author: Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice White,

text:
    HOPKINS v. COHEN, ACTING SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE.
    No. 276.
    Argued March 11-12, 1968.
    Decided April 2, 1968.

      Allen Sharp and Harold H. Gearinger argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the briefs was Israel Steingold.

      Harris Weinstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Weisl and Morton Hollander.

   Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the ceiling on an attorney’s fee under §206 (b)(1) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 79 Stat. 403, 42 U. S. C. §406 (b)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. II), is based on the benefits received by the claimant alone or may be based also on the benefits that other dependent members of his family receive by virtue of the claimant’s disability.

Respondent ruled that petitioner was not totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the Act. The District Court reversed and awarded the claimant’s attorney a fee equal to 25% of the benefits accruing to the claimant alone. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 374 P. 2d 726. Because its ruling as to attorney fees conflicted with decisions of the Fourth Circuit (see Redden v. Celebrezze, 361 F. 2d 815; Lambert v. Celebrezze, 361 F. 2d 677), we granted the petition for certiorari. 389 U. S. 811.

The disabled claimant qualifies under § 223 of the Act (42 U. S. C. § 423 (1964 ed., Supp. II)) and figures his primary benefits under § 215 of the Act (42 U. S. C. §415 (1964 ed., Supp. II)).

The claimants who receive benefits as relatives of the disabled person who qualifies under § 223, figure their eligibility and amount of benefits under § 202 of the Act (42 U. S. C. §402 (1964 ed., Supp. II); wife, § 202 (b); child, § 202 (d); widow, § 202 (e); widower, § 202 (f); mother, § 202(g); parent, § 202 (h)).

Section 202 of the Act describes in (b)(1) and (b)(2) the benefits payable to the wife on the disability of the husband, and in (d) (1) and (d) (2) the disability benefits of the child of the disabled claimant. The wife (§ 202 (b)(1)(A)) and the child (§ 202 (d)(1)(A)) may file for these benefits. But they need not always do so themselves, for the Act makes the right to such benefits dependent primarily on the status and condition of those dependent persons.

The wife and child each compute their benefits on the basis of a percentage share of the disabled claimant’s primary benefits determined under § 223. See §§ 202 (b)(2) and 202 (d)(2). The maximum family benefit depends upon the amount of the primary benefit to which the disabled claimant is entitled. See §§ 215 (a) and 203 (a). The scheme of the Act thus proceeds from a recognition of an intimate relationship between the varying amounts of benefits due the disabled claimant and his dependents.

Hopkins was receiving disability payments under § 223 between March 1961 and December 1962; his wife and two children were also receiving benefits during this same period as dependents of a recipient of disability payments (§ 202). In December 1962 these benefits were terminated, on the ground that petitioner was no longer “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies, and then sought review in the District Court. The District Court’s order reversed the administrative decision as to disability.

And pursuant to this order the Director of the Bureau of Disability Insurance wrote petitioner as follows:

“Based on the recent amendments to the Social Security Act, you are entitled to receive $123.10. Your wife and the two children are each entitled to receive $51.50. These new monthly rates are effective beginning January 1965.
“Section 206 (b)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that [y]our attornéy may ask the court to approve a fee not to exceed 25 percent of past-benefits due you. We are, therefore, withholding the amount of $936.20, which represents 25 percent of your past-due benefits of $3,744.00 pending action by the court on the amount of the attorney fee. The amount withheld will be applied against the fee set by the court and will be mailed directly to your attorney; any remaining amount will be sent to you.
“Benefit payments for you and your wife will continue to be combined. The next husband-wife check will be for $5,032.60. This represents payment for January 1963 through December 1965. You will receive this check within a few days. After that, the regular monthly check for $174.60 will be sent shortly after the month for which, it is payable.
“The children’s check for the period of January 1963 through December 1963, [sic], in the amount of $3,463.50, will be sent to you shortly. After that, their monthly, regular check for $103.00 will be sent to you as usual.”

Section 206 (b)(1), restricting the amount of an attorney’s fee, speaks of “the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” Respondent argues that only a plaintiff can satisfy such a description, not a non-party. It is also urged that dependents who are not joined as parties have not received a judgment and that the benefits accruing to the wife and the children are not benefits to which the husband, the only claimant, is “entitled” within the meaning of § 206 (b)(1).

That seems to us to be too technical a construction of the Act which we need not adopt. In this instance, proof of the husband’s “claim” results in a package of benefits to his immediate family; and those benefits inure to the benefit of the head of the family who files the “claim.”

The legislative history of §206 (b)(1) speaks of the desire of Congress to reduce “contingent fee” arrangements and to restrict an attorney’s fee to an amount “not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits.” We find nothing in the history of § 206 (b)(1) that would likewise restrict those “accrued benefits” to amounts owed the claimant, as distinguished from his dependents, viz., the wife and the children.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan join,

dissenting.

As the Court recognizes, §206 (b)(1) entitles the attorney of a Social Security benefits claimant to a fee “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Court characterizes the normal and natural reading of this language as “too technical a construction . . . which we need not adopt.” From the undisputed fact that benefits accruing to the dependents of a claimant inure to the benefit of the claimant as head of the family, the Court seems to conclude that it may read “claimant” to mean “claimant and his dependents.” Because I see no justification for this result, either in the language of the statute or its history, I dissent.

