source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Stewart,

license: Public Domain

text:
    LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. NELMS et al.
    No. 71-573.
    Argued April 17, 1972
    Decided June 7, 1972
    Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 803. Douglas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Richard B. Stone argued the cause for petitioners. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Gray, Wm. Terry Bray, Alan S. Rosen-thal, and Robert E. Kopp.

      George E. Allen, Sr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents brought this action in the United States District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-2680. They sought recovery for property damage allegedly resulting from a sonic boom caused by California-based United States military planes flying over North Carolina on a training mission. The District Court entered summary judgment for petitioners, but on respondents’ appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. That court held that, although respondents had been unable to show negligence “either in the planning or operation of the flight,” they were nonetheless entitled to proceed on a theory of strict or absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities conducted by petitioners in their official capacities. That court relied on its earlier opinion in United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291 (1953), which in turn had distinguished this Court’s holding in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 45 (1953). We granted certiorari. 404 U. S. 1037.

Dalehite held that the Government was not liable for the extensive damage resulting from the explosion of two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas, in 1947. The Court’s opinion rejected various specifications of negligence on the part of Government employees that had been found by the District Court in that case, and then went on to treat petitioners’ claim that the Government was absolutely or strictly liable because of its having engaged in a dangerous activity. The Court said with respect to this aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim:

“[T]he Act does not extend to such situations, though of course well known in tort law generally. It is to be invoked only on a 'negligent or wrongful act or omission’ of an employee. Absolute liability, of course, arises irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself; it is imposed automatically when any damages are sustained as a result of the decision to engage in the dangerous activity.” 346 U. S., at 44.

This Court’s resolution of the strict-liability issue in Dalehite did not turn on the question of whether the law of Texas or of some other State did or did not recognize strict liability for the conduct of ultrahazardous activities. It turned instead on the question of whether the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act permitted under any circumstances the imposition of liability upon the Government where there had been neither negligence nor wrongful act. The necessary consequence of the Court’s holding in Dalehite is that the statutory language “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government,” is a uniform federal limitation on the types of acts committed by its employees for which the United States has consented to be sued. Regardless of state law characterization, the Federal Tort Claims Act itself precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negligence or other form of “misfeasance or nonfeasance,” 346 U. S., at 45, on the part of the Government.

It is at least theoretically possible to argue that since Dalehite in discussing the legislative history of the Act said that “wrongful” acts could include some kind of trespass, and since courts imposed liability in some of the early blasting cases on the theory that the plaintiff’s action sounded in trespass, liability could be imposed on the Government in this case on a theory of trespass which would be within the Act’s waiver of immunity. We believe, however, that there is more than one reason for rejecting such an alternate basis of governmental liability here.

The notion that a military plane on a high-altitude training flight itself intrudes upon any property interest of an owner of the land over which it flies was rejected in United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). There this Court, construing the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U. S. C. §401, said:

“It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe — Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.” 328 U. S., at 260-261.

Thus, quite apart from what would very likely be insuperable problems of proof in connecting the passage of the plane over the owner’s air space with any ensuing damage from a sonic boom, this version of the trespass theory is ruled out by established federal law. Perhaps the precise holding of United States v. Causby, supra, could be skirted by analogizing the pressure wave of air characterizing a sonic boom to the concussion that on occasion accompanies blasting, and treating the air wave striking the actual land of the property owner as a direct intrusion caused by the pilot of the plane in the mold of the classical common-law theory of trespass.

It is quite clear, however, that the presently prevailing view as to the theory of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be strict liability for undertaking an ultrahazardous activity, rather than any attenuated notion of common-law trespass. See Restatement of Torts §§ 519, 520 (e); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 75 (4th ed. 1971). While a leading North Carolina case on the subject of strict liability discusses the distinction between actions on the case and actions sounding in trespass that the earlier decisions made, it, too, actually grounds liability on the basis that he who engages in ultrahazardous activity must pay his way regardless of what precautions he may have taken. Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N. C. 69, 131 S. E. 2d 900 (1963).

More importantly, however, Congress in considering the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot realistically be said to have dealt in terms of either the jurisprudential distinctions peculiar to the forms of action at common law or the metaphysical subtleties that crop up in even contemporary discussions of tort theory. See Prosser, supra, at 492-496. The legislative history discussed in Dalehite indicates that Congress intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful or careless conduct of Government employees, for which the Government was to be made liable according to state law under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but to exclude liability based solely on the ultrahazardous nature of an activity undertaken by the Government.

A House Judiciary Committee memorandum explaining the “discretionary function” exemption from the bill when that exemption first appeared in the draft legislation in 1942 made the comment that “the cases covered by that subsection would probably have been exempted ... by judicial construction” in any event, but that the exemption was intended to preclude any possibility

“that the act would be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of a legally authorized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no wrongful act or omission on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious . . . .” Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, pp. 65-66 (1942).

The same memorandum, after noting the erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the years, observed with respect to the bill generally:

“Yet a large and highly important area remains in which no satisfactory remedy has been provided for the wrongs of Government officers or employees, the ordinary 'commonlaw’ type of tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the negligent operation of an automobile.” Id., at 39.

The type of trespass subsumed under the Act’s language making the Government liable for “wrongful” acts of its employees is exemplified by the conduct of the Government agents in Hatahley v. United States, 351 U. S. 173, 181. Liability of this type under the Act is not to be broadened beyond the intent of Congress by dressing up the substance of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities in the garments of common-law trespass. To permit respondent to proceed on a trespass theory here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front door. We do not believe the Act permits such a result.

Shortly after the decision of this Court in Dalehite, the facts of the Texas City catastrophe were presented to Congress in an effort to obtain legislative relief from that body. Congress, after conducting hearings and receiving reports, ultimately. enacted a bill granting compensation to the victims in question. 69 Stat. 707; H. R. Rep. No. 2024, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 2363, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1305, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. Rep. No. 1623, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. Rep. No. 684, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). At no time during these hearings was there any effort made to modify this Court’s construction of the Tort Claims Act in Dalehite. Both by reason of stare decisis and by reason of Congress’ failure to make any statutory change upon again reviewing the subject, we regard the principle enunciated in Dalehite as controlling here.

