author: Mr. Justice Douglas.

text:
    November 6, 1971
    No. A-483.
    Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc., et al. v. Schlesinger, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, et al.
    See: — U. S. App. D. C. —, —, —, 463 F. 2d 783, 788, 796.

      David Sive argued the cause for applicants. With him on the application for injunction were Harold P. Green and Thomas B. Stoel, Jr.

      Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondents.
   Mr. Justice Douglas.

I would grant the injunction so that the case can be heard on the merits. The most serious question tendered is whether the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has satisfied the mandate of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. By § 102 (2) (C) of that Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C), Congress directed each agency of the Federal Government to “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—

“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
“(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.”

I agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 39, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1115, that “if the decision [under NEPA] was reached [by AEC] procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors — conducted fully and in good faith — it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.”

That opinion, rendered on July 23, 1971, by a panel consisting of Judges Wright, Tamm, and Robinson, found that AEC’s procedures in this nuclear area did not comply with the Act and that its entire approach to the environmental problems in the nuclear field violated the Act.

Another panel of the same Court of Appeals, composed of Judges Bazelon, Leventhal, and Robinson, said in the instant case, after examining in camera the relevant environmental documents,

“We are left with difficult questions about the validity of the AEC’s environmental statement. But a hurried review of several hundred pages of technical documents cannot provide a satisfactory basis for resolving this litigation.” — U. S. App. D. C. —, —, 463 F. 2d 796, 798.

In that opinion the Court of Appeals did not approve the findings of the District Court that the order complies with the Act, saying, “In our view the case does present a substantial question as to the legality of the proposed test.”

I have added in an appendix some apparently obvious defects in AEC’s Impact Statement (hereafter sometimes I. S.).

We plainly do not have time to resolve this question between now and the scheduled detonation. Accordingly, I would grant the injunction so that a full Court can consider the case on the merits.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OP DOUGLAS, J.

In the Calvert Cliffs case the Court of Appeals held that the procedural rules adopted by AEC for the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements did not meet statutory requirements. And in the October 5, 1971, opinion by the Court of Appeals in the instant case it is held that “responsible opposing views” on environmental damage “need be included” in the Impact Statement in the form of “a meaningful reference that identifies the problem at hand for the responsible official.” — U. S. App. D. C. —, —, 463 F. 2d 783, 787.

The Act requires that reports from federal agencies required by the Act and the guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to be consulted with respect to the preparation of an Impact Statement, which are adverse to the project with respect to which their views are sought, must be released as part of the Impact Statement prepared by the agency responsible for the project.

Here, several such reports were not disclosed. The existence of these reports became known through newspaper stories and debates on the floor of Congress. These reports were the subject of the discovery proceedings which caused such a long delay in this litigation. The reports in question included those of:

(a) Russell Train, Chairman of CEQ;

(b) Edward E. David, Jr., Director of Office of Science and Technology (OST);

(c) William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and

(d) Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the AEC.

The CEQ guidelines specifically state that the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, are not applicable to agency comments made in the course of consultations with reference to the preparation of an Impact Statement. The Act and § 7 of the guidelines direct that an agency charged with the preparation of an Impact Statement “consult with, and obtain the comment on the environmental impact of the action of, Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.” 36 Fed. Reg. 7725. The EPA is specifically designated to be one of the agencies within the contemplation of § 7, ibid. And under § 10 (f) of the regulations, the AEC would be the agency “responsible for making the statement and the comments received available to the public pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.” Id., at 7726. Besides the express designation of the EPA, the argument is compelling that the other agencies in question have “special expertise” and, in the case of the AEC, “jurisdiction by law” concerning the various environmental effects to be expected from an underground nuclear explosion.

Once noncompliance with the NEPA is shown, the federal courts have uniformly held that injunctive relief is appropriate.

Disclosure of these statements to the public by any federal agency which has “special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved” is indeed required by § 102 (2) (C) of the Act. And the courts have consistently held that a defect in the Impact Statement presents a justiciable question and is the basis for equitable relief. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F. 2d 232; Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759; Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422.

Seismic Dangers:

According to the Impact Statement, “No significant environmental impact can be expected from the seismic activity caused by the CANNIKIN test.” I. S. 3. Two sorts of seismic effects are at issue. First, there is the possibility that the explosion might trigger a natural earthquake of greater force than the bomb itself. The Impact Statement asserts that:

“The possibility of the CANNIKIN test 'triggering’ an earthquake with seismic energy comparable to or greater than that produced by the explosion itself is very unlikely. Since the understanding of earthquake mechanisms is still developing and is not yet sufficient for exact calculations, the possibility of such an occurrence cannot be ruled out. However, foremost seismologists have asserted that an explosion at Amchitka will not trigger a large earthquake . . . unless the occurrence of such an event is imminent, very near to the test site.” Ibid.

This conclusion is based on nothing more than an assertion to this effect by “[a] panel of eminent scientists and engineers . . . acting as consultants to the AEC,” id., at 54, which was presumably based, in turn, on

“the size and location of the CANNIKIN explosion, considered along with the size and frequency of naturally occurring earthquakes and the experience gained by observation of past nuclear detonations and aftershocks.” Id., at 3.

That more should be required is clear from the heretofore secret memorandum written by Russell Train of the CEQ (hereafter Train memo), the agency charged with the broadest statutory authority in establishing national environmental policy.

According to Mr. Train,

“All the earthquakes triggered by underground explosions in the various Nevada tests released substantially less energy than the explosion itself. If one could establish that this is a necessary condition then there would be no apprehension with regard to the CANNIKIN event. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The magnitude of the triggered earthquakes will depend on the state of strain in the crust in the general region at which the underground explosion is set off. Extrapolation from the Nevada experience is uncertain because of the fundamentally different geologic setting between Nevada and the Aleutians. Further, experience with MILROW [a one-megaton underground detonation set off on Amchitka in 1969] does not provide a sure basis for extrapolation. In the highly nonlinear phenomena involved in earthquake generation, there may be a threshold value of the strain that must be exceeded prior to initiation of a large earthquake.” Train memo 4.

Mr. Train goes on to explain that “great earthquakes” (those with a force of 8.0 or more on the Richter scale) are now considered to result from the cumulative effects of a series of smaller shocks. (CANNIKIN is expected to register about 7.0 on the Richter scale.) Referring specifically to great earthquakes occurring within the past few years in Chile and Alaska, he notes that the theoretical explanation for these events justifies a concern that the force of CANNIKIN, which would be the largest underground device exploded by man, might surpass the “threshold” required to trigger a great quake.

