text:
    No. 71-1638.
    No. 72-5128.
    Nelson et al. v. Duncan; and Duncan v. Nelson et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent in No. 71-1638 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-1633.
    Larsen v. Air California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to proceed as a veteran granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1654.
    McKinney v. City of Birmingham.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied, it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 71-1701.
    White v. Central Charge Service, Inc.
   Ct. App. D. C. Motion for leave to proceed on typewritten papers granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6305.
    Rettig v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and reverse judgment.

Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965), and Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U. S. 1052 (1972).

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari, vacate judgment, and remand case.

Turner v. Louisiana, supra, and Gonzales v. Beto, supra.


text:
    No. 71-6415.
    Cherry v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6451.
    Harris v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6467.
    Thomas v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6767.
    Washington v. Jacobs, Hospital Superintendent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6528.
    Morningstar v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari, vacate judgment, and remand case for further proceedings in light of the memorandum of the Solicitor General, filed June 7, 1972, stating that the prejeopardy dismissal of the indictment was appeal-able, not to the Court of Appeals, but directly to this Court. See United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U. S. 558 (1971), and United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U. S. 263 (1966).


text:
    No. 71-6536.
    Guy v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Motion to recuse presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist by them severally denied.


text:
    No. 72-19.
    Weiss et al. v. City of Chicago.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari and reverse judgment.

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611 (1971).


text:
    No. 72-29.
    Mathews v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari and reverse judgment.

Lemke v. United States, 346 U. S. 325 (1953).


text:
    No. 72-134.
    McClure v. Salvation Army.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Organization for Women for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied for reason that petition not timely filed.


text:
    No. 1469,
    October Term, 1970.
    Homart Development Co. v. Diamond et al.,
   402 U. S. 988, 404 U. S. 874, 406 U. S. 981. Motion for leave to file third petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would call for a response pursuant to Rule 58 (3).


text:
    No. 40,
    No. 68-5006.
    No. 68-5013.
    No. 68-5022.
    No. 68-5023.
    No. 69-3.
    No. 69-5001.
    No. 69-5006.
    No. 69-5015.
    No. 69-5026.
    No. 69-5027.
    No. 69-5032.
    No. 69-5039.
    No. 69-5043.
    No. 69-5045.
    No. 69-5049.
    No. 70-3.
    No. 70-295.
    No. 70-303.
    No. 70-322.
    Orig.
    Pennsylvania v. New York et al., Wright v. Beto, Corrections Director, Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, Kruchten v. Eyman, Warden, Smith v. Texas, Park v. Georgia, Moore v. Illinois, Sullivan v. Georgia, Manor v. Georgia, Robles v. California, Cummings v. Georgia, Arkwright v. Georgia, Lee, aka King v. Georgia, Huffman v. Beto, Corrections Director, Thacker v. Georgia, Williams v. Georgia, Walker v. Georgia, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, United States v. Korman et al., In re Warren,
   407 U. S. 206 and 223;

408 U. S. 934;

408 U. S. 934;

408 U. S. 934;

408 U. S. 934;

408 U. S. 935;

408 U. S. 786;

408 U. S. 935;

408 U. S. 935;

406 U. S. 972;

408 U. S. 935;

408 U. S. 936;

408 U. S. 936;

408 U. S. 936;

408 U. S. 936;

408 U. S. 936;

408 U. S. 936;

406 U. S. 759;

406 U. S. 952; and

408 U. S. 942. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5008.
    No. 70-5011.
    No. 70-5022.
    No. 70-5024.
    No. 70-5031.
    No. 70-5044.
    No. 70-5064.
    No. 70-5065.
    No. 70-5066.
    No. 70-5067.
    No. 70-5069.
    No. 70-5079.
    No. 71-249.
    No. 71-308.
    No. 71-473.
    No. 71-506.
    No. 71-1111.
    No. 71-1147.
    No. 71-1164.
    No. 71-1206.
    No. 71-1214.
    No. 71-1227.
    David, aka Davis v. Texas, Thames v. Texas, Tea v. Texas, Farrell v. Stovall et al., Sellars v. Beto, Corrections Director, Jackson v. Beto, Corrections Director, Jefferson et al. v. Hackney, Commissioner of Public Welfare, et al., Miller v. Georgia, Williams v. Smith, Warden, Morales v. Texas, McKenzie v. Texas, Henderson v. Georgia, Orr v. Trinter et al., United States v. Byrum, Executrix, Weg v. United States, United States et al. v. Midwest Video Corp., Muse v. North Carolina, Ford Motor Co. v. Ellipse Corp., Watts v. Mylius, DePugh v. United States, Stein v. United States, Mastrotataro v. United States,
   408 U. S. 937;

408 U. S. 937;

408 U. S. 937;

407 U. S. 901;

408 U. S. 937;

408 U. S. 937;

406 U. S. 535;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 943;

408 U. S. 125;

406 U. S. 962;

406 U. S. 649;

406 U. S. 974;

406 U. S. 948;

406 U. S. 906;

407 U. S. 920;

408 U. S. 922; and

406 U. S. 967. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1257.
    No. 71-1270.
    No. 71-1280.
    No. 71-1295.
    No. 71-1307.
    No. 71-1330.
    No. 71-1379.
    No. 71-1383.
    No. 71-1457.
    No. 71-1466.
    No. 71-1549.
    No. 71-5228.
    No. 71-5744.
    No. 71-5972.
    No. 71-6025.
    No. 71-6068.
    No. 71-6158.
    No. 71-6164.
    No. 71-6183.
    No. 71-6210.
    No. 71-6256.
    Moore et al. v. United States, McKee v. United States, B. Forman Co., Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Wenger v. United States, Samuels v. United States, Katz v. United States, Watts v. Teagle et al., Pooley v. Mississippi, Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., Blanknbr v. City of Chicago, Curry v. Texas, Phelan v. Brierley, Warden, Esgate v. English, Sheriff, Hood v. Burnett et al., Stanley v. Texas, Foggy v. Arizona et al., Levy v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida et al., Matthews v. Texas, Ansley v. Georgia, Alers v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico,
   407 U. S. 910;

407 U. S. 910;

407 U. S. 934;

407 U. S. 920;

407 U. S. 920;

408 U. S. 923;

407 U. S. 920;

408 U. S. 928;

407 U. S. 934;

407 U. S. 921;

408 U. S. 931;

408 U. S. 939;

408 U. S. 939;

406 U. S. 959;

405 U. S. 1068;

408 U. S. 939;

407 U. S. 915;

406 U. S. 916;

408 U. S. 940;

408 U. S. 929; and

406 U. S. 914. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-6342.
    No. 71-6344.
    No. 71-6391.
    No. 71-6400.
    No. 71-6418.
    No. 71-6443.
    No. 71-6452.
    No. 71-6474.
    No. 71-6519.
    No. 71-6538.
    No. 71-6573.
    No. 71-6578.
    No. 71-6600.
    No. 71-6630.
    Walton v. Virginia, Quattrucci v. United States, Freeman v. United States, Nash v. Amerada Hess Corp. et al., Krikmanis v. White, Mayor of Boston, et al., Clark v. Johnson et al., Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al., Erwing v. United States, Blauner v. United States, Huckabay v. Woodmansee, Judge, et al., Gerardi v. United States District Court for the Central District of California et al., Pillis et al. v. Governor of Virginia et al., In re Wayland, Pillis et al. v. State Board of Elections et al.,
   408 U. S. 925;

