text:
    No. 71-1461.
    Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Weston.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-1550.
    McFerrin v. Lubbock National Bank.
   C. A..5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5737.
    Reynolds v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5881.
    Molter v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1541.
    No. 71-1542.
    No. 71-1543.
    Susquehanna Corp. v. Dasho, Executrix, et al.; Bogan et al. v. Dasho, Executrix, et al.; and Hardin et al. v. Dasho, Executrix, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6189.
    Cannon v. Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6232.
    Brown v. Clark, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6241.
    Siirila v. Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6247.
    Nickerson v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6262.
    Nickols v. Gagnon.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6295.
    Simpson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6299.
    Cancino v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6302.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6342.
    Walton v. Virginia.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6433.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6491.
    No. 71-6501.
    No. 71-6505.
    Burnette v. United States; Gray v. United States; and Wilkerson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6492.
    Gutierrez-Rubio v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6504.
    Zurita v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6507.
    Waller v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6513.
    Landman v. Clark, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6525.
    Spencer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6527.
    Durham v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6574.
    McGucken v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6601.
    Allen v. Worrall.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6604.
    Boag v. Boies, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6607.
    Ingram v. Arkansas.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6609.
    Szwalla v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6613.
    Hayes v. Coulon et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6621.
    Nixon v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6622.
    Key v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6623.
    Morningstar v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Riverside. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6626.
    Logan v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6630.
    Pillis et al. v. State Board of Elections et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6632.
    Hamilton v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6635.
    Jones v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6636.
    Hardin v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6638.
    Thornhill v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6642.
    Lary v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6652.
    Roth v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6655.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6661.
    Miles v. Graham.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6721.
    Swinton v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-5035.
    Dickerson v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-5077.
    Brumfield v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1344.
    DeTore, aka Hayes v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1383.
    Pooley v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1427.
    Wilson v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1433.
    Belliston et al. v. Texaco Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1475.
    Wilson v. Deitz, Commissioner, Department of Economic Security, Division of Public Assistance, of Kentucky.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1503.
    DeSoto, Inc. v. Cataphote Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1513.
    Russo v. Byrne, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5121.
    Baker v. Tollett, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6210.
    Ansley v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6340.
    Robinson v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6350.
    Lewis v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6596.
    Evans v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6618.
    Bogdan v. Rodriguez, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6628.
    Goetz v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-256.
    United States v. Evans et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1340.
    New York District Council No. 9, International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1411.
    Lii v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Motions to dispense with printing petition and brief in opposition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1426.
    Chambers v. Speight, Commissioner of Highways and Public Works of Tennessee.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-1431.
    Triangle Publications, Inc., et al. v. Matus.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1441.
    Connors et al. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1534.
    Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1549.
    Blankner v. City of Chicago.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motions of Janitors Union Local 1, Chicago Property Owners Assn, et al., and Roman C. Pucinski for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 71—1581.
    Ferrara et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-6468.
    No. 71-6790.
    Hurst v. Estes, U. S. District Judge; and Hurst v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to consolidate granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6625.
    Holt v. City of Richmond et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-78.
    Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah et al. v. United States et al.,
   406 U. S. 128. Petition for rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-117.
    Kastigar et al. v. United States,
   406 U. S. 441. Petition for rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5830.
    Jones v. Craven, Warden,
   406 U. S. 921. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-913.
    No. 71-1068.
    No. 71-1264.
    No. 71-5795.
    No. 71-6170.
    No. 71-6194.
    No. 71-6205.
    No. 71-6249.
    No. 71-6324.
    No. 71-6429.
    Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Moran Inland Waterways Corp. et al., Midwest Freight Forwarding Co., Inc., et al. v. Lewis, Secretary of State of Illinois, et al., Ferrell et al. v. Hall, Governor of Oklahoma, et al., Park v. California et al., Soots et ux. v. Panaro, Baten v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, Pokras v. United States, Krikmanis v. Mannering et al., DeLevay v. Greyhound Corp., Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co. et al.,
   406 U. S. 949;

406 U. S. 939;

406 U. S. 939;

406 U. S. 962;

406 U. S. 922;

406 U. S. 923;

406 U. S. 924;

406 U. S. 926;

406 U. S. 928; and

406 U. S. 961. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 29, 1972
    No. 68-5017.
    Johnson et al. v. Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845.


text:
    No. 69-5050.
    Kerrigan v. Scafati, Correctional Superintendent.
   Appeal from D. C. Mass. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845.


text:
    No. 71-5073.
    Pope v. Nebraska.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Neb. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 70-210.
    Oyen et al. v. Washington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Police Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley, ante, p. 92, and Grayned v. City of Rockford, ante, p. 104.


text:
    No. 68-5012.
    Howard v. Nevada.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Nev. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 68-5001.
    Marks v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 68-5002.
    McCants v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 68-5003.
    In re Reynolds et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5004.
    Yates v. Cook, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 5th Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5005.
    Sims v. Eyman, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5006.
    Wright v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 68-5008.
    Miller v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 68-5010.
    Williams v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 68-5011.
    Hubbard v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 68-5013.
    Scoleri v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa.


text:
    No. 68-5015.
    Janovic v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5016.
    Smith et al. v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash.


text:
    No. 68-5018.
    Billingsley v. New Jersey et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5019.
    Morford v. Hocker, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Nev.


text:
    No. 68-5022.
    Kruchten v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 68-5023.
    Smith v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 68-5024.
    McAllister v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 69-2.
    Koonce v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla.


text:
    No. 69-3.
    Park v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5004.
    Hurst v. Illinois et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill.


text:
    No. 69-5005.
    Lokos v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 69-5006.
    Sullivan v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5007.
    Fesmire v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla.


text:
    No. 69-5008.
    Duisen v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo.


text:
    No. 69-5010.
    Thomas v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 69-5011.
    Walker v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev.


text:
    No. 69-5013.
    Mefford v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir.


text:
    No. 69-5014.
    Davis v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn.


text:
    No. 69-5015.
    Manor v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5018.
    Eaton v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 69-5023.
    Irving v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.


text:
    No. 69-5024.
    Paramore v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 69-5025.
    Kelbach et al. v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah.


text:
    No. 69-5027.
    Cummings v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5028.
    Williams v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Va.


text:
    No. 69-5029.
    Eubanks v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 69-5032.
    Arkwright v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5033.
    Atkinson v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C.


text:
    No. 69-5034.
    Carter v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 69-5036.
    Hubbard v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 69-5038.
    Keaton v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County.


text:
    No. 69-5039.
    Lee, aka King v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct.

Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5043.
    Huffman v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 69-5044.
    Swain v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 69-5045.
    Thacker v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 69-5047.
    Duling v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 69-5048.
    Laskey v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 69-5049.
    Williams v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 70-3.
    Walker v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 70-5.
    Limone et al. v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.


text:
    No. 71-1139.
    Limone et al. v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.


text:
    No. 70-5001.
    Poland v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 70-5003.
    Capler v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss.


text:
    No. 70-5006.
    Hamby et al. v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.


text:
    No. 70-5008.
    David, aka Davis v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 70-5011.
    Thames v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 70-5016.
    Strong v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 70-5017.
    Fuller v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C.


text:
    No. 70-5018.
    Miller v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.


text:
    No. 70-5019.
    Fogg v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Ya.


text:
    No. 70-5022.
    Tea v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 70-5023.
    Douglas et al. v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 70-5027.
    Alvarez v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb.


text:
    No. 70-5031.
    Sellars v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir.


text:
    No. 70-5034.
    Tyler v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash.


text:
    No. 70-5043.
    Herron v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.


text:
    No. 70-5044.
    Jackson v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir.


text:
    No. 70-5046.
    Johnson v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 70-5050.
    Brickhouse v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Va.


text:
    No. 70-5051.
    Jackson v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.


text:
    No. 70-5054.
    Bryson v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 70-5062.
    Cunningham v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 70-5065.
    Miller v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 70-5066.
    Williams v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir.


text:
    No. 70-5067.
    Morales v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 70-5069.
    McKenzie v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 70-5070.
    Anderson v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 70-5079.
    Henderson v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.


text:
    No. 70-5084.
    Morehead v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 70-5221.
    Staten v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 70-5326.
    Arrington v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir.


text:
    No. 70-5394.
    Brown v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 70-5400.
    Williams v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky.


text:
    No. 71-5008.
    Bartholomey v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 71-5114.
    Square v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 71-5184.
    Sinclair v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La.


text:
    No. 71-5192.
    Tull v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 71-5194.
    Seeney v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del.


text:
    No. 71-5197.
    Strong v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 71-5225.
    Steigler v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del.


text:
    No. 71-5228.
    Curry v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 71-5274.
    Elliott v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 71-5359.
    Cerny v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash.


text:
    No. 71-5369.
    Tilford v. Page, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir.


text:
    No. 71-5395.
    Westbrook v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.


text:
    No. 71-5525.
    White v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 71-5648.
    Alford v. Eyman, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir.


text:
    No. 71-5744.
    Phelan v. Brierley, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir.


text:
    No. 71-5866.
    Johnson v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 71-6001.
    Doss v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.


text:
    No. 71-6068.
    Stanley v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 71-6081.
    Kassow v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 71-6137.
    Gilmore v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md.


text:
    No. 71-6138.
    Terry v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo.


text:
    No. 71-6154.
    Boykin v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.


text:
    No. 71-6156.
    Young v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio.


text:
    No. 71-6183.
    Matthews v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.


text:
    No. 71-6204.
    Brown v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va.


text:
    No. 71-6223.
    Music v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash.


text:
    No. 71-6224.
    Chance v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.


text:
    No. 71-6282.
    Canaday v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash.


text:
    No. 71-6539.
    Menthen v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla.


text:
    No. 71-6592.
    Delgado v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn.


text:
    No. 71-819.
    No. 71-946.
    Thomas et al. v. Shirck; and Shirck v. Thomas et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, ante, p. 564. Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment below.


text:
    No. 71-5790.
    Canty v. Board of Education of the City of New York
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Perry v. Sindermann, ante, p. 593; Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, ante, p. 564; and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant, vacate, and remand solely in light of Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., supra.


text:
    No. 69-5016.
    Pitts v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the petition for -writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845.


text:
    No. 69-5017.
    Hawkins v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845.


text:
    No. 70-5020.
    Williams v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari granted. Judgment vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, ante, p. 845.


text:
    No. 204,
    October Term, 1970.
    Crampton v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Petition for rehearing granted. Judgment affirming judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 402 U. S. 183 (1971), vacated. Judgment, 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N. E. 2d 614 (1969), vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and case remanded for further proceedings. See Furman v. Georgia, ante, p. 238.


text:
    No. 71-1255.
    United States v. Ash.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 407 U. S. 909.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Sherman L. Cohn, Esquire, of Washington, D. C., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 71-575.
    Gomez v. Perez.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 4th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 920.] Joseph Jaworski, Esquire, of Houston, Texas, a member of the Bar of this Court, is invited to brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.


text:
    No. 70-228.
    No. 70-5198.
    Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Ralph; and Ralph v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1284.
    New Jersey v. Presha et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-322.
    In re Warren.
   Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Caswell County, N. C. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari, vacate judgment below, and remand case for further consideration in light of his opinion dissenting in part in Morrissey v. Brewer, ante, p. 471, at 491.


text:
    No. 70-141.
    Hodgin v. Noland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-354.
    Fooden et al. v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-430.
    Crabtree v. Board of Education, Wellston City School District, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-6259.
    McEnteggart v. Cataldo et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-249.
    Orr v. Trinter et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of National Education Assn, and Board of Education of the City of Washington C. H., Ohio, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


author: Pee Curiam. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    O'BRIEN et al. v. BROWN et al.
    Nos. 72-34 and A-23.
    Decided July 7, 1972

    See: 152 U. S. App. D. C. 157, 469 F. 2d 563.

      Together with Nos. 72-35 and A-24, Keane et al. v. National Democratic Party et al., on petition for writ of certiorari and on application for stay to the same court.

   Pee Curiam.

Yesterday, July 6, 1972, the petitioners filed petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in actions challenging the recommendations of the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention regarding the seating of certain delegates to the convention that will meet three days hence.

In No. 72-35, the Credentials Committee recommended unseating 59 uncommitted delegates from Illinois on the ground, among others, that they had been elected in violation of the “slate-making” guideline adopted by the Democratic Party in 1971. A complaint challenging the Credentials Committee action was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals on review rejected the contentions of the unseated delegates that the action of the Committee violated their rights under the Constition of the United States.

In No. 72-34, the Credentials Committee recommended unseating 151 of 271 delegates from California committed by California law to Senator George McGovern under that State’s “winner-take-all” primary system. The Committee concluded that the winner-take-all system violated the mandate- of the 1968 Democratic National Convention calling for reform in the party delegate selection process, even though such primaries had not been explicitly prohibited by the rules adopted by the party in 1971 to implement that mandate. A complaint challenging the Credentials Committee action was dismissed by the District Court. On review the Court of Appeals concluded that the action of the Credentials Committee in this case violated the Constitution of the United States.

Accompanying the petitions for certiorari were applications to stay the judgments of the Court of Appeals pending disposition of the petitions.

The petitions for certiorari present novel questions of importance to the litigants and to the political system under which national political parties nominate candidates for office and vote on their policies and programs. The particular actions of the Credentials Committee on which the Court of Appeals ruled are recommendations that have yet to be submitted to the National Convention of the Democratic Party. Absent judicial intervention, the Convention could decide to accept or reject, or accept with modification, the proposals of its Credentials Committee.

This Court is now asked to review these novel and important questions and to resolve them within the remaining days prior to the opening sessions of the convention now scheduled to be convened Monday, July 10, 1972.

The Court concludes it cannot in this limited time give to these issues the consideration warranted for final decision on the merits; we therefore take no action on the petitions for certiorari at this time.

