author: Mr. Justice White

text:
    CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.
    No. 92.
    Argued February 15, 1967.
    Decided June 5, 1967.

      Marshall W. Krause argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Donald M. Cahen.

      Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attorney General.

      Leonard J. Kerpelman filed a brief for Homeowners in Opposition to Housing Authoritarianism, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
    Briefs of ,amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Thomas M. O’Connor, John W. Sholenberger, Roger Arnebergh, Barnett I. Shur, Alexander G. Brown, David Stahl and Robert E. Michalski for the Member Municipalities of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and by Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General, Willie J. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Edward T. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Max Rosenblatt, Lewis H. Weinstein and Loyd M. Starrett for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al.
   Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, this Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, a similar conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those closely divided decisions, more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while numerous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23. In view of the growing nationwide importance of the problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and in See v. City of Seattle, post, p. 541, to re-examine whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U. S. 808.

Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.

Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding, we shall set forth the parties’ factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing Code. The building’s manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building’s occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.

The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused to allow an inspection. ' A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney’s office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an inspection under § 503 of the Housing Code:

“Sec. 503 Right to Enter Building. Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.”

Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of § 507 of the Code. Appellant was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under § 507 for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by § 503. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price, and decisions in other States, the District Court of Appeal held that § 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it “is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.” Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.

I.

The Fourth Amendment provides that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which “is basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27. As such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 30.

Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20. As the Court explained in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14:

“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”

In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this case on its facts, the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that ruling is the core of appellant’s challenge here. We proceed to a re-examination of the factors which persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.

To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs “touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against official intrusion,” 359 U. S., at 367, because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for “evidence of criminal action” which may be used to secure the owner’s criminal conviction, historic interests of “self-protection” jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said not to be involved, but only the less intense “right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy.” Id., at 365.

We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely “peripheral.”. It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen. has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And even accepting Frank’s rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here considering do in fact jeopardize “self-protection” interests of the property owner. Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces only an administrative compliance order, refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant. Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.

The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is argued that these inspections are “designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant.” 359 U. S., at 367. The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards, and at any rate the inspector’s particular decision to enter must comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if -he may enter without a warrant. In addition, the argument proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or administrative assessment of broad factors such as the area’s age and condition. Unless the magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must issue a “rubber stamp” warrant which provides no protection at all to the property owner.

In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet, only by refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector’s decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. See cases cited, p. 529, supra. We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.

The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to say that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police without a warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never be made. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.

In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of these inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights is essential.

II.

The Fourth Amendment provides that, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, appellant argues not only that code enforcement inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being enforced. We disagree.

In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, “probable cause” is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. Por example, in a criminal investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with a warrant, is “reasonable” only when there is “probable cause” to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.

Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. Because fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly conditions adversely affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous courts have upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce such minimum standards even upon existing structures. In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable — and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection — the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.

There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures. It is here that the probable cause debate is focused, for the agency’s decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard urged by appellant is adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking compliance with code standards and the reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.

In meeting this contention, appellant argues first, that his probable cause standard would not jeopardize area inspection programs because only a minute portion of the population will refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual privacy in any event should be given preference to the public interest in conducting such inspections. The first argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether the area inspection is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The second argument is in effect an assertion that the area inspection is an unreasonable search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S., at 367-371. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions— faulty wiring is an obvious example — are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy. Both the majority and the dissent in Frank emphatically supported this conclusion:

“Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few. Certainly, the nature of our society has not vitiated the need for inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting this need by means that history and dominant public opinion have sanctioned.” 359 U. S., at 372.
. . This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause’ to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause’ required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought.” 359 U. S., at 383 (Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting).

Having concluded that the area inspection is a “reasonable” search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that “probable cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a “synthetic search warrant” and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S., at 373. But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S., at 273-274 (opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).

III.

Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N. E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle). On the other hand, in the .case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.

IV.

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant’s consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the building’s manager, but appellee does not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant’s premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451. Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, see post, p. 546.]

       The inspection was conducted pursuant to § 86 (3) of the San Francisco Municipal Code, which provides that apartment house operators shall pay an annual license fee in part to defray the cost of periodic inspections of their buildings. The inspections are to be made by the Bureau of Housing Inspection “at least once a year and as often thereafter as may be deemed necessary.” The permit of occupancy, which prescribes the apartment units which a building may contain, is not issued until the license is obtained.

       “Sec. 507 PENALTY FOR Violation. Any person, the owner or his authorized agent who violates, disobeys, omits, neglects, or refuses to comply with, or who resists or opposes the execution of any of the provisions of this Code, or any order of the Superintendent, the Director of Public Works, or the Director of Public Health made pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment, not exceeding six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise provided in this Code, and shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for every day such violation, disobedience, omission, neglect or refusal shall continue.”

         Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A. 2d 764 (1956); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S. W. 2d 948 (Mo. 1960); State ex rel. Eaton v. Pnce, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N. E. 2d 523 (1958), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 364 U. S. 263 (1960). See also State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139 N. W. 2d 406 (1966); Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N. E. 2d 681 (1966), appeal docketed Jan. 5, 1967, No. 1179, Misc., O. T. 1966; People v. Laverne, 14 N. Y. 2d 304, 200 N. E. 2d 441 (1964).

       In Frank, the Baltimore ordinance required that the health inspector “have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure” before he could demand entry without a warrant, a requirement obviously met in Frank because the inspector observed extreme structural decay and a pile of rodent feces on the appellant’s premises. Section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code has no such “cause” requirement, but neither did the Ohio ordinance at issue in Eaton v. Price, a case which four Justices thought was controlled by Frank. 364 U. S., at 264, 265, n. 2 (opinion of Mr. Justice BrennaN).

       See Boyd v. United States, 116 17. S. 616. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 766-772.

       See Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 254-256 (MR. Justice Brennan, dissenting); District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 178 F. 2d 13, aff’d, 339 U. S. 1.