“The suggested explanation of the Chilean and Alaskan earthquakes in terms of a succession of smaller earthquakes would support this interpretation. In this model a number of lock points stabilize a fault. Once one lock point is broken, sufficient energy may be released to break other lock points. If the stored strain energy is large, then the triggered earthquake could be of much greater magnitude than the triggering event. The underground explosion could serve as the first domino of the row of dominoes leading to a major earthquake. The major fault in the general region of Amchitka is thought to be some 40 km. beneath the test shot. The strain field will certainly be altered at this depth by the underground explosion. Observations on the BENHAM event [a one-megaton detonation at the Nevada test sites] showed strains exceeding tidal strains at 29 km.” Ibid.

The CANNIKIN yield may be as high as five times that of the BENHAM and MILROW devices.

The “lock-point” theory is also explained in a statement by J. W. Hadley (hereafter Hadley memo), which had also been suppressed until this week. The theory is nowhere discussed, nor even “alluded to,” in the Impact Statement.

A further misleading conclusion in the Impact Statement is that CANNIKIN could not trigger a natural quake unless that quake “is imminent, very near to the test site.” The documents revealed this week indicate there is a possibility that earthquakes may be triggered by a rise in underground fluid levels, or by artificial loading of the earth’s crust. Presumably, the fluid lubricates the rock along a fault line, thus enhancing the potential for slippage. A series of earthquakes along a dormant fault near Denver has been definitely attributed to the pumping of waste water deep into the earth by the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Train memo 2-3.

“A second example is found in the case of earthquakes associated with large lakes or reservoirs. As a result of loading of the earth’s crust by these large bodies of water or by the modification of the groundwater flow or for some other reason not yet understood, substantial earthquakes have been associated with construction of large artificial lakes. A recent earthquake near Koyna Dam in India located in an area that is not normally seismic killed about 200 people. Similarly, many small earthquakes occurred when Lake Mead was filled.” Id., at 3.

Increased subsurface fluid pressure will be one result of CANNIKIN.

“[T]he explosion will alter the pressure regime in the groundwater. The water pressure in the rocks interstices will increase due to the compaction of the ground around the cavity. . . . This increase in the fluid pressure will reduce the friction between fracture separated blocks. The effect would be greatest on faults oriented parallel to the residual compressive stresses resulting from the test explosion. Thus, it is possible that the mechanism involved in the Denver earthquake would raise the probability of triggering a large earthquake.” Ibid.

Thus, it would appear that “imminence” may not be necessary for CANNIKIN to trigger a large earthquake. This possibility is not mentioned in the Impact Statement.

The Impact Statement also fails to consider the long-term effects of the CANNIKIN device on the geology. “The creation of a large cavity together with a later collapse of the chimney produces permanent changes in the strain field. . . . However, the strain field resulting from an underground explosion cannot be calculated with any precision because of the dependence of the field on the detailed geology which is largely unknown at any given location.” Ibid.

Not only does the Impact Statement fail to assess the possible effects of permanent changes in the strain field, but it represents that the geologic conditions at Amchitka have been fully explored. I. S. 19.

Perhaps the most striking deception of the Impact Statement, in light of the Train memo, is its attempt to represent that professional opinion is unanimous that there is no real danger that CANNIKIN will trigger a large earthquake. According to Mr. Hadley, however,

“Qualified scientific opinion is in good agreement that the possibility of triggering a large earthquake by CANNIKIN is remote, but real. . . . Variation of technical opinion from this position is minor.” Hadley memo 6.

The second seismic effect which might result from CANNIKIN is a tsunami, or tidal wave. According to the Impact Statement, “the possibility of the CAN-NIKIN explosion or an earthquake causing a damaging tsunami (seismic sea wave) is even more unlikely [than the triggering of a great earthquake].” I. S. 3. The Train memo itself points out, “Large earthquakes in the near vicinity of Amchitka have not caused destructive tsunamis in the past.” Train memo 4. Train goes on, however: “[A]s in the case of earthquakes it is not possible at this time to assess quantitatively the probability of a tsunami following the explosion.” Id., at 4-5. Another heretofore suppressed statement, that of Dr. W. G. Van Dorn, entitled Probability of Tsunami Generation and Connection with CANNIKIN, indicates the author to be as deeply concerned about the danger from the explosion as the “well-qualified geophysicists” who believe that the risks are great, and whose views are contained in an attachment to the Train memo. Those views remain suppressed. Considering the awesome destructive capabilities of even a “small” tsunami, and its ability to retain its destructive force thousands of miles from its source, it would seem incumbent upon the drafters of the Impact Statement to explore in greater detail the sources of such responsible concern.

Venting:

The second category of environmental hazards from the CANNIKIN event are those relating to the danger that radioactive material from the explosion might escape to the surface. The most serious problem is the effect on groundwater movement, for the water table on Am-chitka extends almost to the surface.

According to the analysis of the Impact Statement, the most probable mode of groundwater circulation by which radionuclides might escape into the sea would take “a thousand years or more.” I. S. 24. The least likely

“involves the very unlikely assumption that the water within the cavity-chimney system becomes completely mixed [with radionuclides, predominately tritium], coupled with a second unlikely assumption that the flow through the rock occurs only through a system of interconnecting fractures. Estimates using these assumptions indicate contaminated water would reach the sea in . . . some three years after the explosion. This would introduce tritiated [radioactive] water into the ocean with an initial concentration about 1,200 times that of the RCG [recommended concentration guideline] for water.” Ibid.

Indeed, the Impact Statement thinks it far more probable that only “some small fraction of the tritiated water” will “move upward in the chimney rubble.” And only relatively near the surface will increased permeability provide a path to the sea. The Impact Statement estimates that no tritium would be released into the water for over a hundred years through this mechanism. Ibid.

The Train memo, however, relying on calculations from the United States Geological Survey, comes to a different conclusion.

“Water in the chimney would move to the sea at a rate dependent on the hydraulic head, the permeability of existing aquifers and permeability of any new fractures opened up by the explosion. USGS calculations indicate a time for such movement might be as short as one to two years. These are short times and are inconsistent with estimates made by AEC that tritium will be discharged into the ocean only 145 years after the explosion. ... If the shorter times (5 to 10 years) postulated above are correct then the level of radioactivity in the groundwater entering the ocean would be in excess of ten thousand to one hundred thousand maximum permissible concentration for water.” Train memo 5.

Thus, the judgment of the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality is that it is likely, if not probable, that within 10 years of CANNIKIN, radioactive water of concentrations perhaps 100,000 times permitted máxi-mums will reach the sea near Amchitka. Inasmuch as this estimate is 100 times greater than their own, I should think it would require consideration by the drafters of the Impact Statement.

Another document shown to the applicants herein for the first time this week supports the Train analysis:

“[I]t must also be admitted, and this is the basis for the Council on Environmental Quality’s [Train’s] comments on CANNIKIN, that the rubble chimney constitutes a highly permeable vertical short circuit of the groundwater system, and that the hydrological measurements indicate zones of fairly permeable rock higher in the section.” M. Merritt, The Ground Water Problem at Amchitka 1-2.

