text:
    No. 70-6.
    Swarb et al. v. Lennox et al.,
   ante, p. 191. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-884.
    Chandler, U. S. District Judge v. O’Bryan,
   ante, p. 964. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    April 7, 1972
    No. 71-1050.
    Roberts, aka Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    April 11, 1972
    No. A-972 (71-982).
    Hall, Secretary of Human Relations Agency, et al. v. Villa et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay of judgment pending action on petition for writ of certiorari presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    April 17, 1972
    No. 71-940.
    Brusca et al. v. State Board of Education et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Mo.


text:
    No. 71-793.
    Anderson et al. v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 71-5974.
    Morris v. Georgia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6067.
    Diggs v. Benjamin Franklin University.
   Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6082.
    Rener v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-44.
    Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion to strike appellant's supplemental brief denied. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Stanley v. Illinois, ante, p. 645, and with due consideration for the completion of adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has apparently, lived with the adoptive family for the intervening period of time.


text:
    No. 71-9.
    Lung et al. v. Jones et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. M. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., ante, p. 538.


text:
    No. 70-123.
    Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Stanley v. Illinois, ante, p. 645.


text:
    No. 70-142.
    Garren et al. v. City of Winston-Salem.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., ante, p. 538.


text:
    No. 70-249.
    Tucker v. Maher et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., ante, p. 538.


author: Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 71-5580.
    Gonzales v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma yauyeris and certiorari granted. Judgment reversed and case remanded. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

concurring in the judgment.

A gas station attendant was shot to death during the course of a holdup in Dawson County, Texas, on a February night in 1956. Five years later the petitioner was arrested, tried, and convicted of the crime. The prosecution’s case against the petitioner rested almost totally upon the testimony of the county sheriff. The sheriff testified to the authenticity of a written confession that he said had been dictated and signed with an “X” by the petitioner. The witness insisted on cross-examination that, although the petitioner could not read or write, and had some difficulty speaking and understanding English, he had indeed dictated the rather complex confession and had understood what he was signing. Only one other witness, who corroborated a part of the sheriff’s testimony, connected the petitioner with the crime.

The county sheriff, however, played a dual role at the trial, for he was not only the key prosecution witness against the petitioner, but the bailiff of the jury as well. In the latter capacity, he was responsible for the care and protection of the jurors. He had, therefore, substantial and continuing contact with and authority over them during the entire course of the trial. On several occasions, he conducted them in and out of the courtroom on the instructions of the judge. Once, the judge even asked him to step down from the witness stand, where he was undergoing cross-examination, in order to retire the jury. In his role as bailiff, the sheriff walked with the jurors to a local restaurant for lunch, conversing with them on the way. At the restaurant, he ate with them in a private room, where the conversations continued. Late in the afternoon, while the jurors were deliberating in the case that turned so largely on their assessment of .the sheriff’s credibility, they asked the sheriff, as bailiff, to bring them soft drinks in the jury room, which he did.

The petitioner has now sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the sheriff’s dual role as key prosecution witness and jury bailiff and his substantial association with the jurors during the trial infringed the petitioner’s right to due process of law under the doctrine of Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466. In Turner, two deputy sheriffs served identical dual roles as prosecution witnesses and jury custodians, testifying as to the circumstances of the defendant’s confession while shepherding the jurors through a three-day trial. During the trial, the jury was sequestered and was in “close and continual association” with the deputies. Id., at 468. “The deputies ate with them, conversed with them, and did errands for them.” Ibid. This Court held that the prejudice inherent in that situation violated the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.

After the evidentiary hearing in the present case, the District Court denied the petitioner’s habeas corpus application. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. 445 F. 2d 1202. Both courts held that the particular facts of the petitioner’s case distinguished it from Turner, since the association of the key prosecution witness with the jurors as their custodian during the petitioner’s one-day trial was somewhat less extensive and somewhat less intense than the association of the deputy sheriffs with the sequestered jury during the three-day trial in Turner.

Turner, of course, did not set down a rigid, per se rule automatically requiring the reversal of any conviction whenever any Government witness comes into any contact with the jury. The Court’s opinion specifically indicated that association with the jury by a witness whose testimony was “confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution” would hardly present a constitutional problem.. Id., at 473. And it indicated that- a mere “brief encounter,” by chance, with the jury would not generally contravene due process principles. Ibid. For, as pointed out in dissent today, certain chance contacts between witnesses and jury members, while passing in the hall or crowded together in an elevator, are often inevitable.

