author: Justice Scalia Justice Ginsburg,

text:
    DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK CO. et al.
    No. 93-1783.
    Argued January 9, 1995
    Decided March 21, 1995

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 136.

      Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Allen H. Feldman, Steven J. Mandel, and Mark S. Flynn.

      Lawrence P. Postol argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was James M. Mesnard.

        Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Thomas D. Wilcox, and Dennis J. Lindsay filed a brief for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us in this case is whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs in the United States Department of Labor has standing under § 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., to seek judicial review of decisions by the Benefits Review Board that in the Director’s view deny claimants compensation to which they are entitled.

I

On October 24, 1984, Jackie Harcum, an employee of respondent Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., was working in the bilge of a steam barge when a piece of metal grating fell and struck him in the lower back. His injury required surgery to remove a herniated disc, and caused prolonged disability. Respondent paid Harcum benefits under the LHWCA until he returned to light-duty work in April 1987. In November 1987, Harcum returned to his regular department under medical restrictions. He proved unable to perform essential tasks, however, and the company terminated his employment in May 1988. Harcum ultimately found work elsewhere, and started his new job in February 1989.

Harcum filed a claim for further benefits under the LHWCA. Respondent contested the claim, and the dispute was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). One of the issues was whether Harcum was entitled to benefits for total disability, or instead only for partial disability, from the date he stopped work for respondent until he began his new job. “Disability” under the LHWCA means “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 33 U. S. C. § 902(10).

After a hearing on October 20, 1989, the AU determined that Harcum was partially, rather than totally, disabled when he left respondent’s employ, and that he was therefore owed only partial-disability benefits for the interval of his unemployment. On appeal, the Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s judgment, and also ruled that under 33 U. S. C. § 908(f), the company was entitled to cease payments to Harcum after 104 weeks, after which time the LHWCA special fund would be liable for disbursements pursuant to § 944.

The Director petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of both aspects of the Board’s ruling. Harcum did not seek review and, while not opposing the Director’s pursuit of the action, expressly declined to intervene on his own behalf in response to an inquiry by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the question whether the Director had standing to appeal the Board’s order. 8 F. 3d 175 (1993). It concluded that she did not have standing with regard to that aspect of the order denying Harcum’s claim for full-disability compensation, since she was not “adversely affected or aggrieved” by that decision within the meaning of § 21(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c). We granted the Director’s petition for certiorari. 512 U. S. 1287 (1994).

II

The LHWCA provides for compensation of workers injured or killed while employed on the navigable waters or adjoining, shipping-related land areas of the United States. 33 U. S. C. § 903. With the exception of those duties imposed by §§ 919(d), 921(b), and 941, the Secretary of Labor has delegated all responsibilities of the Department with respect to administration of the LHWCA to the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 20 CFR §§ 701.201 and 701.202 (1994); 52 Fed. Reg. 48466 (1987). For ease of exposition, the Director will hereinafter be referred to as the statutory recipient of those responsibilities.

A worker seeking compensation under the Act must file a claim with an OWCP district director. 33 U. S. C. § 919(a); 20 CFR §§ 701.301(a) and 702.105 (1994). If the district director cannot resolve the claim informally, 20 CFR § 702.311, it is referred to an ALJ authorized to issue a compensation order, § 702.316; 33 U. S. C. § 919(d). The ALJ’s decision is reviewable by the Benefits Review Board, whose members are appointed by the Secretary. § 921(b)(1). The Board’s decision is in turn appealable to a United States court of appeals, at the instance of “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by” the Board’s order. § 921(c).

With regard to claims that proceed to ALJ hearings, the Act does not by its terms make the Director a party to the proceedings, or grant her authority to prosecute appeals to the Board, or thence to the federal courts of appeals. The Director argues that she nonetheless had standing to petition the Fourth Circuit for review of the Board’s order, because she is a “person adversely affected or aggrieved” under § 921(c). Specifically, she contends the Board’s decision injures her because it impairs her ability to achieve the Act’s purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes.

The phrase “person adversely affected or aggrieved” is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the courts. See, e. g., federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 402(b)(6); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 660(a); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 816. The terms “adversely affected” and “aggrieved,” alone or in combination, have a long history in federal administrative law, dating back at least to the federal Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2) (codified, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 402(b)(6)). They were already familiar terms in 1946, when they were embodied within the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702, which entitles “[a] person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to judicial review. In that provision, the qualification “within the meaning of a relevant statute” is not an addition to what “adversely affected or aggrieved” alone conveys; but is rather an acknowledgment of the fact that what constitutes adverse effect or aggrievement varies from statute to statute. As the United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) put it, “The determination of who is ‘adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of any relevant statute’ has ‘been marked out largely by the gradual judicial process of inclusion and exclusion, aided at times by the courts’ judgment as to the probable legislative intent derived from the spirit of the statutory scheme.’ ” Id., at 96 (citation omitted). We have thus interpreted § 702 as requiring a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action and that the interest he seeks to vindicate is arguably within the “zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute” in question. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 395-396 (1987).