The USGS recognized that its water migration time scale was highly inconsistent with that of the AEC; in so doing, it reaffirmed its original position:

“It should be emphasized that the foregoing analysis is heavily weighed in favor of the worst case. However, it is difficult to conceive of conditions which might improve the outlook significantly.” USGS, Effects Evaluation Report — Cannikin Event.

The AEC was aware of the USGS position with respect to groundwater migration. It simply ignored it.

More disturbing than the failure of the Impact Statement to meet the arguments advanced by its critics, perhaps, is a deliberate distortion, in certain instances, of those opposing views. Thus, the statement argues that even were the “extreme case” to occur, and radioactive water migrate to the sea within a few years,

“dilution of that water by the sea water would take place rapidly. With the seeping water being swept up by the passing ocean current and mixed through tidal action and wave action, oceanographers have estimated that there would be an effective dilution factor of about 100,000 within a few hours. In this manner, the sea water tritium would quickly dilute to levels comparable to those freshwater levels acceptable for lifetime use by humans.” I. S. 25.

Compare this use of the dilution figure with that of Train:

“Even if the dilution is as great as a hundred thousand, there is the possibility of concentration of tritium well above background levels in various steps of the food chain.” Train memo 5.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant a temporary restraining order pending applicants’ filing of a petition for certiorari and action by the Court on the petition. The question to be presented is whether the detonation of CANNIKIN would be illegal if the Atomic Energy Commission did not comply with the mandate of § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Court of Appeals did not accept the holding of the District Court that the Commission had complied with §102(2)(C), stating, “In our view the case does present a substantial question as to the legality of the proposed test.” The oral argument confirmed this view. In that circumstance, to avoid mootness, the Commission must be enjoined from proceeding with CANNIKIN until the Court decides whether to review the question of its legality.

       Guidelines for agency action are provided by the Council on Environmental Quality of which Russell E. Train is Chairman. See 36 Fed. Reg. 7724.

       As the Court of Appeals held in an earlier opinion in this case, — U. S. App. D. C. —, —, 463 F. 2d 783, 786, Congress did not intend, by approving funds for the Cannikin detonation, to repeal the NEPA as it applied to the test.
      “On the contrary, there is an affirmative indication that at least some of the Congressmen voting for the authorization and appropriations measures specifically contemplated that the claim of illegality remained for resolution by the courts.”
      See Remarks of Rep. Price, 117 Cong. Rec. H6785, July 15, 1971:
      “This matter is before the court. I submit that if there has been any violation of the law, the court will supply the appropriate-remedy.”
      Other federal courts have similarly concluded that congressional appropriations for a project subject to NEPA are not to be taken as expressing any view with respect to compliance with NEPA. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 762-763.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. A-465.
    Hughes Tool Co. et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. It is ordered that the stay of mandate heretofore granted by Mr. Justice Marshall be, and it is hereby, continued pending further order of this Court.

Mr. Justice Marshall dissents.


text:
    November 9, 1971
    No. 71-332.
    Bond et al. v. Fortson, Secretary of State of Georgia, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga.


text:
    No. 71-336.
    United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Assn. v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Pa.


text:
    No. 70-5269.
    Barnes v. Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-326.
    Lowe v. Lowe.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the. appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-340.
    Branton et al. v. Parker, Treasurer of Louisiana, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-348.
    Mealey et al. v. City of Laramie et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-360.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Michigan et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-5170.
    Wood et al. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5239.
    Harless v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Blackmun dissent.


text:
    No. -.
    Friedland v. Justices of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en banc.
   Request for reconsideration of application for extraordinary relief denied.


text:
    No. A-404.
    Skaggs v. Director of Department of Motor Vehicles of California et al.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-462.
    Duncantell v. Ingraham, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-379 (71-549).
    Giamo v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Application for stay denied.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al. (Louisiana Boundary Case).
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 403 U. S. 950.]
   Motion of the United States for entry of a supplemental decree as to the State of Louisiana is set down for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 17,
    Orig.
    Nebraska v. Iowa.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 393 U. S. 910.]
   Report of Special Master received and filed. Exceptions, if any, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed within 30 days thereafter.


text:
    No. 27,
    Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 385 U. S. 803.]
   Motion for leave to file amended bill of complaint referred to Special Master.


text:
    No. 30,
    Orig.
    Michigan v. Ohio.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 386 U. S. 1029.]
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed within 30 days thereafter.


text:
    No. 51,
    Orig.
    Founding Church of Scientology v. Cromer et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 53,
    Orig.
    Alabama v. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. 68-5027;
    No. 69-5003;
    No. 69-5030;
    No. 69-5031.
    Aikens v. California. Furman v. Georgia. Jackson v. Georgia. Branch v. Texas.
   Sup. Ct. Cal.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.; and

Ct. Crim. App. Tex. [Certiorari granted, 403 U. S. 952.] Motion of Edmund G. Brown et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-14.
    Cole, State Hospital Superintendent, et al. v. Richardson.
   Appeal from D. C. Mass. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 403 U. S. 917.] Motion of Harold Hestnes to permit Stephen H. Olesky to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of appellee granted.


text:
    No. 70-6.
    Swarb et al. v. Lennox et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 991.] Motion of appellants to dispense with printing reply brief granted. Motion of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania for additional time for oral argument denied. Conditional motion of Pennsylvania Bankers Assn, for leave to present oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 70-18.
    No. 70-40.
    Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County. Doe et al. v. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex.; and

Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. Motions of Certain Physicians, Professors & Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology and the National Right to Life Committee for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of Ferdinand Buckley for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 70-40 granted. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 402 U. S. 941.]


text:
    No. 70-36.
    Perry et al. v. Sindermann.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 403 U. S. 917.] Motion of American Federation of Teachers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-54.
    Victory Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Law.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 936.] Motions of National Maritime Compensation Committee for reconsideration and for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-75.
    Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 401 U. S. 992.] Motion of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 70-79.
    Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 1008.] Motion of Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-86.
    United States v. Tucker.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 402 U. S. 942.] Motion to appoint co-counsel on behalf of respondent and for William A. Reppy, Jr., to present oral argument in this case granted. It is ordered that William A. Reppy, Jr., Esquire, of Durham, North Carolina, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as co-counsel for respondent.


text:
    No. 70-92.
    California Motor Transport Co. et al. v. Trucking Unlimited et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 402 U. S. 1008.] Motion of Landmarks Holding Corp. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-113.
    Ford Motor Co. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Mich. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 403 U. S. 903.] Motion of Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-5025.
    Haines v. Kerner et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 954.] Motion of Joel M. Flaum et al. for leave to permit Warren K. Smoot to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of respondents granted.