406 U. S. 960;

406 U. S. 975;

406 U. S. 948;

406 U. S. 961 ;

407 U. S. 913;

406 U. S. 970;

407 U. S. 922;

407 U. S. 920;

407 U. S. 926;

407 U. S. 919;

407 U. S. 923;

407 U. S. 924; and

408 U. S. 927. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 68-5008.
    No. 69-5013.
    No. 69-5025.
    No. 70-5046.
    Miller v. Maryland, Mefford v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, Kelbach et al. v. Utah, Johnson v. Maryland,
   408 U. S. 934;

408 U. S. 935;

408 U. S. 935; and

408 U. S. 937. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5062.
    No. 70-5326.
    No. 71-5008.
    No. 71-5192.
    No. 71-5197.
    No. 71-5689.
    No. 71-6109.
    No. 71-6120.
    No. 71-6137.
    No. 71-6341.
    No. 71-6242.
    No. 71-6257.
    No. 71-6480.
    Cunningham v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, Arrington v. Maryland, Bartholomey v. Maryland, Tull v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, Strong v. Maryland, Nachbaur v. Herman, Negron v. Agnew, State Hospital Director, Shields v. United States, Gilmore v. Maryland, Diggs v. United States, Bradley v. Wingo, Warden, Owings v. Secretary of the Air Force, Tilli v. Davis et al.,
   408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 938;

408 U. S. 939 ;

408 U. S. 939;

405 U. S. 931;

406 U. S. 968;

406 U. S. 910;

408 U. S. 940;

406 U. S. 952;

406 U. S. 915;

406U. S.926;

407 U. S. 908. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-183.
    No. 71-5428.
    No. 71-5531.
    Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians et al. v. County of Riverside, California, Lipscomb v. United States, Lipscomb v. Warden, Atlanta Penitentiary, et al.,
   405 U.S. 933, 1033;

404 U. S. 1021,406 U.S. 911; and

404 U. S. 1005, 1064. Motions for leave to file second petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-288.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Tatum et al.,
   408 U. S. 1. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 69-5003.
    No. 69-5030.
    No. 69-5031.
    Furman v. Georgia; Jackson v. Georgia; and Branch v. Texas,
   408 U. S. 238. Motion of Committee of State Chief Justices (retired) for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of rehearing granted. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5039.
    Fuentes v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al.,
   407 U. S. 67. Motion of National Consumer Law Center, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in opposition to petitions for rehearing denied. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions and this motion.


text:
    No. 70-5138.
    Parham et al. v. Cortese et al.,
   407 U. S. 67. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-315.
    Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp.,
   406 U. S. 518. Motion for leave to supplement petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-573.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Nelms et al.,
   406 U. S. 797. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1017.
    No. 71-1026.
    Gravel v. United States; and United States v. Gravel,
   408 U. S. 606. Motion to recuse, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, by him denied. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1169.
    Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matzen et al.
   Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1179.
    No. 71-1188.
    No. 71-1326.
    Amoco Production Co. v. Waechter et al.; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Matzen et al.; and Federal Power Commission v. Mobil Oil Corp. et al.,
   406 U. S. 976. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 71-1232.
    Landerman et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
   406 U. S. 967. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1291.
    Chandler, U. S. District Judge v. Battisti, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court,
   406 U. S. 956. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1411.
    Lii v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc., et al.,
   408 U. S. 930. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1435.
    State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Florida et al. v. Zarate et al.,
   407 U. S. 918. Petition for rehearing or in the alternative for clarification of lower court opinion denied.


text:
    October 12, 1972
    No. 72-273.
    Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Brinkerhoff et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    October 16, 1972
    No. 71-1447.
    Davidson, Secretary, Maryland Department of Employment and Social Services, et al. v. Francis et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Md. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 71-1547.
    No. 72-149.
    C & H Transportation Co., Inc., et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission; and United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission (International Transport, Inc., Case).
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo. Reported below: 337 F. Supp. 985.


text:
    No. 71-6774.
    Simpson v. Oates et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Cal.


text:
    No. 72-25.
    American Yearbook Co., Inc. v. Askew, Governor of Florida, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 72-150.
    United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission (Ace Doran Hauling Co. Case).
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Pa.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-1408.
    No. 71-1419.
    Aero Mayflower Transit Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al. Hutter et ux. v. Korzen.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind.; and

Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion to supplement jurisdictional statement in No. 71-1408 granted. Appeals dismissed for failure to docket cases within time prescribed by Rule 13 (1) of the Rules of this Court.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

These cases, here on appeal, are dismissed by the Court, as being out of time under our Rules. I dissent from that disposition.

We held in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 84-86, that the Rules of this Court determine the effect of untimely docketing. Only the filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Docketing is prescribed by Rule 13 (1), and this Court in case after case has in its discretion waived the strictures of that rule. Up to now it has, indeed, been more concerned with disposing of cases as justice may require rather than finding technical ways to avoid decision of knotty questions.

In the Aero Mayflower Transit Co. case the three-judge court entered its judgment on December 29, 1971, and Aero Mayflower filed its notice of appeal on February 14, 1972, within the 60-day period prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (a) but did not docket its case within the subsequent 60-day period. Instead, it filed its jurisdictional statement on April 28, 1972, 14 days out of time.

In the Hutter case the notice of appeal was filed on February 17, 1972, following denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of Hutter’s motion to reconsider on January 18,1972. This was timely under § 2101 (c). Docketing on May 1, 1972, however, did not occur within the period provided by Rule 13 (1), but was 14 days late.

The delay in each of these appeals was much shorter than that which occurred in Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, where we entertained an appeal that was not docketed until 56 days after the time provided in Rule 13 (1) expired. 391 U. S., at 598 n.

In Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481 (1971), the Court considered a petition for certiorari in which the opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed on November 12, 1969, rehearing was denied on March 5 1970, and the petition was filed on September 26, 1970. Under Rule 22 (2) that applied in that case, the petition was more than five months out of time. Only Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented.

Our Rules are only guidelines for litigants and we do disservice to the administration of justice by exalting them as Baron Parke doubtless would have done. Our experience with our Rules shows that lateness in docketing may be due to slow delivery of the mail (which is even worse today than it was 10 years ago), to snowstorms that stop or slow up all traffic, to sickness of counsel, or to other accidents that make untimely docketing that normally would be on time. Before we penalize litigants for late docketing of appeals we should have a case that shows palpable neglect.