But the Court in Turner was not dealing with just any prosecution witness coming into any contact with the jury. Rather, it was dealing with crucial witnesses against the defendant who associated with the jurors as their official guardians throughout the trial. Turner established the simple principle that association of that particular sort cannot be permitted if criminal defendants are to be afforded due process of law.

At the heart of our holding in Turner lay a recognition of the great prejudice inherent in the dual role of jury bailiff and key prosecution witness:

“It would have undermined the basic guarantees of trial by jury to permit this kind of an association between the jurors and two key prosecution witnesses who were not deputy sheriffs. But the role that Simmons and Rispone played as deputies made the association even more prejudicial. For the relationship was one which could not but foster the jurors’ confidence in those who were their official guardians during the entire period of the trial.” Id., at 474.

Our adversary system of criminal justice demands that the respective roles of prosecution and defense and the neutral role of the court be kept separate and distinct in a criminal trial. When a key witness against a defendant doubles as the officer of the court specifically charged with the care and protection of the jurors, associating with them on both a personal and an official basis while simultaneously testifying for the prosecution, the adversary system of justice is perverted.

Naturally, the extent and intensity of a bailiff’s association with a jury will vary from case to case. But, in the petitioner’s case, I cannot say that it was by any means de minimis. Although the trial lasted only one day and the jury was not sequestered with the county sheriff, the association between the jurors and the witness-bailiff was an extended one, and the duality of the witness-bailiff’s roles was inevitably driven home to the jury. And, although the witness-bailiff may not have spoken to the jurors about the case itself outside the courtroom, Turner makes clear that even if he “never did discuss the case directly with any members of the jury, it would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this association throughout the trial between the jurors and [this] key witness for the prosecution.” 379 U. S., at 473. It is enough to bring the petitioner’s case within the four corners of Turner that the key witness for the prosecution also served as the guardian of the jury, associating extensively with the jurors during the trial.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

whom Mr. Justice White joins,

dissenting.

In order to reverse summarily the state court conviction of a confessed murderer, the majority in this case chooses to convert a salutary principle into a rigid rule unjustified by considerations of constitutional policy or fairness. I must respectfully dissent.

Petitioner Rudy Gonzales was convicted of murder after a trial by jury in the District Court of Dawson County, Texas. The case was not a complicated one. The State’s evidence consisted primarily of petitioner’s signed and witnessed confession, admitting his complicity in an armed robbery and murder of the proprietor of a local service station. The evidence showed that the police had warned petitioner of his rights before he made this confession, and there is no suggestion that the statement was in any way coerced.

In cross-examining the sheriff who obtained the confession, petitioner’s counsel questioned whether petitioner’s command of the English language had been sufficient for him to understand what occurred at the time of the confession. The sheriff responded that while petitioner had not spoken perfect English, he had been able to comprehend and answer sensibly all the sheriff’s questions. The defense presented no evidence to the jury, which found petitioner guilty within 10 minutes after the close of the case.

Petitioner’s sole claim to habeas relief is that he was deprived of due process of law because the sheriff of Dawson County at that time also served as bailiff of the jury. In order to sustain this claim, petitioner seeks to have this Court extend the doctrine of Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965).

In Turner, two deputy sheriffs who testified as to the circumstances of the defendant’s confession served as jury bailiffs throughout the three-day trial. During this period the jury was sequestered and was in “close and continual association” with the deputies. Id., at 468. “The deputies ate with them, conversed with them, and did errands for them.” Ibid. Defendant’s counsel repeatedly argued against this practice at trial, but the trial judge refused to halt the deputy sheriffs’ association with the jury. Under such circumstances, this Court found a denial of due process and reversed the convictions.

Turner did not, however, establish a rigid, per se rule automatically requiring the reversal of any conviction whenever a Government witness comes into contact with the jury. Indeed, certain chance contacts between witnesses and jury members — while passing in the hall or crowded together in an elevator — may be inevitable. Although such contacts may be undesirable, as Judge Learned Hand stated, “when it appears with certainty that no harm has been done, it would be the merest pedantry to insist upon procedural regularity.” United States v. Compagna, 146 F. 2d 524, 528 (CA2 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 867 (1945).

