text:
    No. 781.
    Baan et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Harry R. Horrow for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument immediately following No. 760, supra.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 805.
    Raney et al. v. Board of Education of the Gould School District et al.

      Jack Greenberg and Michael Meltsner for petitioners.

      Robert V. Light and Herschel H. Friday for respondents.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari granted and case set for oral argument immediately following No. 740, supra.


text:
    No. 678,
    Misc.
    Bumper v. North Carolina.

      T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Harry W. McGalliard, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket.


text:
    No. 802.
    Peyton, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Rowe et al.

      Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, and Reno S. Harp III, Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner.

      Thorrms S. Currier for respondents.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari granted and case set for oral argument immediately following No. 71, ante, p. 896.


text:
    No. 344,
    Misc.
    Witherspoon v. Illinois et al.

      Elmer Gertz on the motion for Illinois Division, American Civil Liberties Union.

      Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Thomas P. Sullivan and John C. Tucker for petitioner.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General, and John J. O’Toole and Donald J. Veverka, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Illinois, and John J. Stamos, Elmer C. Kissane and Joel M. Flaum, for Woods, respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of Illinois Division, American Civil Liberties Union, for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, granted. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket, limited to the following question: Whether the operation of the Illinois statute providing that the State could challenge for cause all prospective jurors who were opposed to, or had conscientious scruples against, capital punishment deprived the petitioner of a jury which fairly represented a cross section of the community, and assured the State of a jury whose members were partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence, in violation of the petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.


text:
    No. 518.
    Stepps v. Arkansas.

      Jack Holt, Jr., for petitioner.

      Joe Purcell, Attorney General of Arkansas, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 668.
    Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.

      Harold Buchman for petitioner.

      Roberts B. Owen and Nestor S. Foley for respondent.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Robert S. Rijkind for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 680.
    Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc. v. Donaldson Publishing Co.

      Frederick W. R. Pride, Leo P. Larkin, Jr., Max Chopnick, Jerome E. Malino and Theodore R. Jackson for petitioner.

      Lewis A. Dreyer for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 731.
    Crouse v. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

      Clay S. Crouse, petitioner, pro se.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Weisl and Kathryn H. Baldwin for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 734.
    Gladney v. Review Committee.

      Paul K. Kirkpatrick, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 744.
    Walker v. United States.

      Lawrence J. Simmons for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 735.
    Klein et al. v. United States.

      Bert A. Bandstra for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold and Acting Assistant Attorney General Williams for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 739.
    Metlox Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Frank Simpson for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 741.
    Doyle et al. v. Brenner, Commissioner of Patents.

      Albert L. Jacobs for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 743.
    Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Victor Van Bourg for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 745.
    Roberge v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin, Gilbert E. Andrews and Boring W. Post for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 746.
    Glimco v. Parsons, U. S. District Judge.

      Edward J. Calihan, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for respondent.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 747.
    McLane et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Thaddeus Rojek for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin and Gilbert E. Andrews for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 751.
    Kohler et al. v. Washington.

      Clarence W. Pierce and Michael R. Alfieri for petitioners.
   Super. Ct. Wash., County of King and/or Sup. Ct. Wash. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 753.
    Birns v. Ohio.

      Jack G. Day for petitioner.

      John T. Corrigan, Harvey R. Monck and Charles W. Fleming for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 758.
    Gates v. P. F. Collier, Inc.

      Wilbur K. Watkins, Jr., for petitioner.

      Peter Megargee Brown for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 761.
    International Atlas Services, Inc., a Division of Atlas Corp., formerly International Aircraft Services, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co. et al.

      John D. Gray for petitioner.

      Leonard H. Monroe for respondents.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 763.
    Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles v. Holtzendorff et al.

      Jack E. Hildreth and Richard R. Rogan for petitioner.

      Herman F. Selvin for respondents.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 762.
    Lowe v. Monk, Administrator, et al.

      Charles E. Muskett for petitioner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 767.
    Sanders et al. v. Erreca et al.

      Hyman Goldman for petitioners.

      Harry S. Fenton, R. B. Pegram and Joseph A. Montoya for respondents.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 769.
    Skyline Homes, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Larry S. Davidow for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come and Leonard M. Wagman for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 770.
    Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Marshall.

      Joseph W. Morris and Cecil E. Mu-rm for petitioner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 771.
    Cameron v. Hauck.

      John D. Gofer, Hume Cofer and Luther E. Jones for petitioner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 772.
    No. 773.
    International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.; and Professional Employees of I. T. T. Federal Laboratories et al. v. McCulloch et al.

      Thomas L. Morrissey for petitioner in No. 772, and Merritt T. Viscardi for petitioners in No. 773.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondents National Labor Relations Board et al., and Sidney Reitman for respondent Local 400, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, AFL-CIO, in both cases.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 382 F. 2d 366, 374.


text:
    No. 775.
    Chemical Cleaning, Inc., et al. v. Dow Chemical Co.

      M. Ted Raptes for petitioners.

      Charles J. Merriam for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 777.
    Billingsley v. Mackay.

      William D. Neary for petitioner.

      Philip I. Palmer for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 780.
    Loffland Brothers Co. v. Roberts et al.

      Robert B. Acomb, Jr., for petitioner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 782.
    International Cable T. V. Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al.

      Dirks B. Foster for petitioner.

      Mary Moran Pajalich and J. Thomasan Phelps for Public Utilities Commission of California, and William E. Mussman for Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 783.
    No. 784.
    City of Hammond v. McLean, Trustee, et al.; and Woodmar Realty Co. v. McLean, Trustee, et al.

      O. Edward McHie for petitioner in No. 783, and Owen W. Crum-packer, Harold Abrahamson and Milton K. Joseph for petitioner in No. 784.

      Porter R. Draper for respondents in both cases.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 384 F. 2d 776.


text:
    No. 786.
    Barnes v. United States.

      Harris A. Gilbert for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 789.
    Krieger-Ragsdale & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Harry P. Dees for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come and George B. Driesen for respondent.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 792.
    Crawford et al. v. United States.

      Alan Y. Cole, Isaac N. Groner, Jerry D. Anker and Earl C. Berger for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.

      Harry N. Rosenfield for National Education Association, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 794.
    Cargill v. United States.

      Edward Bennett Williams and Robert L. Weinberg for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 799.
    Board of Pardons and Paroles of Texas et al. v. Black.

      Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, George M. Cowden, First Assistant Attorney General, R. L. Lattimore, Howard M. Fender, Robert E. Owen, Gilbert J. Pena and Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorneys General, and A. J. Carubbi, Jr., for petitioners.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 811.
    Lannom v. United States.

      Peter J. Hughes for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 785.
    Stumo v. United Air Lines, Inc., et al.

      George F. Archer for petitioner.

      Stuart Bernstein for respondents United Air Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 803.
    United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO.

      Harold D. Burgess for petitioner.

      Bernard Kleiman, Elliot Bredhoff, Michael H. Gottes-man, George H. Cohen and Jerome A. Cooper for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 806.
    Page et al. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. et al.

      Sam J. Lee for petitioners.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 1st Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 814.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Brenner, Commissioner of Patents, et al.

      Sidney Neuman, Robert L. Austin and Paul L. Gomory for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold for Brenner, Harry L. Kirkpatrick for Goodrich-Gulf Chemicals, Inc., and John D. Upham, L. Bruce Stevens, Jr., and Ellsworth H. Mosher for Monsanto Co., respondents.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 819.
    Weinberg v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar et al.

      M. Roland Nachman, Jr., for respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 821.
    Bell et ux. v. United States.

      Robert J. Woolsey for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 810.
    Rogers v. Ohio.

      Bernard Cohen for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 822.
    Jemison v. Brown et al.

      Charles S. Conley for petitioner.

      W. McLean Pitts for respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 827.
    Floridice Co., Inc., et al. v. Wirtz, Secretary of Labor.

      Charles W. Pittman for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 829.
    Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. et al. v. Osborne-McMillan Elevator Co., Inc.

