorris for petitioner.
   Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1201,
    Misc.
    Landman v. Marshall, Judge, et al.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1203,
    Misc.
    Meyer v. Klinger, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1205,
    Misc.
    Williams v. Fay, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1206,
    Misc.
    Gonzales v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1207,
    Misc.
    Newkirk v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1208,
    Misc.
    Lawson v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1213,
    Misc.
    Silverman v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1214,
    Misc.
    Cooper v. Maroney, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1219,
    Misc.
    Pompey v. Illinois.

      Irving Bronstein for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1230,
    Misc.
    Campbell v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1252,
    Misc.
    Bland v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1258,
    Misc.
    Bruce v. Hogan, District Attorney of New York County, et al.

      Edward de Grazia and Ernst Liebman for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan and William Cahn, respondents, pro se.

   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1253,
    Misc.
    Green v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1264,
    Misc.
    Dorado v. California.

      William Klein for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1251,
    Misc.
    Johnson v. California.
   Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1255,
    Misc.
    DeMoss v. Heinze, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1303,
    Misc.
    Poulson v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1106,
    Misc.
    McIntosh v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 839.
    No. 879.
    No. 1027,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Louisville Trust Co. et al., Administrators, Bishop et al. v. Ohio, Vincent v. United States,
   380 U. S. 943;

380 U. S. 973; and

380 U. S. 988. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 7, 1965.
    No. 14,
    Original.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see 375 U. S. 803, 950; 377 U. S. 901.]
   The Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs, to the Report of the Special Master may be filed by the parties on or before August 25, 1965. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed on or before September 24, 1965.


text:
    No. 13,
    Original.
    Texas v. New Jersey et al.

      Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, Alan B. Handler, First Assistant Attorney General, and Charles J. Kehoe, Deputy Attorney General, on the motion.
   (379 U. S. 674, 380 U. S. 518, ante, p. 931.) Motion of State of New Jersey for modification of final decree denied.


text:
    No. 515,
    Misc.
    Milne v. Milne.
   Ct. App. Md. The Attorney General of the State of Maryland is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the State of Maryland.


text:
    No. 147,
    Misc.
    Beltowski v. Tahash, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se. Walter F. Mondale, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Charles E. Houston, Special Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent from the denial of certiorari for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker, ante, p. 640.


text:
    No. 1038,
    Misc.
    In re Blevins.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Michael R. Marrón, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certio-rari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    No. 1308,
    Misc.
    Leaf v. Indian Claims Commission.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Weisl and Roger P. Marquis for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 1054.
    No. 1070.
    Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al.; and Hardin et al. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al.

      James E. Youngdahl for appellants in No. 1054. Bruce Bennett, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Jack L. Lessenberry for appellants in No. 1070. Robert V. Light, Thurman Arnold, Dennis G. Lyons, W. J. Smith and H. H. Friday for appellees in both cases.
   Appeals from D. C. W. D. Ark. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument.

Reported below: 239 F. Supp. 1.


text:
    No. 838,
    Misc.
    Baxstrom v. Herold, State Hospital Director.
    Petitioner pro se. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Anthony J. Lokot, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certio-rari granted. Case transferred to the appellate docket.


text:
    No. 39.
    Pennington et al. v. Lewis et al., Trustees.

      John A. Rowntree for petitioners. Val J. Mitch, Harold H. Bacon, R. R. Kramer, E. H. Rayson and M. E. Boiarsky for respondents.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1062.
    Cole et al. v. United States.

      Edward Bennett Williams and Seymour B. Goldjeld for petitioners. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jones and Joseph M. Howard for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1089.
    Ralston Steel Corp., Assignee v. United States.

      Max A. Reinstein for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1091.
    Cook v. Republic Steel Corp.
    Petitioner pro se. Mathias J. DeVito for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1092.
    Williamson v. United States.

      James P. Coleman for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glaser for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1093.
    Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Commission.

      W. C. Braden, Jr., B. J. Williamson and Stanley M. Morley for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff for respondent.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1096.
    Hair Industry, Ltd., et al. v. United States.

      Nicholas Atlas and Anthony H. Atlas for petitioners. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Joseph M. Howard and Burton Berkley for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1097.
    Eastern Die Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Henry Friedman for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1105.
    Koolish et al. v. United States.

      Albert E. Jenner, Jr., for petitioners. Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1129.
    Diversified Development Corp. et al. v. Security Trust Co.

      Gordon Burroughs for petitioners. William H. Armstrong and Robert Broderick for respondent.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1184.
    Sparber v. New York.

      Maurice Edelbaum for petitioner. Frank S. Hogan and H. Richard Uviller for respondent.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 442.
    LaVallee et al. v. Carafas et al.

      Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, Barry Mahoney, Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for petitioners. Leon B. Polsky for Wilson et al., respondents.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondents Wilson and West for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 827,
    Misc.
    Wright v. Myers, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1131.
    Airline Pilots Association, International v. Capitol Airways, Inc.

      Cecil D. Branstetter and Harry Noe for petitioner. Judson Harwood for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 180,
    Misc.
    Ford v. New York.
    Petitioner pro se. Frank S. Hogan for respondent.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 400,
    Misc.
    Draper v. Maryland.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General of Maryland, and R. Randolph Victor, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 678,
    Misc.
    Adams v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Theodore George Gilinsky for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 743,
    Misc.
    Lloyd v. United States.

      Morris. Kanjer and Alvin O. West for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Theodore George Gilinsky for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 933,
    Misc.
    Tucker v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 835,
    Misc.
    Hernandez v. California.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 853,
    Misc.
    Randazzo v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 885,
    Misc.
    Madison v. North Carolina.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas Wade Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Theodore C. Brown, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 890,
    Misc.
    Castle v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States. Monroe H. Freedman and David Carliner for the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 901,
    Misc.
    Cortez v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1071,
    Misc.
    Murphy v. Maxwell, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1076,
    Misc.
    Sumpter v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 924,
    Misc.
    Hickok v. California.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Albert W. Harris, Jr., and John F. Kraetzer, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 966,
    Misc.
    Ware v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    Nos. 979, and 990,
    Misc.,
    Misc.
    Smith v. United States.
    Petitioners pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1121,
    Misc.
    White v. Crouse, Warden.