        Teague v. Regional Comm’r of Customs, 394 U. S. 977, 984, was a case in which a petition for certiorari was filed two days after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed, the delay being caused by a snowstorm. Justice Black wrote in dissent:
      “It might be well to imagine for a moment what would have happened if some Senator or Representative had suggested an amendment to ‘clarify’ the proposed §2101 (c) by stating that a petition filed after the 90-day period will not be out of time ‘when the delay is caused solely by an interruption of the mail service due to snowstorms.’ It is conceivable that more than a few members of Congress would consider such an amendment an insult to this Court’s intelligence and would feel it unnecessary to lead this Court by the hand on such matters of elementary common sense. It is impossible, however, to believe that anjr of them would have regarded an amendment to the opposite effect as properly reflecting the purpose of the statute, and yet this opposite amendment, ruling a petition out of time under these circumstances, is precisely the amendment that the Court today tacitly engrafts onto §2101 (c).
      “I would not adopt any such pointlessly harsh interpretation of the statute, one that furthers no congressional objective whatsoever and denies litigants their opportunity to seek review in this Court on the basis of atmospheric events wholly beyond their control. This is a return to all the cruel technicalities of common-law pleading, and then some. . . .”

       In many of our cases we have entertained petitions, though docketed after expiration of the time prescribed in our Rules: Smith v. Mississippi, 373 U. S. 238; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773; Mazzie v. United States, 375 U. S. 32; Robison v. United States, 390 U. S. 198; Nelson v. United States, 392 U. S. 303; Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80; Banks v. California, 382 U. S. 420; Long v. Parker, 384 U. S. 32; Serio v. United States, 392 U. S. 305.


text:
    No. 71-1554.
    United States Chamber of Commerce v. Francis et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Md. Motion of appellee Wright for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for consolidation with No. 71-1447 [Davidson v. Francis, supra] and for other relief denied. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 71-6740.
    Lloyd et al. v. Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah dismissed, it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 72-189.
    Kisley, trading as Falls Church Health Center, et al. v. City of Falls Church et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5252.
    Howard v. Allen.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5161.
    Saffioti v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5294.
    Hill et al. v. Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5026.
    Gaglie v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of position presently asserted by the Government.


text:
    No. A-294 (72-492).
    Fried v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for continuance of bail and stay of mandate presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-349.
    Stone et al. v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Maine. Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-360 (72-730).
    Markle et al. v. Abele et al.
   D. C. Conn. Application for stay presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted.

Mr. Justice Douglas would deny the application.


text:
    No. A-377.
    Board of Education of Memphis City Schools et al. v. Northcross et al.
   D. C. W. D. Term. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-393.
    Slobodian v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al. (Louisiana Boundary Case).
   Motion of State of Louisiana for entry of a supplemental decree (No. 4) as to the United States granted [see ante, p. 17]. Motion of the United States for leave to file an account of funds released from impoundment pursuant to supplemental decree (No. 3) of December 20, 1971 [404 U. S. 388], granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 58,
    Orig.
    American Party et al. v. New York et al.
   Motion for temporary restraining order denied.


text:
    No. 70-2.
    United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film et al. (Paladini, Claimant).
   Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 403 U. S. 930.] Motion of First Amendment Lawyers’ Assn, for leave to file untimely brief as amicus curiae in support of appellees granted. Motion of Joel Hirsch-horn for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of appellees denied.


text:
    No. 70-40.
    Doe et al. v. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. [Restored to calendar, 408 U. S. 919.] Motion of appellants for leave to present late authorities granted.


text:
    No. 72-5238.
    Kochel v. Maryland.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-653.
    Gibson et al. v. Berryhill et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 408 U. S. 920.] Motion to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 71-718.
    McGinnis, Correction Commissioner, et al. v. Royster et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U. S. 986.] Motion to permit G. Jeffery Sorge, Esquire, to argue pro hac vice in place of James J. McDonough for appellees granted.


text:
    No. 71-1134.
    Roaden v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. [Certiorari granted, 406 U. S. 905.] Motion of Charles H. Keating, Jr., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of First Amendment Lawyers' Assn, for leave to file untimely brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioner denied. Motion of Joel Hirschhorn for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of petitioner denied.


text:
    No. 71-1136.
    Tillman et al. v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certi-orari granted, 406 U. S. 916.] Motion of respondent McIntyre for additional counsel to participate in oral argument granted but motion for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 71-1192.
    Goldstein et al. v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. [Certi-orari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motions of American Federation of Musicians et al. and Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 72-549.
    School Board of Richmond, Virginia, et al. v. State Board of Education of Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to advance and for pendente lite relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-1315.
    Alexander et al. v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. [Certiorari granted, 408 U. S. 921.] Motion of First Amendment Lawyers’ Assn, for leave to file untimely brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioners granted. Motion of Joel Hirschhorn for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of petitioners denied.


text:
    No. 72-5038.
    Chavez et al. v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 71-1523.
    Hunt v. McNair, Governor of South Carolina, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 72-75.
    Georgia et al. v. United States.
   Ap-péal from D. C. N. D. Ga. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-1583.
    Brown, Secretary of State of California v. Chote.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-1005.
    Michigan v. Payne.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1585.
    United States v. Russell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-95.
    Tollett, Warden v. Henderson.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-6732.
    Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1566.
    Blasecki et al. v. City of Durham, North Carolina, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1572.
    Bowling et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1618.
    Otto v. Kosofsky et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1705.
    Bombacino v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5601.
    Sweeney v. County of Monroe et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6185.
    Mallard v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6298.
    Gabrielson v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6326.
    Blake v. Coiner, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6644.
    Vanderburgh v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6517.
    Dotson v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6724.
    Patterson v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6734.
    Boone et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6739.
    Evans v. Arkansas.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6765.
    Fincher v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6768.
    Davis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6839.
    Gomori v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6856.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6872.
    Lovingood v. Ross, Prison Farm Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6898.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6908.
    Holiday v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6909.
    Pickerell v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6923.
    Ronstadt v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6925.
    Handley et al. v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-40.
    Gonzales v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-54.
    Plaquemine Equipment & Machine Co. et al. v. Neuman, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-74.
    Barrett et al. v. Kunzig, Administrator, General Services Administration, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-82.
    Tomeo v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-118.
    No. 72-119.
    No. 72-120.
    No. 72-121.
    No. 72-128.
    Kropke v. United States; Stapleton v. United States; Kunz v. United States; Murphy v. United States; and Sternkopf v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 462 F. 2d 1205.


text:
    No. 72-131.
    Grant et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-141.
    Greenseid et al. v. Stewart, Superintendent of Insurance.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-142.
    Ruisi et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-152.
    Ming v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-153.
    Gnoss et al. v. Young et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-156.
    Zarate v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-168.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-183.
    Crawford v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-186.
    Munchak v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-188.
    Martinez-Villanueva et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-194.
    Landis Tool Co., Division of Litton Industries v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-197.
    Womack, Executor, et al. v. Fair et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-199.
    Romano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72 206.
    Colquitt County Board of Education et al. v. Harrington et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5022.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-209.
    Vlahakis v. Schostak et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-211.
    LewRon Television, Inc. v. United Network, Inc., formerly Jaymac, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5033.
    Bullard v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5047.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5062.
    Hurd v. Slaughter et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5071.
    Von Perry v. Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5077.
    Smith v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5085.
    Jackson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5091.
    Bennett v. Rundle, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5094.
    Dobbs v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5096.
    Paturso v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5103.
    Wion v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5104.
    Wion v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5108.
    Brudney v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1386.
    Ohio AFL-CIO, United Autoworkers of Ohio, et al. v. Insurance Rating Board et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I would grant certiorari in this case.

