text:
    No. 71-764.
    Scott et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 71-768.
    Williams et ux. v. Dill et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-774.
    Brockstein et al., dba Church Avenue Poultry v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-778.
    Herriman et al. v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-779.
    Dow v. Connell et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-780.
    Johnson v. Dennis, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-781.
    Cook Industries, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-782.
    Smith, Superintendent of Insurance, et al. v. Ohio Valley Insurance Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-794.
    Johnson v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-785.
    Mariemont, Inc. v. Masheter, Director of Highways.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-795.
    Southern Railway Co. v. City of Morristown.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-802.
    Barbara v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-804.
    Wolff v. Korholz et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-808.
    Fluor Western, Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-811.
    Marks v. Democratic Party of the United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-820.
    General Motors Corp. v. Jenkins.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-823.
    Jorgenson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-825.
    Enresco, Inc., et al. v. Valmont Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-835.
    Giacalone v. Lucas, Sheriff.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-837.
    Roper v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-841.
    Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. et al. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana et al.
   App. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-843.
    County of Wayne et al. v. Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-845.
    Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-848.
    Tedesco v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-856.
    Security Savings & Loan Assn. et al. v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-877.
    Smith v. New Hampshire.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-887.
    Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. The Captayannis “S” et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5242.
    Calloway et al. v. Leeke, Corrections Director, et al.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5384.
    Cantrell v. California Adult Authority.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5409.
    Wainman v. Clark, Sheriff, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5371.
    Bennett v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5440.
    Rogers v. Adams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5441.
    Inman v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5466.
    Mitchell v. Ideal Collection Service, Inc.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5549.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5551.
    Denton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5553.
    Lawton v. Tarr, National Director, Selective Service System, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5554.
    Hood v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5556.
    Neal v. Georgia et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5557.
    Austin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5559.
    Willis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5561.
    Waggoner v. California.
   C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5563.
    Magee v. Reagan, Governor of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5566.
    Ridgill v. Otis, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5568.
    Bryan v. Kurcevich, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5569.
    Hagelberger v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5573.
    Scott v. Field, Men’s Colony Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5574.
    Wade v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5575.
    Evans v. Evans et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5576.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5578.
    Battle v. Moseley, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5579.
    Diggs v. Dunne et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5584.
    Osborn v. Brierley, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5586.
    Ruiz v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5589.
    Sanchez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5588.
    Tarlton v. United States.
   C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5592.
    Ortiz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5593.
    Ray v. Foreman et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5594.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5595.
    Faulkner v. United States.
   C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5596.
    Neal v. American Veterans Committee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5597.
    Oskins v. Coiner, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5598.
    Rozenfeld v. New York Board of Parole.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5600.
    No. 71-5612.
    Trudo v. United States; and Tatro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 F. 2d 649.


text:
    No. 71-5602.
    Zimmerman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5603.
    Hunter v. City Solicitor of Philadelphia et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5604.
    Cohen v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5606.
    Williams v. Rogers, Secretary of State, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5607.
    Spivey v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5608.
    Guile v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5613.
    Lumsden v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5614.
    Cole v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5615.
    Sullivan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5616.
    Boyd v. Kansas.
   Sup. Ct. Kan. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5617.
    Agers v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5618.
    Finister v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. denied.


text:
    No. 71-5619.
    Sims v. McCarthy, Men's Colony Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5620.
    Robinson, aka Loper v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5621.
    Baskin v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5622.
    Gaines et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5623.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5626.
    Calabro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5627.
    McDonald v. Wellons et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5628.
    Jackson, aka Robbins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5629.
    Johnson v. Salisbury, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5630.
    DiRosa v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5631.
    Scott v. Hill et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5632.
    Memoli v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5634.
    Whitehead v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5635.
    Johnson v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5636.
    Moscatello et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5637.
    Underwood v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5639.
    Poss v. Smith, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5640.
    Fitzgerald v. Civil Service Commission of Radnor Township.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5641.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5642.
    Fountain v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5643.
    Casella v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5644.
    Edwards v. Fishman.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5646.
    Bell v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5649.
    Colabella v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5650.
    Northern v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5651.
    Trevino v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5653.
    Pressley v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5654.
    Winkfield v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5655.
    Overton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5658.
    Sarrameda v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5659.
    Brooks et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5660.
    Farries v. Parker, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5661.
    Kelsey v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5662.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5663.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5664.
    Buchanan v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5665.
    Earles v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5667.
    Avery, aka Kenyatta v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5668.
    Serrano v. Hocker, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5669.
    Wright v. Bateson, Insurance Commissioner.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5670.
    Abarca-Espinosa v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5673.
    Jennings v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5674.
    Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5676.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5678.
    Bullock v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5680.
    Murphy v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5681.
    McKillop v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5684.
    Poweleit v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5688.
    No. 71-5727.
    Woodard v. United States; and Cole v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 F. 2d 194.


text:
    No. 71-5689.
    Nachbaur v. Herman.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5691.
    Huffman v. Moore, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5692.
    Brown v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5694.
    Hunter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5695.
    Picking v. State Finance Corp. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5696.
    Teague v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5699.
    Alkes v. U. S. Board of Parole et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5698.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5700.
    No. 71-5717.
    Harris v. United States; and Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5702.
    Waugh v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5703.
    Smith et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5704.
    Rollins v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5705.
    Troy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5706.
    Heard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5708.
    Lustman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5712.
    Young v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5715.
    Bartlett v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5716.
    Wion v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5718.
    Becker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5721.
    Oller v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5724.
    Amato v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5725.
    Marrero v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5728.
    Welp v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5732.
    England v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5733.
    Coley v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-272.
    Katz et al. v. McAulay et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-183.
    Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians et al. v. County of Riverside, California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-659.
    DeVilliers v. Atlas Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-661.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-680.
    Ferguson, U. S. District Judge v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-683.
    Insurance Company of North America v. Continental Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-714.
    Farinas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-723.
    Meister v. Dalton.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-748.
    Kane v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-755.
    Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5548.
    Munds v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5555.
    Upshaw v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-741.
    Messenger v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 4, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5562.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5565.
    Hutchings v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5599.
    Wheeler v. Warden, Leavenworth Penitentiary.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5633.
    Oba v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5638.
    Murray v. United States.
   C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5683.
    Nordlop v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari- denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5697.
    Powell v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-654.
    Lovisi v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of respondent to dispense with printing brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-705.
    Galveston City Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-713.
    Virginia Impression Products Co., Inc. v. SCM Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-717.
    Krozak v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-751.
    Board of Education of Little Rock School District et al. v. Clark et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-729.
    Sheppard v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 71-744.
    No. 71-745.
    No. 71-754.
    No. 71-756.
    Addonizio v. United States; LaMorte v. United States; Vicaro v. United States; and Biancone v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 F. 2d 49.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