      Charles S. Scott for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 415,
    Misc.
    Eastman v. Fay, Warden.

      Leon B. Polsky for petitioner. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, Barry Ma-honey, Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgment reversed for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker, ante, p. 640.


text:
    No. 1183,
    Misc.
    Mount v. Pennsylvania.

      Stephen M. Feldman for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 975,
    Misc.
    Jones v. Virginia.

      Robert Lee Watt and Robert L. Murphy for petitioner. Ralph G. Louk and Donald C. Crounse for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 373,
    Misc.
    Carney v. LaVallee, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Barry Mahoney, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgment reversed for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker, ante, p. 640.


text:
    No. 612,
    Misc.
    Berman v. Fay, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se. Frank S. Hogan for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgment reversed for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker, ante, p. 640.


text:
    No. 513,
    Misc.
    Crawford v. Bannan, Warden.
    Petitioner pro se. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and James R. Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Erwin Ellmann for the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari and other relief denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgment reversed for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinion in Link-letter v. Walker, ante, p. 640.


text:
    No. 1169,
    Misc.
    Roberts v. New York.

      Douglas A. Jacobsen for petitioner.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 748,
    Misc.
    Southerland v. Georgia.

      Chester E. Wallace for petitioner. Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, and Peyton S. Hawes, Jr., and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate United States District Court.


text:
    No. 123.
    No. 363.
    No. 871.
    No. 899.
    No. 924.
    No. 925.
    No. 952.
    No. 956.
    No. 977.
    No. 988.
    No. 991.
    No. 1013.
    No. 1094.
    No. 237,
    Misc.
    Federal Power Commission v. Union Electric Co., Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank, Executor, Cauer et al. v. Brenner, Commissioner of Patents, Murphy Oil Corp. v. United States, Allegretti v. United States, Darlak v. United States, Spomar v. United States, United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wilson & Co., Inc., Bendelari v. United States, Allied Central Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Summerlin v. United States, Schwartz v. Tanner, Atwood et al. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Stephens v. Texas,
   ante, p. 90;

ante, p. 81;

380 U. S. 953;

380 U. S. 979;

ante, p. 911;

ante, p. 911;

380 U. S. 975;

380 U. S. 976;

380 U. S. 978;

ante, p. 903;

ante, p. 903;

ante, p. 904;

ante, p. 926; and

380 U. S. 980. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 481,
    No. 932,
    No. 982,
    No. 994,
    No. 1050,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Brady v. Ohio, Ferguson v. Georgia, Evans v. Katzenbach, Attorney General, et al., Allen v. Hoffius et al., Santos v. California,
   ante, p. 904;

ante, p. 905;

ante, p. 920;

ante, p. 274; and

ante, p. 919. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 202.
    Griffin v. California,
   380 U. S. 609. Petition for rehearing denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 677,
    Misc.
    Lawson v. United States,
   380 U. S. 919, 989. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    FAIRFAX FAMILY FUND, INC. v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 124.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Herman F. Selvin for appellant.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Charles E. Corker, Assistant Attorney General, and Arthur C. de Goede and H. Warren Siegel, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Appellant is a Kentucky corporation engaged in a mail-order loan business in thirty-two' States. It has no offices, no agents, no employees, and no property in California. It solicits loans from California residents by mail; after a credit report is prepared by a local independent contractor, the loan application is passed on by appellant’s officers in Kentucky. If the loan is approved, the check is mailed to the borrower from Kentucky. Because appellant failed to obtain a license from the State of California and pay the annual $200 fee, appellee sought and obtained an injunction barring appellant from conducting its out-of-state small-loan business until the requisite California license was obtained. In order to obtain a license, the lender must display “the financial responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness . . . such as to command the confidence of the community and to warrant belief that the business will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently . . . Cal. Fin. Code § 24206.

Our decisions have heretofore precluded a State from exacting a license of a firm doing an exclusively interstate business as a condition of entry into the State. See, e. g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, 366 U. S. 276, 278-289; see also id., at 288, 289-292 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Appellee would characterize these California statutes as primarily of a regulatory nature, invoking Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, in which the majority of the Court held that a State might exclude an interstate insurance company which failed to meet certain minimum reserve requirements designed to assure that the insurer is financially solvent.

But here California exacts a $200 annual fee as a condition of obtaining and maintaining a license. As we recognized in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 112: “The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The California District Court of Appeal viewed the fee as one designed to offset the expenses of administering the licensing system itself. From California’s characterization of the fee it is not one to “defray the cost of purely local regulations” which we indicated was permissible in Murdock, 319 U. S., at 114, n. 8. (Emphasis added.)

Because I believe that this case presents substantial and important constitutional questions, I would note probable jurisdiction and set this case down for argument.

      “The charges or expenses imposed by the licensing procedure are no larger in amount than is reasonably necessary to defray the administrative expenses involved California v. Fairfax Family Fund, 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 884, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    WMCA, INC., et al. v. LOMENZO, SECRETARY OF STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 85.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Leo A. Larkin, Jack B. Weinstein, Leonard B. Sand, Max Gross, Morris Handel and George H. P. Dwight for appellants.

      Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Thomas E. Dewey, Leonard Joseph and Malcolm H. Bell for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

The Court today disposes summarily of four New York reapportionment cases; it retains jurisdiction of a fifth, Lomenzo v. WMCA, Inc., No. 81, which raises substantial questions similar to some of those involved in a set of Hawaii reapportionment cases, Burns v. Richardson, No. 318; Cravalho v. Richardson, No. 323; and Abe v. Richardson, No. 409, with respect to which probable jurisdiction has been noted (post, p. 807). Because these cryptic dispositions risk bewildering the New York legislators and courts, let alone those of other States, I believe it fitting to elucidate my understanding of these dispositions, all of which I join on the premises herein indicated. The need for clarification is particularly desirable because, through dismissal of the appeal in Rockefeller v. Orans, No. 319, and affirmance in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, No. 85, this Court signifies its approval of two decisions concerning the same apportionment plan, one of which (No. 85) found it acceptable and the other of which (No. 319) struck it down.