      Donald N. Clausen for petitioners.

      Peter Dorsey and William A. Whitlock for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 843.
    Rutherford et al. v. American Medical Association, Inc., et al.

      Frank 0. Walther for petitioners.

      Don H. Reuben and Lawrence Gunnels for respondents American Medical Association, Inc., et al., James J. Costello for respondents Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois et al., and Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for respondent employees of the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 837.
    Aiken v. United States.

      James J. Hanrahan for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 828.
    Brothman et al. v. Michigan.

      Ernest Goodman and Chester J. Antieau for petitioners.

      Thomas F. Shea for respondent.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 838.
    Smolen v. Connecticut.

      Melvin L. Wulf for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 847.
    Marcello et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Jack Wasserman for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin and Coring W. Post for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 848.
    Gaillard et ux. v. Field, Administratrix.

      William Walter Hentz, Jr., for petitioners.

      George L. Verity for respondent.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 852.
    No. 853.
    Cox, Administratrix v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.; and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, Administratrix.

      James A. Dooley for petitioner in No. 852 and for respondent in No. 853.

      Owen Rail for petitioner in No. 853 and for respondent in No. 852.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 379 F. 2d 893.


text:
    No. 854.
    Feinberg v. United States.

      Jay Leo Rothschild for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Paul C. Summitt for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 873.
    Costa v. Connecticut.

      F. Lee Bailey for petitioner.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 865.
    E. W. Buschman Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.

      Edward Statland for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 870.
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Walker et al.

      Frederick P. Bamberger for petitioner.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 881.
    Shue v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 7.
    Purolator Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.

      Sumner S. Kittelle and Allan Trumbull for petitioner.

      James Mcl. Henderson and Charles C. Moore, Jr., for respondent.

      Solicitor General Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Turner for the United States, as amicus curiae.

   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion to amend petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 147.
    K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp. et al.

      Richard F. Wolf son for petitioner.

      Simon H. Rif kind and Jay H. Topkis for respondents.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Howard E. Shapiro for the United States, as amicus curiae, in opposition to the petition.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 155.
    Bagley v. United States.

      Stanton E. Tefft for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin, Gilbert E. Andrews and Edward Lee Rogers for the United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 387.
    Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Nordwick, Executor, et al.

      Marvin J. Sonosky, Frederick Bernays Wiener and John M. Schütz for petitioners.

      Otis L. Packwood for respondents.

      Solicitor General Griswold filed a memorandum for the United States, by invitation of the Court, ante, 806.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 732.
    Bramlett et al. v. Leber, Governor of the Canal Zone and President, Panama Canal Co.

      Thomas Morton Gittimgs, Jr., for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Weisl, Alan S. Rosenthal and Richard S. Salzman for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 737.
    Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indians of Oklahoma et al. v. United States.

      Ijouís L. Rochmes for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Williams, Roger P. Marquis and A. Donald Mileur for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 752.
    Alabama, for and in Behalf of and as Trustee for the Department of Pensions and Security of Alabama, et al. v. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, Gordon Madison, Assistant Attorney General, Reid B. Barnes, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William G. Somerville, Jr., for petitioners. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Doar and David L. Rose for respondent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 812.
    Transocean Air Lines, Inc., et al. v. United States.

      Jeptha P. Marchant, pro se, Joseph A. Perkins, pro se, and John H. Gunn for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 883.
    Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. et al. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

      Francis M. Shea, Richard T. Conway and. James R. Wolfe for petitioners.

      Milton Kramer, Martin W. Fingerhut and John H. Haley, Jr., for respondent.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 756.
    Weger v. California.

      A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence Sperber for petitioner.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 736.
    Zeringue et al. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. et al.

      Albert Russell Roberts for petitioners.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 807.
    Seay v. United States.

      Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 594.
    Levin v. Maryland.

      Frank B. Cahn II and Paul A. Dorf for petitioner.

      Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and Fred Oken, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 710.
    Green v. Board of Elections of the City of New York et al.

      Leonard B. Boudin, Victor Rabinowitz and David Rein for petitioner.

      Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
   C. A. 2d fcir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 717.
    Inman v. City of Miami et al.

      Tobias Simon and Alfred I. Hopkins for petitioner.

      S. R. Sterbenz for respondent City of Miami.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 795.
    Kaufman v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

      Morton Liftin for petitioner.

      John G. Bonomi and Michael Franck for respondent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y, 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 776.
    National Committee of Gibran v. Shiya.

      William H. Dempsey and Jam,es F. Sams for petitioner.

      Joseph M. Cunningham for respondent.

      Lenox G. Cooper and Worth Rowley for Republic of Lebanon, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Republic of Lebanon for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 498.
    Colorado River Water Conservation District et al. v. Four Counties Water Users Association et al.

      Kenneth Balcomb, Edward Mulhall, Jr., and Robert L. McCarty for petitioners.

      Clarence L. Ireland for Four Counties Water Users Association, and J. Fred Schneider for Matheson, respondents.

      Solicitor General Griswold filed a memorandum for the United States, by invitation of the Court, ante, p. 924.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Fortas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 766.
    Miller v. Shell Oil Co.

      William R. Federici for respondent.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion to strike respondent’s brief in opposition denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 851.
    Pacific Scientific Co. v. Aerotec Industries of California et al.

      Francis R. Kirkham, Francis N. Marshall and C. Russell Hale for petitioner.

      Casimir A. Miketta for respondents.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Strategic Industries Association for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 860.
    Levy v. Resor, Secretary of the Army, et al.

      Charles Morgan, Jr., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Alan H. Levine and Melvin L. Wulf for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for respondents.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 788.
    McCollough v. Travelers Insurance Co. et al.

      Ward Stephenson for petitioner.

      Louis V. Nelson for respondents.

      Paul S. Edelman for American Trial Lawyers Association, Admiralty Section, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Trial Lawyers Association, Admiralty Section, for leave to file a brief, as amicus curias, granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 102,
    Misc.
    Ochoa v. California.

      Aidan R. Gough for petitioner.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Robert R. Granucci and Michael Buzzell, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 215,
    Misc.
    Phillips v. Mississippi.

      Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Guy N. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 220,
    Misc.
    Killmon v. Oregon.

      George Van Hoomissen and Jacob B. Tamer for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 267,
    Misc.
    Cantrell v. California Adult Authority et al.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Stanton Price, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 421,
    Misc.
    Perales et al. v. Housing Authority of Tulare County.

      William M. Lewers for petitioners.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of Tulare. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 791.
    Sobell v. United States.

      Marshall Perlin, William M. Kunstler, Arthur Kinoy, Benjamin 0. Dreyfus and Vem Countryman for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Marcmey and Robert L. Keuch for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to file copies of petitioner's Appendix in the Court of Appeals granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 877.
    Nicholson v. Calbeck, Deputy Commissioner, et al.

      Arthur J. Mandell for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold for Calbeck, and Carl G. Stearns for Crown Steve-doring Co. et al., respondents.

      Paul S. Edelman for American Trial Lawyers Association, Admiralty Section, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Trial Lawyers Association, Admiralty Section, for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 309,
    Misc.
    Vasquez v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Kirby W. Patterson for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 589,
    Misc.
    Cuevas v. California.

      S. E. Gramer for petitioner.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 415,
    Misc.
    Constas v. California.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and James H. Kline, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 432,
    Misc.
    Barnes v. Kentucky.

      Robert Matthews, Attorney General of Kentucky, and John B. Browning, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 462,
    Misc.
    Gonzales v. Texas.

      Gene Richie for' petitioner.

      Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, George M. Gowden, First Assistant Attorney General, R. L. Lat-timore and Howard M. " Fender, Assistant Attorneys General, and A. J. Carubbi, Jr., for respondent.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 487,
    Misc.
    Crow v. California.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 491,
    Misc.
    White v. United States.

      George B. Newitt for petitioner.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 617,
    Misc.
    Fitzsimmons v. United States.