The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint, which alleged that respondents had engaged in an illegal combination and conspiracy in the fixing of automobile insurance premiums in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the exemption of the insurance industry from antitrust laws by § 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34, 15 U. S. C. § 1012.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in part, that the Sherman Antitrust Act “shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” In FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U. S. 560, 563, after examining the statute and its legislative history, we held that federal regulation as to advertising practices was prohibited in those States which were regulating such practices under their own laws. We indicated, however, that the grant of exclusive regulatory power to the State would be ineffective if the state statutory provisions which purported to regulate were a “mere pretense” of regulation.

In the instant case the petitioners allege that the state statutory scheme is such a “mere pretense” of regulation. This allegation is based on the following factors: Although rating organizations are required to be examined at least once every five years under- the statutory scheme, the state Department of Insurance has examined only two rate bureaus in the last five years, and only six examinations have been conducted in the last 20 years. The Insurance Rating Board, composed of 129 insurance companies which write approximately 17% of the automobile liability insurance and approximately 22% of the physical damage insurance in the State, is permitted under the statutory scheme to determine the amount of any rate increase and institute that increase at a date picked by it. Review of that determination may occur only upon the challenge of the state Department of Insurance, which has never challenged an increase, and which in fact does not even employ an actuary so as to be able to examine the increase.

A governmental regulatory agency which, in contradiction of a statutory direction, only rarely exercises its examinatory powers; which has never exercised its power of review of rate increases; and which does not even employ the personnel which would be necessary to exercise the power would prima facie seem to be no more than a “mere pretense” of regulation. Perhaps a full hearing would show otherwise. But enough has been tendered to make the trial court's dismissal of the complaint improper and this petition a clear grant.


text:
    No. 72-5109.
    Hill v. Gauvin et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5112.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5113.
    Enoch v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5114.
    Trevino v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5121.
    Donovan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5122.
    Wilke v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1532.
    Chongris et al. v. Corrigan et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

In 1946, this Court articulated the standard to be applied in testing flight patterns over private property against the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256. We held that “the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it.” We noted that the important factor is whether the intrusion impinges on “the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and ... his exploitation of it.” Id., at 264-265. And, in 1962, we reiterated that standard. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84.

State after State, in the years since Causby, has come to the conclusion that airport zoning schemes that impose height restrictions on the use of the land located below the flight paths of approaching and departing aircraft are unconstitutional efforts to avoid the costs properly incident to the use of airport facilities, and that the imposition of such regulations upon private property constitutes a “taking” prohibited by the Constitution. Yara Engineering Corp. v. Newark, 132 N. J. L. 370, 40 A. 2d 559 (1945); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P. 2d 664 (1960); Indiana Toll Road Comm’n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N. E. 2d 237 (1963); Roark v. Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P. 2d 641 (1964); Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966); and Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963). Lower Ohio courts agreed. Hageman v. Bd. of Trustees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251 N. E. 2d 507 (Montgomery Co., 1969); 23 Ohio Misc. 93, 259 N. E. 2d 162 (Common Pleas, Montgomery Co., 1968).

Yet a quarter of a century after Causby, the Supreme Court of Ohio has sustained the Airport Zoning Statutes contained in Chapter 4563 of the Ohio Revised Code.

It accomplishes this tour de force through the application of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365. Reasoning that zoning regulations always involve some restriction on the uses to which land may be put, the court balanced “the loss of use against the benefits to society thus obtained.” Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 46, 278 N. E. 2d 658, 663 (1972). It is a nice question when police power comes to an end as a justification for public taking of private property. Is it when the public at large is benefited at the expense of an owner of private property who has refrained from using his land in a way that is not obnoxious to his neighbors? Arguably eminent domain principles then apply; and, although the public may force upon the property owner the public need for his land, compensation is due him.

The Court’s denial of the petition for certiorari in this case suggests that “[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416 (Holmes, J.).

The present case tenders some of the issues present when the government seeks a scenic easement so as to bar the erection of towers or other high structures. We said in Causby:

“The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value.” 328 U. S., at 262.

Whether there has been a diminution in value of petitioners’ property is not clear from the present record. Whether the zoning regulations themselves constitute a taking is necessarily involved, as is the question of the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved property owner.

These are all important questions of public importance throughout the country and lead me to conclude that the petition should be granted and the case put down for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-5123.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5127.
    Lacaze et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5130.
    Salazar v. New Mexico.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5131.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1537.
    Nebraska State Board of Education et al. v. School District of Hartington, aka School District No. 8, Cedar County.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs,

dissenting.

I would grant this petition for certiorari and put the case down for oral argument. It involves alleged violations of the First Amendment which are applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the violations, on the papers before us, seem to me to be of the kind that we struck down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602.

What happened was this: The school district made application to the State for financial aid in instructing students in remedial reading and remedial mathematics. The application stated that the school district was leasing the facilities of the Cedar Catholic High School as a place to conduct this project. The students from both the public school and the private school would attend these classes.

The lease provided that no objects, pictures, or other articles having a religious connotation would be visible in the classroom.

This action was instituted in the Nebraska courts when the state authorities refused to undertake the project. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, by a divided vote, approved the project over the objection that it violated the First Amendment. 188 Neb. 1, 195 N. W. 2d 161. Under the project as approved, state funds will be channeled into this parochial school. In this case, as in Lemon v. Kurtsman, the State is supplying funds for instruction in parochial schools leading to a degree of entanglement between government and religion which runs counter to our opinions.

If a State can finance two courses in a parochial school, there is no reason and logic why it cannot finance the teaching and learning of an entire curriculum. In Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U. S. 955, we affirmed a district court decision (319 F. Supp. 421) that held invalid a program whereby the State had contracted with parochial schools for the “purchase” by the State of “secular educational services” to be supplied to the children. The contract in that case is different only in scope and in form from the present one. There is no provision in the lease for surveillance of the use of the premises except for making sure that no objects, pictures, or other articles having a religious connotation are present in the classrooms. Yet, those teaching in a parochial school may be members of that faith or under compelling pressures. In light of the. command of the First Amendment, the State in each case must see that all courses of instruction are confined to the “secular” area and do not trench on religious tenets or doctrine. To police this statutory-standard would require the exercise of broad powers of surveillance by the State. As stated by the District Court in the Sanders case:

“In the present case, the parochial school function which is funded is the entirety of secular 'instruction’ itself. In order to confine assistance to this rather amorphous use, the Act would introduce state supervision into virtually every nook and cranny of a school’s administration. Perhaps this is logically necessary. If a conscientious public official is to be certain that tax dollars are spent only for activities which are proper secular subcategories of the school’s instruction, he must engage in a program of inspecting and monitoring which even the copious specifications of the Act and its open-ended supplementary regulations only begin to suggest.” 319 F. Supp., at 431.