At the trial involved in these cases there was much evidence of corrupt practices by the administration of petitioner Addonizio during his tenure as mayor of Newark, New Jersey. But the question posed to the jury below was not whether these petitioners had engaged in corrupt practices, but the narrower issue of whether they had entered into and executed a criminal agreement to extract kickbacks from public contractors through threats of physical harm or economic ruin in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1951. Although the petitioners were charged with 65 substantive acts of coercive extraction of kickbacks, the key issue in the trial was who, if anyone, had conspired to commit these acts. - Absent a finding that such a confederation had been formed, most of the evidence which damaged the petitioners could not have been introduced at all inasmuch as this evidence was hearsay admitted provisionally under the so-called coconspirator exception. That the jury found a conspiracy to have existed, however, was under the circumstances of this trial the unsurprising and virtually inevitable result of the many disabilities imposed upon an accused by the ordeal of a multi-defendant conspiracy prosecution.

Mr. Justice Jackson catalogued many of these disabilities in his well-known concurrence in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 446 (1949), reversing a conspiracy conviction, where he concluded that the prevailing “loose practice as to [the conspiracy] offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice.” He criticized the tendency of courts to dispense “with even the necessity to infer any definite agreement, although that is the gist of the offense.” Id., at 452. As to the procedural evils of this device he found that the risk to a codefendant of guilt by association was abnormally high:

“A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other.” Id., at 454.

Mr. Justice Jackson also regretted the wide leeway that prosecutors enjoyed in the broad scope of evidence admissible to prove conspiracy (and consequently to prove substantive acts as well). Under conspiracy law, the declarations and acts of any confederate in furtherance of the joint project are attributable to and admissible against all of its participants. This is true even if the declarant is not available for cross-examination. Moreover, such statements are admissible “subject to connection” by the prosecutor later in the trial. At the close of the Government’s case, for example, the judge may believe that the Government failed to present a jury question as to a defendant’s participation in a collective criminal plot. In such a case, the judge must ask the jury to disregard the provisionally admitted hearsay. Obviously, however, it will be difficult in a lengthy trial (such as this one filling 5,500 pages of transcript) for jurors to excise the stricken testimony from their memories. In the alternative case where the judge believes that a jury question has been presented as to a defendant’s participation in a criminal enterprise, the jury is permitted to consider the provisionally admitted matter in determining whether or not a' defendant was a conspirator. In other words, the jury is allowed to assume its ultimate conclusion. Mr. Justice Jackson was particularly sensitive to the abuse potential in this vicious logic:

“When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the conspiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evidence of acts and declarations of each in the course of its execution are admissible against all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter, the accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may never have authorized or intended or even known about, but which help to persuade the jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that conspiracy existed. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 559, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F. 2d 54.” Id., at 453.

There are other disabilities. Often testimony will be receivable only against a particular codefendant, yet it may also inculpate another accused such as where (a) a codefendant “opens the door” to prejudicial evidence by placing his reputation in issue, (b) a codefend-ant wants to place before the jury information which is helpful to him but is damaging to other defendants, or (c) the Government desires to offer evidence admissible against less than all of the codefendants. Cautionary instructions, of course, are routinely given where such circumstances arise but we have often recognized the inability of jurors to compartmentalize information according to defendants. Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 388 (1964); Krulewitch v. United States, supra, at 453 (quoted above). This shortcoming of the jury is compounded when, as here, the jury is also asked to digest voluminous testimony.

A victim of the multi-defendant conspiracy trial has fewer options for trial strategy than the ordinary defendant tried alone. Counsel may reluctantly give up the option of pointing the accusing finger at his client’s codefendants in order to obtain similar concessions from other trial counsel. Counsel must also divert his preparation in part toward generating possible responses to evidence which may be admissible only against other codefendants. As for the defendant, he may be put to the choice of hiring less experienced counsel or less actively pursuing discovery or investigation because of the higher legal expenses imposed by longer joint trials. Furthermore, although an accused normally has “the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense,” Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967), an accused in a mass conspiracy trial may not put on his codefendants without their prior waivers of their absolute rights not to testify.

All of these oppressive features were present in various degrees in this trial. But, in particular, the most onerous burden cast upon these petitioners was their inability to cross-examine each other as to comments which Government witnesses said they had heard them utter. The Court of Appeals recognized that “[t]here was much testimony as to statements made by various co-conspirators during the course, and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 451 F. 2d 49, 71. For example, one important prosecution witness testified that he had been a contractor hired by the city administration and that one of the accused conspirators, “Tony Boy” Boiardo, had told him: “You pay me the 10% ... I take care of the Mayor. I take care of the Council.” (App. 2611a.) The lawyer for the former mayor, however, was not permitted to put Boiardo on the stand and to ask him whether Addonizio had, in fact, entered into an agreement with him to coerce kickbacks. This handicap of an accused is at war with the holdings of this Court that a defendant should be permitted to confront his accusers, especially where, as here, their declarations might have been purposely misleading or self-serving. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 407 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966); Bruton v. United States, supra; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968). Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970), is not inconsistent with this proposition. There the Court found that the hearsay was probably reliable. “[T]he circumstances under which [the declarant] made the statement were such as to give reason to suppose that [he] did not misrepresent [his coconspirator’s] involvement in the crime.” Id., at 89. On the other hand, involved here were declarants, as mentioned earlier, who might have been motivated to misrepresent the roles of other parties in order to induce contractors, such as Rigo (the Government’s key witness), to make kickbacks. Moreover, in Dutton the hearsay was “of peripheral significance at most,” whereas here much of the case against the petitioners, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, was admitted under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