Section 206 (b)(1) deals with the attorney’s fees payable with respect to “a claimant under this title who was represented before the court by an attorney . . . The attorney may receive no more than 25% of the benefits payable to such a claimant “by reason of such judgment . . . .” Only plaintiffs can meet the §206 (b)(1) definition of a “claimant.” Therefore, dependents who are not joined as parties in a suit for past-due benefits are not “claimants,” for they are not before the court, are not represented in court, and do not receive a judgment. In this case only petitioner, and not his wife and children, was the plaintiff in the court below. As is true in most such cases, petitioner’s wife and children were determined in separate administrative proceedings to be dependents eligible for secondary benefits under § 202. Their entitlement to § 202 benefits should petitioner be found entitled to benefits under § 223 was not disputed and was not an issue before the court below. Since petitioner was the sole claimant before the court, and the only party for whom his lawyer provided representation in that court, I cannot escape the conclusion that the lawyer was only entitled to a maximum of 25% of the past-due benefits payable to petitioner. The situation might well be different in a case where the dependents were active plaintiffs before the court and where the primary claimant’s attorney provided effective representation for the secondary claimants as well.

As the Court makes clear, the purpose of § 206 (b) (1) was to reduce contingent fee arrangements by limiting the maximum fees recoverable by attorneys. The Court somehow concludes that this clear legislative purpose militates for a construction of the statute which is against its clear wording and which has the result of once again permitting attorneys to obtain a very high percentage of the benefits payable to Social Security claimants. The legislative history, however, supports the plain language of the statute. Indeed, the Court fails to mention that this very case was generated initially by a claim made by petitioner’s lawyer that a contingent fee contract signed by petitioner, which would have given his lawyer 40% of the award, should be given effect because entered into prior to the passage of §206 (b)(1). It was just such contingent fees that Congress meant to prohibit. By its present ruling the Court gives mere lip service to the legislative mandate while effectively undoing it in practice. For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.

       42 U. S. C. § 466 (b) (1) presently provides:
      “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an' attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Secretary may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (i) of this title, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such judgment, no other fee may _ be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.”

       “Petitioner,” as used in this opinion, refers to Raymond Hopkins, the Social Security claimant. The interest involved in the case, as it reaches this Court on the issue of the proper amount of the attorney’s fee, is, however, that of Hopkins’ attorney, Allen Sharp.

       See 20 CFB §§ 404.603-404.604. Nor are the wife and children required to become parties to proceedings on review of an administrative determination. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 405 (b) and (g); and 20 CFR §§404.909-404.910; 404.916-404.919 ; 404.945; 404.951.

       The Social Security Amendments of 1967 changed former § 202 (b) to read:
      “Except as provided in subsection (q), such wife's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to whichever of the following is the smaller: (A) one-half of the primary insurance amount of her husband (or, in the case of a divorced wife, her former husband) for such month, or (B) $105.” Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 103 (Jan. 2, 1968).

       The record reveals that petitioner applied for benefits for his two children in his initial application for disability payments. Although that application did not encompass a claim for benefits on behalf of his wife, it is made clear in the application that his wife was also applying for benefits. It does not appear, however, whether the separate application for wife’s benefits was filed by her or by petitioner on her behalf. See n. 3, supra. No question is raised concerning the propriety of the claims that were filed. Nor is this a case where any question has been raised concerning the right of the wife or children to benefits. Rather, the wife and children had been receiving them as dependents of a disabled person until they were terminated by respondent’s erroneous decision that the husband was no longer disabled. When that decision was reversed by the District Court, the only impediment standing in the way of the receipt of past-due benefits by the wife and children was removed. In a realistic sense, then, the attorney was- representing fully the interests of the wife and children when he litigated the question of the husband’s disability.

       S. Rep. No. 404, Pt. I, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 122.
      “It has come to the attention of the committee that attorneys have upon occasion charged what appear to be inordinately large fees for representing claimants in Federal district court actions arising under the social security program. Usually, these large fees result from a contingent-fee arrangement under which the attorney is entitled to a percentage (frequently one-third to one-half) of the accrued benefits. Since litigation necessarily involves a considerable lapse of time, in many cases large amounts of accrued benefits, and consequently large legal fees, are payable if the claimant wins his case.
      “The committee bill would provide that whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant, it would have express authority to allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee, not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits, for services rendered in connection with the claim; no other fee would be payable. . .


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Black

license: Public Domain

text:
    EDWARDS v. PACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS CO.
    No. 465.
    Argued March 14, 1968.
    Decided April 8, 1968.

      Arne Werchick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David S. Levinson.

      John J. Corrigan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Donald O. Roy.

      Clifton Hildebrand filed a brief for the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal.
   Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Employers’ Liability Act provides that every common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages for the injury or death of its employees resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the railroad or its agents or resulting from defects in its equipment due to its negligence. The question in this case is whether the respondent Pacific Fruit Express Company is a “common carrier by railroad.”

