source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Warren

license: Public Domain

text:
    WMCA, INC., et al. v. LOMENZO, SECRETARY OF STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.
    No. 20.
    Argued November 12-13, 1963.
    Decided June 15, 1964.

      Leonard B. Sand argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Max Gross.

      Irving Galt, Assistant Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for the Secretary of State and Attorney General of New York were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Sheldon Raab, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Mahoney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Francis J. Morgan and Irving. Libenson filed a brief for appellee Berman. Stanley S. Corwin filed a brief for appellee Griffing.

      Bertram Harnett and Jack B. Weinstein filed a brief for appellee Nickerson in support of appellants. Leo A. Larkin, George H. P. Dwight and Benjamin Offner filed a brief for appellees Screvane et al., in support of appellants.

      Solicitor General Cox, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Bruce J. Terris and Richard W. Schmude.

    Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Leo Pfeffer, Melvin L. Wulf, Jack Greenberg and Robert B. McKay for the American Jewish Congress et al., and by W. Scott Miller, Jr. and George J. Long for Schmied, President of the Board of Aldermen of Louisville, Kentucky.
   Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this litigation is the constitutional validity, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, of the apportionment of seats in the New York Legislature.

I.

Appellants initially brought this action on May 1, 1961, in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs below included individual citizens and voters residing in five of the six most populous New York counties (Bronx, Kings, Nassau, New York and Queens), suing in their own behalf and on behalf of all New York citizens similarly situated. Appellees, sued in their representative capacities, are various state and local officials charged with .duties in connection with reapportionment and the conducting of state elections. The complaint claimed rights under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1988, and asserted jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).

Plaintiffs below sought a declaration that those provisions of the State Constitution which establish the formulas for apportioning seats in the two houses of the New York Legislature, and the statutes implementing them, are unconstitutional since violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The complaint further asked the District Court to enjoin defendants from performing any acts or duties in compliance with the allegedly unconstitutional legislative apportionment provisions. Plaintiffs asserted that they had no adequate remedy other than the judicial relief sought, and requested the court to retain jurisdiction until the New York Legislature, “freed from the fetters imposed by the Constitutional provisions invalidated by this Court, provides for such apportionment of the State legislature as will insure to the urban voters of New York State the rights guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United States.”

In attacking the existing apportionment of seats in the New York Legislature, plaintiffs below stated, more particularly, that:

“The provisions of the New York State Constitution, Article III, §§ 2-5, violate the XIV Amendment of the Constitution of the United States because the apportionment formula contained therein results, and must necessarily result, when applied to the population figures of the State in a grossly unfair weighting of both houses in the State legislature in favor of the lesser populated rural areas of the state to the great disadvantage of the densely populated urban centers of the state. . . .
“As a result of the constitutional provisions challenged herein, the Plaintiffs’ votes are not as effective in either house of the legislature as the votes of other citizens residing in rural areas of the state. Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated suffer a debasement of their votes by virtue of the arbitrary, obsolete and unconstitutional apportionment of the legislature and they and all others similarly situated are denied the equal protection of the laws required by the Constitution of the United States.”

The complaint asserted that the legislative apportionment provisions of the 1894 New York Constitution, as amended, are not only presently unconstitutional, but also were invalid and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of their adoption, and that “[t]he population growth in the State of New York and the shifts of population to urban areas have aggravated the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the XIV Amendment.”

As requested by plaintiffs, a three-judge District Court was convened. The New York City defendants admitted the allegations of the complaint and requested the Court to grant plaintiffs the relief they were seeking. The remaining defendants moved to dismiss. On January 11, .1962, the District Court announced its initial decision. It held that it had jurisdiction but dismissed the complaint, without reaching the merits, on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, since the issues raised were nonjusticiable. 202 F. Supp. 741. In discussing the allegations made by plaintiffs, the Court stated:

“The complaint specifically cites as the cause of this allegedly unconstitutional distribution of state legislative representation the New York Constitutional provisions requiring that:
“(a) '. . . the total of fifty Senators established by the Constitution of 1894 shall be increased by those Senators to which any of the larger counties become entitled in addition to their allotment as of 1894, but without effect for decreases in other large counties . . .’
“(b) no county may have 'four or more Senators unless it has a full ratio for each Senator . . .’ and
“(c) ‘. . . every county except Hamilton shall always be entitled [in the Assembly] to one member coupled with the limitation of the entire membership to 150 members . . . .’ ”

Noting that the 1894 Constitution, containing the present apportionment provisions, was approved by a majority of the State’s electorate before becoming effective, and that, subsequently the voters had twice disapproved proposals for a constitutional convention to amend the constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment, the District Court concluded that, in any event, there was a “want of equity in the relief sought, or, to view it slightly differently, want of justiciability, [which] clearly demands dismissal.”

Plaintiffs appealed to this Court from the District Court’s dismissal of their complaint. On June 11, 1962, we vacated the judgment below and remanded for further consideration in the light of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, which had been decided subsequent to the District Court’s dismissal of the suit below. 370 U. S. 190. In vacating and remanding, we stated:

“Our well-established practice of a remand for consideration in the light of a subsequent decision therefore applies. . . . [W]e believe that the court below should be the first to consider the merits of the federal constitutional claim, free from any doubts as to its justiciability and as 'to the merits of alleged arbitrary and invidious geographical discrimination.”

On August 16, 1962, the District Court, after conducting a hearing, dismissed the complaint on the merits, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any invidious discrimination, that the apportionment provisions of the New York Constitution were rational and not arbitrary, that they were of historical origin and contained no improper geographical discrimination, that they could be amended by an electoral majority of the citizens of New York, and that therefore the apportionment of seats in the New York Senate and Assembly was not unconstitutional. 208 F. Supp. 368. Finding no failure by the New York Legislature to comply with the state constitutional provisions requiring and establishing the formulas for periodic reapportionment of Senate and Assembly seats, the court below relied on the presumption of constitutionality attaching to a state constitutional provision and the necessity for a clear violation “before a federal court of equity will lend its power to the disruption of the state election processes . . . .” After postulating a number of “tests” for invidious discrimination, including the “[Rationality of state policy and whether or not the system is arbitrary,” “[w]hether or not the present complexion of the legislature has a historical basis,” whether the electorate has an available political remedy, and “[g]eography, including accessibility of legislative representatives to their electors,” the Court concluded that none of the relevant New York constitutional provisions were arbitrary or irrational in giving weight to, in addition to population, “the ingredient of area, accessibility and character of interest.” Stating that in New York “the county is a classic unit of governmental organization and administration,” the District Court found that the allocation of one Assembly seat to each county was grounded on a historical basis. The Court noted that the 1957 vote on whether to call a constitutional convention was “heralded as an issue of apportionment” by the then Governor, but that nevertheless a majority of the State’s voters chose not to have a constitutional convention convened. The Court also noted that “if strict population standards were adopted certain undesirable results might follow such as an increase in the size of the legislature to such an extent that effective debate may be hampered or an increase in the size of districts to such an extent that contacts between the individual legislator and his constituents may become impracticable.” As a result of the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint, the November 1962 election of New York legislators was conducted pursuant to the existing apportionment scheme. A timely appeal to this Court was filed, and we noted probable jurisdiction on June 10, 1963. 374 IT. S. 802.

II.

