author: Mr. Justice Harlan

text:
    MARCHETTI v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 2.
    Argued January 17-18, 1967.
    Reargued October 10, 1967.—
    Decided January 29, 1968.

      Jacob D. Zeldes reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief on the reargument were David Goldstein, Elaine S. Amendola, Francis J. King and Ira B. Grudberg, and on the original argument Messrs. Goldstein, King and Grudberg.

      Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., reargued the cause for the United States, pro hac vice. With him on the brief on the reargument were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit, and on the original argument Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Miss Rosenberg and Theodore George Gilinsky.

   Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut under two indictments which charged violations of the federal wagering tax statutes. The first indictment averred that petitioner and others conspired to evade payment of the annual occupational tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 4411. The second indictment included two counts: the first alleged a willful failure to pay the occupational tax, and the second a willful failure to register, as required by 26 U. S. C. § 4412, before engaging in the business of accepting wagers.

After verdict, petitioner unsuccessfully sought to arrest judgment, in part on the basis that the statutory obligations to register and to pay the occupational tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 352 F. 2d 848, on the authority of United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419.

We granted certiorari to re-examine the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the pertinent provisions of the wagering tax statutes, and more particularly to consider whether Kahriger and Lewis still have vitality. 383 U. S. 942. For reasons which follow, we have concluded that these provisions may not be employed to punish criminally those persons who have defended a failure to comply with their requirements with a proper assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The judgment below is accordingly reversed.

I.

The provisions in issue here are part of an interrelated statutory system for taxing wagers. The system is broadly as follows. Section 4401 of Title 26 imposes upon those engaged in the business of accepting wagers an excise tax of 10% on the gross amount of all wagers they accept, including the value of chances purchased in lotteries conducted for profit. Parimutuel wagering enterprises, coin-operated devices, and state-conducted sweepstakes are expressly excluded from taxation. 26 U. S. C. §4402 (1964 ed., Supp. II). Section 4411 imposes in addition an occupational tax of $50 annually, both upon those subject to taxation under § 4401 and upon those who receive wagers on their behalf.

The taxes are supplemented by ancillary provisions calculated to assure their collection. In particular, § 4412 requires those liable for the occupational tax to register each year with the director of their local internal revenue district. The registrants must submit Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C, and upon it must provide their residence and business addresses, must indicate whether they are engaged in the business of accepting wagers, and must list the names and addresses of their agents and employees. The statutory obligations to register and to pay the occupational tax áre essentially inseparable elements of a single registration procedure; Form 11-C thus constitutes both the application for registration and the return for the occupational tax.

In addition, registrants are obliged to post the revenue stamps which denote payment of the occupational tax “conspicuously” in their principal places of business, or, if they lack such places, to keep the stamps on their persons, and to exhibit them upon demand to any Treasury officer. 26 U. S'. C. § 6806 (c). They are required to preserve daily records indicating the gross amount of the wagers as to which they are liable for taxation, and to permit inspection of their books of account. 26 U. S. C. §§ 4403, 4423. Moreover, each principal internal revenue office is instructed to maintain for public inspection a listing of all who have paid the occupational tax, and to provide certified copies of the listing upon request to any state or local prosecuting officer. 26 U. S. C. § 6107. Finally, payment of the wagering taxes is declared not to “exempt any person from any penalty provided by a law of the United States or of any State for engaging” in any taxable activity. 26 U. S. C. § 4422.

II.

The issue before us is not whether the United States may tax activities which a State or Congress has declared unlawful. The Court has repeatedly indicated that the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation, and nothing that follows is intended to limit or diminish the vitality of those cases. See, e. g., License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462. The issue is instead whether the methods employed by Congress in the federal wagering tax statutes are, in this situation, consistent with the limitations created by the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. We must for this purpose first examine the implications of these statutory provisions.

Wagering and its ancillary activities are very widely prohibited under both federal and state law. Federal statutes impose criminal penalties upon the interstate transmission of wagering information, 18 U. S. C. § 1084; upon interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, defined to include gambling, 18 U. S. C. § 1952; upon lotteries conducted through use of the mails or broadcasting, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1304; and upon the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, 18 U. S. C. § 1953.

State and local enactments are more comprehensive. The laws of every State, except Nevada, include broad prohibitions against gambling, wagering, and associated activities. Every State forbids, with essentially minor and carefully circumscribed exceptions, lotteries. Even Nevada, which permits many forms of gambling, retains criminal penalties upon lotteries and certain other wagering activities taxable under these statutes. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.603, 462.010-462.080, 465.010 (1957).

Connecticut, in which petitioner allegedly conducted his activities, has adopted a variety of measures for the punishment of gambling and wagering. It punishes “[a]ny person, whether as principal, agent or servant, who owns, possesses, keeps, manages, maintains or occupies” premises employed for purposes of wagering or pool selling. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-295 (1958). It imposes criminal penalties upon any person who possesses, keeps, or maintains premises in which policy playing occurs, or lotteries are conducted, and upon any person who becomes the custodian of books, property, appliances, or apparatus employed for wagering. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-298 (1958). See also §§ 53-273, 53-290, 53-293. It provides additional penalties for those who conspire to organize or conduct unlawful wagering activities. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 54 — 197 (1958). Every aspect of petitioner’s wagering activities thus subjected him to possible state or federal prosecution. By any standard, in Connecticut and throughout the United States, wagering is “an area permeated with criminal statutes,” and those engaged in wagering are a group “inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, 79.

Information obtained as a consequence of the federal wagering tax laws is readily available to assist the efforts of state and federal authorities to enforce these penalties. Section 6107 of Title 26 requires the principal internal revenue offices to provide to prosecuting officers a listing of those who have paid the occupational tax. Section 6806 (c) obliges taxpayers either to post the revenue stamp “conspicuously” in their principal places of business, or to keep it on their persons, and to produce it on the demand of Treasury officers. Evidence of the possession of a federal wagering tax stamp, or of payment of the wagering taxes, has often been admitted at trial in state and federal prosecutions for gambling offenses; such evidence has doubtless proved useful even more frequently to lead prosecuting authorities to other evidence upon which convictions have subsequently been obtained. Finally, we are obliged to notice that a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue has acknowledged that the Service “makes available” to law enforcement agencies the names and addresses of those who have paid the wagering taxes, and that it is in “full cooperation” with the efforts of the Attorney General of the United States to suppress organized gambling. Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8 Crime & Delin. 371, 372, 377.

In these circumstances, it can scarcely be denied that the obligations to register and to pay the occupational tax created for petitioner “real and appreciable,” and not merely “imaginary and unsubstantial,” hazards of self-incrimination. Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 599-600; Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374. Petitioner was confronted by a comprehensive system of federal and state prohibitions against wagering activities; he was required, on pain of criminal prosecution, to provide information which he might reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting authorities, and which would surely prove a significant “link in a chain” of evidence tending to establish his guilt. Unlike the income tax return in question in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, every portion of these requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of incriminating petitioner; the application of the constitutional privilege to the entire registration procedure was in this instance neither “extreme” nor “extravagant.” See id., at 263. It would appear to follow that petitioner’s assertion of the privilege as a defense to this prosecution was entirely proper, and accordingly should have sufficed to prevent his conviction.

Nonetheless, this Court has twice concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination may not appropriately be asserted by those in petitioner’s circumstances. United States v. Kahriger, supra; Lewis v. United States, supra. We must therefore consider whether those cases have continuing force in light of our more recent decisions. Moreover, we must also consider the relevance of certain collateral lines of authority; in particular, we must determine whether either the “required records” doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, or restrictions placed upon the use by prosecuting authorities of information obtained as a consequence of the wagering taxes, cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, should be utilized to preclude assertion of the constitutional privilege in this situation. To these questions we turn.

III.