The District Court went on to say:

“[T]he detailed plan which the legislature has enacted to separate, purchase, 'promote,’ and regulate the contents of secular instruction goes well beyond a theoretical 'subsidy’ and brings the potentiality of mutually-damaging involvement to life. Public officials must investigate curricula, materials, and manner of teaching in detail, case by case; oversee the training of teachers; and audit financial records. By doing so, they might disentangle the last thread of religious doctrine from all secular instruction; but by this very process, they would certainly enmesh the state in continuous conflict with churches over the effectiveness with which governmental investigating and policing machinery would be operated.” Id., at 432.

The necessity for surveillance is necessarily implied.

Denial of certiorari here does not appear consistent with our affirmance of Sanders. These considerations lead me to vote to take this case and put it down for oral argument so that the entire plan may be carefully examined against the requirements of the First Amendment.

Mr. Justice Brennan.

The situation, as I see it, is not that portrayed in my Brother Douglas’ dissent. Hartington, Nebraska, is a small town where neither the public nor the parochial schools offered remedial reading and remedial mathematics courses. The school district decided to avail itself of the benefits of the federally financed courses in such subjects provided under the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, and submitted a grant proposal, as required by that Act, adequate to provide the courses for all educationally deprived children within the school district — 91 public school and 48 parochial school children. But there was a problem of space because there were no available classrooms in the public schools. There were, however, two unused classrooms in the Hartington Cedar Catholic High School and the school district proposed to lease one classroom full time and the second classroom half time at an annual rent of $200 for the full-time classroom and $100 for the half-time classroom. The lease provided that the classrooms would be used only for carrying on the project under the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965; that the Hartington School District would have full control over the classrooms and the educational programs; and that no objects, pictures, or other articles having a religious meaning or connotation would be in the classrooms. The lease represented the complete extent of the relations between the school district and the parochial school. There is not the slightest suggestion that this was a subterfuge to make a subsidy to the parochial school, or anything except an arrangement motivated solely by the lack of space in the public schools. Thus, the school district would have no part whatever in the curriculum of the parochial school either by way of subsidy of its costs through financing of teaching or otherwise. The remedial reading and remedial mathematics courses would operate completely independently of that curriculum and of the Catholic school administration. My Brother Douglas relies on Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U. S. 955 (1971), aff’g 319 F. Supp. 421 (Conn. 1970). The situation there is poles apart from this. That was an undisguised subsidy in the form of “purchasing” “secular educational services” from parochial schools and was patently invalid under our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). I have heretofore expressed my view that the First Amendment does not render unconstitutional “every vestige, however slight, of cooperation or accommodation between religion and government.” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 294 (1963) (concurring opinion). The accommodation involved in this case would not trespass beyond permissible bounds. For this reason, I join in denying the petition for certiorari.

      That was the view of Chief Justice White, joined by Justice Spencer of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, as stated in his dissenting opinion:
      “In summary, it seems to me, over and beyond the other reasons touched on in this dissent, that this act, this scheme, this procedure requires that the state will be amidst the daily affairs of a religious school. It must be remembered that we are not dealing with something as simple as a bus ride, or a textbook, or a mere lease agreement; we have here an innovative program of noble purpose and it carries with it those highly feared risks of conflict and divisiveness which history has shown follow any close proximity between government and religion.
      “If this statute, and the state action asked to be taken under it, is constitutionally permissible, then I see no obstruction or impediment to the state and the federal government taking complete and literal control of the contracting schools and making their entire secular curricula part of its public system for all purposes, including the hiring of teachers, the renting of the physical facilities, and perhaps the admission of students. Such action plainly runs afoul of the state and federal Constitutions. We must remember that the real test of constitutionality is not what is actually done under the act but what the act authorizes.” 188 Neb. 1, 13, 195 N. W. 2d 161, 168.

       The population of Hartington, according to the 1970 census, is 1,581. The Hartington public schools had a total enrollment of 572 pupils during the 1969-1970 school year.

       The lease agreement states that:
      “[T]he above described project for said courses does not and will not duplicate or replace, either in whole or in part, any course of study in the present curricula of either the public schools or the private schools in Hartington and its environs . . . .”

       The Superintendent of the Hartington Public Schools, in a letter to the State Board of Education, indicated that a consolidation of rural school districts into the Hartington School District had increased total enrollment in Hartington’s public schools from 394 students in 1967-1968 to 572 students in 1969-1970. As a consequence, the school district was making preparations to conduct three kindergarten classes in the city auditorium. R. 10.


text:
    No. 71-1582.
    No. 72-163.
    Felts v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.; and Adkins v. Kelly’s Creek Railroad Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision in No. 71-1582.

Reported below: No. 72-163, 458 F. 2d 26.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

These cases present recurring problems under § 6 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 66, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 56.

In No. 72-163, Adkins, an employee, lost a part of his left leg while attempting to repair a broken rail. Kelly’s Creek was a carrier by rail wholly owned by Warners Collieries Co., a mining company. The jury returned a verdict for Adkins in the amount of $117,568.44. The District Court granted a defense motion for judgment n. o. v.; and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 458 F. 2d 26.

In No. 71-1582, Felts was a Pullman conductor who reported for work on the Seaboard Silver Comet Train out of Richmond, Virginia. He was injured while trying to open the trap door which would allow passengers to leave or to board the car. The jury returned a verdict for Felts which the District Court set aside; and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

These two cases are classic examples of the type of cases memorialized in our many FELA controversies— a page in our history highlighted by Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, where we said:

“Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee’s contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or death due 'in whole or in part’ to its negligence.” Id., at 506-507.

Trial by jury is “part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers” under FELA. Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 354. The question whether the plaintiff was an employee of the carrier turns on factual elements, to be resolved by the jury under appropriate instructions. Baker v. Texas & P. R. Co., 359 U. S. 227.

In Felts, while the conductor was a Pullman employee he was under instructions that “[w]hile on cars, on trains, in stations and yards, or on other railroad property” he was also “subject to instructions of the train conductor and officials of the railroad companies.” The Seaboard train conductor had control and supervision over Felts, the Pullman conductor, and had authority to make him perform the assigned duties and to remove him if he did not. In other like situations the question whether an employee of one firm had become in performance of his work an employee of a railroad was a jury question. We so held in Baker v. Texas & P. R. Co., supra, which should be controlling here.

In Adkins the defense, sustained by the lower courts, was that the carrier and its insurance company had settled the claim with the employee. Here again the question whether a carrier sued under FELA should be es-topped to plead limitations, Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U. S. 231, or has obtained a valid release from the injured employee, Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, is a question for the jury.

