author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 71-1487.
    Confederation Life Insurance Co. v. De Lara et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurs,

dissenting.

I dissent from the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari to consider whether the Florida Supreme Court’s choice of law in this action on a life insurance contract deprived petitioner of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the principles established in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930).

Petitioner, a Canadian insurance company, issued a policy of life insurance in 1938 to German Lopez Sanchez, who was a citizen and resident of Cuba until his death in 1962. The policy provided that all payments would be made in United States dollars, which were then recognized as one of two legal currencies in Cuba. But on June 30, 1951, the Government of Cuba suspended the legal tender status of the dollar and decreed that all previously contracted dollar obligations would henceforth be payable exclusively in Cuban pesos at the rate of one peso per dollar. Petitioner concluded that the decree automatically converted the policy from dollars to pesos, and on July 1, 1951, it notified the insured that

“[a] 11 premiums payable in accordance with this policy as well as all other liabilities contracted under the same and in which a reference is made to American currency, will from now on be payable in Cuban National currency, at par, in accordance with Law No. 13 of 1948 and Decree No. 1384 of April 1951.”

The insured declined to terminate the policy in light of this notification, and made all subsequent payments entirely in pesos. By legislation in 1959 and 1961 the Cuban Government reconfirmed the 1951 decree and provided criminal penalties for its violation. Petitioner maintains peso reserves in Cuba precisely for the purpose of meeting its obligations under this and similar contracts, but it is barred by the Cuban currency laws from transferring those funds outside of Cuba. Under Cuban law it thus seems clear that petitioner was obligated to pay the benefits due under the policy only in Cuba and only in pesos.

Nevertheless, in this suit brought by respondents, beneficiaries of the insured who are now living in Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida held that petitioner’s obligations under the contract should be determined according to Florida law. And applying the law of that State, the court concluded that petitioner was obligated to pay the benefits in Florida and in United States dollars. De Lara v. Confederation Life Assn., 257 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1971).

Whether the state court correctly applied its own substantive law is, of course, not in issue here. We are concerned only with the state court’s choice of law. Petitioner maintains that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a State from altering “substantive obligations arising out of a foreign transaction having no significant relation to the state.” The general validity of that proposition is clearly established by Dick, supra, where we held that the State of Texas was “without power to affect the terms of the contracts” since “[a] 11 acts relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico.” In an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandéis, the Court held that the attempt by the Texas courts “to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of property without due process of law.” 281 U. S., at 408.

In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 377 U. S. 179 (1964), we reaffirmed by implication the validity of Dick, but concluded that, on the particular facts of that case, the forum State could reasonably apply its own law. We distinguished Dick and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934), on the grounds that in the latter the relationship of the forum State to the transaction was too slight and casual to permit application of local law, and in the former the relationship was “wholly lacking.” 377 U. S., at 181-182. The question, therefore, is whether this case is controlled by Dick and Delta & Pine Land Co. or by Clay. In my view, the facts of this case warrant plenary review by this Court of the question whether the obligation of the parties is governed by Cuban law. Florida has no relationship to the insurance policy at issue here. The deceased lived in Cuba until his death in 1962. All premiums were paid in Cuba. And assets held in reserve to meet the insurer’s obligations were also maintained in Cuba. Measured under any reasonable choice-of-law test, these facts argue forcefully against the application of Florida law.

Respondents maintain, however, that even if the Florida Supreme Court erred in applying Florida law, the court could properly have applied the law of Canada and reached the same result. As a statement of Canadian law, respondents cite the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Colmenares, 1967 Can. L. Rep. 443. And they point out that the Florida trial court, reasoning that the contract was made in Toronto, Canada, and that the lex loci contractus was Canadian law, applied the decision in Colmenares as an alternative basis for its decision. Petitioner’s head office is, of course, located in Toronto. But the conclusion of the trial court flies in the face of the undisputed fact that the policy was negotiated in Cuba and became effective there; that it was to be performed in Cuba; that premiums were to be paid there; that it was drafted in Spanish and in conformance with Cuban law; that it was issued through petitioner’s Havana office and was notarized there. It may well be that on this record the Florida Supreme Court perceived no basis for the conclusion that the contract was in any sense “made” in Canada.

In any case, the short answer to respondents’ contention is that the Florida Supreme Court relied on Florida law — and Florida law alone — in disposing of the case. The court declined to comment on the trial court’s alternative holding, and rested its decision squarely and exclusively on Confederation Life Assn. v. Vega, 207 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff’d, 211 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 980 (1968), where it had applied Florida law to determine the obligations of an insurer under a contract issued to a Cuban. Thus, there is a substantial question whether the only asserted basis of the decision of the Florida Supreme Court — application of Florida law — was erroneous under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And since the Government of Canada has represented to us that the decision of the Florida court has significant international ramifications, considerations of comity provide an additional and forceful reason for granting the petition for certiorari and setting the case for oral argument.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 72-5190.
    Womack v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5191.
    Gregory v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6679.
    Almond v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-148.
    Rothman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice White,

text:
    No. 71-1645.
    Weaver et ux. v. Hutson, Trustee in Reorganization.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White,

dissenting.

Section 70 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in part:

“[A]n express covenant [in a lease] that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate the same is enforc[ea]ble.” 11 U. S. C. § 110 (b).

In Finn v. Meighan, 325 U. S. 300 (1945), the Court held § 70 (b) fully applicable in c. X reorganization proceedings despite arguments that enforcement of forfeiture clauses could deprive the debtor of property vital to the continuance of the business and so defeat the very purpose of the reorganization proceedings. The Court said:

“There is some suggestion, however, that that provision is applicable only in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings and not to reorganizations under Ch. X. It is pointed out that frequently the value of enterprises is greatly enhanced by leases on strategic premises and that if forfeiture clauses were allowed to be enforced, reorganization plans might be seriously impaired. But Congress has made the forfeiture provision of § 70 applicable to reorganization proceedings, under Ch. X. . . . Thus we must read § 70 (b) as providing that an express covenant is enforceable which allows the lessor to terminate the lease' if a petition to reorganize the lessee under Ch. X is approved. Cf. In re Walker, 93 F. 2d 281. That being the policy adopted by Congress, our duty is to enforce it.” 325 U. S., at 302-303.