Given the long lineage of the text in question, it is significant that counsel have cited to us no case, neither in this Court nor in the courts of appeals, neither under the APA nor under individual statutory-review provisions such as the present one, which holds that, without benefit of specific authorization to appeal, an agency, in its regulatory or policy-making capacity, is “adversely affected” or “aggrieved.” Cf. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 302-305 (1983) (noting the issue of whether the Director has standing under § 921(c), but finding it unnecessary to reach the question). There are cases in which an agency has been held to be adversely affected or aggrieved in what might be called its nongovernmental capacity — that is, in its capacity as a member of the market group that the statute was meant to protect. For example, in United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426 (1949), we held that the United States had standing to sue the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in federal court to overturn a Commission order that denied the Government recovery of damages for an allegedly unlawful railroad rate. The Government, we said, “is not less entitled than any other shipper to invoke administrative and judicial protection.” Id., at 430. But the status of the Government as a statutory beneficiary or market participant must be sharply distinguished from the status of the Government as regulator or administrator.

The latter status would be at issue if — to use an example that continues the ICC analogy — the Environmental Protection Agency sued to overturn an ICC order establishing high tariffs for the transportation of recyclable materials. Cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669 (1973). Or if the Department of Transportation, to further a policy of encouraging so-called “telecommuting” in order to reduce traffic congestion, sued as a “party aggrieved” under 28 U. S. C. § 2344, to reverse the Federal Communications Commission’s approval of rate increases on second phone lines used for modems. We are aware of no case in which such a “policy interest” by an agency has sufficed to confer standing under an “adversely affected or aggrieved” statute or any other general review provision. To acknowledge the general adequacy of such an interest would put the federal courts into the regular business of deciding intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes — a role that would be most inappropriate.

That an agency in its governmental capacity is not “adversely affected or aggrieved” is strongly suggested, as well, by two aspects of the United States Code: First, the fact that the Code’s general judicial review provision, contained in the APA, does not include agencies within the category of “person adversely affected or aggrieved.” See 5 U. S. C. § 551(2) (excepting agencies from the definition of “person”). Since, as we suggested in United States v. ICC, the APA provision reflects “the general legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships,” 337 U. S., at 433-434, it indicates that even under specific “adversely affected or aggrieved” statutes (there were a number extant when the APA was adopted) agencies as such normally do not have standing. And second, the United States Code displays throughout that when an agency in its governmental capacity is meant to have standing, Congress says so. The LHWCA’s silence regarding the Secretary’s ability to take an appeal is significant when laid beside other provisions of law. See, e. g., Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U. S. C. § 932(k) (“The Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding relative to [a] claim for benefits”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to initiate civil actions against private employers) and § 2000e-4(g)(6) (authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to “intervene in a civil action brought ... by an aggrieved party . . .”); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(2) (granting Secretary power to initiate various civil actions under the Act). It is particularly illuminating to compare the LHWCA with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. Section 660(a) of OSHA is virtually identical to § 921(c): It allows “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved” by an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (a body distinct from the Secretary, as the Benefits Review Board is) to petition for review in the courts of appeals. OSHA, however, further contains a § 660(b), which expressly grants such petitioning authority to the Secretary — suggesting, of course, that the Secretary would not be considered “adversely affected or aggrieved” under § 660(a), and should not be considered so under § 921(c).

All of the foregoing indicates that the phrase “person adversely affected or aggrieved” does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity. Of course the text of a particular statute could make clear that the phrase is being used in a peculiar sense. But the Director points to no such text in the LHWCA, and relies solely upon the mere existence and impairment of her governmental interest. If that alone could ever suffice to contradict the normal meaning of the phrase (which is doubtful), it would have to be an interest of an extraordinary nature, extraordinarily impaired. As we proceed to discuss, that is not present here.

Ill

The LHWCA assigns four broad areas of responsibility to the Director: (1) supervising, administering, and making rules and regulations for calculation of benefits and processing of claims, 33 U. S. C. §§ 906, 908-910, 914, 919, 930, and 939; (2) supervising, administering, and making rules and regulations for provision of medical care to covered workers, §907; (3) assisting claimants with processing claims and receiving medical and vocational rehabilitation, § 939(c); and (4) enforcing compensation orders and administering payments to and disbursements from the special fund established by the Act for the payment of certain benefits, §§ 921(d) and 944. The Director does not assert that the Board’s decision hampers her performance of these express statutory responsibilities. She claims only two categories of interest that are affected, neither of which remotely suggests that she has authority to appeal Board determinations.