Since Dalehite held that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize suit against the Government on claims based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity, the Court of Appeals in the instant case erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. While as a matter of practice within the Circuit it may have been proper to rely upon United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291, it is clear that the holding of the latter case permitting imposition of strict liability on the Government where state law permits it is likewise inconsistent with Dalehite. Dalehite did not depend on the factual question of whether the Government was handling dangerous property, as opposed to operating a dangerous instrument but, rather, on the Court’s determination that the Act did not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon the Government. Indeed, even the dissenting opinion in Dalehite did not disagree with the conclusion of the majority on that point.

Our reaffirmation of the construction put on the Federal Tort Claims Act in Dalehite makes it unnecessary to treat the scope of the discretionary-function exemption contained in the Act, or the other matters dealt with by the Court of Appeals.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Douglas, having heard the argument, withdrew from participation in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable for injuries to persons or property

“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b).

The Court of Appeals in this case found that the law of North Carolina renders a person who creates a sonic boom absolutely liable for any injuries caused thereby, and that finding is not challenged here. And while the petitioners argue that the conduct involved falls within one of the numerous express exceptions to the coverage of the Act contained in § 2680, the Court today does not reach that issue. Rather, the Court holds that the words “negligent or wrongful act or omission” preclude the application to the United States of any state law under which persons may be held absolutely liable for injuries caused by certain kinds of conduct. In my view, this conclusion is not justified by the language or the history of the Act, and is plainly contrary to the statutory purpose. I therefore dissent.

In the vast majority of cases in the law of torts, liability is predicated on a breach of some legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, whether that duty involves exercising reasonable care in one’s activities or refraining from certain activities altogether. The law of most jurisdictions, however, imposes liability for harm caused by certain narrowly limited kinds of activities even though those activities are not prohibited and even though the actor may have exercised the utmost care. Such conduct is “tortious,” not because the actor is necessarily blameworthy, but because society has made a judgment that while the conduct is so socially valuable that it should not be prohibited, it nevertheless carries such a high risk of harm to others, even in the absence of negligence, that one who engages in it should make good any harm caused to others thereby. See generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts 785-795, 815-816 (1956); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 442-496 (4th ed. 1971).

While the doctrine of absolute liability is not encountered in many situations even under modern tort law, it was nevertheless well established at the time the Tort Claims Act was enacted, and there is nothing in the language or the history of the Act to support the notion that this doctrine alone, among all the rules governing tort liability in the various States, was considered inapplicable in cases arising under the Act. The legislative history quoted by the Court relates solely to the “discretionary function” exception contained in § 2680, an exception upon which the Court specifically declines to rely. As I read the Act and the legislative history, the phrase “negligent or wrongful act or omission” was intended to include the entire range of conduct classified as tortious under state law. The only intended exceptions to this sweeping waiver of governmental immunity were those expressly set forth and now collected in § 2680. This interpretation was put upon the Act by the legislative committees that recommended its passage in 1946: “The present bill would establish a uniform system . . . permitting suit to be brought on any tort claim . . . with the exception of certain classes of torts expressly exempted from the operation of the act.” (Emphasis supplied.) H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3; S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 31. See Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 433, 441-450 (1957).

The Court rests its conclusion on language from Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, where a four-man majority of the Court, in an opinion dealing primarily with the “discretionary function” exception, held the doctrine of absolute liability inapplicable in that extremely unusual case arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act. That language has been severely criticized; it has not since been relied upon in any decision of this Court; and it was rejected as a general principle by at least one Court of Appeals less than a year after Dalehite was decided. United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291, 295. Moreover, Dalehite represented an approach to interpretation of the Act that was abruptly changed only two years later in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61. That decision rejected the proposition that the United States was immune from liability where the activity involved was “governmental” rather than “proprietary” — a proposition that seemingly had been established in Dalehite. And while the Dalehite opinion explicitly created a presumption in favor of sovereign immunity, to be overcome only where relinquishment by Congress was “clear,” 346 U. S., at 30-31, the Court in Indian Towing recognized that the Tort Claims Act “cuts the ground from under” the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and cautioned that a court should not “as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.” 350 U. S., at 65, 69. See also Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 319-320. These developments, together with an approving citation of the Praylou case in Rayonier, supra, at 319 n. 2, have until today been generally understood to mean that the language in Dalehite rejecting the absolute-liability doctrine had been implicitly abandoned.

The rule announced by the Court today seems to me contrary to the whole policy of the Tort Claims Act. For the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable not only to sonic booms, but to other activities that the Government carries on in common with many private citizens. Absolute liability for injury caused by the concussion or debris from dynamite blasting, for example, is recognized by an overwhelming majority of state courts. A private person who detonates an explosion in the process of building a road is liable for injuries to others caused thereby under the law of most States even though he took all practicable precautions to prevent such injuries, on the sound principle that he who creates such a hazard should make good the harm that results. Yet if employees of the United States engage in exactly the same conduct with an identical result, the United States will not, under the principle announced by the Court today, be liable to the injured party. Nothing in the language or the legislative history of the Act compels such a result, and we should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to create a situation so much at odds with common sense and the basic rationale of the Act. We recognized that rationale in Rayonier, supra, a case involving negligence by employees of the United States in controlling a forest fire:

“Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by Government employees.” 352 U. S., at 320.

For the reasons stated, I would hold that the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable to conduct of employees of the United States under the same circumstances as those in which it is applied to the conduct of private persons under the law of the State where the conduct occurs. That holding would not by itself be dispositive of this case, however, for the petitioners argue that liability is precluded by the “discretionary function” exception in the Act. While the Court does not reach this issue, I shall state briefly the reasons for my conclusion that the exception is inapplicable in this case.

No right of action lies under the Tort Claims Act for any claim

“based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a).

The Assistant Attorney General who testified on the bill before the House committee indicated that this provision was intended to create no exceptions beyond those that courts would probably create without it:

“[I]t is likely that the cases embraced within that subsection would have been exempted from [a bill that did not include the exception] by judicial construction. It is not probable that the courts would extend a Tort Claims Act into the realm of the validity of legislation or discretionary administrative action, but [the recommended bill] makes this specific.” Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, p. 29.