Apportionment of seats in the two houses of the New York Legislature is prescribed by certain formulas contained in the 1894 State Constitution, as amended. Reapportionment is effected periodically by statutory provisions, enacted in compliance with the constitutionally established formulas. The county is the basic unit of area for apportionment purposes, except that two sparsely populated counties, Fulton and Hamilton, are treated as one. New York uses citizen population instead of total population, excluding aliens from consideration, for purposes of legislative apportionment. The number of assemblymen is fixed at 150, while the size of the Senate is prescribed as not less than 50 and may vary with each apportionment. All members of both houses of the New York Legislature are elected for two-year terms only, in even-numbered years.

With respect to the Senate, after providing that that body should initially have 50 seats and creating 50 senatorial districts, the New York Constitution, in Art. Ill, § 4, as amended, provides for decennial readjustment of the size of the Senate and reapportionment of senatorial seats, beginning in 1932 and every decade thereafter, in the following manner:

“Such districts shall be so readjusted or altered that each senate district shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, and be in as compact form as practicable, and shall remain unaltered until the first year of the next decade as above defined, and shall at all times consist of contiguous territory, and no county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district except to make two or more senate districts wholly in such county. . . .
“No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall have a full ratio for each senator. No county shall have more than one-third of all the senators; and no two counties or the territory thereof as now organized, which are adjoining counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall have more than one-half of all the senators.
“The ratio for apportioning senators shall always be obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, by fifty, and the senate shall always be composed of fifty members, except that if any county having three or more senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional senator or senators, such additional senator or senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number of senators shall be increased to that extent."

As interpreted by practice and judicial decision, reapportionment and readjustment of senatorial representation is accomplished in several stages. First, the total population of the State, excluding aliens, as determined by the last federal census, is divided by 50 (the minimum number of Senate seats) in order to obtain a so-called “ratio” figure. The counties on account of which the size of the Senate might have to be increased are then ascertained — counties having three or more ratios, i. e., more than 6% of the State’s total citizen population each. Under the existing apportionment, only five counties are in the 6%-or-more class, four of New York City’s five counties and upstate Erie County (Buffalo and environs). Nassau County (suburban New York City) will be added to this class in the pending reapportionment based on the 1960 census. After those counties that come within the “populous” category, so defined, have been ascertained, they are then allocated one senatorial seat for each full ratio. Fractions of a ratio are disregarded, and each populous county is thereafter divided into the appropriate number of Senate districts. In ascertaining the size of the Senate, the total number of additional seats resulting from the growth of the populous counties since 1894 is added to the 50 original seats. And, while the total number of seats which any of the populous counties has gained since 1894 is added to the 50 original seats, the number of seats which any of them has lost since 1894 is not deducted from the total number of seats to be added. Currently the New York Senate, as reapportioned in 1953, has 58 seats. From that total, the number allocated to the populous counties is subtracted — 27 under the 1953 apportionment — and the remaining seats — 31 under the 1953 scheme — are then apportioned among the less populous counties. When reapportioned on the basis of 1960 census figures, the Senate will have 57 seats, with 26 allotted to the populous counties, as a result of applying the constitutionally prescribed ratio and the requirement of a full ratio in order for a populous county to be given more than three Senate seats.

The second stage of applying the senatorial apportionment formula involves the allocation of seats to the less populous counties, i. e., those having less than 6% of the State’s total citizen population (less than three full ratios). After the number of Senate seats allocated to the populous counties (and thus the size of the Senate) has been determined, a second population ratio figure is obtained by dividing the number of seats available for distribution to the less populous counties, 31 under both the 1950 and 1960 censuses, into the total citizen population of the less populous counties. Less populous counties which are entitled to two or three seats, as determined by comparing a county’s population with the second ratio figure thus ascertained, are then divided into senatorial districts. A less populous county is entitled to three seats if it has less than three full first ratios, but has more than three, or has two and a large fraction, second ratios. Since the first ratio is significantly larger than the second, a county can have less than three first ratios but more than three second ratios. Finally, counties with substantially less than one second ratio are combined into multicounty districts.

The result of applying this complicated apportionment formula is to give the populous counties markedly less senatorial representation, when compared with respective population figures, than the less populous counties. Under the 1953 apportionment, based on the 1950 census, a senator from one of the less populous counties represented, on the average, 195,859 citizens, while a senator from a populous county represented an average of 301,178. The constitutionally prescribed first ratio figure was 284,069, while the second ratio was, of course, only 195,859. Under the pending apportionment based on the 1960 census, the first ratio figure is 324,816, and the average population of the senatorial districts in the populous counties will be 366,128. On the other hand, the second ratio, and the average population of the senatorial districts in the less populous counties, is only 216,822. Thus, a citizen in a less populous county had, under the 1953 apportionment, over 1.5 times the representation, on the average, of a citizen in a populous county, and, under the apportionment based on the 1960 census, this ratio will be about 1.7-to-l.

The 1894 New York Constitution also provided for an Assembly composed of 150 members, in Art. Ill, § 2. Under the formula prescribed by Art. Ill, § 5, of the New York Constitution, each of the State’s 62 counties, except Hamilton County which is combined with Fulton County for purposes of Assembly representation, is initially given one Assembly seat. The remaining 89 seats are then allocated among the various counties in accordance with a “ratio” figure obtained by dividing the total number of seats, 150, into the State’s total citizen population. Applying the constitutional formula, a county whose population is at least 1% times this ratio (1% of the total citizen population) is given one additional assemblyman. The remaining Assembly seats are then apportioned among those counties whose citizen populations total two or more whole ratios, with any remaining seats being allocated among the counties on the basis of “highest remainders.” Finally, those counties receiving more than one seat are divided into the appropriate number of Assembly districts. In allocating 61 of the 150 Assembly seats on a basis wholly unrelated to population, and in establishing three separate categories of counties for the apportionment of Assembly representation, the constitutional provisions relating to the apportionment of Assembly seats plainly result in a favoring of the less populous counties. Under the new reapportionment based on 1960 census figures, the smallest 44 counties will each be given one seat for an average of 62,765 citizen inhabitants per seat, three counties will receive two seats each, with a total of six assemblymen representing an average of 93,478 citizen inhabitants, and the 14 most populous counties will be given the remaining 100 seats, resulting in an average representation figure of 129,183 citizen inhabitants each.

Although the New York Legislature has not yet reapportioned on the basis of 1960 census figures, the outlines of the forthcoming apportionment can be predicted with assurance. Since the rules prescribed in the New York Constitution for apportioning the Senate are so explicit and detailed, the New York Legislature has little discretion, in decennially enacting implementing statutory reapportionment provisions, except in determining which of the less populous counties are to be joined together in multicounty districts and in districting within counties having more than one senator. Similarly, the legislature has little discretion in reapportioning Assembly seats. A number of other rather detailed rules, some mandatory and some only directive, are included in the constitutional provisions prescribing the system for apportioning seats in the two houses of the New York Legislature, and are set out in Art. Ill, §§ 2-5, of the New York Constitution.