In the case before us the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to apply § 70 (b) in a reorganization proceeding and to enforce a termination provision in a lease, because to do so, in its opinion, would emasculate the reorganization plan. The Court of Appeals relied on Smith v. Hoboken R. Co., 328 U. S. 123 (1946), where this Court held that § 70 (b) did not require recognition of a forfeiture provision in the context of a railroad reorganization under § 77 because the forfeiture would deprive the Interstate Commerce Commission of its statutory function. The Court was careful to distinguish Finn:

“Finn v. Meighan, supra, involved the forfeiture of a lease in reorganization proceedings under Ch. X. But the problem there was not complicated by any provisions of Ch. X giving to an administrative agency the functions entrusted to the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 77. As we stated in Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 87, ‘. . . the whole scheme of § 77 leaves no doubt that Congress did not mean to grant to the district courts the same scope as to bankrupt roads that they may have in dealing with other bankrupt estates.” 328 U. S., at 133 n. 5.

Because the decision of the Court of Appeals appears to depart from the views of the Court expressed in Finn, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for argument.

      The petitioner argued, Brief for Petitioner in No. 953, O. T. 1944, pp. 4-5, 11:
      “The fundamental purpose of Chapter X of that Act would in many cases be thwarted if valuable, and often vital, assets were lost by the very fact of the institution of reorganization proceedings designed to conserve the debtor’s property. ... In innumerable instances, corporate contracts, including leases, constitute assets which,- in many cases, are vital to the continuance of the business. Many such corporate contracts contain clauses of the type involved herein. If the decision in the instant case of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should in such situations be followed, the very filing and approval of the petition for reorganization would immediately operate to cancel such executory contracts and thus defeat in large part the very purpose of the reorganization proceedings . . .


author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 71-6518.
    Martinez v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurs,

dissenting.

I dissent. I think petitioner’s guilty plea entered in New York state court was clearly involuntary, particularly after our decision last Term in Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971).

On October 23, 1968, petitioner was charged in an indictment returned in New York state court with one count of criminally selling a dangerous drug in the second degree and one count of criminally selling a dangerous drug in the third degree. In November 1968, a second indictment was returned against petitioner in state court charging him with a single count of criminally selling a dangerous drug in the third degree. Prior to the 1969 amendments of the New York Penal Law, criminally selling a dangerous drug in the second degree was punishable by a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment, while the maximum sentence under a third-degree charge was seven years’ imprisonment. At arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges; the case was set for trial.

On February 17, 1969, the State moved for trial. Before the proceedings commenced, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the trial judge met in the judge’s chambers — in the absence of the petitioner — to discuss the case. When the case was subsequently called for disposition, the prosecutor began by stating that he understood petitioner wished to withdraw his earlier1 pleas of not guilty and to “enter a plea of guilty to the second count of [the October 23 indictment] . . . charging [him] with the crime of Criminally Selling a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree.” At this point the court interrupted the prosecutor and the following exchange occurred:

“The Court: Wait a minute. Third Degree?
“[Prosecutor]: The second count, your Honor, of [the first indictment].
“[Defense Counsel]: There are two counts of Second Degree and one of Third Degree.
“The Court: That is not what I understood.
“(Whereupon a conversation was had off the record).
“The Court: . . . [A]s far as I am concerned, it may be that two indictments were to be disposed of through one plea, but it was not a plea to Selling a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree. That was no part of our talk.
“[Defense Counsel]: It was this afternoon, Judge.
“The Court: It was not part of our talk.”

Unable to obtain the plea he had expected, defense counsel requested a one-day adjournment because he was “not prepared to go to trial.”

“The Court: The case will proceed to trial or disposition right now.
“[Defense Counsel]: . . . This case was answered ready by my office at the February calendar, but I was not informed until this morning that we were proceeding. And I would again respectfully request that the court grant me until at least tomorrow morning.
“The Court: Application denied.”

When the defense counsel subsequently turned to the prosecutor — the same prosecutor who only a moment before had stated in open court that he understood the defendant wished to change his pleas of not guilty to a plea of guilty to the third degree charge — for assistance in clearing up the confusion, the only response was, “No comment.”

Defense counsel indicated that he was going to withdraw “because I can’t adequately defend this man without some preparation, and I think the District Attorney should at least give me that kind of notice.” Defense counsel was given a few moments to speak with petitioner. Faced with the dilemma of either proceeding immediately to trial on all three charges with unprepared counsel or pleading guilty to one count of selling a dangerous drug in the second degree, petitioner not unexpectedly chose the latter course as the lesser of two evils. The usual litany of the plea then followed. In advance of sentencing, petitioner sought to withdraw his plea, but this was denied and he received an indefinite sentence of from five to 15 years’ imprisonment. After appealing his case through the state courts, petitioner sought review of his plea by way of federal habeas corpus. The District Court denied relief without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, 455 F. 2d 705 (CA2 1972).

Last Term in Santobello we emphasized the importance of the plea-bargaining process: "If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities,” 404 U. S., at 260. But a guilty plea necessarily involves the waiver of a variety of fundamental constitutional rights, see, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confront one’s accusers), and the process by which it is obtained must therefore be governed by a standard of absolute fairness. The plea must be the result of "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 31 (1970). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 493 (1962). I think it clear that this petitioner was denied such a choice. To be sure, it is in the nature of the plea-bargaining process that some pressure is brought to bear on the defendant to enter a plea. But here the normal pressures inherent in the plea-bargaining process were improperly augmented by both the prosecutor and the trial judge.

In Santobello, supra, at 262, we said “that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” In that decision, we condemned a prosecutor’s failure to abide by the agreement of an associate who had promised to make no recommendation as to sentence in return for the guilty plea. What occurred here was far more serious. It would be naive to deny that, at least as between defense counsel and the prosecutor, a clear understanding had been reached in the judge’s chambers that petitioner would be allowed to plead guilty to the third-degree charge. The prosecutor’s opening remarks in the subsequent proceedings unquestionably indicate that this was the case. Yet when defense counsel turned to the prosecutor for corroboration that the deal struck was indeed for a plea to the less serious charge in the third degree, he received only the unhelpful “No comment.” This is not fulfillment by the prosecutor of his promise. And at this juncture it is impossible to assess what impact affirmative support from the prosecutor might have had upon the trial judge, who quickly became unreceptive to the unsupported efforts of defense counsel to clarify the situation.

