author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas, Me. Justice Black,

text:
    AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD.
    No. 44.
    Argued December 8-9, 1964.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Rein.

      Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, George B. Searls and Doris H. Spangenburg.

      Melvin L. Wulj and Marvin M. Karpatkin filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
   Per Curiam.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring that the petitioner register as a “Communist-front” organization under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (1958 ed.). 117 U. S. App. D. C. 393, 331 F. 2d 53. We granted certiorari. 377 U. S. 915.

Under the statute, a determination that an organization is a Communist front must rest on findings that it “(A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization, and (B) is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization . . . .” § 3 (4), 64 Stat. 989, 50 U. S. C. § 782 (4) (1958 ed.). In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, this Court sustained the Board’s determination that the Communist Party is a “Communist-action organization” within the meaning of § 3 (3) of the Act; in doing so, the Court upheld the registration requirement against First Amendment attack and found an objection based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination not ripe for decision.

In the present case the Board’s findings that petitioner is a “Communist front” were based primarily upon evidence taken at a hearing which was concluded in 1955. The findings which support the conclusion that the petitioner is controlled by and primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to the Communist Party rest in substantial measure upon evidence of the activities of Abner Green, found to be a Party member expressly assigned in 1941 to be petitioner’s executive secretary. Green died in 1959. The Board’s order was filed on June 27, 1960, but the record discloses no findings or evidence concerning petitioner’s activities after Green’s death. In the circumstances we think that the record should be brought up to date to take account of supervening events. Since a registration order operates prospectively, it is apparent that reasonably current aid and control must be established to justify a registration order. Our Communist Party decision on the Communist-action provisions did not necessarily foreclose petitioner’s constitutional questions bearing on the Communist-front provisions. Since petitioner’s current status is not clear on this record, decision of the serious constitutional questions raised by the order is neither necessary nor appropriate.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan concur,

dissenting.

I dissent from the refusal of the Court to face up to the important constitutional questions squarely presented by this case. The Court’s excuse is that Abner Green, the executive secretary, who was prominent in petitioner’s affairs, died after the close of the hearings.

Petitioner has never, so far as appears, alleged any facts indicating that with the death of Abner Green the nature of the Committee underwent any significant change. Yet this suggestion could have been made to the Board prior to its decision; and it could have been made to the Court of Appeals, for the Act in § 14 (a) specifically provides: “If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board and to be adduced upon the proceeding in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seenh proper.”

In determining that petitioner was a Communist-front organization, the Board was directed by the Act to'consider other evidence in addition to evidence that petitioner’s executive secretary was a member of the Communist Party. Section 13 (f) sets forth four different categories of evidence which must be considered by the Board in deciding whether an organization is a front: (1) the extent to which those who are active in the direction of the alleged front are also active in a Communist-action organization; (2) the extent to which financial or other support is derived from a Communist-action organization; (3) the extent to which the alleged front’s funds and personnel are used to promote the objectives of a Communist-action organization; and (4) the extent to which the alleged front’s positions on matters of policy do not deviate from the Communist line. Evidence in all four of these categories was adduced.

The Court takes a peculiar view of the evidence when it surmises that the death of petitioner’s executive secretary may suddenly have changed the nature of the organization. It forgets what the Court said in the Communist Party case: “Where the current character of an organization and the nature of its connections with others is at issue, of course past conduct is pertinent. Institutions, like other organisms, are predominantly what their past has made them. History provides the illuminating context within which the implications of present conduct may be known.” 367 U. S. 1, 69.

The Board found that the petitioner had existed in the United States since 1932 or 1933 and that it was eight or nine years later that Green became its executive secretary. The evidence before the Board established that Green was the “top functionary” of petitioner’s national organization and that he was the “most influential official” therein, but he was not the only top official who was found to be a member of the Communist Party. The number two person in the national organization was Harriet Barron, the administrative secretary, who with Green carried on the organization’s day-to-day activities. She was found to have been a member of the Communist Party at the time of the hearings and for a number of years prior thereto.

A great deal of the evidence heard by the Board related to the local branches of the petitioner. The Board found: “The management, direction, and supervision of the branches (local committees) have been by Communist Party members such as Ruth Hillsgrove for the New England Committee; Evelyn Abelson and Bess Steinberg for the Western Pennsylvania Committee; Saul Grossman for the Michigan Committee; Marion Kinney for the Northwest Committee; and Delphine Smith for the Los Angeles Committee.” This evidence establishes that the petitioner cannot possibly be regarded as a one-man organization. It is true that Green was the leader of the national organization in New York and that he appeared at some meetings of the local committees. But the nature and existence of these local committees, which the Board regarded as “part of” the national organization, indicate clearly that the organization had an existence above and beyond Green himself.

In this regard the genesis of the Northwest Committee is instructive. The Board found that the organization of this branch resulted from discussions in Communist Party meetings in Seattle about the need for a local branch of the American Committee to defend Party members. This was in 1949 when the Party designated member Kinney to head this organization. Green was not present at the meetings which led to the formation of this branch, and seems to have had little, if any, part in it. The first mention of Green in connection with this branch seems to be the testimony that in 1952 he made a speech at a meeting that was in some way connected with the activities of the local committee.

The ultimate finding of the Board as to these local organizations was: “We find on the entire record that the American Committee and the various area or local committees are associated together for joint action on particular subjects. Together they constitute a voluntary association and one organization within the meaning of the term 'organization’ set forth in section 3 (2) of the statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) One simply cannot read the record and come to the conclusion that this congeries of individual organizations, loosely united under the aegis of the national committee, was merely Green’s alter ego and would therefore change upon his death.

A Communist-front organization is one which is controlled by a Communist-action organization and which is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to Communism. To prove this latter part of the definition the Attorney General introduced before the Board evidence showing that the Committee engaged in the legal defense of Party members who were defendants in deportation and denaturalization proceedings. Much of this evidence appears to have concerned the activities of the local committees. The Board found, for example, that “the cases of Joe Weber, Refugio Ramon Martinez, and James MacKay [were] handled by the Midwest Committee; the Mexican deportees and a group referred to as the Terminal Island Four [were] handled by the Los Angeles Committee; and the Giacomo Quattrone-Ponzi case [was] handled by the New England Committee.” There is no reason to believe that this work of the local committees has been discontinued because of Green’s death.

The case is very much alive; and the record is by no means stale. We should face up to the serious issues presented and in no way affected by Abner Green’s death.

Me. Justice Black,

dissenting.

While I have joined the dissents of Mr. Justice Douglas from the Court’s action in remanding these cases without deciding the important constitutional questions involved, I have additional reasons for objecting to the remands. In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 137 (dissenting opinion), I stated at some length my reasons for believing that the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U. S. C. §§ 781-826 (1958 ed.), on which the Government’s case here rests, violates a number of provisions of our Constitution and Bill of Rights in many respects. See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 517 (concurring opinion). I think that among other things the Act is a bill of attainder; that it imposes cruel, unusual and savage punishments for thought, speech, writing, petition and assembly; and that it stigmatizes people for their beliefs, associations and views about politics, law, and government. The Act has borrowed the worst features of old laws intended to put shackles on the minds and bodies of men, to make them confess to crime, to make them miserable while in this country, and to make it a crime even to attempt to get out of it. It is difficult to find laws more thought-stifling than this one even in countries considered the most benighted. Previous efforts to have this Court pass on the constitutionality of the various provisions of this freedom-crushing law have met with frustration on one excuse or another. I protest against following this course again. My vote is to hear the case now and hold the law to be what I think it is — a wholesale denial of what I believe to be the constitutional heritage of every freedom-loving American.