The Court's opinion in Kahriger suggested that a defendant under indictment for willful failure to register under § 4412 cannot properly challenge the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the registration requirement. For this point, the Court relied entirely upon Mr. Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court in United States v. Sullivan, supra. The taxpayer in Sullivan was convicted of willful failure to file an income tax return, despite his contention that the return would have obliged him to admit violations of the National Prohibition Act. The Court affirmed the conviction, and rejected the taxpayer’s claim of the privilege. It concluded that most of the return’s questions would not have compelled the taxpayer to make incriminating disclosures, and that it would have been “an extreme if not an extravagant application” of the privilege to permit him to draw within it the entire return. 274 U. S., at 263.

The Court in Sullivan was evidently concerned, first, that the claim before it was an unwarranted extension of the scope of the privilege, and, second, that to accept a claim of privilege not asserted at the time the return was due would “make the taxpayer rather than a tribunal the final arbiter of the merits of the claim.” Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, 79. Neither reason suffices to prevent this petitioner’s assertion of the privilege. The first is, as we have indicated, inapplicable, and we find the second unpersuasive in this situation. Every element of these requirements would have served to incriminate petitioner; to have required him to present his claim to Treasury officers would have obliged him “to prove guilt to avoid admitting it.” United States v. Kahriger, supra, at 34 (concurring opinion). In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that his failure to assert the privilege to Treasury officials at the moment the tax payments were due irretrievably abandoned his constitutional protection. Petitioner is under sentence for violation of statutory requirements which he consistently asserted at and after trial to be unconstitutional; no more can here be required.

The Court held in Lewis that the registration and occupational tax requirements do not infringe the constitutional privilege because they do not compel self-incrimination, but merely impose on the gambler the initial choice of whether he wishes, at the cost of his constitutional privilege, to commence wagering activities. The Court reasoned that even if the required disclosures might prove incriminating, the gambler need not register or pay the occupational tax if only he elects to cease, or never to begin, gambling. There is, the Court said, “no constitutional right to gamble.” 348 U. S., at 423.

We find this reasoning no longer persuasive. The question is not whether petitioner holds a “right” to violate state law, but whether, having done so, he may be compelled to give evidence against himself. The constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresigh ted; if such an inference of antecedent choice were alone enough to abrogate the privilege’s protection, it would be excluded from the situations in which it has historically been guaranteed, and withheld from those who most require it. Such inferences, bottomed on what must ordinarily be a fiction, have precisely the infirmities which the Court has found in other circumstances in which implied or uninformed waivers of the privilege have been said to have occurred. See, e. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; and Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60. To give credence to such “waivers” without the most deliberate examination of the circumstances surrounding them would ultimately license widespread erosion of the privilege through “ingeniously drawn legislation/’ Morgan, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 37. We cannot agree that the constitutional privilege is meaningfully waived merely because those “inherently suspect of criminal activities” have been commanded either to cease wagering or to provide information incriminating to themselves, and have ultimately elected to do neither.

The Court held in both Kahriger and Lewis that the registration and occupational tax requirements are entirely prospective in their application, and that the constitutional privilege, since it offers protection only as to past and present acts, is accordingly unavailable. This reasoning appears to us twice deficient: first, it overlooks the hazards here of incrimination as to past or present acts; and second, it is hinged upon an excessively narrow view of the scope of the constitutional privilege.

Substantial hazards of incrimination as to past or present acts plainly may stem from the requirements to register and to pay the occupational tax. See generally McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling Tax, 5 Duke B. J. 86. In the first place, satisfaction of those requirements increases the likelihood that any past or present gambling offenses will be discovered and successfully prosecuted. It both centers attention upon the registrant as a gambler, and compels “injurious disclosure [s]” which may provide or assist in the collection of evidence admissible in a prosecution for past or present offenses. These offenses need not include actual gambling; they might involve only the custody or transportation of gambling paraphernalia, or other preparations for future gambling. Further, the acquisition of a federal gambling tax stamp, requiring as it does the declaration of a present intent to commence gambling activities, obliges even a prospective gambler to accuse himself of conspiracy to violate either state gambling prohibitions, or federal laws forbidding the use of interstate facilities for gambling purposes. See, e. g., Acklen v. State, 196 Tenn. 314, 267 S. W. 2d 101.

There is a second, and more fundamental, deficiency in the reasoning of Kahriger and Lewis. Its linchpin is plainly the premise that the privilege is entirely inapplicable to prospective acts; for this the Court in Kahriger could vouch as authority only a generalization at 8 Wig-more, Evidence § 2259c (3d ed. 1940). We see no warrant for so rigorous a constraint upon the constitutional privilege. History, to be sure, offers no ready illustrations of the privilege’s application to prospective acts, but the occasions on which such claims might appropriately have been made must necessarily have been very infrequent. We are, in any event, bid to view the constitutional commands as “organic living institutions,” whose significance is “vital not formal.” Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610.

The central standard for the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and “real,” and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600. This principle does not permit the rigid chronological distinction adopted in Kahriger and 'Lewis. We see no reason to suppose that the force of the constitutional prohibition is diminished merely because confession of a guilty purpose precedes the act which it is subsequently employed to evidence. Yet, if the factual situations in which the privilege may be claimed were inflexibly defined by a chronological formula, the policies which the constitutional privilege is intended to serve could easily be evaded. Moreover, although prospective acts will doubtless ordinarily involve only speculative and insubstantial risks of incrimination, this will scarcely always prove true. As we shall show, it is not true here. We conclude that it is not mere time to which the law must look, but the substantiality of the risks of incrimination.

The hazards of incrimination created by §§4411 and 4412 as to future acts are not trifling or imaginary. Prospective registrants can reasonably expect that registration and payment of the occupational tax will significantly enhance the likelihood of their prosecution for future acts, and that it will readily provide evidence which will facilitate their convictions. Indeed, they can reasonably fear that registration, and acquisition of a wagering tax stamp, may serve as decisive evidence that they have in fact subsequently violated state gambling prohibitions. Compare Ala. Code, Tit. 14, §§ 302 (8)-(10) (1958); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6413 (Supp. 1967). Insubstantial claims of the privilege as to entirely prospective acts may certainly be asserted, but such claims are not here, and they need only be considered when a litigant has the temerity to pursue them.

We conclude that nothing in the Court’s opinions in Kahriger and Lewis now suffices to preclude petitioner’s assertion of the constitutional privilege as a defense to the indictments under which he was convicted. To this extent Kahriger and Lewis are overruled.

IY.

We must next consider the relevance in this situation of the “required records” doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1. It is necessary first to summarize briefly the circumstances in Shapiro. Petitioner, a wholesaler of fruit and produce, was obliged by a regulation issued under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act to keep and “preserve for examination” various records “of the same kind as he has customarily kept....” Maximum Price Regulation 426, § 14, 8 Fed. Reg. 9546, 9548-9549 (1943). He was subsequently directed by an administrative subpoena to produce certain of these records before attorneys of the Office of Price Administration. Petitioner complied, but asserted his constitutional privilege. In a prosecution for violations of the Price Control Act, petitioner urged that the records had facilitated the collection of evidence against him, and claimed immunity from prosecution under § 202 (g) of the Act, 56 Stat. 30. Petitioner was nonetheless convicted, and his conviction was affirmed. 159 E. 2d 890.

On certiorari, this Court held both that § 202 (g) did not confer immunity upon petitioner, and that he could not properly claim the protection of the privilege as to records which he was required by administrative regulation to preserve. On the second question, the Court relied upon the cases which have held that a custodian of public records may not assert the privilege as to those records, and reiterated a dictum in Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 380, suggesting that “the privilege which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained in relation to ‘records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly estab-lushed.’ ” 335 U. S., at 33. The Court considered that “it cannot be doubted” that the records in question had “public aspects,” and thus held that petitioner, as their custodian, could not properly assert the privilege as to them. Id., at 34.