The Court in Turner recognized that there is a continuum of potential prejudice resulting from different types of contacts. It emphasized that the case before it dealt “not with a brief encounter, but with a continuous and intimate association throughout a three-day trial.” 379 U. S., at 473. The Court granted relief only after analyzing the specific factors that might have resulted in prejudice to the defendant.

In the instant case it is undisputed that the sheriff never discussed the case with any member of the jury. As bailiff he escorted the jury to the jury room on several occasions. After the jury had found petitioner guilty and while it was considering the penalty, the sheriff responded to- the jury’s request for some soft drinks. This contact with the jury consisted solely of the sheriff walking into the room, placing the bottles on the table, and immediately leaving the room. There was no conversation beyond an exchange of formal pleasantries. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the sheriff accompanied the jury to lunch.

As Turner noted, under certain circumstances a series of such informal contacts between witness and jury can be prejudicial. A jury member is more likely to question the credibility of an unknown Government witness than that of a person whom he has come to know and like after extended association. But in the present case the sheriff’s contacts with the jury were far less prejudicial than in Turner. First, viewed quantitatively, the amount of contact involved here appears closer to a “brief encounter” than to the “continuous and intimate association” emphasized there, where the jury was sequestered with those witnesses for three days. Secondly, it is important to note that this is not a case where jurors became personally acquainted with the sheriff because of his role as bailiff. Indeed, prior to the trial which took place in Lamesa, Texas, a town of only about 13,000 people, the sheriff knew personally every single member of the jury. I find it impossible to conclude on this record that the sheriff’s casual lunchtime conversation with people he already knew deprived petitioner of his constitutional rights.

By applying the Turner principle to the facts of this case, the Court converts Turner’s, pragmatic approach into an almost insurmountable per se rule. Yet, this case decisively demonstrates the error of following such a quasi-legislative approach. After the decision in Turner, the Texas Legislature passed a statute forbidding a Government witness to serve as bailiff. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 36.24. This statute had prospective application only, and thus did not affect Gonzales’ trial, which had taken place in 1961. In this manner the legislature was able to prevent a problem from arising in the future, without adopting a blunderbuss approach which would upset final convictions whose reliability and fairness could not reasonably be questioned. The legislators left to the courts the job of reviewing past cases, using the more practical, flexible Turner approach.

Applying this case-by-case approach, it is hard to discern any unfairness in Gonzales’ trial. Indeed, unlike Turner, Gonzales’ counsel never raised any objection at trial to the sheriff’s activities, although they were completely open and obvious. While this failure to object might not preclude petitioner’s raising the issue now, it does seem to indicate a recognition at the time by all concerned that there was not in fact any dangerous objectionable impropriety taking place.

Today’s ruling bids fair to swell the ever-mounting volume of constitutional litigation with which the courts of this country must deal. Turner’s reliance on Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), leaves open the inference that the gist of the claim of constitutional deprivation depends, not on the fact that the particular State’s witness was a custodian of the jury, but on the fact that the State presumably failed to insulate the jury from all contact with the State’s witnesses during the trial. Thus all of the unintended but virtually inevitable contacts between the State’s witnesses, prosecuting attorneys, and the jurors during trial recesses could become potential constitutional infirmities in a conviction. Today’s decision may well convert into Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claims many matters that have in the past been dealt with quite satisfactorily by the trial judge determining on a motion for mistrial whether or not there was prejudice. Cases dealing with the issue in the past do not suggest that juror-witness contacts automatically raise issues of constitutional dimension. See, e. g., Jordan v. United States, 133 U. S. App. D. C. 102, 408 F. 2d 1305 (1969); State v. Miles, 364 S. W. 2d 532 (Mo. 1963). See generally Annot., 9 A. L. R. 3d 1275 (1966).

After revealing the activities of the deputy sheriffs in Turner, 379 U. S., at 473, the Court stated that “it would be blinking reality” to ignore the inherent prejudice there. In my view, it is “blinking reality” to hold that petitioner here was denied a substantial constitutional right at the trial of his case. The Court having determined that this matter should be treated summarily and without argument, I would affirm.

