author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 72-521.
    Irish Northern Aid Committee v. Attorney General of the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan concur,

dissenting.

Petitioner is registered as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 631, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 611 et seg. The District Court ordered it to comply with the Act by filing, inter alia, a statement of contributions which included the names of contributors. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in an unreported order.

I believe that the Foreign Agents Registration Act does not authorize the Attorney General to require lists of the names and addresses of contributors, as he has done in 28 CFR §5.201 (e). Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958).

The Foreign Agents Registration Act sets out an extensive scheme to regulate the activities of foreign agents. But the scheme is not all-encompassing. Its purpose is to inform the American people of the activities of the agents of foreign principals so that the people may carefully “appraise them and the purposes for which they act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966).

Congress has determined that we must know the extent to which a foreign agent is supported by his principal so that we may properly evaluate the agent’s interest in the views he presents. To that end, the statute requires the agent to disclose “[t]he nature and amount of contributions, income, money, or thing of value, if any, that the registrant has received . . . from each such foreign principal . . . .” 22 U. S. C. § 612 (a) (5). Prior to its amendment in 1966, the statute did require the disclosure of the name and address of “any person who has . .. contributed or paid money or anything of value to the registrant,” § 2 (a)(7), 56 Stat. 252. This provision was omitted in 1966, leaving § 612 (a) (5) as essentially the only provision requiring disclosure of contributors.

The amendments adopted in 1966 were intended to limit the scope of the previous act and thereby to make effective enforcement more likely. In language repeated in each subsequent Committee report on the proposed revision, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations referred to its bill as “better focusing the act on those individuals performing political or semipolitical activities.” S. Rep. No. 875, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1964). The Committee said, “Too broadly written for today’s needs, the present act’s disclosure provisions have through the years been too narrowly enforced with the emphasis placed on subversive or potentially subversive agents.” Id., at 5. Congress in 1966 deliberately narrowed the coverage of the statute. I would not read into it broad coverage, through a general authorization to the Attorney General, that is inconsistent with the thrust of the legislation taken as a whole.

The statute no longer requires, in terms, the disclosure of the names of all contributors. But the registrant must keep “such books of account and other records with respect to all his activities, the disclosure of which is required under the provisions of this subchapter . . . as the Attorney General, having due regard for the national security and the public interest, may by regulation prescribe as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of this subchapter.” 22 U. S. C. § 615. The Attorney General has apparently determined that the names and addresses of all contributors must be disclosed to insure full disclosure of contributions from the foreign principal. 28 CFR § 5.201(e). This requirement, I believe, goes beyond the bounds of the statute.

First, the Attorney General is authorized to require that records be kept as to “all . . . activities, the disclosure of which is required under the provisions of this subchapter,” 22 U. S. C. § 615. The predicate of a valid regulation, then, is that it relate to an activity that must be disclosed by the terms of the Act itself. As I have noted, nothing in the Act requires the disclosure of the names of all contributors.

The Act does require that the organization disclose the extent to which it is controlled financially by its principal. And disclosure of the names of all contributors would make it easier for Americans to learn the degree of control which the foreign principal has over an organization which solicits their contributions. But the respondent in this case has given no reason to believe that the foreign principal in this case has contributed more to the Irish Northern Aid Committee than has already been disclosed. Indeed, the very nature of the organization and the principal makes that very unlikely. For all that appears, the Irish Northern Aid Committee is a shoestring operation, which raises money at dances and house parties and sends it to an organization in Northern Ireland which seems to have few resources of its own. It is not the well-financed agent of an established government that sends money to this country for extensive efforts to influence public opinion.

The case might be different if the Attorney General had shown some reason to believe that the Irish Northern Aid Committee had failed to disclose contributions it had received from its principal. Full disclosure then might be the only way to discover whether that suspicion had some basis in fact. Without such a showing, however, the Attorney General has not established that the predicate for a valid regulation exists. The regulation he has promulgated, which does not require any showing of possible relevance to some disclosure required by the terms of the Act, is more than the Act permits.

Second, if we were to construe the Act as authorizing such a broad-ranging inquiry, I would be troubled by the possibility that Congress had authorized an inquiry which the First Amendment forbids. Membership in ah organization is protected from disclosure when the Government’s interest in disclosure is outweighed by the impact on association that disclosure causes. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462-464 (1958). This balancing can be done only after careful consideration is given to the competing interests. Here the Government’s interest is said to be guaranteeing that the public knows the extent to which petitioner is supported by its foreign principal. The Committee has already registered as a foreign agent and is subject to a wide range of disclosure requirements that I do not question. It is hard to believe that the increment in public information provided by disclosure of the names and addresses of contributors would be great, especially in a case where the Attorney General has shown no reason to believe that disclosure would reveal hidden contributions from the foreign principal.

On the other side, petitioner claims that many of its contributors are properly fearful for the safety of their relatives who remain in the turbulent surroundings of Northern Ireland. On the record developed in the District Court, based solely on affidavits, we cannot, I think, make an informed judgment of the impact of such fears on potential contributors.

The constitutional argument is a difficult one. I would not assume that Congress had carefully considered it when enacting a statute which does not, in terms, pose the constitutional question. The statutory basis for the Attorney General’s requirement that the names of contributors be disclosed, without any preliminary showing that such disclosure would advance the ends of the statute, is rather slender in the first instance. It is hardly construing the statute to avoid constitutional doubts to read into it authority for the Attorney General to adopt regulations that themselves raise constitutional questions.

I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.