text:
    No. 70-5032.
    Alexander et al. v. Swank, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 906.] Motion of Ronald J. Offenkrantz for leave to permit M. James Spitzer, Jr., to argue orally pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 70-5082.
    Carter et al. v. Stanton, Director, Marion County Department of Public Welfare, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 402 U. S. 994.] Motion to postpone oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 70-5138.
    Parham et al. v. Cortese et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, sub nom. Epps v. Cortese, 402 U. S. 994.] Motion of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 71-83.
    Strait v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petitioner’s reply brief granted.


text:
    No. 71-119.
    Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 880.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-157.
    R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   D. C. N. J. Motion of John J. McMullen for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and to dispense with printing granted.


text:
    No. 71-5159.
    White v. Cardwell, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 70-5188.
    Riddell v. Hamilton et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-5265.
    Theriault v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 71-227.
    United States et al. v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-308.
    United States v. Byrum, Executrix.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-322.
    The Bremen et al. v. Zapata Offshore Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-5344.
    Willis v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-5172.
    Dukes v. Warden, Connecticut State Prison.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-5248.
    Williams v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5302.
    Gardner v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5318.
    Pilgrim v. Wolff, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5329.
    Kupczyk v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5406.
    Kapelus v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-61.
    Wechsler v. Gottlieb et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-101.
    Berniker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-214.
    United Bonding Insurance Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-232.
    Nalle Clinic v. Schultz, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-248.
    Saitta v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-266.
    Baker et al., Trustees v. United Transportation Union, Local 63E.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-287.
    Palisades Pageants, Inc. v. Miss America Pageant.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-289.
    Zahn et al. v. Security Pacific National Bank, Executor, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-290.
    Kilty v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-291.
    McNabb v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-299.
    Henderson, dba Henderson Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Plumbers Local No. 8, AFL, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-294.
    New York v. Ruppert.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-297.
    Schaefer v. Leone, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-307.
    Allen v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-309.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-311.
    Netski v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-314.
    Adcock v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-320.
    Ampex Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-321.
    Drewrys Limited U. S. A., Inc., et al. v. Bartmess.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-324.
    McCrea, Judge v. Sperry et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-330.
    County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Engineering Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-333.
    Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. United States et al.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-341.
    Parish et al. v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assn., Inc., et al..
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-342.
    Louisiana v. Patout et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-345.
    De Curtis et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No 71-351.
    PSG Co. v. El Salto, S. A.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

477.


text:
    No. 71-354.
    Brody et al. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-355.
    Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Lazier.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-356.
    City Trade & Industries, Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No 71-359.
    Perez v. Duncan.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-362.
    Kapelski v. Purcell et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-367.
    Forchelli et al. v. Hart, Administratrix.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-368.
    Golsen et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-366.
    Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-370.
    Scaglione v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-371.
    Keogh v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-372.
    Law Research Service, Inc., et al. v. Blair & Co., Granbery Marache, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-376.
    Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-383.
    Nunnelley et al. v. Miller et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-386.
    Rice Growers’ Association of California v. County of Yolo.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-395.
    Stone v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-397.
    Capital Electric Power Assn. et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-399.
    Amoco Production Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-413.
    Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Robledo et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-416.
    Stout v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-414.
    Vulcan Materials Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-417.
    La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Division, Fruehauf Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-429.
    Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Oil Transport Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5034.
    Fair v. Lo Scalzo et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5046.
    Mackey v. Craven, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5156.
    Frame v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5157.
    Thrower v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5158.
    Briddle et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5163.
    Poe v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5165.
    Holt v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5166.
    Jankord v. Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5168.
    Sloben v. New York.
   App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5167.
    Harvin v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5173.
    Bretti v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5176.
    Adams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5177.
    No. 71-5279.
    McCray v. Solomon, U. S. District Judge; and McCray v. Belloni, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5178.
    Nemeth v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5180.
    Chalk et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5181.
    Harrelson, aka Stoughtenborough v. United States.
   C. A. 8th -Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5182.
    Milano v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5183.
    Read v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5187.
    Rainwater v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5188.
    Clemons v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5190.
    Avila et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5193.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5195.
    Dapper v. Witt.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5196.
    Wion v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5200.
    Dingee v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5201.
    Teague v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5202.
    Ratow v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5203.
    Schaffer v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5204.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5205.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5206.
    Prado v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5208.
    Hawkins v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5209.
    Levin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5210.
    Ray v. Brierley, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5211.
    Durgin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5212.
    Stevens v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5213.
    Campbell v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5214.
    Ridgill v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5219.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5221.
    Messina v. McMann, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5222.
    Gennaro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5224.
    Hughes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5230.
    Secondino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5233.
    Westfall v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5234.
    Hall v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5235.
    Grove v. Rizzolo.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5237.
    Senfeld v. Salisbury, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5238.
    Terry v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5240.
    McKee v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5241.
    Pickell v. Reed et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5243.
    Williams v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5244.
    Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5245.
    Anglin v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5246.
    Bickford v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5248.
    Finley v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5249.
    Scruggs et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5250.
    Bankston v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5251.
    Griggs v. Alaska.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5252.
    Hitchcock v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5254.
    Caffey v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5256.
    Huber et vir v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5257.
    Bradley v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5258.
    Bond v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5259.
    Boyles v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5260.
    Weis v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5261.
    Kress v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5264.
    Polillo v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-342.
    MacPherson v. Boston & Maine Corp.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and judgment reversed. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500.


text:
    No. 70-5399.
    Richardson v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-184.
    No. 71-381.
    No. 71-396.
    No. 71-5215.
    Portela v. United States; Alexander v. United States; Marti v. United States; and Manarite v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and cases set for oral argument.

Reported below: 448 F. 2d 583.


