text:
    No. 6825.
    No. 6827.
    Fauls v. United States; and Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 437 F. 2d 1318.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 6843.
    Ferguson v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6844.
    Ferree v. Frye, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6845.
    Ebbs v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6849.
    Phillips v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6858.
    Gill v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6859.
    Powers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6861.
    Anderson v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6863.
    Hoy v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6865.
    Burke v. Erickson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6866.
    Simpson v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6869.
    Smith v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6897.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1468.
    Scott et al. v. Texas.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1575.
    More v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6794.
    Grijalva v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6809.
    Austin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1474.
    Marchese v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1546.
    Hohensee et al. v. Scientific Living, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1550.
    Silk v. Kleppe, Administrator of Small Business Administration, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1557.
    LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent v. Burns.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1526.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Auburndale Freezer Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 962.
    No. 1348.
    No. 1352.
    No. 1368.
    No. 1400.
    No. 6182.
    No. 6459.
    No. 6665.
    No. 6671.
    No. 6700.
    Kostamo v. Northern City National Bank, Administrator, et al., Littlepage v. United States, Consolidated Carriers Corp. v. United States et al., Foreman v. City of Bellefontaine et al., Drobnick et al. (First National Bank of Waukegan, Trustee) v. Foss Park District, Bustos v. California, Chacon v. Nelson, Warden, Laughlin v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Morales v. Cady, Warden, Bryant v. United States,
   ante, p. 902;

ante, p. 915;

ante, p. 901;

ante, p. 901;

ante, p. 907;

ante, p. 910;

ante, p. 941;

ante, p. 904;

ante, p. 931; and

ante, p. 932. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1021.
    Toliver v. United States,
   401 U. S. 913. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


author: Me. Chief Justice Burger Mr. Justice Harlan

text:
    GORDON et al. v. LANCE et al.
    No. 96.
    Argued January 18, 1971
    Decided June 7, 1971
    Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Harlan, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 8. Brennan and Marshall, JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 8.

      George M. Scott argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.

      Charles C. Wise, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. .With him on the brief was J. Henry Francis, Jr.

      Briefs. of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and Philip H. Austin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington et al.; by Thomas M. O’Connor for the City and County of San Francisco; by Francis R. Kirkham and Francis N. Marshall for the California Taxpayers’ Association; and by George E. Svoboda for •Hayes Smith.
    Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by James R. Ellis for Seattle School District No. 1; by Stephen J. Poliak, William H. Dempsey, Jr., Ralph J. Moore, Jr., and Robert H. Chanin for the National Education Association et al.; by August W. Steinhilber and Robert G. Dixon, Jr., for the National School Boards Association; by David R. Hardy and Robert E. Northrup for the Missouri State Teachers Association; by William B. Beebe, Hershél Shanks, and Allan I. Mendelsohn for the American Association of School Administrators et al.; by Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Paul W. Preisler for the Committee for the Equal Weighting of Votes.
    ■ Briefs of amici curiae were filed by John W. Witt and Joseph Kase, Jr., for the City of San Diego et al., and by Chas. Clafiin Allen, pro se.

   Me. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review a challenge to a 60% vote requirement to incur public debt as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Constitution of West Virginia and certain West Virginia statutes provide that political subdivisions of the State may not incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond those established by the Constitution without the approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum election.

On April 29, 1968, the Board of Education of Roane County, West Virginia, submitted to the voters of Roane County a proposal calling for the issuance of general obligation bonds in the amount of $1,830,000 for the purpose of constructing new school buildings and improving existing educational facilities. At the same election, by separate ballot, the voters were asked to authorize the Board of Education to levy additional taxes to support current expenditures and capital improvements. Of the total votes cast, 51.55% favored the bond issues and 51.51% favored the tax levy. Having failed to obtain the requisite 60% affirmative vote, the proposals were declared defeated.

. Following the election, respondents appeared before the Board of Education on behalf of themselves and other persons who had voted in favor of the proposals and demanded that the Board authorize the bonds and the additional taxes. -The Board- refused.'