We think that neither Shapiro nor the cases upon which it relied are applicable here. Compare generally Note, Required Information and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 65 Col. L. Rev. 681; and McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 214r-217. Moreover, we find it unnecessary for present purposes to pursue in detail the question, left unanswered in Shapiro, of what “limits . . . the Government cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records . . . .” 335 U. S., at 32. It is enough that there are significant points of difference between the situations here and in Shapiro which in this instance preclude, under any formulation, an appropriate application of the “required records” doctrine.

Each of the three principal elements of the doctrine, as it is described in Shapiro, is absent from this situation. First, petitioner Marchetti was not, by the provisions now at issue, obliged to keep and preserve records “of the same kind as he has customarily kept”; he was required simply to provide information, unrelated to any records which he may have maintained, about his wagering activities. This requirement is not significantly different from a demand that he provide oral testimony. Compare McKay, supra, at 221. Second, whatever “public aspects” there were to the records at issue in Shapiro, there are none to the information demanded from Marchetti. The Government’s anxiety to obtain information known to a private individual does not without more render that information public; if it did, no room would remain for the application of the constitutional privilege. Nor does it stamp information with a public character that the Government has formalized its demands in the attire of a statute; if this alone were sufficient, the constitutional privilege could be entirely abrogated by any Act of Congress. Third, the requirements at issue in Shapiro were imposed in “an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry” while those here are directed to a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Cf. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, 79. The United States’ principal interest is evidently the collection of revenue, and not the punishment of gamblers, see United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, 358; but the characteristics of the activities about which information is sought, and the composition of the groups to which inquiries are made, readily distinguish this situation from that in Shapiro. There is no need to explore further the elements and limitations of Shapiro and the cases involving public papers; these points of difference in combination preclude any appropriate application of those cases to the present one.'

y.

Finally, we have been urged by the United States to permit continued enforcement of the registration and occupational tax provisions, despite the demands of the constitutional privilege, by shielding the privilege’s claimants through the imposition of restrictions upon the use by federal and state authorities of information obtained as a consequence of compliance with the wagering tax requirements. It is suggested that these restrictions might be similar to those imposed by the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52.

The Constitution of course obliges this Court to give full recognition to the taxing powers and to measures reasonably incidental to. their exercise. But we are equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions which attend the exercise of those powers. We do not, as we have said, doubt Congress’ power to tax activities which are, wholly or in part, unlawful. Nor can it be doubted that the privilege against self-incrimination may not properly be asserted if other protection is granted which “is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect” as the privilege itself. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 585. The Government’s suggestion is thus in principle an attractive and apparently practical resolution of the difficult problem before us. Compare Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government’s Need for Information, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 103, 159; and McKay, supra, at 232. Nonetheless, we think that it would be entirely inappropriate in the circumstances here for the Court to impose such restrictions.

The terms of the wagering tax system make quite plain that Congress intended information obtained as a consequence of registration and payment of the occupational tax to be provided to interested prosecuting authorities. See 26 U. S. C. § 6107. This has evidently been the consistent practice of the Revenue Service. We must therefore assume that the imposition of use-restrictions would directly preclude effectuation of a significant element of Congress’ purposes in adopting the wagering taxes. Moreover, the imposition of such restrictions would necessarily oblige state prosecuting authorities to establish in each case that their evidence was untainted by any connection with information obtained as a consequence of the wagering taxes; the federal requirements would thus be protected only at the cost of hampering, perhaps seriously, enforcement of state prohibitions against gambling. We cannot know how Congress would assess the competing demands of the federal treasury and of state gambling prohibitions; we are, however, entirely certain that the Constitution has entrusted to Congress, and not to this Court, the task of striking an appropriate balance among such values. We therefore must decide that it would be improper for the Court to impose restrictions of the kind urged by the United States.

VI.

We are fully cognizant of the importance for the United States’ various fiscal and regulatory functions of timely and accurate information, compare Mansfield, supra, and Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687; but other methods, entirely consistent with constitutional limitations, exist by which Congress may obtain such information. See generally Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, at 585; compare Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, supra. Accordingly, nothing we do today will prevent either the taxation or the regulation by Congress of activities otherwise made unlawful by state or federal statutes.

Nonetheless, we can only conclude, under the wagering tax system as presently written, that petitioner properly asserted the privilege against self-incrimination, and that his assertion should have provided a complete defense to this prosecution. This defense should have reached both the substantive counts for failure to register and to pay the occupational tax, and the count for conspiracy to evade payment of the tax. We emphasize that we do not hold that these wagering tax provisions are as such constitutionally impermissible; we hold only that those who properly assert the constitutional privilege as to these provisions may not be criminally punished for failure to comply with their requirements. If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is not confronted by substantial hazards of self-incrimination, or if he is otherwise outside the privilege’s protection, nothing we decide today would shield him from the various penalties prescribed by the wagering tax statutes.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 72.]

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, see post, p. 76.]

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, see post, p. 77.]

       Certiorari was originally granted in Costello v. United States, 383 U. S. 942, to consider these issues. Upon Costello’s death, certiorari was granted in the present ease. 385 U. S. 1000. Mar-chetti and Costello, with others, were convicted at the same trial of identical offenses, arising from the same series of transactions. Certiorari both here and in Costello was limited to the following questions: “Do not the federal wagering tax statutes here involved violate the petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment? Should not this Court, especially in view of its recent decision in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965), overrule United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 (1955)?” After argument, the case was restored to the calendar, and set for reargument at the 1967 Term. 388 U. S. 903. Counsel were asked to argue, in addition to the original questions, the following: “(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, to the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the registration and special occupational tax requirements of 26 U. S. C. §§4411, 4412? (2) Can an obligation to pay the special occupational tax required by 26 U. S. C. § 4411 be satisfied without filing the registration statement provided for by 26 U. S. C. §4412?”

       A July 1963 revision of Form 11-C modified the form of certain of its questions. The record does not indicate which version of the return was available to petitioner at the time of the omissions for which he was convicted. The minor verbal variations between the two do not affect the result which we reach today.

       The Treasury Regulations provide that a stamp, evidencing payment of the occupational tax, may not be issued unless the taxpayer both submits Form 11-C and tenders the full amount of the tax. 26 CFR §44.4901-1 (c). Accordingly, the Revenue Service has refused to accept the $50 tax unless it is accompanied by the completed registration form; and it has consistently been upheld in that practice. See United States v. Whiting, 311 F. 2d 191; United States v. Mungiole, 233 F. 2d 204; Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531, aff’d, 342 U. S. 939. The United States has in this case acknowledged that the registration and occupational tax provisions are not realistically severable. Brief on Reargument 37-41.

       In his trial testimony in Grosso v. United States, decided herewith, post, p. 62, W. Dean Struble, technical advisor to the District Director of Internal Revenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, described Form 11-C as follows: “A Form 11-C serves two purposes. The first is an application for registry for a wagering tax stamp. After the application is properly filed and the tax paid, at that time the Form 11-C becomes a special tax return.” Transcript of Record 90.