text:
    No. 71-17.
    Tumminello v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-226.
    Jersey City Education Assn. et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-292.
    Ballew et al. v. Robinson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-302.
    Ratliff et al. v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-310.
    Lyzun v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-317.
    Swords, Administratrix v. American Sealanes, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-358.
    Epton v. Nenna, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-365.
    Strahan v. Strahan et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-388.
    Halcon International, Inc. v. Monsanto Australia Ltd.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-455.
    Ragland et al. v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5153.
    Couming v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5169.
    Christy v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5186.
    Brown v. Moseley, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5236.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5253.
    Parler v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5226.
    Dockery v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5247.
    Cunningham v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-89.
    Evans Theatre Corp. et al. v. Slaton et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-194.
    Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Diaz.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed m forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-230.
    Newark Teachers Union et al. v. Board of Education of Newark.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion to dispense with printing petitioners' reply brief granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-285.
    Anderson et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-218.
    Grounds et al. v. Northern Natural Gas Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied as out of time.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-301.
    Franklin et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-325.
    Frauhiger v. Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-334.
    Johnson et al. v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-338.
    Ellis et al. v. Harada et al.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-343.
    Smith et al. v. Oriscello, Sheriff.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-361.
    United States v. Schmid.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-363.
    Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Reeves Instrument Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-305.
    Kazubowski v. Ray, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay and motion to amend petition denied. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 71-378.
    Flickinger v. Electric Construction Co., Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion of National Association of Contractors Licensing Agencies for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-389.
    Blaine et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for the Government to furnish list of pending similar controversies and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5266.
    Theriault v. Pittman, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-115.
    McVean v. United States,
   ante, p. 822. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 10, 1971
    No. 71-124.
    Gulf Shores Leasing Corp. v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-205.
    Berman v. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    November 16, 1971
    No. 70-5249.
    Van Geldern v. California Adult Authority.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5428.
    Sowder v. City of Cincinnati.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5280.
    Perry v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5282.
    Dundon v. Jesmer.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. A-453 (71-5633).
    Oba v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 35,
    Orig.
    United States v. Maine et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 403 U. S. 949.]
   Motion of Florida Council of 100, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-5388.
    Loper v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 821.] Motion of petitioner to have A. C. Turner et al., acting members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles of Texas, joined as parties respondent granted. Motion of petitioner for the appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that John T. Cabaniss, Esquire, of Houston, Texas, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 71-5267.
    No. 71-5278.
    Morrison v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; and Smith v. California.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-5044.
    Welch v. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
   Motion to amend petition granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-83.
    Strait v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-288.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Tatum et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-300.
    Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-5313.
    Brooks v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions III and IV, presented by the petition, which read as follows:

“III. The trial court was in error in refusing to allow defendant to be placed on the witness stand after other witnesses had testified in his behalf as said Tennessee Statute requiring defendant to be first witness is unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of Tennessee Constitution.

“IV. Code section 40-2403 deprives a defendant of due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

Reported below: — Tenn. App. —, — S. W. 2d —.


text:
    No. 70-5118.
    Burk v. New Mexico,
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5295.
    Pattillo v. Wilson et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5142.
    Mitchell v. Hocker, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5281.
    Rodriguez v. Agnew, Hospital Director.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5310.
    Miles v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5375.
    Lipton v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5381.
    Justus v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5389.
    Kitchen v. Crawford et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5409.
    Utsler v. Erickson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5005.
    Brooks v. Florida et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5075.
    Brooks v. Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5087.
    Denmark v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5218.
    Clemons v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5229.
    Iverson v. North Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5268.
    Rushing v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5269.
    Morris v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5270.
    Lewis v. Oklahoma.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5271.
    Stelly v. Quick Manufacturing Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5272.
    Titus v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5273.
    Bodmer v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5276.
    Maddox v. Sigler, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5281.
    Murdock v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5283.
    Baber v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5284.
    Hicks v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5285.
    Slater v. Tarver et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5288.
    Tosatto v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5290.
    Woodard v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5291.
    Chubbs v. City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5292.
    LePera v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5293.
    Jacobs v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5295.
    Barber v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5296.
    Badger v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5299.
    Favell v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5300.
    Gilbreath v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5301.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5303.
    Main v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5304.
    DeLegge v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5307.
    Subilosky v. Moore, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5310.
    Little v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5314.
    Willametz v. Teece et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5316.
    Tuzo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5361.
    Callahan et al. v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5052.
    Ginsberg v. Levitt, Comptroller of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5275.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5287.
    Crouch v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-176.
    Rosenspan v. United States,
   ante, p. 864. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5235.
    No. 70-5253.
    No. 70-5367.
    No. 71-5012.
    Dorrough v. Texas, Crackenberger v. United States, Morales v. United States, McDuffie v. United States,
   ante, p. 840;

ante, p. 841;

ante, p. 873; and

ante, p. 859. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5153.
    Theriault v. United States,
   ante, p. 869. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1588,
    No. 70-131.
    No. 70-158.
    No. 70-213.
    No. 70-217.
    No. 70-248.
    No. 70-5140.
    No. 70-5146.
    No. 70-5169.
    No. 70-5172.
    No. 70-5190.
    No. 70-5196.
    No. 70-5199.
    No. 70-5272.
    No. 70-5279.
    No. 70-5284.
    No. 70-5292.
    No. 70-5300.
    No. 70-5301.
    October Term, 1970.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al. v. Solien, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, et al., California v. Eller Telecasting Company of Arizona, Inject-O-Meter Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. North Plains Fertilizer & Chemical, Inc., Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Ansted v. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, et al., Harrison et al. v. Prather, Cole v. Nigro, Judge, Beasley v. United States, Brown v. Kentucky, Quarles v. Texas et al., Clark v. Craven, Warden, Watson v. Goodwin, U. S. District Judge, Marts et al. v. United States, Clausser v. First National Bank of Arizona, Administrator, et al., Herrington v. United States, Dixon v. United States, McDonald v. Metropolitan Traffic and Parking Commission et al., Fanning v. United States, Marmorstein et al. v. United States,
   403 U. S. 905;

ante, p. 869;

ante, p. 824;

ante, p. 827;

ante, p. 827;

ante, p. 829;

ante, p. 804;

ante, p. 866;

ante, p. 837;

ante, p. 805;

ante, p. 805;

ante, p. 818;

ante, p. 839;

ante, p. 842;

ante, p. 842;

ante, p. 828;

ante, p. 843;

ante, p. 828; and

ante, p. 828. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-7.
    No. 71-19.
    No. 71-47.
    No. 71-54.
    No. 71-63.
    No. 71-118.
    No. 71-134.
    No. 71-149.
    No. 71-175.
    No. 71-192.
    No. 71-5019.
    No. 71-5022.
    No. 71-5042.
    No. 71-5057.
    No. 71-5060.
    No. 71-5080.
    No. 71-5107.
    No. 71-5111.
    Watson v. California, Intercontinental Promotions, Inc. v. Miami Beach First National Bank et al., Worth v. United States, Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Uarco, Inc., Juras v. Meyers et al., Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co., Inc., et al., Gibson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., Allen v. Bankers Trust Co. et al., Fernandez v. Parker, Warden, Johnson v. Oil Transport Co., Inc., et al., Tymcio v. Ohio, Grames v. Michigan, Stoddard v. Stoddard, Benoit v. United States, Johnson v. United States, Hurd v. DiMento & Sullivan, Welch v. Cardwell, Warden, Lott v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent,
   ante, p. 850;

ante, p. 850;

ante, p. 852;

ante, p. 873;

ante, p. 803;

ante, p. 873;

ante, p. 855;

ante, p. 856;

ante, p. 863;

ante, p. 868;

ante, p. 868;

ante, p. 860;

ante, p. 860;

ante, p. 861;

ante, p. 861;

ante, p. 862;

ante, p. 884; and

ante, p. 884. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-20.
    Alo v. United States,
   ante, p. 850. Motion for disclosure and petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5197.
    Sweeney v. Sheridan, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, et al.,
   ante, p. 839. Petition for rehearing and other relief denied.


