text:
    No. 1500.
    American Export Industries, Inc. v. Fluor Corp., Ltd.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 5003.
    Smith v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5005.
    Murphy v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5008.
    Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5021.
    Daut v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5562.
    Blassingame v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5853.
    Britt v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6185.
    Gaito v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6280.
    De La Rosa v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6427.
    McBride v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6445.
    Stevenson v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6521.
    Hoyel v. City of Jackson.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6535.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6613.
    Oliver v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6640.
    Wauford v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6646.
    Haggett v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6659.
    Sarkis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6711.
    Maggard v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6668.
    Rivera v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6682.
    Ardle v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6695.
    Rodgers v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6713.
    Jackson v. Dutton, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6714.
    Li v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6718.
    Davis v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6719.
    Black v. Russell, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6721.
    Farr v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6722.
    Crisp v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6723.
    McTyre v. Pearson.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6724.
    Bowen v. Kropp, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6726.
    Jewett v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6728.
    Corrado et ux. v. Providence Redevelopment Agency.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6737.
    Williams v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6729.
    Brown v. Peterson, Hospital Superintendent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6730.
    Lind v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6739.
    Peterson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6.
    Cox, Penitentiary Superintendent v. May.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94.
    United States v. Meadows.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 993.
    United States v. Liguori.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 17.
    Cox, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Pennington.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion for leave to dispense with printing respondent's brief granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 21.
    Koran v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 22.
    Koran v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 32.
    No. 33.
    Sullivan v. United States; and Teller v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 412 F. 2d 374.


text:
    No. 34.
    Marchese v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 38.
    Donohue v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 50.
    Koran v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 64.
    Provenzano et al. v. Follette, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 67.
    No. 68.
    DiPiazza v. United States; and Deming v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 415 F. 2d 99 and 111.


text:
    No. 70.
    Weiser v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 943.
    Wright et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 103.
    Roviaro v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 126.
    DeVore v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 369.
    Tiktin et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 496.
    DiLorenzo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 630.
    Birns v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 917.
    No. 6199.
    Jacobs v. United States; and Spieler v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 431 F. 2d 754.


text:
    No. 920.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1175.
    Kerr v. State Public Welfare Commission.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1195.
    No. 6414.
    Greene v. Maxwell, Judge; and Sosa v. Maxwell, Judge.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 234 So. 2d 690.


text:
    No. 5045.
    Gibson et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5070.
    Mallory v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5071.
    Daniels v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5088.
    Kuhn v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5102.
    Chatfield v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5555.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6075.
    Escobedo v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5217.
    Groze v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5820.
    Singleton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6648.
    Edwards v. Selective Service Local Board No. 111 et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 358.
    Hanon et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 409.
    Board of Education of Little Rock School District et al. v. Clark et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see 401 U. S. 971.]
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1496.
    Dill v. Greyhound Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 749.
    No. 891.
    Board of Public Instruction of Broward County, Florida, et al. v. Allen et al.; and Blanche Ely Parent Teachers Assn. et al. v. Board of Public Instruction of Broward County, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 432 F. 2d 362.


text:
    No. 6621.
    Theriault v. Blackwell, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 936.
    No. 6139.
    Dade County School Board et al. v. Pate et al.; and Corbett et al. v. Dade County School Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 430 F. 2d 1175.


text:
    No. 982.
    Eckels et al. v. Ross et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, ante, p. 1, and its companion cases.


text:
    No. 1272.
    Caldwell et al. v. Craighead et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1334.
    Silverman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1449.
    Ippolito v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1455.
    Balistrieri v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author:
Mr. Justice Black.
     Mr. Justice Douglas.

text:
    No. 5048.
    Meltzer et al. v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black.

On March 2, 1971, this Court decided Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, holding that Connecticut could not consistently with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses deny access to its divorce courts to indigents unable to pay relatively small filing and service of process fees. We now have eight other cases pending on appeal or on petition for writ of certiorari in which indigents were denied access to civil courts because of their poverty.

One case, Sloatman v. Gibbons, No. 5067, is distinguishable from Boddie only by the fact that Arizona permits an extension of time for an indigent to pay the statutory fee when filing for a divorce. In re Garland, No. 5971, involves the right of a bankrupt to file a petition for discharge in bankruptcy without payment of the $50 statutory fee. Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., No. 5048, involves a slightly more subtle form of handicap to the indigent seeking judicial resolution of a dispute. In that case a tenant who fights his eviction by resort to the judicial process risks the penalty of a judgment for double the rent due during the litigation if he loses. Two other cases, Frederick v. Schwartz, No. 5050, and Bour-beau v. Lancaster, No. 5054, involve indigents who have lost civil cases — a welfare claim and child guardianship claim — and who cannot afford to pay the fees for docketing an appeal. Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., No. 5208, and Lindsey v. Normet, No. 6158, involve indigents who cannot post the penalty bonds required to appeal from adverse judgments in housing-eviction cases. And finally, Kaufman v. Carter, No. 6375, is perhaps the most surprising of all eight cases because in that case an indigent mother was denied court-appointed counsel to defend herself against a state civil suit to declare her an unfit mother and take five of her seven children away from her.

The Court has decided to note probable jurisdiction in No. 6158, Lindsey v. Normet. Review will be denied in five of the other cases — Nos. 5048, 5208, 5054, 5971, and 6375 — while the judgments in the two remaining cases are to be vacated and the cases remanded for reconsideration in light of the decision in Boddie. I agree with my Brethren that Lindsey v. Normet should be set for argument, but I cannot understand why that case is singled out for special treatment and why distinctions are made between the other cases. For the reasons set out below, I would grant the petitions or note probable jurisdiction in each of the other cases and set them for argument or reverse them outright on the basis of the decision in Boddie.

In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one crucial foundation — that the civil courts of the United States and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney. Some may sincerely believe that the decision in Boddie was far more limited in scope — that is, applies only to divorce cases. Other people might recognize that this constitutional decision will eventually extend to all civil cases but believe that it can only be enforced slowly step by step, so that the country will have time to absorb its full import. But in my judgment Boddie cannot and should not be limited to either its facts or its language, and I believe there can be no doubt that this country can afford to provide court costs and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by their poverty from resort to the law for resolution of their disputes.