       This occurred immediately after defense counsel had emphasized his challenge to the sheriff’s credibility:
      “MR. BASDEN [defense counsel] : I have no further questions to ask this witness [the sheriff], and I will pass him. If this statement [the confession] is introduced in evidence, I would like to put on testimony to impeach the testimony given by this witness to assist the Court in understanding the defendant’s ability to speak the English language, in regard to giving a statement to these Peace Officers, and I would like to make this request, to be allowed to call these witnesses of mine at this time to testify.
      “THE COURT: Mr. Sheriff, will you retire the jury for a few minutes?”

       Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals questioned that the county sheriff whose credibility was at issue had been a key witness for the prosecution. Indeed, the District Court's unreported opinion specifically found, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, that “[t]he sheriff was an essential witness for the prosecution in that his testimony, although disputed, established the voluntary character of the confession upon which Gonzales was convicted.” 445 F. 2d, at 1205.

       In a later case drawing upon the doctrine of Turner, the Court emphasized that “the official character of the bailiff — as an officer of the court as well as the State — beyond question carries great weight with a jury . . . .” Parker v. Gladden, 385 U. S. 363, 365.

       The petitioner’s trial was held- before our decision in Turner, but Turner, of course, stated no new constitutional doctrine. Its principle “went to the fairness of the trial — the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639. It overruled no line of decisions on which the State might have justifiably relied. To the contrary, it simply applied established case law holding that due process of law requires an impartial jury. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 471-472.


text:
    No. 776,
    October Term, 1968.
    Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al.,
   395 U. S. 464. Motion for modification of mandate (judgment) and other relief denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 70-223.
    Central Hardware Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of American Retail Federation for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 70-250.
    Carleson, Director, Department of Social Welfare, et al. v. Remillard et al.
   [Probable jurisdiction noted, 404 U. S. 1013.] Motion of National Welfare Rights Organization et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-485.
    Gottschalk, Acting Commissioner of Patents v. Benson et al.
   C. C. P. A. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 915.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing appendix and to proceed on original record granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Black-mun, and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-506.
    United States et al. v. Midwest Video Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-732.
    Schneckloth, Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 953.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Stuart P. Tobisman, Esquire, of Los Angeles, California, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent pro hac vice in this case.


text:
    No. 71-829.
    Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 987.] Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 71-1016.
    No. 71-1040.
    Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.; and United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 973.] Motions of Atlanta Gas Light Co. et ah, Monsanto Co. et al., and Humble Oil & Refining Co. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motions of State of Louisiana, Humble Oil & Refining Co., and Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 71-1017.
    No. 71-1026.
    Gravel v. United States; and United States v. Gravel.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 916.] Motion requesting permission to divide time for oral argument on behalf of amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. A-962 (71-1248).
    California v. Anderson.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Renewed application for stay denied.


text:
    No. 71-5671.
    Gidmark v. Benson, Prison Camp Administrator.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6019.
    No. 71-6077.
    Blackburn v. Henderson, Warden; and Nidiver v. Field, Men’s Colony Superintendent.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-983.
    No. 71-6040.
    No. 71-6055.
    No. 71-6088.
    No. 71-6096.
    No. 71-6110.
    Albrecht v. Matthes, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al.; Rojas v. Chambers, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals; McCray v. Maryland; Gibson v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama et al.; Gay v. Downing et al.; and Picking v. Kaufman, U. S. District Judge.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-6098.
    Arnold v. United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 71-1082.
    Askew, Governor of Florida, et al. v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Fla. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-364.
    No. 71-373.
    No. 71-553.
    Mahan, Secretary of Board of Elections, et al. v. Howell et al.; City of Virginia Beach v. Howell et al.; and Thornton et al. v. Prichard et al.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. Va. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Reported below: 330 F. Supp. 1138.