In addition, the petitioners were deprived of the right to cross-examine codefendant Gordon (who is not one of the petitioners). He had testified at the prior grand jury proceeding and that testimony was introduced at trial by the Government to corroborate the story of the Government’s key witness, Rigo, as to various kickback transactions. The circumstances at trial were substantially similar to those involved in Bruton except that Gordon’s grand jury remarks did not directly mention his codefendants. Normally, that difference would be sufficient to support the lower court’s finding that Bruton was inapposite but for the fact that the Government’s case against all of the defendants turned upon Rigo’s credibility. On cross-examination of Rigo, the codefendants had relentlessly attacked his credibility. But when the Government introduced the grand jury transcript in rebuttal, the defense challenge was completely terminated because Gordon, who was also on trial, could not be called to the stand. The judge, of course, gave instructions to the jury to consider the impact of the transcript upon Rigo’s credibility only when assessing Gordon’s guilt, but it is doubtful that the jurors could faithfully adhere to the delicate logic that Rigo may have told the truth as to Gordon but may have lied as to his codefendants. The contrary conclusion, to borrow from Mr. Justice Jackson, would be “unmitigated fiction.” Krulewitch v. United States, supra, at 453.

In light of the claims of prejudice committed in this multi-defendant conspiracy trial, I would grant certiorari to consider whether the extensive reliance by the prosecutor on the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule and the admission of the Gordon transcript deprived these petitioners of constitutional rights.

       Section 1951 provides:
      “(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
      “ (b) (2) The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”

       The potential for abuse of multi-defendant conspiracy proceedings has been discussed in O’Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 263 (1940); Note, Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 983 (1959); Wessel, Procedural Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A. B. A. J. 628 (1962); Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt By Association, 54 Geo. L. J. 133 (1965).

       An example of a single defendant’s opening the door to prosecution rebuttal prejudicial to other defendants was presented in the famous ApcHachin trial (United States v. Bufalino, 285 F. 2d 408 (CA2 1960)):
      “The reputation of the Apalachin delegates and the character of the meeting had been the subject of much public comment during the two years before trial. Many reports had described the lengthy criminal records of some of the delegates, had characterized the meeting as a convention of the ‘Mafia’ and had given other lurid details of what had occurred. None of this evidence was considered sufficiently material to the charge to warrant its introduction at trial.
      “Toward the end of the trial, one of the defendants placed his reputation squarely in issue. He called witnesses who testified to his excellent reputation for truth and veracity at the time of the trial.
      “Ordinarily it would have been entirely proper to attempt to refute this testimony by cross-examining with reference to the earlier publicity; the defendant himself had elsewhere complained about how much it had hurt his reputation. However, such evidence might have had equally serious adverse effects upon the nineteen co-defendants, who had done nothing to open the door against themselves.” Wessel, Procedural Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, supra, n. 2, at 631.

       Even at a severed trial of only one defendant, another alleged coconspirator may, if called to testify, invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Where the severed trial is delayed until after the acquittal or finalized conviction of the witness, however, invocation of the privilege would be improper. In any event, even if the witness refused to answer questions, the defendant would at least obtain whatever inference of innocence might result from the apparent guilt of the witness.

       The Dutton plurality opinion found the coconspirator hearsay had played a minor role in the trial:
      “In the trial of this case no less than 20 witnesses appeared and testified for the prosecution. Evans’ counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine every one of them. The most important witness, by far, was the eyewitness who described all the details of the triple murder and who was cross-examined at great length. Of the 19 other witnesses, the testimony of but a single one is at issue here.” Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 87 (1970).


text:
    No. 71-888.
    Wyman, Commissioner of New York Department of Social Services v. Almenares et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5547.
    McCray v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner was found guilty of five violations of the Mann Act and sentenced to a total of 10 years — some of the sentences being consecutive and some concurrent. There is no doubt that petitioner transported the same woman to various cities over a period of a year for prostitution. There were five counts, two of which charged transportation in commerce of the named woman between designated cities for the purpose of prostitution. Each was an offense under 18 U. S. C. § 2421, which provides a fine of $5,000 or five years in prison, or both. Three of the five counts charged that petitioner persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced this same woman “to go from one place to another” in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, each count charging an offense under 18 U. S. C. § 2422 which carries a fine of $5,000 or five years in prison, or both.

As a matter of semantics there is an offense under § 2421 whenever a person “transports” a woman for the illegal purpose and there is one under § 2422 when a person “induces” a woman to move interstate for the purpose of prostitution. The two sections seem complementary. But there are two substantial questions:

First, can § 2422 be fragmented into a series of acts, each being described as an inducement to the same woman to move interstate to live the life of a prostitute? Or within the meaning of the Act is she “induced” only once in the series?

Second, where, as here, petitioner and the woman move around the country in one continuous enterprise, is there a separate offense each time they cross a state line?

In Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, we held that where a man for purposes of prostitution took two women across a state line on the same trip and in the same vehicle, he committed only a single offense. We said:

“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Id., at 83.

A man who induces a woman to go on a prostitution tour certainly violates the Act. But what kind of inducement fits the Act? Here this woman, a divorcee, merely got instruction from petitioner as to how to work a cocktail lounge and bar. The legislative history of the Act shows a purpose “to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling . . . women and girls against their will and desire to enter and continue in a life of prostitution.” S. Rep. No. 886, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1910). It was supposed to reach those “who, by means of force and restraint, compel their victims to practice prostitution.” Id., at 11. Examples were given of the use of “[l]iquor, trickery, deceit, fraud and the use of force” by a procurer “to place the girl under his power.” Ibid. For maintaining a regime of prostitution, the Report said, “the procurer has [sic] resort to physical violence and the maintenance of a system of surveillance which makes her, to all intents and purposes, a prisoner.” Id., at 12. There was no such force or compulsion in the present case.

The Report makes plain that the Act “does not attempt to regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution” or to displace any laws of the States. Id., at 10.

Since at best this case is a marginal one, should not the Act be strictly, not loosely, construed? Since petitioner and the woman (plus petitioner’s wife) were on a year’s tour, do the offenses multiply every time a state line is crossed or should the enterprise be considered as one entity? Or, where there is but one inducement, is there not, so far as § 2422 is concerned, but one offense?

These are questions on which we should have briefs and argument.