The opinion in Boddie attempts to draw two distinctions between divorce and other disputes. The Court there stated that access to the judicial process in divorce matters is the “exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.” Supra, at 383. The two elements, then, that require open access to the courts are that the judicial mechanism be the “exclusive” means of resolving the dispute and that the dispute involve “fundamental” subject matter. The first element — the “exclusiveness” of the judicial process as a remedy — is no limitation at all. The States and the Federal Government hold the ultimate power of enforcement in almost every dispute. Every law student learns in the first semester of law school that property, for instance, is “valuable” only because the State will enforce the collection of rights that attach to its ownership. Thus, the State holds the ultimate remedy in almost every property dispute. Similarly, the wrong that gives rise to a right of damages in tort exists only because society’s lawmakers have created a standard of care and a duty to abide by that standard. The alternatives to resort to the judicial process in tort cases are negotiation and settlement, abandonment of recovery, private self-help, and perhaps insurance. With the exception of insurance, the alternatives are exactly the same as in a divorce case — negotiate a separation agreement, decide to continue the marriage relationship, or violate the law. Likewise, contracts are valuable only because society will enforce them. Indeed, marriage itself when analyzed in purely legal terms is a contract that cannot be revoked without governmental approval. Thus, the judicial process is the exclusive means through which almost any dispute can ultimately be resolved short of brute force.

The other distinction between divorce and different kinds of controversies suggested in the Boddie opinion is the degree to which the disputes are regarded as “fundamental.” The extent to which this requirement limits the holding of Boddie is found in the very facts of that decision — the right to seek a divorce is simply not very “fundamental” in the hierarchy of disputes. Marriage is one of the cornerstones of our civilized society. Society generally places a high value on marriage and a low value on the right to divorce. And since Boddie held that the right to a divorce was “fundamental,” I can only conclude that almost every other kind of legally enforceable right is also fundamental to our society. Society generally encourages people to seek recompense when they suffer damages through the fault of others. And I cannot believe that my Brethren would find the rights of a man with both legs cut off by a negligent railroad less “fundamental” than a person's right to seek a divorce. Even the need to be on the welfare rolls or to file for a discharge in bankruptcy seems to me to be more “fundamental” than a person’s right to seek a divorce. Society provides welfare to ensure the survival of the unfortunate. And bankruptcy is designed to permit a man to make a new start unhampered by overwhelming debts in hopes of achieving a useful life. For this Court to have first provided for governmental assumption of civil court costs in a divorce case seems to me a most unfortunate point of departure. But since that step has now been taken, I would either overrule Boddie at once or extend the benefits of government-paid costs to other civil litigants whose interests are at least as important to an orderly society.

In my judgment, the crucial foundation on which Boddie rests also forbids denial of an indigent’s right of appeal in civil cases merely because he is too poor to pay appeal costs. Once the right to unhampered access to the judicial process has been established, that right is diluted unless the indigent litigant has an opportunity to assert and obtain review of the errors committed at trial. Since Boddie rejected distinctions between the civil and the criminal process in determining the permissibility of restrictions upon access to the courts, we need only apply to civil cases our long line of holdings that indigent criminals cannot because of their indigency be denied an appeal or the right to a state-furnished record on appeal. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963).

Finally, there cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process until every serious litigant is represented by competent counsel. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, supra. Of course, not every litigant would be entitled to appointed counsel no matter how frivolous his claims might be. See Ellis v. United States, 356 U. S. 674 (1958). But the fundamental importance of legal representation in our system of adversary justice is beyond dispute. Since Boddie held that there must be meaningful access to civil courts in divorce cases, I can only conclude that Boddie necessitates the appointment of counsel for indigents in such cases. In fact, this Court has held that attorneys’ fees are part of the costs of litigation and may be taxed as costs. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161 (1939). And as with fees and transcripts, I will never agree to limit the advantages of free counsel to divorce cases. See n. 1, supra. The necessity of state-appointed counsel is particularly acute in cases like one of those before us, Kaufman v. Carter, where the State initiates a civil proceeding against an individual to deprive her of the custody of her children. Here the State is employing the judicial mechanism it has created to enforce society’s will upon an individual and take away her children. The case by its very nature resembles a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with conduct — failure to care properly for her children— which may be criminal and which in any event is viewed as reprehensible and morally wrong by a majority of society. And the cost of being unsuccessful is dearly high— loss of the companionship of one’s children. Indeed, Bod-die held that an indigent was entitled to state-paid court costs in a divorce contest, and such cases almost always involve the custody of children. Certainly, if the State must provide funds for an indigent mother’s court costs for a divorce, the State should also provide her with counsel to protect her rights to something far more important to most mothers and to society — her right to custody of her children.

For the reasons expressed above and given in the decision in Boddie I would set each of these cases for argument or reverse them outright and hold that citizens cannot be barred from their courts because they are too poor to afford the required fees and bonds or because they cannot hire the professional legal help essential to turn the wheels of justice. There is simply no fairness or justice in a legal system which pays indigents’ costs to get divorces and does not aid them in other civil cases which are frequently of far greater importance to society.

Mr. Justice Douglas.

The facts of these cases are set out by Mr. Justice Black. All of them except No. 6375, Kaufman v. Carter, involve people who are denied access to the judicial process solely because of their indigency. Kaufman presents a distinctly different problem. There the State commenced a civil suit in 1963, declared petitioner an unfit mother and took five of her seven children away from her. The status of the children is reviewed annually as required by state law. She did not initially seek counsel; but in the 1968 review proceedings she did. The State is enforcing its view of proper public policy. That procedure has consequences for the citizen so great that it is hardly an extension to say the rationale of Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, demands that she be provided counsel. I would grant certiorari and reverse in this case.

I believe a proper application of the Equal Protection Clause also requires that the access cases be reversed. Courts ought not be a private preserve for the affluent. All of these cases contain an invidious discrimination based on poverty, a suspect legislative classification. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 383 (Douglas, J., concurring).