       Petitioner raised the point when, on February 11, 1960, the Board heard oral argument on the sufficiency of the evidence. At that time, petitioner’s counsel urged as an independent reason for “throwing out this case" that “[t]his case is stale and you ought to throw it out because you can’t enter an order under the Act. . . . [The Attornej'- General] talks about what a devil Abner Green was, or Harriet Barron, the two people he said ran the organization. Well, the fact is that it has been years since Harriet Barron has had any connection with the [petitioner], and Abner Green to my great sorrow is now dead. Things have changed, and times have changed . . . you can’t conscientiously-enter an order in the present in view of the terrific amount of time that has passed and the changes in time. . . .” XVIII Transcript 7492-7493. The Board made no mention of this argument in its report.

       That the issues are not plainly foreclosed is illustrated by President Truman’s veto message:
      “Insofar as the bill would require registration by .the Communist Party itself, it does not endanger our traditional liberties. However, the application of the registration requirements to so-called Communist-front organizations can be the greatest danger to freedom of speech, press and assembly, since the alien and sedition laws of 1798. This danger arises out of the. criteria or standards to be applied in determining whether an organization is a Communist-front organization.
      “[T]he bill would permit such a determination to be based solely upon ‘the extent to which the positions taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those’ of the Communist movement.
      “This provision could easily be used to classify as a Communist-front organization any organization which is advocating a single policy or objective which is also being urged by the Communist Party or by a Communist foreign government. . . . Thus, an organization which advocates low-cost housing for sincere humanitarian reasons might be classified as a Communist-front organization because the Communists regularly exploit slum conditions as one of their fifth-column techniques.” H. R. Doc. No. 708, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6. See also Note, 74 Yale L. J. 738 (1965).

       The Attorney General began the present proceeding in 1953 for an order requiring the petitioner to register as a Communist-front organization, alleging that the petitioner was controlled by the Communist Party. (Immediately prior to the commencement of this proceeding the Board had issued its report of April 20, 1953, finding the Party to be a Communist-action organization.) Hearings were had before an examiner and concluded sometime in 1956. The examiner’s recommended decision was issued on September 10, 1957. While the Board had the case under advisement, the second remand in the Communist Party litigation occurred. (The history of .this litigation is set out in full in Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, at 19-22.) It was therefore necessary to postpone action in the present case because petitioner here was alleged to be a front for the Communist Party, and the provisions of the Act would not come into play as to petitioner unless the Party were proved^to be a Communist-action organization — which was of course the purpose of the Communist Party litigation.
      In 1959, after the Board's second modified report in the Communist Party proceeding, the Board reactivated this case and ordered the Attorney General to make available to petitioner certain documents which intervening judicial decisions had suggested were producible. Further proceedings were had in this connection; further oral argument was presented-to the Board; and the Board’s report and order were filed on June 27,1960.
      On appeal the Court of Appeals on January 8, 1962, remanded the case to the Board to allow petitioner to introduce evidence of alleged perjured testimony. On March 8, 1962, the Board reaffirmed its earlier order. On December 17, 1963, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s order. We granted certiorari on April 27, 1964.

       On oral argument before the Board on February 11, 1960, counsel for the petitioner did argue in a general way that the case was “stale” simply as the result of the “passage of time.” In the course of this argument counsel observed that “Abner Green to my great sorrow is now dead. Things have changed, and times have changed. Standards have changed, and everybody has changed, I think, but the Department of Justice . . . .” This passing reference to Green’s death falls far short of a serious effort to show that petitioner was a legally different entity after Green’s death: for example, petitioner made no effort to reopen the record for evidence concerning Green’s successor, any new policies now in effect, or the dike. And, as noted, no effort was made in the Court of Appeals to have the case remanded for the taking of new evidence.

       In that case the Court of Appeals observed:
      “[I]t is rarely, if ever, possible to prove present nature by some instantaneous, contemporaneous fact, totally ignoring the whole of the past. Not only is the past clearly pertinent, it may be quite material to a determination of present nature. Whether it is material depends upon whether there is afirma,tive evidence of a departure from the established past. In the ordinary affairs of life and in ordinary litigation, if a person or an organization is shown to have had over many years a certain policy and program, and no more is shown, the conclusion is clearly indicated that he or it has the same policy and program in the present.” 96 U. S. App. D. C. 66, 105, 223 F. 2d 531, 570.

      [This opinion applies also to No. 65, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control Board, post, p. 513.]

      In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, this Court held unconstitutional on its face the whole of § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 785 (1958 ed.), which made it unlawful for any member of an organization registered under the Act “to make application for a passport . . . or ... to use or attempt to use any such passport.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    VETERANS OF THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN BRIGADE v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD.
    No. 65.
    Argued December 9, 1964.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Victor Rabinowitz and David Rein.

      Kevin T. Maroney and Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and Robert L. Keuch.

      Melvin L. Wulf and Marvin M. Karpatkin filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner was ordered by the Subversive Activities Control Board to register as a Communist-front organization under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (1958 ed.), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 117 U. S. App. D. C. 404, 331 F. 2d 64. We granted certiorari, 377 U. S. 989. In this case, the order to register was based almost exclusively on events before 1950, and very largely on events before 1940. The hearings themselves were concluded in November 1954, more than 10 years ago. On so stale a record we do not think it is either necessary or appropriate that we decide the serious constitutional questions raised by the order. See American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Board, ante, p. 503. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case.

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, see ante, p. 511.]

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan concur,

dissenting.

I think this case is ripe for decision. The controversy is real, not feigned. All of the relevant facts one needs to know to resolve the constitutional question are exposed in the present record.

This is the famous brigade of Americans who fought in the Spanish Civil War against Franco. Approximately 3,000 American youths were members; and of these only about 1,800 survived. Petitioner was formed in 1939 as an unincorporated association and was incorporated in 1940 under the laws of New York, its charter being forfeited in 1952 for failure to file required reports.

The record is detailed. The Court of Appeals, which sustained the Subversive Activities Control Board in finding that petitioner is a “Communist-front organization” within the meaning of § 3 (4) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as amended, 64 Stat. 989, 50 U. S. C. § 782 (4) (117 U. S. App. D. C. 404, 331 F. 2d 64), spoke of “the tremendous volume of the record” and the “almost numberless facets of fact involved.” Id., at 413, 331 F. 2d, at 73. The history of the formation of the Brigade, its relationship with the Communist Party and with Communists, the manner in which international brigades of this kind were employed by Communists, the role of Communists in forming this Brigade, the affiliations of officers of the Brigade, the ideas and program promoted by the Brigade’s official organ, Volunteer for Liberty, the efforts of the Brigade to get its members employed in unions, offices, or factories where a Communist unit or functionary was located, the extent to which the Brigade responded to Party discipline, and the extent to which the Brigade aided and supported the Party — all were fully explored.

Since 1950 the Brigade’s affairs have been run almost entirely by an Executive Secretary and a National Commander. Since 1950 its activities have consisted principally of social affairs, rehabilitating and resettling veterans and getting them employment, making statements in opposition to the Franco regime, supporting its members who were indicted under the Smith Act, and defending itself in this proceeding.

This proceeding started in 1953, when the Attorney General petitioned the Board for an order requiring the Brigade to register as a Communist-front organization. Hearings before the Board commenced May 3, 1954, and ended November 16, 1954. Over a year later the Board issued a registration order against the Brigade, and its report in the case. The final order of the Board is dated December 21, 1955. The opinion of the Court of Appeals comes eight years later and is dated December 17, 1963.