The Court has not been consistent in its approach to this Act, as a comparison of Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, with Bell v. United States, supra, makes plain. The present case of voluntary prostitution is an appropriate vehicle for a re-examination of the judicial decisions in this area.

       Section 2421 provides:
      “Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or
      “Whoever knowingly procures or obtains any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or any Territory or Possession of the United States, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or any Territory or Possession of the United States—
      “Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

       Section 2422 provides:
      “Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person that such woman or girl shall engage in the practice of prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whether with or without her consent, and thereby knowingly causes such woman or girl to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”


text:
    No. 71-5591.
    Leighton v. Neil, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5675.
    Mooney v. United States.
   C. A, 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5687.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that cer-tiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 70-90.
    No. 70-315.
    No. 71-254.
    No. 71-463.
    No. 71-518.
    No. 71-545.
    No. 71-5171.
    No. 71-5326.
    No. 71-5380.
    No. 71-5394.
    No. 71-5479.
    No. 71-5482.
    No. 71-5524.
    Schilb et al. v. Kuebel, Resolute Insurance Co. et al. v. Seventh Judicial District Court of Oklahoma County et al., Westmoreland v. Mississippi, Kadans v. Collins, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Nevada, et al., Couch, Administratrix v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., United States Steel Corp. v. Blair, Cunningham v. Wingo, Warden, Felan v. United States, Galdeira et al. v. Richardson et al., Shappell v. Martin-Marietta Corp., Todaro v. United States, McCray v. United States Marshal for the District of Kansas et al., Logan v. Correctional Superintendent, Wallkill Prison,
   404 U. S. 357;

404 U. S. 997;

404 U. S. 1038;

404 U. S. 1007;

404 U. S. 1025;

404 U. S. 1018;

404 U. S. 1064;

404 U. S. 978;

404 U.S. 993;

404 U. S. 1002;

404 U. S. 1040;

404 U. S. 1040; and

404 U. S. 1061. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-38.
    Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
   404 U. S. 453. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-5025.
    Haines v. Kerner et al.,
   404 U.S. 519. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-193.
    Russo v. United States,
   404 U. S. 1023. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    FEBRUARY 23, 1972
    No. 70-95.
    Board of Elections for the District of Columbia et al. v. Lester et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 71-6014.
    Lepiscopo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    February 28, 1972
    No. 71-765.
    Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Wilson et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Kan.


text:
    No. 71-5464.
    Kirk v. McMeen et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Iowa.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-5743.
    Torres et al. v. New York State Department of Labor et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and reverse. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970).


text:
    No. 70-56.
    Gilligan, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Sweetenham et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio [probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 991] dismissed as moot.


text:
    No. 71-828.
    Detroit Police Officers Assn. et al. v. City of Detroit.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-855.
    Willis v. State Board of Control et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 71-880.
    Haynes et al. v. Linder et al.
   Appeal Mo. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. A-871.
    Fraser & Johnston Co. v. Lodge 1327, Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 70-74.
    Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 402 U. S. 994.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 70-220.
    Caplin, Trustee v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 982.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission granted and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Counsel for respondent allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 40,
    Orig.
    Pennsylvania v. New York et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 401 U. S. 931.]
   Motion of American Express Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 70-250.
    Carleson, Director, Department of Social Welfare, et al. v. Remillard et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 404 U. S. 1013.] Motion of appellee Remillard for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Carmen L. Massey, of Richmond, California, be, and she is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for appellee Remillard in this case.


text:
    No. 70-5015.
    Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 908.] Motion for leave to cite supplemental authority granted.


text:
    No. 70-5061.
    Kirby v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. [Certiorari granted, 402 U. S. 995.] Motion of the Attorney General of California for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Counsel for petitioner allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 70-5276.
    Murel et al. v. Baltimore City Criminal Court et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 999.] Motion to dispense with printing amicus curiae brief of Prison Research Council of the University of Pennsylvania Law School granted.


text:
    No. 71-5097.
    Huffman v. Boersen.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 990.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 71-5103.
    Morrissey et al. v. Brewer, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 999.] Motion to dispense with printing amicus curiae brief of James H. Russell granted.


text:
    No. A-797 (71-994).
    Epstein v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black-mun are of the opinion that the stay should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5470.
    No. 71-5707.
    No. 71-5710.
    No. 71-5711.
    Beasley v. United States; Smith v. MacGruder; Horton v. North Carolina; and Enlow v. Lash, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-5701.
    No. 71-5713.
    No. 71-5751.
    Lauchli v. Poos, U. S. District Judge; Moore v. Whipple, U. S. District Judge; and McCray v. Arraj, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-798.
    Silk v. Kleppe, Administrator of Small Business Administration.
   Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-873.
    United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. R. I. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 71-703 [United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc., probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 915].


text:
    No. 71-879.
    Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 71-857.
    Evco, dba Evco Instructional Designs v. Jones, Commissioner of Bureau of Revenue, et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-858.
    Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-895.
    National Labor Relations Board v. International Van Lines.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-732.
    Schneckloth, Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-863.
    No. 71-864.
    No. 71-865.
    No. 71-866.
    Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee; Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace et al.; Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc. v. Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace; and American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument. Mandate of United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued on October 29, 1971, in these cases is hereby recalled and stayed pending the sending down of judgment of this Court. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that stay should be denied. Reported below: 146 U. S. App. D. C. 181, 450 F. 2d 642.


text:
    No. 71-900.
    Union Oil Co. of California v. The San Jacinto et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-586.
    Neil, Warden v. Biggers.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to use record in No. 237, October Term, 1967 [Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S. 404] and motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pav/peris granted. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions and petition.


text:
    No. 70-5405.
    Capello v. Gates et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-730.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-740.
    Allen, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-763.
    Bradshaw et al. v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-769.
    Morning Telegraph, a Division of Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Powers et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-777.
    No. 71-807.
    Cleveland et al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. et al.; and Agron v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 F. 2d 906.


text:
    No. 71-800.
    Cohen v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-788.
    Armour & Co. v. Local Union No. 186, United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-789.
    No. 71-796.
    Jacobs v. United States; and Kastenbaum v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-810.
    No. 71-824.
    Chicken Delight, Inc., et al. v. Siegel et al.; and Siegel et al. v. Chicken Delight, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 448 F. 2d 43.