Today’s decisions underscore the difficulties with the Boddie approach. In Boddie the majority found marriage and its dissolution to be so fundamental as to require allowing indigents access to divorce courts without costs. When indigency is involved I do not think there is a hierarchy of interests. Marriage and its dissolution are of course fundamental. But the parent-child relationship is also of sufficient importance to require appointment of counsel when the State initiates and maintains proceedings to destroy it. Similarly, obtaining a fresh start in life through bankruptcy proceedings or securing adequate housing and the other procedures in these cases seemingly come within the Equal Protection Clause, as suggested by my separate opinion in Boddie.

      This opinion also applies to No. 5050, Frederick et al. v. Schwartz et al., supra; No. 5208, Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., supra; No. 6158, Lindsey et al. v. Normet et al., supra; No. 5971, In re Garland et al., infra; No. 5054, Bourbeau v. Lancaster, infra; No. 5067, Sloatman v. Gibbons et al., supra; and No. 6375, Kaufman v. Carter, infra.

      I dissented in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 389 (1971), but now believe that if the decision in that case is to continue to be the law, it cannot and should not be restricted to persons seeking a divorce. It is bound to be expanded to all civil cases. Persons seeking a divorce are no different from other members of society who must resort to the judicial process for resolution of their disputes. Consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, special favors cannot and should not be accorded to divorce litigants.

       By “exclusive precondition” the Court in Boddie might have been suggesting that divorce is constitutionally different from all other kinds of disputes because even when the two parties to the marriage agree to end their relationship they still must seek judicial approval. But Boddie by its terms is not limited to divorces in which the parties have agreed to terminate their marriage. And the plaintiff in a contested tort case finds resort to the judicial process every bit as necessary as the litigant seeking a contested divorce.
      Even if “exclusive precondition” meant that the formality of judicial approval was mandatory, the Boddie rationale would go far beyond divorce. Citizens generally must resort to courts for adoptions, to probate a will, to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, for child custody determinations, to clear title to land in rem, to obtain an adjudication of incompetency, to change a name, and for other matters. It would be extremely arbitrary to limit Boddie to these particular kinds of disputes.

      This opinion also applies to No. 5208, Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enterprises, Inc., supra; No. 5971, In re Garland et al., infra; No. 5054, Bourbeau v. Lancaster, infra; and No. 6375, Kaufman v. Carter, infra.


text:
    No. 1520.
    Pinto, Prison Farm Superintendent v. Mitchell.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5004.
    Verdugo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to supplement petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5053.

    Lopez v. United States.

      For dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., see No. 5795, Hudson v. United States, infra.

   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 5210.
    Deal et al. v. Cincinnati Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The court below held in this school segregation case that the “ 'District Court correctly excluded evidence of alleged racial discrimination in the public and private housing markets.’ ” 419 F. 2d 1387, 1392.

I would remand this case so that that evidence can be made part of the record and the lower courts can rule on the issues of de jure and de facto segregation of the races that are presented.

It is true that this petition arrived one working day after a time extension granted by Mr. Justice White expired. Unlike some types of cases where the time for filing is prescribed by our rules, Congress has stated that “any writ of certiorari intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court for review shall be taken or applied for within ninety days after the entry of such judgment or decree. A justice of the Supreme Court, for good cause shown, may extend the time for applying for a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty days.” 28 U. S. C. §2101 (c). (Italics added.)

The question here is whether a petition arriving at the Clerk’s Office one day after the statutory period expires is jurisdictionally barred from a determination on the merits. Mr. Justice Black has pointed out that early cases under the predecessor sections to § 2101 (c) “made clear that this Court had power to waive the time requirement of these provisions under appropriate circumstances.” Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs, 394 U. S. 977, 982 (dissenting opinion). And in Ray v. Pierson (No. 94, October Term, 1966), 386 U. S. 547, we decided on the merits a cross-petition for certiorari that was substantially out of time under § 2101(c). We offered no explanation. Even under the companion sections to § 2101 (c) our practice has not been consistent. We have dismissed for failure to file appeals in the time set by Congress, e. g., Ward v. Winstead, 400 U. S. 1019, while not always dismissing for untimely docketing under our rules even though the time limitations were also set by Congress, e. g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 84-86.

Naturally, past inconsistencies are no justification for overturning a congressional bar if one exists. But one does not exist in this case. The statute states a petition “for review shall be taken or applied for” within certain specified times. That phrase is not free from ambiguity. What constitutes applying for review? A majority of the Court apparently feel it is receipt of the petition for cer-tiorari by the Clerk’s Office. Teague, supra. Yet I can see no reason why mailing or other transmission to this Court should not be construed as an application for relief within the meaning of the time provisions of § 2101 (c). When two potential interpretations of a statute are possible, we should not adopt a technical rule, much like common-law pleading, solely to defeat claims.

Petitioners here did not use the mails, but I believe the situation is analogous. The following appears from a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and from an affidavit of counsel for petitioners: Up until two days before the time extension was to expire he was led to believe by a third party that the petition would be printed and filed on time. Then without any advance warning the third party who was in New York and had all of petitioners’ papers called and told counsel that the papers would not be printed or filed. Counsel immediately began to prepare a new petition and sufficient copies from his notes. Then on the day the petition was due he forwarded it prepaid on Piedmont Airlines to Washington and arranged to have someone deliver it to the Court. But the airline lost all the papers. Counsel then made a new set of papers and filed them with the Clerk on the next working day. How can we possibly say that it does injustice to § 2101 (c) to conclude that these efforts for review were not “taken or applied for within ninety days” as extended within the meaning of § 2101 (c) ? I would grant the petition and remand the case for perfection of the record in the manner indicated.

       See our Rule 22. We can and do waive time requirements under the Rules. See Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481.

       The judgment below in that case was entered on October 25, 1965, but a time extension was granted petitioner Pierson until February 2.4, 1966. Ray’s response in opposition and cross-petition for certiorari was filed on March 25. It was timely as a response, but not as a cross-petition, for a cross-petition must satisfy the requirements of a petition except that the cross-petitioner need not file a certified copy of the record which is already on file. Thus the time requirements are the same for both a petition for certiorari and a cross-petition for certiorari.