Respondents then brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 60% requirements were unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. In their complaint they alleged that the Roane County^ schools had been basically unimproved since 1946 and fell far below the state average, both in classroom size and facilities. They further alleged that four similar proposals had been previously defeated, although each had received majorities of affirmative votes ranging from 52.51% to 55.84%. The West Virginia trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state constitutional and. statutory 60% requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 153 W. Va. 559, 170 S. E. 2d 783 (1969). We granted certiorari, 397 U. S. 1020 (1970), and for the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

The eourt below relied heavily on two of our holdings dealing with limitations on the right to vote and dilution of voting power. The first was Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963), which held that Georgia’s county-unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the votes of primary electors in one county were accorded less weight than the votes of electors in other counties.' The second was Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), in which we held impermissible the limitation to “property taxpayers”' of the right to vote in a revenue bond referendum. From these cases the state court' concluded that West Virginia’s requirement was constitutionally defective, because the votes of those who favored the issuance of the bonds had a proportionately smaller impact on the outcome of the election than the votes of those who opposed issuance of the bonds.

We conclude that the West Virginia court’s reliance on the Gray and Cipriano cases was misplaced. The defect this Court found in those cases lay in the denial or dilution of voting power because of group characteristics — geographic location and property ownership — that bore no valid relation to the interest of those groups in the subject matter of the election; moreover, the dilution or denial was imposed irrespective of how members of those groups actually voted.

. Thus in Gray, supra, at 381 n. 12, we held that the county-unit system would have been defective even if unit votes were allocated strictly in proportion to population. We noted that if a candidate received 60% of the votes cast in a particular county he would receive that county’s entire unit vote, the 40% east for the other candidates being discarded. The defect, however, continued to be geographic discrimination. Votes for the losing candidates were discarded solely because of the county where the votes were cast. Indeed, votes for the winning candidate in a county were likewise devalued, because all marginal votes for him would be discarded and would have no impact on the statewide total.

Cipriano was no more than a reassertion of the principle, consistently recognized, that an individual may not be denied access to the ballot because of some extraneous condition, such as race, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960); wealth, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); tax status, e. g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U. S. 621 (1969) ; or military status, e. g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965).

Unlike the restrictions in our previous cases, the West Virginia Constitution singles out no “discrete and insular minority” for special treatment. The three-fifths requirement applies equally to all bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers, or highways. We are not, therefore, presented with a case like Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), in which fair housing legislation alone was subject to an automatic referendum requirement.

The class singled out in Hunter was clear — “those-who would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations,” supra, at 391. In contrast we can discern no independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing. Consequently no sector of the population may be said to be “fenced out” from the franchise because of the way they will vote. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 94.

Although West Virginia has not denied any group access to the ballot, it has indeed made it more difficult for some kinds of governmental actions to be taken. Certainly any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority. • But there is nothing in the language, of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue. • On the contrary, while we have recognized that state officials are normally chosen by a vote of the majority of the electorate, we have found no constitutional barrier to the selection of a Governor by a state legislature, after no candidate received a majority of the popular vote. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231 (1966).

The Federal Constitution itself provides that a simple ■ majority vote is. insufficient on some issues; the provisions . on impeachment and ratification of treaties are but two examples. Moreover, the Bill of Rights removes entire areas of legislation from the. concept of majoritarian supremacy. The constitutions of. many States prohibit or severely limit the power of the legislature to levy new taxes or to create or increase bonded indebtedness, thereby insulating. entire areas from majority control. Whether these matters, of finance and taxation are to be considered as less “important” than matters of treaties, foreign policy, or impeachment of public officers is more properly left to the determination by the States and the people than to the courts operating under the broad mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. It must be remembered that in voting to issue bonds voters are committing, in part, the credit of infants and of generations yet unborn; and some restriction on such commitment is not an unreasonable demand. That the bond issue may have the desirable objective of providing better education for future generations goes to the wisdom of an indebtedness limitation: it does not alter the basic fact that the balancing of interests is one for the State to resolve.