When the New York Legislature was reapportioned in 1953, on the basis of 1950 census figures, assemblymen representing 37.1% of the State’s citizens constituted a majority in that body, and senators representing 40.9% of the citizens comprised a majority in the Senate. Under the still effective 1953 apportionment, applying 1960 census figures, assemblymen representing 34.7% of the citizens constitute a majority in the Assembly, and senators representing 41.8% of the citizens constitute a majority in that body. If reapportionment were carried out under the existing constitutional formulas, applying 1960 census figures, 37.5% of the State’s citizens would reside in districts electing a majority in the Assembly, and 38.1% would live in areas electing a majority of the members of the Senate. When the State was reapportioned in 1953 on the basis of the 1950 census, the most populous Assembly district had 11.9 times as many citizens as the least populous one, and a similar ratio in the Senate was about 2.4-to-l. Under the current apportionment, applying 1960 census figures, the citizen population-variance ratio between the most populous and least populous Assembly districts is about 21-to-l, and a similar ratio in the Senate is about 3.9-to-l. If the Assembly were reapportioned under the existing constitutional formulas, the most populous Assembly district would have about 12.7 times as many citizens as the least populous one, and a similar ratio in the Senate would be about 2.6-to-l.

According to 1960 census figures, the six counties where the six individual appellants reside had a citizen population of 9,129,780, or 56.2% of the State’s total citizen population of 16,240,786. They are currently represented by 72 assemblymen and 28 senators — 48% of the Assembly and 48.3% of the Senate. When the legislature reapportions on the basis of the 1960 census figures, these six counties will have 26 Senate seats and 69 Assembly seats, or 45.6% and 46%, respectively, of the seats in the two houses. The 10 most heavily populated counties in New York, with about 73.5% of the total citizen population, are given, under the current apportionment, 38 Senate seats, 65.5% of the membership of that body, and 93 Assembly seats, 62% of the seats in that house. When the legislature reapportions on the basis of the 1960 census figures, these same 10 counties will be given 37 Senate seats and 92 Assembly seats, 64.9% and 61.3%, respectively, of the membership of the two houses. The five counties comprising New York City have 45.7% of the State’s total citizen population, and are given, under the current apportionment, 43.1% of the Senate seats and 43.3% of the seats in the Assembly. When the legislature reapportions on the basis of the 1960 census figures, these same counties will be given 36.8% and 37.3%, respectively, of the membership of the two houses.

Under the existing senatorial apportionment, applying 1960 census figures, Suffolk County’s one senator represents a citizen population of 650,112, and Nassau County’s three senators represent an average of 425,267 citizens each. The least populous senatorial district, on the other hand, comprising Saratoga, Warren, and Essex Counties, has a total population of only 166,715. Under the forthcoming reapportionment based on the 1960 census, Nassau County will again be allocated only three Senate seats, with an average population of 425,267, while the least populous senatorial district, which will probably comprise Putnam and Rockland Counties, will have a citizen population of only 162,840. Onondaga County, with a total citizen population of 414,770, less than the average population of e-ach Nassau County district, will nevertheless be given two Senate seats. Because of the effect of the full-ratio requirement applicable only to the populous counties, Nassau County, despite the fact that its citizen population increased from 655,690 to 1,275,801, will not obtain a single additional senatorial seat as a result of the reapportionment based on 1960 census figures. And Monroe County, with a citizen population of 571,029, since not having more than 6% of the State’s total citizen population, will have the same number of senators under the new apportionment, three, as Nassau County, although it has less than half that county’s population. New York City’s 20 senators will represent an average citizen population of 360,193, while the 15 multi-county senatorial districts to be created upstate will have an average of only 207,528 citizens per district. Because of the operation of the full-ratio rule with respect to counties having more than 6% of the State’s total citizen population each, the unrepresented remainders (above a full first ratio but short of another full first ratio which is required for an additional Senate seat) in three of the urban counties will be as follows: Nassau, 301,353; New York, 284,805; and Kings, 244,798. Thus, over 800,000 citizens will not be counted in the apportionment of Senate seats, even though the unrepresented remainders in two of these three counties equal or exceed the statewide average population of 284,926 citizens per district. Furthermore, the effect of the rule requiring an increase in the number of Senate seats because of the entitlement of populous counties to added senatorial representation, coupled with the failure to reduce the size of the Senate because of reductions in the number of seats to which a populous county is entitled (as compared with its senatorial representation in 1894), is that the comparative voting power of the populous counties in the Senate decreases as their share of the State’s total population increases.

With respect to the Assembly, the six assemblymen currently elected from Nassau County represent an average citizen population of 212,634, and one of that county’s current Assembly districts has a citizen population of 314,721. Suffolk County’s three assemblymen presently represent an average of 216,704 citizens. On the other hand, the least populous Assembly district, Schuyler County, has a citizen population, according to the 1960 census, of only 14,974, and yet, in accordance with the constitutional formula, is allocated one Assembly seat. Under the new apportionment, Schuyler County will again be given one Assembly seat, while one projected Monroe County district will have a citizen population of 190,343 and an Assembly district in Suffolk County will have over 170,000 citizens. Additionally, the average population of the 54 Assembly districts in New York City’s four populous counties will be in excess of 132,000 citizens each.

Under the 1953 apportionment, based on 1950 census figures, the most populous Assembly district, in Onondaga County, had a citizen population of 167,226, while the least populous district was that comprising Schuyler County, with only 14,066 citizens. In the Senate, the most populous districts were the four in Bronx County, averaging 344,545 citizens each, while the least populous district had a citizen population of only 146,666.

No adequate political' remedy to obtain relief against alleged legislative malapportionment appears to exist in New York. No initiative procedure exists under New York law. A proposal to amend the State Constitution can be submitted to a vote by the State’s electorate only after approval by a majority of both houses of two successive sessions of the New York Legislature. A majority vote of both houses of the legislature is also required before the electorate can vote on the calling of a constitutional convention. Additionally, under New York law the question of whether a constitutional convention should be called must be submitted to the electorate every 20 years, commencing in 1957. But even if a constitutional convention were convened, the same alleged discrimination which currently exists in the apportionment of Senate seats against each of the counties having 6% or more of a State’s citizen population would be perpetuated in the election of convention delegates. And, since the New York Legislature has rather consistently complied with the state constitutional requirement for decennial legislative reapportionment in accordance with the rather explicit constitutional rules, enacting effective apportionment statutes in 1907, 1917, 1943, and 1953, judicial relief in the state courts to remedy the alleged malapportionment was presumably unavailable.

III.

In Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 533, decided also this date, we held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned substantially on a population basis. Neither house of the New York Legislature, under the state constitutional formulas and the implementing statutory provisions here attacked, is presently or, when reapportioned on the basis of 1960 census figures, will be apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally sustainable. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of New York’s scheme of legislative apportionment.