       Section 612 (a) (7) requires the disclosure of contributions from anyone other than the principal “for whom the registrant is acting .. . under such circumstances as require his registration hereunder.” This provision is intended to prevent the foreign principal from acting through a facade or alter ego who would register and then simply act as a channel for funds to an unregistered person who would do all that the principal wanted done. H. R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The respondent argues that this section is a broad one. On its face, it is quite narrow. Respondent says, however, that the legislative history “makes it clear that Congress did not intend the provision to be read so narrowly.” Brief for Respondent in Opposition 11. I confess that I cannot read the section to require anything more than disclosure of contributions “from each such person.” That is, after all, just what the language of the section purports to require. The legislative history cited by respondent shows only that Congress intended to cover what the language of the section covers, the use of registered agents to convey money to unregistered third parties who would then disburse it within the United States. I find it hard to interpret this history as providing any guidance in deciding the case at hand. The only statutory basis for respondent’s action that I can find is § 615.

       See also S. Rep. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1965); H. R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966).

       See also S. Rep. No. 143, supra, n. 2, at 5.

       It does require full disclosure of all expenditures. 22 U. S. C. § 612 (a) (8).

       The case was submitted to the District Court on affidavits, none of which revealed any reason for respondent to believe that the petitioner was receiving undisclosed amounts from its principal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 72-529.
    Gremillion v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-532.
    Keever v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion for leave to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-594.
    Mather v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-625.
    Smith v. Falcon Seaboard, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-680.
    Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 76 of Wisconsin et al.
   C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5146.
    Johnson v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5199.
    Phillips v. Carr et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5230.
    Boag v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5239.
    Leroy v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5508.
    Rosemond v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5556.
    Hoover v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-633.
    Copeland Refrigeration Corp. v. Warriner Hermetics, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5497.
    Clizer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-644.
    D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondent Black United Front for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5506.
    James v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 72-5405.
    Al-Karagholi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner, a nonimmigrant student, was admitted to the United States in January 1962, pursuant to § 101 (a) (15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 167, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15), with authorization to remain in the country in that status until January 28, 1968. In June 1967, deportation proceedings were initiated against petitioner on the ground that he had failed to maintain his student status. These proceedings were apparently dropped.

On January 5, 1968, prior to the date of the expiration of his visa, petitioner filed an application for an extension of time under the visa for the purpose of continuing his education. This application was denied by the Special Inquiry Officer on the ground that the petitioner’s primary interest in remaining in the United States was to work as a street vendor and not to pursue his educational interests. Petitioner was granted until May 21, 1969, to leave the country. On May 13, 1969, his application for reconsideration, wherein he verified his admission to the Washington Technical Institute, was denied.

On March 4, 1970, a deportation hearing was held at which time petitioner was represented by counsel. The Special Inquiry Officer found petitioner deportable. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals observed that the principal basis for petitioner’s appeal — the denial of his request for an extension of his student visa — was not appealable or subject to review.

Title 8 CFR § 214.2 (f) (4), a rule promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, indicates that there is no review available of the decisions on applications for extensions of student visas. “The applicant shall be notified of the decision and, if the application is denied, of the reason therefor. No appeal shall lie from the decision.” In light of this Court’s decisions, recognizing the fundamental rights involved in deportation, this regulation denies applicants due process of law.

As early as 1921 this Court recognized that fundamental rights were involved in observing that not only does deportation deprive a person of his liberty, but, “[i]t may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.” Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284. Because of the nature of the deprivation, although deportation is not technically a criminal penalty, this Court has concluded that “deportation is a penalty — at times a most serious one .... Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he [the alien] is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 154. (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court has held that the denial of a motion to reopen by the Special Inquiry Officer is reviewable as a “final order of deportation.” Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U. S. 18; Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U. S. 217. At least one federal court of appeals has interpreted these cases to authorize judicial review of a decision on an issue stemming from a deportation proceeding. Rose v. Woolwine, 344 F. 2d 993 (CA4).

Contrary to Regulation § 214.2 (f)(4), an order of the Special Inquiry Officer denying an application for an extension of time under a currently valid visa does operate as a final order and must be subject to judicial review. When the extension is denied, a deportation date is set. The alien is given no recourse to challenge this deportation other than to leave the country and attempt to regain entry or to stay in the United States illegally in hopes of obtaining review in a deportation proceeding. But, as in the instant case, that review is so limited as to be nonexistent, when the Board of Immigration Appeals feels compelled by Regulation § 214.2 (f) (4) not to give any consideration to the denial of the extension or the reasons thereunder.

Such a result would appear to be contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U. S. C. § 704) wherein “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is asserted that petitioner was not seeking a true student status because his main purpose was to work here. That is a gross distortion of the record. Petitioner was and is a true student, whether brilliant or mediocre being not material. He is a penniless student and works his way through the schools here in the District of Columbia by being a vendor of articles in the parks and other places. He has no criminal record; his mastery of the English language is not superior, and he has problems understanding the requirements of our laws and the procedures before our bureaucracy, just as an American studying in Baghdad would have great difficulty in toeing the line of Arabic law as construed and applied by Iraqi officials.

I would grant the petition for certiorari and put the case down for oral argument.

       At the hearing before the Special Inquiry Officer, it was determined that petitioner had discontinued his education and he was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the case with directions to the Special Inquiry Officer to reopen the hearing to consider evidence, which had not been before him, which verified petitioner’s student status. No further hearing was held.

       That approach is as important in dealing with deportation of students as it is in other alien' cases. These days students are often political targets of their home country. Both Iran and Taiwan have been notorious in seeking our aid in deporting students, so that the students can be executed on their return for their opposed political ideas. While cancellation of the student visa in these troubled days may be sought for that purpose, Iraq does not seem to be the force behind the scenes in the present case.