text:
    November 17, 1971
    No. 71-460.
    Chapman, aka Gardner v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    November 19, 1971
    No. A-507.
    Hammond et al. v. Brown et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, believing that the Ohio anti-rioting statutes, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.52 to 2923.54 (Supp. 1970), on their face seem overly broad and prima facie infringe on freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment, would grant stay for reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 58.


text:
    No. A-516.
    No. A-523.
    Hanrahan v. State Electoral Board of Illinois et al.; and Germano et al. v. State Electoral Board of Illinois.
   D. C. N. D. Ill. Applications for stay presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications.


text:
    November 22, 1971
    No. 71-5337.
    Fullington et al. v. Shea, Director, Colorado Department of Social Services, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted and judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5363.
    Kirkwood v. Winstead, Commissioner of Public Welfare, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct, Miss, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. A-520.
    In re Disbarment of Samples.
   It is ordered that Franklin P. Samples, of Huntsville, Alabama, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. A-521.
    In re Disbarment of Freel.
   It is ordered that Frederick J. Freel, of Kansas City, Missouri, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. A-522.
    In re Resignation of Pratt.
   The request of John E. Pratt, of Boynton Beach, Florida, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice in this Court is granted.


text:
    No. 70-34.
    Sierra Club v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C, A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Motion of Environmental Defense Fund for leave to file reply brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 70-153.
    United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. (Plamondon et al., real parties in interest).
   C, A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 403 U. S. 930.] Motion of Plamondon et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 70-5025.
    Haines v. Kerner et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir, [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 954.] Motion of Boston College Center for Corrections & the Law for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and motion to dispense with printing granted.


text:
    No. 71-93.
    Howard et al. v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., Inc., et al.,
   ante, p. 897. Motion of respondent Florida East Coast Railway Co., Inc., for damages denied.

Mr, Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. A-411 (71-384).
    Klein v. Bower et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir, Application for vacation of preliminary injunction denied.


text:
    No. 71-5321.
    No. 71-5334.
    Kinnell v. Gaffney, Warden; and Newman v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-5078.
    Peters v. Kiff, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-5282.
    Littlejohn v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5330.
    Schill v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5339.
    Knowles v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5351.
    Turley v. Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5385.
    Rutherford v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5032.
    Reynolds v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5039.
    Miller v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5053.
    No. 71-5434.
    Hardin v. United States; and Hardin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 71-5434, 446 F. 2d 148.


text:
    No. 71-5054.
    Oakes v. Vermont.
   Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5058.
    Woods et ux. v. Department of Social Services.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5059.
    Newman v. Estelle, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5063.
    Fahy et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5084.
    Matthews v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5207.
    Brooks v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5320.
    Gephart v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5322.
    Perry v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5323.
    Williams et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5324.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5325.
    Panzavecchia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5328.
    Verdugo-Medina v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5329.
    Harden, aka Brown v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5330.
    Misenhimer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5331.
    Bryant et al. v. Carleson, Director, Department of Social Welfare of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5332.
    Rubin v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5333.
    Meachum v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5338.
    Tonsul et al. v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5340.
    Washington v. Yeager, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5341.
    Stafford v. NAA Employees Federal Credit Union et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5344.
    Wiseman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5345.
    Lipscomb v. Chenault.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5346.
    Hicks v. Picard, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5347.
    Pope v. Hendrick, Prisons Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5348.
    Crispin v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5350.
    Clark v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5351.
    Wilkinson v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5354.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 70-5233.
    Donaldson v. California.
    Mr. Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.
   Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs,

dissenting.

The Court today denies certiorari to a black man who stands convicted by an all-white jury which had been selected through a process which petitioner alleges methodically excluded members of minority racial groups. The most pernicious of the practices used to exclude black and Chicano jurors was what purported to be an intelligence test which, because of its cultural bias and its blatant unreliability, excluded nearly 50% of the otherwise qualified prospective jurors from minority groups. We would all agree that the brand of justice received in our courts should not depend upon the color of one’s skin and that the selection of jury panels should not be tainted by the exclusion of racial groups. With all respect, I fear precisely that result has obtained in the case.

Petitioner was convicted of the unlawful possession of marihuana. The State’s evidence consisted of the testimony of two white police officers that they observed and smelled petitioner smoking a marihuana cigarette and that he dropped the cigarette on the ground before he was arrested. Petitioner steadfastly denied his guilt. He offered witnesses who “testified that, because of an obstruction, it was not possible to see” the area where petitioner was allegedly smoking marihuana, who supported his story “that no one was smoking marihuana,” and who gave credence to the apparent theory of the defense that a black man was being framed by white' police officers. People v. Donaldson, Crim. No. 17615 (Ct. App. Cal., Dec. 21, 1970, unpublished opinion).

The issue for the jury was the relative credibility of two white police officers and the four black defense witnesses. Cf. Note, 79 Yale L. J. 531 (1970). That this question was close is indicated by the fact that after some 514 hours of deliberation the jury reported itself deadlocked eight-to-four and an Allen charge was then given. See Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896). It took an additional hour of deliberation before the jury resolved the credibility issue against petitioner and returned a verdict of guilty.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that petitioner, as a black, had no standing to challenge the exclusion of Chicanos from the jury panel, that the exclusion of racial minorities was unintentional and that, in any event, it did not deny equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court of California denied a petition for a hearing and petitioner now seeks a writ of certiorari.

The culturally biased intelligence test used in this case excludes almost half of the otherwise qualified prospective jurors from minority groups. It is also argued that members of racial minority groups are effectively barred from jury service by (1) the selection of prospective jurors solely from voter registration lists despite the significantly lower incidence of registration by blacks and Chicanos, (2) the absence of any follow-up procedures to correct for the high frequency with which blacks and Chicanos fail to respond to jury service notices, and (3) the token $5 per diem paid jurors which precludes those in low economic strata from serving as jurors.

Petitioner concludes that “[i]n the 1968 South District Jury Draw [from which his jury was selected], the cumulative effect of the . . . selection procedures . . . was such that the percentage selected from a white middle-class comparison area was IS times as great as the percentage selected from a low-income black comparison area, and the exclusion of low-income Mexican-Americans was virtually total.” The opinion of the Court of Appeal and the argument of the respondent do not, in my mind, sufficiently rebut the prima facie showing petitioner has made that he has been denied the equal protection of the laws by his conviction by a jury selected through racially biased procedures. “If there has been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 132 (1940). It would seem enough, therefore, to reverse this conviction out of hand because of the racial bias built into the jury selection and because of the improper legal standard applied by the court below.