The Dalehite opinion seemed to say that no action of a Government employee could be made the basis for liability under the Act if the action involved “policy judgment and decision.” 346 U. S., at 36. Decisions in the courts of appeals following Dalehite have interpreted this language as drawing a distinction between “policy” and “operational” decisions, with the latter falling outside the exception. That distinction has bedeviled the courts that have attempted to apply it to torts outside routine categories such as automobile accidents, but there is no need in the present case to explore the limits of the discretionary function exception.

The legislative history indicates that the purpose of this statutory exception was to avoid any possibility that policy decisions of Congress, of the Executive, or of administrative agencies would be second-guessed by courts in the context of tort actions. There is no such danger in this case, for liability does not depend upon a judgment as to whether Government officials acted irresponsibly or illegally. Rather, once the creation of sonic booms is determined to be an activity as to which the doctrine of absolute liability applies, the only questions for the court relate to causation and damages. Whether or not the decision to fly a military aircraft over the respondents’ property, at a given altitude and at a speed three times the speed of sound, was a decision at the “policy” or the “operational” level, the propriety of that decision is irrelevant to the question of liability in this case, and thus the discretionary function exception does not apply.

       The question whether damage caused by sonic booms is recoverable on a theory of absolute liability has received considerable attention from commentators, most of whom have concluded that there should be such recovery, at least under certain conditions. See, e. g., Note, 32 J. Air Law & Commerce 596, 602-605 (1966); Note, 39 Tulane L. Rev. 145 (1964); Comment, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 266-274 (1958); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 516 (4th ed. 1971).

       See n. 5, infra.

       The Court’s opinion refers to language in Dalehite v. United States, 346 TJ. S. 15, which in turn relied on a fragment of legislative history, for the proposition that the words “wrongful act” as used in § 1346 (b) refer only to trespasses. The legislative history cited by the Court in Dalehite, consisting of a statement by a Special Assistant to the Attorney General at a committee hearing, merely suggested trespass as one example of the kinds of conduct that would not be embraced by the word “negligence” but which the Act was intended to reach. As the Court today observes, many of the state cases applying what is essentially the doctrine of absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities speak in terms of “trespass.” See, e. g., Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N. C. 69, 131 S. E. 2d 900 (1963); Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692, 188 N. E. 2d 406 (1963); Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 146 W. Va. 130, 118 S. E. 2d 622 (1961). The similarity between the theories of trespass and absolute liability in the blasting cases leads the Court to conclude that the Act does not permit recovery on a “trespass” theory in this case because the Act does not permit recovery on an absolute-liability theory. But if Congress intended, as the Court assumes, that “trespasses” be covered by the Act, I should think the similarity between the two theories would more logically lead to a conclusion that absolute-liability situations are likewise covered.

       A bill passed by the Senate in 1942 covered only actions based on the “negligence” of Government employees. S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. The House committee substituted the phrase “negligent or wrongful act or omission,” saying that the “committee prefers its language as it would afford relief for certain acts or omissions which may be wrongful but not necessarily negligent.” H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 11. The language used by the House committee was carried over into the bill finally enacted in 1946, without further mention in the committee reports of the intended scope of the words “wrongful act.”

       “The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not apply to—
      “(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
      “(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.
      “(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
      “(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
      “(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
      “(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States.
      “(g) Repealed.
      “ (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
      “ (i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
      “(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
      “(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
      “(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
      “(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
      “ (n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.”

       See, e. g., Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 433 (1957); Jacoby, Absolute Liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 Fed. Bar J. 139 (1964); 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts 860 (1956).

       Four members of the Court dissented, saying that the failure of Congress to amend the Act after Dalehite should have been taken as indicating approval by Congress of the interpretation given to the Act in that case. 350 U. S., at 74.

       See Peck, supra, n. 6, at 435; Jacoby, supra, n. 6, at 140; Comment, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 266 n. 56; Dostal, Aviation Law under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 Fed. Bar J. 165, 177 (1964).

       See, e. g., Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng. Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A. 2d 591 (1951); Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N. E. 970 (1914); Thigpen v. Skousen & Hise, 64 N. M. 290, 327 P. 2d 802 (1958); Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S. C. 349, 117 S. E. 2d 359 (1960); and cases cited in n. 3, supra. See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts 514 (4th ed. 1971).

       See, e. g., Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2d 62, aff’d, 350 U. S. 907; Fair v. United States, 234 F. 2d 288; Hendry v. United States, 418 F. 2d 774. For a thorough discussion of the “policy/operational” distinction that has developed, see Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 Geo. L. J. 81 (1968).

       The policy behind the exception is explained by one leading commentator as follows: “[A]lmost no one contends that there should be compensation for all the ills that result from governmental operations. No one, for instance, suggests that there should be liability for the injurious consequence of political blunders such as the unwise imposition of tariff duties or the premature lifting of OPA controls. . . . The separation of powers in our form of government and a decent regard by the judiciary for its co-ordinate branches should make courts reluctant to sit in judgment on the wisdom or reasonableness of legislative or executive political action. Moreover, courts are not particularly well suited to pursue the examinations that would be necessary to make this kind of judgment.” James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the “Discretionary Function” Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 184 (1957).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    AIKENS v. CALIFORNIA
    No. 68-5027.
    Argued January 17, 1972
    Decided June 7, 1972

      Anthony G. Amsterdam argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Paul N. Halvonik, Michael Meltsner, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Jack Himmelstein, and Elizabeth B. Dubois.

      Ronald M. George, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and William E. James, Assistant Attorney General.
    Briefs of amici curiae were filed by John E. Havelock, Attorney General, for the State of Alaska; by Willard J. Lassers and Elmer Gertz for the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States et al.; by Leo Pfeffer for the Synagogue Council of America and its Constituents et al.; by Paul Raymond Stone for the West Virginia Council of Churches et al.; by Donald M. Wessling for the Committee of Psychiatrists for Evaluation of the Death Penalty; by Gerald H. Gottlieb, Melvin L. Wulf, and Sanford Jay Rosen for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Chauncey Eskridge, Mario G. Obledo, Leroy D. Clark, Nathaniel R. Jones, and Vernon Jordan for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.; by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association; by
      Michael V. DiSalle for Edmund G. Brown et al.; by Hilbert P. Zarky for James V. Bennett et al.; and by Luke McKissack, pro se.

   Per Curiam.