We have examined the state constitutional formulas governing legislative apportionment in New York in a detailed fashion in order to point out that, as a result of following these provisions, the weight of the votes of those living in populous areas is of necessity substantially diluted in effect. However complicated or sophisticated an apportionment scheme might be, it cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, result in a significant undervaluation of the weight of the votes of certain of a State’s citizens merely because of where they happen to reside. New York’s constitutional formulas relating to legislative apportionment demonstrably include a built-in bias against voters living in the State’s more populous counties. And the legislative representation accorded to the urban and suburban areas becomes proportionately less as the population of those areas increases. With the size of the Assembly fixed at 150, with a substantial number of Assembly seats distributed to sparsely populated counties without regard to population, and with an additional seat given to counties having 1% population ratios, the population-variance ratios between the more populous and the less populous counties will continually increase so long as population growth proceeds at a disparate rate in various areas of the State. With respect to the Senate, significantly different population ratio figures are used in determining the number of Senate seats to be given to the more populous and the less populous counties, and the more populous counties are required to have full first ratios in order to be entitled to additional senatorial representation. Also, in ascertaining the size of the Senate, the number of seats by which the senatorial representation of the more populous counties has increased since 1894 is added to 50, but the number of Senate seats that some of the more populous counties have lost since 1894 is not subtracted from that figure. Thus, an increasingly smaller percentage of the State’s population will, in all probability, reside in senatorial districts electing a majority of the members of that body. Despite the opaque intricacies of New York’s constitutional formulas relating to legislative apportionment, when the effect of these provisions, and the statutes implementing them, on the right to vote of those individuals living in the disfavored areas of the State is considered, we conclude that neither the existing scheme nor the forthcoming one can be constitutionally condoned.

We find it inappropriate to discuss questions relating to remedies at the present time, beyond what we said in our opinion in Reynolds. , Since all members of both houses of the New York Legislature will be elected in November 1964, the court below, acting under equitable principles, must now determine whether, because of the imminence of that election and in order to give the New York Legislature an opportunity to fashion a constitutionally valid legislative apportionment plan, it would be desirable to permit the 1964 election of legislators to be conducted pursuant to the existing provisions, or whether under the circumstances the effectuation of appellants’ right to a properly weighted voice in the election of state legislators should not be delayed beyond the 1964 election. We therefore reverse the decision below and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the views stated here and in our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims.

It is so ordered.

[For dissenting opinion of MR. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 589.]

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, see post, p. 744.]

       See 196 F. Supp. 758, where the District Court concluded that the suit presented issues warranting the convening of a three-judge court, over defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

       202 F. Supp., at 743. AH decisions of the District Court, and also this Court’s initial decision in this litigation, are reported sub nom. WMCA, Inc., v. Simon.

       370 U. S., at 191. Shortly after we remanded the case, the District Court ordered defendants to answer or otherwise move in respect to the complaint. Another of the defendants, a Nassau County official, joined the New York City defendants in admitting most of the allegations, and requested the Court to grant plaintiffs the relief which they were seeking. The remaining defendants, presently appellees, denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted varied defenses.

       At the hearing on the merits a large amount of statistical evidence was introduced showing the population and citizen population of New York under various censuses, including the populations of the State’s 62 counties and the Senate and Assembly districts established under the various apportionments. The 1953 apportionment of Senate and Assembly seats under the 1950 census was shown, and other statistical computations showing the apportionment to be made by the legislature under the 1960 census figures, as a result of applying the pertinent constitutional provisions, were also introduced into evidence.
      The District Court refused to receive evidence showing the effect of the alleged malapportionment on citizens of several of the most populous counties with respect to financial matters such as the collection of state taxes and the disbursement of state assistance. The Court also excluded evidence offered to show that the State Constitution’s apportionment formulas were devised for the express purpose of creating a class of citizens whose representation was inferior to that of a more preferred class, and that there had been intentional discrimination against the citizens of New York City in the designing of the legislative apportionment provisions of the 1894 Constitution. Since we hold that the court below erred in finding the New York legislative apportionment scheme here challenged to be constitutionally valid, we express no view on the correctness of the District Court’s exclusion of this evidence.

       A concurring opinion stated that, while the six counties where plaintiffs reside contain 56.2% of the State’s population^ they comprise only 3.1% of its area, and, if legislative apportionment were “based solely on population, . . . 3% of the state’s area would dominate the rest of New York.”

       The existing plan of apportionment of Senate and Assembly seats is provided for in McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1952 (Supp. 1963), State Law, §§ 120-124, enacted by the New York Legislature in 1953.

       Article III, § 2, of the 1894 New York Constitution provided for a 50-member Senate and a 150-member Assembly. Article III, § 3, of the 1894 Constitution prescribed a detailed plan for the apportionment of the 50 Senate seats, subject to periodic alteration by the legislature under the formula provided for in Art. Ill, § 4.

       N. Y. Const., Art. Ill, § 4.

       For an extended discussion of the apportionment of seats in the New York Senate under the pertinent state constitutional provisions, see Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Ford. L. Rev. 595 (1962). See also Silva, Legislative Representation — With Special Reference to New York, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 408 (1962).

       For a thorough discussion of the apportionment of seats in the New York Assembly pursuant to the relevant state constitutional provisions, see Silva, Apportionment of the New York Assembly, 31 Ford. L. Rev. 1 (1962).

       Article III, § 4, of the New York Constitution requires the legislature to reapportion and redistriet Senate seats no later than 1966, and Art. Ill, § 5, provides that “[t]he members of the Assembly shall be chosen by single districts and shall be apportioned by the legislature at each regular session at which the senate districts are readjusted or altered, and by the same law, among the several counties of the state, as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens.”

       While the legislature has the sole power to apportion Assembly seats among the State's counties, in accordance with the constitutional formula, the New York Constitution gives local governmental authorities the exclusive power to divide their respective counties into Assembly districts. A county having only one assemblyman constitutes one Assembly district by itself, of course, and therefore cannot be divided into Assembly districts. But, with respect to counties given more than one Assembly seat, the New York Constitution, Art. Ill, § 5, provides: “In any county entitled to more than one member [of the Assembly], the board of supervisors, and in any city embracing an entire county and having no board of supervisors,, the common council, or if there be none, the body exercising the powers of a common council, shall . . . divide such counties into assembly districts as nearly equal in number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, as may be . . . .”

       Under these specific provisions, while more than one Senate or Assembly district can be contained within the whole of a single county, and while a Senate district may consist of more than one county, no county border line can be broken in the formation of either type of district. Both Senate and Assembly districts are required to consist of contiguous territory, and each Assembly district is required to be wholly within the same senatorial district. Each Assembly district in the same county shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of citizen inhabitants, and shall consist of “convenient” territory and be as compact as practicable. Further detailed provisions relate to the division of towns between adjoining districts, and the equalization of population among Senate districts in the same county and Assembly districts in the same Senate district.

       Included as Appendix D to the District Court’s opinion on the merits is a map of the State of New York showing the 58 senatorial districts under the existing apportionment. 208 F. Supp., at 383. Appendix E contains a chart which includes census figures showing the 1960 population of each of New York’s 62 counties. Id., at 384.

       Appendix A to the District Court’s opinion on the merits is a chart showing the apportionment of senatorial seats which would result if the Senate were reapportioned on the basis of the present constitutional formula, using 1960 census figures, including the citizen populations of the 13 most populous counties, the number of senators to be allocated to each, and the average citizen population per senator in each of the projected senatorial districts. 208 F. Supp., at 380.

       Included as Appendix C to the District Court’s opinion on the merits is a map of the State of New York showing the number of Assembly seats apportioned to each county under the existing apportionment. 208 F. Supp., at 383. Appendix E contains a chart which includes census figures showing the 1960 population of each of New York’s 62 counties. Id., at 384.