The history of FELA litigation shows how narrow, prejudiced judicial constructions of the Act in time subtly amended it, so as to deprive it of its original beneficent purpose of protecting the men who risk life and limb to keep our rail carriers operating. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., supra, at 507-509.

The emasculation that the judiciary made of this important social legislation led eventually to the revision of the Act by Congress in 1939 (Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., supra, at 510) so that litigation under it could start with a new mandate rather than with the crippling construction given by the courts. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 63-68. It was in that tradition that Rogers, Bailey, Baker, Clus, and a host of other cases were decided. If the voice of Hugo Black were still heard and heeded, these two cases would be granted and reversed outright. That would be my vote. But at the very least we should put these cases down for argument. Our rejection of them means the start of a dark and disastrous retreat from the humanitarian purposes of this Act of Congress and a renewal of the ancient judicial art of emasculation of remedial legislation.

        See Cimorelli v. New York Central R. Co., 148 F. 2d 575; Byrne v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 262 F. 2d 906; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Pearson, 422 F. 2d 1037.


text:
    No. 71-1602.
    Craven, Warden v. Carmical.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1652.
    Sarnoff et al. v. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurs,

dissenting.

Petitioners brought this suit for an injunction against disbursements under certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 424, as amended, §§ 510, 610, 614 (a), 22 U. S. C. §§ 2318, 2360, 2364 (a). Respondents, as agents of the Chief Executive, made the disbursements in pursuit of our military venture in Vietnam. Their request for a three-judge court was denied, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 457 P. 2d 809, saying that the complaint tendered a “political question” beyond judicial cognizance.

This would be a difficult case under the regime of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, whose broad language denied a federal taxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute. But Frothing-ham was greatly narrowed by our 1968 decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83. Flast held that federal taxpayers have standing if the constitutionality of the taxing or spending claims of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution were squarely involved and if the taxpayer can show that “the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.” Id., at 102-103.

In Flast the challenged expenditures were said to have violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Here they are said to contravene the provision in Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, which gives Congress the power to “declare War.” No declaration of war has been made respecting Vietnam. Hence the question can be phrased in terms of the constitutionality of the use of funds to pursue a “Presidential war.”

The action here, as in Flast, is a challenge by federal taxpayers of a violation of a specific constitutional provision. Actions of the Congress and of the Executive Branch are involved here as in Flast. The question is therefore no more “political” in this case than in Flast.

There has in the past been much confusion over the distinction between a “political” question and one that is “justiciable.” We dispelled much of that confusion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217, when we said:

“It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”

We added that a bona fide controversy “as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority” cannot be rejected by the courts. Ibid.

Whether after full argument and deliberation we would hold that this case falls in the category of Flast v. Cohen is unknown. But certainly the issue is important and substantial. The provisions in Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, which give Congress, not the President, the power to “declare War” is a specific grant of power that impliedly bars its exercise by the Executive Branch. And the power is so pervasive in its reach that it may affect the lives, the property, and the well-being of the entire Nation. Arguably the principles announced in Flast v. Cohen control this case.

I would therefore grant the petition and put the case down for oral argument.

      I have previously filed dissents in various cases tendering this question, the Court having consistently refused to entertain them. See, e. g., Holmes v. United States, 391 U. S. 936; Hart v. United States, 391 U. S. 956; McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U. S. 1002.


text:
    No. 72-368.
    Bensinger, Corrections Director, et al. v. Doss.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1656.
    Achtenberg v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I would grant certiorari.

Petitioner was convicted of attempting to destroy “war material” and “war premises” in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2153 (a). This section makes it a crime “when the United States is at war, or in times of national emergency as declared by the President or by the Congress” to willfully destroy or attempt to destroy “any war material, war premises, or war utilities . . ..” (Emphasis added.)

A criminal statute which fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden is constitutionally infirm. Predicating criminal liability on conduct engaged in under special circumstances or at certain times is not constitutionally infirm, as long as men of common intelligence are not forced to guess as to a statute’s meaning or differ as to its application. Under the terms of the above statute, the defendant is prohibited from doing specific acts at “times of national emergency as declared by the President.” The declared national emergency under which petitioner was held to have acted is the 1950 declaration of President Truman issued in response to the Korean conflict; the resolution by its terms contemplates termination of the emergency only by act of the President or by concurrent resolution of Congress, neither of which has yet been done.

I doubt that many lawyers, let alone laymen, of ordinary intelligence are aware of the continuing effect of the 1950 national emergency declaration. Under these circumstances, it is questionable whether proper notice of possible criminal liability has been afforded to any individual prosecuted under 18 U. S. C. § 2153 (a). The viability of criminal responsibility predicated upon evaluations of current political temperament or outdated presidential proclamations is an important issue worthy of our consideration on the merits.


text:
    No. 71-1690.
    No. 71-1691.
    Kresse et al. v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture; and Rasmussen, dba Sarival Guernsey Farms v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to amend petition in No. 71-1691 granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.

Reported below: 461 F. 2d 595.


text:
    No. 71-6512.
    Marcovich v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6544.
    Wallace v. Warner, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-81.
    Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Commissioner of Customs, Region II, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6606.
    Wetteroff et al. v. Grand, Trustee.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6869.
    Dorado et al. v. Kerr, Chairman, California Adult Authority.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-64.
    DeMoulin et al. v. City of Denver et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-145.
    Noland et al. v. Desobry.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-146.
    Hunter, dba Courier v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-198.
    Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 71-6489.
    McLamore v. South Carolina et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I vote to hear this case because of the importance of the question raised.

A prisoner sentenced in the State of South Carolina, in any case in which confinement is the punishment, can be sent (1) to a county to work on its chain gang (if the county maintains one) (2) or in the alternative to the Department of Corrections and then to the local jail or state penitentiary. Under the statute, an elected official, the County Supervisor, makes the choice. There are no statutory criteria by which he is to make his choice.

Petitioner was sentenced under S. C. Code Ann. § 17-554 and assigned to the chain gang of Richland County, South Carolina. Under the Post Conviction Relief Statute of South Carolina he sought review of two questions: (1) whether the chain gang was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) whether the sending of certain prisoners to the penitentiary where some rehabilitative services are available and others to the chain gang where none exists is a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

On April 28, 1971, the relief in both areas was denied and the decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 257 S. C. 413, 186 S. E. 2d 250 (1972). The case is here on certiorari.

The delineation of just what conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment is not well defined. But we know from Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), that the concept is not rigid but progressive; that it acquires meaning as the public becomes enlightened. Id., at 378. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren said, “the words of the Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1958).

Does the chain gang fit into our current concept of penology? If not, does it violate the Eighth Amendment? This is an important question never decided by the Court.