       See New York, N. Y., Administrative Code § D26-8.0 (1964).

       See Washington, D. C., Housing Regulations §2104.

       This is the more prevalent enforcement procedure. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 813-816.

       The San Francisco Code requires that the inspector display-proper credentials, that he inspect “at reasonable times,” and that he not obtain entry by force, at least when there is no emergency. The Baltimore ordinance in Frank required that the inspector “have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists.” Some cities notify residents in advance, by mail or posted notice, of impending area inspections. State courts upholding these inspections without warrants have imposed a general reasonableness requirement. See cases cited, n. 3, supra.

       See Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. 2d 337, 142 N. E. 2d 691; City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S. W. 2d 869 (Ky.) ; Adamec v. Post, 273 N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. 2d 120; Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N. E. 2d 775; Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S. C. 538, 88 S. E. 2d 683; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N. W. 2d 156.

       See Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 705, 718 and n. 43; Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 423 and n. 93; Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 304, 316-317; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 807, 851; Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1115, 1124-1125. Section 311 (a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 478, 42 U. S. C. § 1468 (1964 ed., Supp. I), authorizes grants of federal funds “to cities, other municipalities, and counties for the purpose of assisting such localities in carrying out programs of concentrated code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which such enforcement, together with those public improvements to be provided by the locality, may be expected to arrest the decline of the area.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice White Mr. Justice Clark,

license: Public Domain

text:
    SEE v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
    No. 180.
    Argued February 15, 1967.
    Decided June 5, 1967.

      Norman Dorsen argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Melvin L. Wulj and Marvin M. Karpatkin.

      A. L. Newbould argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Charles S. Rhyne.

   Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect appellant’s locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed therein. The inspection was conducted as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle’s Fire Code. City of Seattle Ordinance No. 87870, c. 8.01. After he refused the inspector access, appellant was arrested and charged with violating § 8.01.050 of the Code:

“Inspection of building and premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.”

Appellant was convicted and given a suspended fine of $100 despite his claim that § 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize this warrantless inspection of his warehouse, would violate his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We noted probable jurisdiction and set this case for argument with Camara v. Municipal Court, ante, p. 523. 385 U. S. 808. We find the principles enunciated in the Camara opinion applicable here and therefore we reverse.

In Camara, we held that the Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The only question which this case presents is whether Camara applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences. The Supreme Court of Washington, in affirming appellant’s conviction, suggested that this Court “has applied different standards of reasonableness to searches of dwellings than to places of business,” citing Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582. The Washington court held, and appellee here argues, that § 8.01.050, which excludes “the interiors of dwellings,” establishes a reasonable scheme for the warrantless inspection of commercial premises pursuant to the Seattle Fire Code.

In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313; and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, this Court refused to uphold otherwise unreasonable criminal investigative searches merely because commercial rather than residential premises were the object of the police intrusions. Likewise, we see no justification for so relaxing Fourth Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises. As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.

As governmental regulation of business enterprise has mushroomed in recent years, the need for effective investigative techniques to achieve the aims of such regulation has been the subject of substantial comment and legislation. Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to enforce a variety of regulatory laws; thus, entry may permit inspection of the structure in which a business is housed, as in this case, or inspection of business products, or a perusal of financial books and records. This Court has not had occasion to consider the Fourth Amendment’s relation to this broad range of investigations. However, we have dealt with the Fourth Amendment issues raised by another common investigative technique, the administrative subpoena of corporate books and records. We find strong support in these subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises.

It is now settled that, when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to conduct all reasonable inspections of such documents which are contemplated by statute, but it must delimit the confines of a search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena. In addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.

It is these rather minimal limitations on administrative action which we think are constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial establishments. The agency’s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field. Given the analogous investigative functions performed by the administrative subpoena and the demand for entry, we find untenable the proposition that the subpoena, which has been termed a “constructive” search, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 202, is subject to Fourth Amendment limitations which do not apply to actual searches and inspections of commercial premises.

We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs can only be resolved, as many have been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. We hold only that the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment — that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure — is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant’s locked warehouse.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Clark,

with whom Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart join, dissenting.

Eight years ago my Brother Frankfurter wisely wrote in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959):

“Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few.” At 372.

Today the Court renders this municipal experience, which dates back to Colonial days, for naught by overruling Frank v. Maryland and by striking down hundreds of city ordinances throughout the country and jeopardizing thereby the health, welfare, and safety of literally millions of people.

But this is not all. It prostitutes the command of the Fourth Amendment that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” and sets up in the health and safety codes area inspection a newfangled “warrant” system that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards. It is regrettable that the Court wipes out such a long and widely accepted practice and creates in its place such enormous confusion in all of our towns and metropolitan cities in one fell swoop. I dissent.'

I.

I shall not treat in any detail the constitutional issue involved. For me it was settled in Frank v. Maryland, supra. I would adhere to that decision and the reasoning therein of my late Brother Frankfurter. Time has not shown any need for change. Indeed the opposite is true, as I shall show later. As I read it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee of individual privacy is, by its language, specifically qualified. It prohibits only those searches that are “unreasonable.” The majority seem to recognize this for they set up a new test for the long-recognized and enforced Fourth Amendment's “probable-cause” requirement for the issuance of warrants. They would permit the issuance of paper warrants, in area inspection programs, with probable cause based on area inspection standards as set out in municipal codes, and with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing magistrate. In my view, this degrades the Fourth Amendment.

II.

Moreover, history supports the Frank disposition. Over 150 years of city in rem inspections for health and safety purposes have continuously been enforced. In only one case during all that period have the courts denied municipalities this right. See District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 178 F. 2d 13 (1949), aff’d on other grounds, 339 U. S. 1 (1950). In addition to the two cases in this Court (Frank, supra, and Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263 (1960)), which have upheld the municipal action, not a single state high court has held against the validity of such ordinances. Indeed, since our Frank decision five of the States’ highest courts have found that reasonable inspections are constitutionally permissible and in fact imperative, for the protection of health, safety, and welfare of the millions who inhabit our cities and towns.