       Appendix B to the District Court’s opinion on the merits is a chart showing the apportionment of Assembly seats which would result if the Assembly were reapportioned under the present constitutional formula, using 1960 census figures, including the number of Assembly seats to be given to each county and the approximate citizen population in each projected Assembly district. 208 F. Supp., at 381-382.

       For a discussion of the lack of federal constitutional significance of the presence or absence of an available political remedy, see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, pp. 736-737, decided also this date,

       Under Art. XIX, § 1, of the New York Constitution.

       According to Art. XIX, § 2, of the New York Constitution, which provides that the question of whether a constitutional convention should be called can be submitted to the electorate “at such times as the legislature may by law provide . . .

       Pursuant to Art. XIX, § 2, of the New York Constitution. In 1957 the State’s electorate, by a close vote, disapproved the calling of a constitutional convention, and the question is not required to be submitted to the people again until 1977.

       Under Art. XIX, § 2, of the New York Constitution, delegates to a constitutional convention are elected three per senatorial district, plus 15 delegates elected at large.

       Decisions by the New York Court of Appeals indicate that state courts will do no more than determine whether the New York Legislature has properly complied with the state constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment in enacting implementing statutory provisions. See, e. g., In re Sherrill, 188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E. 124 (1907); In re Dowling, 219 N. Y. 44, 113 N. E. 545 (1916); and In re Fay, 291 N. Y. 198, 52 N. E. 2d 97 (1943).

       See Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 585.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Warren Mr. Justice Stewart.

text:
    MARYLAND COMMITTEE FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION et al. v. TAWES, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND, et al.
    No. 29.
    Argued November 13-14, 1963.
    Decided June 15, 1964.

      Alfred L. Scanlan argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were John B. Wright and Johnson Bowie.

      Robert S. Bourbon, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General of Maryland.

      Solicitor General Cox, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Bruce J. Terris and Richard W. Schmude.

      Theodore I. Botter, First Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for the State of New Jersey et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. With him on the brief were the Attorneys General of their respective States as follows: Arthur J. Sills of New Jersey, Robert W. Pickrell of Arizona, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, Bert T. Kobayashi of Hawaii, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho, Edwin K. Steers of Indiana, William M. Ferguson of Kansas, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, T. Wade Bruton of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, Frank L. Farrar of South Dakota and Charles Gibson of Vermont.
    Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Robert G. Tobin, Jr., Douglas H. Moore, Jr. and Richard J. Sincoff for Montgomery County, Maryland, urging reversal; by Leo Pfeffer, Melvin L. Wulf, Jack Greenberg and Robert B. McKay for the American Jewish Congress et al., and by W. Scott Miller, Jr. and George J. Long for Schmied, President of the Board of Aldermen of Louisville, Kentucky.

       228 Md., at 419, 180 A. 2d, at 659.

   Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals upholding the validity, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, of the apportionment of seats in the Maryland Senate.

I.

Appellants, residents, taxpayers and voters in four populous Maryland counties (Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Montgomery and Prince George’s) and the City of Baltimore, and an unincorporated association, originally brought an action in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, in August 1960, challenging the apportionment of the Maryland Legislature. Defendants below, sued in their representative capacities, were various officials charged with duties in connection with state elections. Plaintiffs below alleged that the apportionment of both houses of the Maryland Legislature, pursuant to Art. Ill, §§ 2 and 5, of the 1867 Maryland Constitution, as amended, discriminated against inhabitants of the more populous counties and the City of Baltimore by according these persons substantially less representation than that given to persons residing in other areas of the State. They contended that the alleged legislative malappor-tionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since that provision prohibits any State from “denying, diluting or restricting the equality of voting rights or privileges among classes of otherwise eligible voters similarly situated,” and asserted that there was no political remedy practicably available under Maryland law to obtain the relief sought.

Plaintiffs below sought a declaratory judgment that Art. Ill, §§ 2 and 5, of the Maryland Constitution deny them and those similarly situated rights protected under the Equal Protection Clause, and that the failure of the Maryland Legislature to reapportion its membership in accordance with a formula which would reasonably reflect present population figures deprived them of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also requested a declaration that the failure of the Maryland General Assembly to convene a constitutional convention as approved by a majority of the State’s voters in the general election of 1950 violated various provisions of the State'Constitution.

Plaintiffs requested that, unless the November 1962 election and elections thereafter were conducted on an at-large basis, the court enjoin defendants from performing various election duties until such time as the General Assembly should submit for a referendum vote by eligible state voters an amendment to Art. HI, §§ 2 and 5, which would reapportion the membership of the Maryland Legislature on a population basis in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also asked the court to retain jurisdiction of the case until the General Assembly submitted such a constitutional amendment to the State’s voters.

On February 21, 1961, the Circuit Court sustained defendants’ demurrers to plaintiffs’ complaint and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals, on April 25,1962, splitting 5-to-2, reversed the order of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits. 228 Md. 412, 180 A. 2d 656. Finding that the federal questions raised were not non justiciable in a Maryland state court, the Maryland Court of Appeals, after discussing this Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, stated that

“if any action needs to be taken in order to bring the State’s system of legislative apportionment into conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment ... , it is preferable from the point of view of responsible self-government that the State’s own duly constituted officials and the people themselves undertake the task, rather than leave to the Federal judiciary the delicate and perhaps unwelcome task of doing so.”

While recognizing that “[tjhere was no need in Baker v. Carr ... for the Supreme Court to pass upon the power of a State court to deal with questions of State legislative apportionment,” the Maryland Court of Appeals found “implicit in the vacation of the judgment and remand by the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of Michigan of the case of Scholle v. Hare” this Court’s view that cases challenging the constitutionality of state legislative apportionments are “appropriate for consideration by a State court . ...” Finding “a strong implication in the Baker decision that there must be some reasonable relationship of population, or eligible voters, to representation in the General Assembly, if an apportionment is to escape the label of constitutionally-prohibited invidious discrimination,” the Maryland court nevertheless stated that it was not “possible (or advisable if it were possible) to state a precise, inflexible and intractable formula for constitutional representation in the General Assembly.” In remanding to the lower state court to “receive evidence to determine whether or not an invidious discrimination does exist with respect to representation in either or both houses” of the Maryland Legislature, the Court of Appeals stated that, if the Maryland constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment were held invalid as to the November 1962 election, the Circuit Court should “also declare that the Legislature has the power, if called into Special Session by the Governor and such action be deemed appropriate by it, to enact a bill reapportioning its membership for purposes” of that election.

On May 24, 1962, the Circuit Court, after receiving various exhibits and hearing argument, held that the apportionment of the Maryland House of Delegates invidiously discriminated against the people of Baltimore, Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, but not against the people of Baltimore City or Anne Arundel County, and that therefore Art. Ill, § 5, of the Maryland Constitution, which apportions seats in the House of Delegates, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although stating that the apportionment of the Maryland Senate might be “constitutionally based upon area and geographical location regardless of population or eligible voters,” the Circuit Court refrained from formally passing on the validity of the senatorial apportionment. The lower court also stated that the Maryland Legislature had the power to enact a statute providing for the reapportionment of the House of Delegates as well as to propose a constitutional amendment providing for such a reapportionment. It withheld the granting of injunctive relief but retained jurisdiction to do so before the November 1962 election if such became appropriate.