text:
    No. 71-815.
    Diorio v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-859.
    Bradford et ux. v. Thompson et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-872.
    Johnson et al. v. Board of Appeals and Review.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-885.
    County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Construction Corp.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-894.
    United States Steel Corp. v. Laird et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-904.
    Great Fidelity Investment Co. et al. v. Martin et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5094.
    Beaty et al. v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5418.
    Spiller v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5448.
    Haynes v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5462.
    Whitmore v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5490.
    Petway v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5511.
    Farmer v. Kropp, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5513.
    Rogers v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5734.
    Hoak et al. v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5736.
    Willis v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5738.
    Acarino v. Mishler, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5739.
    Barrow v. Bounds, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5741.
    Sinclair v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5746.
    Grindstaff v. Warden, Leavenworth Penitentiary.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5747.
    Rosenberg v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5748.
    Wimberley v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5749.
    Sasko v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5750.
    Bays v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5752.
    Lewis v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5754.
    Boyd v. Beto, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5756.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5757.
    Ferguson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5758.
    Langley et al. v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5759.
    Hidalgo v. Purcell et al.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5760.
    Yanich v. Mummert, Sheriff.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5763.
    Overton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5764.
    No. 71-5774.
    Noel v. United States; and Jones et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 450 F. 2d 1057.


text:
    No. 71-5765.
    Chicquelo v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-486.
    Monger v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied, it appearing that judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida rests upon an adequate state ground.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart concur,

dissenting.

Petitioner was employed in a newsstand which sold “girlie” magazines. He was charged with the sale of two allegedly obscene magazines — Body Shop and The Erotic Cinema — in violation of Florida’s obscenity statute and, on November 3, 1970, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. On January 12, 1971, the trial court orally pronounced its judgment of guilty and imposed a sentence of either a $1,000 fine or six months’ imprisonment on each count, plus costs. That same day, petitioner filed his notice of appeal and a motion for supersedeas. On January 18, the trial court entered its written order nunc pro tunc January 12. This order recited that petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed after the entry of judgment. Because he was challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, petitioner’s appeal was transferred by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, to the Florida Supreme Court.

Respondent then made a motion to dismiss the appeal because “the notice of appeal. . . was filed prior to entry of either judgment or sentence.” Respondent’s argument was apparently founded upon the fact that the notice of appeal was filed after the oral entry of judgment but before the written nunc pro tunc order. In a 4 — 3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Justice Ervin dissented, saying:

“I think it altogther too technical to refuse to give credence to notices of appeals filed ante to judgments or sentences being reduced to writing and placed in a minute or judgment book after they have been pronounced in open court and reflected in the minutes. A person convicted should not be delayed in taking an appeal or commencing service of sentence. A notice of appeal is not necessarily invalid because it antedates a written judgment. It picks up when the judgment is entered unless the state can show some prejudice by early filing of the notice, which it can’t in this case.”

Petitioner now contends that it is a denial of due process to dismiss a criminal defendant’s only appeal for failing to meet a procedural technicality where the failure does not prejudice the State. Alternatively, petitioner argues that the basis of the dismissal by the Florida Supreme Court was not an adequate and independent state ground which would bar this Court’s review of his First Amendment claims. Respondent answers that the State’s rules of appellate procedure are necessary “to avoid chaotic and haphazard appellate proceedings” and thus comport with the requirements of procedural due process. In any event, argues respondent, the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground and thus is not within our certiorari jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3).

The Federal Constitution contains no requirement that a State provide appellate courts or even that there be a right to appellate review. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18; McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687-688. This is not to say, however, that once appellate review has been provided a State may deny it arbitrarily or capriciously without violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252; Griffin v. Illinois, supra. A substantial constitutional question is presented, therefore, when federal rights secured by the First Amendment are rejected on the basis of procedural technicalities such as the one involved here. See Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 557-558 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 230-231; Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Col. L. Rev. 941, 959-962 (1965).

In my view, the basis of the dismissal in the Supreme Court of Florida is not an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to bar this Court’s review of petitioner’s First Amendment claims. “Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice. ... [I]t is necessary to see that local practice shall not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way.” Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24-25. Thus, the rule that this Court will not review decisions founded upon state grounds is subject to exception so that federal claims may properly be vindicated.

In Rogers v. Alabama, supra, for example, the state court had stricken from the record a motion on the ground that it was “prolix,” but we nonetheless reached the federal question raised in that motion. We have similarly reached federal questions which had been avoided by state courts on the ground that the improper remedy had been used, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; that the argument advanced had been too indefinite or was improperly presented for consideration by the state court, Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 293-302; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 318-320; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 449-450; that the state appellate court lacked jurisdiction because the appellant had failed to give opposing counsel the requisite opportunity to examine and correct the transcript, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229; that a criminal defendant had not made timely objection to the admission of evidence, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443; or that the required certification of the state appeal had not been obtained, Parrot v. Tallahassee, 381 U. S. 129. See also R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 131-142 (4th ed. 1969); Hill, supra; Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1375 (1961); Note, 62 Col. L. Rev. 822 (1962). In Henry v. Mississippi, supra, at 446-447, we summarized the effect of procedural irregularities in state proceedings upon the scope of this Court's review:

“It is, of course, a familiar principle that this Court will decline to review state court judgments which rest on independent and adequate state grounds, even where those judgments also decide federal questions. The principle applies not only in cases involving state substantive grounds, but also in cases involving state procedural grounds. But it is important to distinguish between state substantive grounds and state procedural grounds. Where the ground involved is substantive, the determination of the federal question cannot affect the disposition if the state court decision on the state law question is allowed to stand. Under the view taken in Murdock [20 Wall. 590] of the statutes conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court, we have no power to revise judgments on questions of state law. Thus, the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine is necessary to avoid advisory opinions.
“These justifications have no application where the state ground is purely procedural. A procedural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right. Accordingly, we have consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question.” (Citations omitted.)

We then concluded “that a litigant’s procedural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his federal rights unless the State’s insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest. In every case we must inquire whether the enforcement of a procedural forfeiture serves such a state interest. If it does not, the state procedural rule ought not be permitted to bar vindication of important federal rights.” Id., at 447-448.

