author: Mr. Justice Marshall Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. ARMOUR & CO. et al.
    No. 759.
    Argued April 19, 1971
    Decided June 1, 1971
    Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Harlan and Stewart, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and White, JJ., joined, post, p. 683. Black and Blackmun, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

      Deputy Solicitor General Springer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Comegys, and Howard E. Shapiro.

      Edward L. Foote argued the cause for appellee Greyhound Corp. With him on the brief was Robert J. Bernard.

   Mr. Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Here as in United States v. Armour & Co., 398 U. S. 268, we have been asked to determine if the Meat Packers Consent Decree of 1920, which prohibits Armour & Co. from dealing directly or indirectly in certain specified commodities, prohibits a corporation that may deal in some of those specified commodities from acquiring a controlling interest in Armour. When this decree was here last Term the Government was seeking to prevent General Host, a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of a variety of food products, from acquiring control of Armour. While that case was pending, General Host agreed to sell its interest in Armour to Greyhound Corp., a regulated motor carrier. After the required approval was obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the transaction was consummated. This Court then dismissed the action against General Host as moot. 398 U. S. 268.

The Government then proceeded against Greyhound as it had against General Host and filed a petition in the District Court alleging that Greyhound’s engagement in businesses forbidden to Armour or any firm in which Armour has a direct or indirect interest, and that Greyhound’s ownership of Armour create a relationship forbidden by the 1920 Consent Decree. The District Court, as it had when General Host’s ownership of Armour was at issue, held that the Consent Decree did not prohibit such acquisitions. The Government appealed.

This case does not involve the question whether the acquisition of a majority of Armour stock by Greyhound is illegal under the antitrust laws. If the Government had wished to test that proposition, it could have brought an action to enjoin the acquisition Under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18. Alternatively, if the Government believed that changed conditions warranted further relief against the acquisition, it could have sought modification of the Meat Packers Decree itself. It took neither of those steps, but, rather, sought to enjoin the acquisition under the decree as originally written. Thus the case presents only the narrow question whether ownership of a majority of stock in Armour by a company that engages in business forbidden to Armour by the decree, in itself and without any evidentiary showing as to the consequences, violates the prohibition against Armour's “directly or indirectly . . . engaging in or carrying on” that forbidden business.

On February 27, 1920, the United States filed a bill in equity against the Nation’s five largest meatpackers, including Armour, and against their subsidiary corporations and controlling stockholders, charging conspiratorial and individual attempts to monopolize a substantial part of the Nation’s food supply. The bill alleged that the packers, from their initial position of power in the slaughtering and packing business, had acquired control of the Nation’s stockyards, stockyard terminal rail lines, refrigerated rolling stock, and cold storage facilities, and that they had used predatory practices to eliminate competition in the food business.

The bill further alleged that the packers, having gained monopoly power in the meat business, were attempting to destroy competition in products which might be substituted for meat. That objective was being pursued through the acquisition of nonmeat food companies and by means of exclusive output contracts with suppliers. The prayer for relief sought, along with other prohibitions against the defendants’ attempts to monopolize, the divestiture of most of their nonpacking operations and the permanent exclusion of them from the substitute food business.

On the same day as the complaint was filed, defendants filed their answer, denying its essential allegations, and both sides filed a stipulation to a consent decree, granting the Government the largest part of the relief it had sought. Paragraph Fourth of the decree enjoined the corporate defendants, including Armour, from “either directly or indirectly, by themselves or through their officers, directors, agents, or servants, engaging in or carrying on, either by concert of action or otherwise . . . the manufacturing, jobbing, selling . . . distributing, or otherwise dealing in” a long list of food and other products sold by grocery stores. Paragraph Fourth further enjoined the corporate defendants from “owning, either directly or indirectly . . . any capital stock or other interests whatsoever” in any business which dealt in these commodities.

Paragraph Eighteenth of the decree provided that the court should retain jurisdiction of the case “for the purpose of taking such other action or adding to the foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as may become necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement of this decree.”

Since 1920, the decree has withstood a motion to vacate it in its entirety, Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311 (1928), and two attempts on the part of the defendants to have it modified in light of alleged changed circumstances. United States v. Swift Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932); United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 892 (ND Ill. 1960), aff’d, 367 U. S. 909 (1961). Thus the decree stood at the time this case arose, and still stands, as originally written.

The Government does not contend that Greyhound’s acquisition of controlling interest in Armour subjects Greyhound to punishment for contempt since it was not a party to the decree. Nor does the Government contend that Greyhound has acted “in active concert or participation with” a party. Instead, the Government argues that Greyhound should have been brought before the District Court, which retained permanent jurisdiction over the decree, pursuant to § 5 of the Sherman Act, and be enjoined from acting to exercise control over or influence the business affairs of Armour, and be required to divest itself of the Armour stock.

The contention is that the acquisition violates the decree since it causes Armour to be engaged in activities prohibited by the decree. The claim is that Greyhound is engaged in businesses that the decree prohibits Armour from being engaged in and the decree's purported purpose of separating the meatpackers from the retail food business is thus circumvented.

But while structural separation of this kind may have been the Government’s overall aim, the decree itself, carefully worked out between the parties in exchange for their right to litigate the issues, does not effect a complete separation, but, rather, prohibits particular actions and relationships not including the one here in question. The crucial provision, Paragraph Fourth, forbids the corporate defendants from “engaging in or carrying on” commerce in the enumerated product lines. This language, taken in its natural sense, bars only active conduct on the part of the defendants. Thus Armour could not trade in these products, either under its own corporate form, or through its “officers, directors, agents, or servants.” The entry of Armour into the grocery business through subsidiaries is clearly and Draconically prevented by the separate provision of Paragraph Fourth forbidding the defendant meatpackers from owning “any . . . interests whatsoever” in a firm trading in the enumerated commodities. In the Government’s view these prohibitions also bar Armour from having any ownership relationship with corporations like Greyhound. The Government contends that Armour has an obligation not to engage directly or indirectly in legal or economic association with firms in the retail food business. It refers to the prohibited relationship between Armour and Greyhound.

But the decree does not speak in terms of relationships in general, but, rather, prohibits certain behavior, and in doing so prohibits some but not all economic interrelationship between Armour and the retail food business. Armour may not carry on or engage in that business, nor may it acquire any interest in any firm in that business, but there is no prohibition against selling any interest to a grocery firm, or more generally against entering into an ownership relationship with such a firm. If the parties had agreed to such a prohibition, they could have chosen language that would have established the sort of prohibition that the Government now seeks.

If the parties had agreed to prohibit the kind of transaction here involved, that end could also have been accomplished through the provision of the decree running against the stockholders of the defendant meat-packers. Many of the controlling stockholders were defendants in the 1920 action, and the decree prohibits certain conduct on their part in Paragraph Fifth. That paragraph prohibits the individual defendants from owning a half interest or more in any firm engaged in the product lines enumerated in Paragraph Fourth. This prohibition, through its negative implications, refutes the Government’s argument that the decree established a complete structural separation between the defendant corporations and the retail food business. For it allows a controlling stockholder of a meatpacker to own a controlling, though not a majority, interest in a grocery firm — say 49% of the common stock, a figure which in all but the most unusual corporate situation would represent de facto control.

Perhaps more important, the prohibitions of Paragraph Fifth run only against the named stockholders and not against their successors and assigns. If a “successors and assigns” clause had been included, the Government could argue with some persuasiveness that ownership of a meatpacker by a controlling interest in a retail food firm was prohibited. And the parties were able to use the words “successors and assigns” when they wanted to. Paragraph Third, which prohibits the corporate defendants from using their distribution facilities to handle the commodities named in Paragraph Fourth, expressly runs against the corporations and their “successors and assigns.”

In short, we do not find in the decree a structural separation such as the Government claims. On the one hand, the decree leaves gaps inconsistent with so complete a separation; on the other, language that would have been apt either to create a complete separation or tJbar with particularity^ the sort of transaction involved here was not used.

Stepping back from this analysis of the terms of the 1920 decree, we are confronted with the Government’s argument that to allow Greyhound to take over Armour would allow the same kind of anticompetitive evils that the 1920 suit was brought to prevent. In its 1920 suit, the Government sought to insulate the large meatpackers from the grocery business, both to prevent the destruction of competition in that business, and to prevent consolidation of the packers’ monopoly control of the meat business by controlling commerce in products that might be substitutes for meat. Those purposes, the Government says, are frustrated as much by a retail food company’s acquisition of a meatpacker as they would be by a meatpacker’s entry into the retail food business.

This argument would have great force if addressed to a court that had the responsibility for formulating original relief in this case, after the factual and legal issues raised by the pleadings had been litigated. It might be a persuasive argument for modifying the original decree, after full litigation, on a claim that unforeseen circumstances now made additional relief desirable to prevent the evils aimed at by the original complaint. Here, however, where we deal with the construction of an existing consent decree, such an argument is out of place.

Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it. Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that waiver must be respected, and the instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.

This Court has recognized these principles before. In Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952), the Government sought to construe a consent decree that gave the defendant the option of selling his stock or putting it in a voting trust as requiring him to sell the stock within a reasonable time even though he chose the voting trust alternative, because the pro-competitive purpose of the decree would otherwise be frustrated. The Court responded:

“It may be true as the Government now contends that Hughes’ large block of ownership in both types of companies endangers the independence of each. Evidence might show that a sale by Hughes is indispensable if competition is to be preserved. However, in section V the parties and the District Court provided their own detailed plan to neutralize the evils from such ownership. Whatever justification there may be now or hereafter for new terms that require a sale of Hughes’ stock, we think there is no fair support for reading that requirement into the language of section V.” 342 U. S., at 357.

In United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959), the Government sought an order limiting the dividends payable by common carriers to shipper-owners, under a consent decree that allowed such dividends to be paid according to a stated formula. Noting that the language in which the formula was expressed could “be made to support the United States’ contention,” but characterizing that construction as “strained,” 360 U. S., at 22, the Court stated:

“The Government contends that the interpretation it now offers would more nearly effectuate ‘the basic purpose of the Elkins and Interstate Commerce Acts that carriers are to treat all shippers alike.’ This may be true. But it does not warrant our substantially changing the terms of a decree to which the parties consented without any adjudication of the issues.” Id., at 23.

And here too, although the relief the Government seeks may be in keeping with the purposes of the antitrust laws, we do not believe that it is supported by the terms of the consent decree under which it is sought.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White concur, dissenting.

The antitrust decree before us last Term in United States v. Armour & Co., 398 U. S. 268, is here again in a new posture. Under the original decree of 1920 the defendants were required to abandon their interests in a wide variety of food and nonfood lines. They were required to divest themselves of any interest in the businesses of “manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting . . . distributing, or otherwise dealing in” some 114 specified food products and some 30 other products. They were enjoined from “owning, either directly or indirectly . . . any capital stock or other interests whatsoever in any corporation . . . which is in the business, in the United States, of manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting . . . distributing, or otherwise dealing in any” of the prohibited products. Under the decree the District Court retained jurisdiction “for the purpose of taking such other action or adding to the foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as may become necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement of this decree.”

Armour, one of the parties to the decree, is now the second largest meatpacker in the United States with total assets of almost $700 million and total sales in 1967 of approximately $2,150,000,000. In addition to meatpacking, Armour manufactures, processes, and sells various nonprohibited products. In early 1969 the Government filed a petition in Federal District Court to make General Host Corp., a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of numerous food products, a party to the decree and forbid it from acquiring control of Armour. The District Court held that the decree prohibited Armour from holding any interest in a company handling any of the prohibited products but did not prohibit such a company from acquiring Armour. The Government appealed the decision arguing that acquisition by General Host of a majority of Armour’s stock would be in violation of the decree and General Host should have been made a party to the decree so that an injunction could issue. We noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 811.

In the interim, General Host entered into an agreement to sell its controlling stock interest in Armour to Greyhound, a regulated motor carrier. The Interstate Commerce Commission approved the acquisition. Following Greyhound's acquisition, the Court dismissed the case as moot. 398 U. S. 268.

The Government then filed a new petition in the District Court alleging (as it had against General Host) that Greyhound is engaged in businesses forbidden to Armour, or any firm in which Armour has a direct or indirect interest, and therefore Greyhound’s acquisition violates the decree. The petition prayed that Greyhound be brought before the Court under § 5 of the Sherman Act and that an order supplemental to the original decree be entered enjoining Greyhound from acquiring any additional stock or exercising control over or influencing the business affairs of Armour, and requiring Greyhound to divest itself of the Armour stock. The District Court dismissed the Government’s complaint, ruling that since Greyhound was not a party to the original decree, Greyhound may not be enjoined from “committing any acts on the ground that they are prohibited by the decree.” The court also rejected the Government’s argument that acquisition of the Armour stock placed the two companies in a “corporate relationship” which was prohibited by the decree. The court stated “the decree does not speak in terms of corporate relationships; it speaks in terms of the defendants dealing in the specified lines of commerce . . . The Government appealed.

The Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. § 5) provides:

“Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.”

Under § 5 and the All Writs Act (28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a)) the District Court has ample power to prevent frustration of the original decree.

Greyhound may well have devised a plan which would render the original decree nugatory.

Under the decree, none of the meatpackers could own a chain of grocery stores. Yet under the interpretation of the District Court a chain of grocery stores could acquire a meatpacking company. I do not view the decree so narrowly. The evil at which the decree is aimed is combining meatpackers with companies in other food product areas.

The authorities support the proposition that judges who construe, interpret, and enforce consent decrees look at the evil which the decree was designed to rectify. See Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1315. My interpretation of the evil at which this decree was aimed is the same as that of Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for this Court in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106. As we stated in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556, 562, the test for reviewing modifications is “whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original consent decree.”

Neither Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353, nor United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19, relied on by the Court, is to the contrary. Hughes involved a Government attempt to require the trustee to sell stock in a voting trust where the consent decree expressly allowed Hughes a choice of selling the stock himself or placing the stock in a voting trust “until Howard R. Hughes shall have sold his holdings of stock.” Atlantic Refining was a case where for 16 years, right until the eve of the litigation, both parties had construed the decree in one way. Then the Government changed its interpretation not because it would effectuate the purposes of the decree but because it “would more nearly effectuate 'the basic purpose of the Elkins and Interstate Commerce Acts.’ ” 360 TJ. S., at 23.

The evil at which the present decree is aimed — combining meatpackers with companies in other food product areas — is present whether Armour purchases a company dealing in the various prohibited food lines or whether that company purchases Armour. When any company purchases Armour it acquires not only Armour’s assets and liabilities, but also Armour’s legal disabilities. And one of Armour’s legal disabilities is that Armour cannot be combined with a company in the various food lines set out in the decree.

I read the decree to prohibit any combination of the meatpacking company defendants with companies dealing in various food lines.

In the District Court the Government offered an affidavit which showed that Greyhound deals in food products through its divisions and wholly owned subsidiaries, which provide industrial catering services, and operates restaurants, cafeterias, and other eating facilities. The affidavit states that in 1969 Greyhound had revenues of about $124 million from food operations which accounted for over 16% of Greyhound’s total revenues that year. Greyhound has contended that it operates no grocery business and only buys raw foodstuffs and sells prepared meals. Thus, Greyhound argues, it can acquire Armour even if it is made a party to the decree because the decree does not prohibit meatpackers from entering the restaurant business. I do not pass on this contention. Rather, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court for any further proceedings which are necessary to determine if Greyhound’s acquisition of Armour violates the decree. If it does, then the District Court should make Greyhound a party to that decree.

       The Government claims that two of Greyhound’s wholly owned subsidiaries are engaged in the retail food business. Prophet Foods Co., an industrial catering company, operates eating facilities in industrial plants, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and other commercial establishments. In 1968 Prophet’s sales were in excess of $77 million. Post Houses, Inc., operates restaurants in bus stations and at rest and meal stop locations. Post Houses had sales in excess of $33 million in 1968.

       See Chrysler Corp. v. United, States, 316 U. S. 556 (1942); and see generally Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1303 (1967).

       Paragraph Eighth made identical provisions with respect to certain dairy commodities.

      Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65 (d) provides:
      “Every order granting an injunction ... is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.”

       Section 5 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210, 15 U. S. C. § 5, provides:
      “Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.”

       That portion of Paragraph Fourth provides:
      “[T]he corporation defendants and each of them be, and they are hereby, further perpetually enjoined and restrained from owning, either directly or indirectly, severally or jointly, by themselves or through their officers, directors, agents, or servants any capital stock or other interests whatsoever in any corporation, firm, or association except common carriers, which is in the business, in the United States, of manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting, except as common carriers, distributing, or otherwise dealing in any of the above-described products or commodities.”

       The Government contends that Paragraph Fourth prohibits Armour from having “any . . . interests whatsoever” in firms engaged in the prohibited businesses and that Armour as a subsidiary of Greyhound has an “interest” in the other Greyhound subsidiaries that are engaged in the retail food business. But Paragraph Fourth does not prohibit Armour from having any interest; it prohibits Armour from “owning” an interest. See n. 6, supra. Clearly, Armour has nothing approaching an ownership interest in Greyhound or Greyhound’s subsidiaries.

       Paragraph Fifth provides:
      “That the individual defendants and each of them, be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined and restrained from, in the United States, either directly or indirectly, by themselves or through their agents, servants, or employees, owning voting stock which in the aggregate amounts to 50% or more of the voting stock of any corporation, except common carriers, or any interest in such corporation resulting in a voting power amounting to 50 per cent or more of the total voting power of such corporation, or which interest by any device gives to any such defendant or defendants a voting power of 50 per cent or more in any such corporation, or a half interest or more in any firm or association which corporation, firm, or association may be, in the United States, in the business of manufacturing, jobbing, selling, transporting, distributing, or otherwise dealing in . . . [specified products].”

       See sources cited in n. 2, supra.

       Cf. Note, Flexibility and Finality, n. 2, supra, at 1314-1315.

      See the cases cited in Note, Requests by the Government for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 Yale L. J. 657, 667-668, n. 56.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    DEWEY v. REYNOLDS METALS CO.
    No. 835.
    Argued April 20-21, 1971
    Decided June 1, 1971

      Donald F. Oosterhouse argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      William A. Coughlin, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Fred B. Edney.

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, David L. Bose, Stanley P. Hebert, Julia P. Cooper, and George H. Darden.

    Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Nathan Lewin, Samuel Babinove, and Sol Babkin for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs et al., and by Paul S. Berger, Joseph B. Bobison, and Beverly Coleman for the American Jewish Congress.

      Milton A. Smith and Jay S. Siegel filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Black,

text:
    CONNOR et al. v. JOHNSON et al.
    Decided June 3, 1971
   Per Curiam.

On May 14, 1971, a three-judge District Court, convened in the Southern District of Mississippi, invalidated the Mississippi Legislature's latest reapportionment statute as allowing impermissibly large variations among House and Senate districts. The parties were requested by the court to submit suggested plans, and the applicants did so on May 17. All four plans suggested by applicants utilized single-member districts exclusively in Hinds County. The following day, May 18, the court issued its own plan, which included single- and multi-member districts in each House; Hinds County was constituted as a multi-member district electing five senators and 12 representatives. The court expressed some reluctance over use of multi-member districts in counties electing four or more senators or representatives, saying: “[I]t would be ideal if [such counties] could be divided into districts, for the election of one member [from] the district.” However, in view of the June 4, 1971, deadline for filing notices of candidacy, the court concluded that: “[W]ith the time left available it is a matter of sheer impossibility to obtain dependable data, population figures, boundary locations, etc. so as fairly and correctly to divide these counties into districts for the election of single members of the Senate or the House in time for the elections of 1971.” The court promised to appoint a special master in January 1972 to investigate the possibility of single-member districts for the general elections of 1975 and 1979.

Applicants moved the District Court to stay its order. The motion was denied on May 24. Applicants have now applied to this Court for a stay of the District Court’s order and for an extension of the June 4 filing deadline until the District Court shall have provided single-member districts in Hinds County, or until the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia approves the District Court’s apportionment plan under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. V).

Insofar as applicants ask relief under the Voting Rights Act the motion for stay is denied. A decree of the United States District Court is not within reach of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. However, other reasons lead us to grant the motion to the extent indicated below.

In failing to devise single-member districts, the court was under the belief that insufficient time remained until June 4, the deadline for the filing of notices of candidacy. Yet at that time June 4 was 17 days away and, according to an uncontradicted statement in the brief supporting this motion, the applicants were able to formulate and offer to the court four single-member district plans for Hinds County in the space of three days. Also according to uncontradicted statements, these plans were based on data which included county maps showing existing political subdivisions, the supervisory districts used by the Census Bureau for the taking of the 1970 census, official 1970 Census Bureau “final population counts,” and “computer print-out from Census Bureau official computer tapes showing total and white/Negro population by census enumeration districts.” Applicants also assert that no other population figures will subsequently become available.

The District Court’s judgment was that single-member districting would be “ideal” for Hinds County. We agree that when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter. Furthermore, given the census information apparently available and the dispatch with which the applicants devised suggested plans for the District Court, it is our view that, on this record, the District Court had ample time to devise single-member districts for Hinds County prior to the June 4 filing deadline. While meeting the June 4 date is no longer possible, there is nothing before us to suggest any insurmountable barrier to devising such a plan by June 14, 1971. Therefore the motion for stay is granted and the judgment below is stayed until June 14. The District Court is instructed, absent insurmountable difficulties, to devise and put into effect a single-member district plan for Hinds County by that date. In light of this disposition, the District Court is directed to extend the June 4 filing date for legislative candidates from Hinds County to an appropriate date so that those candidates and the State of Mississippi may act in light of the new districts into which Hinds County will be divided.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent and reserve the right to file an opinion to that effect.

Mr. Justice Black,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan join, dissenting.

I strongly dissent from the stay order of June 3, 1971, more particularly as it relates to a postponement of the Hinds County, Mississippi, election. Under Mississippi law and the decrees of the three-judge court, Hinds County candidates for the state legislature would be elected from the county at large. But this Court — at the eleventh hour — now commands the District Court to change its decree and divide Hinds County into single-member districts so that each voter there can vote for only one state representative and one state senator. Under Mississippi law, the final filing date for candidates is June 4. This Court's order now postpones that deadline to “an appropriate date” after June 14. The order compels candidates who had expected to run countywide to change their plans completely and to campaign only in a particular district which is part of the county. The confusion is compounded because the candidates do not yet know where the district lines will be drawn. Any candidate would be dumbfounded by the thought that his old district had suddenly been abolished on the eve of the filing date and he must now run in a new but unspecified district which is still only a dream in the eyes of the United States Supreme Court sitting a thousand miles from Hinds County.

This abrupt order by the Court is all the more astounding since this Court has consistently approved multi-member districts for state legislatures. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U. S. 42 (1965); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966).

I do not deny that this Court has the sheer, raw power to impose single-member districts on Hinds County. I do, however, strongly object to this Court’s exercising that power by throwing a monkey wrench into the county election procedure at this late date.

Above all else, we should remember that no one of us is a resident of Mississippi or the Judicial Circuit of which Mississippi is a part. The judges who entered this order do reside in that Circuit, they heard the evidence and oral arguments, and examined the statistics. We should not forget they concluded that:

“There is no evading the fact that with the time left available it is a matter of sheer impossibility to obtain dependable data, population figures, boundary locations, etc. so as fairly and correctly to divide these counties into districts for the election of single members of the Senate or the House in time for the elections of 1971.”

The holding of a county election is a difficult, intricate, and time-consuming process. Orders must be filed, ballots printed, campaigning plans laid, and officials appointed. Many different procedures must be carefully synchronized if the elections are to be efficiently and fairly administered. But today the Court plunges into an unfamiliar arena and creates utter confusion for the voters, candidates, and officials of Hinds County by subjecting them to the judicial branch of Federal Government.

Needless to say I completely agree with the holding of the majority that a reapportionment plan formulated and ordered by a federal district court need not be approved by the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Under our constitutional system it would be strange indeed to construe § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. V), to require that actions of a federal court be stayed and reviewed by the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

I dissent.

      [Note: This opinion was filed June 4, 1971.]


text:
    April 15, 1971
    No. 710.
    Associated Press v. Adams et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    April 19, 1971
    No. 1352.
    Consolidated Carriers Corp. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 1347.
    Fairview Development, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Alaska dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1368.
    Foreman v. City of Bellefontaine et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Logan County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1426.
    Delahay v. Alaska et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Alaska dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6381.
    Price v. Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 1367.
    Clairol, Inc. v. Director of Division of Taxation.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. Motion of Automobile Manufacturers Assn., Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Harlan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 1390.
    Pruett v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 1391.
    H. L. Federman & Co., Inc. v. Zerbel, dba John A. Zerbel & Co.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 1428.
    Fried et al. v. Danaher, Clerk of Circuit Court, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 962.
    Kostamo v. Northern City National Bank, Administrator, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent from dismissal of appeal.


text:
    No. 5925.
    Hietala v. Heir of Pakarinen.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent from dismissal of appeal. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 1353.
    McCann, District Attorney of Milwaukee County v. Babbitz.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Wis. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37; and Samuels v. Mackell and Fernandez v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from the remand.


text:
    No. 5029.
    Romontio v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 400 U. S. 901.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.


text:
    No. 538.
    Swarb et al. v. Lennox et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 991.] Motion to proceed on original record and motion to dispense with printing appellants’ brief on merits granted.


text:
    No. 1042.
    Diffenderfer et al. v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from

D. C. S. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 934.] Joint motion to dispense with printing appendix record granted.


text:
    No. 798.
    United States et al. v. Mitchell et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 400 U. S. 1008.] Motion of respondent Angello for additional time for oral argument granted and an additional 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. The Solicitor General also granted an additional 15 minutes to argue on behalf of the United States.


text:
    No. 835.
    Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 400 U. S. 1008.] Motions of National Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs et al., Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and American Jewish Congress for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 1463.
    Dekar Industries, Inc., et al. v. Bissett-Berman Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent to restrict distribution of petition or in the alternative to delete portions thereof denied.


text:
    No. 6303.
    Trull v. Smith, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6319.
    No. 6474.
    No. 6579.
    No. 6663.
    Ney v. Field, Men’s Colony Superintendent; Brown v. Buchkoe, Warden; Ward v. Page, Warden; and Reese et al. v. Smith, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 6601.
    No. 6665.
    Harris v. LaFave; and Laughlin v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
      No. 1346.
    United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 1331.
    Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1023.
    Healy et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1189.
    No. 1277.
    No. 6532.
    DeLegge v. United States; Daddano v. United States; and Cain v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 432 F. 2d 1119.


text:
    No. 1228.
    Roberts v. State Real Estate Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1265.
    Construction & General Laborers’ Local Union No. 246, Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. Jordan Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1294.
    McAfee et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1337.
    No. 1399.
    Morelli et al. v. New York; and Colon v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 N. Y. 2d 1, 267 N. E. 2d 577.


text:
    No. 1296.
    El Ranco, Inc., et al. v. First National Bank of Nevada, Administrator.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1308.
    United Mine Workers of America v. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, aka International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1338.
    Beto, Corrections Director v. Marion.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1339.
    Haldane v. Ruppe et al.
   C. A,, 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1342.
    McMann, Warden v. Owen.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1345.
    Noll Motors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1357.
    Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1358.
    Coakley v. Reising et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1361.
    Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1369.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1366.
    Baum v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1372.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1374.
    Granger et al. v. City of Mentor.
   Ct. Common Pleas, Lake County, Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1377.
    Rose et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1379.
    International Metal Specialties, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1380.
    Mather Construction Co. et al. v. Continental Casualty Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1382.
    MacLeod v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1384.
    Raymond v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1385.
    Kirkland, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1388.
    Messick, dba Georgian Hall Motor Lodge, et al. v. Gordon.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1400.
    Drobnick et al. (First National Bank of Waukegan, Trustee) v. Foss Park District.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1396.
    Lombardozzi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1401.
    Bagel Bakers Council of Greater New York et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1403.
    Stanley Air Tools, a Division of Stanley Works v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1404.
    Noriega v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1405.
    Leslie Salt Co. v. Alameda Conservation Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1407.
    Doyle v. Koelbl et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1408.
    Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. King et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1410.
    Certain Space in Property Known as Chimes Building et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1411.
    National Bank of Albany Park in Chicago, Trustee, et al. v. City of Chicago in Trust for Use of Schools.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1416.
    Canel Lodge No. 700, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. United Aircraft Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1417.
    Sherwood et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1418.
    Sandoval et al. v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1422.
    Shaw et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1427.
    Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lester.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1437.
    Armstrong Equipment Co. v. Clark Equipment Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1458.
    Costen et vir v. Hirschbach Motor Line et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1462.
    Sparks v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crina. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1466.
    Democratic Organization of Cook County et al. v. Shakman et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1486.
    Atlas Engine Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6071.
    Booth v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6127.
    Scott v. Mancusi, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6163.
    Reynolds v. Arizona.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6182.
    Bustos v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6231.
    Malone v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6261.
    Dudley v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6273.
    Lay v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6299.
    Hill v. Circuit Court of Hillsborough.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6318.
    Blanton v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6326.
    Fitzsimmons v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6332.
    Murphy v. Conte.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6337.
    Lockridge et al. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6339.
    Nichols v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6347.
    Walters, aka Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6358.
    Mayfield v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6369.
    Rush v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6387.
    Gilyard v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6398.
    Landgham v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6408.
    Paszek v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6428.
    Ligue v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6437.
    Scott v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6438.
    Fognini, aka Swartz v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6469.
    Muhammad v. Mancusi, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6497.
    Harper v. Ciccone, Medical Center Director.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6506.
    Sostre v. Mitchell, Attorney General.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6520.
    Vermeulen v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6526.
    Hepler v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6530.
    Haslam v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6542.
    Nordeste v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6546.
    Reeb v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6549.
    Sullivan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6556.
    Chapman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6561.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6577.
    Tanner v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6581.
    Zenchak v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6582.
    Hargrove v. Rundle, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6585.
    Seyfried v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6591.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6595.
    Martin v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6596.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6597.
    Borman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6599.
    Platt v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6603.
    Mos v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6605.
    Tanner v. Pate, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6606.
    Holman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6607.
    Bournett v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6608.
    Hicks v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6609.
    Jordan v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6616.
    Lewis v. Smith, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6618.
    Rose v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6620.
    Lopez v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6631.
    Mason v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6641.
    Enty v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6634.
    Hacker v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6644.
    Williams v. McMann, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6650.
    Morrison v. North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6655.
    Hughes v. District Attorney for Atlanta, Georgia, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6669.
    Alexander v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6670.
    McKinney v. Patuxent Institution Director.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6675.
    Duffen v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6678.
    Hathorne v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1248.
    LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent v. Miller et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent Miller for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1279.
    No. 1315.
    Timmons v. United States; and Nolte v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions to dispense with printing petitions granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 432 F. 2d 1011.


text:
    No. 1281.
    Heine v. Raus.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1348.
    Littlepage v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1364.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1310.
    Edwards v. Bryan et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6635.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1340.
    Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1350.
    United Transportation Union v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1351.
    Interboro Contractors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1356.
    Franco v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 1316.
    2,606.84 Acres of Land in Tarrant County, Texas, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

dissenting.

In 1945 Congress authorized the Benbrook Dam and Reservoir Project on the Clear Fork of the Trinity River near the southwest outskirts of Fort Worth, Texas. The authorization stated in part:

“The improvement of the Trinity River and tributaries, Texas, for navigation, flood control, and allied purposes is hereby approved and authorized in accordance with the reports contained in House Document Numbered 403, Seventy-seventh Congress.” § 2, 59 Stat. 18.

The project described in House Document 403 called for a gated spillway dam to be located on the Clear Fork at river mile 11.3. The storage capacity of the reservoir in acre feet of water was to be dead storage, 603; conservation storage, 30,603; and controlled (combined conservation and flood control) storage, 208,850. The elevation of the spillway crest was 672 feet and the top of the dam was 702 feet. Approximately 6,200 acres of land would have been required. Projected cost of the land was $483,600 and the entire project was estimated to cost about $5,205,502.

The project that was subsequently built bears little resemblance to the one described in House Document 403. It is located 3.7 miles farther upstream at river mile 15. It is an uncontrolled spillway type. The notch crest of the spillway is 710 feet, and the main spillway crest is 724 feet. The top of the dam is 747 feet. The storage capacity in acre feet of water as stated by the Definite Project Report is dead storage, 17,750; conservation storage, 88,250; and controlled storage, 410,013. Over 13,000 acres of land were acquired at a cost of about $2,500,000; total project cost was well over $14,000,000.

This case arose when the United States filed a petition for condemnation of petitioners’ land in federal district court. Some 1,207 acres were finally sought. Of this land some lies below the elevation of 697.1 feet (conservation pool elevation, the maximum water level of the pool below flood stage). That land below elevation 697.1 is not involved in the case here. But some 647 acres lie above that elevation. The Army Corps of Engineers took that land for recreation purposes. Petitioners claim that taking is not authorized by law. Petitioners have consistently contended that the land was taken for recreation purposes and that was not authorized under statutes authorizing the Benbrook Project and that the project, as built, was so radically and materially changed that it had to be resubmitted to Congress for a new authorization.

Shortly after the Government filed its condemnation suit, petitioners’ predecessor, Richardson, instituted discovery proceedings. The Secretary of the Army refused to submit and the District Court abated the cause with bare legal title left in the Government and possession restored to Richardson pending the Government’s obedience to the court’s discovery orders. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this action. United States v. Richardson, 204 F. 2d 552 (1953). The Government later submitted to discovery and discovery showed, as General Sturgis, former Chief of the Corps, admitted to a congressional subcommittee, that “it could have been very embarrassing to have justified his [the Secretary’s] certification of the public need of all of this particular taking.”

As a result of a congressional investigation and discovery in this case certain facts about this case emerged. Petitioners allege that prior to 1953 the Corps had a “field practice” of taking more property than was authorized in order to create land for purely recreational purposes. According to the District Court, 309 F. Supp. 887, almost simultaneously with the 1945 authorization the Corps in the present case began its plans for twice as much land as had been authorized with much of the excess for purely recreational purposes. Maps were prepared showing the locations of the recreational facilities. The final recreational plans for the project were in the form of Appendix VIII E to the Definite Project Report. In preliminary drafts certain proposed expenses were designated as “for recreation,” but in final drafts they were credited to “preparation of master plan.” Similarly, the maps initially showed “recreational areas,” but in final stages the label was changed to “reservoir management.” In addition, Appendix VIII E was stamped “Not for Public Release.” According to the District Court, no other appendix was so classified. Id., at 896.

Justification for the excess land was necessary. The District Court found that to accomplish this, the Corps created the Great Storm and used its Great Storm as a basis for its spillway design on the dam as built. It is said that the storm will indeed be great, if it ever comes, dumping some 28.2 inches of rain in the area within a 60-hour period. The likelihood of this happening is said not to be high. Average annual rainfall in the area is 31.3 inches. The greatest storm ever recorded there dropped 12.57 inches in a 57-hour period. The District Court says the Great Storm was invented from a storm near Thrall, Texas, in 1922. Thrall is 130 miles from the Gulf of Mexico and over 150 miles from the Ben-brook Project. The Thrall storm dropped an uncertain amount of rain and reports of the amount increased as the years passed. The District Court found that in all probability about 18-19 inches were dropped in a three-day period in Thrall.

But even with the Great Storm, recordbreaking though it would be, the District Court found that the Corps could not justify the height of the spillway necessary to obtain the land it wanted for recreational purposes. But one Great Storm deserves another and that, it is said, is what the Corps postulated. The Great Storm was assumed to come right after another big storm had dropped large amounts of rain in the area, thus preventing any opening of the dam gates. Furthermore, none of the spillway design criteria made any allowance for the well-established reservoir management practice of lowering the level of water during potential flood months. And large floods have occurred only during three months of the year in the Fort Worth area.

The District Court found that the taking of the land for recreational purpose was lawless. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that recreational development was an “allied purpose” within the meaning of the project authorization and also concluding the modifications were proper and needed no further authorization. 432 F. 2d, at 1291.

From the Solicitor General’s brief in opposition there is much we do not know about the Government position. There have been congressional inquiries into the Corps’ actions in taking more land than necessary for projects which it is building. Hearings on Army-Interior Reservoir Land Acquisition Policy before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Report of the Subcommittee on Deficiencies and Army Civil Functions of the House Committee on Appropriations, Investigation of Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1951). The Solicitor General does not discuss the effect of these reports on this litigation.

Further, there is some relevant statutory material which the Solicitor General does not discuss or cite. Section 70lb-8 of 33 U. S. C. states that “[n]o . . . modification not authorized, of a project . . . shall be authorized . . . unless a report for such . . . modification has been previously submitted by the Chief of Engineers . . . in conformity with existing law.” Section 701m authorizes the Corps to make a dam smaller than originally planned, but does not authorize making a dam larger, as happened here. Section 701 requires reports for projects or modifications covering, inter alia, “the extent and character of the area to be affected by the proposed improvement” and “such other uses as may be properly related to or coordinated with the project.”

Finally we do not know to what use the land has been put. If there is no development yet, what are the current plans? The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. § 4331 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. Y), requires environmental impact statements for proposed projects. So far as we are advised, no such statement has been filed.

The questions raised are of such great public importance that I dissent from a denial of certiorari.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, provides in § 102 the following:

Sec. 102. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—

(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man’s environment;

(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;

(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;

(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind’s world environment;

(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment;

(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of resource-oriented projects; and

(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act.

       Hearings on Army-Interior Reservoir Land Acquisition Policy before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 422 (1957).

       The relevant portions of this Act are set forth in an Appendix to this dissent.


text:
    No. 1359.
    Wheeler v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1386.
    Chicago Housing Authority et al. v. Gautreaux et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1432.
    Lynd et al. v. City of Chicago.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6087.
    McKenzie v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6567.
    Kember v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1376.
    Samuel Goldwyn Productions et al. v. Mulvey.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6082.
    Harrington et ux. v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan would grant certiorari, vacate judgment below, and remand case in light of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and his separate opinion in Mackey v. United States (and companion cases), 401 U. S. 667, 675.


text:
    No. 6484.
    Aguirre v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan would grant certiorari, vacate judgment below, and remand case in light of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and his separate opinion in Mackey v. United States (and companion cases), 401 U. S. 667, 675.


text:
    No. 6105.
    Cantrell v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6512.
    Cantrell v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6325.
    Nemke v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari, vacate judgment below, and remand case in light of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and Mr. Justice Harlan’s separate opinion in Mackey v. United States (and companion cases), 401 U. S. 667, 675, and Mr. Justice Marshall’s separate opinion in Williams v. United States (and companion case), 401 U. S. 646, 665.


text:
    No. 6698.
    Ganci v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 152.
    Patterson v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. et al.,
   401 U. S. 922. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1034.
    Jacobs v. United States,
   401 U. S. 924. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6276.
    Singal v. Blackwell, Warden, et al.,
   401 U. S. 922. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 370.
    No. 964.
    No. 966.
    No. 1037.
    No. 1130.
    No. 1132.
    No. 5740.
    No. 5942.
    No. 6175.
    No. 6355.
    Magnesium Casting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Van Sickle v. Nevada, Florida State Board of Dentistry v. Mack, Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., Nolynn Association of Separate Baptist in Christ of Kentucky et al. v. Oak Grove Separate Baptist Church et al., City of Millard et al. v. City of Omaha et al., Garcia et ux. v. United States, Shirley v. Louisiana, Spigner v. United States, Maras v. Gehring,
   401 U. S. 137;

401 U. S. 910;

401 U. S. 960;

401 U. S. 938;

401 U. S. 955;

401 U. S. 951;

400 U. S. 945;

401 U. S. 926;

401 U. S. 918; and

401 U. S. 946. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1211.
    Levy v. United States,
   401 U. S. 962. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    April 21, 1971
    No. -.
    Morton, Secretary of the Interior v. Quaker Action Group et al.
   Upon consideration of the application of the Solicitor General of the United States for a stay herein and the opposition to such stay on behalf of the respondents presented to The Chief Justice as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit at 6 p. m. on April 20, 1971, The Chief Justice entered an order, dated April 20, 1971, vacating the order of the United States Court of Appeals, dated April 19, 1971, which modified the preliminary injunction issued on April 16, 1971, by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and reinstated the said order of the District Court, dated April 16, 1971, pending further order of the Court; and said matter being referred by The Chief Justice to the Court and the Court having considered the matter,

It is ordered

(1) that the Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, dated April 19, 1971, modifying the preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on April 16, 1971, is vacated;

(2) that the preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court herein on April 16, 1971, is reinstated with full force and effect.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of this matter.


text:
    April 26, 1971
    No. 48,
    Orig.
    Mississippi v. Arkansas.
   [Motion to file complaint granted, 400 U. S. 1019.]

It is ordered that the Honorable Clifford O'Sullivan, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for thé Sixth Circuit, be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case. The Special Master shall have authority to fix the time and conditions for filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may approve.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.


text:
    No. 1285.
    United States v. Bass.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 993.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that William E. Hellerstein, Esquire, of New York, New York, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 5515.
    Humphrey v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 973.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Irvin B. Charne, Esquire, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 1395.
    DeSapio v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to copy briefs for respondent in No. 825, October Term, 1970, granted.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 5798.
    Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 908.] Motion of National Legal Aid & Defender Assn. to dispense with printing brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 6046.
    Lego v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 992.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Nathan Lewin, Esquire, of Washington, D. C., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 6464.
    No. 6765.
    Eisenhardt v. United States; and Davis v. California Adult Authority et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 6697.
    Dixon v. Gordon, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 1412.
    Schilb et al. v. Kuebel.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 1420.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Nash-Finch Co., dba Jack & Jill Stores.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1307.
    Bellamy et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1343.
    Glucksman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1409.
    Barnett v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1423.
    Elbel v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1430.
    Benedict et al. v. County of Peoria.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1431.
    Hingle v. Perez et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1439.
    Ethicon, Inc. v. Handgards, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1440.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1444.
    Young v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1445.
    Dorr v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1446.
    McKown et al. v. Pierce et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1450.
    Polson v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1451.
    Maxwell v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1464.
    United Mine Workers of America v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1490.
    Howard Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1498.
    Hubbard v. Kiefel.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6217.
    Gould v. Zelker, Warden.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6244.
    Stark v. Minnesota.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6600.
    Virga v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6624.
    Tate v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6625.
    Potter v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6627.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6628.
    Parker v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6632.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6637.
    Chapman v. Collins, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6642.
    Carrizoza-Islas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6643.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6647.
    Eaton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6653.
    Edmondson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6654.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6671.
    Morales v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6677.
    Westfall v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6679.
    Palmer v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6683.
    Braxton v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6691.
    Kitchens v. McCulloch.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6693.
    Colby v. Kropp, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6699.
    Leighty v. Goodwin, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6700.
    Bryant v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6701.
    Griffith v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6706.
    Howell v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6708.
    Halpern v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6709.
    Davis v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1074.
    Petkus v. New Hampshire.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1421.
    Weber v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1438.
    Schmutz Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Atkins.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6389.
    Cimino v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6421.
    Burwell v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6590.
    Jack v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6636.
    Shelton v. United States.
   Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1127.
    Burke, Warden v. Hahn.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing brief for respondent granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1406.
    Broom v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and judgment reversed in light of this Court's decision in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560.


text:
    No. 1424.
    Gornto v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and judgment reversed.


text:
    No. 1467.
    ITT Lamp Division of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Minter, Commissioner of Department of Public Welfare of Massachusetts.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1436.
    Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Price et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6195.
    Martinez v. Patterson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6447.
    Murray v. Page, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6310.
    Kelm v. Patterson, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 325.
    No. 991.
    No. 1149.
    No. 1221.
    No. 6419.
    No. 6441.
    Negre v. Larsen et al., Koserkoff v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., Davenport v. City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration of the City of New York et al., Cataldo v. United States, Stead v. United States, Tilli v. County of Northampton et al.,
   401 U. S. 437;

401 U. S. 947;

401 U. S. 956;

401 U. S. 977;

401 U. S. 978; and

401 U. S. 978. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 272.
    Calarco v. United States,
   400 U. S. 824. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    April 29, 1971
    No. 1317.
    Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc., et al. v. Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    May 3, 1971
    No. 1136.
    Clark v. Ellenbogen et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Pa. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37; Samuels v. Mackell, and Fernandez v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 1354.
    No. 1365.
    Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York, et al. v. Lee et al.; and Chropowicki et al. v. Lee et al.
   Affirmed on appeals from D. C. W. D. N. Y. The Chief Justice,

Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Harlan are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and cases set for oral argument.

Reported below: 318 F. Supp. 710.


text:
    No. 1193.
    Lane v. Texas.
   Appeal from County Ct. at Law No. 1, Travis County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 973.
    No. 6172.
    Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, et al. v. Doe; and Unborn Child of Doe v. Doe et al.
   Appeals from D. C. N. D. Ga. Motion of appellee in No. 973 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970). Reported below: 319 F. Supp. 1048.


text:
    No. 1457.
    McMillan v. Federal National Mortgage Assn.
   Appeal from App, Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 1230.
    Abodeely v. Iowa.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5208.

    Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc.

      For separate opinions of Black, J., and Douglas, J., see No. 5048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., infra.

   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6367.
    Campbell v. Florida.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 5050.

    Frederick et al. v. Schwartz et al.

      For separate opinion of Black, J., see No. 5048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., infra.

   Appeal from D. C. Conn. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that judgment should be reversed. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra.


text:
    No. 3.
    Cobb et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 8.
    Dean et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 455.
    Scott et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 285.
    Decker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decisions in Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 1073.
    United States v. Zizzo.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from this action of the Court.


text:
    No. 1150.
    Bloss v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari granted and judgment reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967).

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant petition and set case for oral argument on issue whether seizure of the film without a warrant violated applicable constitutional standards.


text:
    No. 5016.
    Lauchli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decisions in Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 5052.
    Gillespie v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decisions in Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 5040.
    Graham v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. 5067.

    Sloatman v. Gibbons et al.

      For separate opinion of Black, J., see No. 5048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., infra.

   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that judgment should be reversed. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra.


text:
    No. 5111.
    No. 5927.
    No. 6306.
    No. 6645.
    Drotar v. United States. Weber v. United States. Cochran v. United States. Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 416 F. 2d 914;

C. A. 9th Cir. Reported below: 429 F. 2d 148;

C. A. 9th Cir. Reported below: 432 F. 2d 1356; and

C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 437 F. 2d 1199. Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715.


text:
    No. —.
    Pruett v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that the application should be granted.


text:
    No. 48,
    Orig.
    Mississippi v. Arkansas.
   [Motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted, 400 U. S. 1019.] Application for stay of proceedings in Chancery Court of Chicot County, Arkansas, in Arkansas Land & Cattle Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co., Civil Action No. 10,177, referred to Special Master for report and recommendation.


text:
    No. 45,
    Orig.
    Washington et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint set for oral argument. One hour allowed for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 49,
    Orig.
    Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint set for oral argument. One hour allowed for oral argument.


text:
    No. 50,
    Orig.
    Vermont v. New York et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint set for oral argument. One hour allowed for oral argument.


text:
    No. 87.
    United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle et al.,
   401 U. S. 520. Motion of Fort Mojave Tribe of Indians for leave to file suggestion of interest denied.


text:
    No. 812.
    United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5 et al.,
   401 U. S. 527. Motion of Fort Mojave Tribe of Indians for leave to file suggestion of interest denied.


text:
    No. 846.
    First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
   400 U. S. 1019. Motion of respondent for waiver of Clerk's costs denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that the motion should be granted.


text:
    No. 6458.
    Harris v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Counsel for petitioner directed to file a brief in support of petition on or before May 20, 1971. The Attorney General of Texas is invited to file a responsive brief within 10 days from date of receipt of petitioner’s brief.


text:
    No. 6459.
    No. 6495.
    No. 6775.
    Chacon v. Nelson, Warden; Kohl v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent, et al.; and Szijarto v. Nelson, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 6913.
    Fallon v. Waggonner, Sheriff, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 808.
    Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. Probable jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 971.
    Doe et al. v. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. Probable jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 876.
    Mitchum, dba Book Mart v. Foster et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Fla. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 1495.
    Col-An Entertainment Corp. et al. v. Harper et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Fla. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 6158.

    Lindsey et al. v. Normet et al.

      For separate opinion of Black, J., see No. 5048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., infra.

   Appeal from D. C. Ore. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 661.
    Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1114.
    United States v. Caldwell.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1381.
    Branzburg v. Hayes et al., Judges.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1286.
    United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1389.
    United States v. Tucker.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1454.
    Picard v. Connor.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1413.
    Parisi v. Davidson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and certiorari granted. Motion to advance oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 1434.
    In re Pappas.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of National Broadcasting Co., Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 16.
    Hoskins v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 23.
    Franke et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 37.
    Wallace et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 100.
    Iozzi v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 186.
    United States v. Lucia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 424.
    Alexander et al. v. Pasadena City Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 632.
    Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, Florida, et al. v. Bradley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 745.
    Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County, Florida, et al. v. Harvest et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 775.
    School District 151 of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 784.
    Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, Florida, et al. v. Youngblood et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 823.
    Riley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 839.
    Jackson Municipal Separate School District et al. v. Singleton et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 850.
    Porcelli et al. v. Titus, Superintendent of Schools of the City of Newark, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 902.
    Klein et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1191.
    No. 1314.
    No. 1435.
    Adler v. United States; Kroll v. United States; and Cahn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 433 F. 2d 1282.


text:
    No. 1333.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1378.
    Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1392.
    Los Angeles Police Department et al. v. Robinson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1433.
    Flintkote Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1443.
    Chambers et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1461.
    Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. National Mediation Board et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1456.
    Pace v. Haymarket Co-Operative Bank.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1463.
    Dekar Industries, Inc., et al. v. Bissett-Berman Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1471.
    Sammons v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1478.
    Chemical Cleaning, Inc., et al. v. Dow Chemical Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1482.
    Bolettieri v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1487.
    Hartzell Propeller Fan Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.