Petitioner in this case, which has been orally argued and is now sub judice, has filed a Suggestion of Mootness and Motion for Remand based on the intervening decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880 (1972). That decision declared capital punishment in California unconstitutional under Art. 1, § 6, of the state constitution. The decision rested on an adequate state ground and the State’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied. 406 U. S. 958. The California Supreme Court declared in the Anderson case that its decision was fully retroactive and stated that any prisoner currently under sentence of death could petition a superior court to modify its judgment. Petitioner thus no longer faces a realistic threat of execution, and the issue on which certiorari was granted — the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Federal Constitution — is now moot in his case. Accordingly the writ of certiorari is dismissed.


text:
    April 21, 1972
    No. A-1096.
    No. A-1097.
    Brown et al. v. Apodaca et al.; and Norvell, Attorney General of New Mexico v. Apodaca.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Applications for stay having been filed on April 19, 1972, and responses thereto filed late yesterday afternoon, presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, judgment of the Supreme Court of New Mexico entered on April 17, 1972, which among other things ordered exclusion from the ballot of candidates who have not paid the statutory filing fees, is hereby stayed until Tuesday, April 25, 1972, or further order of the Court.


text:
    No. A-1105.
    Fortson, Secretary of State of Georgia v. Millican.
   D. C. N. D. Ga. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, granted. It is ordered that the order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, of April 19, 1972, in Civil Action File No. 16401, be, and the same is hereby, stayed pending further order of this Court.


text:
    No. A-1106.
    Georgia et al. v. United States.
   D. C. N. D. Ga. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, granted. It is ordered that the order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, of April 19, 1972, in Civil Action File No. 16373, be, and the same is hereby, stayed pending further order of this Court. Mr. Justice Marshall is of the opinion that the application should be denied.


text:
    April 24, 1972
    No. 71-1057.
    Standke et al. v. B. E. Darby & Sons, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-975.
    Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.


text:
    No. 70-5093.
    Daniels v. Hirshberg, Hospital Superintendent.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed as moot.


text:
    No. 71-1101.
    Reitz et ux. v. Town of Vanden Broek.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stewart would dismiss the appeal as moot.


text:
    No. 71-1135.
    Ridgill v. Gulf Reston, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. Motion to consider late-docketed appeal granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. A-1053.
    McKenna v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1085.
    Garrison v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas and by him referred to the Court, denied.


author: The Chief Justice,

text:
    No. A-1090.
    Holt v. City of Richmond et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application to enjoin elections for City Council of the city of Richmond, Virginia, scheduled for May 2, 1972, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

The Chief Justice,

with whom Mr. Justice Black-mun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

concurring.

In joining in Mr. Justice Blackmun’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 397 (1971), I indicated that “[gjiven the decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969),” the result reached by the Court in Perkins followed. The instant motion for a stay is not an appropriate occasion to reconsider the holdings in Allen and Perkins. Hence, I see no alternative but to grant the requested stay of the May 2, 1972, election. Perkins squarely held that an annexation enlarging a city’s number of eligible voters constitutes a change of a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. That being the case, as stated in the memorandum of the United States as amicus curiae filed in this matter in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, “[t]he legal effect of the . . . objection by the Attorney General, when coupled with the absence of a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court, District of Columbia, is to preclude the city from holding an election on an at-large basis.”


text:
    No. A-1070.
    Aero Mayflower Transit Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ind. Application for extension of time in which to docket appeal presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1096.
    No. A-1097.
    Brown et al. v. Apodaca et al.; and Norvell, Attorney General of New Mexico v. Apodaca.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Applications for stay denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that the applications should be granted.

Reported below: 83 N. M. 663, 495 P. 2d 1379.


text:
    No. 71-110.
    Gelbard et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 990.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 71-651.
    California v. Krivda et al.
   [Certio-rari granted, 405 U. S. 1039.] Motion of respondents for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Roger S. Hanson, Esquire, of Woodland Hills, California, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondents in this case.


text:
    No. 71-685.
    No. 71-691.
    Lehnhausen, Director, Department of Local Government Affairs of Illinois v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. et al.; and Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. Shapiro et al.
   [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 1039.] Motion of petitioners to advance oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 71-1190.
    Summers v. Cenarrusa, Secretary of State of Idaho, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Idaho. Motions to accelerate filing of briefs and to advance oral argument denied.


text:
    No. A-1069 (71-1024).
    No. A-1069 (71-1145).
    Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens et al.; and Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens et al.
   Application for temporary stay presented to MR. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending further order of the Court.


text:
    No. 71-1317.
    School Board of the City of Norfolk et al. v. Brewer et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to advance denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-6130.
    Moore v. Smith, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-738.
    Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, Commissioner, Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. Motions of Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians and Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1134.
    Roaden v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition which reads as follows:

“1. In the absence of a prior adversary hearing, is the seizure incident to arrest of allegedly obscene material, a violation of due process of law?”


text:
    No. 71-997.
    McGinnis, Correction Commissioner, et al. v. Pollack.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1000.
    No. 71-1010.
    No. 71-1014.
    Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. United States; Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. United States; and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 F. 2d 418.


text:
    No. 71-1047.
    Waller v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1084.
    Anderson et al., trading as Anderson Seafood Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1102.
    Antonioli et al. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1106.
    United Mine Workers of America v. Yablonski et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1126.
    Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D’Armement v. Joseph Muller Corporation Zurich.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1128.
    Kelemen et al. v. Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius of Akron.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1138.
    Cross Contracting Co. v. Law et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1164.
    Watts v. Mylius.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1181.
    Flanagan et al. v. Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1197.
    Ryan et al. v. J. Walter Thompson Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1208.
    Rose v. Rose et al. Cir. Ct., Oakland County, Mich.
   Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5740.
    Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc.
   C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5788.
    Paulino v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5794.
    Wells v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5801.
    Winward v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5852.
    Coopersmith v. Town of Grand Lake et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6118.
    Williams v. Stire et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6121.
    Timmons v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6123.
    Stinson v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6126.
    Schreiner v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6124.
    Chapman v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6128.
    Vanderhorst v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6131.
    Foster v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6132.
    Bryant v. Pickett, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6133.
    Jordan v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6134.
    Alvarez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6135.
    King v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6136.
    Weast v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6140.
    Roberts v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6142.
    Mead v. Meier, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6143.
    Branch et al. v. Oriscello, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6145.
    No. 71-6157.
    Holmes v. United States; and Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 453 F. 2d 950.


text:
    No. 71-6144.
    Fay v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6147.
    Earin v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6148.
    Kujaca v. Daly.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6149.
    Edwards v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6150.
    McGarrity v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6151.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6159.
    Wilson v. Rowe, Industrial School Superintendent.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6160.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6162.
    Redden v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5417.
    Holmes v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1023.
    Cranson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-964.
    Pennsylvania v. Ware.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. The order of this Court dated March 20, 1972 [405 U. S. 987], insofar as it granted the petition for writ of cer-tiorari, is vacated. Certiorari denied, it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 71-977.
    Shepherd v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Motions to dispense with printing petition and respondent’s briefs granted.

Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5845.
    Coleman v. Cramer.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6120.
    Shields v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted


text:
    No. 71-1144.
    No. 71-1161.
    Milstein et al. v. GAF Corp.; and GAF Corp. v. Milstein.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted in No. 71-1144.

Reported below: 453 F. 2d 709.


text:
    No. 71-5423.
    Moses et al. v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6141.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6152.
    Underwood v. Rouse et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5058.
    No. 71-247.
    No. 71-600.
    No. 71-852.
    No. 71-853.
    No. 71-948.
    No. 71-987.
    No. 71-1009.
    No. 71-1061.
    No. 71-5127.
    No. 71-5428.
    No. 71-5545.
    No. 71-5624.
    No. 71-5817.
    No. 71-5883.
    Lynch et al. v. Household Finance Corp. et al., Rabe v. Washington, State Board of Election Commissioners et al. v. Evers et al., C. D. Construction Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Greenberg v. United States, Gipe, Guardian v. Dempsey et al., Moody v. Moody, Lindauer v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority et al., Arneson Products, Inc., et al. v. Blumenfeld, Hardee v. Nelson, Warden, Lipscomb v. United States, Collins v. Michigan, Alcala v. Wyoming, Burns v. Columbia Pictures International Corp. et al., Bible v. Arizona et al.,
   405 U. S. 538; 405 U. S. 313; 405 U. S. 1001; 405 U. S. 988; 405 U. S. 988; 405 U. S. 990; 405 U. S. 990; 405 U. S. 1017; 405 U. S. 1017; 404 U. S. 1060; 404 U. S. 1021; 405 U. S. 991; 405 U. S. 997; 405 U. S. 991; and 405 U. S. 994.


text:
    No. 71-5375. No. 71-5771.
    Stanley v. United States, Muncaster v. United States,
   404 U. S. 996; and 405 U. S. 979. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 5, 1972
    No. A-1106.
    Georgia et al. v. United States.
   D. C. N. D. Ga. Application of the United States to vacate stay order of this Court heretofore granted on April 21, 1972 [ante, p. 901], denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that the application should be granted.


text:
    No. A-1116.
    Essex, Superintendent of Public Schools of Ohio, et al. v. Wolman et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ohio. Application for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Civ. No. 71-396, presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist are of the opinion that the application should be granted.


text:
    No. A-1121.
    Luros et al. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    May 8, 1972
    No. 70-5005.
    Terry v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.

Miscellaneous Order


text:
    May 12, 1972
    No. A-1179.
    Kleindienst, Acting Attorney General, et al. v. Washington Post Co. et al.
   D. C. D. C. Application of the Solicitor General for stay of judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civ. Action No. 467-72), presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court, granted pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Mu. Justice Douglas would deny stay and leave Judge Gesell's order in effect pending appeal. See Vanden Heuvel, The Press and the Prisons, 11 Col. Journalism Rev. 35 (May/ June 1972). Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that the application should be denied.


text:
    May 15, 1972
    No. 71-1156. No. 71-1246.
    Grivetti et al. v. Illinois State Electoral Board et al.; and Independent Voters of Illinois et al. v. Lewis, Secretary of State of Illinois, et al.
   Affirmed on appeals from D. C. N. D. Ill. Reported below: 335 F. Supp. 779.


text:
    No. 71-1176.
    Oswald, Correction Commissioner, et al. v. Gesicki et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 71-5872.
    Van Eeghen v. Florida et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla.


text:
    No. 71-801.
    County of Alameda et al. v. California Welfare Rights Organization et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-6360.
    Toczauer v. State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers of California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-6256.
    Alers v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. P. R. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-1094.
    Crowder v. Georgia et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6372.
    Cleary v. District of Columbia.
   Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would postpone consideration of question of jurisdiction to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 71-5515.
    Metcalf et al. v. Swank, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. A-1105.
    Fortson, Secretary of State of Georgia v. Millican.
   D. C. N. D. Ga. Motion of appellee to vacate stay order of this Court dated April 21, 1972 [ante, p. 901], denied.


text:
    No. A-1165.
    In re Disbarment of Morton.
   It is ordered that William M. Morton, Jr., of St. Joseph, Missouri, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule to show cause issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 27,
    Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky.
   Report of Special Master, upon motion of State of Ohio, received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs may be filed within 60 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed within 30 days of receipt of exceptions. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 404 U. S. 933.]


text:
    No. 71-718.
    McGinnis, Correction Commissioner, et al. v. Royster et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U. S. 986.] Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 71-1016.
    No. 71-1040.
    Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.; and United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 973.] Motion of Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al. for leave to file supplemental amici curiae brief after argument granted. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-5908.
    Chambers v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 987.] Motion of Ramsey Clark to permit Peter Westen to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 71-6242.
    No. 71-6255.
    No. 71-6315.
    Bradley v. Wingo, Warden; Brisbon v. Elrod, Sheriff, et al.; and Wooten v. Wingo, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-6186.
    Students Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc. v. Bazelon, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6219.
    Reese et al. v. Meier, Prison Director, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-6164.
    No. 71-6261.
    No. 71-6270.
    Levy v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida et al.; Anderson v. Turrentine, U. S. District Judge; and Wion v. Aaraj, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-1193.
    United States v. Enmons et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-834.
    McClanahan v. Arizona Tax-Commission.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ariz. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 71-738 [Mescalera Apache Tribe v. Jones, certiorari granted, ante, p. 905].