The respondent is the largest company of its kind in the United States. It owns, maintains, and leases refrigerator cars to railroads to transport perishable products in commerce. Because it repairs its own cars, it also owns buildings, plants, switching tracks, and equipment to make these repairs. While the railroads to which its cars are leased transport them as directed, the respondent Express Company reserves the right to have the cars diverted to carry out its own business plans. The petitioner Edwards works as an iceman at one of respondent’s repair and concentration plants. His duties are to transport ice and help store it in cars for carriage by the railroads. While driving a company motor vehicle in the performance of his duty as an employee for respondent, he was thrown violently to the ground, covered with burning gasoline and severely burned. He later brought this action against respondent, charging it was a “common carrier by railroad” and liable for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Contending that it was not a railroad within the meaning of the Act, respondent company moved for a summary judgment which the District Court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 378 F. 2d 54, and we granted cer-tiorari. 389 U. S. 912. We agree with both courts and affirm.

In conducting its business of providing and servicing insulated railroad cars for the carriage of perishable commodities, it is undoubtedly true that respondent performs some railroad functions. For example, it maintains and takes care of railroad cars which are leased to railroads for transportation in interstate commerce. It services these cars while in transit and controls their eventual destination. And respondent has yards and facilities for the repair and storage of its refrigerator cars. The question is whether such functions as these are sufficient to constitute respondent a “common carrier by railroad.” For the answer to this question we must look to past judicial decisions interpreting the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and also the legislative history surrounding the Act.

This Court has held that the words “common carrier by railroad” mean “one who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for the public, — that is to say, a railroad company acting as a common carrier. This view not only is in accord with the ordinary acceptation of the words, but is enforced by the mention of cars, engines, track, roadbed and other property pertaining to a going railroad . . . .” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 187-188. (Emphasis added.) This interpretation of the Act with its references to “operat[ing] a railroad” and a “going railroad” would indicate that the business of renting refrigerator cars to railroads or shippers and providing protective service in the transportation of perishable commodities is not of itself that of a “common carrier by railroad.” And indeed the Wells Fargo decision held that express companies were not within the coverage of the Act. In an even earlier case, Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, this Court held that a Pullman car porter was not an employee of a railroad, hence, not within the coverage of the Act. These decisions are based on the rationale that there exist a number of activities and facilities which, while used in conjunction with railroads and closely related to railroading, are yet not railroading itself. In fact, this Court pointed out in the Robinson case, in discussing the coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, that, “It was well known that there were on interstate trains persons engaged in various services for other masters. Congress, familiar with this situation, did not use any appropriate expression which could be taken to indicate a purpose to include such persons among those to whom the railroad company was to be liable under the Act.” 237 U. S., at 94.

In 1939 Congress substantially amended the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Because of such decisions as Wells Fargo, supra, and Robinson, supra, one of the proposed amendments would have changed the coverage language of § 1 of the Act to read as follows: “Every common carrier by railroad, including every express company, freight forwarding company, and sleeping-car company, engaged in commerce . . . .” Obviously the proposal was designed to nullify this Court’s construction of the Act which had excluded employees of sleeping-car companies and express companies. In committee the proposal received little support and was even opposed by certain segments of organized labor, and it failed to pass. By refusing to broaden the meaning of railroads, Congress declined to extend the coverage of the Act to activities and facilities intimately associated with the business of common carrier by railroad.

Equally significant is the fact that in the years immediately preceding the 1939 amendment to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Congress had enacted other major labor and social transportation legislation in which refrigerator car companies were expressly included. For example, in the decade of the 1930’s Congress passed the following Acts which specifically extend coverage to “any company . . . which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service ... in connection with . . . refrigeration or icing ... of property transported by railroad . . (1) An amendment to the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151. The Act as originally passed, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), did not specifically include refrigerator car companies. Congress amended it to do so. (2) The Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1283, held unconstitutional in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935). (3) The Railroad Retirement Act (1935), 49 Stat. 967, and (4) The Carriers’ Taxing Act, 49 Stat. 974 (1935), both of which were passed to overcome the constitutional objection to the Act of 1934. (5) The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, 45 U. S. C. § 228a et seq. (1937). (6) The Carriers’ Taxing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 435. (7) The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U. S. C. § 351 et seq. (1938). Yet in 1939, when it came to the amendment of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Congress made no mention of refrigerator car companies.

In light of this history it is not surprising that there are only four reported cases where suits have been filed alleging that refrigerator car companies like respondent are covered by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act— all refusing to hold liability under the Act. The first was Gaulden v. Southern Pacific Co., 174 F. 2d 1022 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1949), where suit was brought by an iceman employed by the very refrigerator car company involved here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s opinion (78 F. Supp. 651) holding that such a refrigerator car company was not a “common carrier by railroad.” In a subsequent case the Third Circuit, citing the Gaulden opinion, held that another refrigerator car company “which conducted a business similar in all critical aspects to that of” Pacific Fruit Express Company, was not a “common carrier by railroad.” Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 346 F. 2d 947 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1965). There have also been two state cases involving this very respondent which denied liability. In both Aguirre v. Southern Pacific Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73, and Moleton v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 107, 219 P. 2d 1080, cert. denied, 340 U. S. 932, the courts concluded that respondent was not a “common' carrier by railroad.”