• First, the Director claims that because the LHWCA “has many of the elements of social insurance, and as such is designed to promote the public interest,” Brief for Petitioner 17, she has standing to “advance in federal court the public interest in ensuring adequate compensation payments to claimants,” id., at 18. It is doubtful, to begin with, that the goal of the LHWCA is simply the support of disabled workers. In fact, we have said that, because “the LHWCA represents a compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and their employers,” it “is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities.” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268, 282 (1980). The LHWCA is a scheme for fair and efficient resolution of a class of private disputes, managed and arbitered by the Government. It represents a “quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in turn, do the employees.” 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries §4.1, p. 106 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).

But even assuming the single-minded, compensate-the-employee goal that the Director posits, there is nothing to suggest that the Director has been given authority to pursue that goal in the courts. Agencies do not automatically have standing to sue for actions that frustrate the purposes of their statutes. The Interior Department, being charged with the duty to “protect persons and property within areas of the National Park System,” 16 U. S. C. § 1a-6(a), does not thereby have authority to intervene in suits for assault brought by campers; or (more precisely) to bring a suit for assault when the camper declines to do so. What the Director must establish here is such a clear and distinctive responsibility for employee compensation as to overcome the universal assumption that “person adversely affected or aggrieved” leaves private interests (even those favored by public policy) to be litigated by private parties. That we are unable to find. The Director is not the designated champion of employees within this statutory scheme. To the contrary, one of her principal roles is to serve as the broker of informal settlements between employers and employees. 33 U. S. C. § 914(h). She is charged, moreover, with providing “information and assistance” regarding the program to all persons covered by the Act, including employers. §§ 902(1), 939(c). To be sure, she has discretion under § 939(c) to provide “legal assistance in processing a claim” if it is requested (a provision that is perhaps of little consequence, since the Act provides attorney’s fees to successful claimants, see § 928); but that authority, which is discretionary with her and contingent upon a request by the claimant, does not evidence the duty and power, when the claimant is satisfied with his award, to contest the award on her own.

The Director argues that her standing to pursue the public’s interest in adequate compensation of claimants is supported by our decisions in Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), Pasa dena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976), and General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318 (1980). Brief for Petitioner 18. None of those cases is apposite. Heckman and Moe pertain to the United States’ standing to represent the interests of Indians; the former holds, see 224 U. S., at 437, and the latter indicates in dictum, see 425 U. S., at 474, n. 13, that the Government’s status as guardian confers standing. The third case, Spangler, supra, at 427, based standing of the United States upon an explicit provision of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U. S. C. § 2000h-2, and the last, General Telephone Co., supra, at 325, based standing of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) upon a specific provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing suit, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Those two cases certainly establish that Congress could have conferred standing upon the Director without infringing Article III of the Constitution; but they do not at all establish that Congress did so. In fact, General Telephone Co. suggests just the opposite, since it describes how, prior to the 1972 amendment specifically giving the EEOC authority to sue, only the “aggrieved person” could bring suit, even though the EEOC was authorized to use “ ‘informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion’” to eliminate unlawful employment practices, 446 U. S., at 325 — an authority similar to the Director’s informal settlement authority here.

The second category of interest claimed to be affected by erroneous Board rulings is the Director’s ability to fulfill “important administrative and enforcement responsibilities.” Brief for Petitioner 18. The Director fails, however, to identify any specific statutory duties that an erroneous Board ruling interferes with, reciting instead conjectural harms to abstract and remote concerns. She contends, for example, that “incorrect claim determinations by the Board frustrate [her] duty to administer and enforce the statutory scheme in a uniform manner.” Id., at 18-19. But it is impossible to understand how a duty of uniform administration and enforcement by the Director (presumably arising out of the prohibition of arbitrary action reflected in 5 U. S. C. § 706) hinges upon correct adjudication by someone else. The Director does not (and we think cannot) explain, for example, how an erroneous decision by the Board affects her ability to process the underlying claim, §919, provide information and assistance regarding coverage, compensation, and procedures, § 939(c), enforce the final award, § 921(d), or perform any other required task in a “uniform” manner.

If the correctness of adjudications were essential to the Director’s performance of her assigned duties, Congress would presumably have done what it has done with many other agencies: made adjudication her responsibility. In fact, however, it has taken pains to remove adjudication from her realm. The LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1251, assigned administration to the Director, 33 U. S. C. § 939(a); assigned initial adjudication to ALJ’s, § 919(d); and created the Board to consider appeals from ALJ decisions, § 921. The assertion that proper adjudication is essential to proper performance of the Director’s functions is quite simply contrary to the whole structure of the Act. To make an implausible argument even worse, the Director must acknowledge that her lack of control over the adjudicative process does not even deprive her of the power to resolve legal ambiguities in the statute. She retains the rulemaking power, see § 939(a), which means that if her problem with the present decision of the Board is that it has established an erroneous rule of law, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), she has full power to alter that rule. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992) (“[T]he [Board] is not entitled to any special deference”). Her only possible complaint, then, is that she does not agree with the outcome of this particular case. The Director also claims that precluding her from seeking review of erroneous Board rulings “would reduce the incentive for employers to view the Director’s informal resolution efforts as authoritative, because the employer could proceed to a higher level of review from which the Director could not appeal.” Brief for Petitioner 19. This argument assumes that her informal resolution efforts are supposed to be “authoritative.” We doubt that. The structure of the statute suggests that they are supposed to be facilitative — a service to both parties, rather than an imposition upon either of them. But even if the opposite were true, we doubt that the unlikely prospect that the Director will appeal when the claimant does not will have much of an impact upon whether the employer chooses to spurn the Director’s settlement proposal and roll the dice before the Board. The statutory requirement of adverse effect or aggrievement must be based upon “something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 688.