The applications to stay the judgments of the Court of Appeals call for a weighing of three basic factors: (a) whether irreparable injury may occur absent a stay; (b) the probability that the Court of Appeals was in error in holding that the merits of these controversies were appropriate for decision by federal courts; and (c) the public interests that may be affected by the operation of the judgments of the Court of Appeals.

Absent a stay, the mandate of the Court of Appeals denies to the Democratic National Convention its traditional power to pass on the credentials of the California delegates in question. The grant of a stay, on the other hand, will not foreclose the Convention’s giving the respective litigants in both cases the relief they sought in federal courts.

We must also consider the absence of authority supporting the action of the Court of Appeals in intervening in the internal determinations of a national political party, on the eve of its convention, regarding the seating of delegates. No case is cited to us in which any federal court has undertaken to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political convention; no holding of this Court up to now gives support for judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here, involving as they do relationships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature. Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849). Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached with great caution and restraint. See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 399 F. 2d 119 (CA8 1968), affirming 287 F. Supp. 794 (Minn. 1968), and cases cited; Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F. 2d 370 (CA3 1965); Smith v. State Exec. Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga., 288 F. Supp. 371 (ND Ga. 1968). Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952). It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. Thus, these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judiciary to review actions heretofore thought to lie in the control of political parties. Highly important questions are presented concerning justiciability, whether the action of the Credentials Committee is state action and, if so, the reach of the Due Process Clause in this unique context. Vital rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution are also involved. While the Court is unwilling to undertake final resolution of the important constitutional questions presented without full briefing and argument and adequate opportunity for deliberation, we entertain grave doubts as to the action taken by the Court of Appeals.

In light of the availability of the convention as a forum to review the recommendations of the Credentials Committee, in which process the complaining parties might obtain the relief they have sought from the federal courts, the lack of precedent to support the extraordinary relief granted by the Court of Appeals, and the large public interest in allowing the political processes to function free from judicial supervision, we conclude the judgments of the Court of Appeals must be stayed.

We recognize that a stay of the Court of Appeals’ judgments may well preclude any judicial review of the final action of the Democratic National Convention on the recommendation of its Credentials Committee. But, for nearly a century and a half the national political parties themselves have determined controversies regarding the seating of delegates to their conventions. If this system is to be altered by federal courts in the exercise of their extraordinary equity powers, it should not be done under the circumstances and time pressures surrounding the actions brought in the District Court, and the expedited review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court.

The applications for stays of the judgments of the Court of Appeals are granted.

Mr. Justice Brennan is of the view that in the limited time available the Court cannot give these difficult and important questions consideration adequate for their proper resolution. He therefore concurs in the grant of the stays pending action by the Court on the petitions for certiorari.

Mr. Justice White would deny the applications for stays.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

I would deny the stays and deny the petitions for cer-tiorari. The grant of the stays is, with all respect, an abuse of the power to grant one. The petitions for cer-tiorari will not be voted on until October, at which time everyone knows the cases will be moot. So the action granting the stays is an oblique and covert way of deciding the merits. If the merits are to be decided, the cases should be put down for argument. As Mr. Justice Marshall has shown, the questions are by no means frivolous. The lateness of the hour before the Convention and the apparently appropriate action by the Court of Appeals on the issues combine to make a denial of the stays and a denial of the petitions the only responsible action we should take without oral argument.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,

dissenting.

These two separate actions challenge the exclusion from the Democratic National Convention by the party's Credentials Committee of 151 delegates from the State of California and 59 delegates from the State of Illinois, all of whom were selected as delegates as a result of primary elections in their respective States. The excluded delegates allege, in essence, that the refusal of the party to accept them as delegates denies them due process, and denies the voters who elected them their right to full participation in the electoral process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Two assertions are central to the challenge made by the delegates from California. First, they contend that under California’s winner-take-all primary election law, which the Democratic Party explicitly approved prior to the 1972 primary election, and which the California voters relied on in casting their ballots, they are validly elected delegates committed to the presidential candidacy of Senator George McGovern. Second, they claim that after all of the presidential candidates who were on the ballot in California had planned and carried out their campaigns relying on the validity of the State’s election laws, and after all votes had been cast in the expectation that the winner of the primary would command the entire California delegation, the Credentials Committee changed the party’s rules and reneged on the party’s earlier approval of the California electoral system. The delegates contend that, in so doing, the committee and the party impaired the rights of both voters and duly elected delegates in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Illinois delegates contend that they were excluded on the ground that they were “selected outside the arena of public participation by, and given the massive support and endorsement of, the Democratic organization in Chicago and specifically and clearly identifiable as the party apparatus in [certain districts], to the exclusion of other candidates not favored by the organization, and this without written and publicized rules and with no notice to the public such as would permit interested Democratic electors to participate.” They argue that the restrictions placed by the rules on party officials violate their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is also suggested that another reason why the delegates were excluded was that their delegation had an insufficient number of Negroes, women, and representatives of certain other identifiable classes of persons. This is alleged to be establishment of a “quota” system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied both sets of plaintiffs relief on the ground that there was no justiciable question before it. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and held that the questions presented in both suits were justiciable. It unanimously rejected the challenge made by the Illinois delegates, and by a 2-1 vote upheld the claim of the delegates from California that the belated change in the rules constituted a denial of due process of law.

The losing parties in the Court of Appeals seek review, and today this Court grants partial relief in the form of a stay of the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Court holds, in effect, that even if the District Court was incorrect in ruling that the issues before it were “political questions” not properly justiciable in a court of law, the posture and timing of these cases require that federal courts defer to the Democratic National Convention for resolution of the underlying disputes. I cannot agree.

In each of these cases, the claim is made that the Credentials Committee has impaired the right of Democratic voters to have their votes counted in a presidential primary election. The related claim is also made that the committee has deprived the delegates themselves of their right to participate in the convention, by methods that deny them due process of law. Both these claims are entitled to judicial resolution, and now is the most appropriate time for them to be heard.

If these cases present justiciable controversies, then we are faced with a decision as to the most appropriate time to resolve them. There would appear to be three available choices: now; after the Credentials Committee’s report is either accepted or rejected by the national convention; or after the convention is over.

There can be no doubt, in my view, that there is, at the present time, a live controversy between the excluded delegates and the Democratic National Committee. Nevertheless, because this controversy may vanish at the national convention, it is suggested that judicial intervention is premature at this point. This may be correct with respect to a decision on whether to grant injunctive relief, but not with respect to the appropriateness of a declaratory judgment.

Should this Court, or a lower federal court, be compelled to wait until the national convention makes a final decision on whether it will seat the delegates excluded by the Credentials Committee, it may never again be practicable to consider the important constitutional issues presented. Once the convention rules, we will be faced with the Hobson’s choice between refusing to hear the federal questions at all, or hearing them and possibly stopping the Democratic convention in midstream. This would be a far more serious intrusion into the democratic process than any we are asked to make at this time.