       The following illustrate the state gambling and wagering statutes under which one engaged in activities taxable under the federal provisions at issue here might incur criminal penalties. Ala. Code, Tit. 14, c. 46 (1958); Alaska Laws, Tit. 65, e. 13 (1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-438 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann., Tit. 41, e. 20 (1947); Cal. Pen. Code §§ 330-337a (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 40, Art. 10 (1963); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 665-669 (1953); D. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-1504 to 22-1511 (1967); Fla. Stat., c. 849 (1965); Ga. Code Ann., c. 26-64 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Laws, e. 288 (1955); Idaho Code Ann., Tit. 18, c. 38 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, Art. 28 (1965); Ind. Ann. Stat., Tit. 10, e. 23 (1956); Iowa Code, e. 726 (1966); Kan. Stat. Ann., c. 21, Art. 15 (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. §436.200 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. § 14:90 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, c. 61 (1964); Md. Ann. Code, Art, 27, §§237-242 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 271 (1959); Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.533 (1954); Minn. Stat. §609.755 (1965); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 2190-2202 (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.350 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann., Tit. 94, c. 24 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-941 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§293.603, 465.010 (1957); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., e. 577 (1955); N. J. Rev. Stat., Tit. 2A, c. 112 (1953); N. M. Stat. Ann., c. 40A, Art. 19 (1953); N. Y. Pen. Law, Art. 225 (1967); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14 — 292 to 14-295 (1953); N. D. Cent. Code Ann., c. 12-23 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., c. 2915 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, c. 38 (1958); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 167.505 (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4603-4607 (1963); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann., Tit. 11, c. 19 (1956); S. C. Code Ann., Tit. 16, c. 8, Art. 1 (1962); S. D. Code, Tit. 24, c. 24.01 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann., Tit. 39, c. 20 (1955); Tex. Pen. Code Ann., c. 6 (1952); Utah Code Ann., Tit. 76, c. 27 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, c. 43, subch. 2 (1959); Va. Code Ann., Tit. 18.1, c. 7, Art. 2 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code, Tit. 9, c. 9.47 (1956); W. Va. Code Ann., c. 61, Art. 10 (1961); Wis. Stat., c. 945 (1965); Wyo. Stat. Ann., Tit. 6, c. 9, Art. 2 (1957). These statutes of course vary in their terms and scope, but these variations scarcely detract from the breadth or prevalence of the penalties which in combination they create.

       New Hampshire conducts a state sweepstakes, but imposes broad criminal penalties upon privately operated lotteries. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 577 (1955). The following illustrate the other state statutes which impose criminal penalties upon lottery activities which would be taxable under these federal statutes. Ala. Code, Tit. 14, c. 46 (1958); Alaska Laws §65-13-1 (1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-436 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-2024 (1947); Cal. Pen. Code §§ 319-326 (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 40, Art. 16 (1963); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§661-664 (1953); D. C. Code Ann. § 22-1501 (1967); Fla. Stat. § 849.09 (1965); Ga. Code Ann., c. 26-65 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Laws, e. 288 (1955); Idaho Code Ann., Tit. 18, e. 49 (1948); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, Art. 28 (1965); Ind. Ann. Stat., Tit. 10, c. 23 (1956); Iowa Code §726.8 (1966); Kan. Stat. Ann., c. 21, Art. 15 (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. §436.360 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. §14:90 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, c. 81 (1964); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 356 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 271 (1959); Mich. Stat. Ann., §§ 28.604-28.608 (1954); Miss. Code Ann. §§2270-2279 (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.430 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann., Tit. 94, c. 30 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-961 (1943); N. J. Rev. Stat., Tit. 2A, c. 121 (1953); N. M. Stat. Ann., c. 40A, Art. 19 (1953); N. Y. Pen. Law, Art. 225 (1967); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§14-289 to 14-291 (1953); N. D. Cent. Code Ann., e. 12-24 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., c. 2915 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, c. 41 (1958); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 167.405 (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4601-4602 (1963); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann., Tit. 11, c. 19 (1956); S. C. Code Ann., Tit. 16, c. 8, Art. 1 (1962); S. D. Code, Tit. 24, c. 24.01 (1939)1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2017 (1955); Tex. Pen. Code Ann., Art. 654 (1952); Utah Code Ann., Tit. 76, c. 27 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, c. 43, subch. 1 (1959); Va. Code Ann., Tit. 18.1, c. 7, Art. 2 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code, Tit. 9, c. 9.59 (1956); W. Va. Code Ann., e. 61, Art. 10 (1961); Wis. Stat., c 945 (1965); Wyo. Stat. Ann., Tit. 6, c. 9, Art. 2 (1957).

       See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128; United States v. Zizzo, 338 F. 2d 577; Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195 A. 2d 119; State v. Curry, 92 Ohio App. 1, 109 N. E. 2d 298; State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d 530; Griggs v. State, 37 Ala. App. 605, 73 So. 2d 382; McClary v. State, 211 Term. 46, 362 S. W. 2d 450. See also State v. Baum, 230 La. 247, 88 So. 2d 209.

       One State has gone a step further to facilitate the enforcement of its gambling prohibitions through the federal wagering tax. Illinois requires each holder of a wagering tax stamp to register with the clerk of the county in which he resides or conducts any business, and imposes fines and imprisonment upon those who do not. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §28-4 (1965).

       The metaphor is to be found in the opinions both of Lord Eldon in Paxton v. Douglas, 19 Ves. Jr. 225, 227, and of Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692 e).

       We must note that some States and municipalities have undertaken to punish compliance with the federal wagering tax statutes in an even more direct fashion. Alabama has created a statutory presumption that possessors of federal wagering tax stamps are in violation of state law. Ala. Code, Tit. 14, §§302 (8)-(10) (1958). Florida adopted a similar statute, Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28057, but it was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court. Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So. 2d 494. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has upheld an ordinance adopted by the City of Chattanooga which makes possession of a federal tax stamp a misdemeanor. Deitch v. City of Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S. W. 2d 776. See for a similar provision Rev. Ord., Kansas City, Missouri, § 23.110 (1956); and Kansas City v. Lee, 414 S. W. 2d 251. Georgia has recently provided by statute that the possession or purchase of a federal wagering tax stamp is “prima facie evidence of guilt” of professional gambling. Ga. Code Ann. §26-6413 (Supp. 1967). See for a similar rule McClary v. State, supra, n. 7.

        Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 487.

       We presume that the Court referred to the following: “[T]here is no compulsory self-crimination in a rule of law which merely requires beforehand a future report on a class of future acts among which a particular one may or may not in future be criminal at the choice of the party reporting.” 8 Wigmore, supra, at 349. But see Morgan, supra, at 37; and McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 221.

       The Court in fact quoted from the reiteration of the Wilson dictum included in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 590.

       The United States has urged that this case is not reached by Shapiro simply because petitioner was required to submit reports, and not to maintain records. Insofar as this is intended to suggest the the crucial issue respecting the applicability of Shapiro is the method by which information reaches the Government, we are unable to accept the distinction. We perceive no meaningful difference between an obligation to maintain records for inspection, and such an obligation supplemented by a requirement that those records be filed periodically with officers of the United States. We believe, as the United States itself argued in Shapiro, that “[regulations permit records to be retained, rather than filed, largely for the convenience of the persons regulated.” Brief for the United States in No. 49, October Term 1947, at 21, n. 7.

       Section 6107 reads as follows:
      “In the principal internal revenue office in each internal revenue district there shall be kept, for public inspection, an alphabetical list of the names of all persons who have paid special taxes under subtitle D or E within such district. Such list shall be prepared and kept pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, and shall contain the time, place, and business for which such special taxes have been paid, and upon application of any prosecuting officer of any State, county, or municipality there shall be furnished to him a certified copy thereof, as of a public record, for which a fee of $1 for each 100 words or fraction thereof in the copy or copies so requested may be charged.” The special taxes to which the section refers include the occupational tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. §4411.

       The requirement now embodied in § 6107 was adopted prior to the special occupational tax on wagering, but Congress plainly indicated when it adopted the latter that it understood, and wished, that state prosecuting authorities would be provided fists of those who had paid the wagering tax. See H. R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 60; S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 118.

       The Court required such a showing as part of the restrictions imposed in Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, n. 18. The United States has acknowledged that this would be no less imperative here. Brief for the United States 24r-25.