But no one suggests that there have been any basic changes in the pattern of the Brigade’s activities either since the Board’s order or the Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals found no difficulty in concluding that as of the date of the record the Brigade continued to be what it had been in the past:

“The events in 1950-1954 were not factually isolated. The Brigade continued to operate after 1950. It had the same officers and occupied the same offices. It continued to publish its magazine. The character and tone of its declarations upon the subjects with which it dealt were the same as those it had always utilized. So that factually, on this record, the post-1950 activities and policies appear as a continued, although diminished, stream, rather than as a separate, new phase of life.” 117 U. S. App. D. C., at 412-413, 331 F. 2d, at 72-73.

None of the parties before us has suggested that the record is stale or incomplete; and as noted in my dissenting opinion in American Committee v. Control Board, ante, p. 507, the Act contains a special provision covering that contingency. None of the parties before us has suggested that we need to know more about the Brigade since the Board’s decision in 1955. We are told by counsel that what the Brigade once was, it still is.

There is one way and one way only in which this case is getting stale with the passage of time. And that is that the Brigade’s membership is not being renewed but depleted. Its membership, as noted, is made up of Americans who fought in the Spanish War against Franco. The mortality table has caused that list to shrink and it will continue to shrink. In 1955 there were only 600 survivors of the Brigade, not all of whom were members of petitioner. Hence in some months or years the case will return to us more stale than it is at the present time.

With all due respect, I think it is indefensible not to decide the important constitutional questions tendered here and now.

       The finding of the Board that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization was a product of the litigation which terminated on June 5, 1961, with this Court’s decision in Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U. S. 1. That litigation was in progress in the years between 1950 and 1961; and since the finding that the Party was a Communist-action organization was necessary to the Board’s result in this case, the present case was held by the Court, of Appeals pending the outcome of the Communist Party litigation. See 117 U. S. App. D. C. 404, at 406, 331 F. 2d 64, at 66. The present case was then argued before the Court of Appeals in October of 1962, and decision was rendered on December 17, 1963.


text:
    TEXAS v. NEW JERSEY et al.
    No. 13,
    Original.
    Decided February 1, 1965.
    Decree entered April 26, 1965.
   It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as Follows :

1. Each item of property in question in this case as to which a last-known, address of the person entitled thereto is shown on the books and records of defendant Sun Oil Company is subject to escheat or custodial taking only by the State of that last-known address, as shown on the books and records of defendant Sun Oil Company, to the extent of that State’s power under its own laws to escheat or to take custodially.

2. Each item of property in question in this case as to which there is no address of the person entitled thereto shown on the books and records of defendant Sun Oil Company is subject to escheat or custodial taking only by New Jersey, the State in which Sun Oil Company was incorporated, to the extent of New Jersey’s power under its own laws to escheat or to take custodially, subject to the right of any other State to recover such property from New Jersey upon proof that the last-known address of the creditor was within that other State’s borders.

3. Each item of property in question in this case as to which the last-known address of the person entitled thereto as shown on the books and records of defendant Sun Oil Company is in a State, the laws of which do not provide for the escheat of such property, is subject to escheat or custodial taking only by New Jersey, the State in which Sun Oil Company was incorporated, to the extent of New Jersey’s power under its own laws to escheat or to take custodially, subject to the right of the State of the last-known address to recover the property from New Jersey if and when the law of the State of the last-known address makes provision for escheat or custodial taking of such property.

4. Any relief prayed for by any party to this action which is not hereby granted is denied.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    CALLENDER et al. v. FLORIDA.
    No. 58.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Carl Rachlin and Floyd McKissick for petitioners.

      James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and George R. GeorgiejJ, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgments are reversed. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, Abernathy v. Alabama, ante, p. 447.


text:
    GOLD et al. v. DiCARLO, COMMISSIONER OF LICENSES OF CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 901.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Jesse Moss for appellants.

      Leo A. Larkin and Seymour B. Quel for DiCarlo, and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Lester Esterman, Assistant Attorney General, for Lefkowitz, appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    CORPORA v. NEW YORK.
    No. 934.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Emanuel Redfield for appellant.

      Frank S. Hogan and H. Richard Uviller for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    CUMBERLAND FARMS NORTHERN, INC. v. MAINE MILK COMMISSION.
    No. 904.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Sidney W. Wernick for appellant.

      Richard J. Dubord, Attorney General of Maine, George C. West, Deputy Attorney General, and John W. Benoit, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


text:
    BROWN v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 194,
    Misc.
    Decided April 26, 1965.
    Appellant pro se.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Lawrence R. Tapper, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    WESTERN & SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
    No. 91.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      John O. Wayman for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the National Labor Relations Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court in Labor Board v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., ante, p. 438. The judgment shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.


text:
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
    No. 56.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Burton A. Zorn, George G. Gallants, Marvin Dicker and Thomas F. Delaney for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the National Labor Relations Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court in Labor Board v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., ante, p. 438. The judgment shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.


text:
    THOMAS et al. v. MISSISSIPPI.
    No. 181.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Jack Young, B. Jess Brown, Carl Rachlin and Michael Meltsner for petitioners.

      Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, and John A. Travis and Robert G. Nichols, Jr., Special Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgments are reversed. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, Abernathy v. Alabama, ante, p. 447.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
    No. 229.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      Burton A. Zorn, George G. Gallantz, Marvin Dicker and Thomas F. Delaney for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the National Labor Relations Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court in Labor Board v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., ante, p. 438. The judgment shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.


text:
    CAROLINA & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 838.
    Decided April 26, 1965.

      W. Graham, Claytor, Jr., Henry J. Karison, Hugh B. Cox and William H. Allen for appellants.

      Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Lionel Kestenbaum, Donald L. Hardison, Robert W. Ginnane and Arthur J. Cerra for the United States et al.; and R. Wray Henriott, W. L. Grubbs, James W. Hoeland, Elbert R. Leigh and Joseph L. Lenihan for Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.


text:
    MURRAY v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 260,
    Misc.
    Decided April 26, 1965.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Upon consideration of the suggestion of the Solicitor General and an examination of the entire record, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the validity of the arrest of Henry Murray and of the search for and seizure of the money in question as an incident of such arrest.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Warren

text:
    HARMAN et al. v. FORSSENIUS et al.
    No. 360.
    Argued March 1-2, 1965.
    Decided April 27, 1965.

      Joseph C. Carter, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert Y. Button, Attorney-General of Virginia, Richard N. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, and E. Milton Farley III.

      H. E. Widener, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were L. S. Parsons, Jr., John N. Dalton and Bentley Hite.

      Harold H. Greene, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Louis F. Claiborne and David Rubin.

   Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon in this case to construe, for the first time, the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”

The precise issue is whether § 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code — which provides that in order to qualify to vote in federal elections one must either pay a poll tax or file a witnessed or notarized certificate of residence— contravenes this command.

Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Virginia Constitution (Art. II, §§ 18-20) and statutes (Va. Code Ann. §§ 24^17, 24-67 (1950)) established uniform standards for qualification for voting in both federal and state elections. The requirements were: (1) United States citizenship; (2) a minimum age of twenty-one; (3) residence in the State for one year, in the city or county for six months, and in the voting precinct for thirty days; and (4) payment “at least six months prior to the election ... to the proper officer all State poll taxes [$1.50 annually] assessed or assessable against him for three years next preceding such election.” The statutes further provided for permanent registration. Once registered, the voters could qualify for elections in subsequent years merely by paying the poll taxes.