Wisely or not, the people of the State of West Virginia have long since resolved to remove from a simple majority vote the choice on certain decisions as to what indebtedness may be incurred and . what taxes their children will bear.

We conclude that so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. We see no meaningful distinction between such absolute provisions on debt,. changeable only by constitutional amendment, and provisions that legislative decisions on the same issues require more than a majority vote in the legislature. On the contrary, these latter provisions may, in practice, be less burdensome than the amendment process. Moreover, the same considerations apply whén the ultimate power, rather than being delegated to the legislature, remains with the people, by way of a referendum. Indeed, we see no constitutional distinction between the 60% requirement in the present- case and a state requirement that a given issue be approved by a majority of all registered voters.' Cf. Clay v. Thornton, 253 S. C. 209, 169 S. E. 2d 617 (1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Turner v. Clay, 397 U. S. 39 (1970).

That West Virginia has adopted a rule of decision, applicable to all bond referenda, by which the strong consensus of three-fifths is required before indebtedness is authorized, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or any other provision of the Constitution.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan

concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, post, p. 165.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would affirm for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 153 W. Va. 559, 170 S. E. 2d 783 (1969).'

       While Cipriano involved.a denial of the vote, a percentage reduction of an individual’s voting power in proportion to the amount of property he owned would be similarly defective. See Stewart v. Parish School Board, 310 F. Supp. 1172 (ED La.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 884 (1970).

       E. g.,..Indiana Constitution, Art. 10, § 5; Ohio Constitution, Art. 8, § 3; Texas Constitution, Art. 3, § 49; Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 8, § 4.

       Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).

       Some 14 States require an amendment to be apbroved- by two sessions of the legislature, before submission to the people. West Virginia’s- Constitution, Art. 14, § 2, provides for approval by two-thirds of a single legislature and a majority of the voters.

       In practice, the latter requirement would be far more burdensome than a 60% requirement. There were 8,913 registered voters in Roane County in 1968, of whom 5,600 voted in the referendum at issue. If a majority of all eligible voters had been required, approval would have required the affirmative votes of over 79% of those voting. See'State of West Virginia, Official Returns of 1970 Primary Election (including the 1968 registration figures).

       We intimate no view on the constitutionality of a provision requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small group. Nor do we decide whether a State may, consistently with the Constitution, require extraordinary majorities for the election of public officers. ;


author: Mr. Justice Douglas

text:
    UTAH v. UNITED STATES
    No. 31,
    Orig.
    Argued April 26, 1971
    Decided June 7, 1971
    Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except MARSHALL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, argued for plaintiff in support of the Report of the Special Master. With him on the briefs were Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General, Robert B. Hansen, Deputy Attorney General, Paul E. Reimann, Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford L. Ashton and Edward W. Clyde, Special Assistant Attorneys General.

      Peter L. Strauss argued for the United States on exceptions to the Report of the Special Master. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa, Louis F. Claiborne, and .Martin Green.

   Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was initiated by Utah to resolve a dispute between it and the United States as to shorelands around the Great Salt Lake. Utah’s claim to the lands is premised on the navigability of the' lake at the date of statehood, viz., January 4, 1896. If indeed the lake were navigable at that time, the claim of Utah would override any claim of the United States, with the possible exception of a claim based on the doctrine of reliction, not now before us.

The operation of the “equal footing” principle has accorded newly admitted States the same property interests in submerged lands as was enjoyed by the Thirteen Original States as successors to the British Crown. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 222-223, 228-230. That means that Utah’s claim to the original bed of the Great Salt Lake — whether now submerged or exposed — ultimately rests on whether the lake was navigable (Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410, 416-417) at the time of Utah’s admission. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 26-28. It was to that issue that we directed the Special Master, Hon. J. Cullen Ganey, to address himself. See Utah v. United States, 394 U. S. 89. In the present report the Special Master found that at the time in question the Great Salt Lake was navigable. We approve that finding.