I would not stop in this case, however, with the prosecutor. For the trial judge saw fit to become a party to the plea negotiations and agreement. Whatever the considerations when the judge is not a participant in the plea-bargaining process, it seems to me that once he has injected himself into that process he must be held to the same strict standard of fairness as the prosecutor. This is not to say that the trial judge should be deprived of his traditional discretion to reject a plea of guilty; I agree that “[t]here is ... no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted,” Santobello, supra, at 262, citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 719 (1962). By the same token, though, a trial judge cannot be allowed to use his discretion to apply undue pressures on a defendant. Nothing could be more destructive of the integrity — and ultimately the viability — of the plea-bargaining process. I do not doubt that in this instance there was a misunderstanding between the prosecutor and defense counsel, on the one hand, and the trial judge, on the other, as to the charge to which petitioner would be allowed to plead guilty. In light of this confusion over the plea agreement, the trial judge was justified in refusing to accept the plea to the third-degree charge. But he certainly was not justified in visiting the consequences of the misunderstanding and the resulting confusion on petitioner by compelling him either to go to trial on all three charges with counsel who was unprepared or to plead guilty to the more serious charge. Having been a party to the negotiations and having thereafter refused to accept the plea that both the other parties to the negotiations thought was agreed upon, the trial judge was obligated to allow petitioner to extract himself from the predicament in which he had been placed by the misunderstanding that subsequently became apparent. Consequently, I believe that the judge should at least have granted the one-day continuance requested by defense counsel.

It is no answer that defense counsel should have been prepared to proceed to trial at once because his office had answered ready to the call of the February calendar. First, it is not disputed that defense counsel was not informed until the morning of the proceeding that the case was to be heard. We cannot ignore that in these days of crowded dockets, attorneys — as well as judges — are often forced to juggle unreasonably large case loads. Moreover, regardless of whether defense counsel technically should have been ready for trial because the case had previously been answered ready at the call of the February calendar, counsel undoubtedly could have made valuable use of the time between the conference in the judge’s chambers and the formal disposition of the case had he not been under the misim-pression that a bargain had been struck. In short, I question whether defense counsel can be faulted for his unpreparedness for immediate trial upon discovering that a plea to a third-degree charge would not be accepted. But whatever the justification for defense counsel’s unpreparedness, it was the petitioner, not his counsel, whom the trial judge forced to bear the consequences. I cannot accept this penalizing of petitioner for the conduct of his attorney, given the importance of the rights at stake. Weighed against the right of effective assistance of counsel, the request for a one-day continuance was hardly unreasonable. Previously we have said:

“The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. . . . Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. . . .” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 589 (1964).

And the alternative to proceeding with unprepared counsel was the waiver of a variety of important constitutional rights by way of a plea of guilty to a charge as to which, as a matter of unfettered choice, petitioner was obviously not prepared to concede guilt. Therefore, I think — as I have already indicated — granting of the short continuance requested was incumbent on the trial judge once he had rejected the plea bargain that everyone else understood to have been struck. The judge’s refusal to grant the continuance can only be viewed as an unjustified compounding of the coercive circumstances under which petitioner’s plea was procured.

Hence, I would grant the petition for certiorari and remand the case with instructions that petitioner’s plea be vacated and he be allowed to replead to the original charges. In Santobello, the Court declined to direct that the guilty plea there at issue be vacated and simply remanded for reconsideration. The broken promise in Santobello, however, affected only the petitioner’s sentence, not the charge to which he had pleaded guilty. Here, by contrast, the conduct of the prosecutor and the trial judge improperly coerced petitioner to plead guilty to the second-degree charge.

       N. Y. Penal Law § 220.35 (Supp. 1972-1973).

       N. Y. Penal Law § 220.30 (Supp. 1972-1973).

       See N. Y. Penal Law §70.00, subds. 2 (c)-(d) (1967).

       Indeed, there was only a single slip by petitioner when he indicated that he had been told what sentence he would receive. Defense counsel quickly denied this, and petitioner naturally corrected himself.

        People v. Martinez, 34 App. Div. 2d 174, 311 N. Y. S. 2d 117 (1970), leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, and a petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by this Court, 401 U. S. 941 (1971).

       Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, it does appear that a substantial amount of time elapsed between the conference in the judge’s chambers and when petitioner’s ease was called for formal disposition.

       The Court of Appeals majority, in discounting the unpreparedness of defense counsel and the importance of the continuance, suggested that “the very request for merely an overnight adjournment would indicate the lack of complexity of the defense.” We have noted, though, that whether or not a continuance would in fact “have been useful to the accused, . .. the importance of the assistance of counsel in a serious criminal charge after arraignment is too large to permit speculation on its effect.” Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 278 (1945).


text:
    No. 71-6571.
    Albert v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6830.
    West v. Miller, State Welfare Administrator, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-210.
    Nichols v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-223.
    Hahn et ux. v. Norwegian America Line.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-239.
    Childs v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-187.
    Square D Co. v. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.-


text:
    No. 72-258.
    Lehman v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-276.
    Taylor, Executrix v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5179.
    Powers v. Kleindienst, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5180.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-42.
    Durst v. National Casualty Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-191.
    Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Calvert et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-213.
    Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conference et al. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petitioners’ reply brief granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-6789.
    Sellars et al. v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

I vote to hear this case because it raises substantial questions of law in the area of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Petitioners are inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections (T. D. C.). They brought a class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of:

(1) a T. D. C. regulation barring all inmate assistance in preparation of legal work;

(2) the primitive conditions of the solitary confinement as administered by the T. D. C.

The District Court denied relief, Novak v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 1206 (SD Tex. 1970).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed as to the prohibition on prisoners’ legal assistance, holding that the State had not met its burden of providing alternatives to assure access to the courts as required by Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969).