In 1963, in anticipation of the promulgation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Governor of Virginia convened a special session of the Virginia General Assembly. On November 21 of that year, the General Assembly enacted two Acts designed

“(1) to enable persons to register and vote in Federal elections without the payment of poll tax or other tax as required by the 24th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, (2) to continue in effect in all other elections the present registration and voting requirements of the Constitution of Virginia, and (3) to provide methods by which all persons registered to vote in Federal or other elections may prove that they meet the residence requirements of Section 18 of the Constitution of Virginia.”

No changes were made with regard to qualification for voting in state elections. With regard to federal elections, however, the payment of a poll tax as an absolute prerequisite to registration and voting was eliminated, and a provision was added requiring the federal voter to file a certificate of residence in each election year or, at his option, to pay the customary poll taxes. The statute provides that the certificate of residence must be filed no earlier than October 1 of the year immediately preceding that in which the voter desires to vote and not later than six months prior to the election. The voter must state in the certificate (which must be notarized or witnessed) his present address, that he is currently a resident of Virginia, that he has been a resident since the date of his registration, and that he does not presently intend to remove from the city or county of which he is a resident prior to the next general election. Va. Code Ann. §24-17.2 (1964 Supp.). Thus, as a result of the 1963 Acts, a citizen after registration may vote in both federal and state elections upon the payment of all assessable poll taxes. Va. Code Ann. § 24-17 (1964 Supp.). If he has not paid such taxes he cannot vote in state elections, and may vote in federal elections only upon filing a certificate of residence in each election year. Va. Code Ann. §§ 24-17.1, 24-17.2 (1964 Supp.).

The present appeal originated as two separate class actions, brought by appellees in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, attacking the foregoing provisions of the 1963 Virginia legislation as violative of Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and the Fourteenth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments thereto. The complaints, which prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief, named as defendants (appellants here) the three members of the Virginia State Board of Elections and, in one case, the County Treasurer of Roanoke County, Virginia, and, in the other, the Director of Finance of Fairfax County. The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 (1958 ed.), and a court of three judges was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1958 ed.).

The District Court denied the State’s motion to stay the proceedings in order to give the Virginia courts an opportunity to resolve the issues and interpret the statutes involved. The court further denied the State’s motions to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and for want of a justiciable controversy.* On the merits, the District Court held that the certificate of residence requirement was “a distinct qualification” or at least an “increase [in] the quantum of necessary proof of residence” imposed solely on the federal voter, and that it therefore violated Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment, which provide that electors choosing a Representative or Senator in the Congress of the United States “shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.” The court rejected the argument that the residency certificate was merely a method, like the poll tax, of proving the residence qualification which is imposed on both federal and state voters. Accordingly, the District Court entered an order declaring invalid the portions of the 1963 Virginia legislation which required the filing of a certificate of residence and enjoining appellants from requiring compliance by a voter with said portions of the 1963 Acts. We noted probable jurisdiction. 379 U. S. 810.

We hold that § 24^17.2 is repugnant to the Twenty-fourth Amendment and affirm the decision of th.e District Court on that basis. We therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether that section violates Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment.

I.

At the outset, we are faced with the State’s contention that the District Court should have stayed the proceedings until the courts of Virginia had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass on underlying issues of state law and to construe the statutes involved. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction.

In applying the doctrine of abstention, a federal district court is vested with discretion to decline to exercise or to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to state court resolution of underlying issues of state law. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496. Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication. E. g., Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co.¡ supra. The doctrine, however, contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain. Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 690; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 673-674; Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 84. If the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375-379. Thus, “recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.” England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415-416.

The state statutes involved here are clear and unambiguous in all material respects. While the State suggests that the Virginia tribunals are “unquestionably far better equipped than the lower [federal] court to unravel the skeins of local law and administrative practices in which the Appellees’ claims are entangled,” the State does not point to any provision in the legislation which leaves “reasonable room for a construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem.” Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177.

In spite of the clarity of the 1963 legislation, the State argues that the District Court should have abstained on the ground that if the certificate of residence requirement were found to be a qualification distinct from those specified in the Virginia Constitution, it would be invalid as a matter of Virginia law and “a crucial federal constitutional issue would accordingly disappear from the case.” We find little force in this argument. The section of the Virginia Constitution (Art. II, § 18) on which the State relies expressly limits the franchise to citizens who have met certain residency requirements. The statute in issue, § 24-17.2, requires the voter to certify that he meets those residence requirements. It is thus difficult to envisage how § 24-17.2 could be construed as setting forth a qualification not found in the Virginia Constitution.

In addition to the clarity of the Virginia statutes, support for the District Court’s refusal to stay the proceedings is found in the nature of the constitutional deprivation alleged and the probable consequences of abstaining. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 229; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375-379. The District Court was faced with two class actions attacking a statutory scheme allegedly impairing the right to vote in violation of Art. I, § 2, and the Fourteenth, Seventeenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments. As this Court has stressed on numerous occasions, “[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 Ui S. 533, 555. The right is fundamental “because preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370. In appraising the motion to stay proceedings, the District Court was thus faced with a claimed impairment of the fundamental civil rights of a broad class of citizens. The motion was heard about two months prior to the deadline for meeting the statutory requirements and just eight months before the 1964 general elections. Given the importance and immediacy of the problem, and the delay inherent in referring questions of state law to state tribunals, it is evident that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 229; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375-379.

II.

Reaching the merits, it is important to emphasize that the question presented is not whether it would be within a State’s power to abolish entirely the poll tax and require all voters — state and federal — to file annually a certificate of residence. Rather, the issue here is whether the State of Virginia may constitutionally confront the federal voter with a requirement that he either pay the customary poll taxes as required for state elections or file a certificate of residence. We conclude that this requirement constitutes an abridgment of the right to vote "in federal elections in contravention of the Twenty-fourth Amendment.

Prior to the proposal of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1962, federal legislation to eliminate poll taxes, either by constitutional amendment or statute, had been introduced in every Congress since 1939. The House of Representatives passed anti-poll tax bills on five occasions and the Senate twice proposed constitutional amendments. Even though in 1962 only five States retained the poll tax as a voting requirement, Congress reflected widespread national concern with the characteristics of the tax. Disenchantment with the poll tax was many-faceted. One of the basic objections to the poll tax was that it exacted a price for the privilege of exercising the franchise. Congressional hearings and debates indicate a general repugnance to the disenfranchisement of the poor occasioned by failure to pay the tax.

“While it is true that the amount of poll tax now required to be paid in the several States is small and imposes only a slight economical obstacle for any citizen who desires to qualify in order to vote, nevertheless, it is significant that the voting in poll tax States is relatively low as compared to the overall population which would be eligible. . . . [T]he historical analysis . . . indicates that where the poll tax has been abandoned . . . voter participation increased.” H. R. Rep. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3.

Another objection to the poll tax raised in the congressional hearings was that the tax usually had to be paid long before the election — at a time when political campaigns were still quiescent — which tended to eliminate from the franchise a substantial number of voters who did not plan so far ahead. The poll tax was also attacked as a vehicle for fraud which could be manipulated by-political machines by financing block payments of the tax. In addition, and of primary concern to many, the poll tax was viewed as a requirement adopted with an eye to the disenfranchisement of Negroes and applied in.a discriminatory manner. It is against this background that Congress proposed, and three-fourths of the States ratified, the Twenty-fourth Amendment abolishing the poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections.