Thus, for 60 years the Federal Employers’ Liability Act has been administered with the understanding that refrigerator car companies are not included within the terms of the Act. During that time injured employees have been taken care of under state compensation laws. In fact the petitioner here has already drawn more than $6,000 under the California compensation law. The question of whether employees shall rely on state compensation or on the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is a pure question of legislative policy, concerning which apparently even the labor organizations most interested have been divided. Under these circumstances we do not think this Court should depart from 60 years of history to do what is a job for Congress.

Affirmed.

       35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51.

       Express companies were again excluded in the subsequent case of Jones v. New York Cent. R. Co., 182 F. 2d 326 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1950), relying on the Wells Fargo decision.

       S. 1708, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).

       Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Amending the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 57, 58 (1939).


author: Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice White,

text:
    IN RE RUFFALO.
    No. 73.
    Argued March 4, 1968.
    Decided April 8, 1968.

      Craig Spangenberg argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Thomas V. Koykka argued the cause for the Ohio State and Mahoning County Bar Associations. With him on the brief were Samuel T. Gaines, Walter A. Porter, P. Paul Pusateri and Henry C. Robinson.

   Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was ordered indefinitely suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of Ohio on two findings of alleged misconduct. Mahoning County Bar Assn. v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N. E. 2d 396. That order became final and is not here on review. The Federal District Court, after ordering petitioner to show cause why he should not be disbarred, found that there was no misconduct. In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432 (D. C. N. D. Ohio). The Court of Appeals likewise ordered petitioner to show cause why he should not be stricken from the roll of that court on the basis of Ohio’s disbarment order. The majority held that while one of the two charges might not justify discipline, the other one did; and it disbarred petitioner from practice in that Court. 370 F. 2d 447 (C. A. 6th Cir.). The dissenting judge thought that neither charge justified suspension from practice. Id., at 460. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 389 U. S. 815.

Petitioner was an active trial lawyer who handled many Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases. The Association of American Railroads investigated his handling of claims and referred charges of impropriety to the President of the Mahoning County Bar Association who was also local counsel for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. See In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432, 435, n. 3. The Mahoning County Bar Association then filed the charges against petitioner.

In the state court proceedings, upon which the decision of the Court of Appeals relied (see Rule 6 (3) of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline originally charged petitioner with 12 counts of misconduct. Charges Nos. 4 and 5 accused petitioner of soliciting FELA plaintiffs as clients through an agent, Michael Orlando. At the hearings which followed, both Orlando and petitioner testified that Orlando did not solicit clients for petitioner but merely investigated FELA cases for him. It was brought out that some of Orlando’s investigations involved cases where his employer, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was defendant. Immediately after hearing this testimony, the Board, on the third day of hearings, added a charge No. 13 against petitioner based on his hiring Orlando to investigate Orlando’s own employer. Counsel for petitioner objected, stating:

“Oh, I object to that very highly. There is nothing morally wrong and there is nothing legally wrong with it. . . . When does the end of these amendments come? I mean the last minute you are here, [counsel for the county Bar Association] may bring in another amendment. I think this gentleman [petitioner] has a right to know beforehand what the charges are against him and be heard on those charges.”

Motion to strike charge No. 13 was denied, but the Board gave petitioner a continuance in order to have time to respond to the new charge.

The State Board found petitioner guilty of seven counts of misconduct, including No. 13. On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio found the evidence sufficient to sustain only two charges, one of them being No. 13, but concluded that the two violations required disbarment. The only charge on which the Court of Appeals acted was No. 13, which reads as follows:

“That Respondent did conspire with one, Michael Orlando, and paid said Michael Orlando moneys for preparing lawsuits against the B. & O. Railroad, the employer of said Michael Orlando, during all the periods of time extending from 1957 to July of 1961, well knowing that said practice was deceptive in its nature and was morally and legally wrong as respects the employee, Michael Orlando, toward his employer, the B. & O. Railroad Company.”

Though admission to practice before a federal court is derivative from membership in a state bar, disbarment by the State does not result in automatic disbarment by the federal court. Though that state action is entitled to respect, it is not conclusively binding on the federal courts. Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278, 281-282.

Petitioner, active in the trial of FELA cases, hired a railroad man to help investigate the cases. He was Orlando, a night-shift car inspector for the Baltimore ■& Ohio Railroad Co. There was no evidence that Orlando ever investigated a case in the yard where he worked as inspector. There was no evidence that he ever investigated on company time. Orlando had no access to confidential information; and there was no claim he ever revealed secret matters or breached any trust. It is clear from the record that petitioner chose a railroad man to help him investigate those claims because Orlando knew railroading.

One federal guidepost in this field is contained in § 10 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as amended, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 60, which was enacted to encourage employees of common carriers to furnish information “to a person in interest,” as to facts incident to the injury or death of an employee.

The Ohio Supreme Court, however, concluded that “one who believes that it is proper to employ and pay another to work against the interests of his regular employer is not qualified to be a member of the Ohio Bar.” 176 Ohio St., at 269, 199 N. E. 2d, at 401.

We are urged to hold that petitioner’s efforts to conceal this employment relationship and the likelihood of a conflict of interest require the federal courts to respect the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court as being within the range of discretion.