      John E. Archibold for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 453,
    Misc.
    Phillips v. Alabama.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and David W. Clark and Walter S. Turner, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 514,
    Misc.
    Greer v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 597,
    Misc.
    Malry v. United States.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 611,
    Misc.
    Holmes v. Kentucky.

      Robert Matthews, Attorney General of Kentucky, and David Murrell, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 620,
    Misc.
    Epps v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 625,
    Misc.
    Lusk v. United States.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer for the United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 666,
    No. 669,
    No. 670,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Perry v. United States; McGuire v. United States; and Blumner v. United States.

      Anthony F. Marra for petitioner in No. 666, Mise., Jerome J. Londin for petitioner in No. 669, Mise., and Eugene P. Souther for petitioner in No. 670, Mise.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States in all three cases.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 381 F. 2d 306.


text:
    No. 622,
    Misc.
    Hackworth v. United States.

      G. Wray Gill, Sr., for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 681,
    Misc.
    Waldron v. Pate, Warden.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and John J. O’Toole and Robert F. Nix, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 682,
    Misc.
    Stuart et ux. v. United States.

      Acting Solicitor General Spritzer for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 686,
    Misc.
    Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.

      Harry Alan Sherman for petitioner.

      David J. Armstrong for respondent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 691,
    Misc.
    Moser et al. v. United States.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 696,
    Misc.
    Pillis v. Pillis.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 699,
    Misc.
    Melendez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 718,
    Misc.
    Davis v. New Jersey.

      Leo Kaplowits for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 701,
    Misc.
    Ayers v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 702,
    Misc.
    Rogers v. Stanley, State Hospital Director.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 703,
    Misc.
    Malbrue v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 704,
    Misc.
    Jordan v. Kamp et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 715,
    Misc.
    Brown v. United States.

      John M. Hollis for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 719,
    Misc.
    Giuliano v. United States.

      Thomas F. Campion for petitioner.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Philip R. Monahan for the United States.
   C. A: 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 720,
    Misc.
    Dispenza v. LaVallee, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 724,
    Misc.
    Sumrall et al. v. United States.

      Emmett Colvin, Jr., for petitioners.

      Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. May sack for the United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 725,
    Misc.
    Swilling v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 721,
    Misc.
    Lana v. Follette, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 726,
    Misc.
    Kotka v. Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 729,
    Misc.
    Bogart v. California et al.

      Peter D. Bogart for petitioner.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 732,
    Misc.
    Mesa v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 733,
    Misc.
    Albini v. Mancusi, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 734,
    Misc.
    Prather v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 735,
    Misc.
    Switzer v. Oliver, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 736,
    Misc.
    Turner v. New York.

      Frank S. Hogan for respondent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 739,
    Misc.
    Little v. Swenson, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 748,
    Misc.
    Ashby v. Haugh, Warden.

      Luther L. Hill, Jr., for petitioner.

      Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa, and David A. Elderkin and William A. Claerhout, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 743,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Maxwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 750,
    Misc.
    Maxwell et al. v. United States.

      Leon B. Polsky and Harry C. Batchelder, Jr., for petitioners.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 752,
    Misc.
    Michael v. California.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Kerrigan and Robert P. Samoian, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 755,
    Misc.
    Lucas v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 763,
    Misc.
    Hurley v. United States.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 774,
    Misc.
    McDaniel v. Thyer Manufacturing Corp. et al.

      Dixon L. Pyles for petitioner.

      John F. Bodle and Bruce C. Aultman for respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 789,
    Misc.
    Warner et ux. v. United States.

      Solicitor General Gris-wold for the United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 802,
    Misc.
    Steinpreis et ux. v. Shook et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 760,
    Misc.
    Crook v. Craven, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 761,
    Misc.
    Williams v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 248,
    Misc.
    Murray v. Florida.

      Earl Faircloth, Attorney General of Florida, and Wallace E. Allbritton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Whitney v. Florida, ante, p. 138, and particularly in light of the increasing burden on federal courts caused by habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners who are unable to obtain hearings in state courts, I would grant the writ of certiorari and remand the case to Florida with directions to give petitioner an evidentiary hearing.


text:
    No. 434,
    Misc.
    Jacobs v. Brough, Warden.

      William W. Greenhalgh for petitioner.

      Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and Edward F. Borgerding, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 468,
    Misc.
    Vanderhorst v. New York.

      Leon B. Polsky for petitioner.

      Isidore Dollinger and Daniel J. Sullivan for respondent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 705,
    Misc.
    Williams v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1217,
    October Term, 1966.
    International Railways of Central America v. United Fruit Co.,
   387 U. S. 921. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1324,
    Misc.,
    October Term, 1966.
    Oppenheim et al. v. Sterling et al.,
   386 U. S. 1011, 388 U. S. 925. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al.,
   ante, p. 155. Petition for rehearing denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 344.
    No. 441.
    No. 590.
    No. 674.
    No. 58,
    No. 124,
    No. 199,
    No. 408,
    No. 474,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Mensik et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Wallace v. Brenner, Commissioner of Patents, Gray v. Porter, Thomas et al. v. Consolidation Coal Co. (Pocahontas Fuel Co. Division) et al., Vela v. Beto, Corrections Director, White v. Florida, DeSimone v. United States, Steppe v. Florida, Adams v. Cameron, Hospital Superintendent,
   ante, p. 912;

ante, p. 898;

ante, p. 972;

ante, p. 1004;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 996;

ante, p. 960;

ante, p. 966; and

ante, p. 993. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 503,
    No. 516,
    No. 552,
    No. 555,
    No. 613,
    No. 630,
    No. 660,
    No. 688,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Nielsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association, Henry v. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Fair v. Dekle, Supervisor of Elections, Noland v. United States, Holland v. Pennsylvania, Simpson v. United States, Feist v. California et al., Garza v. California,
   ante, p. 154;

ante, p. 993;

ante, p. 994;

ante, p. 945;

ante, p. 994;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1009; and

ante, p. 1024. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 194.
    No. 659.
    Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al., Eagar et al. v. Magma Copper Co.,
   ante, p. 837; and

ante, p. 323. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 523.
    Hackin v. Arizona et al.,
   ante, p. 143. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 614.
    R. A. Holman & Co., Inc., et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
   ante, p. 991. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 244,
    Misc.
    Pettett v. United States,
   ante, p. 917. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 266,
    No. 303,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Nelson v. Oregon, Abel v. Beto, Corrections Director,
   ante, p. 964; and

ante, p. 872. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Mv. Justice Catron

text:
    Joseph Evans, Plaintiff in error, vs. Sterling H. Gee, Defendant in error.
    It is the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court.of the United States that a writ of error does not lie from the Circuit Court,on a refusal of a motion to .quash an execution; such refusal not being a final judgment, under the twenty-second section of- the Judiciary- Act of 1789.
    The opinion of the Court on the case of Boyle vs. Zacharie and Turner, 6 Peters,' 648, cited and affirmed.
    IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama.
    In the Circuit Court- of Alabama, an action was instituted by Sterling H. Gee, the defendant in error, against Thomas Evans, on a bill of exchange drawn by Harris G. Evans in favour of Thomas Evans, on George M. Rives of Mobile, for five thousand three -hundred' and fifty dollars, dated 16th December, 1834, due twelve months after date, negotiable and payable at the office, of discount and deposite of the Branch Bank of the United States at Mobile; for value received; and protested for non-acceptance.
    The declaration does not charge that notice of the non-acceptance was given to the endorser. No proof was given at the trial of such notice.
    To this declaration the defendant (the endorser of the bill) demurred, and the -plaintiff was nonsuited: afterwards, at the same term, the nonsuit was struck out, and the cause continued. At the next term a jury was empannelled, who. found a verdict, for plaintiff, on which judgment was entered.
    Thomas Evans, the defendant in this judgment, died 12th Septernber, 1837; and, on the 16th March,'1838, a fieri facias issued-on the judgment.