text:
    No. 71-6078.
    Linda R. S. v. Richard D. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 71-1011.
    Bronston v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-1059.
    Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-284.
    Pennsylvania v. Silverman.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-851.
    Wrenn v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-861.
    Leff et al. v. Housing Authority of the City of East Orange et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-914.
    Braver et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-918.
    Love et al. v. Dade County School Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-947.
    Vuci et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-963.
    BBF Liquidating, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-969.
    Century Arms, Inc. v. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-972.
    Cochran v. Costill et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-998.
    Penosi v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1006.
    Virginia National Bank v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1007.
    Regency Realty et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1025.
    Henry County Beverage Co., Inc. v. Secretary of the Treasury.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 71-1032.
    A. W. Thompson, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1036.
    Lecci v. Leonard et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1062.
    Procter & Gamble Co. v. Purex Corp., Ltd.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1073.
    Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Kohl, Commissioner of Transportation, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1067.
    Riley et al. v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1071.
    Saiken v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1074.
    Bixler v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1075.
    Fershtman et al. v. Schectman et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1076.
    Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local Union 295, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1081.
    Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1089.
    California Shipping Co., Inc., et al. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1096.
    Miles v. City-Parish Government of East Baton Rouge Parish et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1108.
    Newsome et al. v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5364.
    Armstead et al. v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1118.
    Ford Motor Co. v. W. F. Holt & Sons, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1203.
    Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Las Colinas, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5516.
    Weddel v. Craven, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5517.
    Weddel v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5645.
    Andrade v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5652.
    Glover v. Florida.
   Ct. of Record of Escambia County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5682.
    O’Dell v. Ohio State Medical Board.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Clermont County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5693.
    Reid v. Virginia.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5719.
    Standifer v. Jarvis et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5730.
    Meredith v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5742.
    Sims et al. v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5787.
    Jackson v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5731.
    Stuard v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6010.
    Jackson v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6012.
    Jackson v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6013.
    Evans v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6015.
    Goznelli v. Brantley, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6016.
    Guile v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6018.
    Close v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6020.
    Sundlun v. Sundlun.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6021.
    Bolton v. Kropp, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6022.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6024.
    Warner v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6025.
    Hood v. Burnett et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6026.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6027.
    Brown v. Ross, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6028.
    Ross v. Howard, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6031.
    Stratton v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6032.
    Patton v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6033.
    Stephenson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6036.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6038.
    Waltenberg v. Supreme Court of Richmond County et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6039.
    Pickett v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6041.
    Tate v. Grace et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6044.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6045.
    Rodgers v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6046.
    Lucas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6047.
    Mahler v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6048.
    Mahler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6049.
    Mattison v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6052.
    George v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6053.
    Magee v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6054.
    Evins v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6057.
    Dougherty v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6058.
    Augello v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6061.
    Hume v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6062.
    Capps v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6063.
    Fully v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6064.
    Parsons v. Adams, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6065.
    Byland v. Craven, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6066.
    Sullivan v. Sullivan.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6069.
    Smiley v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6072.
    Parker v. Lewis, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6075.
    Watt v. Page, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6073.
    Lathan v. Deegan, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6076.
    Thompson v. Strom et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6079.
    Burroughs v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6080.
    Lucas v. Broughton.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6083.
    Wilkerson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6084.
    Archie v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6086.
    Long v. Kleindienst, Acting Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6087.
    Chambers et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6089.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6090.
    Speaks v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6091.
    Jeffries v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6092.
    Hagler et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6093.
    Dean v. Moore et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6094.
    Webb v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6095.
    White, aka Littlejohn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6099.
    Marnin v. Urbaniak et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6101.
    Adams v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6102.
    Smothers v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6103.
    Pleasant v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6105.
    Breaux v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6107.
    Marratto v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6108.
    Baca v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6111.
    Boswell v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6113.
    Johnson v. Department of Water & Power of the City of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6114.
    Dennis v. McCracken et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6115.
    Freeman v. First District Court of Appeals et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-758.
    Green v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-797.
    Puglia v. Cotter et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-962.
    Kelley et al. v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1035.
    Lecci v. Cahn, District Attorney of Nassau County, et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1041.
    Taxay v. Shaffer, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1090.
    Cabbler v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1099.
    Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., et al. v. Peagler et al.
   Super. Ct. Ariz., County of Maricopa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1019.
    Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO v. Moore of Bedford, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5367.
    Amphy v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5657.
    Williams v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5714.
    Scherer v. Hocker, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6011.
    Breedlove et al. v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6023.
    Camara v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6029.
    Silverstein v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-979.
    City of Chicago et al. v. Federal Power Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6030.
    Teague v. Wright.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-976.
    Tyrone v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1002.
    Lamm v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1042.
    Exer-Genie, Inc., et al. v. McDonald et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1052.
    McKinney, dba Paris Bookstall, et al. v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Jus-Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and judgment reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967).