The New York Legislature adopted an apportionment plan, known as “Plan A,” to comply with an order of a three-judge District Court, dated July 27, 1964, requiring the State to enact “a valid apportionment scheme that is in compliance with the XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution and which shall be implemented so as to effect the election of Members of the Legislature at the election in November, 1965, Members so elected to hold office for a term of one year ending December 31, 1966 . ...”

In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, the three-judge court found that Plan A satisfied this order; in so doing it rejected contentions that apportioning on a basis of citizen population violates the Federal Constitution, and that partisan “gerrymandering” may be subject to federal constitutional attack under the Fourteenth Amendment. In affirming this decision, this Court necessarily affirms these two eminently correct principles.

Quite evidently Plan A was seen by the District Court, and is also viewed by this Court, as but a temporary measure. In holding the plan federally acceptable for the purpose of electing a special 1966 Legislature, the District Court explicitly abstained from dealing with challenges to the plan under the State Constitution. Judge Waterman also noted that although Plan A met federal constitutional requirements, “Of course, the ultimate fitness of the scheme for their needs and purposes is for the people of the State of New York, themselves, to decide, and not for this court to mandate.” 238 F. Supp., at 927.

Subsequent to the decision below in WMCA, the New York Court of Appeals held Plan A (as well as Plans B, C, and D) unconstitutional as a matter of state law. In now dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question the appeal from that decision (Rockefeller v. Orans, No. 319) insofar as it may bear upon any apportionment plan effective after the expiration of the 1966 New York Legislature, I take it that the Court is asserting that any final apportionment plan must comport with state as well as federal constitutional requirements. So much of the disposition in No. 319 I join without reservation. In dismissing, without more, the remaining part of that appeal, I take it that the Court is simply reflecting its affirmances in Nos. 191 and 449 (post, pp. 9, 11), whereby it puts its stamp of approval on the District Court’s use of Plan A, though invalid under the New York Constitution, as a temporary measure. I acquiesce in this aspect of the disposition because of factors to which I advert below.

The Court affirms as well two appeals, Travia v. Lomenzo, No. 191, and Screvane v. Lomenzo, No. 449, from the District Court’s order of May 24, 1965, which specifically ordered a November 1965 special election under Plan A after the New York Court of Appeals had already declared that plan to be in violation of the State Constitution. On June 1, 1965, this Court denied a motion to stay the order and to accelerate the appeal, Travia v. Lomenzo, 381 U. S. 431. In dissent I noted that a federal court order that a state election be held under a plan declared invalid under the State Constitution by the highest court of that State surely presented issues of far-reaching importance for the smooth functioning of our federal system, which were deserving of plenary consideration by this Court. I would have accelerated the appeal, and but for the action of this Court in denying the stay which was sought I would have granted the further application for such a stay that was made to me during the summer. Travia v. Lomenzo, No. 191, Memorandum of Mr. Justice Harlan, July 16, 1965, 86 S. Ct. 7. I now acquiesce in the affirmance as I can see no satisfactory way to heal, at this juncture, the wounds to federal-state relations caused by the District Court’s order without inflicting even greater ones.

The upshot of what is done today is, then, to suspend New York’s 150-member constitutional provision for the one-year duration of the 1966 Legislature, a result to which I subscribe only under the compulsion of what has gone before in this Court.

      [This opinion applies also to No. 191, Travia et al. v. Lomenzo, Secretary of State of New York, et al.; No. 319, Rockefeller, Governor of New York, et al. v. Orans et al.; and No. 449, Screvane, President of City Council of City of New York, et al. v. Lomenzo, Secretary of State of New York, et al.]

       New York Laws 1964, e. 976. The New York Legislature passed three successive amendments to c. 976: New York Laws 1964, cc. 977-978 (“Plan B”), c. 979 (“Plan C”), and c. 981 (“Plan D”). The District Court in the same opinion that found Plan A constitutional, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, also held that Plans B, C, and D did not meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633. This Court is retaining jurisdiction in the appeal from those determinations, Lomenzo v. WMCA, Inc., No. 81.

       Civil No. 61-1559, U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. The order of the District Court was affirmed summarily by this Court, Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U. S. 694, Mr. Justice Clark and I dissenting.

        In re Orans, 15 N. Y. 2d 339, 206 N. E. 2d 854. The Court of Appeals held Plans A, B, C, and D invalid under Art. Ill, § 2, of the New York Constitution which states, “The assembly shall consist of one hundred and fifty members.” All four plans provided for larger assemblies: Plan A, 165 assemblymen, c. 976, §301; Plan B, 180 assemblymen, c. 977, § 301; Plan C, 186 assemblymen (having a total of 165 votes), c. 979, §301; Plan D, 174 assemblymen (having a total of 150 votes), c. 981, § 301.

       The Court’s dismissal of this part of the appeal in No. 319 necessarily approves the Court of Appeals’ holding that from the standpoint of federal law the 150-member requirement of the New York Constitution was not an integral part of the apportionment scheme invalidated in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633.

       The May 24, 1965, order of the District Court was in oral form. A written opinion was handed down on July 13, 1965, Civil No. 61-1559,. embodying the May order.

       A decision on the merits by this Court is unavoidable. The appeal from the three-judge District Court is brought here under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1964 ed.), and I do not believe this case, or a fortiori any of the other New York reapportionment cases presently before the Court, is moot. Surely if this Court now held that the District Court erred in ordering the election under Plan A, it has the power, for example, to enjoin the November 2 election and to order the District Court to arrange for yet another election and for other appropriate temporary reapportionment relief. The very great difficulties implicit in affording any such relief at this late stage go to the question of its desirability, not to the mootness of the underlying action.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    TRAVIA et al. v. LOMENZO, SECRETARY OF STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 191.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Simon H. Rifkind and Edward N. Costikyan for appellants.

      Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Daniel M. Cohen, Assistant Solicitor General, Donald Zimmerman, Special Assistant Attorney General, George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorney General, and Willis Burton Lemon for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fort as took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see No. 85, WMCA, Inc., et al. v. Lomenzo, Secretary of State of New York, et al., ante, p. 4.]


text:
    ROCKEFELLER, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, et al. v. ORANS et al.
    No. 319.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Thomas E. Dewey, Leonard Joseph and Malcolm H. Bell for appellants.

      Justin N. Feldman for appellee Orans.
   Per Curiam.