       See Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement 72 Col. L. Rev. 1293, 1348 et seq. (1972).


text:
    No. 72-5535.
    Dye v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of bookmaking in violation of state law. The evidence from which the conviction resulted arose primarily from a wiretap of a telephone on the premises where petitioner was employed. Petitioner challenges the admissibility of the wiretap product on the grounds that the judicial authorization was not in conformity with the state statute authorizing wiretapping (N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:156A-1) and that the wiretap violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Pursuant to judicial authorization, a wiretap was placed on the pay telephone located in the restaurant-bar-liquor store in which petitioner was employed. The affidavits supporting the request for authorization of the tap included the following information: That the police had been advised that the number of the telephone in question was listed many times on the toll receipt of another telephone which was located at a place where there was “good reason to believe,” pursuant to a different investigation, that bookmaking operations were being conducted; that police stakeouts in the restaurant-bar-liquor store overheard both petitioner and an unidentified male make a call on the telephone in which betting information was passed; that petitioner was observed taking notes from the sports pages of a newspaper and having guarded conversations with customers; and that when a reliable informer was requested to call the telephone number and place a bet, petitioner refused to take the bet, leading the informer to believe that petitioner would not deal with strangers.

From the above facts, the law division judge concluded that sufficient exigent circumstances existed for concluding that traditional investigative techniques would be unproductive, and issued a warrant which authorized the placing of a wiretap on the telephone between the hours of 10 a. m. and 3 p. m., Monday through Saturday for a 30-day period, with directions that the interception begin as soon as practicable. The order also directed that the wiretap be conducted in such a way as to minimize or eliminate the interception of communications other than the type described. Those communications subject to seizure were described as “communications of Bentley Dye [petitioner] relating to the offenses of Bookmaking and Conspiracy from telephone facility number 201-725-9743.”

Pursuant to the order, the police placed a wiretap on the telephone which was operative for 22 days. Over 105 hours of conversations were tapped. A master tape of those conversations allegedly involving bookmaking and the conspiracy was made and it ran about 2% hours. The recordings of nonrelated communications were sealed. (No reason is given as to why they were not destroyed.) On several days when petitioner was not at work the wiretap remained in effect, recording any calls made on the telephone.

In Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 63, this Court held that “[w]hile ‘[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement’ ... it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one’s home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.”

In Berger, the language of the New York statute authorizing the wiretap was held to be unconstitutionally broad because authorization thereunder operated as the issuance of an illegal general warrant. The authorization in Berger allowed a wiretap to be placed on the defendant’s business office phone for a period of 60 days. The authorization was issued on the basis of affidavits advising the judge that the bases for the suspicions of a conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority were recorded interviews between a complainant and the petitioner.

In Berger the Court placed special emphasis on the Fourth Amendment requirements that there be probable cause for the belief that a particular offense has been or is being committed and that the “property” (conversations) to be seized be described with particularity. In addition, the Court found the authorization constitutionally infirm on the grounds that an authorization for a period of two months constitutes a series of intrusions pursuant to a single showing of probable cause and that the authorization did not establish an intermediate termination date once the conversation sought was intercepted.

These same concerns dictate a reversal in the instant case: Only the merest investigation had been undertaken to establish that a particular offense was being committed, and part of that investigation, the unsuccessful attempt by an informer to place a bet, itself negated the suspicion. Although the authorization order limited the conversations to be seized, the execution of the order included seizure of all conversations on the telephone over the period of the wiretap. Such an invasion of privacy is even more horrendous since it involves a pay telephone in a public place where the majority of users and conversations, as indicated by the 102% hours of innocent conversations out of the 105 hours of seized conversations, will have no relationship to the alleged criminal activity. Authorization for a 30-day wiretap would not appear to be any less of a continuing search than authorization for 60 days, especially in light of the absence of any establishment of an intermediate termination date once the conversation sought was intercepted.

It is alleged that the New Jersey statute under which this wiretap was authorized is for all practical purposes identical to the federal authorization for wiretapping contained in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq. If the authorization of the wiretap in the instant case, which is the equivalent of a general warrant, is allowed by either of these statutes, then it is difficult to declare them constitutional.

I would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5566.
    Egbert v. Martinez et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for extension of time to file petition nunc pro tunc presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1497.
    No. 71-6500.
    No. 71-6649.
    No. 71-6847.
    No. 72-240.
    No. 72-319.
    No. 72-5014.
    No. 72-5351.
    Beck v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., Doherty v. United States, Fair v. Sebesta, Martin v. United States, Harper v. United States, Kennecott Copper Corp. et al. v. State Tax Commission of Utah, Connors v. Johnson, Warden, Newell v. United States,
   ante, p. 845;

ante, p. 888;

ante, p. 978;

ante, p. 870;

ante, p. 973;

ante, p. 973;

ante, p. 1009; and

ante, p. 1025. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-6540.
    Grene v. United States,
   ante, p. 856. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    December 21, 1972
    No. 72-457.
    Rodriguez v. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 72-5302.
    Phillips v. Housing Authority of City of Providence.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. R. I. dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    January 8, 1973
    No. 72-579.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Mo.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-581.
    Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo.


text:
    No. 72-632.
    National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.


text:
    No. 72-723.
    United States v. State Corporation Commission of Virginia et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Va.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.


author: Mr. Justice White,

text:
    No. 72-621.
    Wells v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. La.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

The Louisiana constitutional provisions, which this Court today upholds against appellant’s renewed constitutional attack, provide for the election of the State’s Supreme Court Justices from election districts that are established without regard to population. Voters in five districts, composed of varying numbers of parishes, elect one justice each. A sixth district elects two justices. La. Const., Art. VII, § 9. The record before the District Court indicated that there was "considerable deviation between the population of some of the [election] districts,” 347 F. Supp. 453, 454, and that, therefore, the votes of some qualified voters, depending on the happenstance of residence, were of less value in electing justices than others cast elsewhere. But the District Court refused even to consider this evidence and, relying on a few isolated sentences in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50 (1970), concluded that “the concept of one-man, one-vote apportionment does not apply to the judicial branch of the government.” 347 F. Supp., at 454. Summary judgment was entered against appellant, who Nad attacked the Louisiana scheme under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Hadley, we held that the one-person, one-vote principle extended to the election of trustees for a consolidated junior college district. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated broadly that, as a general rule, "whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election.” 397 U. S., at 56. The District Court in this case seized upon the phrase “persons . . . to perform governmental functions,” and concluded that such persons were limited to “officials who performed legislative or executive type duties.” 347 F. Supp., at 455. I find no such limiting import in the phrase. Judges are not private citizens who are sought out by litigious neighbors to pass upon their disputes. They are state officials, vested with state powers and elected (or appointed) to carry out the state government’s judicial functions. As such, they most certainly “perform governmental functions.” Indeed, this Court held precisely that nearly a decade ago, in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963), by invalidating Georgia’s county unit system that had been used for counting Democratic Party primary votes for United States Senator, Governor, statehouse officers, justices of the Supreme Court, and judges of the Court of Appeals. Nowhere did we suggest that the county unit system was any less unconstitutional for the election of judges than for the election of governor. On the contrary, with the most direct language possible, the Court stated:

“The concept of 'we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.” Id., at 379-380.

We have held that a State may dispense with certain elections altogether (see Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105 (1967); cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231 (1966)) and we have suggested that not all persons must be permitted to vote on an issue that may affect only a discernible portion of the public, see Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 632 (1969). What I had thought the apportionment decisions at least established is the simple constitutional principle that, subject to narrow exceptions, once a State chooses to select officials by popular vote, each qualified voter must be treated with an equal hand and not be subjected to irrational discrimination based on his residence. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554-555 (1964). Nothing could be plainer from Mr. Justice Black’s statement in Hadley, 397 U. S., at 54-55:

“[WJhile the office of junior college trustee differs in certain respects from those offices considered in prior cases, it is exactly the same in the one crucial factor — these officials are elected by popular vote.
“When a court is asked to decide whether a State is required by the Constitution to give each qualified voter the same power in an election open to all, there is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election. If one person’s vote is given less weight through unequal apportionment, his right to equal voting participation is impaired just as much when he votes for a school board member as when he votes for a state legislator. While there are differences in the powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the right of each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in the election process. It should be remembered that in cases like this one we are asked by voters to insure that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm from unequal treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials selected.”

The judgment of the District Court is questionable under a decade of this Court’s decisions. It at least warrants plenary review here.

       The record indicates that in 1970 the election districts ranged in population from 369,485 to 682,072. The two-justice district had a total population of 1,007,449.

       There is language in other district court opinions to the effect that the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to the judiciary. See, e. g., Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928 (MDNC 1971), aff’d, ante, p. 807; Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860 (ND Ohio), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 385 U. S. 3 (1966); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (ND Ga. 1964). See also New York Assn. of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (SDNY 1967). The statutory schemes involved in those cases, however, differ materially from the Louisiana provisions at issue here. For example, in Holshouser and Stokes, district judges were nominated through primaries in districts with varying populations; the judges were elected, however, on a statewide basis that conformed to the one-person, one-vote principle. In this context, the district courts rejected the claim that plaintiffs’ primary votes were “diluted” by the general election. Cf. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967). In Buchanan, plaintiffs claimed that the apportionment of trial judges in the State resulted in fewer judges per capita in urban districts than in rural districts. Plaintiffs challenged the apportionment on the ground that it denied them speedy justice, not on the ground that their vote in statewide elections was diluted.
      See generally Note, The Equal-Population Principle: Does It Apply To Elected Judges?, 47 Notre Dame Law. 316 (1971).

       For example, in Hadley, Mr. Justice Black conceded the possibility “that there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds . . . might not be required.” 397 U. S., at 56. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 483-484 (1968).


text:
    No. 72-660.
    Davis et al. v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. La.


text:
    No. 71-1577.
    Rexrode v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-695.
    Kellems et al. v. Brown, Tax Commissioner, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Conn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-179.
    Wilkinson v. Wilkinson.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement and motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-622.
    Cutrone v. Kelly, Administrative Judge, et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-670.
    McLean Trucking Co. v. County of Forsyth et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-640.
    Oregon State Elks Assn. et al. v. Falkenstein et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 72-5468.
    Carr v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-308.
    Fitzharris, Warden v. Love.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss case as moot.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall would deny certiorari.


text:
    No. A-557.
    Enders, District Attorney of Oneida County, New York, et al. v. Esquire Theaters of America, Inc.
   D. C. N. D. N. Y. Application for stay of execution of judgment in case No. 72-CV-450 presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending disposition of case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.


text:
    No. A-605.
    Hampton, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission, et al. v. Fitzgerald et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of the Solicitor General to dissolve stay granted. [See ante, p. 1055.]


text:
    No. D-1.
    In re Disbarment of Kahn.
   It having been reported to this Court that Frances Kahn of New York, New York, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of November 6,1972 {ante, p. 974), having suspended the said Frances Kahn from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It Is Ordered that the said Frances Kahn be, and she is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that her name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. A-665.
    Kingston et al., Justices v. McLaughlin, Justice, et al.
   D. C. Mass. Application for stay of judgment presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-2.
    In re Disbarment of Abrams.
   It having been reported to this Court that Hyman Abrams of New York, New York, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of November 6, 1972 (ante, p. 974), having suspended the said Hyman Abrams from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It Is Ordered that the said Hyman Abrams be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. D-4.
    In re Disbarment of Brouner.
   It having been reported to this Court that Samuel B. Brouner of New York, New York, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of November 6, 1972 (ante, p. 974), having suspended the said Samuel B. Brouner from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was issued and served upon the respondent and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It Is Ordered that the said Samuel B. Brouner be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. D-8.
    In re Disbarment of Pavsner.
   It having been reported to this Court that Emanuel H. Pavsner of New York, New York, has been suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, for a period of three years effective March 27, 1972, and until further order of that court, and such order was duly entered March 30, 1972, and this Court by order of November 6, 1972 (ante,, p. 975), having suspended the said Emanuel H. Pavsner from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent, and that a response has been filed,