If we wait even longer — until the national convention is over — and ultimately sustain the delegates’ claims on the merits, we would have no choice but to declare the convention null and void and to require that it be repeated. The dispute in these cases concerns the right to -participate in the machinery to elect the President of the United States. If participation is denied, there is no possible way for the underlying disputes to become moot. The drastic remedy that delay might require should be avoided at all costs.

It is, therefore, obvious to me that now is the time for us to act. It is significant in this regard that the delegates request declaratory, as well as injunctive, relief. A declaratory judgment is a milder remedy than an injunction, cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 111 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is a particularly appropriate remedy under these circumstances, because it can protect any constitutional rights that may be threatened at the same time that the premature issuance of an injunction is avoided. Hence, I believe that we should consider the prayer for declaratory relief and that we should do so now.

In granting the stays, then, the Court seems to rely at least in part on the view that the claims are not yet ripe for decision, a view which I cannot accept for the reasons stated above. In addition, the Court suggests that judicial relief will be inappropriate even after the full convention has ruled on these claims. The point appears to be that, quite apart from the mere matter of timing, the cases present a “political question,” or are otherwise non justiciable, because they concern the internal decisionmaking of a political party. That argument misconceives the nature and the purpose of the doctrine. Half a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, made it clear that a question is not “political,” in the jurisdictional sense, merely because it involves the operations of a political party:

“The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320, and has been recognized by this Court. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64, 65. Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475, 485. See also Judicial Code, § 24 (11), (12), (14). Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231; 36 Stat. 1087, 1092. If the defendants’ conduct was a wrong to the plaintiff the same reasons that allow a recovery for denying the plaintiff a vote at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary election that may determine the final result.” Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927).

The doctrine of “political questions” was fashioned to deal with a very different problem, which has nothing to do with this case. As the Court said in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), the basic characteristic of a political question is that its resolution would lead a court into conflict with one or more of the coordinate branches of government; courts decline to decide political questions out of deference to the separation of powers. 369 U. S., at 217; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 518-549 (1969). Neither the Executive nor the Legislative Branch of Government purports to have jurisdiction over the claims asserted in these cases. Apart from the judicial forum, only one other forum has been suggested — the full convention of the National Democratic Party — and that is most assuredly not a coordinate branch of government to which the federal courts owe deference within the meaning of the separation of powers or the political-question doctrine.

Moreover, it cannot be said that “judicially manageable standards” are lacking for the determinations required by these cases, 369 U. S., at 217. The Illinois challenge requires the Court to determine whether certain rules adopted by the National Party for the selection of delegates violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Illinois voters and, if the rules are valid, whether they were correctly applied to the facts of the case. The California challenge requires the Court to determine whether the votes of party mémbers were counted in accordance with the rules announced prior to the election and, if not, whether a change in the rules after the election violates the constitutional rights of the voters or the candidates. Both these determinations are well within the range of questions regularly presented to courts for decision, and capable of judicial resolution.

A second threshold objection, however, has been raised as an obstacle to judicial determination of these claims. Even if the actions of a political party are not inherently non justiciable,, it is suggested that the Constitution places few, if any, restrictions on the actions of a political party, and none of those restrictions are even arguably implicated by any of the allegations here. On this view, then, the plaintiffs below failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. I disagree.

1. First, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the action of the Party in these cases was governmental action, and therefore subject to the requirements of due process. The primary election was, by state law, the first step in a process designed to select a Democratic candidate for President; the State will include electors pledged to that candidate on the ballot in the general election. The State is intertwined in the process at every step, not only authorizing the primary but conducting it, and adopting its result for use in the general election. In these circumstances, the primary must be regarded as an integral part of the general election, see United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), quoted infra, at 15-16, and the rules that regulate the primary must be held to the standards of elementary due process.

It is suggested that California, at least, cannot be charged with responsibility for the rules that are challenged here, because California by law sought (albeit unsuccessfully) to prohibit the Party from adopting those rules. That argument is somewhat disingenuous, however, unless it can seriously be contended that California will decline to recognize on its ballot in the general election the nominee of the Democratic convention. For so long as the State recognizes and adopts the fruits of the primary as it was actually conducted, then the State has made that primary an integral part of the election process, and infused the primary with state action, no matter how vociferously it may protest. A State cannot render the action of officials “private” and strip it of its character as state action, merely by disapproving that action. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-187 (1961).

Thus, when the Party deprived the candidates of their status as delegates, it was obliged to do so in a manner consistent with the demands of due process. Because the Court does not reach the question, I likewise refrain from expressing my views on the merits of the due process challenge in either case. It is sufficient to say that beyond all doubt, these claimants are entitled to a judicial resolution of their claim.

2. Even if the action of the Credentials Committee did not deny the delegates due process, petitioners in these cases claim that it impaired the federally protected right of voters to vote, and to have their votes counted, in the presidential primary election.

It is, of course, well established that the Constitution protects the right to vote in federal or state elections without impairment on the basis of race or color, Const. Arndt. XV, or on the basis of any other invidious classification, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). With respect to federal elections, however, the right to vote enjoys a broader constitutional protection. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), Mr. Justice Black cited a long line of precedents for the proposition that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over all congressional elections, based on Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution. E. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 (1915); United States v. Classic, supra. On the basis of these precedents, it is beyond dispute that the right to vote in congressional elections is a federally secured right.

Mr. Justice Black went on to argue that presidential elections have the same constitutional status: “It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections.” 400 U. S., at 124. To support this conclusion, he relied on Art. II, § 1, and its judicial interpretation in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934), and also on “the very concept of a supreme national government with national officers.” 400 U. S., at 124 n. 7. On the basis of Oregon v. Mitchell, then, in which Mr. Justice Black’s analysis was decisive, the right to vote in national elections, both congressional and presidential, is secured by the Federal Constitution.

Moreover, federal protection of the right to vote in federal elections extends not only to the general election, but to the primary election as well. In United States v. Classic, supra, this Court sustained an indictment charging a conspiracy “to injure and oppress citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution and Laws of the United States, namely, (1) the right of qualified voters who cast their ballots in the primary election to have their ballots counted as cast for the candidate of their choice, and (2) the right of the candidates to run for the office of Congressman and to have the votes in favor of their nomination counted as cast.” Id., at 308. It was critical to the decision to hold, first, that the Constitution protects the right to vote in federal congressional elections, and, second, that the right to vote in the general election includes the right to vote in the primary.

“Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary is likewise included in the right protected by Article I; § 2. And this right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, whether the voter exercises his right in a party primary which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate choice of the representative.” Id., at 318.

That reasoning has equal force in the case of a presidential election. Where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, then the right to vote at that primary is protected just as is the right to vote at the election. In the cases before this Court, it is claimed that the presidential primary is an integral part of the election machinery, and that the right to vote in the presidential primary has been impaired. That claim should be heard and decided on its merits, certainly not by the use of the stay mechanism in lieu of granting certiorari and plenary consideration.