On April 14,1965, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the New York Laws of 1964, cc. 976, 977, 978, 979, 981, were invalid under the New York Constitution, Art. Ill, § 2. On July 13, 1965, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined interference with an election of members of the New York Legislature to be held on November 2,1965, based on “the scheme set forth” in the New York Laws of 1964, c. 976. Insofar as the decision of the Court of Appeals has been superseded by the order of the District Court, the appeal is dismissed. In all other respects, the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see No. 85, WMCA, Inc., et al. v. Lomenzo, Secretary of State of New York, et al., ante, p. 4.]


text:
    SCREVANE, PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. v. LOMENZO, SECRETARY OF STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 449.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Leo A. Larkin, Morris Handel and George H. P. Dwight for appellants.

      Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Daniel M. Cohen, Assistant Solicitor General, Donald Zimmerman, Special Assistant Attorney General, George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorney General, Leonard B. Sand and Max Gross for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see No. 85, WMCA, Inc., et al. v. Lomenzo, Secretary of State of New York, et al., ante, p. 4.]


text:
    JOBE et al. v. CITY OF ERLANGER.
    No. 62.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      James C. Ware for appellants.

      Harry L. Riggs, Jr., for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Harlan, is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA et al. v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 84.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Herbert A. Bergson, Howard Adler, Jr., Daniel H. Margolis and William K. Unverzagt for appellants.

      Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Wright, Lionel Kestenbaum, Jerry Z. Pruzansky and Edna Lingreen for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    HERALD PUBLISHING CO. v. WHITEHEAD-DONOVAN CORP.
    No. 156.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      James G. Butler for appellant.

      George G. Shapitric for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    BOWMAN v. LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC BUILDING COMMISSION et al.
    No. 170.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Paul E. Hamer for appellant.

      Andrew A. Semmelman and Bruno W. Stanczak for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    PURE-VAC DAIRY PRODUCTS CORP. v. MISSISSIPPI ex rel. PATTERSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL.
    No. 179.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      George E. Morrow for appellant.

      Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, and John L. Hatcher, Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    FILISTER et al. v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS et al.
    No. 184.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Josiah E. Brill for appellants.

      Arvid Falk and Kenneth W. Green for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to substitute Katherine E. Bliss in place of J. J. Bliss as a party appellant is granted.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    GRIFFING et al., CONSTITUTING BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK v. BIANCHI et al.
    No. 206.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Stanley S. Corwin, Joseph L. Nellis and Allen A. Sper-ling for appellants.

      Richard C. Cohn for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    JONES et al. v. McFADDIN et al.
    No. 226.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      William Blum, Jr., for appellants.

      George A. Weller, Ewell Strong and Major T. Bell for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    BERRY v. STATE TAX COMMISSION.
    No. 229.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Robert N. Gygi for appellant.

      Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, and John C. Mull and Carlisle B. Roberts, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Harlan,is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    SEACAT MARINE DRILLING CO. et al. v. BABINEAUX.
    No. 283.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Marian Mayer Berkett for appellants.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    UNITED STATES v. NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, INC., et al.
    No. 119.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Robert B. Hummel and Gerald Radish for the United States.

      R. Emmett Kerrigan, George W. Wise and Joseph J. Smith, Jr., for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is reversed. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, at 623-624; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U. S. 150, at 226.


text:
    HOURIHAN v. MAHONEY.
    No. 342,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    MADDOX v. WILLIS et al.
    No. 308.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      William G. McRae for appellant.

      Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III and Michael Meltsner for appellees Willis et al. Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Doar and Harold H. Greene for appellee Katzenbach.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    EL PASO ELECTRIC CO. v. CALVERT et al.
    No. 395.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      William Duncan for appellant.

      Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attorney General, T. B. Wright, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon C. Cass and H. Grady Chandler, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    ALAMO EXPRESS, INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 357.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Reagan Sayers and Ewell H. Muse, Jr., for appellants.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Lionel Kestenbaum, Robert W. Ginnane and Arthur J. Cerra for the United States et al. William E. Cureton for appellees Central Freight Lines, Inc., et al.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    O’CONNOR v. OHIO.
    No. 281,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      James W. Cowell for appellant.

      Harry Friberg for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    PRICE, dba HOWARD PRICE & CO. v. STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA et al.
    No. 144.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Carney M. Layne and Charles W. Yeager for appellant.

      C. Donald Robertson, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Philip J. Grasiani and C. Robert Sarver, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed in light of the representations of the Attorney General of West Virginia that there is open to the appellant an effective state procedure of which he has not availed himself.


text:
    PUGACH v. NEW YORK.
    No. 12,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    BRAADT v. CITY OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, et al.
    No. 358.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      William Gitnick for appellant.

      Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Jean M. Coon, Assistant Attorney General, for New York State Workmen’s Compensation Board, and Leo A. Larkin, Seymour B. Quel and Benjamin Offner for City of New York, appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author: Per Curiam,

text:
    CASSESE v. PEYTON, PENITENTIARY SUPERINTENDENT.
    No. 137,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam,

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    MALLORY et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA.
    No. 81,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Walter 8. Haffner for appellants.

      T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    KADANS v. DICKERSON et al.
    No. 399,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.

      Joseph M. Kadans, appellant, pro se.

      Paul C. Parraguirre for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    GRANIERI v. SALT LAKE CITY.
    No. 202,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    KASHARIAN v. HALPERN et al.
    No. 389,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    THOMPSON v. CITY AND STATE OF NEW YORK.
    No. 248,
    Misc.
    Decided October 11, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author:
      Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Clark,
      Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    GONDECK v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., et al.
    No. 919,
    October Term, 1961.
    Certiorari denied June 11, 1962.— Rehearing denied October 8, 1962
    Rehearing and certiorari granted and case decided October 18, 1965.

      Arthur Roth for petitioner.

      Leo M. Alpert for respondents.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner’s husband, Frank J. Gondeck, was killed as a result of a jeep accident on San Salvador Island outside a defense base at which he was employed. The accident took place in the evening as Gondeck and four others were returning from a nearby town. The Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, United States Department of Labor, awarded death benefits to petitioner in accordance with the terms of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1958 ed.), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 55 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1651 et seq. (1958 ed.). In support of the award, the Deputy Commissioner found, among other things, that, although Gondeck had completed his day’s work, he was subject to call for emergencies while off duty and was returning from reasonable recreation when the accident occurred. The District Court set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s order, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 299 F. 2d 74. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Gondeck was subject to call, id., at 75, but found no benefit to the employer in Gondeck’s trip, and “no evidence that furnishes a link by which the activity in which Gondeck was engaged was related to his employment.” Id., at 77.