A divided court affirmed the constitutionality of the conditions of solitary confinement. Novak v. Beto, 453 F. 2d 661 (1971). A motion for a rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied March 8, 1972, six judges dissenting. Novak v. Beto, 456 F. 2d 1303.

If we are to believe the facts as stated by petitioners, and for purposes of review we must, a prisoner placed in solitary confinement in Texas will find himself in a shockingly primitive condition.

The cell is kept in complete darkness 24 hours a day. A barred iron gate backed up by a wooden door blocks all light and prevents any human contact with those in the hall. Within this black interior is a combination toilet-water basin and a steel bunk. The bunk has no mattress although the prisoner is given a blanket. The cell is otherwise bare. The inmate is fed on a bread and water diet with one full meal every 72 hours. He is clothed only by a cloth gown. In addition to those conditions, which were considered inhumane at the time of Charles Dickens, the prisoner has no opportunity to exercise; he is not permitted correspondence with family, friends, or lawyer; no visits are allowed and he is allowed no reading material of any kind.

The prisoner is not seen by a psychologist, psychiatrist, or counselor before, during, or after confinement to solitary. And all deprivations involved in solitary confinement apply uniformly regardless of the individual’s background or criminal record or offense for which he is being punished.

A prisoner can be kept so confined for 15 days and re-confined after a two-day respite. Such practices as above described exist in all of Texas’ 14 correctional facilities.

The petitioners do not question the right of the prison to isolate inmates for cause but do challenge these practices.

Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), was a landmark in the definition of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Robinson v. California made the Eighth Amendment binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 370 U. S. 660 (1962). We said that the “dignity of man” was the overriding value preserved by that clause. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 (1958).

The fitness of punishment is to be judged by applying evolving standards, for the clause “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” 217 U. S., at 378. What those standards are is now tendered. The extent to which the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment will apply in prison must also be determined. In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), we held that a bare allegation of onerous penal conditions is sufficient to require a hearing.

Lower courts have often dealt with the issue and have reached divergent results without guidance from us. See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (1972).

Denial of the petition here in my view constitutes a travesty of justice. As Judge Tuttle stated in his dissent:

“I do not hesitate to assert the proposition that the only way the law has progressed from the days of the rack, the screw and the wheel is the development of moral concepts, or, as stated by the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles, the application of ‘evolving standards of decency.’ ” Novak v. Beto, 453 F. 2d, at 672.

I would grant this petition and put the case down for argument.

       On July 10, 1972, the T. D. C. revised its regulations on the lighting and diet.
      “50.92322 Lighting.

      “The solid doors of the solitary cells will be left open. If an inmate becomes noisy and creates a disturbance the door will be closed. On some units the open doors create a security problem, and it is not practical to utilize this procedure. If this occurs, artificial fighting will be provided during the normal daylight hours.”

       “50.9233 Diet.

      “50.92331 Inmates in solitary [confinement] are to be fed twice a day a hot meal consisting of vegetables from the regular serving fine, and are to be given unlimited drinking water.”

       Some lower courts have held that some conditions of imprisonment constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519 (CA2 1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp. 127 (NDNY 1970), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 460 F. 2d 126 (CA2 1972); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (MD Tenn. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (ED Ark. 1969); Barnes v. Hocker, No. R 2071 (Nev. Sept. 5, 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (ND Cal. 1966). Contra: Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178, 192 (CA2 1971); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F. 2d 1185 (CA8 1969); Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F. 2d 937 (CA3 1969); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (SD Ga. 1970), aff’d, 439 F. 2d 146 (CA5 1971).

       As stated by Judge Kaufman in Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d, at 526:
      “We are of the view that civilized standards of humane decency simply do not permit a man for a substantial period of time to be denuded and exposed to the bitter cold of winter in northern New York State and to be deprived of the basic elements of hygiene such as soap and toilet paper. The subhuman conditions alleged by Wright to exist in the ‘strip cel! at Dannemora could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity of the prisoner. The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so foul, so inhuman and so violative of basic concepts of decency.”


text:
    No. 72-221.
    Sherdon v. Carmona et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    November 3, 1972
    No. A-467.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Spock et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay of judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (No. 72-1934) denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the stay.


text:
    November 6, 1972
    No. 72-175.
    Fidell et al. v. Board of Elections of the City of New York et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-200.
    Chief of the Capitol Police et al. v. Jeannette Rankin Brigade et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.


text:
    No. 72-251.
    LoFrisco et al. v. Schaffer, Secretary of State of Connecticut, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Conn.


text:
    No. 72-252.
    Kerr Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 71-1584.
    Stauffer v. Weedlun, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Neb. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-115.
    Cunningham et al. v. King County Boundary Review Board et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-318.
    Rafter v. Newark Insurance Co.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-240.
    Harper v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5007.
    Corrado v. Rhode Island Bar Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. R. I. dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5290.
    Birdwell v. Washington.
   Appeal from ,Ct. App. Wash, dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-319.
    Kennecott Copper Corp. et al. v. State Tax Commission of Utah.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah. Motions of Financial Executives Institute, Tax Executives Institute, Inc., and Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. A-410 (72-5579).
    Bekeny et ux. v. Wandschneider, Executor, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-428.
    Cook et al. v. Calhoun et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. D-1.
    In re Disbarment of Kahn.
   It is ordered that Frances Kahn, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2.
    In re Disbarment of Abrams.
   It is ordered that Hyman Abrams, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-3.
    In re Disbarment of Konigsberg.
   It is ordered that Sidney Konigsberg, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-4.
    In re Disbarment of Brouner.
   It is ordered that Samuel B. Brouner, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 27,
    Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky.
   Exceptions to Report of Special Master set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 406 U. S. 915.]


text:
    No. D-5.
    In re Disbarment of Signer.
   It is ordered that Burton R. Signer, of Cincinnati, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to showr cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-6.
    In re Disbarment of Yudow.
   It is ordered that Daniel D. Yudow, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-7.
    In re Disbarment of Scherman.
   It is ordered that Benjamin B. Scherman, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-8.
    In re Disbarment of Pavsner.
   It is ordered that Emanuel H. Pavsner, of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 71-92.
    Corkey et al. v. Edwards et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. N. C. Motion to set questions Y, VI, and IV for briefing and oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 71-829.
    Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 987.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice as amicus curiae in support of petition granted.