The test in question was drafted in 1935 and it consists of some 33 questions designed to measure vocabulary and reading comprehension. The Jury Commissioner testified that it was administered “[t]o see if a prospective juror has sufficient knowledge of the English language,” but expert scientific testimony indicated that the test was “not a good measure ... of average verbal ability.” The author of the examination, Psychology Professor Dr. Neil Warren, testified that he validated the test and established the passing score by administering it to some 100 to 200 white middle-class college students. Over the years, the test questions themselves have remained unchanged despite changes in the common vocabulary. At some point, however, the test was divided into two parts and, for some inexplicable reason, the passing grade was changed. Dr. Warren testified that these changes would “reduce the reliability to the point where [he] would not want to condone the results.” Another expert witness testified that the test was “completely arbitrary to use in its present form.”

While the test may have been unreliable as a measure of juror competence, it effectively excluded minority group members from jury service. The rate of failure in minority group areas was almost four times that in a white, middle-class comparison area:

Area Failure Rate
Long Beach (white, middle-class).... 13% (14/106)
Wilmington (48% Spanish surname) and San Pedro (41% Mexican-American and 11% black). 45%> (23/51)
Central Long Beach (55% black).... 48% (12/25)
District-wide . 18% (349/1937)

It would seem that this device is ill-suited to serve any legitimate state interest and does serve to exclude from jury panels significantly disproportionate numbers of minority groups. The Constitution does not, of course, require racially balanced juries because, in our pluralistic society, a group of 12 men and women could not possibly represent all of the ethnic, racial, and economic groups which compose our diverse culture. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 208 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 286-287 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945). What the Constitution demands, however, is that no such groups be consciously excluded from the selection process. See Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 (1940); 5 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, Justice 89-103 (1961).

What the facts might show after oral argument, no one knows. I would hold constitutionally infirm a conviction returned by a jury from which a disproportionately large number of minority group members were excluded through the use of a culturally biased intelligence test where the test is shown to be unreliable as a measure of jury competence. There is a prima facie showing that this test is vulnerable. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING

A comparison of the number of jurors approved from white, Chicano, and black residential, areas indicates the discriminatory effect of the jury selection method used here:
Long Beach (white, middle-class) Wilmington (48% Spanish surname) Central Long Beach (55% black)
Median family income. $14,252 $6,584 $6,534
Total population. 20,215 36,796 26,400
Population over 21. 11,522 18,002 13,423
Registered voters (percent of those over 21) 8,991 (78%) 8,945 (41%) 5,747 (43%)
Notices sent (percent of registered voters).. 315 (3.50%) 163 (1.82%) 110 (1.91%)
Responses received (percent of notices). 216 (65%) 68 (42%) 46 (42%)
Approved by jury commission. 83 13 12

       Such reasoning is contrary to Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946), where we said, “[R]eversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection. . . . The injury is not limited to the defendant — there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.”

       Even if it were assumed that these exclusions were the unavoidable consequences of Los Angeles’ method of jury selection, it does not follow that jury panels must be racially unrepresentative of the community. The names of prospective jurors are selected by a computer from voter registration lists. With modern sampling techniques, it would be a simple matter to program the computer so that its initial selection of names would — after the operation of these exclusions — yield a racially representative jury panel. Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 Md. L. Rev. 205, 214 (1962).
      “A selection system which is economically and racially unbalanced by the application of juror quality tests can produce representative panels if a larger percentage of those population segments which tend to fail the tests is considered for jury service so that a fair proportion of their members survive the selection process.” Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235, 315 (1968).

       See Appendix to this opinion.

       The Court of Appeal argues, for example, that “[t]he poor, the Blacks and Mexiean-Americans have the power to register to vote, and voter registration is free and relatively uncomplicated.” Be this as it may, this argument is unresponsive to petitioner’s contention that jurors are selected from lists which are racially unbalanced.

       Evidence was adduced at trial which indicated that, even apart from the unsupported changes in the grading of the examination, the test was likely invalid solely because of its vintage and the unrepresentative sample used to validate it in 1935.


text:
    No. 70-5379.
    Riddell v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurs,

dissenting.

Over the dissents of Justices Black, Brennan, and Marshall, and myself, this Court last Term held that statements elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), may nevertheless be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant whose testimony in his own behalf is inconsistent with those statements. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). Denial of certiorari in this case illustrates the rewards that flow to those police interrogators who, deliberately or otherwise, ignore the restrictions placed upon them by Miranda — restrictions necessary to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination and to insure the reliability of statements elicited in the police-dominated atmosphere of an incommunicado custodial interrogation.

Petitioner Riddell was convicted in state court of assault. The facts are undisputed. In the course of an argument over the conduct of a neighbor’s dog, a rifle carried by Mr. Riddell discharged, the bullet striking his neighbor in the foot. The only real issue at trial was that of intent. Testifying in his own defense, Mr. Rid-dell said he did not intend that the rifle go off, and did not have his finger on the trigger when it fired. On cross-examination, however, the prosecution was permitted to confront Mr. Riddell with a statement elicited from him, in violation of Miranda, in which he told the police “I cocked the hammer and pulled the trigger. I thought the rifle was aimed towards the ground and only intended to scare Mr. Lewis.” This statement was virtually a direct admission of the only element of the offense at issue; and though it was introduced for the “limited purpose” of “impeachment,” it was certain to have a prejudicial, if not conclusive, effect on the jury.

The possibility of using illegally obtained incriminating statements at trial, for any purpose, raises grave questions concerning police noncompliance with Miranda. It is undeniable that Miranda was predicated in part upon a deep concern for discouraging coercive police practices. Eleven pages of the opinion are devoted to an examination of police interrogation procedures. They compel the conclusion that

“without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of. crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” 384 U. S., at 467.

It is, of course, just this kind of testimonial compulsion that the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, proscribes.

There is widespread agreement that police interrogation procedures are sensitive to the mandates of the courts:

“[T]he predominant incentive for interrogation is to obtain evidence for use in court. Consequently, police conduct in this area is likely to be responsive to judicial rules governing the admissibility of that evidence. ‘There can be no doubt,’ the President’s Crime Commission reported, that the Supreme Court’s rulings about interrogation procedures ‘had much to do with the fact that today the third degree is almost nonexistent.’ ”

Oaks, Studying The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 722 (1970). See also J. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (1968). Thus, to the extent that the use of incriminating statements elicited in violation of constitutional safeguards is prohibited, the police have no incentive to attempt to circumvent those safeguards.