On June 11, 1962, we denied certiorari. 370 U. S. 918. On October 8, 1962, we denied a petition for rehearing. 371 U. S. 856. We are now apprised, however, of “intervening circumstances of substantial . . . effect,” justifying application of the established doctrine that “the interest in finality of litigation must yield where the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules.” United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98,99. Subsequent to our orders in the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an award to the survivors of another employee killed in the same accident. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. O’Hearne, 335 F. 2d 70. In upholding the award, the court cited our decision in O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504. In a subsequent case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit itself expressed doubt whether its decision in the present case had been consistent with Brown-Pacific-Maxon. O’Keeffe v. Pan American World Airways, 338 F. 2d 319, 325. The court also noted that, “The Gondeck case stands alone, except for a per curiam opinion.” Id., at 325. This Court reversed that per curiam judgment last Term, O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U. S. 359, so that the present case now stands completely alone.

In O’Keeffe we made clear that the determinations of the Deputy Commissioner are subject only to limited judicial review, and we reaffirmed the Brown-Pacific-Maxon holding that the Deputy Commissioner need not find a causal relation between the nature of the victim’s employment and the accident, nor that the victim was engaged in activity of benefit to the employer at the time of his injury or death. No more is required than that the obligations or conditions of employment create the “zone of special danger” out of which the injury or death arose. Since the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Brown-Pacific-Maxon standard in this case, and since, of those eligible for compensation from the accident, this petitioner stands alone in not receiving it, “the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules.” United States v. Ohio Power Co., supra, at 99.

We therefore grant the motion for leave to file the petition for rehearing, grant the petition for rehearing, vacate the order denying certiorari, grant the petition for certio-rari, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Clark,

joining in the judgment.

I fully agree with my Brother Harlan “that litigation must at some point come to an end” and “that this decision holds seeds of mischief for the future orderly administration of justice . . . .” But with Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 351 U. S. 183 (1956), on our books, no other conclusion can be reached.

Up until Cahill I thought that successive petitions for rehearing would not be received by the Court under its Rule 58 (4). This rule took the place of the old “end of Term” rule of Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415 (1882), abolished by the Congress in 1948, 28 U. S. C. § 452 (1958 ed.). Indeed, I doubted that the Court had the power to grant a successive petition for rehearing under a factual situation, as here, where a petition for certiorari had been denied over three years ago, 370 U. S. 918 (1962); a petition for rehearing had been denied, 371 U. S. 856 (1962); the mandate had issued more than three years before; and where petitioner had, about the same date, cancelled her appeal bond and been discharged of all liability thereunder. In Cahill, however, the Court through the device of a “motion to recall and amend the judgment” permitted a successive petition not only to be received but granted, despite the fact that the judgment thereby reopened had been previously paid. This paved the way for the grant of a successive petition for rehearing in United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98 (1957), to make its judgment conform with this Court’s decision that same Term in United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U. S. 306 (1957), a companion case of Ohio Power in the Court of Claims.

The vice, of course, is the granting of successive petitions for rehearing in violation of Rule 58 (4), which was done for the first time in Cahill. It makes no difference that the rejection of finality be to correct alleged errors of our own or those below. Nor does it matter that the errors be corrected in the same Term, as in Cahill, or four Terms later, as here. In each instance the action violates Rule 58 (4) and that is the basis of my position.

I, too, as my Brother Harlan said in Ohio Power, “can think of nothing more unsettling to lawyers and litigants, and more disturbing to their confidence in the evenhand-edness of the Court’s processes, than to be left in . . . uncertainty ... as to when their cases may be considered finally closed in this Court.” At p. Ill (dissenting opinion). However, Cahill opened up this practice. It may be that Ohio Power and the present case are more objectionable on their facts, but they merely condone Cahill’s original vice. Until we can gain the vote of the majority to the contrary we are stuck with the practice. The outlook for this appears dim. We can only hope that this rule of “no finality,” which the Court varnishes with the charms of reason, will be sparingly used, or overruled by Congress, as was the “end of Term” rule. I, therefore, join in the judgment of the Court.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

The result reached in this case has been achieved at the expense of the sound legal principle that litigation must at some point come to an end.

I can find nothing in the train of events on which the Court relies in overturning this more than three-year-old final judgment that justifies bringing into play the dubious doctrine of United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98, a case which was decided by a closely divided vote of less than a full bench, which deviated from long-established practices of this Court, and which, so far as I can find, has had no sequel in subsequent decisions of the Court.

The judgment against this petitioner became final as long ago as June 11, 1962. 370 U. S. 918. The Court refused to reconsider it four months later when it denied rehearing on October 8, 1962. 371 U. S. 856. When some two years later, July 13, 1964, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a compensation award with respect to a co-employee of Gondeck killed in the same accident, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. O’Hearne, 335 F. 2d 70, petitioner did not even seek to file another petition for rehearing here. A few months later the Fifth Circuit might be thought to have indicated some doubt about its earlier decision in the Gondeck case, O’Keeffe v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 338 F. 2d 319, 325, but again no attempt was made to file a further petition for rehearing here in Gondeck.

It was this Court’s decision of last Term in O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U. S. 359, which itself was a debatable innovation in this area of the law, that triggered the undoing of this judgment of four Terms ago. It should be noted that the subject matter in O’Keeffe v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., was an entirely different accident from the one in which petitioner’s decedent was involved.

This, then, is hardly one of those rare cases in which “ 'the interest in finality of litigation must yield’ ” because “ 'the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules,’ ” ante, pp. 26-27. On the contrary, the situation is one in which the prevailing party in this litigation had every reason to count on the judgment in its favor remaining firm. Believing that this decision holds seeds of mischief for the future orderly administration of justice, I respectfully dissent.

      U. S. Supreme Ct. Rule 58 (2).

       “Consecutive petitions for rehearings, and petitions for rehearing that are out of time under this rule, will not be received.”