      The administrator of the deceased made a motion to quash this. execution at May term, IS,38: but the Court overruled the motion; and gave judgment, sustaining the execution.
    The defendant prosecuted this writ- of error.
    The case was argued by Mr. Key for the plaintiff in error.' No counsel appeared for the defendant.
    For the plaintiff in error it was contended, that the judgment of the Circuit Court was erroneous, because it did not appear on the record that a plea was filed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s declaration ; or that any issue was joined before the trial of the cause.
    2. No notice of the non-acceptance of the bill of exchange was charged in the declaration, nor proved at the trial.
    3. No judgment was given by-the Court on the demurrer of the defendant.
    ' 4.. The judgment of the Circuit Court sustaining the execution was erroneous.
    Mr. Key stated that the cause had been brought up, mainly, upon the motion to quash the execution; and the question was, whether the Court would sustain a writ of error- on that ground. He cited 4 Cranch, 324; 6 Cranch, 233, 235; 7 Wheat. 534; 8 Peters, 259. In the case before the Court, the execution was issued against-the property of a dead man. Thomas Evans died in 1837. A case was decided by .this Court which goes fully up to the question in this, case. Boyle vs. Zacharie and Turner, 6 Peters, 648.
   Mv. Justice Catron

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The- principal matters appearing -in the record are not now open to-investigation, being the same adjudged of by this Court-in 1837; the report of which is found in 11 Peters, 81.

Theoriginal judgment against Thomas Evans was rendered atMay term, 1836." No execution seems-to have issued until 16th March, 1S38, when one was taken out bearing teste the s.econd Monday of October, 1837, and returnable the second Monday of April, 1838.

Nothing appears in the record showing that Thomas Evans was dead, save an affidavit of one of his sons, and the circumstance that the administrator’s name is used in prosecuting the writ of error: but no suggestion of the death of Thomas Evans, nor any revival of the judgment against his administrator, is found.

The .execution was levied on sundry slaves, and a bond given for their delivery, which recites that the execution, in virtue of which the levy was made, bore teste at.May term, 1S36; and to this date the writ may have had relation, by the laws of Alabama, and the' facts of the case.

One of the sons of Thomas Evans made an affidavit, stating his father to have died on the 12th day of September, 1837, on which' the motion to quash the execution and delivery bond was founded. The motion was refused; but for what particular reason, does not' appear; nor does this Court feel itself authorized to inquire. It is the settled doctrine here, that a writ of error, does not lie upon the refusal of a motion to quash-an execution: such record of refusal not being a final judgment in the sense of the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act. We will content ourselves by referring to the opinion of the Court in the cause of Boyle vs. Zacharie and Turner, 6 Peters, 654. It is therefore ordered, that the writ of error be dismissed, and the supersedeas discharged.

This cause came on tó be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court, that this writ of error .be, and the same is hereby, dismissed with costs; and that this causé be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to proceed therein according to law and justice.


author: Mr. Justice M‘Lean Mr. Chief Justice Taney. Mr, Justice Catkon.

text:
    Lessee of Margaret Lattimer and others, Plaintiffs in error, vs. William Poteet, Defendant in error.
    ■Ejectment for forty-niné thousand acres óf iand in the state' of North Carolina, claimed by the plaintiffs under a grant from the state, dated 20th. July, 1796, to'William Cathcart, founded on entries made in the 'office of the entry taker, in the county of Buncombe, in the state .of North Carolina, made after the 3d of February, 1795, within the limits of the county. The land lay wholly within the limits of the territory specially , described and set forth in the fifth section of the act of 1783, entitled an act for opening the land office of,the state of North Carolina. -The claim of the plaintiffs, in the eject- . ment was resisted on the. ground that the grant Under which the-plaintiffs claimed, was, at the time of its emanation, wholly within the territory allotted to the Cherokee Indians, and was null and void; as such entries and grants were prohibited by the sixth section of the act. It was held that the title under which the plaintiffs claim was invalid.
    Construction of the treaties with the Cherokee Indians, relative to lands within the boundary; an<l of the acts -of the. legislature of the state of North Corolina, relative to the occupation and entry of lands within the Indian boundary.'
    I; will not be denied that the parties to a treaty are competent to determine any dispur • respecting its limits. In no mode .can a controversy of this nature be as satisfactorily determined.- as by the contracting parties. If their language .in the .treaty shall be wholly indefinite, or the natural objects called for are uncertain or contradictory, there is no power but that ¡which formed the treaty which can remedy such defects.
    It is á sound principle of law, and applies to the treaty-making power of the government of the United States, whether exercised with a foreign nation or an Indian tribe, that all questions of boundary may be settled by the parties to the treaty: and to the-exercise of that high function of the government within its constitutional powers, neither the rights of a state, or gf art individual can be interposed.
    The Indian title being a right bf occupancy, the state of North Carolina had the power to grant the fee in those lands subject to this right.
    IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for. the District of North Carolina.
    This case was argued at January term, 1839, by Mr. Coxe for the plaintiffs in error; and by Mr. Webster for the defendant.. It was held under advisement until this term.
    •The case is fully stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Mr. Justice M‘Lean

delivered the opinion.

This case comes before the Court on a writ-of error to the Circuit Court of North Carolina.

The" lessors of the plaintiff brought -tjiéir action of ejectment, to recover the possession of forty-nine thousand nine hundred and twenty acres of land, in Haywood county, and described in the declaration by metes and bounds. On the trial, certain exceptions were taken 'by the plaintiff to the rulings of the Court; and the verdict being not guilty, a judgment in favour of the' defendant was entered. To revise this judgment, this writ of error is prosecuted.

The lessors of the plaintiff, to sustain their act'oji, .offered in evidence a grant from North Carolina to William Cat' cart, for the land described in the declaration, dated the 30th July, 1796, ahd founded on entries made' in the entry-taker’s office, of the county of Buncombe, in said state, in the year 1795, within, the limits of said county. It was admitted that the title, if any, had descended to the lessors of the plaintiff, and that, at the commencement of the action, the defendant was in possession; and also, that the land was within the limits of the territory described in the fifth section of the act of North Carolina, 1783, entitled an act for opening the land office for the redemption of specie and other certificátes, &c. And the great questions arising out of the instructions are, whether, at the dates of the entry and grant, the land was within the Indian country; and if it was, whether the entry and grant were void.

The limits of the Indian country, within the state of North Carolina, were established by treaties made between the United. States and the Cherokee tribe of Indians.

The first treaty was concluded' at Hopewell, the 20th November, 17£S5. The fourth article of this treaty declared, “that the boundary allotted to the Cherokees for their hunting grounds, between the said Indians and the citizens of the United States, &c., shall begin at the mohth of Duck river, on the Tennesseé; thence running northeast to the ridge dividing' the waters running into Cumberland from those running into the.Tennesseé, thénce easterly along, the said ridge to a northeast line, to be run, which shall strike the river Cumberland forty miles above Nashville; thence along the said line to the river; thence up the said river to the ford where the Kentucky road crosses the fiver thence to Campbell’s line, near Cumberland Gap; thence to the mouth of Cloud’s creek on Holston, thence to the Chimney-top mountain ; thence to Camp creek near the mouth of Big Limestone on Nalichuchey; thence a southerly course six miles to a mountain; thence south to the North Carolina line; thence to the South Carolina Indian boundary; and along the same southwest over the top of the Occunna mountain,, till it shall strike Túgalo river; thence a direct line to the top of the Currahee mountain.; thence to the head of the south fork of the Occunna river.”

The treaty of Holston, which was concluded the 2d July, 1791, altered the limits, as established by the Hopewell treaty, and declared that “the line should begin at the top of the Currahee mountain, where the creek line passes it; thence a direct line to Túgalo river; thence northeast to the Occunna mountain, and over the same along the South Carolina Indian boundary to the' North Carolina' boundary; thence north to a point from which á line is to be extended to the river Clinch, that shall pass the Holston at.the ridge which divides • the waters running into Little river from those running into the Tennessee; thence up the river Clinch to Campbell’s line, and along the same to the top of Cumberland mountain; thence a direct line to the- Cumberland riyer, where the Kentucky road crosses it; thence down the Cumberland river to-a point from which a southwest line will strike .the ridge which divides the waters of Cumberland from those of Duck river, forty miles above Nashville; thence down the said ridge to a point from whence' a southwest line will strike the mouth of Duck river.”