I submit that under the carefully circumscribed requirements of health and safety codes, as well as the facts and circumstances of these particular inspections, there is nothing unreasonable about the ones undertaken here. These inspections meet the Fourth Amendment’s test of reasonableness and are entirely consistent with the Amendment’s commands and our cases.

There is nothing here that suggests that the inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper purpose, or designed as a basis for a criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of any discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action affecting the appellant in either case. Indeed, Camara was admittedly violating the Code by living in quarters prohibited thereby; and See was operating a locked warehouse — a business establishment subject to inspection.

The majority say, however, that under the present system the occupant has no way of knowing the necessity for the inspection, the limits of the inspector’s power, or whether the inspector is himself authorized to perform the search. Each of the ordinances here is supported by findings as to the necessity for inspections of this type and San Francisco specifically bans the conduct in which appellant Camara is admittedly engaged. Furthermore, all of these doubts raised by the Court could be resolved very quickly. Indeed, the inspectors all have identification cards which they show the occupant and the latter could easily resolve the remaining questions by a call to the inspector’s superior or, upon demand, receive a written answer thereto. The record here shows these challenges could have been easily interposed. The inspectors called on several occasions, but still no such questions were raised. These cases, from the outset, were based on the Fourth Amendment, not on any of the circumstances surrounding the attempted inspection. To say, therefore, that the inspection is left to the discretion of the officer in the field is to reach a conclusion not authorized by this record or the ordinances involved here. The Court says the question is not whether the “inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant.” With due respect, inspections of this type have been made for over a century and a half without warrants and it is a little late to impose a death sentence on such procedures now. In most instances the officer could not secure a warrant — such as in See’s case — thereby insulating large and important segments of our cities from inspection for health and safety conditions. It is this situation — which is even recognized by the Court — that should give us pause.

III.

The great need for health and safety inspection is emphasized by the experience of San Francisco, a metropolitan area known for its cleanliness and safety ever since it suffered earthquake and fire back in 1906. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, over 16,000 dwelling structures were inspected, of which over 5,600 required some type of compliance action in order to meet code requirements. And in 1965-1966 over 62,000 apartments, hotels, and dwellings were inspected with similar results. During the same period the Public Works Department conducted over 52,000 building inspections, over 43,000 electrical ones and over 33,000 plumbing inspections. During the entire year 1965-1966 inspectors were refused entry on less than 10 occasions where the ordinance required the householder to so permit.

In Seattle, the site of No. 180, See v. City of Seattle, fire inspections of commercial and industrial buildings totaled over 85,000 in 1965. In Jacksonville, Florida, over 21,000 fire inspections were carried on in the same year, while in excess of 135,000 health inspections were conducted. In Portland, Oregon, out of 27,000 health and safety inspections over 4,500 violations of regulations were uncovered and the fire marshal in Portland found over 17,000 violations of the fire code in 1965 alone. In Boston over 56,000 code violations were uncovered in 1966 while in Baltimore a somewhat similar situation was reported.

In the larger metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, over 300,000 inspections (health and fire) revealed over 28,000 hazardous violations. In Chicago during the period November 1965 to December 1966, over 18,000 buildings were found to be rodent infested out of some 46,000 inspections. And in Cleveland the division of housing found over 42,000 violations of its code in 1965 ; its health inspectors found over 33,000 violations in commercial establishments alone and over 27,000 dwelling code infractions were reported in the same period. And in New York City the problem is even more acute. A grand jury in Brooklyn conducted a housing survey of 15 square blocks in three different areas and found over 12,000 hazardous violations of code restrictions in those areas alone. Prior to this test there were only 567 violations reported in the three areas. The pressing need for inspection is shown by the fact that some 12,000 additional violations were actually present at that very time.

An even more disastrous effect will be suffered in plumbing violations. These are not only more frequent but also the more dangerous to the community. Defective plumbing causes back siphonage of sewage and other household wastes. Chicago’s disastrous amoebic dysentery epidemic is an example. Over 100 deaths resulted. Fire code violations also often cause many conflagrations. Indeed, if the fire inspection attempted in District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U. S. 1 (1950), had been permitted a two-year-old child’s death resulting from a fire that gutted the home involved there on August 6, 1949, might well have been prevented.

Inspections also play a vital role in urban redevelopment and slum clearance. Statistics indicate that slums constitute 20% of the residential area of the average American city, still they produce 35% of the fires, 45% of the major crimes, and 50% of the disease. Today’s decision will play havoc with the many programs now designed to aid in the improvement of these areas. We should remember the admonition of Mr. Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32 (1954):

“Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden.”

IV.

The majority propose two answers to this admittedly pressing problem of need for constant inspection of premises for fire, health, and safety infractions of municipal codes. First, they say that there will be few refusals of entry to inspect. Unlike the attitude of householders as to codes requiring entry for inspection, we have few empirical statistics on attitudes where consent must be obtained. It is true that in the required entry-to-inspect situations most occupants welcome the periodic visits of municipal inspectors. In my view this will not be true when consent is necessary. The City of Portland, Oregon, has a voluntary home inspection program. The 1966 record shows that out of 16,171 calls where the occupant was at home, entry was refused in 2,540 cases — approximately one out of six. This is a large percentage and would place an intolerable burden on the inspection service when required to secure warrants. What is more important is that out of the houses inspected 4,515 hazardous conditions were found! Hence, on the same percentage, there would be approximately 840 hazardous situations in the 2,540 in which inspection was refused in Portland.

Human nature being what it is, we must face up to the fact that thousands of inspections are going to be denied. The economics of the situation alone will force this result. Homeowners generally try to minimize maintenance costs and some landlords make needed repairs only when required to do so. Immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct possible defects are going to keep many a door closed to the inspector. It was said by way of dissent in Frank v. Maryland, supra, at 384, that “[o]ne rebel a year” is not too great a price to pay for the right to privacy. But when voluntary inspection is relied upon this “one rebel” is going to become a general rebellion. That there will be a significant increase in refusals is certain and, as time goes on, that trend may well become a frightening reality. It is submitted that voluntary compliance cannot be depended upon.