On May 31, 1962, the Maryland Legislature, called into special session by the Governor, enacted temporary “stop-gap” legislation reapportioning seats in the House of Delegates, by allocating 19 added seats to the more populous areas of the State. However, the legislature failed to pass a proposed constitutional amendment reapportioning the Maryland House. The newly enacted apportionment statute expires automatically on January 1,1966, except that, if a constitutional amendment superseding the statutory provisions is submitted to the voters at the 1964 general election and is rejected, the statute will continue in force until January 1, 1970. The statute further provides that upon its expiration the House of Delegates shall again be apportioned according to Art. Ill, § 5, which the Circuit Court had previously held unconstitutional. No appeal was taken from the Circuit Court’s decision holding invalid the existing apportionment of the Maryland House of Delegates.

Following the Circuit Court’s failure to rule upon the validity of the senatorial apportionment, plaintiffs appealed this question to the Maryland Court of Appeals. On June 8, 1962, the Court of Appeals ordered the case remanded to the Circuit Court for a prompt decision on whether Art. Ill, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, apportioning seats in the Senate, was valid or invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. On June 28, 1962, the Circuit Court held that the apportionment of the Maryland Senate did not violate the Federal Constitution because it felt that an apportionment based upon area and geographical location, without regard to population, served to protect minorities, preserve legislative checks and balances, and prevent hasty, though temporarily popular, legislation, and accorded with history, tradition and reason, placing considerable reliance on a comparison of that body of the Maryland Legislature with the Federal Senate.

On July 23, 1962, the Maryland Court of Appeals, splitting 5-to-3, in a per curiam order- affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision holding valid the apportionment of the Maryland Senate, noting that its reasons would be stated in an opinion to be filed at a later date. Plaintiffs’ motion for reargument, calling attention to recent decisions and developments relating tó legislative apportionment, was denied by the Maryland Court of Appeals on September 11, 1962. On September 25, 1962, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion. 229 Md. 406, 184 A. 2d 715. It stated initially that the appeal did not question the apportionment of the Maryland House. Continuing, the Maryland court indicated that it was affirming the decision below and upholding the constitutionality of the senatorial apportionment, on the grounds that: (1) Each Maryland county has since 1837 had the same number of Senate seats, except that Baltimore City had periodically been given additional representation, and Maryland counties "have always been an integral part of the state government” and have consistently possessed and maintained “distinct individualities”; (2) since the idea of a bicameral legislature assumes two different methods of apportionment in the two Houses to check “hasty and ill-conceived legislation,” one house can be constitutionally apportioned on a nonpopulation, geographical basis; and (3) geographical representation in the Maryland Senate, based on political subdivisions, is closely analogous to the representation of the States in the Federal Senate. The dissenting judges pointed out that the House of Delegates, even as reapportioned, was still not apportioned on a population basis, and that gross disparities from population-based representation existed in the senatorial apportionment. The dissenters found that neither history nor reliance on the so-called federal analogy provided a rational basis for such gross disparities from population-based representation as were found in the apportionment of the Maryland Legislature, before and after the 1962 reapportionment. Since the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the senatorial apportionment plan, the November 1962 election of senators was conducted pursuant thereto, and delegates were elected under the scheme provided by the 1962 legislation. Notice of appeal to this Court from the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision was timely filed, and we noted probable jurisdiction on June 10, 1963. 374 U. S. 804.

II.

The Maryland Constitution of 1867 vests legislative power in a bicameral General Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Delegates. According to official census figures, Maryland had a 1960 population of 3,100,689, and the combined population of the five most-populous political subdivisions of Maryland — the counties of Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Montgomery and Prince George’s, and the City of Baltimore — was 2,336,409. Thus, about 75.3% of the State’s total population lived in these five most populous subdivisions, as of 1960, while about 24.7% lived in the remaining 19 counties of the State. Under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, each of the State’s 23 counties is allocated one seat in the Maryland Senate, and each of the six legislative districts of the City of Baltimore is also entitled to one Senate seat — resulting in a total of 29 seats in the Maryland Senate. Thus, the five most populous political subdivisions, with over three-fourths of the State’s total 1960 population, are represented by only 10 senators, or slightly over one-third of the membership of that body. On the other hand, the remaining 19 counties, with an aggregate population of less than one-fourth of the State’s population, are nevertheless represented by 19 senators, almost two-thirds of the members of that body. And the 15 least populous counties, with only 14.1% of the total state population, can elect a controlling majority of the members of the Maryland Senate. A maximum population-variance ratio of almost 32-to-l exists between the most populous and least populous counties. Kent County, with a 1960 population of 15,481, and Calvert County, where only 15,826 resided, are each entitled to one Senate seat, while Baltimore County, with a 1960 population of 492,428, is likewise entitled to only one senator.

As to the apportionment of the Maryland House of Delegates, Art. Ill, § 5, of the Maryland Constitution, in force when this litigation was commenced but subsequently held unconstitutional by the Maryland courts and superseded by the temporary legislation enacted in 1962, prescribed the representation accorded to each of the State’s political subdivisions in the Maryland House. The membership of the House was numerically fixed at 123 by this constitutional provision, with each county being given at least two House seats. Seven counties were given two seats each, five counties were allocated three seats, and four counties were given four House members. The remaining seven counties, including all of those four populous counties where appellants reside, were each allotted six House seats, and the six legislative districts of the City of Baltimore were given six delegates each. Under the then-existing House apportionment, the five most populous political subdivisions, with 75.3% of the State’s 1960 population, elected only 60 delegates, or less than one-half of the members of the House of Delegates, while the other 19 counties, with only 24.7% of the population, were represented by 63 delegates, or 51.3% of the total membership. A maximum population-variance ratio of over 12-to-l existed between the most populous and least populous counties. Baltimore County, with a 1960 population of 492,428, had only the same number of House seats, six, as did Garrett and Somerset Counties, whose combined 1960 population was 40,043.

Under the 1962 temporary legislation reapportioning the Maryland House of Delegates, the only practical effect is to add 19 House seats, increasing the membership of that body from 123 to 142, for the four.-year terms of delegates elected in November 1962. Seven seats were added for Baltimore County, four delegates each were added for Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, two of Baltimore City’s legislative districts were given two and one additional seats, respectively, and one seat was added for Anné Arundel County. The basic scheme embodied in the temporary legislation is to allocate two House seats to each county and to each of the six Baltimore City legislative districts, and then to distribute the remaining seats, out of a fixed number of 123, among the counties on a population basis. The new law provided, however, that during the initial four-year period of its operation, “and for any additional period during which . . . [it] may be extended,” each county and legislative district would be entitled, as a minimum, to the number of House seats that it had on January 1, 1962. Thus, this means that in actuality there will be more than 123 delegates and that the counties and legislative districts which were allegedly overrepresented under the old constitutional provisions will retain much of their former relative power. Under the new legislation, the five most populous subdivisions, with 75.3% of the State’s 1960 population, elect 79 delegates, or 55.6% of the members in the Maryland House. The remaining 19 counties, with less than one-fourth of the State’s population, elect 44.4% of the members of the House of Delegates. Counties with only 35.6% of the State’s total population elect a majority of the members of the House under the 1962 legislation. A maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-l still exists between the most populous and least populous House districts. A delegate from Somerset County represents an average of 6,541 persons, whereas a delegate from Baltimore County represents an average of 37,879. Under both the previous and present apportionment provisions, members of both the Senate and the House of Delegates in Maryland are all elected to serve four-year terms. None of the Maryland counties, under either the old or revised House apportionment schemes, were divided into districts for the purpose of electing delegates. Rather, all House members are elected at large within each county (and legislative district), regardless of the number of seats allocated thereto.