We do not pursue that inquiry. Nor do we stop to inquire whether the proceeding was defective because the Bar Association, the agency that made the charges against petitioner, was headed by counsel for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. against which petitioner filed several of his claims. For there is one other issue dispositive of the case which requires reversal.

As noted, the charge (No. 13) for which petitioner stands disbarred was not in the original charges made against him. It was only after both he and Orlando had testified that this additional charge was added. Thereafter, no additional evidence against petitioner relating to charge No. 13 was taken. Rather, counsel for the county bar association said:

“We will stipulate that as far as we are concerned, the only facts that we will introduce in support of Specification No. 13 are the statements that Mr. Ruffalo has made here in open court and the testimony of Mike Orlando from the witness stand. Those are the only facts we have to support this Specification No.. 13.”

There was no de novo hearing before the Court of Appeals. Rather, it rested on the Ohio court’s record and findings:

“We have before us, and have reviewed, the entire record developed by the Ohio, proceedings, but think it proper to dispose of the matter primarily upon the charges on which the Ohio Court disciplined Mr. Ruffalo. The facts as to these are not in dispute. We consider whether we find insupportable the Ohio Court’s determination that such facts disclosed unprofessional conduct warranting the discipline imposed and whether they warrant similar discipline by us.” 370 F. 2d, at 449.

The Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze the “admitted facts of Charge No. 13” as found by the Ohio court and the Ohio court’s ruling on those facts. Id., at 450-452.

If there are any constitutional defects in what the Ohio court did concerning Charge 13, those defects are reflected in what the Court of Appeals decided. The Court of Appeals stated:

“We do not find in the record of the state proceedings, ‘Such an infirmity of proof as to the facts found to have established the want of ... [Ruffalo’s] fair private and professional character’ to lead us to a conviction that we cannot, consistent with our duty, ‘accept as final the conclusion’ of the Supreme Court and the Ohio bar.” Id., at 453.

We turn then to the question whether in Ohio’s procedure there was any lack of due process.

Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511, 515. He is accordingly entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge. See In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273. It was said in Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540, that when proceedings for disbarment are “not taken for matters occurring in open court, in the presence of' the judges, notice should be given to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for explanation and defence.” Therefore, one of the conditions this Court considers in determining whether disbarment by a State should be followed by disbarment here is whether “the state procedure from want of notice or opportunity to be heard was wanting in due process.” Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46, 51.

In the present case petitioner had no notice that his employment of Orlando would be considered a disbarment offense until after both he and Orlando had testified at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of the case. As Judge Edwards, dissenting below, said, “Such procedural violation of due process would never pass muster in any normal civil or criminal litigation.” 370 F. 2d, at 462.

These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 33. The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh.

How the charge would have been met had it been originally included in those leveled against petitioner by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline no one knows.

This absence of fair notice as to the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner of procedural due process.

Reversed.

MR. Justice Black, for reasons stated in the Court’s opinion and many others, agrees with the Court’s judgment and opinion.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring in the result.

I see no need to decide whether the notice given petitioner of the charge that formed the basis of his subsequent federal disbarment was adequate to afford him constitutional due process in the state proceedings. For I think that Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278, leaves us free to hold, as I would, that such notice should not be accepted as adequate for the purposes of disbarment from a federal court. On that basis, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

concurring in the result.

The Court reverses petitioner’s disbarment by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because petitioner had inadequate notice prior to his earlier state disbarment proceeding of the charges which the Mahoning County Bar Association was bringing against him at that proceeding. The state disbarment, however, is not before us. We denied a petition for certiorari seeking review of it. Ruffalo v. Mahoning County Bar Assn., 379 U. S. 931 (1964). Our writ in the instant case extends only to petitioner’s disbarment by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The question therefore is whether the defective notice in petitioner’s state disbarment proceeding so infected that federal proceeding that justice requires reversal of the federal determination.

In answering that question we must inquire into the nature of the proceeding that took place in the Court of Appeals. That court was obligated to determine for itself the facts of the attorney’s conduct and whether that conduct had been so grievous as to require disbarment. Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278 (1957). The Court of Appeals asked petitioner to “show cause if any he has . . . why he should not be stricken from the roll of counsel of this Court.” In response to that order petitioner filed a response and brief. The Ohio State Bar Association filed a brief also, urging petitioner’s disbarment. The cause was argued orally to a panel of the Court of Appeals.

In his brief and oral argument, petitioner did not take issue with the determinations of fact that had been made by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals gave petitioner a full opportunity to assert that the state court had not accurately determined the facts of his conduct — and to assert, had he wished to do so, that the late point at which he learned that employing car inspector Orlando would be one ground for disbarment had prejudiced the factual record formed in the. state court. Petitioner, not disputing the lower court’s factual conclusions, made no such objection. Instead petitioner’s response in the Court of Appeals was that the agreed facts of his conduct were not a sufficient basis for disbarment. In reaching its conclusion on that question the Court of Appeals properly gave weight to the views of the state court judges who had passed on the issue. Petitioner, however, had full and fair opportunity to put to the Court of Appeals his contrary view. I must therefore conclude that no procedural defect supports reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, and that the asserted defect relied upon by the Court, since not raised by petitioner below or here, is not properly before us. I am therefore constrained to deal with the central question posed by this case, whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals, in making the independent determination of petitioner’s fitness to remain a member of its bar mandated by Theard v. United States, supra, to disbar petitioner for having hired an employee of the B. & O. Railroad to investigate facts relevant to damage suits against the railroad brought by other employees who had retained petitioner to represent them. We must determine whether the Court of Appeals satisfied its duty “not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, [it is] constrained so to do.” Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46, 51 (1917).