       It has been suggested that the “most tenable theory for entertaining such an out-of-time cross-petition is that the Court may regard its jurisdiction over the whole case as attaching upon the timely filing of a petition by any party, giving the Court discretion to allow any other party at any time thereafter to file an additional petition involving the same judgment.” R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 312 (4th ed. 1969).


text:
    No. 5054.

    Bourbeau v. Lancaster.

      Eor separate opinions of Black, J., and Douglas, J., see No. 5048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., supra.

   Super. Ct. Conn., Fairfield County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6375.*
    Kaufman v. Carter.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5795.
    Hudson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The facts of these three cases are virtually identical. With minor variations in each case an informer placed a telephone call to the petitioner. The informer also consented to a Government agent’s either listening to or recording the conversation without the knowledge of the petitioner. In no case did the Government attempt to obtain a search warrant. Then at the trials the recording of the conversation was either played or the agent testified to the substance of the conversation he overheard.

Perhaps the Court denies certiorari because any claim under the Federal Communications Act was eliminated in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U. S. 107. But it is time we re-examined that decision under the Fourth Amendment, because of the increasing surveillance under which we all live.

In Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 359, we said: “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Yet in these cases all the episodes were prearranged and, in spite of ample time to obtain warrants, none was sought.

I dissent from the doctrine that an individual begins to lose his constitutional rights the minute he answers the telephone.

Though I dissented in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 756, the Court emphasized that where there was connivance of one party to the conversation who wears the recording device, the search could not be considered unreasonable. But here a third person, not a party to the conversation, is the interceptor. Thus does the law grow imperceptibly but surely toward creating in this Nation the totalitarian type of surveillance we profess to abhor.

I would grant certiorari and reverse these judgments.

      This opinion also applies to No. 5053, Lopez v. United States, supra, and No. 5986, Hickman v. United States, infra.


text:
    No. 5971.

    In re Garland et al.

      For separate opinions of Black, J., and Douglas, J., see No. 6048, Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., supra.

   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Beennan is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5986.

    Hickman v. United States.

       For dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., see No. 5795, Hudson v. United States, supra.

   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6514.
    Hortencio v. Whitehead.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Me. Justice Douglas dissent from denial of petition.


text:
    No. 5999.
    No. 6052.
    No. 6489.
    No. 6516.
    No. 6522.
    No. 6598.
    Howard v. Craven, Warden, et al., Fanale v. Anderson et al., Lipscomb v. United States, Young v. United States, Tracy et ux. v. United States et al., Yoder v. United States,
   401 U. S. 983;

401 U. S. 915;

401 U. S. 980;

401 U. S. 995;

401 U. S. 980; and

401 U. S. 1002. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 6044.
    Polese v. United States et al.,
   400 U. S. 1011. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 123.
    International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Hardeman,
   401 U. S. 233. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 17, 1971
    No. 728.
    Hodgson et al. v. Randall et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Minn.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 1501.
    Kollar et al. v. City of Tucson et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Ariz.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 1514.
    Leitchfield Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Ky.


text:
    No. 1510.
    Airwick Industries, Inc., et al. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Authority et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6750.
    Gray v. Pennsylvania.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 729.
    Hodgson v. Minnesota.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1273.
    Stafford v. Michigan.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black dissents from this action of the Court.


text:
    No. 1473.
    G & M Employment Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Labor and Industries et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 1538.
    Passel et al. v. Fort Worth Independent School District et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Disk, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 6054.
    Vasquez v. New York.
    Mr. Justice Brennan is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.
   Appeal from App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970).


text:
    No. 6778.
    Torres et al. v. New York State Department of Labor et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in California Department of Human Resources v. Java, ante, p. 121.


text:
    No. 707.
    United States v. 119 Cartons Containing 30,000 Obscene Magazines (Scan Imports, claimant).
   Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in United States v. Thirty-Seven (87) Photographs (Luros, Claimant), ante, p. 363.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from this action of the Court.


text:
    No. 111.
    United States v. Holmes.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Ehlert v. United States, ante, p. 99.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from this action of the Court.


text:
    No. 611.
    Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Capobianco.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Ehlert v. United States, ante, p. 99.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from this action of the Court.


text:
    No. 928.
    EVCO, dba EVCO Instructional Designs v. Jones, Commissioner of Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, et al.
   Ct. App. N. M. In view of concessions made in brief in opposition filed by the Attorney General of New Mexico, and on examination of the record, certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of position asserted by the Attorney General in the brief in opposition.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.


text:
    No. 6584.
    Griffin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Pursuant to suggestion of the Solicitor General, certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in the Memorandum for the United States.


text:
    No.-.
    Turpin et al. v. Resor, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   D. C. N. D. Cal. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the stay should be granted.


text:
    No. -.
    Kerr v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 109.
    Time, Inc. v. Pape,
   401 U. S. 279. Motion of respondent to be relieved from payment of costs assessed on reversal of judgment denied.


text:
    No. 1009.
    United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Application for suspension of stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pending judgment of this Court, presented to Mr. Justice Harlan, and by him referred to the Court, granted.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 1042.
    Diffenderfer et al. v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 934.] Motion of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 1681.
    Holmes v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that the stay should be granted.


text:
    No. 6623.
    McKenzie v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Counsel for petitioner is directed to file a brief in support of petition on or before June 3, 1971. The Attorney General of Texas is invited to file a responsive brief within 10 days from date of receipt of petitioner’s brief.