Maryland law makes no provision for the initiation of legislation or constitutional amendments by the people. Certain constitutional provisions provide, however, for the taking, at a general election each 20 years, of “the sense of the People in regard to calling a Convention for altering this Constitution.” Pursuant to these provisions, a statewide referendum on whether a constitutional convention, which would have the power to propose amendments to the Maryland Constitution, including amendments relating to the reapportionment of representation in the General Assembly, should be called was submitted to the State’s voters at the general election in 1950. An overwhelming majority of the voters (by a vote of 200,439 to 56,998) indicated their approval of the calling of a constitutional convention. Nevertheless, even though numerous bills providing for the convening of a constitutional convention were introduced into the General Assembly between 1951 and 1962, the General Assembly repeatedly refused to enact the necessary enabling legislation. Thus, despite the favorable vote of the State’s electorate, no constitutional convention has ever been convened. The next such vote will not be taken until 1970, and, even if the people again approve the calling of a constitutional convention, it cannot be actually convened without the enactment of enabling legislation by the Maryland General Assembly.

Although over 10 reapportionment bills were introduced into the General Assembly between 1951 and 1960, all failed to pass because of opposition by legislators from the less populous counties. Both houses of the General Assembly, during its 1960 regular session, declined to pass bills incorporating the limited reapportionment recommendations of a special commission created by the Governor in 1959 to investigate and report on the matter of legislative reapportionment. Numerous proposed reapportionment amendments and reapportionment bills were introduced at the regular session of the Maryland Legislature in 1961 and 1962, but all failed of passage. Relief from the allegedly discriminatory apportionment through constitutional amendment was also apparently unavailable, as a practical matter, to appellants. Article XIV, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution requires a three-fifths affirmative vote of the membership of both houses of the General Assembly in order to have proposed constitutional amendments submitted to the State’s voters at a referendum. Admittedly, legislators from the less populous counties controlled each house of the Maryland Legislature. And even if a constitutional convention were convened, representation at the convention would be based on the allocation of seats in the allegedly malapportioned General Assembly. Significantly, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in its initial opinion in this litigation, stated that “the chances of the appellants’ obtaining relief from the infringement upon their alleged constitutional rights, other than from the courts, is so remote as to be practically nil.”

Neither in the Maryland Constitution nor in the state statutes is there any provision relating to the reapportionment of representation in the General Assembly. Apart from the limited and temporary reapportionment of the House enacted at the 1962 special session of the Maryland Legislature, following the holding of the Circuit Court that the House apportionment provisions of the Maryland Constitution were invalid, all efforts since 1867 to achieve a substantial reapportionment of seats in the General Assembly, with two rather minor exceptions, have been futile. In 1900, the City of Baltimore, because of its expanding population, was given an additional Senate seat and an additional legislative district, bringing its total to four senators and legislative districts. Two additional senators and two more legislative districts were added to Baltimore City’s representation in 1922. Apart from these increases in the legislative representation of the City of Baltimore, membership in the Maryland Senate remains as provided for in the 1867 Constitution. And, until 19 additional House seats were created and distributed among the five most populous political subdivisions in 1962, representation in the House of Delegates had been based, for a period of 95 years, on the limited-population formula embodied in the 1867 Maryland Constitution.

III.

In its unreported opinion holding the Maryland senatorial apportionment valid, the Circuit Court, after referring to the reapportionment of seats in the House of Delegates by the Maryland Legislature, stated: “It appears, therefore, and the Petitioners have conceded, that the Lower House has been legally reapportioned according to population.” And the Maryland Court of Appeals, in its opinion upholding the Circuit Court’s decision that the senatorial apportionment was constitutionally valid, pointed out that the instant appeal was from the lower court’s decision on remand of the previously undecided question as to the validity of the senatorial apportionment, and stated: “No question is presented as to the validity of the ‘stop-gap’ legislation or the reapportionment of the House of Delegates.” Questioning the validity of the majority’s assumption in this regard, the dissenters stated:

“The majority of this Court in the present case seems to accept tacitly, if not expressly, the view that if one house of the Maryland General Assembly (the Senate) may be apportioned on a basis which ignores disparities of population, the other house (the House of Delegates) must be apportioned with due regard to population, and assumes that the House of Delegates now is so apportioned. It is true that the apportionment of the House is not under attack on this appeal and no question with regard thereto is now before us. It is also true, however, that even as reapportioned by the May 1962 Special Session of the General Assembly, considerable disparities still exist in a number of instances, though previous disparities have been materially reduced. . . . There is no such close relationship between population and representation as in the case of the Michigan House .... Surely, the present Maryland apportionment is not so closely related to population as is that of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States. In that respect the Federal analogy is far from perfect.”

Appellants have continually asserted that not only is the constitutional validity of the apportionment of the Maryland Senate at issue in this appeal, but that also presented for decision is the sufficiency, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, of “the combined total representation provided for in both Houses of the Maryland General Assembly.” Appellees, on the other hand, have repeatedly contended that the sole question presented in this appeal is whether one house of a bicameral state legislature, i. e., the Maryland Senate, can be apportioned on a basis other than population, where the other house is presumably apportioned on a strict population basis. Appellees have argued that, since the courts below assumed and appellants allegedly conceded that the Maryland House of Delegates, as reapportioned in 1962, is apportioned on a population basis, and since the decisions of the state courts below here appealed from considered only the validity of the apportionment of the Maryland Senate, this Court is precluded from considering the validity of the apportionment of the Maryland House and is required to assume that that body is now apportioned on a population basis.

Regardless of possible concessions made by the parties and the scope of the consideration of the courts below, in reviewing a state legislative apportionment case this Court must of necessity consider the challenged scheme as a whole in determining whether the particular State’s apportionment plan, in its entirety, meets federal constitutional requisites. It is simply impossible to decide upon the validity of the apportionment of one house of a bicameral legislature in the abstract, without also evaluating the actual scheme of representation employed with respect to the other house. Rather, the proper, and indeed indispensable, subject for judicial focus in a legislative apportionment controversy is the overall representation accorded to the State’s voters, in both houses of a bicameral state legislature. We therefore reject appellees’ contention that the Court is precluded from considering the validity of the apportionment of the Maryland House of Delegates. We cannot be compelled to assume that the Maryland House is presently apportioned on a population basis, when that is in fact plainly not so. Furthermore, whether or not the House is apportioned on a population basis, the scheme of legislative representation in Maryland cannot be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, because of the gross disparities from population-based representation in the apportionment of seats in the Maryland Senate.

IV.

In Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 533, decided also this date, we held that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature are required, under the Equal Protection Clause, to be apportioned substantially on a population basis. Neither house of the Maryland Legislature, even after the 1962 legislation reapportioning the House of Delegates, is apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to be constitutionally sustainable. Thus, we conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals erred in holding the Maryland legislative apportionment valid, and that the decision below must be reversed.