The Court then addresses itself to the propriety of warrantless area inspections. The basis of “probable cause” for area inspection warrants, the Court says, begins with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement; in determining whether an inspection is reasonable “the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.” It adds that there are “a number of persuasive factors” supporting “the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections.” It is interesting to note that the factors the Court relies upon are the identical ones my Brother Frankfurter gave for excusing warrants in Frank v. Maryland, supra. They are: long acceptance historically; the great public interest in health and safety; and the impersonal nature of the inspections — not for evidence of crime — but for the public welfare. Upon this reasoning, the Court concludes that probable cause exists “if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.” These standards will vary, it says, according to the code program and the condition of the area with reference thereto rather than the condition of a particular dwelling. The majority seem to hold that warrants may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry; I can find no such constitutional distinction or command. These boxcar warrants will be identical as to every dwelling in the area, save the street number itself. I daresay they will be printed up in pads of a thousand or more — with space for the street number to be inserted — and issued by magistrates in broadcast fashion as a matter of course.

I ask: Why go through such an exercise, such a pretense? As the same essentials are being followed under the present procedures, I ask: Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the search warrant? In my view this will not only destroy its integrity but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. It will be very costly to the city in paperwork incident to the issuance of the paper warrants, in loss of time of inspectors and waste of the time of magistrates and will result in more annoyance to the public. It will also be more burdensome to the occupant of the premises to be inspected. Under a search warrant the inspector can enter any time he chooses. Under the existing procedures he can enter only at reasonable times and invariably the convenience of the occupant is considered. I submit that the identical grounds for action elaborated today give more support — both legal and practical — to the present practice as approved in Frank v. Maryland, supra, than they do to this legalistic facade that the Court creates. In the Court’s anxiety to limit its own holding as to mass searches it hopes to divert attention from the fact that it destroys the health and safety codes as they apply to individual inspections of specific problems as contrasted to area ones. While the latter are important, the individual inspection is often more so; that was true in District of Columbia v. Little and it may well be in both Camara and See. Frankly, I cannot understand how the Court can authorize warrants in wholesale fashion in the case of an area inspection, but hold the hand of the inspector when a specific dwelling is hazardous to the health and safety of its neighbors.

       Conviction and sentence were pursuant to §8.01.140 of the Fire Code:
      “PeNALtt. Anyone violating or failing to comply with any provision of this Title or lawful order of the Fire Chief pursuant hereto shall upon conviction thereof be punishable by a fine not to exceed Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00), or imprisonment in the City Jail for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.”

       “Dwelling” is defined in the Code as “a building occupied exclusively for residential purposes and having not more than two (2) dwelling units.” Such dwellings are subject to the substantive provisions of the Code, but the Fire Chief’s right to enter such premises is limited to times “when he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of the provisions of this Title exists therein.” § 8.01.040. This provision also lacks a warrant procedure.

       See Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 548, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1314; H. R. Rep. No. 708, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (reporting the “factory inspection” amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 Stat. 476, 21 U. S. C. § 374); Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 Yale L. J. 1111; Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission, I & II, 28 Col. L. Rev. 708, 905; Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 425-430; Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57 Col. L. Rev. 676.

       In United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174, this Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not compel that consent be given to warrantless inspections of establishments covered by the Act. (As a result, the statute was subsequent^ amended, see n. 3, supra.) See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298.

       See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. See generally 1 Davis, Administrative Law §§3.05-3.06 (1958).

       We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only after access is refused; since surprise may often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will necessarily vary with the nature of the regulation involved and may differ from standards applicable to private homes.

        Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, relied upon by the Supreme Court of Washington, held only that government officials could demand access to business premises and, upon obtaining consent to search, could seize gasoline ration coupons issued by the Government and illegally possessed by the petitioner. Davis thus involved the reasonableness of a particular search of business premises but did not involve a search warrant issue.

      [This opinion applies also to No. 92, Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, ante, p. 523.]

         Under the probable-cause standard laid down by the Court, it appears to me that the issuance of warrants could more appropriately be the function of the agency involved than that of the magistrate. This would also relieve magistrates of an intolerable burden. It is therefore unfortunate that the Court fails to pass on the validity of the use of administrative warrants.

        DePass v. City of Spartanburg, 234 S. C. 198, 107 S. E. 2d 350 (1959); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S. W. 2d 948 (Mo. 1960); Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965), pet. for hearing in Cal. Sup. Ct. den. (Civ. No. 22128) Nov. 19, 1965; Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N. E. 2d 681, appeal docketed, Jan. 5, 1967, No. 1179, Misc., O. T. 1966; City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. 2d 475, 408 P. 2d 262 (1965).

       Indeed, appellant Camara was summoned to the office of the district attorney — but failed to appear — where he certainly could have raised these questions.

       It is interesting to note that in each of the cases here the authorities were making periodic area inspections when the refusals to allow entry occurred. Under the holding of the Court today, “probable cause” would therefore be present in each case and a “paper warrant” would issue as a matter of course. This but emphasizes the absurdity of the holding.


author: Mb. Justice White Mr. Justice Black,

text:
    DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD CO. v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al.
    No. 794.
    Argued April 19, 1967.
    Decided June 5, 1967.

      Martin M. Lucente argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ernest Porter, Kenneth D. Barrows and George L. Saunders, Jr.

      James L. Highsaw, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Edward J. Hickey, Jr.

      Frcmcis M. Shea, Richard T. Conway, Ralph J. Moore, Jr., James R. Wolfe and Charles I. Hopkins, Jr., filed a brief for the National Railway Labor Conference, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.

      Frederick Bemays Wiener filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
   Mb. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question here concerns the proper venue for a suit against a labor union, an unincorporated association, under 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), which at the time this action was brought read as follows: “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.”