It is unfortunate that cases like these must be decided quickly or not at all, but sometimes that cannot be avoided. Where there are no substantial facts in dispute, and where the allegation is made that a right as fundamental as the right to participate in the process leading to the election of the President of the United States is threatened, I believe that our duty lies in making decisions, not avoiding them.

I would therefore deny the applications for stays.

       This is not a case in which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination based on race in a primary contest within a single State. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).

       Argument was had and the ease decided in the District Court on July 3; the Court of Appeals entered its judgment July 5. Papers were filed here July 6.

       While the delegates couch their arguments in various ways, all of the arguments boil down to these two: i. e., they have been denied due process and the voters who elected them have been denied an opportunity to vote for the candidate or delegate of their choice.

       This approval was given in the form of a written communication from the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committeeman from California.

       A hearing officer found merit in the delegates’ claims, but he was reversed by the Credentials Committee.

       Report of Hearing Officer 2, adopted by Credentials Committee, June 30, 1972.

       See Report of Hearing Officer 3-4.

         The District Court Judge indicated that, in his view, a quota system would raise serious constitutional questions. Two judges of the Court of Appeals found that the rules did not require any quotas. Judge MacKinnon disagreed, believing that the rules did establish a quota and that they were, therefore, unconstitutional.

       The alleged impairment of that right may be regarded as state action, a§ above, and hence subject to challenge under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Alternatively, it may be regarded as the action of the. Federal Government, on the theory that Congress has the ultimate authority over presidential elections, and has acquiesced in the administration of the primary election process by the national political parties; in that case it may be subject to challenge on the theory of an implied remedy for a federal deprivation of constitutional rights, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Finally, it may be regarded as private action that interferes with a federally protected right; in that case the existence of a right of action may depend on the question whether the claims can be brought within the terms of 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3), which protects certain federal rights against certain kinds of private interference, see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971).


text:
    UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA et al. (LOUISIANA BOUNDARY CASE)
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    Decided May 31, 1960
    Final Decree Entered December 12, 1960
    Supplemental Decrees Entered December 13, 1965,
    December 20, 1971, and October 16, 1972
   Supplemental Decree

For the purpose of giving effect to the conclusions of this Court as stated in its opinion, announced May 31, 1960, 363 U. S. 1, and other opinions or decrees entered by this Court on December 12, 1960, 364 U. S. 502; on December 13, 1965, 382 U. S. 288; on March 3, 1969, 394 U. S. 11; and on December 20, 1971, No. 9, Original, 404 U. S. 388.

It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:

1. With the exceptions provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 32, 43 U. S. C. § 1313 (1964 ed.), the State of Louisiana is entitled, as against the United States, to all the lands, minerals and other natural resources lying more than one foot landward of the lines described in paragraph 2 hereof and seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the Louisiana shore, provided that the United States is not hereby required to relinquish any monies presently held by it for offset purposes solely in connection with accounting problems which have heretofore been deferred by the parties pending resolution of the larger disputes between them, without prejudice to the right of the State of Louisiana to contest éither the substance of the United States's offset claims or its right to withhold monies in connection with them.

2. The lines referred to in paragraph 1 hereof are described by coordinates in the Louisiana Plane Coordinate System, South Zone, in two segments, as follows:

Segment I

South and west of the Mississippi-Louisiana border to grid line Y = 158695, north of West Bay,

X Y

BEGINNING AT . 2769367 675650

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2790268 526390

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2779032 512013

TO . 2791386 525434

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2793119 523838

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2780766 510417

TO . 2794694 522313

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2795887 520810

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2782059 508914

TO . 2796579 519954

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2799209 516495

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2784689 505455

TO . 2800441 614653

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2804270 608096

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2788518 498898

TO . 2804495 607699

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2806028 604916

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2790051 496115

TO . 2807014 502822

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2808653 498677

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2791690 491970

TO . 2809151 497245

X Y

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2812250 486987

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2794789 481712

TO . 2812519 485996

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2813932 480148

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2796202 475864

TO . 2814262 478425

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2815269 471324

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2797209 468763

TO . 2815426 469688

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2815673 464823

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2797456 463898

TO . 2815697 463895

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2815696 458116

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2797455 458119

TO . 2815657 456928

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2815269 450999

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2797067 452190

TO . 2815171 449960

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2813957 440103

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2795853 442333

TO . 2813809 439123

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2812678 432796

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2794722 436006

TO . 2812419 431584

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2810957 425733

BY ÁRC CENTERED AT . 2793260 430155

TO . 2810699 424807

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2807854 415530

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2790415 420878

TO . 2807572 414684

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2805322 408462

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2788165 414646

TO . 2805227 408196

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2803786 404384

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2786724 410834

TO . 2803319 403263

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2799845 395648

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2783250 403219

TO . 2798971 393968

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2795394 387889

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2779673 397140

TO . 2795311 387750

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2793560 384834

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2777922 394224

TO . 2792249 382934

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2790814 381113

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2776487 392403

TO . 2789360 379480

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2774670 . 390293

TO . 2788262 . 378129

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2786653 . 376045

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2770599 . 383887

TO . 2785045 . 372750

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2783942 . 371319

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2783792 . 371062

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2768031 . 380244

TO . 2780548 . 366976

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2775735 . 360553

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2761138 . 371491

TO . 2775111 . 359766

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2773031 . 357287

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2757465 . 366796

TO . 2771721 . 355417

BY ^STRAIGHT LINE TO 27706."$ . 354054

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2770505 . 353847

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2755015 . 363480

TO . 2767788 . 350458

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2761994 . 344775

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2749221 . 357797

TO . 2760703 . 343624

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2757791 . 341265

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2746309 . 355438

TO . 2756022 . 339999

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2754136 . 338812

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2742173 . 323079

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2727653 . 334120

TO . 2741983 . 322834

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2741182 . 321817

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2726852 . 333103

TO . 2738042 . 318698

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2736381 . 317408

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2736060 . 316935

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2732627 . 311249

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2717012 . 320677

TO . 2731416 . 309486

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2729640 . 307200

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2715236 . 318391

TO . 2728702 . 306088

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2728099 . 305428

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2714633 . 317731

TO . 2725197 . 302861

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2723888 . 301931

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2713324 . 316801

TO . 2720770 . 300149

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2719218 . 299455

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2711772 . 316107

TO . 2714238 298034

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2704480 294684

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2704099 293666

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2687014 300054

TO . 2701338 288761

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2699382 286280

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2685058 297573

TO . 2697436 284175

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2699302 266715

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2688235 252215

TO . 2704468 260534

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2689305 250395

TO . 2707507 251577

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2700735 234640

TO .'. 2717908 . 240788

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2701500 232820

TO . 2719022 237890

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2707635 223640

TO . 2721632 235337

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2736873 228413 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2738320 210230