text:
    No. 71-708.
    Trafficante et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 915.] Motion to permit two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents granted.


text:
    No. 71-850.
    United States v. Mara, aka Marasovich.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of Legal Aid Society of New York for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of respondent granted.


text:
    No. 71-1031.
    Tonasket v. Washington et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 407 U. S. 908.] Motion of Colville Confederated Tribes for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1082.
    Askew, Governor of Florida, et al. v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U. S. 1063.] Motions to permit two counsel to argue on behalf of appellants and two counsel to argue on behalf of appellees granted.


text:
    No. 71-1192.
    Goldstein et al. v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. [Certiorari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of Information Industry Assn, for leave to file untimely brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Attorney General of California for additional time to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-1470.
    Lemon et al. v. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 406 U. S. 943.] Motion of Pennsylvania Association of Independent Schools to permit two counsel to argue on behalf of appellees denied.


text:
    No. 71-5139.
    Ham v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1057.] Motion of the Attorney General of South Carolina to permit Timothy G. Quinn to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of respondent granted.


text:
    No. 71-6356.
    Doe et al. v. McMillan et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 408 U. S. 922.] Motion to permit two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents granted.


text:
    No. 72-11.
    Palmore v. United States.
   Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 840.] Motion of appellant for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 72-5214.
    No. 72-5282.
    No. 72-5295.
    Floyd v. Henderson, Warden; Baca v. Harris, Warden, et al.; and Shelton v. Henderson, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-6827.
    Sams v. Frankel, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-269.
    No. 72-270.
    No. 72-271.
    Levitt, Comptroller of New York, et al. v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty et al.; Brydges v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty et al.; and Cathedral Academy et al. v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty et al.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 342 F. Supp. 439.


text:
    No. 72-129.
    National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, New York City Region of New York Conference of Branches, et al. v. New York et al.
   D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 71-6757.
    Fontaine v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1474.
    No. 71-1601.
    Eason et al. v. Dandridge et al.; and Jefferson Parish School Board et al. v. Dandridge et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 456 F. 2d 552.


text:
    No. 71-1544.
    Mahoney v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1613.
    McBride v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5803.
    Gomez v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6122.
    Wilwording v. Burrell et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6649.
    Fair v. Sebesta.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6758.
    Dudley v. Brantley, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6682.
    Stockman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6759.
    Hutchinson v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6799.
    Crawford v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6840.
    McLain v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6853.
    Tafoya, aka Herrera v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6863.
    Komes v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Santa Clara. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6877.
    Moore v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6914.
    Snipes v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6920.
    Bully v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6930.
    Tyler v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-59.
    United States v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-202.
    In re MacLeod.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-86.
    Clark Sherwood Oil Field Contractors et al. v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-117.
    No. 71-6858.
    No. 72-5274.
    Iannelli v. United States; Squires, aka Spears v. United States; and Tortora v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 461 F. 2d 483.


text:
    No. 72-173.
    Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Hodge, Administratrix.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-196.
    Javits v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-247.
    Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., et al. v. Oosting, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-253.
    Pet, Inc. v. Kysor Industrial Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-255.
    National American Bank of New Orleans v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-257.
    Alvarez-Franco v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-260.
    Meyer et al. v. City of Oklahoma City et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-259.
    Alogdelis v. Brooklyn College of the City University of New York et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-261.
    No. 72-5292.
    Miller v. United States; and Pineda et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-262.
    O’Brien v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-263.
    Aikin, aka Akin, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-265.
    Pennsylvania v. Cohen.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-268.
    Schott v. City of Kingman.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-277.
    Fortenberry v. New York Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-278.
    Cravens et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-280.
    Mojar v. Signorelli et ux.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-281.
    Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-282.
    Board of Education of the City of Bessemer, Alabama, et al. v. Brown et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-283.
    Mahin, Director of Revenue of Illinois v. Mitchell et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-284.
    North Carolina State Ports Authority v. International Longshoremen's Assn., AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-285.
    Tibbitts et ux. v. Cussen, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-286.
    American Airlines, Inc. v. Locaynia et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-289.
    Diehl v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-290.
    California v. Halpin et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-291.
    No. 72-344.
    United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Marine Sulphur Transport Corp. et al.; and Marine Sulphur Transport Corp. et al. v. Heard et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 460 F. 2d 89.


text:
    No. 72-293.
    Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. v. Brown.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-296.
    Legari v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-299.
    Pilgrim Equipment Company of Houston v. Texas et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-297.
    Portner v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-301.
    Comeaux v. Buller et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-305.
    Arvidson et al. v. Dillingham Corp., dba Albina Engine & Machine Works.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-306.
    Stanley v. Taylor.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-310.
    Rainier Avenue Corp. v. City of Seattle.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-311.
    Speed v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-314.
    Keefer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-315.
    New York Central Railroad Co. v. Raines, Special Administrator.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-320.
    Lightenburger et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-323.
    Kheel et al. v. Port of New York Authority et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-328.
    Parten et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-324.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-325.
    Stecher v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-329.
    Schrenzel v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-333.
    Bible v. Chevron Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-336.
    Penaat v. City of San Jose.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-337.
    Ross v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-340.
    Cantwell et al. v. Board of Trustees for Utilities, City of Indianapolis, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-342.
    Handel v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5010.
    Hawkins v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5019.
    Caref v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5024.
    Campbell v. Georgia et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5050.
    Wilson v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5059.
    James v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5079.
    Paschall v. Haskins, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5193.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5194.
    Sheppard v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5197.
    Maras v. Lipow.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5198.
    Robertson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5201.
    Wright v. Government of the Canal Zone.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5202.
    Lopez, aka Belix v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5205.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5207.
    Shelton v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5208.
    Davidson v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5211.
    No. 72-5232.
    Carpenter v. United States; and Morris v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 463 F. 2d 397.