       It should be emphasized that it would not suffice here simply to sever § 6107. See 26 U. S. C. § 7852 (a). Cf. Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, 2 Gray 84, 99; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 316. We would be required not merely to strike out words, but to insert words that are not now in the statute. Here, as in the analogous circumstances of United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, “This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. ... To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty.” Id., at 221.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Chief Justice Warren,

license: Public Domain

text:
    GROSSO v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 12.
    Argued January 18, 1967. — Reargued October 10-11, 1967.
    Decided January 29, 1968.

      Charles Alan Wright reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs on the reargument and on the original argument was James E. McLaughlin.

      Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., reargued the cause for the United States, pro hoc vice. With him on the brief on the reargument were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. Jack S. Levin argued the cause for the United States on the original argument. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Miss Rosenberg and Theodore George Gilinsky.

   Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of 15 counts of willful failure to pay the excise tax imposed on wagering by 26 U. S. C. § 4401, four counts of willful failure to pay the special occupational tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 4411, and oné count of conspiracy to defraud the United States by evading payment of both taxes. 18 U. S. C. § 371. Petitioner moved before trial to dismiss the counts which charged conspiracy to defraud and failure to pay the excise tax, asserting that payment would have obliged him to incriminate himself, in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. He reiterated this contention in support of unsuccessful motions for acquittal after verdict and for a new trial. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction. 358 F. 2d 154.

Petitioner did not assert below, and therefore has not urged here, that his privilege was violated by reason of his convictions for conspiracy and for failure to pay the special occupational tax. He has contended only that payment of the excise tax would have required him to incriminate himself, that he therefore may not properly be prosecuted for willful failure to pay the tax or for conspiracy to evade its payment, and that conduct of the trial court after submission of the case to the jury denied him a fair trial. We granted certiorari, 385 U. S. 810, and the case was argued with Marchetti v. United States, decided today, ante, p. 39. For reasons which follow, we reverse.

I.

We turn first to petitioner’s contention that payment of the wagering excise tax would have compelled him to incriminate himself. We have summarized in Marchetti, supra, the various state and federal penalties which have been imposed upon wagering. It is enough now to reiterate that Pennsylvania, in which petitioner allegedly accepted wagers, has adopted a comprehensive statutory •system for the punishment of gambling and ancillary activities. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§4601-4607 (1963). These penalties, in combination with the federal statutes described in Marchetti, place petitioner entirely within “an area permeated with criminal statutes,” where he is “inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, 79. The issues here are therefore whether payment of the excise tax would have provided information incriminating to petitioner, and, if it would have done so, whether petitioner is otherwise prevented from asserting the constitutional privilege.

The statutory scheme by which wagering is taxed is described in Marchetti, supra. Two additional observations are, however, required in order to assess fully the hazards of self-incrimination created by the wagering excise tax. First, those liable for payment of that tax are required to submit each month Internal Revenue Service Form 730. Treas. Reg. § 44.6011 (a)-l (a). The return is expressly designed for the use only of those engaged in the wagering business; its submission, and the replies demanded by each of its questions, evidence in the most direct fashion the fact of the taxpayer’s wagering activities. Although failures to pay the excise tax and to file a return are separately punishable under 26 U. S. C. § 7203, the two obligations must be considered inseparable for purposes of measuring the hazards of self-incrimination which might stem from payment of the excise tax. Nothing in the pertinent statutes or regulations contemplates payment of the tax without submission of the return, and we are informed by the United States that if the return does not accompany the tax payment, “the money is not accepted.”' Brief for the United States on Reargument 39, n. 35. We must conclude that here, as in Albertson, the validity under the Constitution of criminal prosecutions for willful failure to pay the excise tax may properly be determined only after assessment of the hazards of incrimination which would result from “literal and full compliance” with all the statutory requirements. 382 U. S., at 78.

Second, although there is no statutory instruction, as there is for the occupational tax, that state and local prosecuting officers be provided listings of those who have paid the excise tax, neither has Congress imposed explicit restrictions upon the use of information obtained as a consequence of payment of the tax. Moreover, it appears that the Revenue Service, evidently acting under the authority of certain general statutory provisions, has undertaken to tender this information to interested prosecuting authorities. We can only conclude that those liable for payment of the excise tax reasonably may expect that information obtainable from its payment, or from submission of Form 730, will ultimately be proffered to state and federal prosecuting officers.

In these circumstances, it would be impossible to say that the hazards of incrimination which stem from the obligation to pay the excise tax and to file Form 730 are “imaginary and unsubstantial.” Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 599-600. The criminal penalties for wagering with which petitioner is threatened are scarcely “remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law,” Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 144; yet he is obliged, on pain of criminal prosecution, to provide information which would readily incriminate him, and which he may reasonably expect would be provided to prosecuting authorities. These hazards of incrimination can only be characterized as “real and appreciable.” Reg. v. Boyes, supra, at 330; Brown v. Walker, supra, at 699-600. Moreover, unlike the income tax return at issue in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 269, petitioner’s submission of an excise tax payment, and his replies to the questions on the attendant return, would directly and unavoidably have served to incriminate him; his claim of privilege as to the entire tax payment procedure was therefore neither “extreme” nor “extravagant.” Compare, id., at 263.

We are thus obliged to inquire whether petitioner is otherwise foreclosed from asserting the constitutional privilege. For reasons indicated in Marchetti, supra, we have found nothing in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, or Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419, which now warrants the exclusion of this situation from the privilege’s protection. It need only be added that the requirements associated with the excise tax are directed wholly to past and present wagering activities; they lack even the illusory prospectivity which characterizes the special occupational tax and registration requirements.

Similarly, we have concluded that the “required records” doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, cannot be appropriately applied to these circumstances. See generally Marchetti v. United States, supra. The premises of the doctrine, as it is described in Shapiro, are evidently three: first, the purposes of the United States’ inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed “public aspects” which render them at least analogous to public documents. There is no need for present purposes to examine the relative significance of these three factors, or to undertake to define more specifically their incidents, for both the first and third factors are plainly absent from this case.

Here, as in Marchetti, the statutory obligations are directed almost exclusively to individuals inherently suspect of criminal activities. The principal interest of the United States must be assumed to be the collection of revenue, and not the prosecution of gamblers, United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, 358; but we cannot ignore either the characteristics of the activities about which information is sought, or the composition of the group to which the inquiries are made. These collateral circumstances, in combination with Congress’ apparent wish that any information obtained as a consequence of the wagering taxes be made available to prosecuting authorities, readily suffice to distinguish these requirements from those at issue in Shapiro. Moreover, the information demanded here lacks every characteristic of a public document. No doubt it is desired by the United States, but we have concluded, for reasons indicated in Marchetti, that this alone does not render information “public,” and thus does not deprive it of constitutional protection.

We must note that the pertinent Treasury regulations provide that the replies to the questions included on Form 730 are to be compiled each month “from the daily records required by §§ 44.4403-1 and 44.6001-1.” Treas. Reg. § 44.6011 (a)-l (a). It might therefore be argued that Form 730 is merely a monthly abstract of records essentially similar to those required to be preserved by the regulations in Shapiro. The difficulties with this argument are two. First, it is scarcely plain that the records required here are "of the same kind [the taxpayer] has customarily kept.” 335 U. S., at 5, n. 3. Second, and more important, there are, as we have indicated, other points of significant dissimilarity between this situation and that in Shapiro. We have concluded that in combination these points of difference preclude any appropriate application to these circumstances of the “required records” doctrine.

Finally, as in Marchetti, we have been urged by the United States to permit continued enforcement of the wagering excise tax requirements by imposing restrictions upon the use by state and federal authorities of information obtained as a consequence of payment of the tax. We recognize that § 6107 (see Marchetti, supra, at 59, n. 15) is not by its terms applicable to the excise tax, and that there is no similar statutory obligation that the Commissioner provide prosecutors with listings of those who have paid the excise tax. Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate to impose such restrictions upon one portion of a statutory system, when we have concluded that it would be improper, for reasons discussed in Mar-chetti, to do so upon “an integral part” of the same system. We therefore decline to impose the restrictions urged by the United States.