text:
    No. 6885.
    Smith v. Wingo, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 1647.
    Spillers v. Slaughter et al.
   Motion for leave to dispense with printing motion for leave to file and petition for writ of mandamus granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 6536.
    Brooks v. Brown, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 706.
    United States v. Various Articles of “Obscene” Merchandise (Cherry, claimant).
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 1398.
    S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1562.
    Kastigar et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 179.
    Pieters v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 261.
    Robley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 275.
    Swierenga v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 715.
    DeStafano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1022.
    Bergenthal v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1111.
    Manarite v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1165.
    Eubank v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1209.
    Hairston v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1239.
    Glorioso v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1246.
    Carter, Warden, et al. v. Miller.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1397.
    Drown v. Portsmouth School District et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1259.
    Fiore v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1448.
    Klages Coal & Ice Co., dba Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1453.
    Harflinger v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1459.
    Stribling v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1460.
    State National Bank of Alabama et al. v. Ellis et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1465.
    Franco v. Stein Steel & Supply Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1472.
    Fiduciary Counsel, Inc. v. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1477.
    Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Chicago Tribune Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1481.
    Iannone et al. v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1485.
    Tex Tan Welhausen Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1489.
    Davenport et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1492.
    Bering et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1499.
    Tate, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Jamieson, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1502.
    Frank et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1505.
    Mid-South Towing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1513.
    Aero Engineering Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1515.
    Amity Fabrics, Inc. v. United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1517.
    Mehciz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1519.
    Whitehead et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1524.
    Morris et al. v. Leonard, Trustee, et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1529.
    Almendarez v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1539.
    Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1555.
    American Electric, Inc. v. Oldenkott.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5187.
    Arriaga v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5269.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5484.
    Smith v. Brantley, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5559.
    Campbell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5962.
    Black v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6108.
    Kontos v. Creamer, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6317.
    Streule v. Gulf Finance Corp.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6342.
    Klein v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6451.
    Winegar v. Buchkoe, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6470.
    Cothran et al. v. San Jose Water Works et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6518.
    Allen v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6467.
    Brown v. Hendrick, Prisons Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6533.
    Raguse et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6554.
    Johnson v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6565.
    Gaylord v. Wolke, Sheriff.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6664.
    Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6685.
    Hale v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6686.
    Iachino v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6687.
    Knight v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6688.
    Ginsburg v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6689.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6705.
    Haslam v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6715.
    King v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6745.
    Corcino v. Government of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6716.
    Castro v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6717.
    Paige v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6725.
    Stone v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6738.
    Redd v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6740.
    Sanders v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6741.
    Fukumoto v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6742.
    Drew et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6747.
    Marxuach v. Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice et al.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied. Reported below: -P. R. R.-.


text:
    No. 6748.
    Lucas v. New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6749.
    Adcox v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6753.
    Smith v. Bucci Detective Agency et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6756.
    Ramos v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6761.
    Manzanares v. Warden, Nevada State Prison.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6763.
    Prionas v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 11.
    Washington et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner Othello Washington was convicted of engaging in the wagering business without payment of the special occupational tax. This took place prior to our decision in Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, holding unconstitutional against a claim of self-incrimination a conviction under the same statute. In the course of that prosecution a search warrant was obtained and evidence was obtained on the basis of which the present civil suit for excise taxes, fraud penalties, and interest was brought.

The central question is whether the evidence obtained by a warrant in the criminal case, which retrospectively contained the constitutional infirmity noted in Grosso, may be used in this civil case.

Since, as we held in United States v. Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, our decisions in Grosso and its companion, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, are retroactive, I do not see how evidence obtained by use of a search warrant, issued under the old regime which Grosso and Marchetti put into the discard, can do service for process in this new and wholly different civil proceeding.

There are means of discovery provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure and by a special procedure, 26 U. S. C. § 7602, applicable to civil suits to collect federal taxes. The United States would never dare ask for a search warrant to ferret out the facts necessary for its civil suit. The fact that it obtained evidence by a warrant issued in a procedure incident to an unconstitutional prosecution should not now be turned into a windfall. The Government should turn square corners, not taxpayers alone. In retrospect the warrant should not have issued, though under then-existing law it may have been wholly proper. We should hold the Government to the maxim expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392:

“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”

I would grant this petition for certiorari.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

The courts below have ordered a sale of petitioner Othello Washington’s farm to satisfy a tax lien. The extent of his liability was determined on the basis of evidence seized by Internal Revenue agents under a search warrant grounded upon the determination that there was probable cause to believe that he was engaged in the wagering business without having registered and paid the required occupational tax. We subsequently held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from requiring such registration of a gambler who justifiably fears that he will thereby incriminate himself, and who does not waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968). And we have just this Term held that prohibition applicable whether the failure to register took place before or after Marchetti was decided. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715 (1971).

Under these cases, therefore, there is substantial doubt whether the Government could constitutionally punish petitioner for his failure to register. By the same token, I think there is a substantial question whether the affidavits supporting the search warrant were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed an offense that the Government could constitutionally prohibit. For the affidavits on their face gave reason to believe that petitioner’s gambling activities were in violation of local law, and gave no reason to believe that petitioner would waive his right not to incriminate himself of such violations. I may assume that the Government, in showing probable cause to support a search warrant, need not negative any conceivable defense that might be raised by the suspect. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 107-109 (1965). But where, as here, the affidavits in support of the warrant indicate the likely existence of an absolute defense to the crime charged that will be unavailing only if explicitly waived by the accused, it is surely not evident that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed is satisfied. I would grant certiorari and set the case for argument.

      Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26-38.

       The Government does not dispute that petitioner’s gambling activities were illegal under state law, and points to nothing in the record that would indicate petitioner would intelligently and knowingly waive his right against self-incrimination.

       Indeed, the affidavits and the District Court relied upon petitioner’s past arrests on gambling charges to support the finding of probable cause.


text:
    No. 6768.
    Molina v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6769.
    McGregor v. Watts, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6773.
    Alexander v. Michigan Parole Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6798.
    Makarewicz v. Scafati, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6776.
    Escalante v. Zirpoli, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6780.
    Becker v. Nebraska.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6788.
    Reynolds v. Follette, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6791.
    Edgerton v. Batten.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 86.
    Teran et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 110.
    Porter v. Ashmore et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 130.
    Wenzel v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 132.
    Millang v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 141.
    Brossard v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 142.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 145.
    Flesch v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 149.
    Dillon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 151.
    Posner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 173.
    Kee Ming Hsu v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 228.
    Turner v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 284.
    Bender v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 411.
    Tuck v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 542.
    McKinney v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1041.
    David v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1234.
    DeLutro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1242.
    Lawrence v. Woods, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1371.
    Viviano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1479.
    No. 1483.
    Consolidation Coal Co. v. South-East Coal Co.; and United Mine Workers of America v. South-East Coal Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 434 F. 2d 767.