The question of navigability is a federal question. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563. Moreover, the fact that the Great Salt Lake is not part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed. United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 75; United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. The test of navigability of waters was stated in The Daniel Ball, supra, at 563:

“Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in' fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and. travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. . . .”

While that statement was addressed to the navigability of “rivers” it applies to all water courses. ' United States v. Oregon, supra, at 14.

The United States strongly contests the finding of the Special Master that the Great Salt Lake was navigable. Although the evidence is 'not extensive, we think it is sufficient .to sustain the findings. There were,- for example, nine boats used from time to time to haul cattle and' sheep from the mainland to one of the islands or from one of the islands to the mainland. The hauling apparently was done by the owners of the livestock, not by a carrier for the purpose of making money. Hence it is suggested that this was not the use of the lake as a navigable highway in the customary sense of the word. That is to say, the business of the boats was ranching and not carrying water-borne freight. We think that is an4 irrelevant detail. The lake was used as a highway and that is the gist of the federal test.

It is suggested that the carriage was also limited in the sense of serving only the few people who performed ranching operations along the' shores of the lake. But that again does not detract from the basic finding that the lake served as a highway and it .is that feature that distinguishes between navigability and non-navigability.

There was, in addition to the boats used by ranchers, one boat used by an outsider who carried Sheep to an island for the owners of the sheep. It is said that one sheep boat for hire does not make an artery for commerce; but one sheep boat for hire is in keeping with the theme of actual navigability of the waters of the lake in earlier years.

There was, in addition, a boat known as the City of Corinne which was launched in May 1871 for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight; but its life in that capacity apparently lasted less‘than a year. In 1872 it was converted into an excursion boat which apparently' plied the waters of the lake until 1881. There are other boats that hauled sheep to and from an island in the lake and also hauled ore, and salt, and cedar posts. Still another boat was used to carry salt from various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection.

The United States says the trade conducted by these various vessels was sporadic and their careers were short. It is true that most of the traffic which we have mentioned took place in the 1880's, while Utah became a State in 1896. Moreover, it is said that the level of the lake had so changed by 1896 that navigation was not practical. The Master’s Report effectively refutes that contention. It says that on January 4, 1896, the lake was 30.2 feet deep. He finds that on that date “the Lake was physically capable of being used in its ordinary condition as a highway for floating and affording passage to water craft in the manner over which trade and travel was or might be conducted in the customary modes of . travel on water at that time.” He found that the lake on January 4, 1896, “could have floated and -afforded passage to large boats, barges and similar craft currently in general use on inland navigable bodies of water in the United States.” He found that the areas of the lake that had a depth sufficient for navigation “were several miles wide, extending substantially through the length and width of the Lake.”

Most of the history of actual water transportation, to be sure, took place on the lake in the 1880’s, yet the findings of the Master are that the water conditions which obtained on January 4, 1896, still permitted navigation at that time.

In sum, it is clear that Utah is entitled to the decree for which it asks. The Special Master has submitted with his report a proposed decree which we attach as an Appendix to this opinion. We invite the parties to address themselves to that decree with-the view, of agreeing, if possible, upon the issues which have now been settled by this litigation.

So ordered.

Me. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

1. The United States of America, its departments and agencies, are enjoined, subject to any regulations which the Congress may impose in the interest of navigation or pollution control, from asserting against the State of Utah any claim of right, title and interest:

(a) to the bed of the Great Salt Lake lying below the meander line of Great Salt Lake as duly surveyed heretofore or in accordance with Section 1 of the Act of, June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192, with the exception of any lands within the Bear River Migratory Bird Refuge and the Weber B.asin federal reclamation project,

(b) to the natural resources and living organisms in ■ or beneath- the bed of the Great Salt Lake as delineated in (a) above, and

(c) to the natural resources and living organisms either within the waters of the Great Salt Lake, or extracted therefrom, lying below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, as delineated in (a) above, except brine and minerals in solution in the brine or precipitated dr ex- . tracted therefrom in whatever federal lands there may be below said meander line, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same, as set forth in Section 3 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192.