       Mr. Justice Black, joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself, dissented.

         The vote was 4 to 3, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Whittaker, since retired, not participating. 353 U. S., at 99.

       See dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., 353 U. S., at 99.

       My Brother Clark's citation of Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 351 U. S. 183, ante, p. 28, for the proposition that this petition for rehearing must- be granted is inapposite. Cahill was an FELA case in which this Court reversed summarily a judgment of the Court of Appeals overturning a district court judgment for the plaintiff, 350 U. S. 898. Later that same Term, after a petition for rehearing had been denied, 350 U. S. 943, the Court was persuaded on “a motion to recall and amend the judgment” that its mandate, which simply reinstated the District Court’s judgment, was incorrect and that the case should properly have been remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. It is difficult for me to see how the correction during the same Term of our own error in Cahill can be thought to compel or justify a general “rule of ‘no finality’ ” (as my Brother Clark puts it, ante, p. 29) which requires the granting of a second petition for rehearing three years after the first one was denied in a case which this Court never heard.

       The case was decided without argument by a substantially divided Court, 380 U. S. 359. See dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Clark and White, JJ., 380 U. S., at 365. See also separate opinion of Douglas, J., 380 U. S., at 371.


text:
    JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP. v. GRIDIRON STEEL CO.
    No. 123.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      Walter J. Blenko, Walter J. Blenko, Jr., and Richard F. Stevens for petitioner.'

      Robert J. Fay for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is granted, and the judgment dismissing petitioner’s appeal to that court is reversed. The time limited by 28 U. S. C. § 2107 and Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 73 for the filing of the notice of appeal from the judgment appealed from was 30 days. However, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6 (a), as amended, provides that in computing the period, “[t]he last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.” Since the thirtieth day following entry of the judgment appealed from was Saturday and the notice of appeal was filed the following Monday, we hold that the filing of the notice of appeal was timely. The provision of Rule 6 (a) was not made inapplicable by the order of the Court of Appeals directing that the District Court Clerk’s offices be open for business on Saturday mornings. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


text:
    FIRST SECURITY NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. OF LEXINGTON et al. v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 141.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      Paul A. Porter and Victor H. Kramer for appellants.

      Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Lionel Kestenbaum for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

In United States v. First National Bank, 376 U. S. 665, this Court held that the merger of First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington, Kentucky, with Security Trust Co. of Lexington to form First Security National Bank and Trust Co. violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1. The Court’s judgment remanded the case to the District Court “for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court.” Thereafter, on July 1, 1964, the District Court ordered the parties “to report to the court the progress made in complying with the judgment” of the Supreme Court. On application of the parties, the reporting date was thrice postponed to permit negotiations between First Security and the Government concerning an appropriate plan of divestiture. When, on the final date for reporting, February 16, 1965, the parties jointly presented only a proposed interlocutory decree providing that the detailed plan for divestiture would be submitted within six months, the District Court held First Security, its executive officers and directors in contempt. Although there is some indication that the District' Court was dissatisfied with the compliance of the bank with the District Court’s order of July 1, 1964, the contempt judgment itself was entered because the delay in submitting a final plan of divestiture was a failure “to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court . . . .” The court imposed a fine of $100 per day until the contempt had been purged by “full compliance with the mandate of the Supreme Court.”

The District Judge’s interpretation of this Court’s judgment was erroneous. We remanded the case for further proceedings in the District Court consistent with this Court’s opinion. Neither the opinion nor the judgment of this Court expressly dealt with the matter of remedy and neither ordered divestiture within any particular period of time. Compare United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 662 (decided the same day as the prior appeal in this case and directing the District Court to order divestiture without delay). No order of divestiture was entered in the District Court until March 18, 1965, a month after the bank had been held in contempt. The District Court has the authority to require obedience and to punish disobedience of its lawful orders and decrees, .18 U. S. C. § 401, but this record reveals nothing the bank did or failed to do which violated the judgment of this Court. The judgment holding the bank, its executive officers and directors in contempt is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    JAMES v. LOUISIANA.
    No. 23,
    Misc.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      G. Wray Gill, Sr., for petitioner.

      Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, M. E. Culligan, Assistant Attorney General, and Jim Garrison for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petitioner was convicted by a Louisiana jury of possession of narcotics and was sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. The Supreme Court of Louisiana set aside the conviction on the ground that it was based upon evidence seized without a warrant during an illegal search. 246 La. 1033, 169 So. 2d 89. Upon rehearing, however, that court affirmed the conviction by a divided vote. 246 La. 1053, 169 So. 2d 97. We grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment.

Police officers arrested the petitioner near the intersection of Camp Street and Jackson Avenue in the City of New Orleans, after he had alighted from an automobile driven by another man. The officers then drove the petitioner to his home, more than two blocks away. They broke open the door and for several hours conducted an intensive search which finally yielded the narcotics equipment and single morphine tablet that constituted the basis of the petitioner’s subsequent conviction.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the officers had probable cause to arrest the petitioner at the time they apprehended him, and the validity of his arrest is not here in issue. In the circumstances of this case, however, the subsequent search of the petitioner’s home cannot be regarded as incident to his arrest on a street corner more than two blocks away. A search “can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486. See also Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364.

Under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, see also Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, it was constitutional error to admit the fruits of this illegal search into evidence at the petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


text:
    METROMEDIA, INC. v. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS et al.
    No. 212.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      Robert A. Dreyer and George A. Katz for appellant.

      Simon H. Rif kind, Herman Finkelstein and Jay H. Topkis for American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, and Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Lionel Kestenbaum and I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., for the United States, appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    KASHARIAN et al. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al.
    No. 446,
    Misc.
    Decided October 18, 1965.
    Appellants pro se.

      Nicholas Conover English for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    WELLS et al. v. REYNOLDS et al.
    No. 258.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      Jack Greenberg and James M. Nabrit III for appellants.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Fortas dissent.


text:
    SHAKESPEARE et al. v. CITY OF PASADENA.
    No. 281.
    Decided October 18, 1965.
    Appellants pro se.

      Align H. Barber for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    NATIONAL TRAILER CONVOY, INC. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 373.
    Decided October 18, 1965.