I assume that Florida has a legitimate interest in foreclosing interlocutory appeals in order to avoid piecemeal litigation of criminal cases. That assumption, however, does not dispose of the present case because Henry requires that “every case” be considered on its own facts. Here, I can fathom no state interest which would be served by rejecting a notice of appeal filed after an oral pronouncement of judgment but before a written order. This is not a case where the orderly progress of the trial was disrupted by a dilatory interlocutory appeal or where an appeal was sought before some vital aspect of the trial was completed. Nor is this a case where the record on appeal was missing some formal document or pleading. Indeed, tellingly absent from the order of the Supreme Court of Florida and the brief of the respondent is the assertion of any state interest which would have been served had the trial court’s January 12 order been written instead of oral or had the petitioner waited until January 18 to file his formal notice of appeal. Under such circumstances, Henry v. Mississippi teaches that we are free to consider petitioner’s federal claims.

I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse and remand on Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

       Fla. Stat. Ann. §847.011. This statute was held unconstitutional by a three-judge district court, Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, and an appeal from that judgment is presently pending before this Court, No. 70-35, Austin v. Meyer.

       Petitioner argues that the notice of appeal was filed January 12 in order to prevent the trial court from increasing the sentence it had imposed orally.


text:
    No. 71-554.
    Liepman v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-629.
    Valdez et al. v. Black et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-772.
    Menna v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-791.
    Roman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-870.
    Feinlowitz v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-668.
    No. 71-832.
    Rivera v. United States; and Marquez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 449 F. 2d 89.


text:
    No. 71-5365.
    Foster v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5505.
    Bivens v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5745.
    MacLean v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-672.
    United States v. Two Hundred and One 50-pound Bags of Furazolidone et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-709.
    Sumida et al. v. Yumen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions to dispense with printing petition and brief in opposition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-720.
    No. 71-759.
    No. 71-760.
    Cerone et al. v. United States; Angelini v. United States; and Cortina v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted for reasons stated in his dissent in Addonizio v. United States, ante, p. 936.

Reported below: 452 F. 2d 274.


text:
    No. 71-884.
    Chandler, U. S. District Judge v. O’Bryan.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-737.
    Michigan v. Trudeau.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-790.
    Perkins v. Laird, Secretary of Defense.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-792.
    Grubbs et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-799.
    University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-814.
    Cortright et al. v. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certi-orari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-881.
    Illinois v. Hudson.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied, it appearing that judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois rests upon an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 71-5686.
    Lauchli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Petitioner brought this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1985 to recover damages from agents of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department. He alleged that they had conducted unlawful searches of his property beyond the scope of their warrants. Both lower courts denied the petitioner, a pauper, permission to proceed in forma pauperis. The terse orders simply stated that the unlawful search issue was frivolous. Yet there is no doubt that a civil rights damages action is appropriate where federal agents ransack one’s premises without authority. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The Solicitor General, however, contends that the order of the Court of Appeals was nonetheless correct because the agents’ searches had already been validated in the previous and finalized criminal proceeding.

This action, brought to vindicate deprivations of Fourth Amendment privileges, is akin to that of the remedy of federal habeas corpus. The latter relief is not barred merely because the grounds relied on have been rejected on direct review of the conviction. Inasmuch as both 42 U. S. C. § 1985 and federal habeas corpus are designed to make whole those who have been injured, either through loss of liberty or property, by unconstitutional conduct, it is unclear why collateral estoppel should apply against a prisoner in a civil rights action but not in his habeas action on the same issue. If Lauchli is subsequently freed on habeas on the very claim tendered here, will his civil rights action still be barred?

The Solicitor General says that the validity of petitioner's arrest and the searches of his premises, now challenged in this civil action, was “fully litigated and upheld in the criminal proceedings.” That is partially true but not completely so. In the criminal case the motion to suppress the evidence was heard only by the court and it ruled on the question whether there was “probable cause” for the searches. But the issues tendered in this civil rights case will be for a jury to resolve. Is Lauchli barred from a jury trial on his civil rights suit merely because in the prior criminal case a judge ruled there was “probable cause” for the search?

These are important questions upon which we should have briefs and arguments.

The issue assumes added importance in light of the Government’s current position that collateral estoppel does not bar it from re-prosecuting a defendant in a forfeiture lawsuit for the same alleged course of conduct for which he had previously been acquitted. In No. 71-672, United States v. Two Hundred and One 50-pound Bags of Furazolidone, the Solicitor General has petitioned this Court to reverse a Court of Appeals’ determination that a prior acquittal of a defendant charged with smuggling animal feed in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 545 is a bar to a subsequent in rem forfeiture action brought by the Government against the feed on grounds that it was imported in violation of the same section.

The forfeiture case is not distinguishable from this case on the theory that the forfeiture action is “civil” and requires a lesser standard of proof. We have long held that “proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886). In United States v. U. S. Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 718 (1971), we found “no difference between a man who ‘forfeits’ $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a ‘criminal fine’ of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct.”

May the Government have its cake and eat it too? May it (a) maintain that res judicata does not defeat forfeiture actions which are brought subsequent to acquittals and which are based on the same course of conduct, yet (b) plead collateral estoppel to a prisoner’s attempts to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional searches previously sustained on direct review of his conviction?

I would grant the petition for certiorari or at the very least hold it for our disposition of No. 71-672.

       With respect to the frivolity standard under 28 U. S. C. § 1915, I have previously stated my view that the principle of equal protection of the laws prohibits a court from denying a pauper access to judicial machinery where a similarly situated but wealthier litigant could have obtained a ruling on the merits of his claim simply by paying docketing fees. Here the petitioner was unable to pay the docketing fee required by the Court of Appeals and was unable to pay the service fee (but was able to pay the $15 docketing fee) required by the District Court. Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U. S. 59 (1971).

       The Solicitor General may not be entirely correct in his implied assertion that all of the issues tendered in the instant complaint had been litigated in the criminal proceeding. Only searches conducted on AprE 17, 1969, were before the Court of Appeals. 444 F. 2d 1037, 1041 (CA7 1971). In addition to those seizures, petitioner’s civE rights complaint attacked searches conducted on other dates which were not litigated in the previous prosecution inasmuch as the seized items were not sought to be introduced.