II.

There remain for disposition the substantive counts for willful failure to pay the occupational tax, and the count for conspiracy to defraud. The latter was bottomed on allegations that petitioner had conspired to evade payment both of the excise tax and of the occupational tax. Petitioner has consistently contended that the constitutional privilege should have prevented his conviction on the conspiracy count, evidently on the basis that, insofar as it is founded on his failure to pay the excise tax, this count raises questions identical with those presented by the substantive counts for failure to pay that tax. We agree, and conclude that a taxpayer may not be convicted of conspiracy to evade payment of the tax, if the constitutional privilege would properly prevent his conviction for willful failure to pay it. Cf. Marchetti v. United States, supra, at 60-61.

Petitioner has not, however, asserted a claim of privilege either as to the counts which charged willful failure to pay the occupational tax, of as to the allegation that he conspired to evade payment of the occupational tax. Given the decisions of this Court in Kahriger and Lewis, supra, which were on the books at the time of petitioner’s trial, and left untouched by Albertson v. SACB, supra, we are unable to view his failure to present this issue as an effective waiver of the constitutional privilege. By the same token, we do not think that we can well reach these counts on the theory of “plain error.”

It might, therefore, be thought that the proper disposition of the substantive occupational tax counts, and of the portion of the conspiracy count concerned with the occupational tax, would be to vacate, rather than to reverse, the judgments of conviction, and to return the case to the lower courts for further proceedings'consistent with our opinions in this case and in Marchetti.

We think, however, that a different course is indicated. Under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 we have power to dispose of this case “as may be just under the circumstances.” See Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 327-331. Since the record is barren of any evidence on which a finding of waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination might properly be predicated, and since, absent such a waiver, reversal of the conviction would be inevitable in light of our holdings today in this case and in Mar-chetti, we consider that the entire case should now be finally disposed of at this level. In the special circumstances presented, this course seems to us to be dictated by considerations of sound judicial administration, in order to obviate further and entirely unnecessary proceedings below. Cf. Yates v. United States, supra.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in its entirety.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

concurring.

I join the opinions of the Court in these cases. I write only to emphasize why, in my view, nothing we decide or say today in any wise impairs or modifies United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, and Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1.

The privilege against self-incrimination does not bar the Government from establishing every program or scheme featured by provisions designed to secure information from citizens to accomplish proper legislative purposes. Congress is assuredly empowered to construct a statutory scheme which either is general enough to avoid conflict with the privilege, or which assures the necessary confidentiality or immunity to overcome the privilege. See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179; Reina v. United States, 364 U. S. 507. True, some of the values protected by the self-incrimination guaranty may well be affected to an extent by any enforced system of information gathering based upon individual participation, see Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 55, but it is clear that the scope of the privilege does not coincide with the complex of values it helps to protect. Despite the impact upon the inviolability of the human personality, and upon our belief in an adversary system of criminal justice in which the Government must produce the evidence against an accused through its own independent labors, the prosecution is allowed to obtain and use evidence offered by the accused “in the unfettered exercise of his own will,” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8, and evidence which although compelled is generally speaking not “testimonial,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761. Moreover, by the simple expedient of granting appropriate immunity the Government is able to surmount entirely the self-incrimination barrier, despite the value of privacy that provision is intended to protect.

United States v. Sullivan, supra, makes clear that an individual is not exempted, by the fact that he may be privileged to refuse to answer some questions, from a requirement, “directed at the public at large,” of filing an income tax return exclusively containing questions “neutral on their face.” Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, 79. Shapiro v. United States, supra, involved a similar situation; it involved a record-keeping requirement pursuant to a neutral governmental system of price regulation.

On the other hand, we know that where the governmental scheme clearly evidences the purpose of gathering information from citizens in order to secure their conviction of crime, it contravenes the privilege. Thus in Albertson v. SACB, supra, we held invalid both the requirement that Communist Party members file a registration form and that they complete and file a registration statement under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. We distinguished Sullivan, stating that the questions on the forms in Albertson “are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities,” and that the privilege is asserted, not “in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.” Id., at 79.

The cases before us present a statutory system condemned by Albertson. The wagering excise tax, the occupational tax, and the registration requirement are only parts of an interrelated statutory system for taxing illegal wagers. Whatever else Congress may have meant to achieve, an obvious purpose of this statutory system clearly was to coerce evidence from persons engaged in illegal activities for use in their prosecution. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

The Court’s opinions fully establish the statutory system’s impermissible invasions of the privilege. Indeed, 26 U. S. C. § 4401 should create substantial suspicion on privilege grounds simply because it is an excise tax upon persons “engaged in the business of accepting wagers” or who conduct “any wagering pool or lottery.” The persons affected by this language are a relatively Small group, many of whom are engaged in activities made unlawful by state and federal statutes. But § 4401 is actually even more directly confined to that group. Section 4402 (1) exempts from the tax wagers placed with a parimutuel wagering enterprise “licensed under State law,” and § 4421 defines “wager” to exclude most forms of unorganized gambling such as dice and poker, and defines “lottery” to exclude commonly played games such as bingo and drawings conducted by certain tax-exempt organizations. The effect of these exceptions is to limit the wagering excise tax under § 4401 almost exclusively to illegal, organized gambling.

Moreover, the code contemplates extensive record-keeping reporting by persons obligated to pay the tax. But these are records and reports which would incriminate overwhelmingly. Section 6011 (a) requires any person liable to pay a tax to file a return in accordance with the forms and regulations promulgated by the Secretary or his delegate. The regulations promulgating record-keeping requirements and the requirement that taxpayers make a monthly return on Form 730, Treas. Reg. §44.6011 (a)-l(a), were therefore formulated pursuant to specific congressional authority. That the return is intended to be a part of the wagering tax obligation is clear from the face of the return itself. Immediately under Form 730’s title “TAX ON WAGERING” is a reference to “(Section 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code),” and in at least three places the return indicates that “this form must be filed, with remittance, with the District Director of Internal Revenue.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus § 4401 requires that taxpayers send the Government every month both the tax due and the completed Form 730. That much can start them on the road to prison. The Service then is free to take various steps to assure that it does. It may investigate such taxpayers. It may subpoena taxpayers’ records to ascertain whether the payments are accurate. It can and does pass on for use by prosecuting authorities the facts of payments and filing and any other evidence uncovered. These many, substantial dangers easily satisfy the test for incrimination fashioned by our cases.

Of course the privilege does not guarantee anonymity. The question in these cases, however, is not whether all governmental programs which require citizens to expose their identity are invalid, but whether this statutory system, designed primarily for and utilized to pierce the anonymity of citizens engaged in criminal activity, is invalid. The privilege does guarantee anonymity from inquiries so designed, when the risks are not wholly fanciful. And the risks here are obvious and real. A list of persons who comply with § 4401 every month is invaluable to prosecuting authorities. It must frequently provide the clinching link in the chain of conviction.

We must take this statute as it is written and as it has been applied. Both the statute and the practice under it clearly further a congressional purpose to gather evidence from citizens in order to secure their conviction of crime. There undoubtedly will be other statutes and practices as to which this determination will be more difficult to make. These cases, however, present a statutory system manifesting a patent violation of the privilege. That system must be dealt with uncompromisingly to protect against encroachment of the privilege and to encourage legislative care and concern for its continuing vitality.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

If we were writing upon a clean slate, I would agree with the conclusion reached by The Chief Justice in these cases. Por I am' convinced that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was originally meant to do no more than confer a testimonial privilege upon a witness in a judicial proceeding. But the Court long ago lost sight of that original meaning. In the absence of a fundamental re-examination of our decisions, the most relevant recent one being Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70, I am compelled to join the opinions and judgments of the.Court.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren,

dissenting.