text:
    No. 1516.
    Silverman et ux. v. Rogers, Secretary of State, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5081.
    Donovan v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5062.
    Zitzer v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5082.
    Banks v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5096.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5113.
    Castillo v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5116.
    Locklear v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5125.
    Parker v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5130.
    Randazzo v. Follette, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5145.
    Eason v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5199.
    Soyka v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5155.
    Keith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5159.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5186.
    Blassick v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5341.
    Guitian v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5358.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5651.
    Hamilton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5664.
    Robbins v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5669.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5717.
    Verdugo v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5897.
    Bigsby v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5918.
    Leach et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6037.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6090.
    Oliva v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6228.
    Davis v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6400.
    Webster et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6777.
    Ragan v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 104.
    Wild et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6502.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 313.
    Orito v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 356.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1018.
    Norman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1537.
    Eisenberg et al. v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1370.
    No. 1475.
    No. 1497.
    Lamp, Administratrix v. United States Steel Corp. et al.; Fuhrman, Administratrix, et al. v. United States Steel Corp. et al.; and Cook, Administratrix v. United States Steel Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Reported below: 436 F. 2d 1256.


text:
    No. 1493.
    Vernitron Corp. et al. v. Benjamin.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6051.
    Sutton v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1442.
    Clement A. Evans & Co., Inc. v. A. M. Kidder & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1469.
    Homart Development Co. v. Diamond et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1484.
    Schoop et al. v. Mitchell, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1491.
    Hoffa et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1494.
    Hobson et al. v. Board of Elections for the District of Columbia et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted on the basis of Mr. Justice Black’s dissent in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 105 (1947).


text:
    No. 1506.
    Boston & Providence Railroad Development Group v. Bartlett, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion to defer consideration of this petition denied. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition.


text:
    No. 1561.
    Continental/Moss-Gordin et al. v. B-M-G Investment Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondents for damages for delay denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 5849.
    Pino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to file supplemental petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6519.
    Brady v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion for leave to amend petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6529.
    Maret v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6784.
    Barney v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6799.
    Grimes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 169.
    Radich v. New York,
   401 U. S. 531. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 13.
    No. 43.
    No. 975.
    No. 1170.
    No. 1251.
    No. 1284.
    No. 5257.
    No. 5481.
    No. 5980.
    No. 6297.
    No. 6517.
    United States v. White, Shevin et al. v. Lazarus, Colson et al. v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., Southland Incorporated v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., et al., Balc v. Parsons et al., Labine, Tutrix v. Vincent, Administrator, Schlanger v. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, et al., Brown v. LaVallee, Warden, Wright v. District Court of Montgomery County, Benoit v. United States,
   401 U. S. 745;

401 U. S. 987;

401 U. S. 911;

401 U. S. 974;

401 U. S. 993;

401 U. S. 986;

401 U. S. 532;

401 U. S. 487;

401 U. S. 942;

401 U. S. 1011; and

401 U. S. 1011. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 993,
    October Term, 1968.
    University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co.,
   394 U. S. 917. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 237.
    Berend v. J. F. Pritchard & Co.,
   400 U. S. 823. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 1382.
    MacLeod v. United States,
   ante, p. 907. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 6200.
    Emmons v. Taylor et al.,
   401 U. S. 1010. Petition for rehearing and other relief denied.


text:
    May 20, 1971
    No. 6945.
    Spencer v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay and/or injunction, referred to the Court by Mr. Justice Brennan, denied.


text:
    May 24, 1971
    No. 1262.
    Wyman, Commissioner of New York Department of Social Services, et al. v. Boddie et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see 401 U. S. 990.]
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 1373.
    Wyman, Commissioner of New York Department of Social Services, et al. v. Rosado et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 1328.
    Lashley et al. v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted and case set for oral argument.


text:
    No. 6555.
    Burton v. New York.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. It appears that sentences imposed under judgment sought to be reviewed were concurrent and appeal therefore dismissed.


text:
    No. 1504.
    Giannatti et al. v. County of Los Angeles.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur,

dissenting:

I would note probable jurisdiction of this appeal and set the case for argument.

Under California law a county is liable for damages for intentional assault and battery of a civilian by a member of the police force. Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2 (a) (1966), Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355. But the statute exempts any injury to “any prisoner.” Cal. Govt. Code § 844.6 (a)(2) (Supp. 1971).

The California courts have sustained the constitutionality of the exemption of prisoners against the claim that it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Eourteenth Amendment. Sanders v. County of Yuba, 247 Cal. App. 2d 748, 55 Cal. Rptr. 852. The Sanders case was followed in the present one. While a prisoner loses some civil rights, nevertheless as stated by Judge, now Mr. Justice, Blackmun in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 576, “he continues to be protected by the due process and equal protection clauses which follow him through the prison doors.”

The equal protection question is a substantial one which we should decide only after oral argument.


text:
    No. 6588.
    Pardo v. Illinois.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 6911.
    Jackson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 598,
    Misc., October Term, 1964.
    Williamson et al. v. Gilmer et al.,
   379 U. S. 955. Motion to recall and amend order of this Court of January 18, 1965, denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1.
    Anderson v. Kentucky.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 371 U. S. 886 and 937.]
   Ct. App. Ky. Motion for restraining order presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 910.
    No. 961.
    Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents likewise allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 1159.
    Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 973.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to permit the Securities and Exchange Commission to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of petitioner granted, and 15 minutes allowed for this purpose. Respondents allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 1454.
    Picard v. Connor.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 942.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that James J. Twohig, Esquire, of South Boston, Massachusetts, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 6568.
    McKinney v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 6744.
    Carter et al. v. Stanton, Director, Marion County Department of Public Welfare, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 6966.
    Epps et al. v. Cortese et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument immediately following No. 6060. [Sub nom. Fuentes et al. v. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, et al., probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 906.]