      Jack N. Hays and Harold G. Hernly for appellant.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B, Hummel, Robert W. Ginnane and Thomas H. Ploss for the United States et al.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    KASHARIAN et al. v. SOUTH PLAINFIELD BAPTIST CHURCH et al.
    No. 433,
    Misc.
    Decided October 18, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    STEBBINS v. MACY, CHAIRMAN, U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al.
    No. 384.
    Decided October 18, 1965.
    Appellant pro se.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    BURNETTE et al. v. DAVIS et al.
    No. 241.
    Decided October 25, 1965

      Aubrey R. Boivles, Jr., and Aubrey R. Bowles III for appellants in No. 241. Samuel W. Tucker and Henry L. Marsh III for appellants in No. 424.

      Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, R. D. Mcllwaine III, Assistant Attorney General, David J. Mays and Henry T. Wickham for appellees.

       Together with No. 424, Thornton et al. v. Davis et al., also on appeal from the same court.

   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


text:
    RATLEY v. CROUSE, WARDEN.
    No. 551,
    Misc.
    Decided October 25, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    SERVICE TRUCKING CO., INC. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 422.
    Decided October 25, 1965.

      Francis W. Mclnemy and Robert G. Miller for appellant.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B. Hummel, Robert W. Ginnane and Betty Jo Christian for the United States et al.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    KELLER v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 522,
    Misc.
    Decided October 25, 1965.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    MORTON SALT CO. v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 275.
    Decided October 25, 1965.

      L. M. McBride and John P. Ryan, Jr., for appellant in No. 275. R. William Rogers for appellant in No. 276.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Robert B. Hummel for the United States.

      Together with No. 276, Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. United States, also on appeal from the same court.

   Per Curiam.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 493, 494; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 221-227; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 809-810; Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U. S. 537, 540-542.

Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    WETHERALL et al. v. STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA et al.
    No. 428.
    Decided October 25, 1965.

      Carney M. Layne and Charles W. Yeager for appellants.

      C. Donald Robertson, Attorney General of West Virginia, Philip J. Graziani, Deputy Attorney General, and C. Robert Sarver, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Price, dba Howard Price & Co. v. State Road Commission of West Virginia, ante, p. 20.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MARY CARTER PAINT CO. et al.
    No. 15.
    Argued October 21, 1965.
    Decided November 8, 1965.

      Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, James Mcl. Henderson and Charles C. Moore, Jr.

      David W. Peck argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Mary Carter Paint Company manufactures and sells paint and related products. The Federal Trade Commission ordered respondent to cease and desist from the use of certain representations found by the Commission to be deceptive and in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 52 Stat. 111. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1964 ed.). 60 F. T. C. 1830, 1845. The representations appeared in advertisements which stated in various ways that for every can of respondent’s paint purchased by a buyer, the respondent would give the buyer a “free” can of equal quality and quantity. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the Commission’s order. 333 F. 2d 654. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 957. We reverse.

Although there is some ambiguity in the Commission’s opinion, we cannot say that its holding constituted a departure from Commission policy regarding the use of the commercially exploitable word “free.” Initial efforts to define the term in decisions were followed by “Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.” These informed businessmen that they might advertise an article as “free,” even though purchase of another article was required, so long as the terms of the offer were clearly stated, the price of the article required to be purchased was not increased, and its quality and quantity were not diminished. With specific reference to two-for-the-price-of-one offers, the Guides required that either the sales price for the two be “the advertiser’s usual and customary retail price for the single article in the recent, regular course of his business,” or where the advertiser has not previously sold the article, the price for two be the “usual and customary” price for one in the relevant trade areas. These, of course, were guides, not fixed rules as such, and were designed to inform businessmen of the factors which would guide Commission decision. Although Mary Carter seems to have attempted to tailor its offer to come within their terms, the Commission found that it failed; the offer complied in appearance only.

The gist of the Commission’s reasoning is in the hearing examiner’s finding, which it adopted, that

“the usual and customary retail price of each can of Mary Carter paint was not, and is not now, the price designated in the advertisement [$6.98] but was, and is now, substantially less than such price. The second can of paint was not, and is not now, ‘free,’ that is, was not, and is not now, given as a gift or gratuity. The offer is, on the contrary, an offer of two cans of paint for the price advertised as ór purporting to be the list price or customary and usual price of one can.” 60 F. T. C., at 1844.

In sum, the Commission found that Mary Carter had no history of selling single cans of paint; it was marketing twins, and in allocating what is in fact the price of two cans to one can, yet calling one “free,” Mary Carter misrepresented. It is true that respondent was not permitted to show that the quality of its paint matched those paints which usually and customarily sell in the $6.98 range, or that purchasers of paint estimate quality by the price they are charged. If both claims were established, it is arguable that any deception was limited to a representation that Mary Carter has a usual and customary price for single cans of paint, when it has no such price. However, it is not for courts to say whether this violates the Act. “[T]he Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a practice is ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of the Act.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U. S. 374, 385. There was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding; its determination that the practice here was deceptive was neither arbitrary nor clearly wrong. The Court of Appeals should have sustained it. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra; Carter Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 323 F. 2d 523, 528.

The Commission advises us in its brief that it believes it would be appropriate here “to remand the case to it for clarification of its order.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to that court with directions to remand to the Commission for clarification of its order.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

In my opinion the basis for the Commission’s action is too opaque to justify an upholding of its order in this case. A summary discussion of the facts and Commission proceedings will suffice to show why I cannot subscribe to the majority’s disposition.

Since 1951 the enterprise now known as Mary Carter Paint Company has been manufacturing paint products for direct distribution through its own outlets and fran-. chised dealers. For most or all of this period, its practice has been to establish its prices on a per-can basis but to give each customer a second can without further charge for each can purchased. Mary Carter’s advertisements, while disclosing that the first can of each pair must be bought at the listed price, have always described the second can as “free”; typical slogans are: “Buy one get one free” and “Every second can free.” It is this advertising which the Commission now condemns as unfair and deceptive under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 52 Stat. Ill, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1964 ed.).