The Director seeks to derive support for her position from Congress’ later enactment of the BLBA in 1978, but it seems to us that the BLBA militates precisely against her position. The BLBA expressly provides that “[t]he Secretary shall be a party in any proceeding relative to a claim for benefits under this part.” 30 U. S. C. § 932(k). The Director argues that since the Secretary is explicitly made a party under the BLBA, she must be meant to be a party under the LHWCA as well. That is not a form of reasoning we are familiar with. The normal conclusion one would derive from putting these statutes side by side is this: When, in a legislative scheme of this sort, Congress wants the Secretary to have standing, it says so.

Finally, the Director retreats to that last redoubt of losing causes, the proposition that the statute at hand should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, see, e. g., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 268 (1977). That principle may be invoked, in case of ambiguity, to find present rather than absent elements that are essential to operation of a legislative scheme; but it does not add features that will achieve the statutory “purposes” more effectively. Every statute purposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular means — and there is often a considerable legislative battle over what those means ought to be. The withholding of agency authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites between the two. Construing the LHWCA as liberally as can be, we cannot find that the Director is “adversely affected or aggrieved” within the meaning of § 921(c).

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

So ordered.

Justice Ginsburg,

concurring in the judgment.

The Court holds that the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs of the United States Department of Labor (OWCP) lacks standing under § 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., to seek judicial review of LHWCA claim determinations. Before amendment of the LHWCA in 1972, the Act’s administrator had authority to seek review of LHWCA claim determinations in the courts of appeals. The Court reads the 1972 amendments as divesting the Act’s administrator of access to federal appellate tribunals formerly open to the administrator’s petitions. . The practical effect of the Court’s ruling is to order a disparity between two compensatory schemes— the LHWCA and the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 83 Stat. 792, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. — measures that Congress intended to work in essentially the same way.

Significantly, however, the Court observes that our precedent “certainly establishes] that Congress could have conferred standing upon the [OWCP] Director without infringing Article III of the Constitution.” Ante, at 133 (emphasis in original). While I do not challenge the Court’s conclusion that the Director lacks standing under the amended Act, I write separately because I am convinced that Congress did not advert to the change — the withdrawal of the LHWCA administrator’s access to judicial review — wrought by the 1972 LHWCA amendments. Since no Article III impediment stands in its way, Congress may speak the final word by determining whether and how to correct its apparent oversight.

I

Before the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, the OWCP Director’s predecessors as administrators of the Act, officials called OWCP deputy commissioners, adjudicated LHWCA claims in the first instance. 33 U. S. C. §§ 919, 923 (1970 ed.); see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F. 2d 376, 381-382 (CADC), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1119 (1983). A deputy commissioner’s claim determination could be challenged in federal district court in an injunctive action against the deputy commissioner. 33 U. S. C. § 921(b) (1970 ed.); see Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244, 245 (1941). As a defending party in district courts, the deputy commissioner could appeal adverse rulings to the courts of appeals pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291, even when no other party sought appeal. See Henderson v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 134 F. 2d 320, 322 (CA5 1943) (“There are numerous cases in which the deputy commissioner has appealed as the sole party, and his right to appeal has never been questioned.”) (citing, inter alia, Parker, supra).

The 1972 LHWCA amendments shifted the deputy commissioners’ adjudicatory authority to Department of Labor administrative law judges (AU’s). Although district directors — as deputy commissioners are now called — are empowered to investigate LHWCA claims and attempt to resolve them informally, they must order a hearing before an ALJ upon a party’s request. 38 U. S. C. § 919. The 1972 amendments also replaced district court injunctive actions with appeals to the newly created Benefits Review Board. Just as the deputy commissioners were parties before district courts prior to 1972, the Director — as the Secretary’s delegate — is a party before the Benefits Review Board under the current scheme. 20 CFR § 801.2(a)(10) (1994). Either the Director or another party may invoke Board review of an ALJ’s decision. 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(3); 20 CFR §§801.102, 801.2(a)(10) (1994). As before the amendments, further review is available in the courts of appeals. 33 U. S. C. § 921(c).