text:
    No. 1470.
    Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Nemitz et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1480.
    Santobello v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1536.
    Wisconsin v. Yoder et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1289.
    Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6401.
    Kirby v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 2 presented in the petition which reads as follows:

“(2) Whether due process requires that an accused be advised of his right to counsel prior to a pre-indictment showup at a police station several hours after his arrest and forty-eight hours after the alleged crime occurred.”


text:
    No. 1414.
    Gooch et al. v. Mitchell, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1429.
    Fincke et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1447.
    Andrews v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1518.
    Keene v. Jackson County et al.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1527.
    Eldon Industries, Inc., et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Clowes, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1530.
    Elvin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1535.
    Franzese v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1544.
    Swanney-McDonald, Inc. v. Gray et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1566.
    Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1600.
    Compania de Navegacione Almirante S. A., Panama v. Beverly Hills National Bank.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6440.
    Thomas v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6604.
    Greene v. City of Chicago.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6615.
    Papa v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6657.
    Driver v. Cady, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6666.
    Dunn v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6751.
    Shopa v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6755.
    Kimball v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6762.
    Booker v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6771.
    Taft v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6772.
    Sparks v. Metzger, Sheriff.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6781.
    McPherson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6801.
    Ector v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6804.
    Wilson v. Follette, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6808.
    Clermont v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6811.
    Stallings v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6812.
    Lo Cicero v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6814.
    Wade v. Haynes, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6816.
    Brown v. Brierley, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6818.
    Tracy et ux. v. Chandler et al., U. S. Circuit Judges.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6819.
    Skinner v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6820.
    Stovall v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6822.
    Nelson v. Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6824.
    King v. North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6826.
    Tippett v. Haynes, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6830.
    Willoughby v. Lash, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6833.
    Negron v. Wallace et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6834.
    Boag v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6839.
    Schlette v. Craven, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6841.
    Murray v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6846.
    Jones v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6850.
    Goodale v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6851.
    Williams v. Neil, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6854.
    Pelicie v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1199.
    Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, et al. v. Board of Junior College District No. 508, County of Cook, et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Motion for leave to supplement petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1322.
    Pennsylvania v. Davis.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1355.
    Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1395.
    DeSapio v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 1531.
    Davis v. Members of Selective Service Board No. 30 of Dallas, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1540.
    Berzanskis v. Daley et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 1543.
    Nix v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 5157.
    Chambers et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6106.
    Tarver v. Smith, Secretary of Department of Social and Health Services of Washington.
    [For earlier order herein, see 401 U. S. 906.]
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The ability of the Government and private agencies to gather, retain, and catalogue information on anyone for their unfettered use raises problems concerning the privacy and dignity of individuals. Public and private agencies are storing more and more data. “If your name is not in the records of at least one credit bureau, it doesn’t mean that you don’t rate. What it does mean is that you are either under twenty-one or dead.”

A file may show that an individual was arrested. But will it show the arrest was unconstitutional because it was solely for purposes of investigation? Or that the charges were dropped? Or that a jury acquitted him?

Other “facts” may be in a file. Did he vote for Henry Wallace? Was he cited by HUAC? Is he subversive? Did he ever belong to any subversive organizations?

Private files amass similar irrelevancies and subjective information. Is he well regarded in his neighborhood as to character and habits? Does he have domestic difficulties? Is he “slow” in paying his bills?

The problems of a computerized society with large data banks are immense. Who should have access to the files on an individual? Por what purposes should access be allowed? Should an individual be informed each time information is passed on to new parties? How long should information be retained? What mechanisms ought there be for correcting factual errors?

This case presents the latter issue. A caseworker has prepared a highly critical report on petitioner setting forth in detail factual allegations and accusing petitioner of child neglect. The report recommends that petitioner be permanently deprived of the custody of her children. Custody was temporarily placed in juvenile court because petitioner was hospitalized. Subsequently a hearing in juvenile court was held and petitioner was exonerated and retained custody of her children. But the critical report — which petitioner alleges is false— remains in the files with the Department of Social and Health Services of the State of Washington.

Not surprisingly, petitioner would like the allegedly false information removed from those files. But her efforts to obtain a hearing to correct the information have failed.

The State says that petitioner’s file is “confidential and privileged” and under current state law the file may be disclosed only “for purposes directly connected with the administration of public assistance and specific investigatory purposes by legislative committees and properly authorized bodies.” Respondent’s Brief 6. Just how many people and agencies this includes is unclear. The only thing perfectly clear from this record is that petitioner has no rights under state law to a hearing to correct the reports even if they are total lies. And it appears petitioner will never be informed prior to transmittal of her file to the various “authorized” groups.

The State contends that petitioner will suffer no harm from having the material in her files. We are told everyone will know the report is only an opinion; the decree of the juvenile court will be included; and the file will be treated confidentially. While, of course, we cannot know if the information is false and cannot tell which and how many uses will be made of the file, it is apparent that petitioner does raise some serious questions concerning its use. Participation “in the new Work-Incentive Programs is initiated by a referral by respondent’s department of, among others, persons who are 'appropriate for referral.’ R. C. W. 74.22.020; 74.23.040. Those who are referred receive substantial training benefits as well as increased cash benefits. R. C. W. 74.22.050, 060; R. C. W. 74.23.060, 070. Similarly, the availability of sheltered workshop programs depends upon a determination by the respondent’s department that the subject, if a 'disadvantaged person,’ 'can reasonably be expected to benefit from, or in his best interests reasonably requires’ such a program. R. C. W. 28A.10.080 (2).” Petition 7 n. 2. The only answer that respondent gives to this is that any “information transmitted to the Employment Security Department under the Work Incentive Program is for the benefit of the recipient.” How petitioner would benefit from the transmission of the allegedly false material we are not told.