2. The State of Utah is not required to pay the United States, through the Secretary of the Interior, for the lands, including any minerals, lying below the meander .line of the Great Salt Lake, as delineated in 1 (a), above, of this decree.

3. The prayer of the United States of America in its Answer to the State of Utah’s Complaint that this Court “confirm, declare and establish that the United States is the owner of all right, title and interest in all the lands described in Section 2 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192, as amended by the Act of August 23, 1966, 80 Stat. 349, and that the State of Utah is without any right, title or interest in such lands, save for the right to have these lands conveyed to it by the United States, and to pay for them, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 3, 1966, as amended,” is denied.

Respectfully submitted,'

J. Cullen Ganet,

Senior Circuit Judge,

Special Master.


author:
Mr. Justice Harlan
      Me. Justice Blackmun,

text:
    COHEN v. CALIFORNIA
    No. 299.
    Argued February 22, 1971
    Decided June 7, 1971
    Harlan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BrenNan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined. BlackmuN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, J., joined, and in which White, J., joined in part, post, p. 27.

      Melville B. Nimmer argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Laurence R. Sperber.

      Michael T. Sauer argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Roger Arnebergh.

      Anthony G. Amsterdam filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California as amicus curiae urging reversal.
   Mr. Justice Harlan

This case may seem at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our bdoks, but the issue it presents is of no small constitutional significance.

Appellant Paul Robert Cohen was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of California Penal Code § 415 which prohibits “maliciously and willfully disturb [ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . ■. . by . . . offensive conduct . . . He was given 30 days’imprisonment. The facts upon which his conviction rests are detailed in the opinion of the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, as follows:

“On April 26, 1968, the defendant was observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse in the corridor outside of division 20 of the municipal court wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ which were plainly visible. There were women and children present in the corridor. The defendant was arrested. The defendant testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.
“The defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act. of violence. The defendant did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was there any evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest.” 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1969).

In affirming the conviction the Court of Appeal held that' “offensive conduct” means “behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace,” and that the State had,proved this element because, on the facts of this case, “[i]t was certainly reasonably foreseeable that .such conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a violent act against the person of the defendant or attempt to forceably remove his jacket.” 1 Cal. App. 3d, at 99-100, 81 Cal. Rptr., at 506. The California Supreme Court, declined review by á divided vote. We brought the case here, postponing the consideration of the question of our jurisdiction over this appeal to a hearing of the case on the merits. 399 U. S. 904. We now reverse. .

The question of our jurisdiction need not detain us long. Throughout the proceedings below, .Cohen consistently claimed that, as construed to apply to the facts of this case, the statute infringed his rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. That contention has been rejected by the highest California state court in which review could be had. Accordingly, we are fully satisfied that Cohen has properly invoked our jurisdiction by this appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) ; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921).

I

In order to lay hands on the precise issue which this case' involves, it is useful first to canvass various matters which this record does not present.

The conviction quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public. The only “conduct”, which the State sought to punish is the fact of communication. Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely upon “speech,” cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), not upon any separately identifiable conduct which allegedly was intended by Cohen- to be perceived by others as expressive of particular views but which, on its face, does not necessarily convey any r. ,„ssage and hence arguably could be regulated without effectively repressing Cohen’s ability to. express himself. Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). Further, the State certainly lacks power to' punish Cohen for the underlying content of the message the inscription. conveyed. At least so long as there is no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, Cohen could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957).

Appellant’s conviction, then, rests-squarely upon his exercise of the “freedom of speech” protected from arbitrary governmental interference by the Constitution and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message it conveys. This does not end the inquiry, of course, for the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses. In this vein, too, however, we think it important to note that several issues typically associated with such problems are not presented here.