TO . 2745585 226961

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2738938 209975

TO . 2749646 224742

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2750755 206535

TO . 2759837 222354

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2755325 204680

TO . 2773229 201192

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2755178 203815

TO . 2770763 194337

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2754100 186915

TO . 2771780 191404

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2754263 186316

TO . 2772100 182502

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2753885 183460

TO . 2766449 169354

BY ARC CENTERED AT .1.. 2752470 . 182170

TO . 2761213 166161

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2751045 181305

TO . 2752202 163101

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 275b586 181270

TO . 2749611 163055

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2736662 175902

TO . 2748316 161869

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2734720 174030

TO . 2747824 161341

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2746249 159715

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2728153 162005

TO . 2746094 . 158715

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2745156 . 153600

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2727215 . 156890

TO . 2745054 . 153083

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2726951 . 150846

TO .>... 2743622 . 143444

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2726105 . 148530

TO . 2731258 . 131033

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2716731 . 112786

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2702461 . 124148

TO . 2716719 . 112772

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2699435 . 118600

TO . 2710698 . 104252

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2697850 . 117200

TO . 2683320 . 106173

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2682980 . 106621

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2697510 . 117648

TO . 2679799 . 113283

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2679589 . 114135

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2697300 . 118500

TO . 2679155 . 116635

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2685325 . 133800

TO . 2670977 . 122536

BY STRAIGHT LINE .TO 2670552 . 122781

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2666743 . 124295

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2673482 . 141245

TO . 2665719 . 124739

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2672315 . 141745

TO . 2661428 . 127109

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2644940 . 134910

TO . 2660589 . 125539

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2657484 . 120354

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2641835 . 129725

TO . 2656150 . 118421

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2653860 . 115521

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2639545 . 126825

TO . 2648682 . 111038

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2648610 . 110974

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2648531 . 110887

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2646419 . 107265

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2630660 . 116450

TO . 2646250 . 106981

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2644270 . 103721

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2628680 . 113190

TO . 2642494 . 101278

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2640182 . 98597

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2624995 . 108700

TO . 2638408 . 96339

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2638210 . 96123

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2637630 . 95377

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2624045 . 107660

TO 2637471 . 95312

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2635351 . 93007

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2621925 . 105355

TO 2634923 . 92558

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2633653 . 91268

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2620655 . 104065

TO 2631973 . 89760

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2631344 . 89262

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2630156 . 87770

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2615885 . 99131

TO 2630068 . 87661

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2629389 . 86821

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2626027 . 82661

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2624340 . 80576

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2610160 . 92050

TO 2621555 . 77806

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2621180 . 77506

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2609785 . 91750

TO 2617996 . 75462

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2617391 . 75157

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2609180 . 91445

TO 2597416 . 77505

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2595526 . 79100

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2607290 . 93040

TO 2589664 . 97736

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2607455 . 93710

TO 2591641 . 102625

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2592751 . 104785

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2608665 . 96870

TO 2593838 . 106495

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2595167 . 108350

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2596041 . 109955

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2614270 . 110615

TO 2597233 . 117130

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 2597210 . 155899

BY ARC CENTERED AT 2614790 . 160765

TO 2596949 . 156969

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2596342 . 158695

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO SHORE AT 2615450 . 157770

SEGMENT II

From the vicinity of Bayou Goreau to the vicinity of Sabine Pass, west of grid line X = 2082361 and east of the Texas-Louisiana border,

X Y

BEGINNING AT . 2082361 169358 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2081470 169553 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2085370 187372 .

TO . 2076984 171174 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2077417 189409 .

TO . 2071846 172040 __

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2070630 172430 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2076201 189799 .

TO . 2064747 175603 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2063841 176334 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2075295 190530 .

TO . 2059951 180668 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2071131 195080 .

TO . 2058843 181599 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2062055 199555 .

TO . 2057134 181991 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2053779 182931 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2058700 200495 .

TO . 2053474 183019 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2052967 183053 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2051871 183006 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2051090 201230 .

TO . 2050845 182991 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2048985 183016 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2049230 201255 .

TO . 2048033 183054 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2044865 183262 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2041482 183446 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2042475 201660 .

TO . 2037472 184119 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2033139 185355 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2032934 185387 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2035775 203405 .

TO . 2029791 186174 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2027401 187004 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2033385 204235 .

TO . 2026834 187211 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2023510 188491 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2020959 189327 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2026640 206660 .

TO . 2019190 190010 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2016613 191163 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2015796 191414 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2021155 208850 .

TO . 2013823 192148

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2010121 193773

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2017453 210475

TO . 2007660 ...... 195086

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2006450 195856

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2016243 211245

TO . 2002812 198903

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 2001329 200516

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1998627 203119

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1996877 204647

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2008873 218388

TO . . 1994484 207177

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1993669 208223

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2Ó08058 219434

TO . 1992024 210737

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1991723 211291

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1991392 211653

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1987627 216292

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 2000030 228573

TO . 1985881 217061

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1984419 218858

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1998568 230370

TO . 1982726 221329

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1981279 223864

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1987818 240892

TO . 1975782 227186

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1987371 241272

TO . 1972054 231367

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1937446 246505

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1933172 264238

TO . 1920501 251117

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1924399 268936

TO . 1916888 252314

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1914373 270380

TO . 1900989 257987

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1896827 275747

TO . 1895100 257588

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1882306 270590

TO . 1867537 259884

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1872418 277460

TO . 1858534 265630

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1843467 276912

. 1848729 258447 TO .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1835344 270839

TO . 1841538 253682

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1834019 270301

TO . 1817077 263541

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1833527 271423

TO . 1815531 274401 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT .. 1820994 291804 .

TO . 1808997 278064 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1809845 296285 .

TO . 1792971 289357 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1791584 307545 .

TO . 1773422 305849 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1783067 321331 .

TO . 1771284 307407 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1782391 321876 .

TO . 1769317 309156 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1778769 324757 .

TO . 1763172 315299 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1763190 333540 .

TO . 1762008 315338 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1761238 315388 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1762420 333590 .

TO . 1761004 315404 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1758630 333490 -

TO . 1751585 316665 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1749527 316597 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1745678 316238 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1741757 315745 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1738098 314155 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1730831 330886 .

TO . 1737269 313819 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1733962 312572 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1733065 312110 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1724713 328326 .

TO . 1729983 310863 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1729557 310735 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1727510 309315 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1717114 324303 .

TO . 1726647 308752 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1721463 305574 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1721351 305467 .

.BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1708756 318661 .

TO . 1715565 301739 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1713599 300948 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1706790 317870 .

TO . 1711471 300240 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1707761 299255 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1703080 316885 .

TO . 1706765 299020 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1704365 298525 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1700680 316390 .

TO . 1702466 298237 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1698144 297812 .