text:
    No. 71-1043.
    Heller v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 71-1134 [Roaden v. Kentucky, certiorari granted, ante, p. 905].


text:
    No. 71-1136.
    Tillman et al. v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to strike brief of respondents, except McIntyre, denied. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-6272.
    Robinson v. Neil, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-5656.
    Philpott et al. v. Essex County Welfare Board.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-849.
    Grimes v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-980.
    Powell v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-986.
    Crestfield v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1049.
    Altom v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1064.
    Grunberger v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1066.
    Colasurdo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1083.
    Coblentz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1086.
    Masiello v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1087.
    Ream v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hancock County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1088.
    Morado et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1091.
    Castell v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1092.
    Star Office Supply Co. et al. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1095.
    Continental Insurance Co. v. Byrne, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1100.
    Illinois v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1112.
    Grizaffi et al. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp., Receiver.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1113.
    Union Carbide Corp. v. Voutsis et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1114.
    Fiotto et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1116.
    Cruz et al. v. United States.
   C. A.

2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1117.
    Widelski et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1120.
    Schulman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1124.
    Liddon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1129.
    Bel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir.


text:
    No. 71-1131.
    Hamlet v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1137.
    Rothman, Receiver v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1140.
    Sisalcords Do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira De Sisal, S. A.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1143.
    Yohanes v. Ayers Steamship Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1153.
    Meyer v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1154.
    Otis Engineering Corp. v. Guimbellot.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1155.
    Fields, Guardian, et al. v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1163.
    Wing v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1166.
    Ormento v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1172.
    United States Steel Corp. et al. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1183.
    Guthrie v. Taylor et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1185.
    Deshotels et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1189.
    Andrew, Administratrix v. Bendix Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1196.
    Corey et al. v. State Savings & Loan Assn, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1204.
    Fraser & Johnston Co. v. Lodge 1327, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1211.
    Sapenter et ux. v. Dreyco, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1234.
    Kennedy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1238.
    Klaes v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1239.
    Barden v. Junior College District No. 520 of Illinois et al.
   App. Ct. Ill. 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1243.
    New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Co. v. Leighton.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1256.
    Pugh v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1278.
    Chevron Oil Co., California Company Division v. Royal Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1283.
    Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of County of Milwaukee v. Fattore Co., Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1320.
    Hanrahan et al. v. Sears et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5572.
    Conner v. Wingo, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5830.
    Jones v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5858.
    Grindstaff v. Missouri et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5886.
    Gilreath v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5899.
    White v. Tennessee.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5914.
    Sykes v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5920.
    Durley v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5937.
    Bowring v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5938.
    Barone v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6146.
    Tasby v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6163.
    Augello v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6165.
    Higgins v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6166.
    Peterkin et al. v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6168.
    Castanon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6170.
    Soots et ux. v. Panaro.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6171.
    Pizzo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6172.
    Malone v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6173.
    Cole v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6175.
    Beyer v. United States.
   C. A. 3d 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6174.
    Kress v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6177.
    Allen et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6178.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6179.
    McClellan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6180.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6181.
    Naci v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6184.
    Atkinson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6187.
    Baughman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6188.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6191.
    Ray v. Brierley, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6192.
    Redding v. Board of County Commissioners of Prince George’s County.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6194.
    Baten v. District Unemployment Compensation Board.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6195.
    Hayes v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6198.
    Olbrot v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6199.
    McDaniel v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6200.
    Avila-Diaz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6201.
    Wolfson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6202.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6203.
    Tomlin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6205.
    Pokras v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6206.
    Kennedy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6207.
    Baran v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6208.
    No. 71-6217.
    McWilliams v. United States; and Berkley v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6212.
    Strauss et al. v. Dade County.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6211.
    Cook v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6213.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6214.
    Garner v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6215.
    Howells v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6216.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6218.
    Frame v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6220.
    Burke v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6221.
    Ethridge v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6222.
    Adams et ux. v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6228.
    Hamilton et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6229.
    Stewart v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6230.
    Lindsey v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6231.
    Heigl v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6233.
    Allers v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6234.
    Ryles, aka Peterson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6240.
    Thacker v. Braswell, Judge, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6244.
    Rice v. North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6245.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6246.
    Johnson v. Patterson, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6248.
    Buckley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6249.
    Krikmanis v. Mannering et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6250.
    Lauchli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6253.
    Lisk v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6254.
    Sweeney v. Fritz, Correctional Superintendent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6257.
    Owings v. Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6266.
    Taylor v. Smith, Governor of Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6267.
    Dowdle v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6268.
    No. 71-6275.
    Leach v. United States; and Leach v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6276.
    Cummings v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6277.
    Raskin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6283.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6290.
    Williams v. Deegan, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6293.
    Reaves v. Blackledge, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6294.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6300.
    Morrison v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6306.
    Weathers v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6312.
    Thacker v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6310.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6317.
    Fine v. Kolodny et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6318.
    Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6322.
    Schmeideberg v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6323.
    Sheris v. Thompson et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6324.
    DeLevay v. Greyhound Corp.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6331.
    White v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6333.
    Ferenc v. Johnson, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6335.
    Fair v. Tampa Electric Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6338.
    Shutt v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6343.
    Cash v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6348.
    Brown v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6351.
    Blanco v. RKO Theatres, Inc., dba RKO Greenpoint.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6352.
    Greene v. South Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6357.
    Oden v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuya-hoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6358.
    Sapp v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-942.
    Ozzanto et al. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1048.
    London v. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Division of Family Services.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1056.
    Mechanic et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1060.
    Tsakalotos v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1103.
    Honchok et al. v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1149.
    Creek Nation v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1160.
    Transport of New Jersey v. Delaware River Port Authority.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1165.
    Harper v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1207.
    Bayless et al. v. Martine et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1223.
    Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5099.
    Norwood v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5789.
    Anderson v. Kentucky.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5854.
    Stanley et al. v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5855.
    Mealey v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5860.
    Pino et al. v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5896.
    Tennant v. Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5947.
    Erenyi v. Fitzharris, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5960.
    Brown v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6225.
    Dostal et al. v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6227.
    No. 71-6236.
    Mayfield v. United States; and Whitlock v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6239.
    Joe v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6280.
    Rosenthal v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6363.
    Caroline v. Reicher et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6288.
    Ingram v. Haskins, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6289.
    Leslie et al. v. Matzkin, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6365.
    Grumbles et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6366.
    Duff v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-943.
    Whitaker v. New York et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-966.
    Doherty v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Board.
   Ct. App. D. C. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1125.
    DeLaughter et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1130.
    Cargill, Inc., et al. v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1213.
    DeSapio v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1174.
    United Transportation Union v. Georgia Railroad.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6235.
    Telephone Users Association, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6271.
    Telephone Users Association, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1198.
    Texas Highway Department et al. v. Named Individuals.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of Citizens Committee for Completion of the North Expressway et al. and Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1317.
    School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, et al. v. Brewer et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents to vacate stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 71-1110.
    Vestal et al. v. Hoffa et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-5910.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of bank robbery after a trial in which the Government introduced over objection tape recordings of his telephone communications. These tape recordings had resulted from a federal court order which was issued pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, and which permitted federal agents to wiretap. Although the order was limited to seizures of communications relating to narcotics offenses, the eavesdroppers discovered that the subjects were discussing a bank robbery and those conversations were recorded despite the limited scope of the order.