“.And in order to preclude forever all disputes relative to the said boundary, the same shall be ascertained and marked plainly, by three persons appointed on the part of the United States, and three Cherokees on the part of their nation.”

Another treaty was made with the Cherokées, at Philadelphia, the 26th June, 1794, in which it was stated that the treaty of Holston had not been fully carried into effect; and in the second article it was “stipulated that the boundaries mentioned in the fourth article of the said treaty shall be actually ascertained and marked in the manner prescribed by the said article, whenever the Cherokee nation, shall have ninety days’ notice of the time and place at which the commissioners of the United States intend to commence their operation.”

The whole extent of the line designated by this treaty, never appears to have been run and marked. Some parts of it were not run, because .the country through which it passed was mountainous and uninhabitable. On the 7th October, 1792, (1 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 630,) Governor Blount having given the notice to the Cherokees required, by the treaty, under the directions of the Secretary of War, instructed David Campbell, Charles M‘Clung, and John M‘Kee, commissioners for extending the line between the United States and the Cherokees, according to the treaty of Holston, to meet the next day at Major Craig’s,’on'Nine Mile creek, to extend the line. And they were instructed in case the commissioners appeared on the part of the Indians to run the line; but. if the Indians did not attend, they were required to examine where the ridge which divides the waters running into Little river from those running into the Tennessee, strikes the Holston; and extend the line from thence to Clinch river; and again from the ridge to the Chilhowee mountain, paying strict regard to the treaty.

In their report, the 30th November ensuing, the commissioners say, that “ the commissioners on the part of the Cherokees did not' attend; and we proceeded to examine with great attention for the ridge which divides the waters of the Tennessee from those of Little river, and tracing it, found it-a plain leading ridge, and-that it struck the Holston at the mouth; but, having heard it suggested-that the Indians had in.,contemplation, at the time the treaty was -made,a ridge which they'supposed would strike the Holston higher up, we'did hot content ourselves, but retraced the ridge, and examined well the South bank of the' Holston, and the result wás,- that we were perfectly convinced - that • the ridge which divides the waters of Tennessee and Little river, .strikes the Holston at. the mouth, and at'no other part.”

“We then proceeded to run, but not to mark, a line off experiment, from the point of the ridge in a southeast direction to the Chilhowee mountain, distance seventeen and a half miles, and ¿gain from thence to the Clinch, in a northwest direction, distance nine miles, and found that line, continued to the southeast, would intersect the Tennessee, shortly after it crossed the Chilhowee mountain, consequently take away all'the Indian towns lying along the south side of the Tennessee. This showed the necessity of turning the direction more to the east and west; and it is our opinion that a line extended from the point of the ridge aforesaid south sixty degrees east to Chilhowee mountain, ¿gain from the point north sixty degrees west, will form the true line from Chilhowee mountain to Clinch, between the United States and the Cherokees, according to the treaty of Holston. The more fully to elucidate this report, we present you with a map, which we believe' is nearly correct, oh which both the lines are laid down.”

This line l'eft several white settlers within the Indian lands.

In transmitting this report to the War Department, Governor Blount remarks, “ As the geography of the country generally cannot be known to you, there being no correct map of it, I think it necessary to inform you that the country to the east or rather southeast of Chilhowee mountain, through which the line, reported -upon, if continued beyond it, will pass, for fifty or sixty miles is an entire bed or- ledge-after ledge of mountains, that is, until it intersects the line which is to be extended south from the north boundary of North Carolina, near which no settlements can be formed; hence' I conclude it will not be essential to extend it. That which the line reported on will intersect, if continued, meaning that which runs south from the north-boundary of North Carolina, I caused to be run, and marked about' sixty miles from the mouth of M‘Namee’s creek to Rutherford’s war trace, by Mr. Joseph Harden, in the course of last winter." Harden did not run north, as required by the treaty of. Holston, but south, according to the treaty of Hopewell.” The-writer then states certain parts of the line, which, in his opinion, .need not be run.

In a letter from-Governor Blount to the Secretary of War, (1 American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 629,) dated July. 15th, 1-791, in .reference to the treaty of Holston, concluded the 2d of the same month, says, “According to my instructions, I proposed that thefidge dividing' the waters of Tennessee frota those of Little river, should form a part of the boundary; but the- Indians would not agree-to it, but insisted on a'straight line which should cross the Holston where that ridge should strike it-; and were so firmly fixed in their determination, that I could not prevail on them to agree to any other.” And in another letter from Governor Blount to the Secretary, (same page,) dated 2d March 1792, he says, “I can’t help remarking, that I proposed at the treaty that, the ridge should be the line. You will recollect that I was so instructed; and the chiefs were unanimously opposed to it, saying it should be a straight line; and that it was an evidence that my heart was not straight that I wanted a crooked line. The difficulty will bean running the line to ascertain where the ridge that divides the watefs of Little river and Tennessee .will strike the Holston; for, it seems, the white people cannot agree upon it — a circumstance unknown tó me at the time the Indians proposed it; hut’from the best information lean obtain, l am induced to believe it will prove tó be lower down than they-expected; and, in that Case, it is my opinion that the words of the treaty ought not to 'be. so strictly adhered to as to give them any great degree of dissatisfaction.”' ; In his answer of 22d April, 1792, the Secretary of War says, “I am' commanded by the President of the United States, to whom your lettérs are constantly submitted, to say, with respect to your remarks upon the line at Little river, that you will be pleased to make a liberal construction of that ■ article, so as to render it entirely satisfactory to the Indians, and at the same time as consistently as may be with the treaty.”

On the 2d October, 179.8,. the treaty of Tellico was entered into, which contained the following preamble: “Whereas the treaty made and concluded on Holston river, on the 2d of July, 1791, between the United States and f Cherokee nation of Indians, had-not been carried into execution for some time thereafter, by reason. Of sorne misunderstanding which had arisen; and whereas, in order to remove such misunderstanding, and to provide for carrying the said treaty into effect, and for re-establishing more fully the peace and friendship between the parties, another treaty was held, made and concluded, by and between them, at Philadelphia, the 26th o.f June, 1794; in which, among other things, it was stipulated that the boundaries mentioned in thó fourth article of'the ,said treaty of Holston should be actually ascertained and marked, in the manner prescribed by the' said, article, whenever the Cherokee nation should have ninety days’ notice of the time and place at which the commissioners of the United States intended to commence their operations: and whereas further delays in carrying the said fourth article into complete effect did take place, sp that-the boundaries, mentioned and described were not regularly ascertained and marked until the latter part.of the year 17.97; before which time, and for want of knowing the direct course of said boundary, divers settlements were made by 'citizens of the United States upon the Indian lands, over and beyond the boundaries so mentioned and described in- the said article,, and contrary to the intention of the said treaties; but which settlers were removed- from the said Indian lands, by authority of the United States, as soon after the boundaries had been so'lawfully ascertained and marked as the nature-of'the case had admitted.”

The fourth article declares, “ In acknowledgment for the protection of the-United States, and -for the considerations • hereafter expressed and contained, the Cherokee nation agrees,'and does hereby relinquish and. cede to the United States, all the-lands-within the following points and lines, viz. from a point on-the Tennessee river, below Tellico blockhouse, called the Wildcat Rock, in a direct line to. the Militift Spring, near-the Maryville road leading from Tellico. From’the said spring to the Chilhowee mountain, by- a line so to be run as will leave all the farms on Nine-mile creek to the northward •ind eastward of it; and to be continued along Chilhowee mountain until it strikes Hawkins’ line. . Thence along the sard line to the Great Iron mountain; and from the' top of which a line to be continued in a southeasterly course to where thelmost southerly branch of the Little river crosses the. divisional line to Túgalo,river; and from the place of beginning, at the Wildcat Rock, down to the northeast margin of the Tennessee river, (not including islands,) to a point' or place one mile above the junction of that river with the Clinch; and'from thence by a line to be drawn, in a right angle, until it intersects Hawkins’ line leading from Clinch. Thence down the said line to the river Clinch; thence up the said river to its junction with Emmery’s river; and thence up Emmery’s river to the foot of Cumberland mountain, &c.”