text:
    No. 72-5209.
    Jones v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5212.
    Kerr v. Travelers Insurance Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5213.
    Stokes v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5215.
    Briggs v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5216.
    Lines v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5217.
    Webb v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5219.
    DeVille v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5220.
    Ninov v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5223.
    O’Clair v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5224.
    Martin v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5225.
    Turner et al. v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5228.
    Voege v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5229.
    King v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5233.
    Padilla-Partida v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5235.
    Szczytko v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5237.
    Chisum v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5241.
    Jerkins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5242.
    Goodman v. Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5245.
    Starnes v. Connett, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5246.
    Lucchetti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5248.
    Thomas v. Nelson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5249.
    Peaper v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5250.
    Gabbard v. Gabbard.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5251.
    Parker v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5255.
    Kirk v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5263.
    Valentine v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5259.
    DeVerse v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5260.
    Ammons v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5261.
    Collins v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5262.
    Wright v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5264.
    Thacker v. Henry, Prison Administrator, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5266.
    Story v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5267.
    Waterman v. Schutzer et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5268.
    Griffin et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5271.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5276.
    Hunter v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5277.
    McClard v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5280.
    Nordlof v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5281.
    Thompson v. Department of the Army et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5285.
    Barron v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5286.
    McGee v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5287.
    Wetzel v. Blackledge, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5288.
    Hessler v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5289.
    Frierson v. Spruill, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1380.
    Caldwell, Warden v. Mathis.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6550.
    Davidson v. Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6885.
    Hillen v. Director, Department of Social Service and Housing et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6927.
    Jashunsky v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-16.
    Karr et al. v. Schmidt et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-227.
    Waller v. City of St. Petersburg.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-238.
    Birch v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-242.
    Hanly et al. v. Kleindienst, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-295.
    LeBlanc et al. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-309.
    Sandler v. National Director of Selective Service et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-316.
    Azzone v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-330.
    Carey et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5001.
    Jones v. Haskins, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5031.
    Clinton, Administratrix v. Ingram Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5039.
    Bisno v. Martin, Director, California Department of Social Welfare.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5063.
    Jackson v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5072.
    Braun v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5134.
    Cox v. Woodson, Penal Institutions Director, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5192.
    Bell v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5210.
    Hurt v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5222.
    Carpenter v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5231.
    Featherston v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5234.
    No. 72-5236.
    Keresty v. United States; and Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5270.
    Nammack v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5240.
    Thomas et al. v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

On May 27,1971, a member of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department obtained from a United States Magistrate a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit setting forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause to believe that narcotics and related contraband were on specified premises. The warrant was sought pursuant to 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a)—§ 509 (a) of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1274. The warrant was executed by members of the Metropolitan Police Force at 9:40 p. m. on May 29, 1971, and resulted in the seizure of narcotics paraphernalia. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search warrant did not detail any basis for execution at night, as required by 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) and D. C. Code Ann. § 23-521 (f) (5) (Supp. 1972) and that motion was granted. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed with one judge dissenting. 294 A. 2d 164.

Petitioners raise two questions that entail an interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. This Act was passed by Congress to consolidate many of the then-existing narcotics Acts in order to make a concerted attack on the drug problem. It was based on the recommendations of two presidential studies and contains both rehabilitative and. punitive provisions.

The old provisions, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1405 (1) and (2) (1964 ed.), provided (1) that a search warrant may be served at any time of the day or night if the judge or the United States Commissioner issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the grounds for the application exist; and (2) that a search warrant may be directed to any officer of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing a violation of any of such provisions.

These sections have now been replaced. 21 U. S. C. § 878 provides: “Any officer or employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug[s] designated by the Attorney General may ... (2) execute and serve search warrants, arrest warrants, administrative inspection warrants, subpenas, and summonses issued under the authority of the United States.”

Section 879 (a) provides that “A search warrant relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be served at any time of the day or night if the judge or United States magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.” (Emphasis added.)

Petitioners first contend that since the Congress did not include the clause allowing the District police to secure warrants under this provision, they have no power to do so. But since the police have power under D. C. Code Ann. §4-138 (1967) to secure any warrant issued in the District of Columbia, this contention would seem to lose merit.

Of more substance is the second assertion. Under former 18 U. S. C. § 1405 a search warrant could be served day or night on a showing of probable cause. In the District of Columbia the requirements for the service of a warrant in the nighttime required a showing of more than probable cause. Both parties agree that the warrant in question did not meet those standards. When Congress changed § 1405 and added the phrase “probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time” did § 879 incorporate §23-521 (f)(5) of the D. C. Code?

Judge Gesell in United States v. Gooding, 328 F. Supp. 1005 (1971), ruled that the warrant was not adequate for a nighttime search and that case is now before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I would hold this case for that decision or grant certiorari and put it down for argument.

Section 23-521 is an important component in the criminal procedure amendments of the Court Reform Act of 1970, effective February 1, 1971. There is an indication that Congress intended that this section should protect a person against unreasonable invasions of privacy. See D. C. Code Leg. & Adm. Service, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 502 (1970). Since the Court Reform Act did not distinguish between local and federal prosecutions in its procedure, it is arguable that the local rules are binding. Roughly 60% of the search warrants issued in the District of Columbia are drug related. Congress is not unaware of this fact. One would expect that if federal narcotics search warrants were to be excluded from coverage, it would have said so.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, took the position that since § 1405 used the standard of probable cause for both day and night searches and § 879 was merely its substitute, there is no change in the law. The majority is supported in its view by the District Court's opinion in United States v. Green, 331 F. Supp. 44 (1971). The dissent, however, thought that that construction made the added phrase in § 879 (a) meaningless.

We should resolve this controversy. As Judge Gesell stated: “The search warrant statutes of possible application to narcotics searches in this jurisdiction are a bramblebush of uncertainties and contradictions. It is difficult if not impossible to determine the present congressional intent. This uncertainty should be clarified immediately, so that future search warrants will not be invalidated because of misunderstandings as to the applicable law.” United States v. Gooding, supra, at 1008.