Upon adoption of the Amendment, of course, no State could condition the federal franchise upon payment of a poll tax. The State of Virginia accordingly removed the poll tax as an absolute prerequisite to qualification for voting in federal elections, but in its stead substituted a provision whereby the federal voter could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months before the election.

It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 271 U. S. 583. “Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be . . . indirectly denied,” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664, or “manipulated out of existence.” Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 345. Significantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment does not merely insure that the franchise shall not be “denied” by reason of failure to pay the poll tax; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote shall not be “denied or abridged” for that reason. Thus, like the Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes” of impairing the right guaranteed. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275. “It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise” by those claiming the constitutional immunity. Ibid.; cf. Gray v. Johnson, 234 F. Supp. 743 (D. C. S. D. Miss.).

Thus, in order to demonstrate the invalidity of § 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code, it need only be shown that it imposes a material requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a poll tax. Section 24-17.2 unquestionably erects a real obstacle to voting in federal elections for those who assert their constitutional exemption from the poll tax. As previously indicated, the requirement for those who wish to participate in federal elections without paying the poll tax is that they file in each election year, within a stated interval ending six months before the election, a notarized or witnessed certificate attesting that they have been continuous residents of the State since the date of registration (which might have been many years before under Virginia’s system of permanent registration) and that they do not presently intend to leave the city or county in which they reside prior to the forthcoming election. Unlike the poll tax bill which is sent to the voter’s residence, it is not entirely clear how one obtains the necessary certificate. The statutes merely provide for the distribution of the forms to city and county court clerks, and for further distribution to local registrars and election officials. Va. Code Ann. § 24-28.1 (1964 Supp.). Construing the statutes in the manner least burdensome to the voter, it would seem that the voter could either obtain the certificate of residence from local election officials or prepare personally “a certificate in form substantially” as set forth in the statute. The certificate must then be filed “in person, or otherwise” with the city or county treasurer. This is plainly a cumbersome procedure. In effect, it amounts to annual re-registration which Virginia officials have sharply contrasted with the “simple” poll tax system. For many, it would probably seem far preferable to mail in the poll tax payment upon receipt of the bill; In addition, the certificate must be filed six months before the election, thus perpetuating one of the disenfranchising characteristics of the poll tax which the Twenty-fourth Amendment was designed to eliminate. We are thus constrained to hold that the requirement imposed upon the voter who refuses to pay the poll tax constitutes an abridgment of his right to vote by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.

The requirement imposed upon those who reject the poll tax method of qualifying would not be saved even if it could be said that it is no more onerous, or even somewhat less onerous, than the poll tax. For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder substitute may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon the federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and must fall under its ban.

Nor may the statutory scheme be saved, as the State asserts, on the ground that the certificate is a necessary substitute method of proving residence, serving the same function as the poll tax. As this Court has held in analogous situations, constitutional deprivations may not be justified by some remote administrative benefit to the State. Carrington v. Rash, ante, pp. 89, 96; Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 646-647. Moreover, in this case the State has not demonstrated that the alternative requirement is in any sense necessary to the proper administration of its election laws. The forty-six States which do not require the payment of poll taxes have apparently found no great administrative burden in insuring that the electorate is limited to bona fide residents. The availability of numerous devices to enforce valid residence requirements — such as registration, use of the criminal sanction, purging of registration lists, challenges and oaths, public scrutiny by candidates and other interested parties — demonstrates quite clearly the lack of necessity for imposing a requirement whereby persons desiring to vote in federal elections must either pay a poll tax or file a certificate of residence six months prior to the election.

The Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro. At the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902, the sponsor of the suffrage plan of which the poll tax was an integral part frankly expressed the purpose of the suffrage proposal:

“Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for — to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate.”

The poll tax was later characterized by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as a device limiting “the right of suffrage to those who took sufficient interest in the affairs of the State to qualify themselves to vote.” Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va. 463, 466, 2 S. E. 2d 456, 457. Whether, as the State contends, the payment of the poll tax is also a reliable indicium of continuing residence need not be decided, for even if the poll tax has served such an evidentiary function, the confrontation of the federal voter with a requirement that he either continue to pay the customary poll tax or file a certificate of residence could not be sustained. For federal elections the poll tax, regardless of the services it performs, was abolished by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. That Amendment was also designed to absolve all requirements impairing the right to vote in federal elections by reason of failure to pay the poll tax. Section 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code falls within this proscription.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan agrees with this opinion insofar as it rests on the proposition that the Twenty-fourth Amendment forbids the use of a state poll tax for any purpose whatever in determining voter qualifications in all elections for federal office. He also agrees that this is not a case for application of the abstention doctrine.

       Va. Code Ann. §24-17.2 (1964 Supp.) provides:
      “Proof of residence required; how furnished.—
      “(a) No person shall be deemed to have the qualifications of residence required by § 18 of the Constitution of Virginia and §§ 24-17 and 21 — 17.1 in any calendar year subsequent to that in which he registered under either § 24-67 or § 24^67.1, and shall not be entitled to vote in any election held in this State during any such subsequent calendar year, unless he has offered proof of continuing residence by filing in person, or otherwise, a certificate of residence at the time and in the manner prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section, or, at his option, by personally paying to the proper officer, at least six months prior to any such election in which he offers to vote, all State poll taxes assessed or assessable against him for the three years next preceding that in which he offers to vote. Proof of continuing residence may only be established by either of such two methods.
      “(b) Any person who shall offer proof of continuing residence by filing a certificate of residence as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, shall file with the treasurer of his county or city not earlier than the first of October of the year next preceding that in which he offers to vote and not later than six months prior to the election, a certificate in form substantially as follows:
      “I do certify that I am now and have been a resident of Virginia since the date of my registration to vote under the laws of Virginia, that I am now a resident of. (city or county), residing at . (street and number, or place of residence therein), and that it is my present intention not to remove from the city or county stated herein prior to the next general election.
      “Witnessed:
      or
      “Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of . 19
      “Notary Public"

       Members of the Armed Services are exempt from the poll tax requirement. Va. Code Ann. § 24-23.1 (1950).

       Va. Code Ann. §§24-52 — 24-119 (1950). Registration, effected by filing an application showing that the statutory requirements had been met (§ 2-4-68), was permanent. Thereafter, in order to qualify for subsequent elections, the voter merely had to pay the assessed poll taxes (unless, of course, his name had been removed from the registration lists for, inter alia, failure to meet the statutory and constitutional requirements (§§24-94 — 24r-96)).

       Va. Acts, 1963 Extra Sess., cc. 1 and 2. Chapter 2 is now codified in Title 24 of the Virginia Code. Chapter 1 — applicable to 1964 elections only — has not been codified.

       Va. Acts, 1963 Extra Sess., c. 2, § 1 (a).

       The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted and for failure to set forth a justiciable controversy was directed solely at the complaint of appellee Henderson, who was registered and had already paid his poll tax. The District Court was patently correct in rejecting the State’s argument that appellee Henderson lacked standing to maintain this action. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 374-376; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204-208.

         See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp, 377 U. S. 324, 328-329; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375; England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415-416.

       To the same effect, see England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415-416; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369'U. S. 134, 135-136; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105.

       The only ambiguity discussed in the briefs of the parties or developed during argument concerned the question whether §24^17.2 required the voter to secure a prepared certificate of residence from local election officials or whether he could personally prepare one “in form substantially” as set forth in the statute. We do not regard this as a material ambiguity having any effect on the constitutional question and accept, for the purposes of this decision, the State’s assertion that the voter may secure such a form from local election officials or prepare one according to the statutory description. Infra, p. 541.