The Washington State public assistance programs are designed to receive federal assistance whenever federal funds are available. Various provisions in the appropriate title of the Revised Code of Washington dealing with public assistance refer to conformity with and primacy of federal law. E. g., Wash. Rev. Code § 74.04.055 (Supp. 1970) (if more than one construction possible, favor that “most likely to satisfy federal laws”); Wash. Rev. Code § 74.23.005 (Supp. 1970) (“The legislature hereby expresses its intention to comply with the requirements under the federal social security act, as amended, creating a work incentive program” for mothers receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children); Wash. Rev. Code § 74.23.900 (Supp. 1970) (if any part of the chapter conflicts with federal law it is to that extent inoperative). The record in this case is not clear as to which types of public assistance petitioner is receiving. Prior to the temporary unsuccessful attempt to remove her children from her custody she was receiving AFDC benefits. From the references in the briefs to eligibility for the AFDC Work Incentive Program it would appear that she is now again receiving AFDC benefits.

When federal funds are used, then standards are to be shaped and tested federally. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619; Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 295; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 427 (concurring opinion).

If meanwhile she was denied a fair hearing under state law, an important question of procedural due process is raised under the Fourteenth Amendment. For petitioner’s right to continued assistance — -an important property interest — cannot be reduced or terminated without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337.

If petitioner was at the time receiving federal assistance then under HEW Regulations, she was entitled to a fair hearing.

The Department’s regulations require that provision be made for granting a fair hearing:

“to any individual requesting a hearing because his claim for financial or medical assistance is denied, or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness, or became he is aggrieved by any other agency action affecting receipt, suspension, reduction, or termination of such assistance or by agency policy as it affects his situation.” 45 CFR § 205.10 (a)(3), eff. April 14, 1971 (emphasis added). 36 Fed. Reg. 3034.

As the Solicitor General says in his brief, filed at our request:

“One may say, quite simply, that the report which petitioner challenges threatens receipt of AFDC payments by threatening to deprive petitioner of her children, on which her receipt of AFDC benefits depends. One of the federal requirements for a state plan for AFDC is that it must:
“(16) provide that where the State agency has reason to believe that the home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for the child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child it shall bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agencies in the State, providing such data with respect to the situation it may have [42 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) 602 (a) (16)].
“If any question were now to arise as to the suitability of the home for the children, the prior report might well have an effect on referral of the case to the courts and action by the courts, notwithstanding the 1967 decision of the Juvenile Court. Thus, the report retains a constant potential effect on petitioner’s custody of her children and thereby on her receipt of assistance.”

We cannot be sure of the exact posture of this case; but whether or not the claim at the time was federally funded, a question of national importance is presented. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

       Law reviews have been devoting increasing attention to the problem. Recently two total issues have been devoted to the legal problems. See 15 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1374 and 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 251. See also Symposium: Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 211; Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 400; Freed, A Legal Structure for a National Medical Data Center, 49 B.' U. L. Rev. 79; Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091.

       H. Black, Buy Now, Pay Later 37 (1961).

       “[T]he computer can also be an agent of oppression, if, for example, its fantastic memory is used to place indelibly on record all the events in a man’s life, all his mistakes and weaknesses, precluding all hope of their effacement, every stimulating possibility of a new chance in life.” R. Prebisch, Change and Development, Latin America’s Great Task 209 (1970).


text:
    No. 6527.
    Freeman v. Joiner et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.


text:
    No. 6828.
    Mooney v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 6223.
    No. 6284.
    No. 6319.
    No. 6464.
    No. 6510.
    In re Disbarment of Chipley, Donovan v. United States et al., Ney v. Field, Men’s Colony Superintendent, Eisenhardt v. United States, Cookmeyer v. Louisiana Department of Highways,
   401 U. S. 1010;

401 U. S. 944;

ante, p. 904;

ante, p. 928; and

401 U. S. 980. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 1, 1971
    No. 1394.
    Granite Falls State Bank v. Schneider, Director of Department of General Administration, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Wash.


text:
    No. 1574.
    Lowe v. Young.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6901.
    Swaney v. North Carolina.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6662.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Pursuant to suggestion of the Solicitor General, certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of position asserted by the Solicitor General in the Memorandum for the United States. Application for bail also referred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.


text:
    No. 6704.
    Gaines v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Pursuant to suggestion of the Solicitor General, certio-rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of position asserted by the Solicitor General in the Memorandum for the United States.


text:
    No. 910.
    No. 961.
    Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Motion of National Council of Senior Citizens to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 958.
    Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 401 U. S. 907.] Motion of Gainesville Utilities Department et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1622.
    No. 1708.
    No. 1716.
    WHDH, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; Charles River Civic Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; and Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion for expeditious treatment of petitions for writs of certiorari denied. Motion for conditional revocation of stay also denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.

Reported below: - U. S. App. D. C. -, 444 F. 2d 841.


text:
    No. 1689.
    Pruett v. Texas et al.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Reapplication for stay and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 5850.
    No. 6000.
    Townsend et al. v. Swank, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al.; and Alexander et al. v. Swank, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al.
   Appeals from D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 401 U. S. 906.] Motion for additional time for argument denied.


text:
    No. 6979.
    No. 7034.
    Davis v. Pope, Medical Facility Superintendent; and Ray v. Brierley, Correctional Superintendent.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 6848.
    Ruderer v. Regan, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 1419.
    California Motor Transport Co. et al. v. Trucking Unlimited et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 6810.
    McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 1476.
    Ferrone v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1542.
    Allen v. VanCantfort.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1545.
    Karnes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1547.
    General Radio Co. v. Kepco, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1551.
    Weber v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1553.
    Carpenter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1559.
    Alonzo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1567.
    Gallagher v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1568.
    Bean et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1577.
    Gerstein v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1579.
    Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1580.
    Cascade Car Wash, Inc. v. Laurent Watch Co., Inc., dba Cascade Car Wash.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1582.
    Steiner v. Officer in Command, Armed Forces Examining and Induction Center at Houston, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 1631.
    Noe v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6563.
    Norman v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6592.
    Smith v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6593.
    Reyes v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6629.
    Wood v. Gaffney, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6630.
    Mitchell v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6651.
    Green v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6732.
    Jiminez-Lopez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6785.
    Maxwell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6789.
    Wahlquist v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6797.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6813.
    Gonzalez-Parra v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6815.
    Brocato et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6821.
    Frizer v. McMann, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 6823.
    Gwynn v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.