The petitioner challenged the introduction of these tapes on the ground that their subject matter was outside the scope of the warrant. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that once the device was legitimately spliced into the designated telephone lines anything overheard was in “plain view” and therefore could be seized lawfully. Said the Court of Appeals: “Once the listening commences it becomes impossible to turn it off when a subject other than one which is authorized is overheard,” 449 F. 2d 679, 686-687. With all respect, that is precisely the point. As I said in Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 353:

“Such devices lay down a dragnet which indiscriminately sweeps in all conversations within its scope, without regard to the nature of the conversations, or the participants. A warrant authorizing such devices is no different from the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.”

I would grant this petition, reverse, and hold that Title III offends the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.


text:
    No. 71-6125.
    Roach v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and either reverse out of hand or put the case down for argument.

By a 1903 treaty the United States obtained a corridor across the Republic of Panama from the Caribbean to the Pacific. 33 Stat. 2234. But Art. VI of the treaty provided that the grants to the United States shall not “interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through the said zone . . . unless said rights of way or private rights shall conflict with rights herein granted to the United States in which case the rights of the United States shall be superior.” 33 Stat. 2235; 3 Canal Zone Code 431.

Petitioner is a Panamanian who has been operating buses in Panama for 23 years. His license to operate was granted by the Republic of Panama and his area of operation begins and ends in the Republic of Panama. Under a reciprocal agreement between the Canal Zone and Panama any motor vehicle inspected in Panama will be accepted in the Canal Zone and vice versa.

The public road traveled by petitioner crosses the Canal Zone, and his operations in no way conflict with any rights “granted to the United States” under the 1903 treaty.

The Canal Zone authorities decided to give all cross-Canal Zone public transportation to one Delaware corporation. The necessity of the Delaware corporation’s meeting minimum wage requirements was said to be the reason. No hearings, however, were held. The petitioner and the other “indigents” were given no notice and no opportunity to be heard. They were driven out of business by the ipse dixit of the Governor and petitioner stands criminally convicted. Petitioner is no fly-by-night operator. He operated 15 buses and employed 30 people and was in this business for 23 years. His crossing of the Canal Zone is guaranteed by the 1903 treaty; and though one agrees, arguendo, that the right may be regulated as to times and circumstances, there is no defensible reason given why a person should be driven out of business with no chance to be heard.

The Canal Zone has a Bill of Rights, much of it taken almost word for word from our first Eight Amendments. 1 Canal Zone Code, Tit. 1, c. 3, § 31. One guarantee is that “[a] person may not be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” §31 (5)(C). We enacted such a Bill of Rights for the Philippines and when it came for review here this Court said:

“When Congress came to pass the act of July 1, 1902, it enacted, almost in the language of the President’s instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In view of the expressed declaration of the President, followed by the action of Congress, both adopting, with little alteration, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument that in this form it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our Government which the President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom, at the same time expressing regret that the inhabitants of the islands had not theretofore enjoyed their benefit.
“How can it be successfully maintained that these expressions of fundamental rights, which have been the subject of frequent adjudication in the courts of this country, and the maintenance of which has been ever deemed essential to our Government, could be used by Congress in any other sense than that which has been placed upon them in construing the instrument from which they were taken?” Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 124.

That is the approach we should take here.

Procedural due process, for example, may not be necessary before food unfit for human use is seized. See North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306. But barring the need for quick, expeditious action, the amenities of notice and hearing are required whether discharge from public employment be at issue, Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; denial of a tax exemption, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513; disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398; or the termination of welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-265.

The honor of this Nation, as well as the livelihood of this petitioner, is at stake here. We grant Panamanians a Bill of Rights and dishonor it. The imperialistic, colonial attitude of our administration in the Canal Zone is notorious. But the “natives” are entitled to the same due process which we grant our own citizens.

I see no reason why we should not reverse this judgment out of hand. The least we can do is to set the case for argument.


author: Me. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-6176.
    Maffei v. United States.
   C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

Me. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Seven courts of appeals, including the court below, have held that a federal defendant who presents evidence in his behalf thereby waives any error in a prior denial of a motion for acquittal made at the close of the Government’s case. United States v. Haskell, 327 F. 2d 281, 282, n. 2 (CA2); United States v. Feldman, 425 F. 2d 688, 692 (CA3); United States v. Cashio, 420 F. 2d 1132, 1134 (CA5); United States v. Carabbia, 381 F. 2d 133, 138 (CA6); Cline v. United States, 395 F. 2d 138, 144 (CA8); Viramontes-Medina v. United States, 411 F. 2d 981, 982 (CA9); United States v. Greene, 442 F. 2d 1285, 1286-1287, n. 3 (CA10). Two other courts of appeals, however, have held that presentation of a defense is not a waiver. United States v. Rizzo, 416 F. 2d 734, 736 n. 3 (CA7); Cephus v. United States, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 15, 324 F. 2d 893. I would grant this petition to resolve the conflict. Rule 19 (1) (b) of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-5773.
    No. 71-5850.
    No. 71-5853.
    No. 71-5877.
    No. 71-5888.
    No. 71-5889.
    Fair v. Wiggins, Graham v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al. (Aerojet-General Corp. et al., real parties in interest), Timmons v. Pennsylvania et al., Smart v. United States, Baxter v. Davis et al., Denman et al. v. Scannell et al.,
   405 U. S. 971;