In December 1959 and January 1960, the National Railroad Adjustment Board issued monetary awards in favor of certain members of respondent union on their claims for breach of collective bargaining contracts between the union and petitioner, the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. The railroad refused to honor the awards, the union struck to enforce them and the strike was permanently enjoined by the District Court. 185 F. Supp. 369, aff’d, 290 F. 2d 266, cert, denied, 366 U. S. 966. The railroad then sued the union for damages in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, also joining as defendants R. E. Carroll, chairman of the union’s General Grievance Committee on the property of petitioner, and the chairmen of various local lodges of the union. The complaint alleged that the defendants had breached their duties under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The District Court overruled the union’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, held the strike illegal because the union had failed to exhaust its statutory remedies to enforce the Adjustment Board awards, and awarded damages based on the railroad’s loss of traffic caused by the illegal strike. The judgment ran against both the union and Carroll, the case against the other defendants being dismissed for failure of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the union could be sued under § 1391 (b) only in the district of its residence and that its residence was not in Colorado. Because of the seeming conflict with Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307 F. 2d 21, we granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 1000. We reverse.

Section 1391 (b) is the general venue statute governing transitory causes of action in the federal courts where jurisdiction does not depend wholly on diversity of citizenship. Following its amendment in 1966, 80 Stat. 1111, the section permits suit either in the district where all of the defendants reside or in the district where the claim arose. At the time this suit was brought, however, venue lay only at the defendant’s residence, as had been the case since 1887. 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by 25 Stat. 433 (1888). Thus for almost 80 years proper venue in federal-question cases was limited to the district of the defendant’s residence, whether the defendant was an individual, a corporation, or an unincorporated association such as this respondent. During all of this time, down to and including the 1966 amendment, Congress has not expressly defined the residence of an unincorporated association for purposes of the general venue statute. The same was true with respect to corporations until 1948 when Congress directed that a corporation could be sued in the judicial district “in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.” 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c). Congress has maintained its silence, however, with respect to the residence of the unincorporated association. The resolution of that issue, as was true for the corporation prior to 1948, has been left to the courts. The issue is now here for the first time.

Of course, venue for a suit against an unincorporated association becomes important only if the association is itself suable. At common law, such an association could be sued only in the names of its members and liability had to be enforced against each member. This principle was rejected in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, where this Court, recognizing the growth and pervasive influence of labor organizations and noting that the suability of trade unions “is of primary importance in the working out of justice and in protecting individuals and society . . . ,” 259 U. S., at 390, held that such organizations were suable in the federal courts and that funds accumulated by them were subject to execution in suits for torts committed during strikes. The Coronado holding is now reflected in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17 (b).

The Coronado case dealt with capacity to be sued, not with venue, but it did legitimate suing the unincorporated association as an entity. Although that entity has no citizenship independent of its members for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145, a case relied upon by the Court of Appeals here, we think that the question of the proper venue for such a defendant, like the question of capacity, should be determined by looking to the residence of the association itself rather than that of its individual members. Otherwise, § 1391 (b) would seem to require either holding the association not suable at all where its members are residents of different States, or holding that the association “resides” in any State in which any of its members resides. The first alternative seems wholly at odds with Coronado and in addition removes federal-question litigation from the federal courts unnecessarily; the second is patently unfair to the association when it is remembered that venue is primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses. H. R. Rep. No. 1893, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. Of course, having concluded that the unincorporated association should be viewed as an entity for purposes of residence under § 1391 (b), that residence must still be ascertained, an inquiry requiring examination of congressional intent and the interests reflected in Coronado and in principles underlying venue limitations.

In Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F. 2d 408, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of what district an unincorporated association may be said to inhabit under the special venue statute governing patent suits, then 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1940 ed.), now 28 U. S. C. § 1400. That court thought the association should be treated like a corporation. Under the decisions of this Court, corporations had a single residence for venue purposes, the State of their incorporation. Likewise, the Sperry court thought the unincorporated association should be considered as having a single residence, in its case its principal place of business. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, had already determined, however, that corporations, while having only one residence, nevertheless consented to be sued in federal diversity suits where they were licensed to do business. And Neirbo had much to do with producing the 1948 congressional definition of corporate residence as including not only the State of incorporation but wherever the corporation is licensed to do business or is doing business.

It can be argued, as respondent does, that had the 1948 Congress intended the expanded definition of corporate residence to apply to labor unions and other unincorporated associations, it would have said so. But even accepting this, the question of what the association’s residence is for venue purposes remains unanswered. Saying that Congress did not intend to “change” the venue law with respect to unincorporated associations assumes a settled meaning to the prior law. This was not the ease. There was no settled construction of the law in the courts in 1948, and there is none yet. Nor was there anything to indicate that Congress had considered a labor union’s residence to be in only one place or had ever intended a limited view of residence with respect to unincorporated associations. Rather than accepting respondent’s position, we view the action of Congress in 1948 as simply correcting an unacceptably narrow definition of corporate residence which had been adopted by the courts, while maintaining its silence with respect to the unincorporated association. And if it is assumed that Congress was aware of Sperry at all, it is surely reasonable to think that Congress anticipated that the approach of that case, analogizing incorporated and unincorporated entities, would continue to be followed by the courts so that if corporate residence were broadly defined by the Congress, the courts would similarly construe the concept of residence of the unincorporated association. This was the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, supra.