A relevant inquiry in appraising a decision to disbar is whether the attorney stricken from the rolls can be deemed to have been on notice that the courts would condemn the conduct for which he was removed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had provided petitioner and the other members of its bar with a general standard for disbarment:

“When it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court of record, or has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court, the member will be forthwith suspended from practice before the court and notice of his suspension will be mailed to him, and unless he shows good cause to the contrary within 40 days thereafter, he will be further suspended or disbarred from practice before the court.” Rule 6 (3), Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Even when a disbarment standard is as unspecific as the one before us, members of a bar can be assumed to know that certain kinds of conduct, generally condemned by responsible men, will be grounds for disbarment. This class of conduct certainly includes the criminal offenses traditionally known as malum in se. It also includes conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize as improper for a member of the profession.

The conduct for which the Court of Appeals.disbarred petitioner cannot, however, be so characterized. Some responsible attorneys, like the judge who refused to order petitioner disbarred from practice in the Northern District of Ohio, 249 F. Supp. 432 (1965), would undoubtedly find no impropriety at all in hiring a railroad worker, a man with the knowledge and experience to select relevant information and appraise relevant facts, to “moonlight” — work on his own time — collecting data. On the other hand some, like the officials of the Maho-ning County and Ohio State Bar Associations, would believe that encouraging a man to do work arguably at odds with his chief employer’s interests is unethical. The appraisal of petitioner’s conduct is one about which reasonable men differ, not one immediately apparent to any scrupulous citizen who confronts the question. I would hold that a federal court may not deprive an attorney of the opportunity to practice his profession on the basis of a determination after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety of that conduct. I express no opinion about whether the Court of Appeals, as part of a code of specific rules for the members of its bar, could proscribe the conduct for which petitioner was disbarred.

       After the Court of Appeals decision disbarring petitioner, the District Court, which had deferred a final order pending the decision of the Court of Appeals, suspended petitioner from practice in the District Court. The District Court judge said he had an “abiding conviction” that his prior decision finding no grounds for suspension was correct but concluded that orderly administration of justice required the District Court to defer to its Court of Appeals. The District Court’s order is not before us for review.

       45 U. S. C. § 60 provides in part:
      “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee, shall be void, and whoever, by threat, intimidation, order, rule, contract, regulation, or device whatsoever, shall attempt to prevent any person from furnishing voluntarily such information to a person in interest, or whoever discharges or otherwise disciplines or attempts to discipline any employee for furnishing voluntarily such information to a person in interest, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, for each offense: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to void any contract, rule, or regulation with respect to any information contained in the files of the carrier, or other privileged or confidential reports.”

       Rule 15 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part:
      “A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

       The Ohio State Bar Association and Mahoning County Bar Association, amici curiae in support of the order of the Court of Appeals, argue that there was no due process violation because the State Board gave petitioner several months to respond to charge No. 13. This argument overlooks the fact that serious prejudice to petitioner may well have occurred because of the content of the original 12 specifications of misconduct. He may well have been lulled “into a false sense of security” (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 352) that he could rebut charges Nos. 4 and 5 by proof that Orlando was his investigator rather than a solicitor of clients. In that posture he had “no reason even to suspect” (ibid.) that in doing so he would be, by his own testimony, irrevocably assuring his disbarment under charges not yet made.

       Indeed, petitioner did not suggest to this Court, as a reason for reversal, that he had learned of the ground for disbarment too late in the state court proceeding.

       The Court of Appeals did not apply its rule literally: “We should preliminarily observe that our own Rule 6 (3) ... could be read as automatically striking from our roll of counsel the name of any lawyer disbarred in any court of record. It has been amended and we consider this matter in keeping with the requirements and admonitions of Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278, . . . and Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46 . . . . These decisions forbid Federal Courts from acting in total reliance on a state judgment. We have before us, and have reviewed, the entire record developed by the Ohio proceedings, but think it proper to dispose of the matter primarily upon the charges on which the Ohio Court disciplined Mr. Ruffalo. The facts as to these are not in dispute.” 370 F. 2d 447, 449 (1966) (note omitted).

       As the Court points out, there was no evidence before any of the state or federal courts which appraised petitioner’s conduct that the man he employed had ever investigated a case in the yard where he worked, investigated on company time, or been given access to confidential railroad information.


author: Me. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Stewart,

text:
    AVCO CORP. v. AERO LODGE NO. 735, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS, et al.
    No. 445.
    Argued March 11, 1968.
    Decided April 8, 1968.

      J. Mack Swigert argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Warren G. Sullivan, Don A. Banta,-William Waller, Robert G. McCullough and John B. Hollister.

      Bernard Dunau argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Plato E. Papps, Cecil D. Branstetter and Carrol D. Kilgore.

      Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Jerome Powell, Robert M. Scott and William H. Willcox for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al., and by Herman Lazarus and Harold Jacobs for the Labor Relations Committee of Council of State Chambers of Commerce et al.
    Brief of amicus curiae, urging affirmance, was filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.
   Me. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner filed a suit in a state court in Tennessee to enjoin respondent union and its members and associates from striking at petitioner’s plant. The heart of the complaint was a “no-strike” clause in the collective bargaining agreement by which “grievances” were to be settled amicably or by binding arbitration. The eligibility of employees for promotion engendered disputes— allegedly subject to the grievance procedure — which so far as appears involved no violence or trespass but which resulted in work stoppages and a walkout by employees. The state court issued an ex -parte injunction.

Respondents then moved in the Federal District Court for removal of the case. A motion to remand to the state court was made and denied, the District Court-ruling that the action was within its original jurisdiction. The District Court granted respondents’ motion to dissolve the injunction issued by the Tennessee court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 376 F. 2d 337. We granted the petition for certiorari (389 U. S. 819) because of an apparent conflict between the decision below and American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, 338 F. 2d 837, from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The starting point is § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, which, we held in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, was fashioned by Congress to place sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes. We stated:

“We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. . . . The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.” 353 U. S., at 456-457.

An action arising under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it is brought in a state court. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335; Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95; Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502. Removal is but one aspect of “the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.” See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415-416.

It is thus clear that the claim under this collective bargaining agreement is one arising under the “laws of the United States” within the meaning of the removal statute. 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (b). It likewise seems clear that this suit is within the “original jurisdiction” of the District Court within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441 (a) and (b). It is true that the Court by a 5-to-3 decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, held that although a case was properly in the federal district court by reason of § 301, the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars that court from issuing an injunction in the labor dispute. The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. The relief in § 301 cases varies — from specific performance of the promise to arbitrate (Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra), to enforcement or annulment of an arbitration award (United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593), to an award of compensatory damages (Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238), and the like. See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 199-200. But the breadth or narrowness of the relief which may be granted under federal law in § 301 cases is a distinct question from whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Any error in granting or designing relief “does not go to the jurisdiction of the court.” Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 331. Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 254-255. When the Court in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, supra, at 215, said that dismissal of a count in the complaint asking for an injunction was correct “for lack of jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,” it meant only that the Federal District Court lacked the general equity power to grant the particular relief.

Title 28 U. S. C. § 1337 says that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce . . . It is that original jurisdiction that a § 301 action invokes. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 457.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brennan join,

concurring.

I agree that the case before us was removable to the Federal District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1441.

The District Judge not only denied a motion to remand the case to the state court but also dissolved the state court injunction, and it is only by virtue of the latter order that an appeal was possible at this stage of the litigation. American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, 338 F. 2d 837, 838, n. 2.

As the Court says, it is not clear whether or not the District Judge dissolved the injunction “because [he] felt that action was required by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195,” ante, at 561, n. 4. Accordingly, the Court expressly reserves decision on the effect of Sinclair in the circumstances presented by this case. The Court will, no doubt, have an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair upon an appropriate future occasion.

       28 U. S. C. § 1441 provides in relevant part:
      “Actions removable generally.
      “(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
      “(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. . . .”

       We find it unnecessary to rule on the holding of the Court of Appeals below that “the remedies available in State Courts are limited to the remedies available under Federal law.” 376 F. 2d, at 343. That conclusion would suggest that state courts are precluded by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act from issuing injunctions in labor disputes, even though the defendant does not exercise his right — which we confirm today — to remove the case to the District Court under 28 U. S. C. §1441 (b), and the state court therefore retains jurisdiction over the action. We have no occasion to resolve that matter here, since respondents did elect to have the case removed.

       See A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 346 (1928); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 727-733, 1019-1020 (1953).

       Another question raised here is whether the District Court, to which the action had been removed, should have dissolved the injunction issued by the Tennessee state court. There is, of course, no question of the power of the District Court to dissolve the injunction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1450. Whether it did so because it felt that action was required by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, or because of its equity powers or both is not clear. But the Court of Appeals went much further and said in a dictum that “the remedies available in State Courts are limited to the remedies available under Federal law.” 376 F. 2d, at 343. We reserve decision on those questions 1


author: Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Stewart,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON et al.
    No. 482.
    Argued March 14, 1968.
    Decided April 8, 1968.

      Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Doar.

      Robert B. Thompson, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 917, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Reuben A. Garland.

   Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether conspiracies by outside hoodlums to assault Negroes for exercising their right to equality in public accommodations under § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, are subject only to a civil suit for an injunction as provided in § 204 of that Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3, or whether they are also subject to criminal prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 241, which provides fine and imprisonment for a conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same . . .

The indictment charged a conspiracy to injure and intimidate three Negroes in the exercise of their right to patronize a restaurant. The defendants, who were outsiders, not connected with the restaurant, are charged with having used violence against these Negroes for having received service at the restaurant, the purpose of the conspiracy being in part “to discourage them and other Negro citizens from seeking service” there “on the same basis as white citizens.”

The facts are’ not developed because the District Court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 207 (b) of the Act makes the provision for relief by injunction the exclusive remedy under the Act. The case is here on appeal. 18 U. S. C. § 3731. We noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U. S. 910.