       Even where a federal prisoner continues to raise the same issue by filing repetitive petitions pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255, the reviewing judge may not perfunctorily deny the later ones solely on the doctrine of res judicata. “[I]t is open to the applicant to show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting the redeter-mination of the ground.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 16 (1963).

       This proposition, of course, does not foreclose the possibility that the Court could hold against the Government in both situations. By analogizing the subsequent civil rights lawsuit to the habeas action, collateral estoppel might be found inapplicable. By requiring that the Government join all “criminal” charges flowing from a single course of conduct in a single proceeding the Government’s subsequent forfeiture action could be barred. Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957); see my dissenting opinion in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 477 (1958).


text:
    No. 71-5762.
    Sharrow v. Brown.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5761.
    Joyce v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-499.
    No. 71-527.
    No. 71-536.
    No. 71-591.
    No. 71-5546.
    Mascia v. United States, United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, Wilkins, Administratrix v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., Rawls v. Condé Nast Publications, Inc., DunLeavay v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., et al.,
   404 U. S. 1025;

404 U. S. 558;

404 U. S. 1018;

404 U. S. 1038; and

404 U. S. 1062. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 70-79.
    Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,
   404 U. S. 418. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 70-290.
    No. 70-5049.
    Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co. et al., Burns v. Swenson, Warden, et al.,
   404 U. S. 1062; and

404 U. S. 1062. Petitions for rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 71-5444.
    Carlough v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
   404 U. S. 1026. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-5277.
    Carter v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,
   404 U. S. 1012. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 3, 1972
    No. 71-1080.
    United Mine Workers of America v. Bryant, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    March 6, 1972
    No. 71-929.
    Forbush et al. v. Wallace, Governor of Alabama, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala.


text:
    No. 71-5806.
    Charleston et al. v. Wohlgemuth et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 71-805.
    Philada Home Fund, Inc. v. Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-624.
    Thompson v. Thompson.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Pa. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5773.
    Fair v. Wiggins.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-932.
    Woods et al. v. Society for the Propagation of the Faith of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 70-291.
    Osmond et al. v. Spence et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Del. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Swarb v. Lennox, ante, p. 191, and D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., ante, p. 174. Order of June 21, 1971, entered by Mr. Justice Brennan, as modified by his order of August 20, 1971, shall continue in effect unless and until superseded by order of District Court.


text:
    No. 71-5262.
    Carpenter et al. v. Sterrett, Administrator, Department of Public Welfare of Indiana, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ind. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Townsend v. Swank and Alexander v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282.


text:
    No. 71-5421.
    Midgett v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Order of this Court heretofore entered on February 22, 1972 [certiorari granted, ante, p. 916], in this case is hereby revoked. Certiorari dismissed.


text:
    No. 71-41.
    International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Flair Builders, Inc.
   [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 982.] Request for additional time for filing brief for respondent granted and 30 additional days allotted for that purpose. Typewritten briefs may be filed in lieu of printed briefs. J. Robert Murphy, Esquire, of Aurora, Illinois, invited to file a brief and argue in this case as amicus curiae in support of judgment below.


text:
    No. 71-709.
    Sumida et al. v. Yumen et al.,
   ante, p. 964. Motion to disbar denied.


text:
    No. 71-1017.
    No. 71-1026.
    Gravel v. United States; and United States v. Gravel.
   [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 916.] Motion to expedite granted so that the consolidated cases may be briefed and argued during the present Term of Court. Motion of Unitarian Universalist Assn, for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in No. 71-1017 denied.


text:
    No. 71-665.
    Vasquez et al. v. Walsh, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 71-812.
    Lemelson v. Pettine, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 71-5812.
    Magee v. Nelson, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 71-5791.
    No. 71-5792.
    Cleaves v. Pennsylvania et al.; and Knight v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 71-1016.
    No. 71-1040.
    Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.; and United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Petitions for certiorari to review judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (CA No. 71-2550) granted and cases consolidated. Petitions for certiorari before judgment to review opinion and order of Federal Power Commission (FPC Opinion No. 606, United Gas Pipe Line Co.) denied. Motion to expedite granted so that the consolidated cases maybe briefed and argued during present Term of Court. Motions of Humble Oil & Refining Co. and State of Louisiana et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions and motions.

Reported below: 456 F. 2d 326.


text:
    No. 71-839.
    Erlenbaugh et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1, presented by the petition, which reads as follows:

“1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not following the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a 1967 case entitled U. S. vs Arnold, 380 Federal 2nd, 366, thus creating a conflict between the circuits.”

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-909.
    Environmental Protection Agency et al. v. Mink et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-702.
    No. 71-5916.
    No. 71-5924.
    No. 71-5925.
    Tocco v. United States; Richmond v. United States; Smith v. United States; and Long v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 F. 2d 288.


text:
    No. 71-783.
    Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-787.
    Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-818.
    Pace Co., Division of Ambac Industries, Inc. v. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-821.
    Delta Development Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-826.
    967.905 Acres of Land in Cook County et al., Minnesota, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-842.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-846.
    Siragusa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-860.
    Tropiano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-875.
    Ivimey v. New York.
   App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-878.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-882.
    Hunter v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-903.
    Jones v. Board of Education of Daviess County.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-911.
    Pressman v. Nellis.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-917.
    Barbizon Electric Co., Inc. v. City of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-922.
    Cohn v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-927.
    Tropiano v. Moseley, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5753.
    Altimus v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5766.
    Bettker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5767.
    McHenry v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5768.
    Clayton v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5770.
    Maselli v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5772.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5775.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5776.
    Holmes v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5777.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5778.
    Laws v. Yeager, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5779.
    Eisen v. Silver.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5781.
    Jackson v. Picard, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5782.
    Young v. Alabama.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5783.
    Patterson v. Tulsa Local No. 513, Motion Picture Operators of the United States & Canada.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5784.
    Roy v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5785.
    Green v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5786.
    Cagle v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5793.
    Magee v. Yeager, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5796.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5797.
    McBride v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5798.
    McLean, aka McClean v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5800.
    Creasman v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Hendersonville et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5802.
    McGahey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5804.
    Logan v. Lyon et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5805.
    Klabin v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5807.
    Johnson v. Brierley, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5808.
    Haley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5810.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5811.
    Cooke v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5809.
    No. 71-5851.
    Haley v. United States; and Liley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 452 F. 2d 391.


text:
    No. 71-5813.
    Sullivan v. Buchkoe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5814.
    Seewald v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5939.
    Brown et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-246.
    Oswald, Correction Commissioner, et al. v. Sostre.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to dispense with printing amicus curiae brief of National Law Office of National Legal Aid & Defender Assn, and motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-548.
    Hamilton v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Alameda. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-593.
    Berg v. Schmidt, Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-910.
    Sims et al. v. Parke Davis & Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-930.
    Benson et al. v. Rich et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5771.
    Muncaster v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-5799.
    Robinson v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-809.
    Sobel v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-833.
    DaCosta v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Once again, this Court is confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of the presidential war which has raged in Southeast Asia for nearly a decade. Once again, it denies certiorari. Once again, I dissent.