       The State also argues that since the States are empowered by Art. I, § 2, Art. II, § 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment to create voter qualifications for federal elections, the question whether a state statutory enactment creates a voter qualification must initially be referred to the state tribunals. True, “[t]he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50; Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335. The right to vote, however, is constitutionally protected, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 663-665; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664; and the conditions imposed by the States upon that right must not contravene any constitutional provision or congressional restriction enacted pursuant to constitutional power. Carrington v. Rash, ante, p. 89, 91; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50-51; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315. The question presented in this case — whether the Virginia statute imposes- a condition upon the franchise which violates the United States Constitution — is thus quite clearly a federal question. The precise nature of the condition imposed is, of course, a question of Virginia law. However, the statutory requirement is clear and unambiguous, and the sole question remaining is whether the state requirement is valid under the Federal Constitution.

       Va. Const., Art. II, § 18, sets forth as a qualification for voting: residency in the State for one year, in the city or county six months, and in the voting precinct thirty days.

       Moreover, the State cites no Virginia decisions in support of its contention that the requirement might constitute an impermissible “qualification” according to Virginia law.

       See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-379; England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 425-426 (Douglas, J., concurring).

       The State also asserts that the District Court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties. The argument is that the relief requested in the complaints was an injunction against the enforcement of all provisions of the 1963 legislation, which included a system for separate registration of state and federal voters. Va. Code Ann. §§24-67, 24^67.1 (1964 Supp.). Since registration in Virginia is entrusted to local registrars, the State argues, their joinder was essential in order to effect the relief requested. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U. S. 490, 493-494.
      While the State is correct in asserting that the complaints were phrased broadly enough to encompass all portions of the 1963 Acts, the District Court was certainly warranted in concluding that the basic aim of the complaints was to secure relief from the certificate of residence requirement. The named defendants were clearly capable of effecting this relief and hence the District Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss. Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U. S. 599, 603-604. Moreover, even accepting the State’s broad construction of the complaints, it is apparent that, given the State Board of Elections’ power to supervise and to insure “legality” in the election process (Va. Code Ann. §§24-25, 24-26, 24-27 (1950)), the local registrars were not indispensable parties. See Louisiana v. United States, ante, pp. 145, 151, n. 10.

       H. R. Rep. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.

       See generally Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South (1958).

       See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Amendments to Abolish Tax and Property Qualifications for Electors in Federal Elections, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14-22, 48-58 (hereinafter cited as House Hearings); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 29, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).

       See, e. g., House Hearings 14-15. See generally Ogden, supra, note 16, at 44r-52.

       See Ogden, supra, note 16, at 59-110.

       See House Hearings 14-22, 26-27, 48-58; Senate Hearings 33.

       See, e. g., the testimony of Judge William Old before the House Judiciary Committee, defending the poll tax as enabling Virginia “to avoid the burdensome necessity for annual registration.” House Hearings 81. See also id., at 98-99 (Attorney General Button); 108 Cong. Rec. 4532 (Senator Byrd); 108 Cong. Rec. 4641 (Senator Robertson); R. 73, 76 (Governor Harrison).

       See 2 Virginia Constitutional Convention (Proceedings and Debates, 1901-1902) 2937-3080.

       Statement of the Honorable Carter Glass, id., at 3076-3077. This statement was characteristic of the entire debate on the suffrage issue; the only real controversy was whether the provisions eventually adopted were sufficient to accomplish the disenfranchisement of the Negro. See id., at 2937-3080.


author: Mr. Justice Stewart

text:
    ARMSTRONG v. MANZO et ux.
    No. 149.
    Argued March 9, 1965.
    Decided April 27, 1965.

      Ewell Lee Smith, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Eugene L. Smith and Ed M. Brown.

      William Duncan argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Eugene T. Edwards.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner, R. Wright Armstrong, Jr., and his wife were divorced by a Texas court in 1959. Custody of their only child, Molly Page Armstrong, was awarded to Mrs. Armstrong, and the petitioner was granted “the privilege of visiting with said child at reasonable times, places, and intervals.” The divorce decree ordered the petitioner to pay $50 a month for his daughter’s support. In 1960 Mrs. Armstrong married the respondent, Salvatore E. Manzo. Two years later the Manzos filed a petition for adoption in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas, seeking to make Salvatore Manzo the legal father of Molly Page Armstrong.

Texas law provides that an adoption such as this one shall not be permitted without the written consent of the child’s natural father, except in certain specified circumstances. One such exceptional circümstance is if the father. “shall have not contributed substantially to the support of such child during [a] period of two (2) years commensurate with his financial ability.” In that event, the written consent of the judge of the juvenile court of the county of the child’s residence may be accepted by the adoption court in lieu of the father’s consent.

Preliminary to filing the adoption petition, Mrs. Manzo filed an affidavit in the juvenile court, alleging in con-clusory terms that the petitioner had “failed to contribute to the support of” Molly Page Armstrong “for a period in excess of two years preceding this date.” No notice was given to the petitioner of the filing of this affidavit, although the Manzos well knew his precise whereabouts in Fort Worth, Texas. On the basis of the affidavit, and without, so far as the record shows, a hearing of any kind, the juvenile court judge promptly issued his consent to the adoption. In the adoption petition, filed later the same day, the Manzos alleged that “consent of the natural father, R. W. Armstrong, Jr., to the adoption herein sought is not necessary upon grounds that the said father has not contributed to the support of said minor child commensurate with his ability to do so for a period in excess of two (2) years, and the Judge of a Juvenile Court of El Paso County, Texas . . . has consented in writing to said adoption.” No notice of any kind was given to the petitioner of the filing or pendency of this adoption petition.

An investigator appointed by the coúrt made a detailed written report recommending the adoption, and a few weeks later the adoption decree was entered. The decree provided in accord with Texas law that “all legal relationship and all rights and duties between such Child and the natural father shall cease and determine, and such Child is hereafter deemed and held to be for every purpose the child of its parent by adoption, as fully as though naturally born to him in lawful wedlock,” and further provided that “the said Molly Page Armstrong shall be known by the Christian and Surname as Molly Page Manzo, from this day forward.”

During this entire period the petitioner was not given, and did not have, the slightest inkling of the'pendency of these adoption proceedings. On the day the decree was entered, however, Salvatore Manzo wrote to the petitioner’s father, advising him that “I have this date completed court action to adopt Molly Page as my daughter and to change her name to Molly Page Manzo.” The petitioner’s father immediately relayed this news to the petitioner, who promptly filed a motion in the District Court of El Paso County, asking that the adoption decree be “set aside and annulled and a new trial granted,” upon the ground that he had been given no notice of the adoption proceedings.

The court did not vacate the adoption decree, but set a date for hearing on the motion. At that hearing the petitioner introduced evidence, through witnesses and by depositions, in an effort to show that he had not failed to contribute to his daughter’s support “commensurate with his financial ability.” At the conclusion of the hearing the court entered an order denying the petitioner’s motion and providing that the “adoption decree entered herein is in all things confirmed.”

The petitioner appealed to the appropriate Texas court of civil appeals, upon the ground, among others, that the trial court had erred in not setting aside the adoption decree, because the entry of the decree without notice to the petitioner had deprived him “of his child without due process of law.” The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the Supreme Court of Texas refused an application for writ of error.