      That section provides in part:
      “(f) A search warrant shall contain ... (5) a direction that the warrant be executed during the hours of daylight or, where the judicial officer has found cause therefor, including one of the grounds set forth in section 23-522 (e)(1), an authorization for execution at any time of day or night.”
      Section 23-522 (c)(1) provides:
      “(c) The application may also contain — (1) a request that the search warrant be made executable at any hour of the day or night, upon the ground that there is probable cause to believe that (A) it cannot be executed during the hours of daylight, (B) the property sought is likely to be removed or destroyed if not seized forthwith, or (C) the property sought is not likely to be found except at certain times or in certain circumstances.”


text:
    No. 72-5243.
    Mauchlin v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6743.
    Bryant v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurs,

dissenting.

I would grant certiorari in this case.

Petitioner was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial petitioner took the stand and admitted the fact of intercourse, but argued that the alleged victim had consented. Upon cross-examination by the State, petitioner was asked if he had talked with two police officers making certain statements while in custody and admitting his use of force. Petitioner replied that he had talked with the officers but denied making the statements. In rebuttal, the State called the two police officers to the stand. Over petitioner’s objection they testified that petitioner had admitted to them just after his arrest that he had used force to subdue the victim. Prior to this testimony, the trial judge instructed the jury that the testimony was being offered solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant, and not as substantive evidence. There was no allegation that prior to the time the alleged statement was made to the officers, petitioner had been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. Nor was there ever any determination as to the voluntariness of petitioner’s alleged statements.

A defendant’s constitutional right to the fullest opportunity to meet the accusations against him and to be free to deny all the elements of the case against him (Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62), must include the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. The allowance of tainted statements to impeach the accused who takes the stand fetters that choice. The instant case is just another example of the way Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, compromises these constitutionally guaranteed rights.

But my objection goes much farther. The instant case goes a step beyond Harris in allowing the introduction of illegally obtained statements for the impeachment of the defendant when the statement was merely a remembered verbal conversation rather than a typed signed statement; when the statement was presented as direct testimony rather than for the purpose of impeachment by cross-examination; when, although there was an issue of voluntariness, the statement was permitted without a prior determination as to its voluntariness; and when the jury instruction that the statement should not be considered as substantive evidence did not contain the admonition that the statement could not be considered as evidence of guilt.

If Harris is to be extended, we should do so only after argument and mature deliberation.

       The only discussion of voluntariness in the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is that, “While there was evidence he had been given the required warnings, it was admitted he had not waived his right to counsel, had not been given a voir dire hearing, and the court had not found facts showing his statements and admissions were voluntary.” North Carolina v. Bryant, 280 N. C. 551, 554, 187 S. E. 2d 111, 113 (emphasis added). The North Carolina Supreme Court never specifically states that petitioner did not raise these objections at trial; the decision appears to be based on the assumption that these issues are irrelevant since the statement is only being offered for impeachment purposes.


text:
    No. 72-5258.
    Stone v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5291.
    Wall v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-294.
    L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc. v. Trio Process Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Ford Motor Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-302.
    Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Composers & Lyricists Guild of America, Inc., et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-109.
    Presidents Council, District 25, et al. v. Community School Board No. 25 et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Authors League of America, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant the petition for certiorari and set case for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

A book entitled Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas was purchased by the librarians of three junior high schools in School District 25 in Queens, New York. The novel describes in graphic detail sexual and drug and drug-related activities that are a part of everyday life for those who live in Spanish Harlem. Its purpose was to acquaint the youth of Queens with the problems of their contemporaries in this social setting. The book was objected to by some parents and, after a public meeting, the School Board by a vote of 5-3 banned it from the libraries. A later vote by the Board amended the order so the book is now kept on the shelves for direct loan to any parent who wants his or her children to have access to it. No child can borrow it directly.

This suit was brought on behalf of a principal, a librarian, and various parents and children who request that the court declare the resolution adopted by the Board unconstitutional, and order the defendants to place the book in normal circulation in the libraries and enjoin them from interfering with other school libraries within their jurisdiction which desire to purchase the book.

Actions of school boards are not immune from constitutional scrutiny. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U. S. 404 (1923); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). Academic freedom has been upheld against attack on various fronts. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967). The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and publish, but also the right to hear, to learn, to know. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 534 (1945); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386, 390 (1969). And this Court has recognized that this right to know is “ ‘nowhere more vital’ than in our schools and universities,” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 763 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 250 (opinion of Warren, C. J.); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 603. The book involved is not alleged to be obscene either under the standards of Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), or under the stricter standards for minors set forth in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).

The Board, however, contends that a book with such vivid accounts of sordid and perverted occurrences is not good for junior high students. At trial both sides produced expert witnesses to prove the value or harm of the novel. At school the children are allowed to discuss the contents of the book and the social problems it portrays. They can do everything but read it. This in my mind lessens somewhat the contention that the subject matter of the book is not proper.

The First Amendment is a preferred right and is of great importance in the schools. In Tinker, the Court held that the First Amendment can only be restricted in the schools when a disciplinary problem is raised. No such allegation is asserted here. What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How else will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world’s problems?

Another requirement of the First Amendment is that any statute that imposes restrictions on the freedoms it protects must be narrowly drawn so as to impose any limitation in only the least restrictive way. N. Y. Educ. Law § 2590-e (3) (1970) gives the Board power to “determine matters relating to the instruction of students, including the selection of textbooks and other instructional materials . . . ,” provided they are approved by the Chancellor. The regulation of the State Commissioner of Education says that secondary school book collections “shall consist of books approved as satisfactory for (1) supplementing the curriculum (2) reference and general information (3) appreciation and (4) pleasure reading,” 8 N. Y. Code, Rules & Regs. Educ., § 91.1 (b) (1966). Even a casual reading of these regulations shows that they contain no discrete limitations of the type spoken of in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), or Shelton v. Tucker, supra.