The Court holds that the LHWCA, as amended in 1972, does not entitle the Director to appeal Benefits Review Board decisions to the courts of appeals. Congress surely decided to transfer adjudicative functions from the deputy commissioners to ALJ’s, and from the district courts to the Benefits Review Board. But there is scant reason to believe that Congress consciously decided to strip the Act’s administrator of authority that official once had to seek judicial review of claim determinations adverse to the administrator’s position. In amending the LHWCA in 1972, Congress did not expressly address the standing of the Secretary of Labor or his delegate to petition for judicial review. Congress did use the standard phrase “person adversely affected or aggrieved” to describe proper petitioners to the courts of appeals. See 33 U. S. C. § 921(c). But it is doubtful that Congress comprehended the full impact of that phrase: Not only does it qualify employers and injured workers to seek judicial review but, as interpreted, it ordinarily disqualifies agencies acting in a governmental capacity from petitioning for court review.

II

Congress’ 1978 revision of the BLBA reveals the judicial review design Congress ordered when it consciously attended to this matter. The 1978 BLBA amendments were adopted, in part, to keep adjudication of BLBA claims under the same procedural regime as the one Congress devised for LHWCA claims. In the 1978 BLBA prescriptions, Congress expressly provided for the party status of the OWCP Director. See 30 U. S. C. § 932(k) (“The Secretary [of Labor] shall be a party in any proceeding relative to a claim for [black lung] benefits.”).

Congress enacted the BLBA in 1969 to afford compensation to coal miners and their survivors for death or disability caused by pneumoconiosis (black lung disease). See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 8 (1976). The BLBA generally adopts the claims adjudication scheme of the LHWCA. 30 U. S. C. § 932(a). Congress amended the BLBA in 1978 to clarify that the BLBA continuously incorporates LHWCA claim adjudication procedures. See § 7(a)(1), 92 Stat. 98 (amending BLBA to incorporate LHWCA “as it may be amended from time to time”); S. Rep. No. 95-209, p. 18 (1977) (BLBA amendment “makes clear that any and all amendments to the [LHWCA]” are incorporated by the BLBA, including “the 1972 amendments relating to the use of Administrative Law Judges in claims adjudication”).

In the context of assuring automatic application of LHWCA procedures to black lung claims, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-864, pp. 22-28 (1978), Congress added to the BLBA the provision for the Secretary of Labor’s party status “in any proceeding relative to a claim for [black lung] benefits.” See § 7(k), 92 Stat. 99. According to the Report of the Senate Committee on Human Resources:

“Some question has arisen as to whether the adjudication procedures applicable to black lung claims incorporating various sections of the amended [LHWCA] confe[r] standing upon the Secretary of Labor or his designee to appear, present evidence, file appeals or respond to appeals filed with respect to the litigation and appeal of claims. In establishing the [LHWCA] procedures it was the intent of this Committee to afford the Secretary the right to advance his views in the formal claims litigation context whether or not the Secretary had a direct financial interest in the outcome of the case. The Secretary’s interest as the officer charged with the responsibility for carrying forth the intent of Congress with respect to the [BLBA] should be deemed sufficient to confer standing on the Secretary or such designee of the Secretary who has the responsibility for the enforcement of the [BLBA], to actively participate in the adjudication of claims before the Administrative Law Judge, Benefits Review Board, and appropriate United States Courts.” S. Rep. No. 95-209, supra, at 21-22 (emphasis added).

Even if this passage cannot force an uncommon reading of the LHWCA words “person adversely affected or aggrieved,” see ante, at 130, it strongly indicates that Congress considered vital to sound administration of the Act the administrator’s access to court review.

The Director has been a party before this Court in nine argued cases involving the LHWCA. In two of these cases, the Director was a petitioner in the Court of Appeals. As this string of cases indicates, the impact of the 1972 amendments on the Director’s statutory standing generally escaped this Court’s attention just as it apparently slipped from Congress’ grasp.

Ill

In addition to the BLBA, four other Federal Acts incorporate the LHWCA’s claim adjudication procedures. See Defense Base Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1651; District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, 36 D. C. Code Ann. §501 (1973); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b); Employees of Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 8171. Claims under the LHWCA, the BLBA, and these other Acts are handled by the same administrative actors: the OWCP Director, district directors, ALJ’s, and the Benefits Review Board. Because the same procedures generally apply in the administration of these benefits programs, common issues arise under the several programs. See, e. g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 281 (1994) (invalidating “true doubt” burden of persuasion rule that Department of Labor ALJ’s applied in both LHWCA and BLBA claim adjudications).

Under the Court’s holding, the Director can appeal the Benefits Review Board’s resolution of a BLBA claim, but not the Board’s resolution of an identical issue presented in a claim under the LHWCA or the other four Acts. I concur in the Court’s judgment despite the disharmony it establishes and my conviction that Congress did not intend to put the administration of the BLBA and the LHWCA out of sync. Correcting a scrivener’s error is within this Court’s competence, see, e. g., United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439 (1993), but only Congress can correct larger oversights of the kind presented by the OWCP Director’s petition.