We granted certiorari. 379 U. S. 816. The questions before us are whether failure to notify the petitioner of the pendency of the adoption proceedings deprived him of due process of law so as to render the adoption decree constitutionally invalid, and, if so, whether the subsequent hearing on the petitioner’s motion to set aside the decree served to cure its constitutional invalidity.

In disposing of the first issue, there is no occasion to linger long. It is clear that failure to give the petitioner notice of the pending adoption proceedings violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law. “Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306, at 313. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398. . . .” Id., at 314. Questions frequently arise as to the adequacy of a particular form of notice in a particular case. See, e. g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208; New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293; Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U. S. 112; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra. But as to the basic requirement of notice itself there can be no doubt, where, as here, the result of the judicial proceeding was permanently to deprive a legitimate parent of all that parenthood implies. Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 533.

The Texas Court of Civil Appeals implicitly recognized this constitutional rule, but held, in accord with its understanding of the Texas precedents, that whatever constitutional infirmity resulted from the failure to give the petitioner notice had been cured by the hearing subsequently afforded to him upon his motion to set aside the decree. 371 S. W. 2d, at 412. We cannot agree.

Had the petitioner been given the timely notice which the Constitution requires, the Manzos, as the moving parties, would have had the burden of proving their case as against whatever defenses the petitioner might have interposed. See Jones v. Willson, 285 S. W. 2d 877; Ex parte Payne, 301 S. W. 2d 194. It would have been incumbent upon them to show not only that Salvatore Manzo met all the requisites of an adoptive parent under Texas law, but also to prove why the petitioner’s consent to the adoption was not required. Had neither side offered any evidence, those who initiated the adoption proceedings could not have prevailed.

Instead, the petitioner was faced on his first appearance in the courtroom with the task of overcoming an adverse decree entered by one judge, based upon a finding of nonsupport made by another judge. As the record shows, there was placed upon the petitioner the burden of affirmatively showing that he had contributed to the support of his daughter to the limit of his financial ability over the period involved. The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner were real,, not purely theoretical. For “it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. Yet these burdens would not have been imposed upon him had he been given timely notice in accord with the Constitution.

A fundamental requirement of due process is “the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394. It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The trial court could have fully accorded this right to the petitioner only by granting his motion to set aside the decree and consider the case anew. Only that would have wiped the slate clean. Only that would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place. His motion should have been granted.

For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Mrs. Manzo joined the petition in order to manifest her consent to the adoption, and also filed a separate written consent.

       Vernon’s Ann. Civ. Stat., Art. 46a, § 6, provides in pertinent part as follows:
      “Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of the child; provided, however, that if a living parent or parents shall voluntarily abandon and desert a child sought to be adopted, for a period of two (2) yeárs/and shall have left such child to the care, custody, control and management of other persons, or if such parent or parents shall have not contributed substantially to the support of such child during such period of two (2) years commensurate with his financial ability, then, in either event, it shall not be necessary to obtain the written consent of the living parent or parents in such default, and in such cases adoption shall be permitted on the written consent of the Judge of the Juvenile Court of the county of such child’s residence; or if there be no Juvenile Court, then on the written consent of the Judge of the County Court of the county of such child’s residence.”
      The petitioner does not here question the constitutional validity of the substantive provisions of this statute.

       Vernon’s Ann. Civ. Stat., Art. 46a, § 9.

       The third paragraph of the petitioner’s motion was as follows:
      “At the time the above entitled and numbered proceeding came on to be heard and judgment rendered, your Petitioner had never been advised or given notice, actual or constructive, as required by the laws of Texas, that this proceeding was to be heard or that it was even pending or of the judgment herein until after the rendition of the judgment, nor was any attempt made to notify Petitioner in any way of this proceeding although his address and whereabouts were well known to the parties, in fact the parties to this proceeding deliberately and wrongfully withheld all notice from Petitioner for the expressed purpose of denying him any opportunity to appear, contest and present his defenses to this proceeding; and that Petitioner was prevented from appearing and presenting his defenses not by his own fault or negligence but rather by the deliberate and wrongful acts of the parties to this proceeding.”
      The prayer of the motion was as follows:
      “Wherefore, Petitioner prays that the judgment and decree entered in this proceeding be in all things vacated, set aside and annulled and a new trial granted.”

       See note 2, supra.

       371 S. W. 2d 407.

       See Lee v. Purvin, 285 S. W. 2d 405; Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S. W. 2d 269; DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S. W. 2d 687; Johnston v. Chapman, 279 S. W. 2d 597.


text:
    GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
    No. 352.
    Argued March 10, 1965.
    Decided April 27, 1965.

      Donald K. Barnes argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Aloysius F. Power, Thomas J. Hughes, Seymour S. Mintz, William T. Plumb, Jr., and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.

      Henry E. Wixon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Chester H. Cray and Milton D. Korman.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 imposes a tax of 5% on the taxable income of every corporation, foreign or domestic, for the privilege of engaging in any trade or business within the District. The Act further provides that “[t]he measure of the franchise tax shall be that portion of the net income of the corporation ... as is fairly attributable to any trade or business carried on or engaged in within the District and such other net income as is derived from sources within the District.” The Act does not attempt to define a specific method whereby the portion of income “fairly attributable” to the District is to be determined, but authorizes the District Commissioners to prescribe regulations for such determination. However, the Commissioners’ discretion in devising such regulations is not unfettered, as the Act further commands: “If the trade or business of any corporation ... is carried on or engaged in both within and without the District, the net income derived therefrom shall ... be deemed to be income from sources within and without the District.”

Acting pursuant to the authority delegated to formulate regulations governing the allocation of income, the District Commissioners promulgated regulations which provide: “Where income for any taxable year is derived from the manufacture and sale or purchase and sale of tangible personal property, the portion thereof to be apportioned to the District shall be such percentage of the total of such income as the District sales made during such taxable year bear to the total sales made everywhere during such taxable year.”

The petitioner, General Motors Corporation (G. M.), seeks reyiew of an en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which approved the application of these regulations in determining the proportion of its total net income allocable to the District for the purpose of computing the franchise tax due. General Motors attacks this method of computation on the grounds that it attributes to the District an unreasonably high proportion of its total income and that it is therefore both unauthorized by the relevant sections of the statute, and violative of the Interstate Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. We agree that this method of allocation is not authorized by the D. C. Code and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the constitutional questions raised.

General Motors is engaged in the manufacture and sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. A Delaware corporation, the petitioner maintains its principal offices in New York and Detroit. It carries on no manufacturing operations within the District of Columbia, but it makes substantial sales to customers located within the District, chiefly retail automobile dealers. During the years in question, 1957 and 1958, its volume of sales to such customers aggregated $37,185,704 and $32,542,519, respectively. Orders for these sales were received and filled outside the District, and the products were shipped to customers from G. M. manufacturing plants in Maryland, Delaware, and Michigan.

It is the claim of G. M. that the use of the “sales-factor formula” in the regulations is beyond the authority of the statute, because that formula taxes more of its net income than is “fairly attributable” to its District of Columbia business, particularly in light of the statutory provision which provides that the net income of a business carried on both within and without the District shall be deemed to be from sources within and without the District. We agree that the Commissioners exceeded their statutory authority by allocating income to the District in disregard of the express restrictions of the law.