We think it most nearly approximates the intent of Congress to recognize the reality of the multi-state, unincorporated association such as a labor union and to permit suit against that entity, like the analogous corporate entity, wherever it is “doing business.” Congress has itself recognized as much in a special venue statute, § 301 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (c), which provides that actions against labor unions governed by the Labor Management Relations Act may be brought in any district where the union maintains its principal office or in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members. That statute was enacted but a year before the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, and while it does not mention residence, it is a considerable indication that Congress had no desire, then or at any previous time, to construe “residence” as used in the general venue provision so as to confine suits against a labor union to the district where its principal office is located. Moreover, from the standpoint of convenience to parties and witnesses, there would be little merit in holding that suits against unions covered by the National Labor Relations Act may be brought anywhere the responsible representatives of the union take concrete action and yet hold that suits for similar conduct against unions subject to a parallel federal labor statute, the Railway Labor Act, may be brought only where the union’s principal office is located. Nor need we here be concerned, as in Bouligny, with possible effects on the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under these circumstances, for this Court to create such a distinction without some positive lead from Congress and in the face of sound policy considerations to the contrary would be unjustified.

We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly applied § 1391 (b) as it read when this suit was brought. But even if we instead agreed with the Court of Appeals on this question, the case must be considered in light of the present form of that section, that is, as amended by the Act of November 2, 1966, which provides for venue not only at the place of a defendant’s residence but also in the district where the claim arose. This amendment does not change the substantive law applicable to this lawsuit. It is wholly procedural. Absent some contrary indications by the Congress and absent any procedural prejudice to either party, the 1966 amendment to § 1391 is applicable to this suit. See United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602; Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55; American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 201; Pruess v. Udall, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 359 F. 2d 615. As this Court said in applying 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) to pending actions, “No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.” Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S¡, at 71. And in any event, if the decision below were affirmed, the petitioner could reinstitute the same action in the same District Court and seek the benefits of the current version of § 1391, absent the barrier of any applicable statute of limitations. We do not, of course, intimate any views as to whether this claim “arose” in the District of Colorado. That would be an issue for the District Court should it now be determined, in light of this opinion, that respondent was not doing business in Colorado when this suit was instituted.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Black,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Fortas join, dissenting.

This suit for damages caused by an illegal strike was brought by the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and certain of its individual members in the United States District Court for Colorado where the Brotherhood’s local lodges went on strike. The Brotherhood, an unincorporated association with its headquarters and principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The District Court denied this motion, and after a trial without a jury, gave the railroad a $37,988 judgment against the union. The Court of Appeals reversed. 367 F. 2d 137. It held that the applicable venue statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), gave venue only to the district court for the district where the union’s principal place of business is located. I would affirm this holding.

In holding venue improper as to the union, the Court of Appeals rejected the holding of the Second Circuit in Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307 F. 2d 21, cert. denied, 372 U. S. 954, that a union may be sued under § 1391 (b) in any district where it is doing business. The Second Circuit in Rutland recognized that prior to the Judicial Code of 1948, under the predecessor of § 1391 (b), most courts had held that an unincorporated association is suable only at its principal place of business and that the only express change made in pre-existing general venue law by the 1948 Code was the expansion of corporate venue from the place of incorporation to the place of doing business, § 1391 (c). Nevertheless, the court reasoned that there are sound policies for treating unincorporated associations like corporations and that, though the language of § 1391 (c) expressly applies to corporations and not to unincorporated associations, Congress implicitly intended for the expanded concepts of corporate residence under § 1391 (c) to be applied in determining the residence of an unincorporated association under § 1391 (b).

For myself I cannot draw any such inference from the 1948 amendments to the general venue statute. Sections 1391 (b) and (c) were part of a general Code revision designed comprehensively to cover the rules of procedure, including venue, and there is no reference whatever in these sections or their legislative history, so far as I can determine, that would permit us to infer that Congress intended that unincorporated associations be treated as corporations for venue purposes, thus changing the judicially established rule that unincorporated associations are suable only at their principal place of business. Though this Court recognizes that “Congress has maintained its silence . . . with respect to the residence of the unincorporated association,” it approves the Rutland holding because “sound policy considerations” indicate it “most nearly approximates the intent of Congress.” In reaching this result, the Court adopts the Rutkmd reasoning that Congress in 1948 must have approved of assimilating for venue purposes the treatment of unincorporated associations to that of corporations, because such a process of assimilation had been advocated by Judge Learned Hand in Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F. 2d 408, cert. denied, 319 U. S. 744. The narrow issue dealt with in Sperry was where, under the special venue provisions for a patent infringement suit, is an unincorporated association deemed to be an “inhabitant.” The Sperry court first held that, since an unincorporated association can be sued in its own name to enforce a federal right, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, and since it can be served with process under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17 (b), it should, for venue purposes, be treated as a single individual, not an aggregate of individuals. The Sperry court then held that for purposes of the special patent venue provision an unincorporated association is an “inhabitant” of the district where its principal place of business is located — precisely what the Court of Appeals held here as to § 1391 (b). In reaching this result, Judge Hand advanced legislative policy reasons, similar to those advanced by the Court here today, for treating an unincorporated association like a corporation, then deemed to be an inhabitant only of its State of incorporation and of the district within that State where its principal place of business was located. It is Judge Hand’s process of reasoning, not his holding, that the Court uses in assimilating the treatment of unincorporated associations under § 1391 (b) to the treatment of corporations under § 1391 (c).

I find many objections to doing what the Court does here. First, even assuming that in enacting § 1391 Congress was aware of the Sperry decision and thought it applicable to general, as distinguished from patent, venue rules (an assumption I think completely unfounded), it is doubtful that Congress, without saying so, intended to reject the holding of that case — that an unincorporated association is suable at its principal place of business — but at the same time adopt its reasoning — dicta to the effect that an unincorporated association should be treated like a corporation. Second, the only indication I can find of what Congress intended in 1948 as to unincorporated associations comes from Professor Moore, who participated in drafting the Code and who in 1949 wrote:

“Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads took the position that an unincorporated association is an ‘inhabitant,’ i. e., resident, of the district where it has its principal place of business. And this doctrine has been applied to a partnership .... The Code has changed none of these doctrines.”