       The court found that, as administrator of the §944 special fund, the Director did have standing to appeal the Board’s decision to grant respondent relief under § 908(f). That ruling is not before us, and we express no view upon it.

       In addition to not reaching the § 921(c) question, Perini also took as a given (because it had been conceded below) the answer to another question: whether the Director (rather than the Benefits Review Board) is the proper party respondent to an appeal from the Board’s determination. See 459 U. S., at 304, n. 13. Obviously, an agency’s entitlement to party respondent status does not necessarily imply that agency’s standing to appeal: The National Labor Relations Board, for example, is always the party respondent to an employer or employee appeal, but cannot initiate an appeal from its own determination. 29 U. S. C. §§ 152(1), 160(f). Indeed, it can be argued, as amici in this case have done, that if the Director is the proper party respondent in the court of appeals (as her regulations assert, see 20 CFR § 802.410 (1994)), in initiating an appeal she would end up on both sides of the ease. See Brief for National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. as Amici Curiae 17, n. 14. Our opinion today intimates no view on the party-respondent question.

        United States v. ICC accorded the United States standing despite the facts that (1) the Interstate Commerce Act contained no specific judicial review provision, and (2) the APA’s general judicial review provision (“person adversely affected or aggrieved”) excludes agencies from the definition of “person.” See infra, at 129. It would thus appear that an agency suing in what might be termed a nongovernmental capacity escapes that definitional limitation. The LHWCA likewise contains a definition of “person” that does not specifically include agencies. 33 U. S. C. § 902(1). We chose not to rely upon that provision in this opinion because it seemed more likely to sweep in the question of the Director’s authority to appeal Board rulings that are adverse to the § 944 special fund, which deserves separate attention. It is possible that the Director’s status as manager of the privately financed fund removes her from the “person” limitation, just as it may remove her from the more general limitation that agencies qua agencies are not “adversely affected or aggrieved.” We leave those issues to be resolved in a case where the Director’s relationship to the fund is immediately before us.

       In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit raised the standing issue in this case on its own motion because it feared that judicial review initiated by the Director would “strikfe] at the core of the constitutional limitations placed upon th[e] court by Article III of the Constitution.” 8 F. 3d 175, 180, n. 1 (1993); see also Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 302-305 (1983) (noting but not deciding Article III issue).

       20 CFR §§ 701.301(a)(7), 702.105 (1994).

       The law-presentation role OWCP’s Director seeks to play might be compared with the role of an advocate general or ministére public in civil law proceedings. See generally M. Glendon, M. Gordon, & C. Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions 344 (2d ed. 1994); R. David, French Law 59 (1972).

        Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267 (1994); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 506 U. S. 153 (1993); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469 (1992); Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 461 U. S. 624 (1983); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297 (1983); U. S. Industries/Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 455 U. S. 608 (1982); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268 (1980); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249 (1977).

        Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 461 U. S. 624 (1983); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29 (1979). In neither of these cases did the Board’s ruling affect the § 944 special fund. See ante, at 128, n. 3.

       This law “applies to all claims for injuries or deaths based on employment events that occurred prior to July 2[4], 1982, the effective date of the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act [36 D. C. Code Ann. § 36-301 et seq. (1981)].” 20 CFR § 701.101(b) (1994).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Thomas

license: Public Domain

text:
    ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. EDWARDS, guardian ad litem for EDWARDS, et al.
    No. 93-1883.
    Argued January 18, 1995
    Decided March 22, 1995

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Dennis Paul Eckhart, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland III, Assistant Attorney General, and G. Mateo Muñoz, Deputy Attorney General.

      . Paul A. Engelmayer argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Kanter, and Howard S. Scher.

      Katherine E. Meiss argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Alice Bussiere, Patrice E. McElroy, Jodie Berger, and Paul Lee.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and LauraSue Schlatter, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, G. Oliver Koppell of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; for the State of Nevada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and John Albrecht, Deputy Attorney General, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, Vanesa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Donald L. Paillette, Acting Attorney General of Guam, Robert A Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Roland TV Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A Zumbrun and John H. Findley.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alliance for Children’s Rights et al. by Charles N. Freiberg and David B. Goodwin; and for the American Association of Retired Persons by Steven S. Zaleznick and Michael Schuster.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether federal law governing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program prohibits States from grouping into a single AFDC “assistance unit” all needy children who live in the same household under the care of one relative. Such grouping allows States to grant equal assistance to equally sized needy households, regardless of whether the children in the household are all siblings. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that federal law forbids States to equalize assistance in this manner. We disagree and accordingly reverse.

I

AFDC is a joint federal-state public assistance program authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). As its name indicates, the AFDC program “is designed to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and care for them.” Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974). The program “reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends,” so long as the State “administerfe] its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations.” Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985) (citing 42 U. S. C. §§ 602, 603).