The second point is of equal importance. South Carolina creates two classes of prisoners, those who work on the chain gang, and those who are sent to the penitentiary. The latter are under the Department of Corrections and have counseling, psychiatric service, and educational and vocational programs, although no penitentiary has all the programs that are available within the system. Those assigned to the chain gang have none of the rehabilitative services made available by the Corrections Department. As I have said, there are no statutory standards for the County Supervisor to use in determining wfhere each man goes; the decision is entirely within his discretion to treat one type of offender differently from another though the two are in the same class, and though each be found guilty of the same crime and sentenced to serve the same number of years.

A State can, of course, create different classes of prisoners and treat them differently as long as those classes are created for legitimate state aims. And if the basis on which groups so defined bears a reasonable relation to the purpose, the class will survive. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 158. The courts must determine whether the classification is reasonable in light of its purpose. For this Court to refuse to make the decision in this case allows a procedure to exist which arguably has many aspects of involuntary servitude for some, while others of the same class are treated in a more enlightened way.

       S. C. Code Ann. § 17-554 (1962):
      “Able-bodied male convicts to work on county or municipal chain gangs. — In every case in which imprisonment is provided as the punishment, in whole or in part, for any crime, all able-bodied male convicts shall be sentenced to hard labor on the public works of the county in which convicted, if such county maintains a chain gang, without regard to the length of service, and in the alternative to imprisonment in the county jail or State Penitentiary at hard labor. . . . In any case the presiding judge shall have the power, by special order, to direct that any person convicted before him be confined in the State Penitentiary if it is considered unsafe or unwise for such convict to be committed to the county chain gang.”
      Whether the exclusion of women raises an equal protection claim is not raised by the present petition.

        Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, aff’d per curiam, 393 U. S. 266, is not determinative of the present case. The Wilson case, so far as material here, only held that work camps are not per se unconstitutional, saving, however, a prisoner’s right to raise “the question of his own particular treatment as being a violation of his constitutional rights,” 294 F. Supp., at 1012. No such question was reached in that case, as only a class action was involved.
      For a recent account of the dark chapter resulting from the Court’s decisions last century that the paramount duty to protect civil rights rested with the States, not the Federal Government, see Scott, Justice Bradley’s Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment From the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 552 (1971).


text:
    No. 71-6888.
    Hadley v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I vote to hear this case because I assume that equal protection and due process of law under our Constitution apply to the rich as well as to the poor, to whites as well as to the minorities.

In Alabama a certified transcript or sufficient statement of the evidence must be filed within 60 days from the taking of an appeal or from the trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial, whichever is later. Petitioner filed his transcript three days beyond the deadline. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal as out of time. Hadley v. State, 47 Ala. App. 738, 259 So. 2d 853 (1971).

The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama affirmed, with three justices dissenting. Ex parte Hadley, 288 Ala. 293, 259 So. 2d 853 (1972). Under the case law of the Supreme Court of Alabama, had petitioner been an indigent, such tardiness would not have prevented appeal. In Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 192 So. 2d 461 (1966), the transcript of evidence was filed approximately sixteen days after its due date. The court did not dismiss for tardiness but laid down a new procedure: “[T]his court will not honor requests to strike where a lower court . . . has ordered a free transcript. See Rule 48.” Id., at 457, 192 So. 2d, at 463. Such motion to dismiss was also denied in Brummitt v. State, 44 Ala. App. 78, 203 So. 2d 133 (1967), where the court allowed a late filing on a showing of indigency the day after defendant’s arrest, although no formal adjudication of indigency was ever made.

The question petitioner Hadley raises here and raised in the Alabama Supreme Court below, is whether by case law, a State can give more time for filing of a transcript for a person without funds than for a person of wealth. The exception for indigents was created by Rule 48 of the Supreme Court of Alabama which puts within the court’s discretion the power to hear appeals in cases where the transcript filing is late but within time for taking an appeal. Such was the case here. The spirit of the Rule is a generous and progressive one. Although not written to create classes of appellants, the courts have added that feature. The class is defined by wealth. We have held that a class based on wealth is inherently suspect. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966). And when a suspect classification is made in such a manner as to impair a fundamental right, the burden on the State to prove a compelling state interest is a heavy one. While there is no constitutional right to appeal, a State may not grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate between those appellants who are wealthy and those who are poor. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956).

Alabama’s law seems to be out of line with that principle. I would therefore grant the petition and put the case down for oral argument.

       In Johnson v. Committee on Examinations, 407 U. S. 915, the Court last Term denied a petition for certiorari in a case from Arizona where a white candidate for admission to the Bar claimed discrimination against him as compared with the treatment accorded black candidates. It seems that the passing grade on the Arizona bar examination is 70. Petitioner alleged that he got below 70 and was rejected, while the blacks were admitted whose grades were likewise below 70 and no better than his own. I dissented from the denial of certiorari in that case. Like the present one, it seemed to be a case of reverse discrimination.

       Code of Alabama, Title 7, § 827 (4) (1960):
      “The court reporter's certified transcript shall be filed with the clerk within sixty days from the date of the taking of the appeal or within sixty days from the date of the court’s ruling on the motion for a new trial, whichever date is later; and any succinct statement of the evidence made in lieu of such transcript, as authorized in section 827 (3) hereof, shall be filed with the clerk within sixty days from the date of the taking of the appeal, or within sixty days from the date of the court’s ruling on the motion for a new trial, whichever date is later. Provided, that this period may be extended by the trial court for cause.”

       Petitioner obtained private counsel at trial and paid personally for the transcript, but was without counsel on appeal.

       Supreme Court of Alabama Rule 48:
      “In cases at law where the court reporter’s transcript of the evidence is not filed with the clerk of the circuit court within the time prescribed by law, but is filed within the time for taking an appeal, it will be considered by this court if no objection thereto is presented upon the submission of the cause; and it may be so considered in the discretion of the court, even though the point as to the delay be presented on appeal, unless counsel objecting thereto shall point out, with supporting affidavit, material omissions or defects in such certified transcript which should or would have been the subject of contest before the trial judge; in which latter event the certified transcript is not to be considered.”


text:
    No. 72-53.
    Francis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

This petition on its face seems to me to be one we should grant and reverse the judgment below on the basis of Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385. At the very-least we should put the case down for oral argument.

Petitioner was convicted for failure to report for induction into the Armed Forces in violation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 457 F. 2d 553.

When classified as I-A, petitioner requested classification as a conscientious objector. The Board rejected his request on five grounds:

“1. Left Church. Religion is not thoroughly understood.

“2. Appears insincere in his 1-0 request. Possibly coached.

“3. Could help a wounded man, but wouldn’t in battle.

“4. Decision to fill out SSS 150 and apply for 1-0 status came after he fell behind academically.

“5. Won’t take military orders. Appears that he is against taking any orders.”

The first reason seems plainly untenable as a ground for denying the 1-0 classification. Two years earlier petitioner had joined the Church of Christ. But the fact that he left it is irrelevant to his 1-0 status. His tie to a church is irrelevant to his claim, because purely ethical or moral grounds, though unrelated to any church, are adequate, if sincerely believed. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163; Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333.