The Court today strikes down as unconstitutional a statutory scheme enacted by Congress to make effective and enforceable taxes imposed on wagers and the occupation of gambling. In so doing, it of necessity overrules United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U. S. 419 (1955). I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion on the constitutional questions presented, and I would affirm the convictions in these two cases on the authority of Kahriger and Lewis.

In addition to being in disagreement with the Court on the result it reaches in these cases, I am puzzled by the reasoning process which leads it to that result. The Court professes to recognize and accept the power of Congress legitimately to impose taxes on activities which have been declared unlawful by federal or state statutes. Yet, by its sweeping declaration that the congressional scheme for enforcing and collecting the taxes imposed on wagers and gamblers is unconstitutional, the Court has stripped from Congress the power to make its taxing scheme effective. A reading of the registration requirement of 26 U. S. C. § 4412, as implemented by Internal Revenue Service Form 11-C, reveals that the'information demanded of gamblers is no more than is necessary to assure that the tax-collection process will be effective. Registration of those liable for special taxes is a common and integral feature of the tax laws. See 26 U. S. C. § 7011. So also is the requirement of public disclosure. And the reach of the registration and disclosure requirements extends to both lawful and unlawful activities. Because registration and disclosure are so pervasive in the Internal Revenue Code, it is clear that such requirements have been imposed by Congress to aid in the collection of taxes legitimately levied. Because most forms of gambling have been declared illegal in this country, gamblers necessarily operate furtively in the dark shadows of the underworld. Only by requiring that such individuals come forward under pain of criminal sanctions and reveal the nature and scope of their activities can Congress confidently expect that revenue derived from that outlawed occupation will be subject to the legitimate reach of the tax laws. Indeed, it seems to me that the very secrecy which surrounds the business of gambling demands disclosure. Those legislative committees and executive commissions which have studied the problems of illicit gambling activities have found it impossible to determine with any precision the gross revenues derived from that business. For example, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported:

“There is no accurate way of ascertaining organized crime’s gross revenue from gambling in the United States. Estimates of the annual intake have varied from $7 to $50 billion. . . . While the Commission cannot judge the accuracy of these figures, even the most conservative estimates place substantial capital in the hands of organized crime leaders.” President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 3 (1967).

The Commission’s observation is doubly revealing. It shows that the business of gambling is a lucrative revenue source. And it demonstrates the need for an enforceable disclosure device, such as the registration requirement of § 4412, if the revenue potential is to be realized. No one denies that the disclosures demanded by § 4412 can also be useful to law enforcement officials and that the very process of disclosure may have a regulatory effect on gamblers and their operations. But this Court has repeatedly recognized that “a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.” Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513 (1937). See also License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (1867).

In declaring the registration requirements of § 4412 invalid, the Court places principal reliance on Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 (1965). But there is a critical distinction between that case and the cases decided today. In Albertson, the Court dealt with a registration requirement which clashed head-on with protected First Amendment rights and which could be viewed as serving no substantial governmental purpose in light of the curtailment of those rights. These elements are notably lacking in the cases decided today. The occupation of gambling can in no sense be called a “protected” activity. The only claim that those engaged in gambling make is that they are somehow entitled to have their activities shrouded in secrecy and shielded from disclosure. Nothing in the Constitution compels such a result. And there is clearly a legitimate tax purpose in demanding that gamblers make the disclosures required by § 4412 and Form 11-C. Disclosure by means of registration is routinely required under the tax laws of those engaged in legitimate and lawful business enterprises. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. §§ 4101, 4222, 5502, 5802. Cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948). To relieve gamblers of the registration requirement is to create for those engaged in that occupation a special constitutional privilege of nonregistration.

In view of these considerations, I cannot understand why the Court today finds it necessary to strike down the registration requirement of § 4412 directed at those who derive their income from gambling. What seems to trouble the Court is not that registration is required but that the information obtained through the registration requirement is turned over by federal officials, under the statutory compulsion of 26 U. S. C. § 6107, to state prosecutors to aid them in the enforcement of state gambling laws. If that is the source of the Court’s Fifth Amendment concern, then constitutional adjudication demands that the provisions of § 6107 be the focus of the Court’s decision. It does not seem reasonable to me to rule that, because information derived from the registration provisions of § 4412 must be made available to state prosecutors under § 6107, the registration requirements suffer from a fatal constitutional infirmity, even though § 4412 is a necessary and proper means of assuring that the occupational tax on gamblers will be enforceable. Certainly no Fifth Amendment issue arises from the fact of registration until an effort is made to use the registration procedure in aid of criminal prosecution. To the extent that the disclosure requirements of § 6107 would raise a Fifth Amendment problem because some of the names on the public list have admitted unlawful activities, that statutory provision is severable for purposes of constitutional adjudication. In fact, in the Internal Revenue Code itself, Congress has specifically enacted a severability clause. Section 7852 (a) of Title 26 provides: “If any provision of this title, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the title, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.” That clause represents a clear statutory command to this Court to wield its constitutional knife surgically, concentrating on the suspect provisions of § 6107 rather than bludgeoning the entire taxing scheme. The Court cannot evade this constitutional and statutory duty, as it seems to do, by labeling every provision of the wagering tax statutes as “interrelated” or “integral.”

There is no such narrow focus to the Court’s approach to these two cases. In fact, the Court impliedly rejects such an approach in dealing with the Government’s suggestion that the taxing scheme at issue be saved from constitutional interment by imposing a use restriction on the information derived from registration under § 4412. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52 (1964). The Court finds such a limitation unacceptable because the legislative history of the wagering tax system reveals a congressional purpose to make available to state and local law enforcement officials the disclosures made through registration. The Court reasons that to impose the use restriction, would be to defeat the congressional purpose, and it finds the suggested saving device unacceptable. But realistically the Court’s sweeping constitutional ruling has the effect of frustrating two congressional purposes — the disclosure purpose and the revenue purpose. Such a result can hardly be justified on the ground of according a congressional purpose the deference due it by this Court. Conceding that the statutory scheme is intended to assist law enforcement, the fact that taxes in the sum of $115,000,000 have flowed from the wagering tax scheme to the Treasury in the past several years is convincing evidence of a legitimate tax purpose. The congressional intent to assist law enforcement should not be the excuse for frustrating the revenue purpose of the statutes before the Court. Regardless of legislative intent, this Court has in the past refused “to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required.” Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 163 (1961); cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 186, n. 43 (1963). This principle should prevail in this case where the Act has the wholesome objective of devising workable procedures to assure that gamblers will pay the same taxes on their profits as other citizens are compelled to pay.

I apprehend that the Court, by unnecessarily sweeping within its constitutional holding the registration requirements of § 4412, is opening the door to a new wave of attacks on a number of federal registration statutes whenever the registration requirement touches upon allegedly illegal activities. As I noted above, registration is a common feature attached to a number of special taxes imposed by Title 26. For example, the following provisions impose special registration requirements: §4101 (those subject to the tax on petroleum products); § 4222 (registration regarding certain tax-free sales by manufacturers); § 4722 (those engaged in dealing in narcotic drugs) ; § 4753 (those who deal in marihuana); § 4804 (d) (manufacturers of white phosphorous matches); §§ 5171-5172 (registration of distilleries); § 5179 (registration of stills); § 5502 (manufacturers of vinegar); § 5802 (importers, manufacturers, and dealers in firearms). And § 7011 imposes a general registration requirement on all those liable for other special taxes. Heretofore this Court has consistently upheld the validity of such registration requirements, without regard to the legality of the activity being taxed. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42 (1950) (26 U. S. C. §4753); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506 (1937) (26 U. S. C. § 5841); Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332 (1928) (26 U. S. C. § 4722). The implications of the Court’s decisions today also extend beyond the tax statutes. For example, the statute requiring narcotics addicts and violators to register whenever they enter or leave the country, 18 U. S. C. § 1407, can now be expected to come under attack. My concern that such registration requirements will now come under attack is not imaginary. This very day the Court, adhering to its decisions in Marchetti and Grosso, declares unconstitutional in Haynes v. United States, post, p. 85, 26 U. S. C. § 5851, which makes unlawful the possession of a firearm not registered under § 5841. The impact of that decision on the efforts of Congress to enact much-needed federal gun control laws is not consistent with national safety. In my view, the Court has failed to take account of these relevant implications in the very broad holdings of today’s decisions.