It Is Ordered that the said Emanuel H. Pavsner be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. 27,
    Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky.
   Motion of Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General of Kentucky, for leave to permit John M. Famularo, Esquire, to argue pm hac vice granted. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 406 U. S. 915.]


text:
    No. 71-1598.
    Hodgson, Secretary of Labor v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante¿ p. 840.] Motion of Institute of Real Estate Management for leave to participate in oral argument granted and five minutes of respondents’ time allotted for that purpose.


text:
    No. 50,
    Orig.
    Vermont v. New York et al.
   Motion of the United States for leave to intervene referred to Special Master. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 408 U. S. 917.]


text:
    No. 71-685.
    No. 71-691.
    Lehnhausen, Director, Department of Local Government Affairs of Illinois v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. et al.; and Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. Shapiro et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 1039.] Motion of Proviso Township High School District No. 209 et al. for reconsideration of their motion for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-1021.
    Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri et al. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of petitioners granted and 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-1069.
    Associated Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 407 U. S. 908.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-6078.
    Linda R. S. v. Richard D. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 405 U. S. 1064.] Motion of appellant for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Windle Turley, Esquire, of Dallas, Texas, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for appellant in this case.


text:
    No. 71-1456.
    Salyer Land Co. et al. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 408 U. S. 920.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amid curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1192.
    Goldstein et al. v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. [Certiorari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of respondent for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 71-1637.
    City of Burbank et al. v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 840.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of appellants granted and 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Appellees also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-146.
    Hunter, dba Courier v. United States,
   ante, p. 934. Respondent requested to file response to motion for leave to file petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 72-552.
    Satiacum v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States in this case. Reported below: 80 Wash. 2d 492, 495 P. 2d 1035.


text:
    No. 72-679.
    United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Yablonski et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Paul R. Connolly, Esquire, and .Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Esquire, of Washington, D. C., members of the Bar of this Court, for leave to withdraw as counsel for petitioners granted.


text:
    No. 72-671.
    Espinoza et vir v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States in this case.


text:
    No. 72-5655.
    Hill v. Henderson, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-5304.
    No. 72-5568.
    No. 72-5671.
    No. 72-5672.
    Bradley v. Supreme Court of Indiana; Davis v. Neaher, U. S. District Judge, et al.; Olden v. Chambers, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.; and Muncaster v. United States.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-658.
    City of Kenosha et al. v. Bruno et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Wis. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 72-394.
    No. 72-414.
    No. 72-555.
    No. 72-666.
    No. 72-528.
    Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.; Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.; Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.; USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. CIBA Corp. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir.; and

C. A. 3d Cir. Reported below: Nos. 72-394 and 72-414, 461 F. 2d 215; No. 72-555, 463 F. 2d 363; No. 72-666, 461 F. 2d 223; and No. 72-528, 463 F. 2d 225. Motion of American Public Health Assn, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in No. 72-394 granted. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of three hours allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-656.
    Logue et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-5521.
    Strunk, aka Wagner v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1528.
    Spears v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6449.
    Ellingburg v. Goodson, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6800.
    D’Ambra v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-292.
    Marrero Land & Improvement Assn., Ltd. v. Jefferson Parish School Board.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-338.
    Carroll, Sheriff, et al. v. McDaniel et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-348.
    Hutter et al. v. Tanck et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-351.
    Maraman v. Hardister et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-366.
    Village of Walthill, Nebraska, et al. v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-392.
    Cramer et ux. v. Director of Revenue.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-393.
    United Transportation Union v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-444.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. William A. Smith Contracting Co., Inc.
   Ct. App. Mo., Kansas City District. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-448.
    Dasher v. Blackmon, Commissioner, Department of Revenue, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 72-474.
    Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-483.
    No. 72-485.
    No. 72-525.
    No. 72-5454.
    No. 72-5563.
    Salazar v. United States; Norman v. United States; Cooper v. United States; Cooper v. United States; and Cooper v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 464 F. 2d 648.