In the first place, Cohen was tried under a statute applicable throughout the entire State. Any attempt to support this conviction on the ground that the statute seeks to preserve an appropriately decorous atmosphere in the courthouse where Cohen was arrested must fail in the absence of any language in the statute that would have put appellant on notice that certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech or conduct would nevertheless, under California law, not.be tolerated in certain places. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 236-237, and n. 11 (1963). Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966). No fair reading of the phrase “offensive conduct” can be said sufficiently to inform the ordinary person that distinctions between certain locations are thereby created.

In the second place, as it comes to us, this case cannot be said to fall within those relatively few categories of instances where prior decisions have established the power of government to deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a showing that such a form was employed. This is not, for example, an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States’ broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957). It cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen’s crudely defaced jacket.

This Court has also held that the States are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called “fighting words,” those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this' instance it was clearly not “directed to the person of the hearer.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309 (1940). No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult. Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of the State’s police power .to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction. Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949). There is, as. noted above, no showing that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that appellant intended .such a result.

Finally, in arguments before this Court much has been made of the claim that Cohen’s distasteful mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers, and that the State might therefore legitimately act as it did in order to protect the sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to appellant’s crude form of protest. Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. See, e. g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971). While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcotne views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue, e. g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970), we have at the'same time consistently stressed that “we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.” Id., at 738. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing if is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.

In this regard, persons confronted were in a quite different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. And, while it may be that one has a more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central Park, surely it is nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one’s own home. Cf. Keefe, supra. Given the subtlety and complexify of the factors involved, if Cohen’s "speech’’ was otherwise entitled to constitutional protection, we do not think the fact that some unwilling “listeners” in a public building may have been briefly exposed to if can serve to justify this breach of the peace conviction where, as here, there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid appellant’s conduct did in fact object to it, and where that portion of the statute upon which Cohen’s conviction rests evinces no concern, either on its face or ns construed by the California courts, with the special plight of the captive auditor, but, instead, indiscriminately sweeps within its prohibitions all “offensive conduct” that disturbs "any neighborhood or person.” Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, supra.

> — i

Against this background, the issue flushed by this caso stands out in bold relief. Tt is whether California can excise, a,s “offensive conduct,” one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory of the court below that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary.

The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 508 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial, numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. There may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of expression. The argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that to avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate that censorship themselves. Cf. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 550-551 (1965)!

Admittedly, it is not so obvious that the First and Fourteenth Amendments must be.taken to disable the States from punishing public utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic. We think, however, that examination and reflection will reveal the shortcomings of a contrary viewpoint.

At the outset, we cannot overemphasize that, in our judgment, most situations where the State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or more of the various established exceptions, discussed, above but not applicable here, tó the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression. Equally important to our conclusion is the constitutional backdrop against which our decision must be made. The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the . premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests. See Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375-377 (1927) (Brandéis, J., concurring).

To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated. That is why “[w] holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons,” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and why “so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability,” Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971).

Against this perception of the constitutional policies involved, we discern certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call for reversal of this conviction. First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.

Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable .of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as. well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, “[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize .public men and measures — and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.” Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 673-674 (1944).

Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the -facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social benefit that might result from running.the risk of opening the door to such grave results.

It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth. Amendments, ■ make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. Because that is the only 'arguably sustainable rationale for the conviqtion here at issue, the judgment below must be

Reversed.

Me. Justice Blackmun,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black join.

I dissent, and I do so for two reasons:

1. Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 555 (1965); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502 (1949). The California Court of Appeal appears so to have described it, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507, and I cannot characterize it otherwise. Further, the case appears to me to be well within the sphere of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), where Mr. Justice Murphy, a known champion of First Amendment freedoms, wrote for a unanimous- bench. As a consequence, this Court’s agonizing over First Amendment values seems misplaced and unnecessary.