I have expressed at length my view that the constitutional questions raised by conscription for a presidential war are both substantial and justiciable. See, e. g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Mass. I); Hart v. United States, 391 U. S. 956 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. United States, 391 U. S. 936 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U. S. 934, 935 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. United States, 386 U. S. 972 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

The circuits are in conflict as to the justiciability of these questions. Compare Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F. 2d 26 (CA1 1971) (Mass. II), and Orlando v. Laird, 443 F. 2d 1039 (CA2 1971), with Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d 236 (CA10 1969), and Luftig v. McNamara, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 4, 373 F. 2d 664 (1967).

This Court, of course, should give deference to the coordinate branches of the Government. But we did not defer in the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, when the issue was presidential power as Commander in Chief to order a blockade. We did not defer in the Steel Seizure Case, when the issue was presidential power, in time of armed international conflict, to order the seizure of domestic steel mills. Nor should we defer here, when the issue is presidential power to seize, not steel, but people. See Mass. I, supra, at 891-900.

The Constitution gives Congress the power “To declare War,” Art. I, § 8; and it is argued that the Constitution gives to Congress the exclusive power to determine when it has declared war. But if there is such a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217, it is for this Court to determine its scope. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 521. See Mass. I, supra, at 892.

While we debate whether to decide the constitutionality of this war, our countrymen are daily compelled to undergo the physical and psychological tortures of armed combat on foreign soil. Families and careers are disrupted; young men maimed and disfigured; lives lost. The issues are large; they are precisely framed; we should decide them.

       Petitioner DaCosta is a Portuguese citizen permanently resident in the United States. He was conscripted into the United States Army in December 1970, and commenced this action in July 1971, to enjoin enforcement of military orders deploying him to Vietnam. He alleges that participation by the United States in the Vietnamese conflict has not been authorized by Congress conformably with the Constitution, and that absent such authorization, Congress has no power to conscript for military service in armed conflict overseas.

        Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.


text:
    No. 71-883.
    Pearl v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-920.
    In re O’Connor.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-953.
    Johnson v. Reed et vir.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1469,
    October Term, 1970.
    Homart Development Co. v. Diamond et al.,
   402 U. S. 988. Joint motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that the motion should be granted.


text:
    No. 71-437.
    No. 71-5504.
    No. 71-5536.
    Amato et al. v. Wisconsin, Feurtado v. Florida, Wickline v. Brooks et al.,
   404 U. S. 1063;

404 U. S. 1047; and

404 U. S. 1061. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 8, 1972
    No. 71-747.
    Grausam v. Murphey, State Hospital Director, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    March 17, 1972
    No. A-937 (71-1170).
    No. A-937 (71-1171).
    WHDH, Inc. v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and WHDH, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for stay pending action on petition for writ of certiorari [No. 71-1171] and motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus [No. 71-1170] presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    March 20, 1972
    No. 71-936.
    Manard et al. v. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Va.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 71-675.
    Kappos v. Iowa.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.


text:
    No. 71-5399.
    Perryman v. Washington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-5590.
    Salisbury v. Oregon.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-431.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Vitales.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 983.] Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss petition to review order of deportation.


text:
    No. A-880.
    Shelton v. Brunson et al.
   D. C. N. D. Tex. Application for stay of deployment presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would continue stay pending timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court.


text:
    No. A-905.
    No. A-913.
    Davis et al. v. Cinema Classics, Ltd., Inc., et al.; and Busch et al. v. Cinema Classics, Ltd., Inc., et al.
   D. C. C. D. Cal. Applications for stay of preliminary injunction presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-962.
    California v. Anderson.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application of State of California for stay of judgment of Supreme Court of California (Crim. 13617) denied.


text:
    No. 50,
    Orig.
    Vermont v. New York et al.
   Motion of Monroe County Conservation Council for leave to intervene as a party plaintiff denied.


text:
    No. A-926.
    Doe (Schwartz, Real Party In Interest) v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence for civil contempt presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending further order of this Court.


text:
    No. 54,
    Orig.
    United States v. Florida et al.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted and defendants allotted 60 days to answer.


text:
    No. 70-283.
    Adams, Warden v. Williams.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1014.] Motion of District Attorney of New York County for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 71-110.
    Gelbard et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 990.] Motion of petitioner Gelbard for assignment of a separate docket number and/or additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 71-263.
    United States v. Egan et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 990.] Motion of Ramsey Clark and Leonard B. Boudin to permit Jack J. Levine to argue orally pro hac vice on behalf of respondent Egan granted.


text:
    No. 71-315.
    Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 1037.] Motion of Edward S. Irons et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 71-708.
    Trafficante et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 915.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing briefs and appendix granted.


text:
    No. 71-858.
    Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 953.] Motion for reconsideration of petition for certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-288.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Tatum et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 404 U. S. 955.] Motion of Sam J. Ervin, Jr., for additional time to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. Permission for two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents granted.


text:
    No. 71-1024.
    No. 71-1145.
    Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens et al.; and Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens et al.
   Appeals from D. C. Minn. Motion to expedite denied. Cases consolidated. Reported below: 336 F. Supp. 715.


text:
    No. 71-1128.
    Kelemen et al. v. Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius of Akron.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion for consolidation with Nos. 71-563 [Rohrbaugh v. Presbytery of Seattle, Inc.] and 71-867 [Simich v. Milisavljevic] denied.