text:
    No. 72-609.
    Kokas v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-595.
    Mott et al., Executors v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-628.
    Moore et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-636.
    Lombardozzi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-642.
    Mayhue’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc., et al. v. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-645.
    Briola v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-646.
    Oree v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-657.
    Local Union 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-661.
    Ledes v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-662.
    Bata v. Bata et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-663.
    Turnpike Realty Co., Inc. v. Town of Dedham.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-664.
    Becker v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-672.
    Pogue v. Retail Credit Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-674.
    Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-678.
    Ford, dba Ford Records v. Ford Motor Co.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-697.
    Jemco, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-706.
    E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Committee et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-709.
    Rialto Theatre Co. et al. v. City of Wilmington et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-711.
    Gerneth et al. v. City of Detroit.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-714.
    California v. Municipal Court for the Sacramento Municipal Court District of Sacramento County et al. (Alford, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-728.
    Bergenthal v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-732.
    Lancaster v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-735.
    Filtrol Corp. et al. v. Kelleher, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-762.
    Reyes v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5126.
    Hyde v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5226.
    Baskerville v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5257.
    Shank v. Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5303.
    Birnbaum v. New Jersey.
   Middle-sex County Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5310.
    Matthews v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5320.
    Gardner v. McCarthy, Men’s Colony Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5349.
    Valdivia v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5359.
    Parker v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5390.
    Herrera v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5520.
    Frommhagen v. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5536.
    Janosko v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5541.
    Allison v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5552.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5553.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5557.
    Zweig v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5558.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5561.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5562.
    Medina v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5564.
    Smith v. Saline County District Court.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5569.
    Schneider v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5570.
    Tripp v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5571.
    Russek v. Governor of Maryland et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5573.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5574.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5575.
    Hester v. Brierley, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5578.
    Vitoratos v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5580.
    O’Brien v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5583.
    Escofil v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5584.
    In re Nix.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5585.
    No. 72-5598.
    Laswell v. United States; and Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5586.
    Casson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5588.
    McCray v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5589.
    Kelly v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5590.
    Alvarez v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5594.
    Toomey v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5595.
    Chavez v. Gibbons et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5599.
    Wrenn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5601.
    Miner v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5602.
    Ross v. United States.
   C. A. 9th- Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5603.
    McCoy v. Egeler, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5606.
    Ochoa v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5608.
    Heindl v. Washington Terminal Co.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5610.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5611.
    Minor v. Cupp, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5613.
    Keane v. Smith.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5614.
    Champagne et al. v. Penrod Drilling Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5615.
    Houser v. Geary, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5616.
    Chiodi v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5620.
    Bailey v. Todd.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5619.
    Beech v. Melancon et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5621.
    Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5623.
    Bright v. New Jersey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5628.
    Bernstein v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5631.
    Means v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5633.
    Reilly v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5635.
    Allen v. Thomas.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5637.
    Szabo v. Westmoreland County Authorities et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5638.
    In re Swope.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5646.
    Dabney v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5647.
    Evans v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5649.
    Milstead et al. v. California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5650.
    Campbell v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5696.
    Platsis v. Michigan et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5653.
    Taylor v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5663.
    Ausby v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5667.
    Jones v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5675.
    Davis v. Gomes, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5690.
    Bryant v. Bailey.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5700.
    Lott v. New York.
   Sup. Ct. N. Y., New York County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1510.
    Ross, Administrative Judge, et al. v. Radich.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-1.
    Baskin et al. v. City of Miami Beach.
   Cir. Ct. Fla., Dade County. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-298.
    Cooley et al. v. Endictor et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-364.
    Director General, India Supply Mission v. The Maru et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-451.
    Kennedy et al. v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, United States Department of Justice, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-580.
    American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-584.
    Martino et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-601.
    Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, Avco Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-715.
    United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-716.
    Wilbanks v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5184.
    Lynch v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5244.
    Rigdon v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5279.
    Hillen v. Hawaii State Prison Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5389.
    Johnson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5526.
    Massimo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5540.
    Kyle v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5560.
    Mendez-Ruiz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5567.
    Henderson v. Maroney, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5654.
    Dotson v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5664.
    Murray v. Owens, Reception Center Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-243.
    Clean Air Coordinating Committee v. Roth Adam Fuel Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-250.
    Goldsberry et al. v. Hieber, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motions to dispense with printing petition and respondent’s brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5604.
    McDonald v. Metro Traffic and Parking Commission et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-598.
    Fournier v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-665.
    Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-684.
    Stephens, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black-mun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-698.
    House v. House.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of respondent to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-1509.
    No. 71-1612.
    No. 71-6690.
    No. 71-6751.
    No. 72-246.
    No. 72-266.
    No. 72-299.
    No. 72-337.
    No. 72-365.
    United States v. Jim et al., Utah et al. v. Jim et al., Keeny v. Swenson, Warden, Dawn, dba Game Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., et al., Interstate Commerce Commission v. IML SeaTransit, Ltd., et al., Stone v. Stone et al., Pilgrim Equipment Company of Houston v. Texas et al., Ross v. United States et al., Reilley v. Reilley,
   ante, p. 80;

ante, p. 80;

ante, p. 1027;

ante, p. 865;

ante, p. 1003;

ante, p. 1000;

ante, p. 982;

ante, p. 984; and

ante, p. 1003. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-370.
    No. 72-373.
    No. 72-374.
    No. 72-381.
    No. 72-447.
    No. 72-5064.
    No. 72-5097.
    No. 72-5337.
    No. 72-5342.
    No. 72-5394.
    Marcus et al. v. New York, Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Benson, Commissioner oF Revenue, Swarthout v. Olund, Basyap, Inc., et al. v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency et al., Hutter et ux. v. City of Chicago, Reilly v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., Inc., et al., Richerson v. United States, Nix v. United States, Houp v. United States, Hitchcock v. Gomes, Warden,
   ante, p. 1027;

ante, p. 1003;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 882;

ante, p. 883;

ante, p. 1013;

ante, p. 1011; and

ante, p. 1026.

Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1235.
    No. 71-6719.
    No. 72-55.
    No. 72-5043.
    Craig, Commissioner of Social Services, et al. v. Gilliard et al., Brown v. United States, Murch et al. v. Mottram, Warriner v. Wiseheart et al.,
   ante, p. 807;

ante, p. 864;

ante, p. 41; and

ante, p. 881. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    January 9, 1973
    No. 71-715.
    Fontham et al. v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    January 15, 1973
    No. 72-537.
    Georges et al. v. McClellan et al.
   Appeal from D. C. R. I. Motions of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and of Rhode Island Consumers’ Council for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae, granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 72-669.
    Smith’s Transfer Corp. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Va.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-687.
    McLean Trucking Co. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. N. C.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-446.
    Tomasino v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-833.
    William E. Goetz & Sons et al. v. Board of Regents, State Senior Colleges, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5612.
    Bodisco v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-749.
    Sunset Amusement Co. et al. v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5471.
    Fuchs v. Silvester.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5293.
    Carter v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied. Motion for leave to proceed m forma pauperis granted. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari granted and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of the memorandum for respondent filed by the Solicitor General in this Court on December 19, 1972.


text:
    No. 72-5391.
    Jackson v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U. S. 845 (1972).


text:
    No. 40, Orig.
    Pennsylvania v. New York et al.,
   407 U. S. 206. Supplemental report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, with supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 71-1031.
    Tonasket v. Washington et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 407 U. S. 908.] Motion of appellant for order requiring briefs upon issue of jurisdiction denied.


text:
    No. 71-1553.
    Gilligan, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Morgan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 947.] Motion of Law Revision Center for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-35.
    Austin et al. v. Meyer et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. Motion of appellants to reinstate stay heretofore vacated by order of this Court on June 26, 1972 [408 U. S. 919], denied. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-1694.
    Frontiero et vir v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 840.] Motion of appellants to divide oral argument granted.