The third ground is also plainly insufficient. It is true as the Government says that the extent to which petitioner would be willing to help the wounded is relevant as to whether he should be assigned to Class I-A-0 for noncombatant service. Yet one’s objection to all military-service may well include even that part of military service that one can serve in a noncombatant capacity. That apparently was the point of petitioner’s willingness to help an injured man, except in battle. It underlines his asserted belief that service even in a noncombatant capacity infringes upon his beliefs. The fifth ground stated by the Selective Service Board is really part and parcel of petitioner’s asserted objection to all military service.

In Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S., at 392, it was impossible to say on what grounds the Selective Service Board made the classification. One ground being illegitimate, we set aside the conviction, for the integrity of the system demanded that the Board rely on some legitimate ground. We followed that course in Clay v. United States, 403 U. S. 698, 703-704, where concededly two of the three grounds on which the Board denied relief were not valid ones. And we noted that, since Sicurella, that rule had become the established practice of federal courts, when dealing with the criminal sanction of the Selective Service Laws. Id., at 705.

I see no way to distinguish this case from Sicurella and Clay and would therefore grant certiorari and reverse. Or, as I said, at the very least we should grant certiorari and put the case down for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-96.
    Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-105.
    Capital Assistance Corp. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-151.
    Henderson, Warden v. Favre.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-204.
    Solomon v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-207.
    Cole et al. v. United States.
   C. A. .2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    October 20, 1972
    No. A-406.
    Scott v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of conviction presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    October 24, 1972
    No. 70-15.
    Sweetenham et al. v. Gilligan, Governor of Ohio, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-12.
    Amos, Secretary of State of Alabama, et al. v. Sims et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala.


text:
    No. 70-48.
    Pratt et al. v. Begley, Secretary of State of Kentucky, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Ky.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-1668.
    No. 71-1684.
    Mayes et al. v. Ellis et al.; and Hill et al. v. McKeithen, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. La.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set cases for oral argument.

Reported below: 345 F. Supp. 1025.


text:
    No. 72-44.
    Fugate, State Highway Commissioner v. Potomac Electric Power Co. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Ya.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 71-1625.
    Kirstel v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-180.
    National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc., et al. v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 72-232.
    Borough of East Rutherford et al. v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 72-234.
    Thompson et al. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-6627.
    Martin v. City of New Orleans.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972). See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U. S. 913 (1972). The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissent for the reasons expressed in the several opinions in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, supra; and Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U. S. 914 (1972). Mr. Justice Powell would remand cause for further consideration only in light of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). See concurring opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, supra.


text:
    No. 72-216.
    Smilow v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. On representation of the Solicitor General, set forth in his Memorandum for the United States, filed September 28, 1972, certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of position presently asserted by the Government.


text:
    No. A-263.
    Oxnard School District Board of Trustees et al. v. Soria et al.
   C. A. 9th Gir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-419 (72-618).
    American Party of Florida et al. v. Askew, Governor of Florida, et al.
   D. C. N. D. Fla. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 71-485.
    Gottschalk, Acting Commissioner of Patents v. Benson et al.
   C. C. P. A. [Certiorari granted, 405 U. S. 915.] Motion of Computer Software Analysts, Inc., et al. for leave to file an untimely brief as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-1051.
    Paris Adult Theatre I et al. v. Slaton et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. [Certiorari granted, 408 U. S. 921.] Motion of Charles H. Keating, Jr., for leave to file an untimely brief as amicus curiae in support of respondent granted.


text:
    No. 71-1082.
    Askew, Governor of Florida, et al. v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 405 U. S. 1063.] Motion of American Bar Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1178.
    Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certi-orari granted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motion of American Public Power Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1119.
    Indiana Employment Security Division et al. v. Burney.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ind. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 406 U. S. 956.] Motions of National Employment Law Project et al., and American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1193.
    United States v. Enmons et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 406 U. S. 916.] Motion of American Newspaper Publishers Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-1585.
    United States v. Russell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 911.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Thomas H. S. Brucker, Esquire, of Seattle, Washington, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 72-243.
    Clean Air Coordinating Committee v. Roth Adam Fuel Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 72-160.
    Durst v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
   Motions to dispense with printing petition and for leave to use record in No. 72-42 [Durst v. National Casualty Co., Inc., infra] granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-136.
    Durst v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al.
   Motion to dispense with printing petition for writ of mandamus granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-159.
    Durst v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al.
   Motions to dispense with printing petition for writ of mandamus and for leave to use record in No. 72-42 [Durst v. National Casualty Co., Inc., infra] granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-5185.
    Fair v. Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Florida, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-1623.
    Bullock, Secretary of State of Texas v. Weiser et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. Motion to dispense with printing motion to dismiss or affirm granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-1545.
    Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1553.
    Gilligan, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Morgan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-178.
    Struck v. Secretary of Defense et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-90.
    United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1502.
    Fitzharris, Conservation Center Superintendent v. Blaylock.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1536.
    Central Gulf Steamship Corp. v. Dennis et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1558.
    Kantner et al. v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1675.
    Adam v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6826.
    Bailey v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6844.
    Jackson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-176.
    Stevens v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-181.
    No. 72-229.
    J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. The Morning Star et al.; and Fish Meal Co. et al. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 457 F. 2d 815.


text:
    No. 72-182.
    Jiffy June Farms, Inc., et al. v. Coleman et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-184.
    Raimondi v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-192.
    Buffalo Cab Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-201.
    Stein v. Cleveland Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-208.
    Carson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-215.
    Rederi A/B Soya et al. v. Evergreen Marine Corp., S. A., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-219.
    Cook v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-222.
    Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Kentucky ex rel. Luckett, Commissioner of Revenue.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-224.
    Tanner et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-225.
    Rodulfa et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-226.
    Anderson et al. v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-228.
    Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-236.
    Budzanoski et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-233.
    Lebman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-237.
    Rusch v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-241.
    Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, now United Transportation Union v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-244.
    Occidental Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-248.
    Alga, Inc., dba Montgomery Book Mart, et al. v. Crosland et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-249.
    City of Akron v. Village of Middlefield et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-367.
    Essling et al. v. Brubacher, Commissioner of Administration of Minnesota.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5069.
    Kier v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5116.
    Reynolds v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5135.
    Wilcynski v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5136.
    Webster v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5143.
    Sinclair v. Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5137.
    Scharbrough v. Cupp, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5141.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5144.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5147.
    Beng-Joc, aka Lee et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5148.
    Roche v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5149.
    Roche v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5150.
    Garcia-Turino v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5154.
    Bishop, aka Speer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5155.
    Paris et al. v. Foreman, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5158.
    Sikes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5159.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5160.
    Hawk v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5164.
    Tyler v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5163.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5165.
    Dzialak v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5166.
    Hill v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5167.
    Pierce v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5169.
    Lincoln v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5171.
    Sibonga v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5172.
    Stead v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5173.
    Waddell v. North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5174.
    Godin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5176.
    Tribblet v. Salisbury, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5177.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5178.
    DeLucia v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5181.
    Lane v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5189.
    Burkley v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.