2. I am not at all certain that the California Court of Appeal’s construction of § 415 is now the authoritative California construction. The Court of Appeal filed its opinion on October 22, 1969. The Supreme Court of California declined review by' a four-to-three vote on December 17. See 1 Cal. App. 3d, at 104. A month later, on January 27, 1970, the State Supreme Court in another case construed § 415, evidently for the first time. In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P. 2d 727. Chief Justice Traynor, who was among the dissenters to his court’s refusal to take Cohen’g. pase, wrote the majority opinion. He held that § 415 ‘ is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad” and further said:

“[TJhat part of Penal Code section 415 in question here makes punishable only wilful and malicious conduct that is violent and endangers public safety and order or that creates a clear and present danger that others will engage in violence of that nature.
. . [It] does not make criminal any nonviolent act unless the act incites or threatens to incite others to violence . . . 1 Cal. 3d, at 773-774, 463 P. 2d, at 731.

Cohen was cited in Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d, at 773, 463 P. 2d, at 730, but. I am not convinced that its description there and Cohen itself are completely consistent with the “clear and present danger” standard enunciated in Bushman. Inasmuch as this Court does not dismiss this case, it ought to be remanded to the California Court of Appeal, for reconsideration in the light of the subsequently rendered. decision by the State’s highest tribunal in Bushman.

Mr. Justice White concurs in Paragraph 2 of Mr. Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion.

       The statute provides in full:
      “Every person who maliciously, and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or threatening,‘-traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on the public streets of any unincorporated town, or upon the public highways in such unincorporated town, run any horse race, either for a wager or for amusement, or fire any gun or pistol in such unincorporated town, or use any vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction by any Court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for not more than ninety days, or by both fine and imprisonment, or either, at the discretion of the Court.”

       The suggestion has been made that, in light of the supervening opinion of the California Supreme Court in In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P. 2d 727 (1970), it is “not at all certain that the California Court of Appeal’s construction of § 415 is now the authoritative California construction.” Post, at 27 (Blackmun-, J., dissenting) . In the course of the Bushman opinion, Chief Justice Traynor stated:
      “[One] may . ... be guilty of disturbing-the peace through 'offensive’ conduct [within the meaning of § 415] if by his actions he wilfully and maliciously incites others to violence or engages in conduct likely to incite others to violence. (People v. Cohen (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 101, [81 Cal, Rptr. 503].)” 1 Cal. 3d at 773, 463 P. 2d, at 730.
      We perceive no difference of substance between the Bushman construction and that of the Court of Appeal, particularly in light of the Bushman court’s approving citation of Cohen.

       It is illuminating to note what transpired when Cohen- entered a courtroom in the building. ' He removed his jacket and stood with it folded over his arm. Meanwhile, a policeman sent the presiding judge a note suggesting that Cohen be held in contempt of court. The judge declined to do so and Cohen was arrested by the officer only after he emerged from the courtroom. App. 18-19.

       In fanl., oilier portions of (lie same, slalitle rio make some sueli distinctions. For example, the stain to also prohibits disturbing "I,ho peace or quiet. . . . by loud or unusual noise” and using "vulgar, profane, or indecent, language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boisterous manner.” See n. 1, supra. This second-quoted provision in particular serves to put the actor on much fairer notice as to what is prohibited. It- also buttresses our view that the, "offensive, conduct” portion, as construed and applied in this ease, cannot legitimately be justified in this Court as designed or intended to make, fine distinctions between differently situated recipients.

       The amicus urges, with some force, that this issue is not properly before us since the statute, as construed, punishes only conduct that might cause others to react violently. However, because the opinion below appears to erect a virtually irrebuttable presumption that use of this word will produce such results, the statute as thus construed appears to impose, in effect, a flat ban on the public utterance .of this word. With the case in this posture, it does not seem inappropriate to inquire whether any other rationale might properly support this result. While we think it clear, for the reasons expressed above, that no statute which merely proscribes “offensive conduct” and has been construed as broadly as this one was below can subsequently be justified in this Court as discriminating between conduct that occurs in different places or that offends only certain persons, it is not so unreasonable to seek to justify its full broad sweep on an alternate rationale such as this. Because it is not so patently clear that acceptance of the justification presently under consideration would render the statute overbroad or unconstitutionally vague, and because the answer to appellee’s argument seems quite clear, we do not pass on the contention that this claim is not presented on this record.