The 5th article provided that this line should be run and marked under the superintendence of commissioners,appointed by both parties.; and that maps should be piade, one of which was to be deposited in the War Office.

The Indian boundary established by the treaty of Holston calls for certain lines and natural objects, which, it would seem, give as much certainty to a boundary as could well be given, short of a marked line or water course.

■It was to begin at the top ,of the Currahee mountain, where the Créek.liñe passes it. This mountain is in the state of Georgia, and is designated on the maps of that state; and “.where the Creek line passes it,” is easily ascertained. From this point the line was to run direct to Túgalo river, an object well known, and marked , on the maps; thence north-east to the Occunna mountain, and over-, the the same along the South Carolina Indian boundary, to the North Carolina boundary. This mountain is designated on the, map, and the boundaries called for, being established, were known.- From the North Carolina southern boundary, the line was to run north to a point, from which a line is to be extended to the river Clinch, that shall passlthe Holston at the ridge'which divides the waters running into Little river from those running into the Tennessee.

The point at which the line shall.strike the Holston, at the ridge,. not being certain, gave rise to some controversy shortly after the date of the treaty. The commissioners appointed to run the line in 1792, found that by tracing the ridge, it led to the junction of the Holston and Tern, nessee rivers; and consequently, if the termination of the ridge was the place, within the meaning of the treaty, where the line should cross, it must cross the Holston at its mouth. But that this was not the construction given to the treaty by the parties to.it is clear, from the letters of Governor Blount, who negotiated it,-to the Secretary of War. The same day the treaty was concluded, he writes: ,1 have concluded a treaty which includes all the white settlers, except those south of the ridge dividing the waters of. Little river from those of Tennessee. And again, July 15th, 1791., he says, “I proposed that the ridge dividing the waters of Tennessee from those-of Little river should form a part of the boundary; but the Indians Vould not agree to it; and were so-firmly fixed in their determination, that I could not prevail on them to agree to any other. - This line is not so limited, as to the point at which it shall leave the north line, or at which it shall strike the Clinch, but that it may be so-run as either to include or leave out the settlers soqth of the ridge; the only stipulations respecting it'are, that it shall cross the Holston at the ridge.” And again, in a letter of 2d March, 1792, “ I can’t help remarking, that I proposed at the treaty that the ridge, should be the line. You will' recollect .that I was .so instructed, and the chiefs were unaninously opposed to it, saying it should be a straight line.” And he says that “the ridge will strike the Holston lower down than was expected ; and, in that case, it is my opinion that the words of the treaty ought not to be so strictly adhered to, as to give them any great degree of dissatisfaction.” .In hi,s answer, the Secretary of War says, by command of the President, “ You will make a liberal construction of that article, so as to render it entirely satisfactory to the Indians.” The Indians remonstrated, and -required the white settlers south of the ridge to be removed.

In. the talk of the President, dated 27th. August,-1798, to the Cherokees, which was sent to them preparatory tó the treaty of Tellico, .he says, if was expected that the Holston treaty line would have included .a great proportion of the frontier white settlers, but it proved otherwise when the line was run. The words, “ shall pass'the Holston at the ridge which divides the watersyrunnihg into Little river, from those running into .the Tennessee,” do not necessarily imply that the line shall cross the Holston at the point where the ridge terminates. Little river .falls into the Holstqn, and the general course of the ridge would strike the Holston some distance above its mouth. And when we consider that the Indians refused to make, the ridge the bouftdary, and would agree to no other than a straight line; and thatmeither jiarty seems to have considered the place of crossing at the mouth of the Holston,-we think, in the language of the.President, through the Secretary of War, “ that a liberal construction of this clause of the treaty should be' given.”

But it is unnecessary to consider the correspondence of Governor Blount, the -report of the commissioners of 1792, or the words of this article of the treaty, with the view to give to it a satisfactory construction'; as the parties in the treaty near Tellico have given to it a practical construction.

In this treaty, the parties say, that for certain causes enumerated, the boundaries mentioned and described in the fourth article of the treaty b.f Holston, “ were not regularly ascertained and marked until the latter part of the year 1797.”

The second article provides, that the treaties subsisting between the present contracting parties, are acknowledged tudre of full and operating force; together with the construction $nd usage under their respective articles, and so to continue. And i|n the third article it is declared, that the limits and boundaries of the Cherokee nation, as stipulated and marked by the existing treaties between the parties, shall be and remain the same, where not altered by the present treaty.

The object of the government in entering into this treaty was, to purchase the Indian territory, into which white settlers had intruded, at apd hear Nine Mile creek, and perhaps at other places. The line established was run and marked, and we have the original map, or a copy of the survey, before us, which was returned to the War Department.

That this purchase was of territory not included in the boundaries of the Holston treaty, will not be disputed. And, from the language of the third article, it is clear, that the parties did not intend to establish an entirely new boundary, but to make such alterations of the Holston boundary as should secure the object of the United States.

The land lying southwest of the Holston boundary belonged to the Indians ; and it was. a part of this land that was purchased by the treaty of Tellico. Of course', this purchase extended from the Holston treaty line southerly. For no one can suppose that a strip of Indian land would be left between the treaty lines of Holston' and Tellico.' The.facts go clearly to show, that the Tellico purchase was up to the Holston line, and that the part of that line to which the'purchase did not extend, was designated; and the point where the Tellico line varied from it, so as to include the lands purchased, is marked on the map. And ibis shows the propriety of the language used in the third article of the Tellico treaty; that" “the boundaries should remain the same as established by existing treaties, where not altered by the present treaty.”

The line of this treaty was to begin “at the Wildcat Rock, in a direct line to the Militia Spring, near the Maryville road, leading from Tellico. From the said spring to the' Chilhowee mountain, by a line so to be run as will leave all the farms on Nine Mile creek to the northward and eastward of it; and to be continued along Chilhowee mountain until it strikes Hawkins’ line.” This line is laid down on-the map, and although it is not called the southern boundary, of the Holston treaty, yet it'is recognised as the northern boundary of the territory purchased; and consequently must be the Holston boundary. Hawkins’ line extends from Clinch, crossing the Holston some miles above its mouth, and runs between the waters of Little river and those of the Tennessee, as appears from the map, and continues until it reaches the summit of the Great Iron mountain. At this point a monument is erected; but if the line were extended beyond this easterly, it was not, probably, marked; and it is not laid down on the plat. It is probable that the original survey ? of this line was destroyed when the War Office was burnt, in'1800.

From the Wildcat Rock, the Tellico treaty calls “ to run down the northeast margin of the Tennessee river, to a point' or place one mile above the junction of that river with the Clinch; and from thence by a line to be drawn in a right angle until it intersects Hawkins’ line leading from Clinch.” Here is another recognition of this line as the northern boundary of the Indian lands; and consequently, the line established by the Holstoh -treaty.

And the Tellico treaty calls again, after striking Hawkins’ line, by running near Nine Mile creek, and along Chilhowee mountain, to run with it to the top of the Great Iron mountain; From this point the new treaty line varies from a direct course, and continues “southeasterly to where the most southeasterly branch of Little river crosses the divisional line to Túgalo river.”

It is only necessary to compare the course.and objects here designated with the southeastern'calls of the Holston treaty lirje, to see bat the Tellico line includes a large tract of country not included by the Holston line. The Holston line, after striking the Túgalo river, runs northeast to the Occunna mountain, and over.the same along the South Carolina Indian boundary, continuing a; northeasterly direction, until it strikes,the North Carolina boundary; thence north .to a point which shall intersect a line to be extended from the river Clinch, that shall pass the Holston at the ridge.