One applicable federal rule requires state plans to provide that all members of a nuclear family who live in the same household must apply for AFDC assistance if any one of them applies; in addition, the income of all of these applicants must be aggregated in determining their eligibility and the amount of their monthly benefits. See 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38) (1988 ed., Supp. V); 45 CFR §206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1993). See generally Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587 (1987) (upholding rule against constitutional challenges). This “family filing unit rule” requires that all cohabiting nuclear family members be grouped into a single AFDC “assistance unit” (AU), defined by federal law as “the group of individuals whose income, resources and needs are considered as a unit for purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of payment.” 45 CFR § 206.10(b)(5) (1993). The regulation at issue in this case — California’s “non-sibling filing unit rule” (California Rule) — goes even further in this regard. It provides: “Two or more AUs in the same home shall be combined into one AU when ... [t]here is only one [adult] caretaker relative.” Cal. Dept. of Social Servs., Manual of Policies & Procedures § 82-824.1.13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 52. In other words, the California Rule groups into a single AU all needy children who live in the same household, whether or not they are siblings, if there is only one adult caring for all of them.

The consolidation of two or more AU’s into a single AU pursuant to the California Rule results in a decrease in the maximum per capita AFDC benefits for which the affected individuals are eligible. This occurs because, while California (like many States) increases the amount of assistance for each additional person added to an AU, the increase is not proportional. Thus, as the number of persons in the AU increases, the per capita payment to the AU decreases. See, e. g., Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U. S. 471, 473-474 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland AFDC regulation under which “the standard of need increases with each additional person in the household, but the increments become proportionately smaller”).

The situation of respondent Verna Edwards and her relatives illustrates the operation of these two rules. Initially, Mrs. Edwards received AFDC assistance on behalf of her granddaughter, for whom she is the sole caretaker. As a one-person AU, the granddaughter was eligible to receive a “maximum aid payment” of $341 per month prior to September 1991. See n. 1, supra. Later, Mrs. Edwards began caring for her two grandnieces, who are siblings. Pursuant to the federal family filing unit rule, the grandnieces are grouped together in a two-person AU, which was eligible to receive $560 per month in benefits prior to September 1991. See ibid. Because none of these children received any outside income, Mrs. Edwards received $901 per month in AFDC assistance on behalf of the three girls. In June 1991, however, Mrs. Edwards received notice that pursuant to the California Rule, her granddaughter and two grandnieces would be grouped together into a single three-person AU, which was eligible to receive only $694 per month. See ibid. The California Rule thus reduced AFDC payments to the Edwards household by $207 per month.

On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Mrs. Edwards, her three relatives, and other respondents brought this action against petitioners, the state officials charged with administering California’s AFDC program, in the District Court for the Eastern District of California. Pursuant to Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, respondents sought a declaration that the California Rule violates federal law and an injunction prohibiting petitioners from enforcing it. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted the requested relief. It found the California Rule indistinguishable in relevant respects from the Washington regulation invalidated in Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F. 2d 701 (CA9 1990).

In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It found the California Rule “virtually identical” to the Washington regulation that Beaton had held to be “inconsistent with federal law and regulation.” Edwards v. Healy, 12 F. 3d 154, 155 (1993). Since the Court of Appeals issued its decision, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) — which administers the AFDC program on the federal level — determined that its own AFDC regulations “do not conflict with the State policy option to consolidate assistance units in the same household.” Transmittal No. ACF-AT-94-6 (Mar. 16, 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. Moreover, a number of Federal Courts of Appeals and state courts of last resort have recently issued rulings at odds with the decision below. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 512 U. S. 1288 (1994), and we now reverse.

II

In Beaton, the Ninth Circuit ruled that grouping into the same AU all needy children (both siblings and non-siblings alike) who live in the same household is inconsistent with three different federal AFDC regulations, namely, 45 CFR §§ 233.20(a)(2)(viii), 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), and 233.90(a)(1) (1993). See Beaton, supra, at 704. Respondents rely principally on these three regulations in their submission here.

As we examine the regulations, we keep in mind that in AFDC cases, “the starting point of the ... analysis must be a recognition that . . . federal law gives each State great latitude in dispensing its available funds.” Dandridge, supra, at 478. Accord, Shea, 416 U. S., at 253 (States “are given broad discretion in determining both the standard of need and the level of benefits”). In light of this cardinal principle, we conclude that the federal regulations do not preclude the adoption of the California Rule.

A

According to § 233.20(a)(2)(viii), States may not reduce the amount of assistance for which AFDC applicants are eligible “solely because of the presence in the household of a non-legally responsible individual.” Using the example of Mrs. Edwards and her relatives, respondents observe that, although the granddaughter received AFDC benefits of $341 per month before the two grandnieces came to live in Mrs. Edwards’ household, she received only one-third of $694, or $231.33, per month after the grandnieces arrived and the California Rule took effect. See Brief for Respondents 6, 22. This reduction in the granddaughter’s per capita benefits occurred, according to respondents, “solely because of the presence in the household of” the grandnieces, who are “non-legally responsible individuals]” in relation to the granddaughter.