The legislative history contains language which to the District Court seemed to preclude remedy by indictment. Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the bill, explained § 207 (b):

“This would mean, for example, that a proprietor who, in the first instance, legitimately — but erroneously — believes his establishment is not covered by section 201 or 202 need not fear a jail sentence or a damage action if his judgment as to coverage of title II is wrong.” 110 Cong. Rec. 9767.

Senator Young agreed:

“The enforcement provisions of title II are based on the specific prohibition in section 203 against denying or interfering with the right to the nondiscriminatory use of facilities covered by the title. In case of a violation, the aggrieved person would be able to sue for an injunction to end the denial or interference. . . . The prohibitions of title II would be enforced only by civil suits for an injunction. Neither criminal penalties nor the recovery of money damages would be involved.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7384.

Senator Magnuson added:

“Moreover, in every case, a judicial determination of coverage must be made prior to the entry of any order requiring the owner to stop discrimination. Thus, no one would become subject to any contempt sanctions — the only sanctions provided for in the act, until after it has been judicially determined that his establishment is subject to the act and he has been ordered by the Court to end this discrimination, and he has violated that Court order.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7405.

That legislative history makes clear that the “proprietor” or “owner” is not to be subjected to criminal liability, where he has not had a chance to litigate whether his facilities are subject to the Act. But no proprietor or owner is here involved. Outside hoodlums are charged with the conspiracy; and the history of federal law, as applicable to them, is clear. 18 U. S. C. § 241 is derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870, § 6, 16 Stat. 141, and, as noted, protects the citizen “in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” The right to service in a restaurant is such a “right,” at least by virtue of the 1964 Act. We said in United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801, in reference to 18 U. S. C. § 241, “We think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give § 241 the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.”

We have over the years given protection to many federal rights under § 241. We refuse to believe that hoodlums operating in the fashion of the Ku Klux Klan, were given protection by the 1964 Act for violating those “rights” of the citizen that § 241 was designed to protect.

Immediately after the provision in § 207 (b) stating that the remedies provided “shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title,” is a further provision stating that “nothing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title ... or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.” There is, therefore, within the four corners of § 207 (b) evidence that it was not designed as pre-empting every other mode of protecting a federal “right” or as granting immunity to those who had long been subject to the regime of § 241.

It is, of course, true that § 203 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-2 (b), bars the use of violence against those who assert their rights under the Act, and that therefore a remedy by way of an injunction could be obtained by the party aggrieved under § 204 (a). A like remedy is available to the Attorney General by reason of § 206 (a). But as we read the Act, the exclusive-remedy provision of § 207 (b) was inserted only to make clear that the substantive rights to public accommodation defined in § 201 and § 202 are to be enforced exclusively by injunction. Proprietors and owners are not to be prosecuted criminally for mere refusal to serve Negroes. But the Act does not purport to deal with outsiders; nor can we imagine that Congress desired to give them a brand new immunity from prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 241 — a statute that encompasses “all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States.” United States v. Price, supra, at 800.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan join,

dissenting.

I regret that I cannot join the opinion of the Court. There is, of course, no question of the reprehensibility of the appellees’ alleged conduct. But the issue is whether Congress has subjected this conduct to federal criminal prosecution.

Section 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, secures the right to equal enjoyment of places of public accommodation. Section 203 prohibits interference with that right in any of three ways:

“No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.”

Section 204 authorizes private injunctive actions against violations of § 203. Section 206 provides for injunctive actions by the Attorney General against patterns or practices of resistance to enjoyment of Title II rights. Finally § 207 (b) states:

“The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title .

The plain language of the exclusive remedies clause of § 207 thus clearly precludes a criminal prosecution for interfering with rights secured by Title II. And the very legislative history cited by the Court leaves no doubt that a specific purpose of that clause was to prevent criminal prosecutions under 18 U. S. C. § 241. It was upon that understanding that Congress enacted the legislation.

The Court’s effort to distinguish between refusal of service by a proprietor and violent interference by third parties is not only without any support in the language of § 207 but also is belied by § 203 of the Title, quoted above. That section clearly prohibits intimidation and coercion by third persons as well as refusal of service by a proprietor. Congress, therefore, was explicitly aware of the kind of conduct alleged in this case when it enacted Title II, and Congress provided in § 207 that the exclusive remedy to prohibit such conduct must be by injunction.

The exclusive remedies provided by Congress to protect the rights secured by Title II of the 1964 Act are undoubtedly ineffective in a case like this. But I cannot, for that reason, join in rewriting the law that Congress so clearly enacted.

I respectfully dissent.

       Section 207 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000a-6 (b), provides:
      “The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title, but nothing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.”

       See, e. g., United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (the right to vote); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (right to travel); United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76 (the right to perfect a homestead); Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (the right to be free of violence while in the custody of a federal marshal); United States v. Mason, 213 U. S. 115 (the right of federal officers to perform their duties); United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (Fourteenth Amendment rights).

       Section 207 contains a proviso; but the United States, which brought this prosecution, is conspicuously absent from the list of those to whom the proviso applies:
      “[Njothing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.” (Emphasis added.)

       The indictment did not allege injury to any rights other than those established by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.