We are normally content to leave undisturbed decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concerning the import of legislation governing the affairs of the District. However, at times application of the District Code has an impact not confined to the Potomac’s shores, but reaching far beyond. This is such a case, for approval of the District Commissioners’ regulations lends sanction to an apportionment formula seriously at variance with those prevailing in the vast majority of States and creates substantial dangers of multiple taxation. Where a decision is of such significance to interstate commerce, and where the result reached involves statutorily unsupportable exertions of administrative power, the traditional reasons underlying our customary refusal to review interpretations of District law do not apply.

It is of course clear that the District Code does not expressly prescribe the use of any particular formula for the apportionment of income to sources within and without the District. On the contrary, the Code expressly authorizes the District Commissioners to promulgate regulations for the detailed apportionment of the income of multistate enterprises. But neither does the Code leave the Commissioners wholly unguided in their exercise of this authority. The Commissioners’ authority is clearly limited by the provision (§ 47-1580a) which requires that the net income of a corporation doing business inside and outside the District be deemed to arise from sources situated in like fashion. To understand the meaning of this limitation, we need but take the simple example of a corporation which has its manufacturing facilities located wholly in Maryland and sells all of its products in the District of Columbia. Application of the Commissioners’ formula would result in the allocation of 100% of the corporation’s income to the District. Yet there can be no doubt that the business of the corporation is carried on both within and without the District, viz., manufacture in Maryland and sales in the District. The statute does not say that net income shall be deemed to be derived from sources within and without the District only where the sales of any corporation are made both within and without the District, which is the effect of the Commissioners’ regulation. The statute is phrased more broadly and commands apportionment of income to sources within and without the District whenever “the trade or business of any corporation ... is carried on or engaged in both within and without the District.” As it is clear that some part of the trade or business of this hypothetical corporation is carried on without the District, the conclusion follows that the Commissioners must “deem” some part of the income of this corporation to be derived from sources outside the District.

It is said that the Commissioners’ regulations are within the statutory grant of authority because the language “the net income derived therefrom” in § 47-1580a must be read to mean the total income of the corporation and not the “net income arising from activities in the District.” The section must be so read, it is argued, because this reading least restricts the discretion of the Commissioners in devising apportionment formulae, and the traditional canon of broad construction of revenue measures demands that restrictions on the Commissioners’ discretion be minimized. Applying this approach to the case at hand, it is argued that the Commissioners fulfilled their statutory obligation in apportioning the total income of G. M. to sources inside and outside the District in accordance with the geographical distribution of the company’s sales.

Where, as in this case, some portion of a corporation’s income is derived from manufacture and sale outside the District, there is no question that the statute requires the Commissioners to allocate that portion to sources outside the District. However, it does not follow that the malting of.that kind of allocation alone relieves the Commissioners of their statutory responsibility to apportion that part of a corporation’s income arising from manufacture outside and sale inside the District limits. As to this segment of its income, G. M. is in precisely the same situation as the hypothetical corporation manufacturing wholly in Maryland and selling solely in the District; that is, it is carrying on a business partly within and partly without the District limits. It is not enough under the statute to require apportionment of income derived from District sales only in the case where the taxed corporation has no sales outside the District. The inescapable and determinative fact in both the hypothetical case and the case before us is that the company carries on business both inside and outside the District with respect to the income which it derives from the sales made within the District. Consequently, § 47-1580a requires that some portion of this income be deemed to arise from sources outside the District.'

The conclusion which we reach by analysis of the plain language of the statute also finds support in the consequences which a contrary view would have for the overall pattern of taxation of income derived from interstate commerce. The great majority of States imposing corporate income taxes apportion the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor formula which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, payroll, and sales. The use of an apportionment formula based wholly on the sales factor, in the context of general use of the three-factor approach, will ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate net income; for the States in which the property and payroll of the corporation are located will allocate to themselves 67% of the corporation’s income, whereas the jurisdictions in which the sales are made will allocate 100% of the income to themselves. Conversely, in some cases enterprises will have their payroll and plant located in the sales-factor jurisdictions and make their sales in the three-factor jurisdictions so that only 33% of their incomes will be subject to state taxation. In any case, the sheer inconsistency of the District formula with that generally prevailing may tend to result in the unhealthy fragmentation of enterprise and an uneconomic pattern of plant location, and so presents an added reason why this Court must give proper meaning to the relevant provisions of the District Code.

Moreover, the result reached in this case is consistent with the concern which the Court has shown that state taxes imposed on income from interstate commerce be fairly apportioned. In upholding taxes imposed on corporate income by Connecticut and New York and apportioned in accordance with the geographical distribution of a corporation’s property, this Court carefully inquired into the reasonableness of the apportionment formulae used.

“The profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale in other States. In this it was typical of a large part of the manufacturing business conducted in the State. The legislature in attempting to put upon this business its fair share of the burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders. . . . There is . . . nothing in this record to show that the method of apportionment adopted by the State was inherently arbitrary, or that its application to this corporation produced an unreasonable result.” Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 120-121.

See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271. While the Court has refrained from attempting to define any single appropriate method of apportionment, it has sought to ensure that the methods used display a modicum of reasonable relation to corporate activities within the State. The Court has approved formulae based on the geographical distribution of corporate property and those based on the standard three-factor formula. See, e. g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501. The standard three-factor formula can be justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either a corporation’s sources of income or the social costs which it generates. By contrast, the geographic distribution of a corporation’s sales is, by itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either factor. We of course do not mean to take any position on the constitutionality of a state income tax based on the sales factor alone. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to note that the factors alluded to by this Court in justifying apportionment measures constitutionally challenged in the past lend little support to the use of an exclusively sales-oriented approach. In construing the District Code to prohibit the use of a sales-factor formula, we sacrifice none of the values which' our scrutiny of state apportionment measures has sought to protect.

In sum, we find that the language of the authorizing statute does not permit the application of an apportionment formula which makes use of the sales factor alone. The conclusion which we draw from examination of the statutory language finds support in the conflict with other taxing jurisdictions which would result from a contrary view. It finds further support in the continuing concern for fair apportionment which this Court has displayed over the years in scrutinizing state taxing statutes. As the District Code confides in the Commissioners the authority to prescribe detailed regulations, it is not for us to make specific prescription, and we limit ourselves to holding that the present regulation is unauthorized by the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the tax here is authorized by the controlling statute, would affirm the judgment.

       D. C. Code 1961, §47-1571a.

       D. C. Code 1961, §47-1580.

       D. C. Code 1961, §47-1580a.

        Ibid.

       Section 10.2 (c) of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Regulations, relettered by amendment of July 24, 1956.

       118 U. S. App. D. C. 381, 336 F. 2d 885, certiorari granted, 379 U. S. 887. An earlier decision (91 Wash. Law Rep. 650) of a panel of the Circuit Court, reversed by the decision here reviewed, had reached a contrary conclusion in affirming the decision of the'District of Columbia Tax Court (CCH D. C. Tax Rep. ¶ 200-006).

       Out of total sales of $9,461,855,874 in 1957 and $7,853,393,381 in 1958.

       This is not to say that the Commissioners need engage in detailed segmentation of corporate income to source and specific allocation thereof. All that is required is that the formula adopted for general application take account of the geographical spread of the major dimensions of a business.

       Of the 38 States requiring payment of such taxes, 26 employ varieties of a three-factor formula which takes into account the geographical distribution of a corporation’s payroll, property and sales, generally giving equal weight to each factor. Another three use substantially the same formula, replacing the payroll factor with the broader category of manufacturing costs. Yet another three make, use of a formula which incorporates the sales and property factors. Only four taxing jurisdictions use formulae based solely on the geographic distribution of corporate sales. See H. R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 119.