The Tellico line, runs southeasterly, until it strikes the divisional line to Túgalo riven The Holston line calls to riin along this divisional line, northeasterly; so thát from this point these linesdivergé until the' Holston line shall reach the point of connection with the line drawn-from the Clinch.

These boundaries, from the point of intersection on the top of the Great Iron mountain to the point of intersection,on the South Carolina Indian: boundary, include a large tract of country. And this tract, with the one designated by - Hawkins’ line, the Tennessee Nine Mile creek, and the Clinch, &c., constituted the territory purchased by the Tellico treaty.

This recognition of Hawkins’line as the Indian boundary, was in 1798, only eight years after the boundary was established by the treaty of Holstom and one year after the line is declared to have been-fun and marked. The facts in regard to this line were recent, and of course fresh in the recollection of the contracting parties. It was a matter about which they could riot be mistaken. They say'the Holston line was not run arid’ marked until the latter part of the year 17.97, and the United States purchase the Indian lands i|p to Hawkins? line. It is true, this line is not in terms said to be the boundary established by the Holston treaty, .but in the most solemn form it is recognised to be the boundary of the Indian! lands, by purchasing those lands tip to it; and by tracing it as the boundary, beyond-the purchase on Nine Mile creek, to the top of the Great Iron mountain. It could then be no. other than the Holston treaty line, .for in that part of the country there was no other Indian boundary before the treaty of Tellico.

Whatever doubt may have existed as to Hawkins’ line-being the true Indian boundary, independently of this treaty; there would seem to be no ground for doubt under the recognitions. ofl that line in this treaty.

. It is contended that the Holston line should run Rom the Clinch, crossing the Holston river at its mouth, and- continue on in the same direction, until it shall strike the North Carolina boundary.

This would not only disregard the solemn acts and recognitions óf the parties to the Holston. treaty, in forming-the treaty of Tellico .; ,but it would also disregard the language of - the'former treaty. It calls for ajine running north, from North Carolina. boundary, to á point that, shall intersect a line drawn from- the Clinch, crossing the Holston-at the ridge. This call to run north, by this construct-iota, is wholly disregarded. • And on what ground is this construction 'attempted'to b'e maintained?

The' answer must be, simply on the call for the line to cross the Holston river .at the ridge. A call in itself somewhat indefinite, and which was never construed, by the Indians to mean the; mouth of-the Holston: nor was such a construction insisted on by the United States, either, at the time the-treaty was concluded or afterytards.

The HopeWell treaty line, in running a southerly course, strikes the northern boundary of North Carolina, near .Nalichuchey, and extends south to the North Carolina line, and thence to the South Carolina Indian boundary..

. From a point in the Hopewell line, near where it strikes the 'southern boundary of North Carolina, a fine seems to have been run by General Pickens,, north seventy-six west to'the state road leading from Ashville to Clayton, in .Georgia. . But this line has no connection -with any other, and does not appear, to have been regarded, either .by the United States, or the Indians, as any part of the line established 'by the Holston treaty. It was certainly not run agreeably to the treaty.

The .evidence establishes very satisfactorily,-that Hawkins’ line, so far as it goes, is the boundary of 'the Holston treaty; and it is very dear, from the language of the treaty, that from the Clinch, crossing the Holston' river at the ridge to the point at Which this line will intersect a line, run north from the southern boundary of North Carolina, a straight line was intended. Of this.no doubt can exist; aud it is only necessary to extend Hawkins’ line from the top of the Great Iron mountain eastward to the point where it shall intersect aline run north from. the .place where the South Carolina Indian boundary strikes the -southern boundary of North Carolina. This, we feel authorized to say, from the evidence before.us, constitutes the boundary of the Holston' treaty.,

It is argued; that it was not in the power of the United .States and the Cherokee nation, by the treaty of Tellico in 1798* to vary in any degree the treaty .line of Holston; so as to affect private rights, or the rights of North Carolina.

The answer to this is, that the Tellico treaty does,not purport to alter the boundary of the Holston treaty, but by the acts’ of the parties, this boundary , is recognised; Not that a new boundary was.substituted, but that the old one was substantially designated.,

Will any one deny that the parties to the treaty aré competent to determine any dispute respecting, its limits. In what mode can . a controversy of this nature be so satisfactorily determined as by the contracting parties. If their language. in the treaty be wholly indefinite, or the natural objects called- for are uncertain or contradictory, there is no. powér but that which formed the treaty which can remedy such defects. And it is a sound principle of national law, and applies to the treaty-malting power of this government, whether exercised with a foreign nation or' an Indian tribe, that all questions of disputed boundaries may-be settled by the parties to the treaty. And to the exercise of these high 'functions by the ' government, within its constitutional powers, neither the rights of a state nor those of an individual can be interposed. We think it was in the due exercise of the powers of the executive and the Cherokee nation, in concluding the treaty of Tellico, to recognise in terms, or by acts, the boundary of the Holston treaty.

It is agreed, that if Hawkins’ line shall be extended as the Holston treaty line, the land in controversy lies within the Indian country. And we are now to consider whether, in this view,- the entry and patent are void. . The Indian- title being only a right of occupancy, the state of North Carolina had the power to grant the fee in the lands, subject to this right. The land was entered in 1795, and patented the 20th July, 1796.

By the fifth section of the act of North Carolina, for opening the-land office for the redemption of specie and other certificates, and discharging the - arrears due to the army, passed in 1783, it is provided, “That the Cherokee Indians shall enjoy all,the lands lying within certain bounds, forever.” And the sixth section provides, “That no person shall enter and survey any lands within the bounds set apart for the said.Cherokee Indians, under the penalty of fifty pounds specie for every such entry so made, to be recovered in any Court of law in this state, &c.; and all such entries and grants thereupon, if any should be made, shall be utterly void.”

In 1784, (North Carolina Laws, 482, ch. 14,) the above act was amended, by authorising the appointment of three surveyors, viz.: “ One. to survey those lands. that lie between the bounds hereafter described for the surveyor of Green county, and Cumberland mountain; one to survey the lands that lie between the Cumberland mountain and the river Tennessee; and one to survey the lands that lie between the Tennessee and the Mississippi river.”

The boundaries here described cover the land reserved by the act of 1783, for the Cherokee Indians; but there is n.o express repeal of the fifth and sixth sections of that act; and as the act of 1784 can operate upon lands not reserved in the above sections, they cannot be held to have been repealed by implication. The Supreme Court of North Carolina- has decided in several cases, that the above sections remained in force; and that the entries and grants made for lands within the territory described, before the Indian title was extinguished, were void. 1 Murphy, 162, 164. Con. Rep. 434. 2 N. Carolina Law Repository, 451. 3 Hawks. 163.

.We come now to examine the exceptions of the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court; and having considered and decided the controverted points, it will not be necessary to examine the exceptions in detail.

The first exception was to the refusal of the Court to instruct the jury that the sixth section in the above act of 1783, had been repealed: and we think the Court did not’err in refusing to give the instruction.

The second instruction asked was, “ that the' treaty line of Holston ought to run with the South Carolina Indian boundary, called for in the treaty of Hopewell, made on the 28th of November, 1786, until it should reach the termination of the line described in that treaty, running from the North Carolina boundary to the South Carolina Indian boundary; and on reaching that line, should then run with the same reversed to the North Carolina boundarywhich instruction was not given.

Some doubt arises from the structure of this instruction, whether the reversed line referred to is the Hopewell treaty line, or the South Carolina Indian boundary. From the maps, the latter line strikes the southern boundary of North-Carolina, and from the language of the Holston treaty, this fact seems to have been within the knowledge of the parties. The call is to run along the South Carolina Indian boundary, to the North'Carolina boundary.”

In the Hopewell treaty line, the southern boundary of North Carolina is not named, but the northern; from which the line runs to the South Carolina Indian boundary. Now the instruction must have referred to the southern boundary of North Carolina; and if the Indian boun'dary strikes this line, it is difficult to perceive what application to the facts the instruction would have.- But if the instruction referred to the Hopewell treaty line, it was not called for in the Holstoif treaty; and under the circumstances of the case, we are not prepared to say that there was error in refusing to give the instruction.