To the extent that the Commission’s order may rest on the proposition that the second can is not “free” because its receipt is “tied” to the purchase of the first can, it is manifestly inconsistent with the rules governing use of the word “free” maintained by the Commission for over a decade. No one suggests that the additional can of Mary Carter paint is free in the sense that no conditions are attached to its receipt, but the FTC forsook this commercially unrealistic definition in 1953. In that year, first by its decision in Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 225, and then a general policy statement, 4 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 40,210, it sanctioned use of the word “free” to describe an item given without extra charge on condition of another purchase so long as the condition was plainly stated and the “tying” product was not increased in price for the occasion or decreased in quantity or quality. The FTC prefaced these rules in Black by saying that “[t]he businessmen of the United States are entitled to a clear and unequivocal answer” and it represented that its new position would be maintained until either Congress or the courts decided otherwise. 50 F. T. C., at 232, 235.

There is presently no .charge by the Commission that Mary Carter failed to comply with this general statement which continued in force through the proceedings and decision affecting Mary Carter. Rather, for the greater period of its advertising operations Mary Carter could properly claim to have relied on the FTC’s official pronouncement while it was establishing its “every second can free” slogan in the public mind, an investment now seemingly lost. Without inflexibly holding the Commission to its promise and avowed position, certainly solid justification should be demanded before the courts agree that this departure is not “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e), 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e) (1964 ed.).

At the very least the Commission should be required to demonstrate real deception and public injury in a decision that allows the courts to evaluate its reasoning and businessmen to comply with assurance with its latest views; these standards are not met by the FTC’s opinion in this case. The Department of Justice suggests that the FTC regards the advertisements as implying that Mary Carter regularly sells its paint for the present per-can price without giving an extra can free; from this premise, it might be argued, the buyer may then conclude that each can of Mary Carter is the equal of similarly priced rivals with whom it has regularly competed on equal terms in the past, making the present “free” can offer appear an excellent bargain. But the advertising in the present case does not really suggest that the “free” can is a departure from Mary Carter’s usual pricing policy. Certainly nothing in any of the publicity states that the extra can is a “new” bargain or asserts that the opportunity may lapse in the near future. To the contrary, a number of Mary Carter advertisements, not separately treated by the Commission, affirmatively suggest that the extra-can offer has been and will continue to be the sales policy. Far from trying to imply that its extra-can offer represents a temporary saving for the customer, Mary Carter has striven over a number of years to associate itself irrevocably in the public mind with the notion that every second can is free; the catchphrase appears in one form or another in nearly all the ads before us and is even imprinted on the top of Mary Carter paint cans. Finally, it is not without irony that the Commission, presumably seeking to protect the consumer from any unfounded ultimate conclusions that a can of Mary Carter is as good as its high-priced rivals, rejected an offer of proof from the company that a single can of Mary Carter is scientifically equal or superior to the leading paints that .sell at the same per-can price level without giving bonus cans. Actually, there is no suggestion that any volume of consumer complaints has been received, which further deepens the mystery why this frail proceeding was ever initiated.

The temptation to gloss over the analytical failings of the rationale now asserted for the FTC by relying on agency expertise must be short-lived in this ease. Any findings by the FTC as to what the public may conclude from particular phrasings are most inexplicit, no distinction is taken between the various ads in question, and the conduct proscribed is never sharply identified. Surely there can be no resort to uninvoked expertise to buttress an unarticulated theory.

The opaqueness of the Commission’s opinion and order makes their approval difficult for yet other reasons. The bite of the FTC decision is in its order, which even the Commission recognizes to be unclear; how the Commission order can be upheld before this Court is told what exactly it means is indeed a puzzling question. Additionally, by failing to spell out its rationale the FTC decision breeds the suspicion that it is not merely ad hoc but quite possibly irreconcilable with the Black case seemingly reaffirmed by the Commission in this very proceeding. If the Commission is able to write an opinion and order that can cure these defects and draw the plain distinctions necessary to assure fair warning and equal treatment for other advertisers, it has not done so yet.

In administering § 5 in the context of the many elusive questions raised by modern advertising, it is the duty of the Commission to speak and rule clearly so that law-abiding businessmen may know where they stand. In proscribing a practice uncomplained of by the public, effectively harmless to the consumer, allowed by the Commission’s long-established policy statement, and only a hairbreadth away from advertising practices that the Commission will continue to permit, I think that the Commission in this instance has fallen far short of what is necessary to entitle its order to enforcement.

For these reasons I would not disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Commission’s order.

       Hereinafter Mary Carter or respondent.

        Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 48 F. T. C. 1297 (1952); Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 225 (1953); Puro Co., 50 F. T. C. 454 (1953); Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 778 (1954); Ray S. Kalwajtys, 52 F. T. C. 721, enforced, 237 F. 2d 654 (1956).

       Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, Guide V, adopted October 2, 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965; see also policy statement, December 3, 1953, 4 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 40,210. For the current guide, Guide IV, effective January 8, 1964, see 29 Fed. Reg. 180.

       Such an implication might be thought to run counter to the spirit of the now-superseded Guide V, Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (1958), requiring that the sales price for two articles in a two-for-the-price-of-one sale must be the usual and customary price for one. Mary Carter can, of course, reasonably claim to have complied with the letter of Guide V; assuming that it is making a two-for-the-priee-of-one offer in substance, the advertised sum is the usual and customary price which a purchaser has to pay in order to acquire a single can. There is evidence that on at least a few occasions customers took only one can, paying the advertised per-can price. There is no evidence that Mary Carter permitted or tolerated sales of single cans at less than the advertised per-can price.

       I put aside the argument that might arise from Mary Carter’s practice of selling its paint in both gallon and quart cans. Conceivably, one might order a gallon and receive an unneeded extra gallon, never realizing that two quarts purchased plus two quarts free could be had for a smaller sum. The FTC ignored and the Government expressly disclaims reliance on any such argument. Moreover, many ads seem to give both quart and gallon prices.

       Of the post-1952 cases cited in the majority’s note 2 (ante, p. 47), none is authority for condemning Mary Carter’s advertising. Puro Co., 50 F. T. C. 454 (1953), and Bay S. Kalwajtys, 52 F. T. C. 721, enforced, 237 F. 2d 654 (1956), both involved plain deceptions as to the usual prices of the items in question. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 778 (1954), and the Black case both exculpate sellers under the rule finally appearing in the 1953 policy statement, with whose terms Mary Carter has complied.