405 U. S. 993;

405 U.S. 993;

405 U. S. 998;

405 U. S. 999; and

405 U. S. 994. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-5902.
    No. 71-5905.
    No. 71-5912.
    No. 71-5944.
    No. 71-6000.
    No. 71-6005.
    Oliver v. Duggan, District Attorney of Allegheny County, et al., Cruz v. Beto, Corrections Director, Williamson et al. v. United States, Kyle v. United States, DunLeavay v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., et al., Evans v. United States,
   405 U. S. 995;

405 U. S.998;

405U. S.1026;

405 U. S. 1018;

405 U. S. 1044; and

405 U. S. 1045.

Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-563.
    Rohrbaugh et al. v. Presbytery of Seattle, Inc., et al.,
   405 U. S. 996. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell is of the opinion that rehearing should be granted.


text:
    May 16, 1972
    No. 70-5002.
    Butler v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    May 22, 1972
    No. 71-1264.
    Ferrell et al. v. Hall, Governor of Oklahoma, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Okla.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 71-1068.
    Midwest Freight Forwarding Co., Inc., et al. v. Lewis, Secretary of State of Illinois, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5998.
    Hayes v. California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1142.
    United States v. Harper.
   Appeal from D. C. Mass. Motion to dispense with printing motion to affirm granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss proceedings as moot.


text:
    No. 71-589.
    Ranch-Way, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., ante, p. 272.


text:
    No. 31,
    Orig.
    Utah v. United States.
   [For decree, see ante, p. 484.]

It is ordered that Honorable Charles Fahy, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case in place of Honorable J. Cullen Ganey, deceased. The Special Master shall have authority to fix the time and conditions for filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may direct.

It is furtheR ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.


text:
    No. 36,
    Orig.
    Texas v. Louisiana.
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 55,
    Orig.
    Webb v. Porter.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 71-237.
    Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent v. Stubbs.
   [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.]

Motions of respondent for appointment of counsel and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 71-257.
    Grubbs, dba T. R. Grubbs Tire & Appliance v. General Electric Credit Corp.,
   405 U. S. 699. Motion of petitioner for a determination of cause on the merits denied.


text:
    No. 71-507.
    Keyes et al. v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1036.] Motions of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al., National Education Assn, et al., and Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 71-685.
    No. 71-691.
    Lehnhausen, Director, Department of Local Government Affairs of Illinois v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. et al. ; and Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. Shapiro et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 1039.] Motion of Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. for leave to withdraw as a party respondent in No. 71-685 denied. Motion for order requiring petitioners to recognize “Maynard Respondents” as parties to the litigation denied without prejudice to seeking leave to appear as amici curiae.


text:
    No. 71-703.
    United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U. S. 915.] Motion of New York State Banking Department for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-732.
    Schneckloth, Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 953.] Motion of respondent for additional time for oral argument denied. However, permission granted for two counsel to argue on behalf of respondent.


text:
    No. 71-900.
    Union Oil Company of California v. The San Jacinto et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 954.] Motion to dispense with printing appendix and to proceed on original record denied.


text:
    No. 71-1476.
    Gaffney v. Cummings et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. Motion of appellant to expedite consideration denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join in denying expedited consideration on the merits but would invite appellant to file an appropriate motion for stay.


text:
    No. 71-1263.
    Kahn et ux. v. Arizona State Tax Commission.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ariz. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 71-1443.
    California Department of Human Resources et al. v. Crow et al.
   Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration and for consolidation with No. 71-1119 [Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, appeal from D. C. N. D. Ind.] denied.


text:
    No. 71-5861.
    No. 71-5876.
    No. 71-6374.
    Moore v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; Parker v. Nelson, Warden; and Smith v. Nelson, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-6384.
    Bivens v. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-1170.
    WHDH, Inc. v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-1470.
    Lemon et al. v. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Application for extension of injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan and by him referred to the Court, granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. Motion to expedite denied.


text:
    No. 71-991.
    Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.
   Appeal from D. C. Minn. Probable jurisdiction noted.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 71-1133.
    Upper Pecos Assn. v. Peterson, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6278.
    Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-928.
    Baskett v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1141.
    No. 71-1229.
    New York v. Penn Central Transportation Co.; and New Jersey v. Penn Central Transportation Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 F. 2d 1107.


text:
    No. 71-1150.
    Patents Management Corp. et al. v. Trustees of the Penn Central Transportation Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1151.
    Warren v. United States.
   C. A 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1157.
    Shewfelt et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1158.
    Crow et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1159.
    Lococo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1177.
    Bailey et al. v. Dixon et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1184.
    No. 71-6485.
    Wisniewski v. United States; and Travisano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 456 F. 2d 9.


text:
    No. 71-1187.
    Marchese v. McEachen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1216.
    Big “D” Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1237.
    Gallinaro et al. v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1242.
    Nakai et al. v. Hamilton et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1244.
    King, Trustee v. City of Chicago et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1249.
    Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson et al. v. Monroe et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1250.
    Noonan v. Midland Capital Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1247.
    Nix v. Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1269.
    Ungar et al. v. Leff, Justice, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1282.
    Gianone v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1328.
    Langhorne v. Langhorne et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5966.
    Mitchell v. Allen, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5985.
    Kanter v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5992.
    Pickett v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6034.
    Sinibaldi v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6056.
    Gibson v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6119.
    Reagan v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6182.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6197.
    Tramel v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6279.
    Mungia v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6292.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6296.
    Epperson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6297.
    Rhoden et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6303.
    Zemke et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6304.
    Vilhotti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6308.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6327.
    Coleman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6332.
    Hamilton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6339.
    Moran v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6375.
    Lalwani v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6376.
    Bush v. Foster et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6378.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6379.
    Lundberg v. Buchkoe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6381.
    Campbell v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6386.
    Melillo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6388.
    Roper v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6389.
    Shindler v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6395.
    Delany v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6397.
    Rivera v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6400.
    Nash v. Amerada Hess Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1146.
    Poeta v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6409.
    Haining v. Roberts et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1147.
    Ford Motor Co. v. Ellipse Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6405.
    Broz v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.