text:
    No. 71-6732.
    Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 912.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Glenn Zell, Esquire, of Atlanta, Georgia, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 72-5410.
    Black v. United States,
   ante, p. 1027. Respondent requested to file response to motion for leave to file petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 72-5372.
    Lucas v. Wyoming et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-792.
    No. 72-802.
    New York State Department of Social Services et al. v. Dublino et al.; and Onondaga County Department of Social Services et al. v. Dublino et al.
   Appeals from D. C. W. D. N. Y. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of cases on the merits. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 348 F. Supp. 290.


text:
    No. 71-1182.
    Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-549.
    No. 72-550.
    School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, et al. v. State Board of Education of Virginia et al.; and Bradley et al. v. State Board of Education of Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 462 F. 2d 1058.


text:
    No. 72-606.
    No. 72-654.
    Oklahoma v. Mason, Administrator, et al.; and United States v. Mason, Administrator, et al.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 198 Ct. Cl. 599, 461 F. 2d 1364.


text:
    No. 72-804.
    Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Sierra Club et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions to- file briefs as amici curiae filed by Utah Power & Light Co., Chamber of Commerce of the United States, American Mining Congress, and the State of Arizona et al., granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-560.
    First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Camp, Comptroller of the Currency, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-627.
    Brezina Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-641.
    Western International Hotels Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-673.
    Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations), Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-685.
    Flannery v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-696.
    Bosley et ux. v. Atlantic Seaboard Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-712.
    Jones et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-727.
    Cervantes v. Time, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-729.
    Frankel v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-733.
    Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa (Kell, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-742.
    First National Bank at Lubbock, Trustee v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-754.
    Danning, Trustee in Bankruptcy, et al. v. Brunswick Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-760.
    Knoll et al. v. Phoenix Steel Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-765.
    Miller v. Board of Law Examiners of Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-778.
    Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5195.
    Smith v. Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5283.
    Parker v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5311.
    Brown v. Wymard et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5322.
    Hinojos v. Black, Conservation Center Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5371.
    Wiley v. Stone, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5426.
    Kahinu v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5441.
    Bryant v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5470.
    Castaneda v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5501.
    Burkheart v. Gomes, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5582.
    Driver v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5597.
    Pollard et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5605.
    Durant v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5624.
    Bauguess v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5626.
    Leftwich v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5627.
    Kelly v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5634.
    Ayala v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5636.
    Boyd v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5644.
    Sidman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5651.
    Borelli v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5656.
    Peters v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5658.
    Cantu v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5660.
    Kochel v. McKeldin et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5666.
    Ottomano v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5674.
    Agnew v. Damner.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5678.
    Ferrell v. Oklahoma.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5679.
    Jackson v. Estelle, Corrections Director, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5680.
    Quinones-Alvarado v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5701.
    Broussard v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5710.
    Sanders et al. v. Wyman, Commissioner, New York Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5716.
    Bennett v. District Director of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5722.
    Carter v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5723.
    Ford v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5731.
    Lingham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5735.
    Stengel v. City of Anaheim et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5736.
    Smith v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6893.
    Gilson v. Macklin, Sheriff.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-410.
    Brooks v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-737.
    Weiss v. Walsh et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5467.
    Klier v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5617.
    Jordan v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5643.
    Wren v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-386.
    Gerberding v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5669.
    Taylor v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5694.
    Graham et al. v. Jones et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5743.
    Hale et al. v. South Dakota.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5746.
    Mabey et al. v. Reagan et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir.' Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-699.
    Hayakawa et al. v. Wong et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-790.
    Alabama et al. v. Brinks.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-703.
    Hay et vir v. Hollis et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and motion of respondent Hollis to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5099.
    DuBose v. Craven, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari, vacate judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to hold a hearing on petitioner’s claim.


text:
    No. 72-5724.
    Rhodes v. Nebraska et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.,


text:
    No. 72-239.
    No. 72-5020.
    No. 72-5082.
    No. 72-5350.
    No. 72-5415.
    No. 72-5495.
    Childs v. United States, Gay v. License Branch, Real Estate Commission of the District of Columbia, Wocher v. Los Angeles City School District et al., Dapper v. O’Connor et al., Wilson v. Scott, District Attorney of Kenosha County, et al., Dalton v. United States,
   ante, p. 966;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 1042;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1043; and

ante, p. 1062. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1478.
    No. 72-463.
    Falkner et ux. v. Pastrano et ux., Silver v. Castle Memorial Hospital et al.,
   ante, p. 1020; and

ante, p. 1048. Motions to dispense with printing petitions granted. Petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

text:
    COUSINS et al. v. WIGODA
    No. A-1.
    Decided July 1, 1972
    See: 463 F. 2d 603.
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Applicants have applied to me as Circuit Justice to stay an order entered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Thursday, June 29, 1972. A divided panel of that court vacated an injunction issued at applicants’ behest by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and further ordered that its mandate issue immediately. Because applicants’ application raised what seemed to me to be significant legal issues of importance not only to them but to the public as a whole, I heard oral argument of counsel on the application.

In April 1972, following the Illinois primary election, respondent Wigoda brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, requesting a declaratory judgment that he and others had been duly elected as delegates to the Democratic National Convention in accordance with Illinois law, and seeking an injunction against applicants to prohibit them from interfering with or impeding the functioning of respondent as a duly elected delegate.

Applicants removed this action to the United States District Court, from which it was then remanded to the state court. Applicants then brought a separate action in the District Court, alleging that the pendency of the state court action infringed their associational rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In reliance on 42 U. S. C. § 1983, they sought an injunction against further prosecution of the state court action. The District Court heard evidence and enjoined the prosecution of so much of the state court action as sought injunctive relief against the applicants, leaving the state court free to proceed with the declaratory judgment aspect of respondent’s action. Respondent appealed from the order of the District Court granting injunctive relief, and the Court of Appeals then entered the order described above vacating the injunction of the District Court.