There is the view that the use of Miranda-violative statements does not affect the “fundamental fairness” of the courtroom trial. I cannot accept this position. The lesson of Miranda is that the effective determination of guilt all too often rests on the ruses and stratagems employed in an incommunicado police interrogation, not on the evidence and testimony elicited in the impartial surroundings of a trial court.

Yet, after Harris, there is no longer any real incentive for police to obey Miranda. Credibility is always an issue when an accused takes the stand in his own defense. The license granted by the Harris majority to use Miranda-violative statements for impeachment purposes, therefore, foreshadows the possible use of tainted statements in almost every case. This opens the door to a calculated risk by police interrogators. If, in response to Miranda warnings, an accused indicates he wishes to have an attorney present during questioning, the request may be ignored with virtual impunity. If a damaging statement is thereafter forthcoming, it may almost certainly be used against the accused if he later elects to take the stand in his own defense. Moreover, the risk is minimal that the inability to use the statement in the prosecution’s case in chief will result in a dismissal of the charges or a directed verdict of acquittal. Unlike other situations in which exclusionary rules operate to exclude illegally obtained physical evidence, it is seldom that a prima facie case requires corroboration from the lips of the accused.

The accused may take cold comfort in the fact that if he does take the stand, the tainted statements may only be used for “impeachment.” We have often noted the impossible task that faces a jury instructed to close its eyes to the fact that evidence introduced for a limited purpose is highly damaging on the ultimate issue of guilt as well. “The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 453 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 575 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368.

It is no answer to say, as did the majority in Harris, that the privilege against self-incrimination “cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.” 401 U. S., at 225. As we said in Miranda, the presence of counsel during police questioning may help “to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial.” 384 U. S., at 470. A statement made in the inherently coercive, police-dominated atmosphere denounced in Miranda is not so reliable that we can safely ignore its implicit involuntariness and the critical burden the use of such a statement places upon the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The exclusionary rule is a recognition that the vision of law enforcement authorities is often narrowed by their total immersion in the never-ending war against crime. If we permit the legitimate desire to win that war to undermine constitutional guarantees of liberty, our victory will indeed be fleeting. I would grant this petition.

      This view is reflected in draft legislation recently submitted by the Justice Department to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. The proposed legislation would restrict federal habeas corpus relief to constitutional rights which have as their “primary purpose the protection of the reliability of either the factfinding process at the trial or the appellate process on appeal .from the judgment of conviction.” Habeas Corpus Amendments of the Department of Justice, Letter to Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Oct. 19, 1971, Appendix ii. The covering letter expressly refers to the use of Mirareda-violative statements as a claim which would be barred under the proposed amendments. Letter 16. But see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York, 80 Yale L. J. 1198 (1971).


text:
    No. 71-5029.
    Singleton v. Deegan, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted to review question whether search of bedroom bureau was incident to arrest of petitioner in basement when he was at time of the search outside house in a police car.


text:
    No. 71-5030.
    Huffman v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5317.
    McCormick v. Selective Service Local Board No. 41 et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5326.
    Felan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5336.
    Sanney v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5343.
    Macias v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5349.
    Buchanan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5352.
    Baca v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5040.
    McKenzie v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied as untimely.


text:
    No. 71-5319.
    King v. Saddleback Junior College District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 70-219.
    No. 70-5180.
    No. 71-270.
    No. 71-5125.
    Muncaster v. United States, Hinkle v. Smith, Governor of Texas, et al., Ken Aker, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, Dorrough v. United States,
   ante, p. 827;

ante, p. 910;

ante, p. 912; and

ante, p. 915. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-5192.
    No. 70-5212.
    No. 70-5364.
    Spencer v. Eyman, Warden, Brooks v. United States, Manuel v. American National Trust et al.,
   ante, p. 838;

ante, p. 839; and

ante, p. 846. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 24, 1971
    No. 71-323.
    Terry v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    December 3, 1971
    No. A-577.
    Chandler, U. S. District Judge v. O'Bryan.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for extension of time to file petition for writ of certiorari and stay of mandate presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, granted. It is ordered that the time for filing petition for writ of certiorari be extended, and the mandate be stayed until January 7, 1972. If petition for writ of certiorari be filed on or before January 7, 1972, then mandate is further stayed pending disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    December 7, 1971
    No. 70-12.
    Bartley et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Ky. Judgment holding constitutional § 224 of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S- C. § 424a, affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents on basis of his dissent in Richardson v. Belcher, ante, p. 78, at 84.


text:
    No. 71-306.
    Carleson, Director of Department of Social Welfare, et al. v. Taylor et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 71-436.
    Emhart Corp. v. Pennsylvania.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-457.
    Village of West Milwaukee et al. v. Area Board of Vocational, Technical & Adult Education (District 9).
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-475.
    Hoffman v. Carson, Sheriff, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. A-544.
    Dadurian v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Application for bail and/or stay of mandate presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that the application should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-18.
    Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 402 U. S. 941.] Motion of appellee to postpone oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 70-55.
    Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. New Left Education Project et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 401 U. S. 935.] Motion of appellant to postpone oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 70-5015.
    Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 908.] Motion of Bruce S. Rogow for leave to permit J. Michael Shea to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 70-5025.
    Haines v. Kerner et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 954.] Motions of National Law Office of the National Legal Aid & Defenders Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and to dispense with printing granted.


text:
    No. 70-5146.
    Beasley v. United States,
   ante, p. 866. Order dated November 16, 1971 [ante, p. 960], denying petition for rehearing is vacated pending further order of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-11.
    James, Judicial Administrator, et al. v. Strange.
   Appeal from D. C. Kan. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-422.
    Lake Carriers’ Assn. et al. v. MacMullan et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Mich. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 70-220.
    Caplin, Trustee v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-314.
    Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-41.
    International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Flair Builders, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-81.
    United States v. Biswell.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-257.
    Grubbs, dba T. R. Grubbs Tire & Appliance v. General Electric Credit Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-431.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Vitales.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-452.
    Healy et al. v. James et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 70-285.
    Alpha Chi Omega et al. v. Rader.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-301.
    Phelps v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-109.
    Swanquist et al. v. Livingston et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-159.
    First National Bank in Palm Beach et al., Trustees v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-279.
    Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, Commissioner of Department of Environmental Conservation of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-344.
    16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible Starter Guns et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-350.
    Miami Beach First National Bank, Executor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-380.
    Ironworkers Local 86 et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-384.
    Klein v. Bower et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-390.
    Bessesen et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-393.
    Dowell et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-394.
    Lloyd et ux. v. City of Fort Pierce.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-398.
    Thompson et ux. v. Clark et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-402.
    Otto v. Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-406.
    Mischlich v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-407.
    Polisher v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-409.
    Collins v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-432.
    Cobb v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied..