author: Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Black,

text:
    REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. v. MADDOX.
    No. 43.
    Argued November 18, 1964.
    Decided January 25, 1965.

      Samuel H. Bun argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Andrew J. Thomas and James R. Forman, Jr.

      Richard L. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John D. Prince, Jr., and Edwin L. Brobston.

      J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Hanis filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
   Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered thé opinion of the Court.

Respondent Maddox brought suit in an Alabama state court against his employer, the Republic Steel Corporation, for severance pay amounting to $694.08, allegedly owed him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement existing between Republic and Maddox’ unión. Maddox had been laid off in December 1953. The collective bargaining agreement called for severance pay if thé layoff was the result of a decision to close the mine, at which Maddox worked, “permanently.” The agreement also contained a three-step grievance procedure to be followed by binding arbitration,, but Maddox made no effort to utilize this mode of redress. Instead, in August 1956, he sued for breach of the contract. At all times material to his claim, Republic was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, and Republic’s industrial relations with Maddox and his union were subject to the provisions of that Act.

The case was tried on stipulated facts without a jury. Judgment was awarded in favor of Maddox, arid the appellate courts of Alabama affirmed on the theory that state law applies to suits for severance pay since, with the employment relationship necessarily ended, no further danger of industrial strife exists warranting the application of federal labor law. Moore v. Illinois Cen tral R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 (1941), and Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653 (1953), cases decided under the Railway Labor Act, were cited to support the proposition. Furthermore, it was held that under Alabama law Maddox was not required to exhaust the contract grievance procedures. We granted Republic’s petition for certiorari, 377 U. S. 904, to determine whether the rationale of Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. carries over to a suit for severance pay on a contract subject to § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. We conclude that the state judgment must be reversed.

I.

As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress. If the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the individual’s claim, differences, may arise as to the forms of redress then available. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335; Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F. 2d 172. But unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf. Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes and stabilizing the “common law” of the plant. LMRA § 203 (d), 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d) ; § 201 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 171 (c) (1958 ed.). Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such activity complements the union’s status as exclusive bargaining representative by permitting it to participate actively in the continuing administration of the contract. In addition, conscientious handling of grievance claims will enhance the union’s prestige with employees. Employer interests, for their part, are served by limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees. And it cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement the procedures and found them so.

A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. In addition to cutting across the interests already mentioned, it would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation “would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.” Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 103.

II.

Once it is established that the federal rule discussed above applies to grievances in general, it should next be inquired whether the specific type of grievance here in question — one relating to severance pay — is so different in kind as to justify an exception. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., and Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra, are put forward for the proposition that it is.

In Moore, the Court ruled that a trainman was not required by the Railway Labor Act to exhaust the administrative remedies granted him by the Act before bringing suit for wrongful discharge. Mr. Justice Black, for the Court, based the decision on the use of permissive language in the Act — disputes “may be referred ... to the . . . Adjustment Board . . . .” Mr. Justice Black wrote again in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1950), a declaratory judgment suit brought in a state court by a.railroad company against two unions to resolve a representation dispute. The Court held that jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board to resolve such disputes was exclusive. Moore was distinguished thus:

“Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad’s action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages, for breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future relations between the railroad and its other employees.” 339 U. S. 239, at 244.

This distinction was confirmed in Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, supra:

“Such [a wrongfully discharged] employee may proceed either in accordance with the administrative procedures prescribed in his employment contract or he may resort to his action at law for alleged unlawful discharge if the state courts recognize such a claim. Where the applicable law permits his recovery of damages without showing his prior exhaustion of his administrative remedies, he may so recover, as he did in the Moore litigation, supra, under Mississippi law.” 345 U. S. 653, at 661.

Federal jurisdiction in both Moore and Koppal was based on diversity; federal law was not thought to apply merely by reason of the fact that the collective bargaining agreements were subject to the Railway Labor Act. Since that timé the Court has made it clear that substantive federal law applies to suits on collective bargaining agreements covered by § 204 of the Railway Labor Act, International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682, and by § 301 (a) of the LMRA, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448. Thus a major underpinning for the continued validity of the Moore case in the field of the Railway Labor Act, and more importantly in the present context, for the extension of its rationale to suits under § 301 (a) of the LMRA, has been removed.

We hold that any such extension is incompatible with the precepts of Lincoln Mills and cannot be accepted. Grievances depending on severance claims are not critically unlike other types of grievances. Although it is true that the employee asserting the claim will necessarily have accepted his discharge as final, it does not follow that the resolution of his claim can have no effect on future relations between the employer and other employees. Severance pay and other contract terms governing discharge are of obvious concern to all- employees, and a potential cause of dispute so long as any employee maintains a continuing employment relationship. Only in the situation in which no employees represented by the union remain employed, as would.be the case with a final and permanent plant shutdown, is there no possibility of a work stoppage resulting from á severance-pay claim. But even in that narrow situation, if applicable law did not require resort to contract procedures, the inability of the union and employer at the contract negotiation stage to agree upon arbitration as the exclusive method of handling permanent shutdown severance claims in all situations could have an inhibiting effect on reaching an agreement. If applicable law permitted a court suit for severance pay in any circumstances without prior recourse to available contract remedies, an employer seeking to limit the modes of redress that could be used against him could do so only by eliminating contract grievance procedures for severance-pay claims. The union would hardly favor the elimination, for it is in the union’s interest to afford comprehensive protection to those it represents, to participate in interpretations of the contract, and to have an arbitrator rather than a court decide such questions as whether the company has determined to “close permanently.”

There are, then, positive reasons why the general federal rule should govern grievances based on severance claims as it does others.. Furthermore, no positive reasons appear why the general federal rule should not apply. “Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process.by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills,” and “the subject matter of § 301 (a) ‘is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.’ ” Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S., at 103. Maddox’ suit in the present case is simply on the contract, and the remedy sought, award of $694.08, did not differ from any that the. grievance procedure had power to provide. Federal law governs “Suits' for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in-an industry affecting commerce as defined'in this chapter .. . .” Section 301 (a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a) (1958 ed.), Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra. The suit by Maddox clearly falls within the terms of the statute and within the principles of Lincoln Mills, and because we see no reason for creating an exception, we conclude that the general federal rule applies.

III.

The federal rule would not of course preclude Maddox’ court suit if the parties to the collective bargaining agreement expressly agreed that arbitration was not the exclusive remédy. The section of this contract governing grievances provides, inter alia:

“It is the purpose of this Section to provide procedure for prompt, equitable adjustment of claimed grievances. It is understood and agreed that unless otherwise specifically specified elsewhere in this Agreement grievances to be considered hereunder must be filed within thirty days after the date on which the fact or events upon which such alleged grievance is based shall have existed or occurred.
“Any Employee who has a complaint may discuss the alleged complaint with his Foreman in an attempt to settle it. Any complaint not so settled shall constitute a grievance within the meaning of this Section, 'Adjustment of Grievances’.
“Grievances shall be handled in the following manner:
“STEP 1. Between the aggrieved Employee, his Grievance Committeeman or Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the Foreman.”

The procedure calls for two more grievance-committee steps capped with binding- arbitration of matters not satisfactorily settled by the initial steps.

The language stating that an employee “may discuss” a complaint with his foreman is susceptible to various interpretations; the most likely is that an employee may, if he chooses, speak to his foreman himself without bringing in his grievance committeeman and formally embarking on Step 1. Use of the permissive “may” does not of itself reveal a clear understanding between the contracting parties that individual employees, unlike either the union or the employer, are free to avoid the contract procedure and its time limitations in favor of a judicial suit. Any doubts must be resolved against such an interpretation. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574; Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co., 315 F. 2d 513, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 847.

Finally, Maddox suggests that it was not possible for him to make use of the grievance procedure, the first step of which called for a discussion within 30 days of his discharge with his foreman, because a mine that has permanently closed has no foreman — indeed, no employees of any kind. This casuistic reading of the contract cannot Ipe accepted. ■ The foreman did not vanish; and it is unlikely that the union grievance procedure broke down within 30 days of Maddox’ discharge. In any event, the case is before us on stipulated facts; in neither the facts nor the pleadings is there any suggestion that Maddox could not have availed himself of the grievance procedure instead of waiting nearly three years and bringing a court suit.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Black,

dissenting.

This is an ordinary, common, run-of-the-mill lawsuit for breach of contract brought by respondent Charlie Maddox, an iron miner employed by petitioner Republic Steel, to recover $694.08 of wages which he said the company owed him. This amount he said was due by the terms of a contract made between the company and the union representing workers at the mine at which Maddox worked, a contract which provided that if any employee • should be discharged because the company “permanently” closed the mine, he should continue to be paid the amount of his regular wages for a number of weeks after the discharge. The mine closed down, Maddox lost his job, but the company nevertheless refused to continue to pay him the wages he said it had obligated itself to pay under the contract. To collect the money he hired a lawyer and went to court. The trial court in Alabama awarded him the $694.08 (the stipulated amount due, if any) and the Supreme Court of the State affirmed. This Court now reverses. It holds that because the contract, agreed to by the union, provided for binding arbitration of all “grievances,” federal law has deprived Maddox of his right to hire his own lawyer and to sue in a court of law for the balance of wages due, and has instead left him with only the remedies set out in the contract: a long, involved grievance procedure, controlled by the company and.the union, followed by compulsory arbitration, with his claim put in the hands of union officials and union lawyers whether he wants them to handle it or not.

In thus deciding on its own, or deciding that Congress somehow has. decided, to expand apparently without limit the kinds of claims subject to compulsory arbitration, to include even wage claims, and in thus depriving individual laborers of the right to handle their wage claims for themselves, today’s decision of the Court interprets federal law in a way that is revolutionary. Yet the .Court disposes of this case as easily as it would reach the conclusion that 2 plus 2 equal 4. First the Court says that the contract between the union and the company provides that a laborer who wants to assert a “contract grievance” is bound to attempt to use the contract grievance procedure, which requires several stages of company-union meetings, negotiations, etc., to be followed by submitting the dispute for final decision to an arbitrator “appointed by mutual agreement” of the union and the company. Next the Court labels Maddox’ claim for wages due him a “grievance” — and, indeed, no one would deny that Maddox was unhappy about the company’s failure to pay him what it had promised. Finally the Court, citing as its authority § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, lays down for this and future cases the flat rule that no matter what his contractual claim — or “grievance,” as the Court prefers to call it— an individual laborer, even though no longer an employee, has no choice but to follow the long, time-consuming, discouraging road to arbitratibn set out in the union-company contract, including haying"the • union represent him whether he wants it to or not and whether or not he is still in its good graces. And of course the Court’s, logic leads irresistibly to the conclusion (although it has not yet had occasion to say so) that if instead of seeking wages due on discharge an employee wants to sue his employer for unpaid wages while he is still working, he cannot do that either, but must instead wait until the union processes his claim through the interminable stages of “grievance procedure” and then turns him over to the arbitrator, whom he does not want. Employees are thiis denied a judicial hearing and state courts have their ancient power to try simple breach-of-contract cases taken away from them — taken away, not by Congress, I think, but,by this Court. Today’s holding is in my judgment completely unprecedented, and is the brainchild of this Court’s recent consistently expressed preference for arbitration over litigation in all types of cases and for accommodating, the wishes of employers and unions in all things over the desires of individual workers. Since I do not believe that Congress has passed any law which justifies any inference at all that workers are barred from bringing and courts from deciding cases like this one, and since I am not sure that it constitutionally could, it is impossible for me to concur in this decision.

I think one crucial flaw in the Court’s logical presentation is that it treats things as the same which are in fact different. “Grievance” is a word of many meanings in many contexts, and yet the Court uses it without any discrimination among them. As used in the industrial field “grievance” generally signifies something that has happened that is unsatisfactory to employers or employees in connection with their work. Failure to settle serious and widespread grievances has sometimes brought about industrial tensions, strikes and violence, often disrupting the peace and doing irreparable harm to the economy of the Nation. In order to try to prevent such widespread disastrous results to the public, arbitration has come to be accepted as a good way to settle such semi-public controversies, which are more in the nature of power struggles between giants than ordinary justiciable controversies involving individual laborers. When a contract provided for arbitration to settle disputes which affected many workers and which could lead to strikes, this Court approved it and held that since both sides — company and union — had agreed to this method of peaceful settlement, federal law would honor and enforce it. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448. But to hold that the union and company can bind themselves to arbitrate a dispute of general,importance affecting all or many of the union’s members and vitally threatening the public welfare is a far cry from saying, as the Court does today, that an ordinary laborer whose employer discharges him and then fails to pay his past-due wagés or wage substitutes must, if the union’s contract with the employer provides for arbitration of grievances, have, the doors of the courts of his country shut in his face to prevent his suing the employer to get his own wages for breach of contract. Lincoln Mills was a case involving a real and active collective bargaining dispute between union and employer over general working conditions; but the present case is a controversy not about general working con-, ditions but about whether the company will pay one individual his wages.

For the individual, whether his case is séttled by a professional arbitrator or tried by a jury can make a crucial difference. Arbitration differs from judicial proceedings, in many ways: arbitration carries no right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the law; they are hot bound by rules of evidence; they need not give reasons- for their awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the record of proceedings need not be complete; and judicial review, it has been held, is extremely limited. To say that because the union chose a contract providing for grievance arbitration an individual employee freely and willingly chose this method of settling any contractual claims of his own which might later arise is surely a transparent and cruel fiction. And even if the employee could with any truth be regarded as having himself agreed to such a thing, until recently this Court refused to recognize and enforce contracts under which individuals were to be denied access to courts and instead left to the comparatively standard-less process of arbitration. An insurance company cannot enforce a contract made with its insured to arbitrate all disputes which might arise in the future, this Court said, since such an agreement would be “an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction by excluding the assured from all resort to them for his remedy.” Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386, 391. Cf. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. The Court holds today, however, that a union representing a worker in a mine or factory can by the union’s contract take away from that worker his right to sue, which he would not be able to contract away himself unless the Riddlesbarger case is to be overruled. Compare Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U. S. 167, 172-173 (concurring opinion). And there is nothing in the legislative history of § 301 which indicates any congressional purpose to overrule or avoid the Riddlesbarger rule. Moreover, there is not one word in § 301 about agreements, to arbitrate. It is true that this Court said in Lincoln Mills, “Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike,” and “the entire tenor of the history indicates that the agreement, to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike agreement.” In that case, however, the Court expressly recognized that .its. decision and reasoning did “not reach” the right of individual employees to bring suit in court on their individual claims. Forcing Charlie Maddox, who is out of a job, to submit his claim to arbitration is not going to promote industrial peace. Charlie Maddox is not threatening to go out in the street by himself and stage a strike against the Republic Steel Corporation to get his unpaid wages. Merely because this Court in Lincoln Mills has expressed its preference for arbitration when used to avoid industrial warfare by heading off violent clashes between powerful employers and powerful unions, it does not follow that § 301 should be expanded to require a worker to arbitrate his wage claim or to surrender his right to bring his own suit to enforce that claim in court'. Such an expansion would run counter to this Court’s long-established policy of preserving the ancient, treasured right to judicial trials in independent courts according to due process of law.

The past decisions of this Court which are closest to the case before us are not Lincoln Mills and cases like it, which involved broad conflicts between unions and employers with reference to contractual terms vital to settlement of genuine employer-union disputes. The cases really in point are those which involved agreements governed by the Railway Labor Act and which expressly-refused to hold that a discharged worker must pursue collective bargaining grievance procedures before suing in a court for wrongful discharge. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653; Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630. While those were wrongful-discharge cases and the suit here is for wages due on a contract after discharge, the principle of those cases is precisely applicable here, since as was pointed out in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 339, 244, the claim of a person no longer employed will almost never involve questions substantially affecting future relations between an employer and the remaining employees. The Court recognizes the relevance of Moore and Koppal and, while declining expressly to overrule them in this case, has raised the overruling axe so high that its falling is just about as certain as the changing of the seasons. Yet although members of Congress and alert counsel for the national unions and employers are bound to have been familiar with Moore at the time the comprehensive labor statute of which. § 301 is a part was enacted, Congress did not see fit to disown the Moore rule and did not express a preference for a different policy with reference to individual suits on collective bargaining agreements covered by the LMRA.

The Court’s opinion manifests great concern for the interests of employers and unions, but not, I fear, enough understanding and appreciation for an individual worker caught in the plight Maddox is in. The Court refers with seeming approval to the “ ‘common law’ of the plant,” and directs, attention to the clear interest that the union has in handling employees’ grievances in order to “enhance the union’s prestige with employees.” It also refers to the great interest that an employer has (and I agree) in having a complicated procedural system which dissatisfied employees are here compelled to follow, which ends up in binding arbitration and which relieves the employer of a lawsuit. The Court then expresses its view that allowing this former employee to sue without going through the grievance procedure and arbitration, as he would be permitted to do in this case by the law of his State, has “little to commend it” and “would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances.” I emphasize the words “employer” and “union” to point out that here, as elsewhere in the opinion, theirs seem to be the chief interests on which the Court’s attention is focused. The procedure they .(employer and union) want must be “made exclusive,” or else they might not like it. Individual workers are to take some comfort, I suppose, in the Court’s statement that “it cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement the procedures and found them so.” I think it can be said, however, and I say it. I think an employee is just as capable of trying to enforce payment of his wages or wage substitutes under a collective bargaining agreement as his union, and he certainly is more interested in this effort than any union would likely be. This is particularly true where the employee has lost his job and is most likely outside the union door looking in instead of on hand to push for his claim. Examples certainly have not been wanting from which the Court might learn that often employees for one reason or another have felt themselves compelled to sue the union as a prerequisite to obtaining any help from the union at all. See, e. g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335; Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, 350 U. S. 892; Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. But, says the Court, the employee attempting to recover wages owed him must, unless the collective bargaining contract of the company and the union provides otherwise, “afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.” The Court then implies that if the union “refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the. individual’s claim,” there may be some form of redress available to the worker, but we are left in the dark as to what form that redress might take. It may be that the worker would be allowed to sue after he had presented his claim to the union and after he had suffered the inevitable discouragement and delay which necessarily accompanies the union’s refusal to press his claim. But I cannot agree that this is the sort of remedy a worker' should have to invoke to bring a simple lawsuit.

I am wholly unable to read § 301 as laying any such restrictive burdens on an employee. And I think the difference between my Brethren and me in this case, is not simply one concerning this Court’s function in interpreting or formulating laws. There is also apparently a vast difference between their philosophy and mine concerning litigation and the role of courts in our country. At least since Magna Carta people have desired to have a system of courts with set rules of procedure of their own and with certain institutional assurances of fair and unbiased reso- ' lution of controversies. It' was in Magna Carta, the English Bill'of Rights, and other such charters of liberty, that there originally was expressed in the English-speaking world a deep desire of people to be able to settle differences. according to standard, well-known procedures in. courts presided ovefr by independent judges with, jurors taken from the public. Because of these deep-seated'desires, the right to sue and be sued in courts according to the “law of the land,” known later as “due process of law,” became recognized. That right was . written into the Bill of Rights of our Constitution and in the constituí tions of the States. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 235-238. Even if it be true, which I do not concede, that Congress could force a man in this country to have his ordinary lawsuit adjudicated not under due process of law, i. e., without the constitutional safeguards of a court trial, I do not think that this Court should ever feel free to infer ot imply that Congress has taken such a step until, the words of the statute are written so clearly that no one who reads them can doubt. Cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 5-10 (opinion announcing judgment); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 456 (dissenting opinion); Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 197 (dissenting opinion); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 216 (dissenting opinion); Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 396 (dissenting opinion). Maddox has a justiciable controversy. He has not agreed since the controversy arose, or even for that matter before it arose, to arbitrate it, and so he should not have the doors of the courts shut in his face. Nor do I believe that he or any other member of the union should be treated as an incompetent unable to pursue his . own simple breaeh-of-contract losses. I cannot and do not believe any law Congress has passed provides that when a man becomes a member of a labor union in this country he thereby has somehow surrendered his own freedom and liberty to conduct his own lawsuit for wages. Of course this is not the worst kind of servitude to which a man could be subjected, but it is certainly contrary to the spirit of freedom in this country to infer from the blue, that workers lose their rights to appeal to the courts for redress when they believe they are mistreated. Compare Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 204-205 (dissenting opinion).

I would affirm.

       The section of the contract dealing with severance allowance provided in relevant part:
      “When, in the sole judgment of the Company, it decides to close permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a department of a mine or plant, or substantial portion thereof and terminate the employment of individuals, an Employee whose employment is terminated either directly as a resúlt thereof because he was not entitled to other employment with the Company under the provisions of Section 9 of this Agreement — Seniority and Subsection C of this Section 14, shall be entitled to a severance allowance in accordance with and subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth in this Section 14.”

       See infra, p. 658.

       61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (1958 ed.).

       275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492.

       48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1958 ed.).

       See infra, p. 657.

        Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 196, n. 1 (by implication); Belk v. Allied Aviation Service Co., 315 F. 2d 513, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 847; see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 647-648 (1956). The proviso of § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1958 ed.), is not contra; Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists, 313 F. 2d 179.

       See, e. g., Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 362 (1962); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 Yale L. J. 1215 (1964).

       See infra, pp. 657-658.

       45 U. S. C. § 153 (i) (1958 ed.).

       Mississippi law, which controlled in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., did not require exhaustion (but see Illinois Central R. Co. v. Bolton, 240 Miss. 195, 126 So. 2d 524 (1961)). Missouri law controlled in Koppal and did require exhaustion. The suing employee therefore lost.

       See n. 1, supra.

       “Between” in the statute refers to “contracts,” not “suits.” Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 200.

       By refusing to extend Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. to § 301 suits, we do not mean to overrule it within the field of the-Railway Labor Act. Consideration of such action should properly await a case presented under the Railway Labor Act in which the various distinctive features of the administrative remedies provided by that Act can be appraised in context, e. g., the make-up of the Adjustment Board, the scope of review from monetary awards, .and the ability of the Board to give the same remedies as could be obtained by court suit.

       Of course a court suit on the collective bargaining agreement •would still be governed by federal law. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448.

       Although the Court calls this “severance pay,” it can be seen that the claim was simply one for wages which were to continue for a stated period after discharge.

       The grievance procedure set out in the contract was as follows:
      " Any Employee who has a complaint may discuss the alleged complaint with his Foreman in an attempt to settle it. Any complaint. not so settled shall constitute a grievance within the meaning of this. Section, 'Adjustment of Grievances.’
      “Grievances shall be handled in the following manner:
      “Step 1. Between the aggrieved Employee, his Grievance Committeeman or Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the Foreman.
      “Step 2. Between the Employee, his Grievance Committeeman or Assistant Grievance Committeeman and the Superintendent or his representative.
      “Step 3. Between the Grievance Committee, a representative of the International Union, the Superintendent of Industrial Relations, the Superintendent, and such Company representatives as he may select. Accurate minutes of this meeting shall be prepared by the Company not later than five days, after the date of the meeting and shall be signed by representatives of the Union and the Company.
      “Grievances not appealed from the decision rendered in writing in any of the three steps specified herein, within ten days from the date of such decision, shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision last made and shall not be eligible for further appeal.
      “If any grievance is not answered within the time limits hereinafter specified in this Section, unless an extension of time has been mutually agreed upon, either party after notifying the other party by notation on the grievance papers of such intent may appeal to the next step.
      “Grievances presented in the first step hereof shall be reduced to writing on forms provided by the Company, dated and signed by the Employee involved and two copies given to the Foreman, the Foreman will have inserted in the appropriate place oh the form his disposition of the matter and will sign and date same, returning one copy to the Assistant Grievance Committeeman or Grievance Committeeman.
      “The following time shall be allowed the Company to give an answer in each of the respective steps before the grievance may be processed to the next step: Step 1, three days exclusive of Sundays and Holidays; Step 2, seven days; Step 3, fifteen days.
      “Step 4. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement grievances not satisfactorily settled in Step 3 may bv-written notice within ten days from the date of the written decision in Step 3, be appealed to an impartial Arbitrator to be appointed by mutual agreement of the parties hereto within fifteen days after either party has requested arbitration. The decision-of the Arbitrator shall be final.”

       61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a) (1958 ed.). Section 301 (a) in its entirety reads as follows:
      “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of'the parties.”

       See, e. g., Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564.

       Compare the distinction in cases under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1958 ed.) between “major” and “minor” disputes. See, e. g., Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30.

       See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 436. But see Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F. 2d 903 (C. A. 7th Cir.), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 379 U. S. 130.

       353 U. S., at 455.

        Id., at 459, n. 9.

       See, e, g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564.

       44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1958 ed.). The Act of April 10,1936, c. 166, makes the Railway Labor Act applicable to aviation workers. 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U. S. C. § 181 (1958 ed.).

       Alabama law does not require exhaustion of grievance procedures and arbitration in a case like this one. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492; Woodward Iron Co. v. Stringfellow, 271 Ala. 596, 126 So. 2d 96.

       The AFL-CIO has filed an amicus brief supporting the employer in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart,

license: Public Domain

text:
    DAVIS v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO.
    No. 560.
    Decided January 25, 1965.

      B. Nathaniel Richter, Charles A. Lord and Amos /. Meyers for petitioner.

      Fenton L. Martin for respondent
   Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals is reversed.

In this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., the petitioner was awarded damages by a jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of employer negligence should not have been submitted to the jury and that the trial court erred in denying the motions of the railroad for a directed verdict and for a judgment n. o. v., 235 Md. 568, 202 A. 2d 348.

The petitioner worked, for the railroad as a tallyman and trucker at its Locust Point terminal in Baltimore City. His foreman directed him to find some boxes of merchandise. While working on this assignment near an open elevator shaft he fell into the shaft and one of the railroad’s forklift trucks fell in on top of him. The crucial fact question in the case concerned the forklift truck. There was testimony that the petitioner had mounted the truck and backed it into the shaft. There was also evidence, however, which, if believed by the jury, would support a finding that the operator assigned to use the truck .negligently left it unattended, and that it rolled toward the petitioner, either because it was not secured or because it was set in motion by an unauthorized third person, and struck petitioner in the back, propelling him into the shaft. In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals improperly invaded the function and province of the jury. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U. S. 500; Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U. S. 108.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

I continue to hold the views first expressed in my separate opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 559-562, and frequently reiterated since: (1) cases of this kind are not the proper business of this Court; (2) once accepted for review, however, by the votes of at least four members of the Court, I deem it my duty to participate in their decision. On this basis I join the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

I share the views of Mr. Justice Harlan. See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U. S. 107, 111 (concurring opinion).

         E. g., Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U. S. 18, 19; Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U. S. 423, 429; Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 361 U. S. 15, 25; Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U. S. 325, 332; Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U. S. 698, 703; Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 372 U. S. 108, 122; Dennis v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 375 U. S. 208, 212.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    LISBON SALESBOOK CO. et al. v. OHIO.
    No. 698.
    Decided January 25, 1965.

      Isadore Top-per, R. Brooke Alloway and N. Victor Goodman for appellants.
   Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


author: Mr. Justice Black Mr. Justice Stewart,

text:
    TEXAS v. NEW JERSEY et al.
    No. 13,
    Original.
    Argued November 9, 1964.
    Decided February 1, 1965.

      W. O. Shultz II, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the; cause for plaintiff. With him on the brief was Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas.

      Charles J. Kehoe, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for the State of New Jersey, defendant. With him on the brief were Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Theodore I. Botter, First Assistant Attorney General.

      Fred M. Bums,. Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for the State of Florida, interverior. With him on the brief were James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and Jack W. Harnett, Assistant Attorney General.

      Joseph H. Resnick, Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the State of Pennsylvania, defendant.

      Augustus S. Ballard argued the cause for the Sun Oil Company, defendant.

      Rálvh W. Oman argued the cause for the Life Insurance Association of America, as amicus curiae. On the brief were William B. McElhenny and Warren Elliott.

   Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court

Invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction under Art III, § 2, of the Constitution, Texas brought this action against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun Oil Company for an injunction and declaration of rights to settle a controversy as to which State has jurisdiction. to take title to certain abandoned intangible personal property through escheat, a procedure with ancient origins whereby a sovereign may acquire title to abandoned property if after a number of years no rightful owner appears. The property in question here consists of various small debts totaling $26,461.65 which the Sun- Oil Company for periods of approximately seven to 40 years prior to thé bringing of this action has owed to approximately 1,730 small creditors who have never appeared to collect them.. The amounts owed, most of them resulting from' failure of creditors to claim or cash checks, aré either evidenced on the' books of Sun’s two Texas offices of are owing to persons whose last known address was in Texas,-or both. Texas says that this intangible property should be treated as situated in Texas, so as to permit that State to escheat it. New Jersey claims the right to escheat the same property because Sun is incorporated in New Jersey. Pennsylvania claims power to escheat part or all of the same property on the ground that Sun’s principar business offices were in that State.. Sun has disclaimed any interest in the property for itself, and asks only to be protected from the possibility of double liability. Since we held in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment , prevents more than one State from escheat-ing a given item of property, we granted Texas leave to file this complaint against New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Sun, 371 U. S. 873, and referred the case to the Honorable Walter A. Huxman to sit as Special Master to take evidence and make appropriate reports, 372 U. S. 926. Florida was permitted to intervene since it claimed, the right to escheat the portion of Sun’s eschéatable obligation's owing to persons whose last known address was in Florida. 373 U. S. 948. The Master has filed his report, Texas and New Jersey each have filed exceptions to it, and. the case is now ready for our decision. We agree with the Master’s recommendation as to ■ the proper disposition of the property.

With respect to tangible property, real or personal, it has always been the unquestioned rule in all jurisdictions that only the State in which the property is located may escheat. But intangible property, such as a debt which a person is' entitled to collect, is not physical matter which can be located on a map. The creditor may live in one State, the debtor in another, and matters may be furthér complicated if, as . in the case before us, the debtor is a corporation which has connections with many States and each creditor is a person who may have had connections with several others and whose • present address is unknown. Since the States separately are without constitutional power to provide a rule to settle this interstate controversy and since there is no applicable federal statute, it becomes our responsibility in the exercise of our original jurisdiction to adopt a rule, which will settle the question of which State will be allowed to escheat this intangible property.

Four different possible rules are urged upon us by the respective States which are parties to this case. Texas, relying on numerous recent decisions of state courts dealing with choice of law in private litigation, says that the State with the most significant “contacts” with the debt should be allowed exclusive jurisdiction to escheat it, and that by that test Texas has the best claim to escheat every item of property involved here. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306; Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P. 2d 960, appeals dismissed and cert, denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U. S. 569. But the rule that Texas proposes, we believe, would serve only to leave in permanent turmoil a question which should be settled once and for all by a clear rule which will govern all types of intangible obligations like these and to which all States may. refer with confidence. The issue before us is mot whether a defendant has had sufficient contact .with a State to make him or his property rights subject to the jurisdiction of its courts, a jurisdiction which need not be exclusive. Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310. Since this Court has held in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, that the same property cannot constitutionally be escheated by more than one State, we are faced here with the very different problem of deciding which State’s claim-to escheat is superior to all others. The “contacts” test as applied in this field is not really any workable test at all — it is simply a phrase suggesting that this Court should examine the circumstances surrounding each particular item of escheatable property on its own peculiar facts and then try to make a difficult, often quite subjective, decision as to which State’s claim to those pennies or dollars seems stronger than, another’s. Under such a doctrine any State likely would easily convince itself, and hope to convince this Court, that its claim should be given priority — as is shown by Texas’ argument that it has a superior claim to every single category of assets involved in this case. Some of them Texas says it should be allowed to escheat because thp last known addresses of the creditors were in Texas, others it claims in spite of the fact that the last known addresses were,not in Texas. The uncertainty of any test which would require us in effect either to decide each escheat case on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of law to apply, to ever-developing new categories of facts, might in the end create so much uncertainty and threaten so much expensive litigation that the States might find that they would lose more in litigation expenses than they might gain in escheats.

New Jersey asks us to hold that the State with power to escheat is the domicile of the debtor — in this case New Jersey, the State of Sun’s incorporation. This plan has the obvious virtues of clarity and ease of application. But it is not the only one which doés, and it seems to us that in deciding a question which should be determined primarily on principles of fairness, it would too greatly exalt a minor factor to permit escheat of obligations incurred all over the country by the State in which the debtor happened to incorporate itself.

In some respects- the claim of Pennsylvania, where Sun’s principal offices are located, is more persuasive, since this State is probably foremost in giving the benefits of its economy and laws to the company whose business activities made the intangible property come into existence. On the other hand, these debts owed by Sun are not property to it, but rather a liability, and it would be strange to convert a liability into an asset when the State decides to escheat. Cf. Case of the State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 320. Moreover, application of the rule Pennsylvania suggests would raise in - every case the sometimes difficult question of where a company’s “main office” or “principal place, of business” or whatever it might be designated is located. Similar -uncertainties would result if we were to attempt in each ease to determine the State in which the debt was created .and allow.it to escheat. Any rule leaving so much for decision on a case-by-case basis should not be adopted unless none is available which is more certain and yet still fair. We think the rule proposed by the Master, based on the one suggested by Florida, is.

The rule Florida suggests is that since a debt is property of the creditor, not of the debtor^ fairness among the-States requires that the right and power to escheat the debt should be accorded to the State of the creditor’s last known address as shown by the debtor’s books and records. Such a solution would be in line with one group of cases dealing with intangible property for other purposes in other areas of the law. Adoption of such a rule involves a factual issue simple and easy to resolve, and leaves no legal issue to be decided. It takes account of the fact that if the creditor instead of perhaps leaving behind an uncashed check had negotiated the check and left behind the cash, this State would have been the sole possible escheat claimant; in other words, the rule recognizes that the debt was an asset of the creditor. The rule recommended by the Master will tend to distribute escheats among the States in the proportion of the commercial activities of their residents. And by using a standard of last known address, rather than technical legal concepts of residence and domicile, administration and application of escheat laws should be simplified. It may well be that some addresses left by vanished creditors will be in States other than those in which they lived at the time the obligation arose or at the time of the escheat. But such situations probably will be the exception, and any errors thus created, if indeed they could be called errors, probably will tend to a large extent to cancel each other out. We therefore hold that each item of property in question in this case is subject to escheat only by the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown by the debtor’s books and records.

This leaves questions as to what is to be done with property owed persons (1) as to whom there is no record of any address at all, or (2) whose last known address is in a- State which does not provide for escheat of the property owed them. The Master suggested as to the first situation — where there is no last known address — that the property be subject to escheat by the State of corporate domicile, provided that anothér State could later escheat upon proof that the last known address of the creditor was within its borders. Although not mentioned by the Master, the same rule could apply to the second situation mentioned above, that is, where the State of the last known, address does not, at the time in question, provide for escheat of the property. In such a case the State of corporate domicile could escheat the property, subject to the right of the State of the last known address to recover it if and when its law made provision for escheat of such property. In other words, in both situations the State of corporate domicile should be allowed to cut off the claims of private persons only, retaining the property for itself only until some other State comes forward with proof that it has a superior right to escheat. Such a solution for these problems, likely to arise with comparative infrequency, seems to us conducive to needed certainty and we therefore adopt it.

We realize that this case could have been resolved otherwise, for the issue here is not controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions or by past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic. It is fundamentally a question of ease of administration and of equity. We believe that the rule we adopt is the fairest, is easy to apply, and in the long run will be the most generally acceptable to all the States.

The parties may submit a proposed decree applying the principles announced in this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

I adhere to the view that only the State of the debtor’s incorporation has power to “escheat” intangible property when the whereabouts of the creditor are unknown. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71, 80 (separate memorandum). The sovereign’s power to escheat tangible. property has long been recognized as extending only to the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Intangible property has no spatial existence, but consists of an obligation owed one person by another. The power to escheat such property has traditionally been thought to be lodged in the domiciliary State of one of the parties to the obligation. In a case such as this the domicile of the creditor is by hypothesis unknown; only the domicile of the debtor is known. This Court has thrice ruled that where the creditor has. disappeared, the State of the debtor’s domicile may escheat the intangible property. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U. S. 428; Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233; Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282. Today the Court overrules all three of those cases. I would not do so. Adherence to settled precedent seems to me far better than giving the property to the State within which is located the one place where we know the creditor is not.

       “The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies between two or more States ....
      “In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”
      28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1958 ed.) provides in relevant part:
      “The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of:
      “(11 All controversies between two or more States

       See generally Enever, Bona Vacantia Under the .Law of England; Note, 61 Col. L. Rev. 1319.

       The amount originally reported by Sun to the Treasurer of Texas was $37,853.37, but payments to owners subsequently found reduced the unclaimed amount.

       The debts consisted of the following:
      (1) Amounts which Sun attempted to pay through its Texas offices owing to creditors some of whose last known addresses were in Texas, some of whose last known addresses were elsewhere, and some of whom had no last known, address indicated:
      (a) 'uncashed checks payable to employees for wages and reimbursable expenses;
      (b) uncashed checks payable to suppliers for goods and services;
      (c) uncashed checks payable to lessors of oil- and gas-producing land as royalty payments;
      (d) unclaimed “mineral -proceeds,” fractional mineral interests shown as debts on the books of the Texas offices.
      (2) Amounts for which various offices of Sun throughout the country attempted to make payment to creditors all of whom had last known addresses in Texas:
      (a) uncashed checks payable to shareholders for dividends on common stock;
      (b) unclaimed refunds of payroll deductions owing to former employees;
      (c) uncashed checks payable to various small creditors, for minor obligations;
      (d) undelivered fractional stock certificates resulting from' Mock dividends.

       Texas’ motion for leave to file the bill of complaint also prayed for temporary injunctions restraining the other States and Sun from taking steps to escheat the property. The other States voluntarily agreed not to act pending determination of this case, and so the motion for injunctions was denied. 370 U. S. 929.

         Illinois, which claims .no interest in the property involved in this case, also sought to intervene to. urge that jurisdiction to escheat should depend on the laws of the State in which the indebtedness was created. Leave to intervene was denied. 372 U. S. 973.

        E. g., Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N. W. 2d 365; Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 2d 99; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N. W. 2d 814. See also Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U. S. 179; Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66; cf. Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1; Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156.

       Nor, since we are dealing only with escheat, are we concerned with the power of a-state legislature .to regulate activities affecting the State, power which like court jurisdiction need not be exclusive. Compare Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53.

       Texas argues in particular that at least the part of the intangible obligations here which are royalties, rents, and mineral proceeds derived from land located in Texas should be escheatable only by that State. We do not believe that the fact that an intangible is income from real property with a fixed situs is significant enough to justify treating it as an exception to a general rule concerning escheat of intangibles.

       On this point - Florida stresses what is essentially a variation of the old concept of “mobilia sequuntur personam,” according to which intangible -personal property is found at the domicile of its owner. See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 9-10.

       We agree with the Master that since our inquiry here is not concerned with the technical domicile of the creditor, and since ease of administration is important where many small sums of money are involved, the address on the-records of the debtor,, which in most cases will be the only one available, should be the only relevant last-known address. •

       See, e. g., Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1. However, it has been held that a State may allow an unpaid creditor to garnish a debt owing to his debtor wherever the person owing that debt is found Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215. But cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518.

       Cf. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541. As was pointed out- in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71, 77-78, none of this Court’s cases allowing States to escheat intangible property decided the possible effect of conflicting claims of other States. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U. S. 428, 443; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, supra; Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233; Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282.


text:
    BLOW et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA.
    No. 387.
    Decided February 1, 1965.

      Jack Greenbergt Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit III, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Charles. L. Black, Jr., Samuel S. Mitchell and Floyd B. McKissick for petitioners.

      T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Petitioners, two Negroes, approached the Plantation Restaurant in the company of 35 to 40 other Negroes. This restaurant served whites only and carried a sign to that effect on its front door. Pursuant to this policy the owner of the restaurant locked the door against the Negroes, though from time to time he would open the door to admit white customers and relock it after they had entered. The restaurant was some 60 feet fróm the highway/ the property between the. restaurant and the highway being owned by the restaurant proprietor. The Negroes waited outside the door, some on a shrubbery box six or eight feet away, others up to 15 feet distant. The owner asked the Negroes to leave; but they continued to wait quietly outside until they were arrested. For this conduct petitioners were indicted'.and convicted for violation of § 14-134 of the North Carolina General Statutes, making it an offense to “go or enter upon the lands of another, without a license therefor” and “after being forbidden to do so.” The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed petitioners’ convictions on March 18, 1964. 261 N. C. 463, 135 S. E. 2d 14; 261 N. C. 467, 135 S. E. 2d 17.

The Plantation Restaurant is situated on Interstate Highway 301 in the town of Enfield, North Carolina. Adjoining the restaurant and owned by the same person is the Enfield Motel. The restaurant’s menu and other advertising are posted in the rooms of this motel. The Plantation Restaurant and Enfield Motel are advertised on billboards for some miles up and down Highway 301. They are further advertised on the radio and in the newspapers.

Since these facts make it clear that the Plantation Restaurant “serves or offers to serve interstate travelers,” it must be held that the restaurant is a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of §§201 (b)(2) and (c) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places of public accommodation and removes peaceful attempts to be served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities. Although the conduct in the present cases occurred prior to the enactment of the Act, the still-pending convictions are abated by its passage.” Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, ante, at 308. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, the judgments are vacated, and the cause remanded for dismissal of the indictments.

It is so ordered.

Me. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Hablan, and Me. Justice White would affirm the judgments of the Supreme Court of North Carolina for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinions in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, ante, at 318, 322, 327.

Me. Justice Stewaet would vacate the judgments of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remand the case to that court for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, ante, at 326.


author: Per Curiam Mr. Justice Goldberg, Mr. Justice Harlan:

text:
    FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORP. et al.
    No. 585.
    Decided February 1, 1965.

      Solicitor General Cox, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff for petitioner.

      William H. Webster, Edwin S. Nail and Joseph W. Morris for Amerada Petroleum Corp., and William R. Allen and Cecil E. Munn for Signal Oil & Gas Co., respondents.
   Per Curiam

Montana-Dakota (MDU) is an interstate natural gas pipeline company, selling and transporting gas in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The lines involved here run to the east and west from the Tioga processing plant in North Dakota, jointly owned by. Amerada and Signal, producers of natural gas in North Dakota. Also, running north from the Tioga point is a line extending to the gasoline extraction plants of Hunt-Herbert and TXL (now Texaco), both in North Dakota.

On a peak winter day in 1962-1963 MDU was expected to purchase a total of 70,000 Mcf of North Dakota-produced gas from these four producers: 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 10,000 Mcf from TXL, and 5,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert. Of the 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 50,000 Mcf would flow to the east and be consumed in North Dakota. All of the Hunt-Herbert and TXL gas, plus the remaining 5,000 Mcf of the Amerada; Signal gas, would flow to the west — a total of 20,000 Mcf. Of this westward-flowing gas, 10,200 Mcf would be consumed in North Dakota; the remaining 9,800 Mcf would flow across the state boundary into Montana for consumption outside of North Dakota.

On an average summer day MDU would take about 45,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, while continuing to take about 15,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert and TXL. Of the Amerada-Signal gas, 13,000 Mcf would flow westward, commingled with the 15,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert and TXL. Only 1,680 Mcf of this stream would be consumed in North Dakota; the remaining 26,320 Mcf would flow into Montana to be held in storage for ultimate redelivery to all parts of MDU’s interstate system. 32,000 Mcf of gas would flow eastward, all from .Amerada-Signal. In contrast to the situation on a peak winter day, only 7,280 Mcf of this eastward-flowing gas would be consumed in North Dakota, while 24,720 Mcf would cross the state boundary and go into storage.

The contracts for the purchase of gas from Hunt-Herbert .and TXL admittedly constitute sales of gas for resale within the meaning of § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717. These sellers applied for and were granted certificates of public convenience and necessity by the Commission. 27 F. P. C. 1092.

Prior to entering into the Hunt-Herbert-TXL contracts, MDU entered into contracts with Amerada and Signal which are here in issue. First, MDU concluded the so-called “North Dakota Contracts" with both Amerada and Signal. Under these contracts MDU must buy at least two-thirds of its annual North Dakota requirements from Amerada-Signal, and it may buy up to all of its North Dakota requirements from them if it só elects. The contracts recite that “all gas purchased by Buyer under this agreement shall be transported, used and consumed entirely within the State of North Dakota.” Soon thereafter, MDU entered its separate “Interstate Contracts” With Amerada and Signal. These contracts provide that MDU must take or pay for a certain number of Mcf per year (and per day) if available, “less the quantity of gas which Buyer shall pay for with respect- to such calendar year under the Amerada [or Signal] North Dakota Contract.”

Respondents Amerada and Signal contended before the Federal Power Commission that sales to MDU under the “North Dakota Contracts” would be “nonjurisdictional” since they were not sales in interstate commerce for resale. Relying on its decision in Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F. P. C. 606 (reversed, 323 F. 2d 190, reversed, ante, p. 366), the Commission rejected the contention and asserted its jurisdiction over the sales. 30 F. P. C. 200. The Court of Appeals reversed. 334 F. 2d 404. The Commission has petitioned for writ of certiorari.

All of the gas purchased by MDU from Amerada-Signal under both sets of contracts is delivered into the pipeline at the-Tioga plant. According to the testimony of MDU’s engineer, on a peak winter day the pipeline would elect to purchase all of the Amerada-Signal. gas under the “North Dakota Contracts.” Yet, as previously shown, on such a day some of the Amerada-Signal gas flows westward, in a commingled stream with gas from other sources, and is resold outside of North Dakota. On an average summer day MDU would elect to purchase about 9,000 Mcf of the Amerada-Signal gas under the “North Dakota Contracts,” and the remaining 36,000 Mcf under the “Interstate Contracts.” Yet, as previously shown, 1,680 Mcf of the 9,000 Mcf consumed in North Dakota would have to be metered off from the westward-flowing commingled stream that is destined in major part for resale out-of-state.

Factually, therefore, the present case is on all fours with California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., ante, p. 366.

The Court of Appeals thought that its decision in North Dakota v. Federal Power Comm’n, 247 F. 2d 173, brought collateral estoppel into play in the present case. 334 F. 2d 404, 411-412. But that rule has no place here for no judgment governing past events is in jeopardy, only the scope of future regulation that involves different events and transactions. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 601-602.

Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Goldberg,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that this case is clearly controlled by our recent decision in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., ante, p. 366, and thus join the opinion and judgment of the Court. I concur, however, in order to make explicit my understanding'of the rationale of the Court’s decision in this case.

At the time of this action, respondents, as in Lo-Vaca, attributed to themselves a greater percentage of so-called nonjurisdictional gas than their proportionate share of the gas in the commingled stream. Thus, here, as in Lo-Vnca, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether “in spite of original commingling there might be a separate so-called nonjurisdictional transaction of a precise amount of gas . . . 379 U. S., at 370.

Mr. Justice Harlan:

Yielding to the Court's view that the case-by-case approach is an acceptable method of procedure in this area of the Commission’s functions (see the Court’s opinion in the Lo-Vaca case at 366 and my dissenting opinion therein at 371), I join the concurring opinion of my Brother Goldberg.

      Some years prior to this action'Amerada-Signal claimed no more than its proportionate share, and under those circumstances the FPC disclaimed jurisdiction. See North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 173 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1967). The fact that the amount claimed by respondents at the time of this action exceeds Amerada-Signal’s proportionate share is due to the addition of new sources of supply to the commingled stream. This change, standing alone, mates inapplicable any doetrine of collateral estoppel based on the FPC’s disclaimer or the Court of Appeal’s affirmance in North Dakota v. FPC, supra.


text:
    HEARNE et al. v. SMYLIE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO, et al.
    No. 617.
    Decided February 1, 1965.

      Herman J. McDevitt for appellants.

      Allan G. Shepard, Attorney General of Idaho, and M. Allyn Dingel, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Williams et al., appellees.
   Per Curiam.

This cause is continued on the docket until the Court Conference of May 21, 1965, before which time the parties are asked to advise the Court by supplemental briefs as to the progress made in reapportioning the Idaho Legislature.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Goldberg,

text:
    FORTY-FOURTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF COLORADO et al. v. LUCAS et al.
    No. 661.
    Decided February 1, 1965.

      Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles S. Vigil, Richard S. Kitchen, Sr., Stephen H. Hart and James Lawrence White for appellants.

      Charles Ginsberg and George Louis Creamer for ap-pellees.
   Per Curiam.

Insofar as the judgment of the District Court decides federal questions, it is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment decides other questions, it is vacated and the cause is remanded for further consideration in light of the supervening decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in White v. Anderson, - Colo. -, 394 P. 2d 333 (1964).

Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Goldberg,

concurring.

It is our understanding that the Court’s disposition of this case leaves it open to the District Court to abstain On the question as to the severability of the various provisions of Amendment No. 7, pending resolution of that issue with reasonable promptitude in further state court proceedings. We deem it appropriate explicitly to state our view that this is the coursé which the District Court should follow. On this basis, we join the Court’s opinion.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Harlan,

text:
    HUGHES et al. v. WMCA, INC., et al.
    No. 623.
    Decided February 1, 1965

      John H. Hughes, pro se, for appellants in No. 623.

      .Leonard B. Sand, Max Gross, Leo A. Larkin, Jack B. ■Weinstein and Robert B. McKay for appellees in No, 623.

      Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, R. D. Mcllwaine III, Assistant Attorney General, David J. Mays and Henry T. Wickham for appellants in No. 718.

      Edmund D. Campbell and E. A. Prichard for Mann et al., and Henry E. Howell, Jr., Leonard B. Sachs and Sidney H. Kelsey for Glanville et al., appellees in No. 718.

      Together with No. 718, Davis, Secretary, State Board of Elections, et al. v. Mann et al., on appeal from the' United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and. the judgments are affirmed.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Goldberg join the affirmance in No. 623 since it is their understanding that it in no way interferes with the power of the District Court, in the light of circumstances as they may develop, to vacate or .otherwise modify its order requiring an election in the fall of 1965.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

whom Mr. Justice Clark joins,

dissenting.

Both of these cases, today affirmed summarily by the Court, raise serious problems concerning the scope of the discretion of a federal court to fashion interim relief in state reapportionment cases, matters not hitherto decided-by this Court.

No, 623.

The New York Constitution, Art. Ill, § 2, provides that the State Legislature will be elected every two years, serving for two annual sessions. Between sessions the Legislature normally works in committee, conducting hearings and drafting reports to be submitted at the following session. In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633, this Court held the New York legislative apportionment formula invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, and remanded the cause to the District Court for appropriate relief. Among other things; the Court authorized the District Court in its discretion to permit the November 1964 elections to proceed under the invalidated apportionment “in order to give the New York Legislature an opportunity to fashion a constitutionally valid legislative apportionment plan . . . .” 377 U. S., at 655.

The District Court, on July 27, 1964, entered a decree permitting the November 1964 elections to be conducted under the invalidated plan, but limiting the term of the Legislature to one year. The decree also ordered that an election be held in November 1965 under a valid apportionment plan, to be enacted by the Legislature by April 1, 1965, and that the Legislature elected in 1965 would also serve for only one year so that, the November 1966 election would be held as scheduled by state law. As a result of this order New York will have to conduct three elections in as many ye^-., and forgo the normal work of the Legislature between sessions.

No. 718.

Virginia elects its lower house, the House of Delegates, every two years to serve for one biennial session of the General Assembly. The Senate is elected for four years to serve during two sessions of the General Assembly which are held each January following the election of the House of Delegates. In November 1962 the District Court held the Virginia apportionment of both houses unconstitutional, and enjoined any further elections under the invalidated plan. Pending appeal to this Court, The Chief Justice stayed the injunction of the District Court, and the 1963. elections were held under the invalidated plan. After the District Court was affirmed on the merits, Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, that court entered a decree on September 18, 1964, directing the General Assembly to reapportion in time for the November 1965 election of the House of Delegates, and ordered further that a special election be held at the same time to elect a properly apportioned Senate to serve for two years. Thus the present Senate, elected in November 1963 to serve for four years, has been limited to a two-year term, and the Senate to be elected next November will also, be so limited.

The orders of the District Courts entered in these two cases present for me important questions which deserve plenary consideration by this Court. I would note probable jurisdiction in both cases and set them for argument on the earliest practicable date at the next argument session of the Court commencing March 1.

      Such a plan, enacted by the New York Legislature, has recently been approved by the District Court.


text:
    No. 38,
    Misc.
    Hemmis v. Burke, Warden, et al.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. August 10, 1964. Dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 312.
    Winston, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. John J. Reilly, Inc., et al.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. August 25, 1964. Dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 93.
    Grimmett v. United States.

      John J. Clancy for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. September 8, 1964. Dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 275.
    Swedish American Lines v. Ferrante et al.

      James M. Estgbrook for petitioner. Harvey Goldstein and Samuel M. Cole. for respondents. Léo /. McGough for Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., in support of the petition.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. October 1, 1964. Dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    October 5, 1964.
    No. 543.
    Katzenbach, Acting Attorney General, et al. v. McClung et al.

      Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Philip B. Heymann, Harold H. Greene and Gerald P. Choppin for appellants. Robert McD. Smith and William G. Somerville for appellees. Jack Greenberg, Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit III and Charles L. Black, Jr., for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae, in support of appellants. T. W. Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of North Carolina, as amicus curiae, in support of appellees.
   Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Probable jurisdiction noted. Motion of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., for leave to. file brief, as amicus curiae, granted. Joint motion to expedite briefing and oral argument granted and case set for oral argument on Monday, October 5, 1964, immediately following No. 515.


text:
    No. 515.
    Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States et al.

      Moretón Rolleston, Jr., fbr appellant. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Philip B. Heymann and Harold H. Greene for the United States et al. Briefs of amici curiae, in support of appellant, were filed by Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia, and Frederick T. Gray, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; and by James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, ánd Fred M. Burns and Joseph C. Jacobs, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Florida. Briefs of amici curiae, in support of the United States et al., were filed by Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Charles E. Corker and Dan Kauf-mann, Assistant Attorneys General, and Charles B. Mc-Kesson and Jerold L. Perry, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New York; and Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General of Massachusetts, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
   Appeal from the United States District •Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Probable jurisdiction noted. Joint motion for acceleration of. oral argument granted and case set for oral argument on Monday, October 5, 1964.


text:
    October 10, 1964.
    No. 77.
    Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Superior Court of Creek County, Bristow Division, et al.

      James H. Ross and John L. Laskey for appellant. Grant W. Wiprud for appellee Espy.
   Appeal from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Dismissed pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    October 12, 1964.
    No. 5,
    Original.
    United States v. California.
    Movant pro se. Stanley Mosk, Attorney General of California, Charles E. Corker and Howard S. Goldin, Assistant Attorneys General, Jay L. Shavelson, Warren J. Abbott and N. Gregory Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, and Richard H. Keatinge for defendant, in opposition.
    [For earlier orders herein, see 375 U. S. 927, 990; 377 U. S. 926, 986.]
   The motion of Carl Whitson for leave to present oral argument, as amicus curiae, is denied.

The Chief Justice -and Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 13.
    United States v. Gainey (formerly Barrett) et al.

      Joseph H. Davis for movant.
   (Certiorari, 375 U. S. 962, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.) The motion of respondent Cleveland Johns for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis is granted.


text:
    No. 34.
    Udall, Secretary of the Interior v. Tallman et al.

      Clayton L. Orn, Marvin J. Sonosky, Oscar L. Chapman, Martin-L. Friedman and Marion B. Plant for Marathon Oil Co. et al., and Abe F orlas, Joseph A. Ball, Gordon A. Goodwin, Francis R. Kirkham and Clark M. Clifford for Richfield Oil Corp. et al., on the motions. Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., and Robert L. McCarty for respondents, in opposition to both motions.
   (Certiorari, 376 U. S. 961, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.) The motions of Marathon Oil Co. et al. and Richfield Oil Corp. et al., for leave to file briefs, as amici curiae, are granted.


text:
    No. 1.
    Anderson v. Kentucky.
    Movant pro se. Robert Matthews, Attorney General of Kentucky, for respondent, in opposition.
   (Certiorari, 371 U.. S. 886, to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.) The motion for a hearing is denied..


text:
    No. 20.
    Brulotte et al. v. Thys Co.
    The motion of Well Surveys, Inc., for leave to file a brief, as amichx, curiae, is granted. Rufus S. Day, Jr., Robert W. Fulwider and Robert J. Woolsey for movant. Edward S. Irons for petitioners, in opposition.
   (Certiorari, 376 U. S. 905, to the Supreme Court of Washington.)


text:
    No. 42.
    Singer v. United States.
    The motion of Joni Rabinowitz for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is granted. The motion of Nicholas Jacop Uselding to dispense with printing motion for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiáe, and the motion to file a brief, as amicus curiae, are granted. Victor Rabinowitz and Leonard B. Boudin for Joni Rabinowitz. Justin A. Stanley for Nicholas Jacop Uselding.
   (Certiorari, 377 U. S. 903, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.)


text:
    No. 44.
    American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. Subversive Activities Control Board.
    The motion to remove this case from the summary calendar is granted and the case is allotted one and one-half hours for oral argument. Joseph Forer and David Rein for petitioner on the motion..
   (Certiorari, 377 U. S. 915, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.)


text:
    No. 182,
    Misc.
    Lee v. Pate, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and for other relief denied.


text:
    No. 65.
    Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control Board.
    The motion to remove this case from the summary calendar is granted and the case is allotted one and one-half hours for oral argument. Leonard B. Boudin and David Rein for petitioner on the motion.
   (Certiorari, 377 U. S. 989, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.)


text:
    No. 107.
    Coffee County, Tennessee v. City of Tullahoma.
   On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 179.
    Corbett, Guardian v. Stergios, alias Steryiakis.
   Appeal from the Supreme Court of Iowa. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. '


text:
    No. 24,
    Misc.
    Marin v. United States.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer for the United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 20,
    Misc.
    Auflick v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
    Petitioner pro sé. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and A. G. Spicola, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 53,
    Misc.
    Anderson v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
    Petitioner pro se. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of FÍorida, and James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for. leave to. file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 65,
    Misc.
    Brown v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, et al.
    Petitioner pro se. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 70,
    Misc.
    Sampson v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
    Petitioner pro se. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and Beeves Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to filé petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 102,
    Misc.
    Beers v. Florida.
    Petitioner pro se. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and Beenes Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 106,
    No. 114,
    No. 115,
    No. 119,
    No. 193,
    No. 268,
    No. 293,
    No. 300,
    No. 302,
    No. 338,
    No. 344,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Unger v. Yeager, Warden; Holman v. Eyman, Warden, et al.; Lambert v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent; Grey v. Minnesota; Burke v. California; Duckett v. Dunbar, Corrections Director, et al.; Garvie v. California; Ferriera v. United States; Beck v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; Schack v. Kellenberger, Sheriff; and Williams v. Pate, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 25,
    Misc.
    Christmas v. Florida.
    Petitioner pro se. James W. Kynes, Attorney General of Florida, and James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    No. 52,
    Misc.
    Mosley v. Missouri.
    Petitioner; pro se. Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General of Missouri, and Howard L. McFadden, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    No. 108,
    Misc.
    Buchanan v. Eyman, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    No. 81,
    Misc.
    Parker v. Lumbard et al.
    Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Cox for Lumbard et al., and Bruce Bromley for Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., et al., respondents.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 98,
    Misc.
    Crawford v. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 314,
    Misc.
    Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co. et al. v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al.

      William C. Dixon and Bernard Reich for petitioners.. Ross C. Fisher and Herman F. Selvin for Sunkist Growers, Inc., et al., respondents.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 172,
    Misc.
    Tansimore v. United States.
   Motion for leave. to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 232.
    United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad et al.

      Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick and Robert B. Hummel for the United States. Edward B. Hanify for Boston & Maine Railroad, and William T. Griffin, Edward O. Proctor and Lothrop Withington for McGinnis et al., appellees.
   Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 300.
    Fortson, Secretary of State of Georgia, et al. v. Toombs et al.

      Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, and E. Freeman. Leverett, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Francis Shackelford, Emmet J. Bondurant II, Hamilton Lokey and J. Quentin Davidson for appellees.
   Appeal from, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Probable jurisdiction noted. Motion to advance granted and case set for oral argument on November 18, 1964.


text:
    No. 86.
    Zemel v. Rusk, Secretary of State, et al.

      Leonard B. Boudin and Victor Rabinowitz for appellant. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney and Lee B. Anderson for appellees.
   Appeal from the United States District Court, for the District of Connecticut. Further consideration of the question of jurisdiction postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits.


text:
    No. 96.
    Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Bowers, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.

      Harris K. Weston and William E. Miller for appellant. William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of Ohio, and Daronne R. Tate, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
   Appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 115.
    Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission et al.

      Edward Jacobson for appellant. Solicitor General Cox, Stephen J. Poliak and Roger P. Marquis for the United States, as amicus cuñae, in support of appellant.
   Appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 178.
    Fortson, Secretary of State of Georgia v. Dorsey et al.

      Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, and Paul Rodgers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Edwin F. Hunt and Charles A. Moye, Jr., for appellees.
   Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 360.
    Harman et al. v. Forssenius et al.

      Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Vii6inia, Richard N. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph C. Carter, Jr., and E. Milton Farley III for appellants. L. S. Parsons, Jr., and H. E. Widen'er, Jr., for appellees.
   Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 111.
    Department of Mental Hygiene of California v. Kirchner, Administratrix.

      Stanley Mosk, Attorney General of California,- Harold B. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, and Elizabeth Palmer, John Carl Porter, and Asher Rubin, Deputy Attorneys General, for petitioner. John Walton Dinkelspiel for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae, in support of the petition, were filed by William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, Richard E. Friedman, First Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond S. Sarnow and Jerome F. Goldberg, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Illinois; Walter E. Alessandroni, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Edgar R. Casper, Deputy Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Pen ylvania; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Solicitor General, for the State of New York; Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Mel Kammerlohr, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Nebraska; and by Helgi Johanneson., Attorney General of North Dakota, and Wesley N. Harry, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of North Dakota.
   Supreme Court of California. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 148.
    McKinnie et al. v. Tennessee.

      Jack Green-berg, James M. Nabrit III, Avon N., Williams and Z. Alexander Looby for petitioners. George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Thomas E. Fox, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Supreme Court of Tennessee. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 61.
    Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.

      J. B. Goldthwaite, Jr., for petitioners. George E. Stone, Jr., and Willis C. Darby, Jr., for respondent. Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   Supreme Court of Alabama. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 82.
    Carrington v. Rash et al.

      W. C. Peticolas for petitioner. Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, and Mary K. Wall, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Carr.
   Supreme Court of Texas. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 123.
    Federal Power Commission v. Union Electric Co.

      Solicitor General Cox, Ralph S. Spritzer, Frank I. Goodman, Richard A. Solomon and Howard E. Wahrenbrock for petitioner. Robert J. Keefe and Robert F. Schlafly for respondent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 98.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

      Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for petitioner. Burton A. Zorn and George G. Gallants for respondent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 134.
    Paragon Jewel Coal Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Frederick Bernays Wiener and LeRoy Katz for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and Melva M. Graney for respondent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 171.
    Hanna v. Plumer, Executor.

      George Welch for petitioner. Alfred E. LoPresti and James T. Connolly for respondent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 240.
    Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc.

      Lester Asher, Bernard Dunau

    and Robert C. Eardley for petitioners. George B. Christensen, Fred H. Daugherty and Theodore A. Groenke for respondent. Solicitor General Cox for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition. J. Albert Woll, Robert C, Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, in support of the petition.
   Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition which read as follows:

“1. Based on the District Court’s undisturbed finding that the limitation ‘was imposed after’ arm’s length bargaining, . . . and was fashioned exclusively by the unions to serve their own interests — how long and what hours members shall work, what work they shall do, and what pay they shall receive’ (R. 672), whether the limitation upon market operating hours and the controversy concerning it are within the labor exemption of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
“2. Whether a claimed violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act which falls within the regulatory scope of the National Labor Relations Act is within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.”

Mótion of American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to .file a brief, as amicus curiae, granted.