Both the state and federal court actions arise out of disputes between the parties as to what group of delegates from Illinois shall be seated at the Democratic National Convention to be held in Miami Beach, Florida, beginning July 10. Respondent contends that he and the others whom he seeks to represent were delegates elected to the convention in accordance with Illinois law at the Illinois primary election. Applicants contend that the Illinois delegate selection process does not conform to standards established by the national Democratic Party, and that, therefore, they and others associated with them, rather than respondent, should be seated by the Democratic National Convention.

Since the Court of Appeals entered its order of June 29, two additional events have supervened. On June 30, the circuit court of Cook County in which respondent’s original action was pending entered a temporary restraining order enjoining applicants from “submitting or causing to be submitted to the National Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee or the Credentials Committee thereof, the name, or names, of any person, or persons, as prospective delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention” from various Illinois districts. That order also provided that “except as herein before ordered” nothing in the order should prevent the applicants from “speaking on behalf of their challenge before the Credentials Committee, holding meetings or engaging in other activities commensurate with their rights of free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” The circuit court further ordered that the matter be set for hearing on the motion of respondent for a preliminary injunction at 11 a. m. on Wednesday, July 5, in that court.

On June 30, the Credentials Committee of the Democratic National Convention voted to sustain the challenge made by applicants and others to respondent and the delegates associated with him, and to recommend to the convention that applicants and other delegates associated with them be seated by the Democratic National Convention. It is my understanding that this action on the part of the Credentials Committee is subject to review by the convention at its meeting in Miami Beach.

At the outset I am faced with a problem which, if not technically one of authority, is at the very least one of the scope of my discretion in acting on the application. The authority of a Circuit Justice to grant a stay in cases such as this stems from the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (f), which reads in pertinent part as follows:

“In any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such judgment or decree may be stayed for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The stay may be granted by a judge of the court rendering the judgment or decree or by a justice of the Supreme Court . . .

While this case is one in which the judgment of the Court of Appeals is undoubtedly “subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari,” as a practical matter it will become moot upon the adjournment of the Democratic National Convention, which customarily takes place in the latter part of the week in which the convention opens. On June 29, this Court adjourned until the first Monday in October, as is its annual custom. There will therefore be no possibility of this Court's convening and granting a writ of certiorari to review the judgment below unless The Chief Justice should determine that a Special Term of Court be convened in order to hear this case. Such Special Terms have, to my knowledge, been held only four times in the recent history of the Court: In 1942 the Court was convened to consider whether the President had authority in time of war to exclude enemy aliens from access to civilian courts, and to order them tried before military tribunals for acts of sabotage. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). A Special Term was convened in 1953 to hear the Government’s motion to vacate a stay of execution of a death sentence against the Rosenbergs for espionage, after exhaustive appellate review of their conviction. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273 (1953). See also id., at 271. In 1958 a Special Term was held to review the Little Rock school desegregation case in time for implementation in the fall school term. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958).

Without in any way disparaging the importance of this case not only to the parties involved in it, but to the political processes of the country, I simply do not believe that it is the same type of case which has caused the Court to convene in Special Term on previous occasions. Both the presumptive availability of the Illinois courts to redress any deprivation of applicants’ constitutional rights, which I discuss in more detail below, and the necessarily highly speculative nature of any connection between the outstanding order of the state court and the choice of a presidential candidate by the Democratic National Convention lead me to conclude that this case is not comparable to those. I therefore conclude that this is not a case in which I would be warranted in requesting The Chief Justice to convene a special session of this Court. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in chambers in Travia v. Lomenzo, 86 S. Ct. 7, 15 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1965).

Having so concluded, I must recognize the fact that were I to grant the stay requested by applicants, the result would be a determination on the merits of the federal litigation in their favor without any prospect of review of my action by the full membership of this Court. While I think that the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (f) confer upon me the technical authority to grant a stay in these circumstances, I would be moved to use that authority only if I were satisfied that the judgment under review represented the most egregious departure from wholly settled principles of law established by the decisions of this Court.

The majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals, in its opinion released yesterday, relied on the principles of comity between federal and state courts as enunciated by this Court’s decisions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972). While Younger and its companion cases involved state criminal prosecutions, the principles of federal comity upon which it was based are enunciated in earlier decisions of this Court dealing with civil as well as criminal matters. See the cases cited in Mitchum, supra, at 243. The Court in Mitchum, after holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983, under which petitioners brought this action in the District Court, was an exception to the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2283, went on to say:

“In so concluding, we do not question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.” Ibid.

While the test to be applied may be less stringent in civil cases than in criminal, the cases cited in Mitchum make clear that the federal courts will not casually enjoin the conduct of pending state court proceedings of either type. Applicants make out what must be described as at least a plausible case that a portion of the decree issued by the circuit court of Cook County does abridge their associational rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But the teaching of Younger, supra, and Mitchum, supra, as I understand them, is that a plausible claim of constitutional infringement does not automatically entitle one to avail himself of the injunctive processes of the federal courts in order to prevent the conduct of pending litigation in the state courts. The opinion issued by the Court of Appeals majority specifically alluded to applicants’ failure to allege that they could not adequately vindicate their constitutional claims in the Illinois state courts, and I must conclude that those courts are available to applicants for this purpose.

Mindful, therefore, of the principles of comity enjoined by our federal system, of the deference due to the judgment of the Court of Appeals (see Breswick & Co. v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 912, 100 L. Ed. 1510 (1955) (Harlan, J., in chambers)), and of the extraordinary burden which falls upon applicants when they seek a stay from a single Justice which would in effect dispose of the litigation on its merits, I conclude that they have failed to meet that burden. An order will therefore be entered denying the application for a stay of the order and mandate of the Court of Appeals.