text:
    No. 71-1072.
    Heyman, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Mahin, Director of Revenue of Illinois, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of S. Bloom, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1077.
    Ellis, Trustee v. Powers et al.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Motion to proceed on typewritten papers granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6104.
    Patterson v. Lash, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-854.
    No. 71-869.
    No. 71-1013.
    No. 71-1030.
    No. 71-1053.
    No. 71-5599.
    No. 71-5711.
    No. 71-5750.
    No. 71-5802.
    Deutsch Co., Metal Components Division v. National Labor Relations Board, Deutsch Co., Electronic Components Division v. National Labor Relations Board, Teitelbaum v. Stone, Secretary of State of Florida, Kiernan et al. v. Lindsay, Mayor of New York, et al., Jamieson v. American National Safe Deposit Co. et al., Wheeler v. Warden, Leavenworth Penitentiary, Enlow v. Lash, Warden, Bays v. United States, McGahey v. United States,
   ante, p. 988;

ante, p. 988;

ante, p. 986;

ante, p. 1000;

ante, p. 990;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 952;

ante, p. 957; and

ante, p. 977. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5223.
    No. 71-5579.
    No. 71-5749.
    Lipscomb v. United States, Diggs v. Dunne et al., Sasko v. United States,
   404 U. S. 840;

ante, p. 925; and

ante, p. 957. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-654.
    Lovisi v. Virginia,
   ante, p. 936. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-5762.
    Sharrow v. Brown,
   ante, p. 968. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Mr. Justice Powell,

text:
    GRAVES v. BARNES
    No. A-795.
    Decided February 7, 1972
    See: 343 F. Supp. 704.
   Mr. Justice Powell,

Circuit Justice.

This is an application for a stay of the judgment of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Texas. The court’s decision covers issues raised in four consolidated actions. The principal issues were as follows:

1. In Graves v. Barnes, plaintiffs challenged the State’s reapportionment plan for the senatorial districts in Harris County (Houston) on the ground that they were racially gerrymandered.

2. In Regester v. Bullock, the State’s reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives was challenged on the grounds of population deviations from the one-man, one-vote requirement, and on the imper-missibility of use of multi-member districts in the metropolitan communities.

3. In Mariott v. Smith, the House plan provision calling for a multi-member district for Dallas County was challenged.

4. In Archer v. Smith, a generally similar attack was leveled against the use of multi-member districting in Bexar County (San Antonio).

The four cases were consolidated and tried by a single three-judge panel. After full pretrial discovery, during which over 2,000 pages of depositions were taken, the District Court heard testimony at a 3%-day hearing. The extensive per curiam opinion, and the concurring and dissenting opinions, which were handed down after some three weeks of deliberation, reflect a careful and exhaustive consideration of the issues in light of the facts as developed. The court's conclusions, in substance, were as follows:

(a) The Senate redistricting plan, as promulgated by the Texas Legislative Redistricting Board, was approved.

(b) The House redistricting plan was held violative of the Equal Protection Clause because of population deviations from equality of representation. But, in an exercise of judicial restraint, the court suspended its decision in this respect for the purpose of affording the Legislature of Texas an opportunity to adopt a new and constitutional plan. Meanwhile, the forthcoming election may be held under the plan found to be deficient.

(c) The multi-member district plans for Dallas and Bexar Counties were found to be unconstitutional under the standard prescribed by this Court in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438-439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966); and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 143 (1971). The three-judge court found from the evidence that these multi-member district plans would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial minority elements of the voting population, and ordered the implementation of a plan calling for single-member districts for Dallas and Bexar Counties. The State offered no plan for single-member districts for these counties, and the court was compelled to draft its own plan. To minimize the disruptive impact of its ruling, the court ordered that the State's requirement that candidates run from the districts of their residence be abated for the forthcoming election. A candidate residing anywhere within the county, therefore, may run for election from any district in the county.

(d) The evidence with respect to nine other metropolitan multi-member districts was found insufficient to warrant treatment similar to that required for Dallas and Bexar Counties.

(e) Finally, the court’s order stated that its judgment was final and that no stays would be granted.

In view of the foregoing holdings, the only present necessity to consider a stay relates to the District Court’s decision with respect to multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties. A number of principles have been recognized to govern a Circuit Justice’s in-chambers review of stay applications. Stays pending appeal to this Court are granted only in extraordinary circumstances. A lower court judgment, entered by a tribunal that was closer to the facts than the single Justice, is entitled to a presumption of validity. Any party seeking a. stay of that judgment bears the burden of showing that the decision below was erroneous and that the implementation of the judgment pending appeal will lead to irreparable harm.