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1696359 315965

TO . 1696239 297725

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1692448 297750

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1692568 315990

TO . 1691302 297793

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1688714 297973

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1689980 316170

TO . 1687709 298071

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1684999 298411

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1687270 316510

TO . 1683393 298686

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1674668 300584

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1678545 318408

TO . 1674182 300697

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1670983 301485

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1675346 319196

TO . 1670472 301619

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1666144 302819

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1671018 320396

TO . 1665216 303103

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1663698 303612

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1662427 303960

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1661678 304151

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1659494 304616

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1663290 322457

TO . 1659476 304620

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1658120 304910

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1658887 323134

TO . 1656354 305070

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1655896 323305

TO . 1652650 305356

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1650184 305802

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1653430 323751

TO . 1648635 306152

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1647051 306584

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1649308 324684

TO . 1643681 307333

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1636292 308607

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1627130 309807

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1620757 310390

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1622420 328555

TO . 1619895 310490

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1614565 311235

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1617090 329300

TO . 1613148 311491

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1611814 311591

BY ARC CENTERED AT .1613190 329780

TO . 1609960 311828

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1606070 . 312528

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1609300 330480

TO . 1604702 312829

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1604290 312866

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1605965 331030

TO . 1601325 313389

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1601195 313403

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1603140 331540

TO . 1598672 313855

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1596370 314437

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1596179 314483

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1592424 315063

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1595210 333090

TO . 1591479 315235

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1594075 333290

TO . 1589694 315583

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1593010 333520

TO . 1589433 315634

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1588108 315899

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1591685 333785

TO . 1585928 316477

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1584286 317023

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1582201 317563

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1586780 335220

TO . 1581596 317732

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1576266 319312

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1581450 336800

TO . 1575360 319606

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1570080 321476

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1576170 338670

TO . 1569889 321545

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1565349 323210

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1571630 340335 ,

TO . 1663529 323992 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1563104 324202

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1561073 324994 ,

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1567695 341990

TO . 1558882 326020 .

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1558879 326021

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1564160 343480 ,

TO . 1556225 327056 ,

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1556066 327133 ,

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1553511 327894 ,

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1558720 345375 ,

TO . 1551769 328511 ,

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1549575 329415 ,

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1553840 347150 ,

TO . 1546081 330642 ,

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1543911 331662

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1551670 348170

TO . 1541402 333094

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1640011 333646

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1546740 350600

TO . 1537927 334630

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1531757 337418

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1639270 354040

TO . 1530263 338178

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1527498 339748

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1536506 355610

TO . 1526511 340351

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1526495 340356

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1532515 357575

TO .. 1623959 341466

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1531240 358190

TO . 1522813 342013

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1516478 345313

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1505572 350398

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1513280 366930

TO . 1504778 350792

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1493968 356487

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1502470 372625

TO . 1493740 366609

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1488240 359607

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1483855 361809

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1492040 378110

TO . 1483320 362089

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1481464 363099

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1472522 367321

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1464632 370389

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1471240 387390

TO . 1464433 370467

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1461367 371700

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1455041 373829

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1449142 375498

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1454105 393050

TO . 1447394 376089

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1443224 377739

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1449935 394700

TO . 1442769 377926

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1437906 380003

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1435142 381048

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1431147 382502

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1431465 400740

TO . 1426148 383291

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1423703 384036

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1429020 401485

TO . 1421665 . 384793

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1421218 . 384903

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1425600 . 492610

TO . 1417428 . 386302

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1411695 . 388054

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1406675 . 389181

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1400158 . 390267

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1395815 . 390681

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1390919 . 390971

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1392000 . 409180

TO . 1390575 . 390995

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1386958 . 390977

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1385797 . 390942

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1383281 . 390516

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1380235 . 408500

TO . 1382827 . 390444

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1380530 . 390115

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1379793 . 389887

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1363392 . 397870

TO . 1364288 . 379651

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1363312 . 379603

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1362416 . 397822

TO . 1348021 . 386619

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1347740 . 386685

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1339580 . 387874

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1332311 . 388694

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1328041 . 388886

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1323345 . 388897

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1318624 . 388814

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1313961 . 388548

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1309176 . 388114

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1299212 . 386972

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1294264 . 386189

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1291413 . 404205

TO . 1293948 . 386141

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1288689 . 385403

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1286154 . 403467

TO . 1288273 . 385350

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1282879 . 384719

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1280760 . 402836

TO . 1282343 . 384664

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1277050 . 384203

BY ARC CENTERED AT 1275467 . 402375

TO . 1276974 . 384197

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1266567 . 383334

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1261754 . 382855

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1256845 . 382176

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO 1252082 . 381444

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1247120 380489

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1243670 398400

TO . . 1246626 380401

BY STRAIGHT LINE .. 379947 TO . 1243866 ..

BY STRAIGHT LINE .. 379144 TO . 1240511 ..

BY STRAIGHT LINE .. 378640 TO . 1238894 ..

BY STRAIGHT LINE .. 377218 TO . 1234692 ..

BY ARC CENTERED .. 394497 AT . 1228846 ..

TO . . 1233981 . 376994

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1225768 . 393281

TO . . 1230677 . 375713

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1229077 . 374980

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1219065 . 390227

TO . . 1227371 . 373987

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1226185 . 373381

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1227214 . 367277

BY ARC CENTERED AT . 1209227 . 364245

TO . . 1214918 . 346915

BY STRAIGHT LINE TO . 1213304 . 346385

3. The United States is not entitled, as against the State of Louisiana, to any interest in the lands, minerals or natural resources described in paragraph 1 hereof, with the exceptions provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 32, 43 U. S. C. § 1313 (1964 ed.).

4. Pending further order of the Court or agreement of the parties, leases of lands lying partly within the area above described and partly seaward of that area shall be in no way affected by anything contained in this decree, and revenues derived from such leases shall remain subject to impoundment under the Interim Agreement of October 12, 1956, as amended, in the same manner as heretofore.

5. All sums now held impounded by the State of Louisiana or the United States under the Interim Agreement of October 12, 1956, as amended, derived from leases of lands wholly, within areas referred to in paragraph 1 hereof are hereby released to the State of Louisiana absolutely, and the State of Louisiana is relieved of any obligation under said agreement to impound any sums hereafter received by it from leases of lands lying wholly within said area and the State of Louisiana is and shall be entitled to lease lands wholly within said areas and to directly receive any sums hereafter derivable therefrom.

6. Nothing in this decree or the proceedings leading to it shall prejudice any rights, claims or defenses of the United States or the State of Louisiana with respect to the remainder of the disputed area or past or future payments derived therefrom or attributable thereto or the operation of the Interim Agreement of October 12, 1956, as amended, with respect to such remaining disputed area and payments. Nor shall anything in this decree nor in the proceedings leading to it prejudice any rights, claims or defenses of the State of Louisiana as to its maritime lateral boundaries with the States of Mississippi and Texas, which boundaries are not at issue in this litigation.

7. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders and issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to its previous orders or decrees herein or to this decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties in the premises.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    CALIFORNIA v. KRIVDA et al.
    No. 71-651.
    Argued October 10, 1972
    Decided October 24, 1972

      Russell Iungerich, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Assistant Attorney General, William E. James and S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorneys General, and William R. Pounders, Deputy Attorney General, joined by John D. LaBelle for the State of Connecticut and by the following Attorneys General: William J. Baxley of Alabama, Gary K. Nelson of Arizona, Ray Thornton of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, W. Laird Stabler, Jr., of Delaware, Robert L. Shevin of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, George Pai of Hawaii, W. Anthony Park of Idaho, Theodore L. Sendak of Indiana, Richard C. Turner of Iowa, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Francis B. Burch of Maryland, á. F. Summer of Mississippi, Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, Robert List of Nevada, Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire, George F. Kugler, Jr., of New Jersey, Louis J. Lefkowitz of New York, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, J. Shane Creamer of Pennsylvania, Richard J. Israel of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Gordon Myland of South Dakota, David M. Pack of Tennessee, Crawford C.

      Martin of Texas, Vernon B. Romney of Utah, James M. Jeffords of Vermont, Andrew P. Miller of Virginia, Rom-ald H. Tonkin of the Virgin Islands, Slade Gorton of Washington, Robert W. Warren of Wisconsin, and Clarence A. Brimmer of Wyoming.

      Roger S. Hanson, by appointment of the Court, 406 U. S. 904, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was George R. Milman.

    Briefs of amici curiae were filed by William J. Scott, Attorney General, and James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Illinois; by Frank G. Car-rington, Jr., Alan S. Ganz, Glen Murphy, and Wayne W. Schmidt for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al.; by Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford J. Rosen, Joel M. Gora, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, and Lawrence R. Sperber for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Sheldon Portman and Rose Elizabeth Bird for the California Public Defenders Assn.; and by Theodore A. Gottfried and Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn.
   Per Curiam.

On the basis of evidence obtained in a police search of respondents’ trash, respondents were charged with possession of marihuana in violation of § 11530 of the California Health & Safety Code. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the superior court’s judgment of dismissal and order suppressing the evidence on the grounds that, under the circumstances of this case, respondents “had a reasonable expectation that their trash would not be rummaged through and picked over by police officers acting without a search warrant.” People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 366-367, 486 P. 2d 1262, 1268 (1971) (en banc). We granted certiorari. 405 U. S. 1039.

After briefing and argument, however, we are unable to determine whether the California Supreme Court based its holding upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, or upon the equivalent provision of the California Constitution, or both. In reaching its result in this case, the California court cited pertinent excerpts from its earlier decision in People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P. 2d 713 (1969) (en banc), which relied specifically upon both the state and federal provisions. 5 Cal. 3d, at 367, 486 P. 2d, at 1269. Thus, as in Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1965), “[wjhile we might speculate from the choice of words used in the opinion, and the authorities cited by the court, which provision was the basis for the judgment of the state court, we are unable to say with any degree of certainty that the judgment of the California Supreme Court was not based on an adequate and independent nonfederal ground.” We therefore vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of California and remand the cause to that court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate. Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, supra; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 (1940); State Tax Comm’n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511 (1939). We intimate no view on the merits of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issue presented.


text:
    ILLINOIS v. MICHIGAN
    No. 57,
    Orig.
    Decided October 24, 1972
   Per Curiam.

The State of Illinois moved to file its bill of complaint in this case on the theory that a “reciprocal treaty” between the States of Illinois and Michigan was violated by a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan which allowed recovery by two injured workmen against an Illinois re-insurance company. Federoff v. Ewing, 386 Mich. 474, 192 N. W. 2d 242 (1971). It claims that such an agreement arose when the two States enacted the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, which contains certain reciprocal features, and that the agreement has the dignity of an interstate compact.

The State of Illinois was a party to the case decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan through the person of the Director of Insurance of the State of Illinois, who was the liquidator of the workmen's compensation insurer, Highway Insurance Co. It was the imposition of liability upon that company’s re-insurer which Illinois claims was inappropriate under the uniform act. Review of the Michigan decision should have been sought in that case by means of a petition for writ of certiorari.

It is now too late for any such petition for certiorari to be filed. But original jurisdiction of the Court is not an alternative to the redress of grievances which could have been sought in the normal appellate process, if the remedy had been timely sought.

The problem presented is essentially one between private litigants and, though the point now raised may not have been presented in the Michigan litigation, these controversies áre recurring and essentially not state concerns.

While the complaint on its face is within our original, as well as our exclusive, jurisdiction, it seems apparent from the moving papers and the response that Illinois, though nominally a party, is here “in the vindication of the grievances of particular individuals.” Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 16.

The motions to file briefs amici curiae by Jack Federoff, William F. Ewing, dba William Ewing Roofing Co., and John H. Shannon are granted.

The motion of the State of Illinois for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied.

      See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution — a Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685 (1925); Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact not a Compact?, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1965); Note, At the Intersection of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1514 (1971).


text:
    ROBINSON v. HANRAHAN, STATES ATTORNEY OF COOK COUNTY
    No. 71-6918.
    Decided October 24, 1972
   Per Curiam.

On June 16, 1970, appellant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery and, immediately thereafter, the State of Illinois instituted forfeiture proceedings against appellant’s automobile pursuant to the Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 36-1 et seq. (1969). Appellant was held in custody in the Cook County jail from June 16, 1970, to October 7,1970, awaiting trial. Nevertheless, the State mailed notice of the pending forfeiture proceedings, not to the jail facility, but to appellant’s home address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State. It is undisputed that appellant, who remained in custody throughout the forfeiture proceedings, did not receive such notice until his release. After an ex parte hearing on August 19, 1970, the circuit court of Cook County ordered the forfeiture and sale of appellant’s vehicle.

Upon learning of the forfeiture after his release, appellant filed a motion for rehearing, requesting that the order of forfeiture be set aside because the manner of notice did not comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois, three justices dissenting, held that, in light of the in rem nature of the proceedings, substituted service as utilized by the State did not deny appellant due process of law. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 Ill. 2d 37, 284 N. E. 2d 646 (1972). We cannot agree.

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), after commenting on the vagueness of the classifications "in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, ‘in the nature of a proceeding in rem,’ ” this Court held that “the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state.” Id., at 312. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id., at 314. More specifically, Múlleme held that notice by publication is not sufficient with respect to an individual whose name and address are known or easily ascertainable. Similarly, in Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that, in the context of a foreclosure action by the town, notice by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate where the individual involved was known by the town to be an incompetent without the protection of a guardian. See also Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112 (1956); New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293 (1953).

In the instant case, the State knew that appellant was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also that appellant could not get to that address since he was at that very time confined in the Cook County jail. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the State made any effort to provide notice which was "reasonably calculated” to apprise appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, we grant the motion for leave, to proceed in forma pauperis, reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

       Under Illinois law, the address of a vehicle owner must be registered in the office of the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 95%, §3-405 (1971). The Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute authorizes service of notice by certified mail to the address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 36-1 (1969).

       Appellant was tried on October 7, 1970, for the offense of armed robbery. The court, sitting without a jury, found appellant guilty only of plain robbery and sentenced him to probation for three years, the first four months of which to be served in the Cook County jail. In light of appellant’s pretrial detention, the four-month requirement was “considered served” and appellant was released immediately on his own recognizance.

       Since we dispose of this case on the notice question, we do not reach the additional issues raised by appellant.