       After argument, the case was returned to the calendar, and set for reargument at the 1967 Term, again with Marchetti, sufra. 388 U. S. 904. Counsel were asked to argue, in addition to the original questions, the following: “(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, to the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the obligation to pay the wagering excise tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 4401 ? (2) Is satisfaction of an obligation to pay a wagering excise tax imposed by 26 U. S. C. §4401 conditioned upon the filing of a return required under 26 U. S. C. § 6011 and pertinent regulations? If it is not, what information, if any, must accompany the payment of a wagering excise tax obligation in order to extinguish the taxpayer’s liability for that obligation?”

       Indeed, so far as the pertinent materials can be said to reflect any position, it is that a return must accompany a tax payment. See 26 U. S. C. §6011; Treas. Reg. §44.6011 (a)-l (a).

       The United States has suggested that the Commissioner has authority to make information obtained as a result of the excise tax available to prosecuting officers under 26 U. S. C. § 6103, 5 U. S. C. §§22, 1002 (c), and Treas. Reg. §§ 601.702 (a) (3) and (d). Brief for the United States on the original argument, p. 14, n. 10. But see Transcript of Record 101-102.

       See State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 86 So. 2d 895; State v. Baum, 230 La. 247, 88 So. 2d 209; Boynton v. State, 75 So. 2d 211, 213; United States v. Whiting, 311 F. 2d 191, 193. And see Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8 Crime & Delin. 371, 372. Further, we note that the United States has acknowledged thé “limited availability” of the excise tax returns, “in certain circumstances,” to state and local officials. Brief on Reargument 33, n. 30.

       It is useful to note that the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the wagering excise tax was not at issue in either Kahriger or Lewis; Lewis involved an information which charged a willful failure to pay the occupational tax, and Kahriger an information which charged willful failures both to register and to pay the occupational tax.

       H. R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 60.

       Section 4411 provides that the occupational tax must be paid “by each person who is liable for tax under section 4401” and by each person who receives wagers for one liable under §4401. It might therefore be argued that since petitioner is entitled to claim the constitutional privilege in defense of a prosecution for willful failure to pay the excise tax, he is thereby freed from liability for the occupational tax. We cannot accept such an argument. We do not hold today either that the excise tax is as such constitutionally impermissible, or that a proper claim of privilege extinguishes liability for taxation; we hold only that such a claim of privilege precludes a criminal conviction premised on failure to pay the tax.

       It should be noted that petitioner’s trial counsel did once assert, in colloquy with the trial judge, that “We contended and have always contended — and if required to go on appeal will continue to contend — that the requirements of this Act in requiring you to pay this excise tax and take out the stamp are a violation of the privilege against self incrimination.” The court then inquired, “You are raising the Constitutional question of the validity of the law?” Petitioner’s counsel replied, “That is right.” Transcript of Record 33. Petitioner did not, however, challenge his obligation to pay the occupational tax either in any of his various motions or in any of his other arguments, here or in the courts below.

       Section 2106 provides that “The Supreme Court . . . may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”

       In light of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to reach petitioner’s alternative contention, that conduct of the trial judge after submission of the case to the jury prevented a fair trial.

      [This opinion applies also to No. 2, Marchetti v. United States, ante, p. 39.]

      The instructions on Form 730 state that the “[r]etum, with remittance, covering the tax due under section 4401 for any calendar month must be in the hands of the District Director . . . on or before the last day of the succeeding month . . . .”

      [This opinion applies also to No. 2, Marchetti v. United States, ante, p. 39.]

       And in Haynes v. United States, post, p. 85.

       That, after all, is what the clause says:
      “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .

      [This opinion applies also to No. 2, Marchetti v. United States, ante, p. 39.]

       It is trae that the Internal Revenue Code also imposes special registration requirements in connection with some of the special taxes. See the registration sections collected in 26 U. S. C. § 7012. However, the special registration requirements differ only in degree, and not in kind, from the provisions of § 7011.

       Among the more general public disclosure provisions of the Revenue Code are § 6103 (f) (list of taxpayers); § 6104 (returns of certain tax-exempt organizations); and § 6105 (lists of those who have been granted excess profit relief).

       Other reports are similarly indefinite concerning the precise amount of revenue realized by organized crime from illicit gambling operations. Thus, a Senate report could be no more exact than to describe unlawful gambling activities as “a multibillion dollar racket.” Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Gambling and Organized Crime, S. Rep. No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 (1962). The President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia reported that “over 100 million dollars is bet annually on ‘numbers’ and sports events” in the Washington metropolitan area. The Commission relied for its figures on information supplied by Sheldon S. Cohen, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Report of the President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia 112 (1966).

       Investigations by congressional committees have established that gambling revenue provides a principal source of revenue for organized crime in this country. See S. Rep. No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 (1962); S. Rep. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1951). Some congressmen may well have been motivated by a desire to control and curtail organized crime in enacting the tax laws challenged, in these cases. However, it is not the task of this Court to examine such motives in ruling on the constitutionality of such laws, and the Court today has wisely declined to engage in any motive-searching inquiries.

       I recognize that Albertson was decided on Fifth Amendment grounds without reaching the petitioners’ First Amendment claims. 382 U. S., at 73-74 and n. 6. However, in applying the Albertson holding to the facts of these cases, it cannot be overlooked that the registration requirement in Albertson was directed at the petitioners’ organizational affiliations' which were arguably protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). There is no such First Amendment issue lurking in the cases decided today. The operative fact upon which the registration requirement of § 4412 depends is an individual’s status as a gambler.

       The Court points out in Grosso v. United States that the disclosure requirements of § 6107 do not extend to the excise tax provisions of §4401. But, by administrative practice, the identity of those who pay the excise tax on wagers is made known to state prosecuting officials. Ante, at 66.

       For example, the following sections impose occupational taxes and subject the taxpayer to the registration requirements of § 7011: § 4461 (those who maintain for use or permit use of coin-operated amusement or gaming devices); §§ 4721 and 4702 (a) (2) (C) (those who deal in narcotic drugs); § 4751 (dealers in marihuana); § 4821 (manufacturers or dealers in renovated or adulterated butter); § 4841 (manufacturers or dealers in filled cheese); § 5081 (those who rectify distilled spirits or wines); § 5091 (brewers of beer) ; § 5101 (manufacturers of stills); and § 5111 (wholesale dealers in liquors, wines, and beer); § 5121 (retail dealers in liquors, wines, and beer); and § 5801 (dealers in certain firearms). The registration requirement applies uniformly to those engaged in such occupations lawfully and those whose activities would make them hable to criminal penalties.

       The petition for a writ of certiorari in Haynes was filed on March 11, 1967, almost a year after this Court granted a writ of certiorari in Costello v. United States (the companion case to Marchetti). In granting the writ, the Court stipulated as the sole question in Costello whether Kahriger and Lewis should be overruled. 383 U. S. 942. There can be little doubt that the Court’s specification of the question for argument in Costello prompted the Fifth Amendment challenge in Haynes.