Because the issues raised here are crucial to our national life, I would hear argument in this case.


text:
    No. 72-218.
    Fugate, Commissioner, Department of Highways of Virginia v. Arlington Coalition on Transportation et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72 266.
    Stone v. Stone et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-275.
    Katz et al. v. Aspinwall et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-303.
    New Hampshire Bankers Assn. et al. v. Nelson, Bank Commissioner of New Hampshire, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-313.
    Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County et al. v. Kelley et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-321.
    Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Jackson.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-327.
    Hoogasian et al. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-339.
    Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-5269.
    No. 71-6536,
    Raymond v. United States. Guy v. United States

   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion for an order reinstating case

[ante, p. 896], and for simultaneous consideration denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 456 F. 2d 1157.


text:
    No. 71-1433.
    Belliston et al. v. Texaco Inc.,
   408 U. S. 928. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1624.
    No. 71-6260.
    No. 71-6536.
    No. 71-6564.
    No. 71-6907.
    Lewis v. Strachan Shipping Co. et al., MacLeod v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent, Guy v. United States, Newell v. Bohannon, U. S. District Judge, Watson v. Stynchcombe, Sheriff,
   ante, p. 887;

ante, p. 853;

ante, p. 896;

ante, p. 823; and

ante, p. 873. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1218.
    Holmes et al. v. United States,
   407 U. S. 909. Motion to dispense with printing motion for leave to file petition for rehearing granted. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 10, 1972
    No. A-444.
    Popkin v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the stay.


text:
    November 13, 1972
    No. 72-104.
    Kaplan et al. v. Milliken, Judge, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Ky.


text:
    No. 72-246.
    Interstate Commerce Commission v. IML SeaTransit, Ltd., et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-6752.
    Walker v. Kentucky.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ky. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-32.
    Winter v. Pratt et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-354.
    No. 72-369.
    Rockland County Builders Assn., Inc., et al. v. McAlevey et al.; and Golden et al. v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo et al.
   Appeals from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 30 N. Y. 2d 359, 285 N. E. 2d 291.


text:
    No. 72-365.
    Reilley v. Reilley.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5513.
    Corrado, dba Perry’s Second Hand Plumbing v. Providence Redevelopment Agency.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. R. I. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-373.
    Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Benson, Commissioner of Revenue.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tenn. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-5317.
    Frazier v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U. S. 845 (1972).


text:
    No. A-394 (72-5535).
    Dye v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant bail. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. A-460.
    In re Berg et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of execution of judgment and bail presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would continue the stay.


text:
    No. 71-1178.
    Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of respondent cities granted and 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Petitioner also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-95.
    Tollett, Warden v. Henderson.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 912.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that H. Fred Hoefle, Esquire, of Cincinnati, Ohio, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 71-1192.
    Goldstein et al. v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. [Certiorari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.; et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-6757.
    Fontaine v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 978.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Steven M. Umin, Esquire, of Washington, D. C., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 72-312.
    Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 72-5324.
    McCrary v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-5336.
    Steele v. Lambros, Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-214.
    No. 72-433.
    Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. v. Wichita Board of Trade et al.; and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Wichita Board of Trade et al.
   Appeals from D. C. Kan. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-350.
    United States v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-1556.
    McGowan v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6720.
    Fletcher v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6880.
    Davis v. Caldwell, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6897.
    Andersen v. Regents of the University of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-67.
    Hill et ux. v. Hill.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-79.
    No. 72-167.
    County Board of Education of Richmond County, Georgia, et al. v. Acree et al.; and Drummond et al. v. Acree et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 458 F. 2d 486.


text:
    No. 72-135.
    No. 72-272.
    No. 72-390.
    No. 72-514.
    Projansky v. United States; Leavitt v. United States; Geier v. United States; and Brainin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 465 F. 2d 123.


text:
    No. 72-157.
    Lonquest v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-177.
    Miller v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-288.
    Potts et al. v. Flax et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-335.
    LeFlore v. Alabama ex rel. Moore.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-343.
    Loeser et al. v. Loeser.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-346.
    Humble v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-347.
    Custom Recording Co., Inc., et al. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-353.
    Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc., et al. v. Sparkle Food Center, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-358.
    Bishop v. Coral Drilling, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-360.
    International Longshoremen’s Assn. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-362.
    Winchester TV Cable Co., Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-361.
    Gottlieb v. Duryea et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-363.
    Grimes v. Nottoway County School Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-372.
    Road Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-374.
    Swarthout v. Olund.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-375.
    San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-377.
    Campbell v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-378.
    Hersh v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-379.
    M. J. Pirolli & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-380.
    Perillo et ux. v. United American Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-381.
    Basyap, Inc., et al. v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-383.
    Texaco Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-384.
    Kansai Iron Works, Ltd. v. Marubeni-Iida, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-387.
    Schwartz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-391.
    Robinson, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Frasher et ux.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-395.
    John Nuveen & Co., Inc., et al. v. Sanders.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-420.
    No. 72-5182.
    Montano v. United States; and Griffin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 464 F. 2d 1352.


text:
    No. 72-5004.
    Cousino v. Coulon et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5014.
    Connors v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5297.
    Carter v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5298.
    Cooper v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5305.
    Hays v. Canale et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5306.
    LaBadie v. Michigan.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5307.
    Gray et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5309.
    Bennett et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5314.
    Hibberd v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5316.
    Knox v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5318.
    Douglas v. Nixon, Sheriff.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5321.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5325.
    Cody v. United States
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5326.
    Grantham v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5327.
    Monje v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5330.
    Wolfe v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5332.
    Hagan v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5333.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5334.
    LeBrun v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5335.
    Jackson v. Wolford.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5338.
    Wagner v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5339.
    Emdy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5340.
    Chacon v. McClain et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5341.
    Spinks v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5342.
    Houp v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5344.
    Strother v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5345.
    Cook v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5514.
    Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1642.
    Farr v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6700.
    Venable et al. v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-349.
    Scarpetta v. DeMartino et ux.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-352.
    Collins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-355.
    Russell, Executrix v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-356.
    Smith, Trustee v. Baker, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 3d Cir. denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-371.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Tamiment, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-382.
    Carter et al. v. Panama Canal Co.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-388.
    Gerace et vir v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-389.
    Zizzo v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5296.
    Chagois v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5315.
    Boatwright v. Hendricks, Prison Camp Superintendent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5328.
    Broadway v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-5337.
    Nix v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6589.
    Slade v. Valley National Bank, Glendale.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Motion for leave to dispense with printing amicus curiae brief by National Legal Aid & Defender Assn, granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-41.
    Washington Parish School Board et al. v. Moses et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to dispense with printing respondents’ brief granted. Certiorari denied.