As a threshold consideration, Justices of this Court have consistently required that there be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction. See Mahan v. Howell, 404 U. S. 1201, 1202; Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S. Ct. 33, 4 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1959). Of equal importance in cases presented on direct appeal — where we lack the discretionary power to refuse to decide the merits — is the related question whether five Justices are likely to conclude that the case was erroneously decided below. Justices have also weighed heavily the fact that the lower court refused to stay its order pending appeal, indicating that it was not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of potentially irreparable harm as a result of enforcement of its judgment in the interim.

In applying these considerations to the present case, I conclude that a stay should not be granted. The case received careful attention by the three-judge court, the members of which were “on the scene” and more familiar with the situation than the Justices of this Court; and the opinions attest to a conscientious application of principles enunciated by this Court. Moreover, the order of the court was narrowly drawn to effectuate its decision with a minimum of interference with the State’s legislative processes, and with a minimum of administrative confusion in the short run.

Following a practice utilized by other Justices in passing on applications raising serious constitutional questions (see Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962); McGee v. Eyman, 83 S. Ct. 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1963)), I have consulted informally with each of my Brethren who was available at this time during the recess. Although no other Justice has participated in the drafting of this opinion, I am authorized to say that each of them would vote to deny this application. My denial of a stay at this point, of course, may not be taken either as a statement of my own position on the merits of the difficult questions raised in this case, or as an indication of what may, in fact, ultimately be the view of my colleagues on the Court.

The application is denied.

      A11 Justices, save two who were not available, have been consulted.


text:
    CHAMBERS v. MISSISSIPPI
    No. A-785 (71-5908).
    Decided February 14, 1972
    See: 252 So. 2d 217.
   Mr. Justice Powell,

Circuit Justice.

On January 31, 1972, counsel for Leon Chambers, petitioner in No. 71-5908, filed with me, as Circuit Justice for the States constituting the Fifth Circuit, an application for bail pending consideration of his petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner’s counsel detailed the reasons making it appropriate for me to exercise my discretion, under 18 U. S. C. § 3144, to admit this petitioner to bail. A copy of his certiorari petition, which raises two non-frivolous constitutional questions, was also attached to his application. The Attorney General of Mississippi declined to file a response objecting to the application.

On February 1,1972, after careful review of petitioner’s application, I entered an order admitting him to bail. In order to assure that petitioner would not flee or pose a danger to any other person, I imposed a number of conditions on his release. He was required to post bail bond in the sum of $15,000; to live at home with his family in his hometown of Woodville, Mississippi; to find employment; and to report, immediately upon release and periodically thereafter, to the local sheriff.

Ten days later, on February 11, 1972, the Attorney General of Mississippi filed an application for reconsideration of my order admitting petitioner to bail. Although the Rules of this Court do not provide for such an application, I have carefully re-examined all papers submitted including a response from petitioner’s counsel.

The Attorney General, in addition to contending that petitioner’s case is frivolous, asserts that petitioner’s “return to the community will create a dangerous situation to citizens of that community.” In support of this latter allegation, he proffers the affidavits of the County Sheriff, the local Police Commissioner, and the Chief of Police of Woodville. In conclusory terms, these documents state that petitioner’s presence will create a tense and explosive situation in the community, which might result in bloodshed. No specific facts are stated in support of the opinions expressed. On the contrary, it appears that this petitioner’s roots in the community and record of good behavior merit his release pending final determination of his case. Petitioner is a lifelong resident of Woodville; he owns a home, subject to a mortgage; he has a wife and nine children there; he served for a period on the Woodville police force; he is a deacon in the local Baptist Church; and he has no prior criminal record. Before his trial he was released on bail for approximately 14 months, apparently without incident. During his period of incarceration after his conviction it appears that petitioner was a model prisoner.

On this record, I am unable to conclude that petitioner’s mere presence in the community poses such a threat to the public "that the only way to protect against it would be to keep [him] in jail.” Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 (1968) (Black, J., in chambers).

The order admitting petitioner to bail is hereby reaffirmed. r, . , ,

, It is so ordered.