And we think there was no error in refusing to give the third, fourth, and fifth instructions prayed by the plaintiffs’ counsel.' Nor do we perceive any error of which the plaintiffs can complain, in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth instructions given by the Circuit Court, on the prayer of the defendant.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney.

I agree with the majority of the Court in affirming these judgments ; but I dissent from some qf- the principles upon which they have founded their opinion.

The Court (as I understand the opinion) consider Hawkins’ line to be the- established boundary line of the treaty of Holston; they think, it is recognised as such-dn the subsequent treaty of Tellico; and that being thus recognised by the political department of the government, the Court (according to;the principles deduced in Garcia vs. Lee and Foster, and Elam vs. Nielson) must also regard it as the true boundary line; and must treat it as such from the date of the treaty of Holston, in any question of property that may come before them.

If the legislative or executive departments of the government, by any clear and unequivocal act, had. declared Hawkins’ line tó be the true line of. the treaty of Holston, I should concur with the majority of this Court. But .I do not find any act of that description-by any ■ department of the government. In the cases of Foster and Elam vs. Neilson, and of Garcia vs. Lee; an act of Congress' had been passed describing particularly the boundary line-therein mentioned, and declaring it to be the true, .line of that treaty. But in this case we have no act of the legislative or executives' departments .of. the, government; recognising the line run by. Hawkins as the treaty line.' It is true that in the subsequent treaty'of Tellieo, the parties, in describing the boundaries of this new treaty, call, .upon two occasions, for Hawkins’ line, and upon both of them rtin some • distance with it. But there is no expression in /this treaty which recognises the line thus called for as the boundary line-of the treaty of Holston. It is mentioned and referred to merely as a known point,like other places called for in this treaty; and the lines spoken of, are run with, merely as known lines.. But so, far from declaring it to be the boundary line described in the treaty of. Holston, the. treaty of Tellieo does not even- say that it was rum by Hawkins as the boundary; nor .is it described as having any connexion whatever with the treaty of H.olston. It is called for as a line known in the country,, and which oh some occasion or other had been run by Hawkins; but- when run, or for what purpose, cannot be gathered from any expressions in the'treaty of Tellieo. We know, indeed, from public historical documents, that Hawkins’ line is one of the many efforts that-were made to fix a certain boundary between North Carolina and the Cherokee Indians, from the vague' and imperfect descriptions contained in the treaty of Holston. Other lines were run for this purpose besides that of Hawkins. And we have no evidence that Hawkins’ line, or any other line was ever acknowledged, either by the Cherokees or the United States, as the correct one, unless .the expressions in the treaty of Tellieo are deemed to be sufficient for that purpose. The treaty of Holston was made in 1791; the treaty, of Tellieo in 1798: and the last mentioned. treaty recites that delays had taken place in carrying the former into effect, so that the boundaries were not. regularly ascertained and marked, until the latter part of the year 1797. But the treaty of Tellieo gives no description of the marks or of the boundaries thus ascertained; nor does it state by whom the lines were run, or the boundaries ascertained and marked. I cannot think that this recital, and- the calls before mentioned for Hawkins’ lime, are sufficient of themselves to establish as a matter of law, that this line is the true boundary of the treaty of Holston; and I must dissent from that part of the opinion of the Court which holds that doctrine. At the trial of this case in the Circuit Court, the jury were instructed, “that the treaty of Tellieo is an admission by the parties that the line of the treaty of Holston has been ascertained and marked,'.and furnishes ■ strong evidence that the lands reserved to the Cherokees by the treatyof Tellieo were reserved by the treaty of Holston, but does not establish the lines of Pickens and Hawkins, if erroneous'in factN I concur entirely in this opinion of the Circuit Court,: and as I perceive nothing in the other instructions of that Court, as stated in the exception, of which the. plaintiff has a right to complain, I agree -with a majority of my brethren in affirming its judgment.

Mr. Justice Wayne dissented.

Mr, Justice Catkon.

1 think the treaty of Tellico did not settle the line of the treaty of Holston, from the Holston river to the top of the Iron mountain; and certainly not east of the Iron mountain. So that it must n,ow be extended in a direct course, and as .a unit, to the line of intersection, running north from the North Carolina line.

The land in controversy was granted before Hawkins’ line was run; and which was not marked in execution of the treaty of Holston ; no one pretends it was; the Indians were not present, which was indispensable, to give binding validity to the line.

To say it was conclusive on one of the contracting parties, the United States, and void as to the other, the Cherokees, at the time it was run and marked, would be a most harsh assumption in regard to those whd acquired titles before it was run;' admitting, that the contracting parties .had the power afterwards to_ settle its position, but, which they never saw proper tó do. The truth is, not open to question, that the Holston. treaty line never was ascertained southeast of the Iron mountain; . and with due deference to the opinion of others, I think not west-of it, in execution'of, and in conformity to, the treaty. Why Hawkins’ line was run, the history of our relations with the Cherokees does not with any distinctness show. From personal position, I, happen to- know, through those who lived at that date, and by reputation, that it was run to fix some line beyond which it was .intended the white population should not be permitted to obtrude, further than they had done at the;"time the line was marked, extending to a few settlers on Nine Mile eréek. But that Hawkins’ line was run as a conclusive boundary' in execution of the treaty of Holston, of .1791, or for any further purpose than to hold the whites .in check, for the sake of peace and convenience, it is impossible to affirm as a matter of history; and as such it must be affirmed, there not being any evidence in this cause.

I repeat: The land in controversy was granted before this line was run; Hawkins’ ceased running far west of where the land is situated; on the east a line was run and marked by Pickens, which, when marked, was as authentic as' that marked by Hawkins, for any thing we know; the object of each line no doubt was the same:, neither concluding the Cherokees previous to the treaty ofi Tellico; which treaty superseded the necessity of ascertaining and marking the true line' of the treaty of Holston, from the point east, from where Hawkins’ ceased running. Frond this point, (the top of the Irpn mountain,) it continues a line not fixed by the contracting parties; ana the United States and Cherokees-having, ceased to-have any interest in its ascertainment after the treaty of Tellico was made,North Carolina had the right to ascertain and settle it for herself,, according to some one construction of -the treaty of. 1791; and by which'her grantees should be bound; if so settled :,or, she may have recognised Pickens’ as the true line of the treaty; if so, I think the state and her grantees bound'by the recognition: so this Court held in Patterson vs. Jenks, 2 Peters, in a similar case;. and for. reasons manifestly just. Truly, Pickens’ line must be proved to’ be in conformity to some onp construction of the treaty; and that it is in conformity to the most favourable construction for North Carolina, there can be little doubt

To extend H'awkins’ line eastwardly as the true boundary of the treaty of Holston, will manifestly tend to disturb titles -made in reference- to another line;. -as it will (when extended) split Buncombe county, long settled, almost in the centre.

I do not, therefore, find myself capable- of concurring with the majority- of the Court in its extension.

Again: If , North-.Carolina has construed this treaty., and for herself settled this boundary, by her subsequent -acts manifesting her understanding of it, I should :not hesitate to adopt that construction, unless in violation.of the plain terms of the treaty: I use the.language holden- by this Court in Patterson vs. Jenks, 2 Peters, 231. But the misfortune is, the bill of exceptions sets forth not a single' fact; and the correctness of the instructions of the Court below cannot therefore be tested by the evidence given,on the trial; whether they are right or wrong, it is impossible for me to say; they may have been mere abstractions,, especially as to the main fact, whether or not North Carolina had-, by her acts fixed a boundary for herself, be it Pickens’ line or another. It follows, I feel bound' to concur with a majority of the Court, -in affirming the judgment, on the presumption that the instructions were proper.'

This, cause came on to be heard on the transcript pf the record from the Circuit Court of tiré United States'for the-District of North Carolina, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is how here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with cost's.