We applaud the willingness of state courts tó assume jurisdiction and render decision in cases involving challenges to state legislative apportionment schemes. However, in determining the validity of a State’s apportionment plan, the same federal constitutional standards are applicable whether the matter is litigated in a federal or a state court. Maryland’s plan is plainly insufficient under the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as spelled out in our opinion in Reynolds.

For the reasons stated in Reynolds, appellees' reliance on the so-called federal analogy as a sustaining principle for the Maryland apportionment scheme, despite significant deviations from population-based representation in both houses of the General Assembly, is clearly misplaced. And considerations of history and tradition, relied upon by appellees, do not, and could not, provide a sufficient justification for the substantial deviations from population-based representation in both houses of the Maryland Legislature.

In view of the circumstances of this case, we feel it inappropriate to discuss remedial questions at the present time. Since all members of both houses of the Maryland General Assembly were elected in 1962, and since all Maryland legislators are elected to serve four-year terms, the next election of legislators in Maryland will not be conducted until 1966. Thus, sufficient time exists for the Maryland Legislature to enact legislation reapportioning seats in the General Assembly prior to the 1966 primary and general elections. With the Maryland constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment hereby held unconstitutional, the Maryland Legislature presumably has the inherent power to enact at least temporary reapportionment legislation pending adoption of state constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment which comport with federal constitutional requirements.

Since primary responsibility for legislative apportionment rests with the legislature itself, and since adequate time exists in which the Maryland General Assembly can act, the Maryland courts need feel obliged to take further affirmative action only if the legislature fails to enact a constitutionally valid state legislative apportionment scheme in a timely fashion after being afforded a further opportunity by the courts to do so. However, under no circumstances should the 1966 election of members of the Maryland Legislature be permitted to be conducted pursuant to the existing or any other unconstitutional plan. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals, and remand the case to that Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views stated here and in our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Clark concurs in the reversal for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 687, decided this date.

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 589.]

Mr. Justice Stewart.

In this case there is no finding by this Court or by the Maryland Court of Appeals that Maryland’s apportionment plan reflects “no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction.” Nor do I think such a finding on the record before us would be warranted. Consequently, on the basis of the constitutional views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, p. 744. I would affirm the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals unless the Maryland apportionment “could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule.” The Maryland court did not address itself to this question. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment and remand this case to the state court for full consideration of this issue.

        Id., at 428, 180 A. 2d, at 664.

        Id., at 433-434, 180 A. 2d, at 667-668.

       Md. Ann. Code (1962 Supp.), Art. 40, §42.

       Included as Appendix B to the dissenting opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals is a chart comparing the senatorial representation of the City of Baltimore and the four most populous counties with that of the other counties in the State. 229 Md., at 430, 184 A. 2d, at 730.

       Article III, § 4, of the 1867 Maryland Constitution provided for a minimum of two delegates per county, with increases proportional to population up to a total of six when a county’s population reached 55,000, but made no provision for additional delegates after a county’s population reached and exceeded 55,000. In 1950, Art. Ill, § 5, was adopted as a constitutional amendment freezing the representation in the House of Delegates on the basis of the allocation of House seats under the 1940 federal census. The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the smaller counties from continuing to receive increased House representation at the expense of the larger political subdivisions which, under the 1867 formula, were not entitled to any more than six delegates after their population had reached 55,000, regardless of how much it might increase thereafter. Additionally, Art. Ill, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution, as amended, provides for altering the boundaries of the legislative districts of the City of Baltimore to provide for approximately equal population among the six districts.

       According to the provisions of Art. Ill, §§ 2, 6, and 7, of the Maryland Constitution.

       Appendix A to the dissenting opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals contains a chart showing the populations, according to 1960 census figures, and representation of Maryland’s 23 counties and the City of Baltimore in the two houses of the Maryland General Assembly, including figures relating to the apportionment of seats in the House of Delegates both before and after the 1962 reapportionment legislation. Also included in this chart are figures showing the number of persons represented by each delegate, and computations of the relative values of votes for delegates and senators in each of the State’s political subdivisions. 229 Md., at 429, 184 A. 2d, at 728-729.

       Article XYI, §§2-5, of the Maryland Constitution provides a procedure for the conducting of a referendum vote by the people on certain types of legislative enactments, however, upon the filing of a petition signed by at least 3% of the State’s qualified voters.
      For a discussion of the lack of federal constitutional significance of the presence or absence of an available political remedy, see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, pp. 736-737, decided also thjis date.

       Md. Const., Art. XIV, § 2.

       Despite the clear mandate of Art. XIV, § 2, of the State Constitution, which states that “if a majority of voters at such election or elections shall vote for a Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by Law for the assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates thereto.”
      Compare the situation existing in Colorado, with respect to the availability of a political remedy, as discussed in our opinion in Lucas, post, pp. 732-733.

       Pursuant to Art. XIV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, which provides: “Each County, and Legislative District of the City of Baltimore, shall have in such Convention a number of Delegates equal to its representation in both Houses at the time at which the Convention is called.”

       228 Md., at 432-433, 180 A. 2d, at 667.

       In fact, there has been no substantial change in the scheme of legislative representation in Maryland since 1837, when the system of indirect election of senators was abolished. In 1864 the City of Baltimore was given additional representation in the form of three legislative districts, with one senator for each of the three districts. A constitutional convention in 1867, which adopted the existing Maryland Constitution, confirmed the increased representation accorded the City of Baltimore, but otherwise based the legislative apportionment provisions which it adopted on the 1837 scheme.

       For a discussion of various aspects of the Maryland legislative apportionment situation, including the instant litigation, see Note, Senate Reapportionment — The Maryland Experience, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 812 (1963).

       229 Md., at 410, 184 A. 2d, at 716.

        Id., at 421-422, 184 A. 2d, at 723-724.

       A commendable example of an exercise of judicial responsibility by a state court in a case involving state legislative apportionment is provided by the action of the Kansas Supreme Court in Harris v. Shanahan, 192 Kan. 183, 387 P. 2d 771 (1963). In that case the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statutory provisions apportioning seats in both houses of the Kansas Legislature were constitutionally invalid, but afforded the legislature a further opportunity to enact a constitutionally valid plan prior to the 1964 primary and general elections. Of course, this decision by the Kansas Supreme Court is not presently before us, and we indicate no view as to the merits in that case.

       The pattern of prolonged legislative inaction with respect to legislative apportionment matters and the existence of a rural strangle hold on the legislature in Maryland closely parallels the situation existing in Alabama, although Maryland, unlike Alabama, has no state constitutional provision requiring decennial legislative reapportionment.

       See Reynolds v. Sims, ante, pp. 571-576.

       Additionally, the Maryland legislative apportionment scheme here attacked fails to resemble the plan of representation in the Federal Congress in at least two important respects: the Maryland House, even as reapportioned in 1962, is clearly not apportioned on a population basis, and political subdivisions are not accorded the same number of senatorial seats, since, although each of Maryland’s. 23 counties is given only one Senate seat, six senators are allotted to the City of Baltimore.

       See Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 585.

       See 228 Md., at 438-440,180 A. 2d, at 670-671, where the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that, if the Maryland constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment were found invalid by the lower court, the Maryland Legislature would have the power to enact reapportionment legislation, “because the powers of the General Assembly of Maryland are plenary, except as limited by constitutional provisions.” See also the reference to this matter earlier in this opinion, ante, at 661.