Third, Congress in 1948 was clearly aware of the venue problems involved in suing an unincorporated association. Just the year before, in 1947, it had expressly considered these problems in relation to suits against labor unions to enforce collective bargaining agreements and in § 301 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (c), explicitly provided for venue in such suits “(1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.” That action is wholly consistent with the idea that Congress’ total failure in 1948 to provide a similar venue rule applicable to other kinds of suits against a union was neither inadvertent nor meant to be cured by judicial implication. Whether there is “little” or much “merit” in holding that venue of a union subject to the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, is different from the venue of a union under the express venue provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, is a question for Congress, not this Court. Finally, since 1948 the lower courts have been completely divided on the question of whether an unincorporated association can be sued at a place other than its principal place of business. In the light of all these things, I cannot impute to Congress an unarticulated intent to make an unincorporated association’s venue precisely the same as that of a corporation.

Neither the language and history of the general venue statute nor any prior decision of this Court throws any light on the question presented here. In the final analysis it is simply an important question of public policy. Reasons can logically be advanced for expanding the venue of unincorporated associations to include districts where they engage in business, but just as strong reasons can be advanced for not doing so. Though venue, relating to the convenience of the litigants, is quite different from jurisdiction, relating to the power of a court to adjudicate, Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 167-168, and though Congress may have more constitutional leeway to deal with venue than with jurisdiction, Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145, venue rules nevertheless pose policy considerations which are and should be weighed by Congress and not by this Court. As we said in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340: “The requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a ‘liberal’ construction.” I think the Court oversteps its boundaries in doing that which Congress did not choose to do in expanding the venue provisions with reference to corporations. I would leave the law of venue as it is until Congress decides its own policy.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       The Court of Appeals also reversed the damage. award against respondent Carroll, concluding that Carroll was not responsible for the strike in question. We do not disturb this factual determination of the Court of Appeals. Carroll’s residence is admittedly within the District of Colorado.

       Other lower court cases are divided on the question whether an unincorporated association can be sued at a place other than its principal place of business. Cases restricting venue to the association’s principal place of business include Brotherhood of Locomotive

        Firemen v. Graham, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 69, n. 2, 175 F. 2d 802, 804, n. 2, rev’d on other grounds, 338 U. S. 232; McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875; Salvant v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 83 F. Supp. 391, 396; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 92 F. Supp. 841, aff’d without discussion, 194 F. 2d 770; Chenco v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637-638; cf. Hadden v. Small, 145 F. Supp. 387 (partnership). Cases holding that unincorporated associations may be sued where they do business: Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922; Eastern Motor Express v. Espen-shade, 138 F. Supp. 426, 432; American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 169 F. Supp. 777, 781-783; R & E Dental Supply Co. v. Ritter Co., 185 F. Supp. 812; cf. Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634.

       28 U. S. C. §1391 (b):
      “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.”

       36 Stat. 1101, § 51, 28 U. S. C. § 112 (1940 ed.), provided that “no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person . . . in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant . . .

       28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c):
      “A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”

       36 Stat. 1100, §48, 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1940 ed.), provided that suits for patent infringement must be brought “in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant . . . shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of business.”

       None of the parties here have suggested, that an unincorporated association’s residence for venue purposes depends on the residence of each individual member, and I agree with the Court’s holding that an unincorporated association like a union is a single entity with a residence. The only problem here is to locate that residence.

         After Sperry the lower courts divided on whether its holding should be extended to the pre-1948 general venue provision (see n. 3, supra). Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 175 F. 2d 802, rev’d on other grounds, 338 U. S. 232, and Griffin v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552, 555, with Thermoid Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 70 F. Supp. 228, 233-234.

       Moore, Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code 193 (1949). Now, however, for legislative policy reasons such as the protection from abuse contained in the transfer provision of 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) and the multi-state nature of unincorporated associations’ activities, Professor Moore believes the position taken in Rutland “desirable.” 1 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.142 [5.-4], at 1508. See also Comment, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 130 (1956); Note, 39 St. John’s L. Rev. 353, 358-360 (1965); Note, 13 Okla. L. Rev. 206 (1960); 45 Geo. L. Rev. 132 (1956). But see Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 945, 949-950 (1955); Comment, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 708 (1956).

       H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 108-109 (1947); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-18 (1947).

       Cases holding an unincorporated association may be sued only at its principal place of business: Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, supra, at 69, n. 2, 175 F. 2d, at 804; McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875; Salvant v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 83 F. Supp. 391, 396; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 92 F. Supp. 841, 842, aff’d without discussion, 194 F. 2d 770; Cherico v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637-638; cf. Hadden v. Small, 145 F. Supp. 387 (partnership). Cases holding that an unincorporated association may be sued where it does business: Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922; Eastern Motor Express v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp. 426, 432; American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 169 F. Supp. 777, 781-783; R & E Dental Supply Co. v. Ritter Co., 185 F. Supp. 812; cf. Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634.

       Since I agree with the Court that the 1966 amendment of § 1391 (b) should apply to pending cases such as this one, I would not have filed this dissent had the Court remanded this case solely for a determination of the propriety of venue under the 1966 amendment.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    ELLIOTT v. OREGON.
    No. 1144,
    Misc.
    Decided June 5, 1967.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Oregon for further consideration in light of Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    CLARK v. ALABAMA.
    No. 1579,
    Misc.
    Decided June 5, 1967.
    Petitioner pro se.

      MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, John G. Bookout, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Robert F. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ, of certiorari, certiorari is denied.


text:
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. LAVOIE.
    No. 513.
    Decided June 5, 1967.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for petitioner.
   Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is vacated. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, ante, p. 118. The case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in order that that court may pass upon the issues in this case not covered by its prior opinion.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 1159.
    Decided June 5, 1967.

      Dickson R. Loos for appellants.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane and Leonard S. Goodman for the United States et al. Harry B. LaTourette and Robert H. Stahlheber for rail carrier appellees.
   Per Curiam.

The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    GILLS v. CALIFORNIA.
    No. 1043,
    Misc.
    Decided June 5, 1967.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, and Edsel W. Haws and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District, for further consideration in light of Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18.


text:
    CAMODEO v. UNITED STATES.
    No. 1073,
    Misc.
    Decided June 5, 1967.
    Petitioner pro se.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glazer for the United States.
   Per Curiam.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738.

Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    May 15, 1967.
    No. -.
    Colacasides v. Michigan.

      Joseph W. Louisell and Ivan E. Ranis for applicant. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, for the State of Michigan, in opposition.
   Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 1169.
    Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. Lisi et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 25.
    United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. et al.

      Harold D. Burgess, Robert C. Keck and James G. Hiering for Arnold, Schwinn & Co., and Earl E. Pollock for Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association in opposition to the motion.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. (Probable jurisdiction noted, 382 U. S. 936.) Motion of O. M. Scott & Sons Co. for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, denied. Thomas A. Rothwell on the motion.


text:
    No. 1521,
    Misc.
    Thomas v. Supreme Court of California et al.
    Petitioner pro se. Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Norman H. Kokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 31,
    Original.
    Utah v. United States.

      Phil L. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, on the motion. Solicitor General Marshall for the United States.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted and the United States allowed sixty days to answer.


text:
    No. 491.
    Board of Supervisors of Suffolk County et al. v. Bianchi et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. (Probable jurisdiction noted, 385 U. S. 966.) Motion of Arthur McComb for leave to file brief, as amicus curiae, denied.


text:
    No. 1342.
    Federal Power Commission v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.

      Solicitor General Marshall for petitioner on the motion. Briefs in opposition to the motion were filed by Robert E. May and Louis Flax for Sun Oil Co., and Bruce R. Merrill, Joseph C. Johnson and Thomas H. Burton for Continental Oil Co., Cecil N. Cook for Midhurst Oil Corp., Murray Christian and H. W. Varner for Superior Oil Co., and Paul W. Hicks, Robert W. Henderson and Donald K. Young for Hunt Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite proceedings denied at this time insofar as it requests that responses to petition of the Federal Power Commission for writ of certiorari and to the other petitions for writs of certiorari dealing with the same proceeding be filed by May 20, 1967, whether or not such responses are, under the Rules of this Court, due by that date.


text:
    No. 1602,
    No. 1617,
    No. 1625,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Baker v. Georgia; Humphrey v. Field, California Mens Colony Superintendent; and Sandefur v. Kropp, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 1623,
    Misc.
    Bryans v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1631,
    Misc.
    Dickerson v. Kropp, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1543,
    No. 1603,
    Misc.
    Misc.
    Garrison v. United States; and Wiltsie v. Wilson, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 1109.
    No. 1155.
    Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas; and United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas.

      Grover Hartt, Jr., and Edwin Tobolowsky for appellant in No. 1109. Paul Carrington and Dan McElroy for appellant in No. 1155. N. Alex Bickley and Ted P. Mac-Master for appellee in both cases.
   Appeals from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases are consolidated and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument.

Reported below: 402 S. W. 2d 770.


text:
    No. 1157.
    Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.

      William H. Henderson and W. Glenn Harmon for petitioner. Charles E. Beardsley and Seth M. Hufstedler for respondent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1115.
    Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Association of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Sanders, Nathan Lewin, Alan S. Rosenthal, Robert V. Zener and Charles Donahue, Edward D. Friedman and James R. Beaird for petitioner. Albert K. Plone for respondent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1117.
    Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Local Union No. 125, Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL-CIO.

      Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Sanders, Nathan Lewin, Alan S. Rosenthal, Robert V. Zener and Charles Donahue for petitioner. Mortimer Riemer for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument immediately following No. 1115.


text:
    No. 956,
    Misc.
    Smith v. Illinois.

      Gerald W. Getty, Marshall J. Hartman and James J. Doherty for petitioner. William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, for respondent.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case transferred to appellate docket.


text:
    No. 891.
    Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. et al. v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers Local Union No. 701 et al.

      James C. Dezendorf for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for the United States, as amicus curiae, in opposition.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 768.
    Sullivan et ux. v. United States.

      Edgar Shook for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall and Assistant Attorney General Rogovin for the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 989.
    Law Motor Freight, Inc., et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al.

      Bryce Rea, Jr., and Thomas M. Knebel for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Joseph B. Goldman, O. D. Ozment, Warren L. Sharfman and Robert L. Toomey for Civil Aeronautics Board, and George C. Neal and Brian C. Elmer for Emery Air Freight Corp., respondents.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1102.
    Hahn et ux. v. Bihlmire.

      George Stephen Leonard for petitioners. Irvin B. Charne for respondent.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1206.
    305 East 43d Street Corp. v. Karlson.

      Edmund F. Lamb for petitioner. Stuart M. Speiser for respondent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1160.
    National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc., et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al.

      Bryce Rea, Jr., Thomas M. Knebel and Ronald R. Pentecost for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Joseph B. Goldman, O. D. Ozment, Warren L. Sharfman and Robert L. Toomey for Civil Aeronautics Board, and George C. Neal and Brian C. Elmer for Emery Air Freight Corp., respondents.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1104.
    Swindlehurst v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. et al.

      H. Donald Bruce for petitioner. Fred Roland Allaben for American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., and Stephen T. Roumell for Sales, respondents.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1180.
    Anderson et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

      Oeorge D. Massar for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin and Robert N. Anderson for respondent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1190.
    Nuccio et al. v. United States.

      Jerome Lewis for petitioners. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1196.
    Datlof v. United States.

      Robert M. Taylor for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Acting Assistant Attorney General Pugh and Robert H. Solomon for the United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1204.
    Sherman v. United States.

      Seymour Ranter for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1200.
    McFarland v. United States.

      Maurice Edelbaum for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1197.
    Bryant-Buckner Associates, Inc. v. Danville Tobacco Association et al.

      Frederick Bernays Wiener for petitioner. Edwin B. Meade for respondent Danville Tobacco Association, and Earle Garrett, Jr., Allan Garrett, Earle Garrett III and G. Kenneth Miller for respondent Producers Tobacco Co., Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.