Respondents are simply wrong. It was not solely the presence of the grandnieces that triggered the decline in per capita benefits paid to the granddaughter; rather, it was the grandnieces’ presence plus their application for AFDC assistance through Mrs. Edwards. Had the two grandnieces, after coming to live in Mrs. Edwards’ home, either not applied for assistance or applied through a different caretaker relative living in that home, the California Rule would not have affected the granddaughter’s benefits at all.

B

Respondents also argue that the California Rule violates the “availability” principle, which is implemented, in one form or another, by all three federal regulations. Section 233.90(a)(1) provides that “the inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a ‘substitute parent’ or ‘man-in-the-house’ or any individual other than [the child’s parent] is not an acceptable basis for . . . assuming the availability of income” to a needy child. Likewise, § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) provides that States may “not assume any contribution from [a nonlegally responsible] individual for the support of the assistance unit.” Finally, § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) provides generally that States shall, “in determining need and the amount of the assistance payment,” count only “[i]ncome . . . and resources available for current use”; the regulation adds that “income and resources are considered available both when actually available and when [legally available].”

According to respondents, the California Rule assumes that income from relatives is contributed to, or otherwise available to, a needy child without a determination that it is actually available. If Mrs. Edwards’ granddaughter were to begin receiving $75 per month in outside income, for example, the AU of which she is a part would receive $75 less in monthly AFDC benefits, and the two grandnieces would each accordingly receive $25 less in per capita monthly benefits. Thus, the California Rule assertedly “assumes,” in violation of all three federal regulations, that the granddaughter will contribute $25 per month of her outside income to each grandniece and also that such income will therefore be available to each grandniece — without a case-specific determination that such contribution will in fact occur.

Respondents’ argument fails for at least two reasons. First, its premise is questionable. Although in this example, the grandnieces each will nominally receive $25 less in per capita monthly benefits, they will actually receive less in benefits only if one assumes that Mrs. Edwards will expend an equal amount of AFDC assistance on each of the three children — without regard to any other relevant circumstances, such as whether one of them receives outside income. Not only would such assumption fail to reflect reality, see, e. g., Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 600, n. 14, it would also be inconsistent with the duty imposed on caretakers by federal law to spend AFDC payments “in the best interests of the children]” for whom they care, 42 U. S. C. § 605, a duty specifically implemented by California law, see, e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §§11005.5, 11480 (West 1991). Thus, California may rationally assume that a caretaker will observe her duties to all the members of the AU and will take into account the receipt of any outside income by one child when expending funds on behalf of the AU.

Second, respondents’ argument misperceives the operation of the California Rule. In the foregoing example, California would simply add the monthly income of all members of the AU — $75 (granddaughter) plus $0 (first grandniece) plus $0 (second grandniece) for a total of $75 — and reduce the monthly assistance payment to the Edwards family AU accordingly. It should be clear from this example that the monthly payment to the AU is reduced not because the California Rule “assumes” that any income is available to the grandnieces, but because it places the two grandnieces into the same AU as the granddaughter (whose income is actually available to herself). What respondents are really attacking is the rule that the income of all members of the AU is combined in order to determine the amount of the assistance payment to the AU. This attack ignores the very definition of an AU: the group of individuals whose income and resources are considered “as a unit” for purposes of determining the amount of the assistance payment. 45 CFR § 206.10(b)(5) (1993). Accord, Brief for Respondents 4 (“All of the income and resources of everyone in the assistance unit are taken into consideration in establishing the benefit payment”).

Perhaps respondents are arguing that the regulations simply forbid California to combine the incomes of all needy children in a household — whether by grouping them into the same AU or otherwise. But whatever are the limits that federal law imposes on States’ authority in this regard, the combination of incomes effected by the California Rule is authorized by the AFDC statute itself, which provides that a state agency “shall, in determining need, take into consideration any .. . income and resources of any child or relative claiming [AFDC assistance].” 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1988 ed. and Supp. V). In light of the “great latitude,” Dandridge, 397 U. S., at 478, and the “broad discretion,” Shea, 416 U. S., at 253, that States have in administering their AFDC programs, this statute is reasonably construed to allow States, in determining a child’s need (and therefore how much assistance she will receive), to take into consideration the income and resources of all cohabiting children and relatives also claiming AFDC assistance.

The availability regulations are addressed to an entirely different problem, namely, the counting of income and resources controlled by persons outside the AU for the purpose of determining the amount of assistance to be provided to the AU. The regulations were adopted to implement our decisions in three AFDC cases. See 42 Fed. Reg. 6583-6584 (1977) (citing King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U. S. 552 (1970); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975)). In all three cases, the State had counted as available to the AU income that was not actually or legally available because it was controlled by a person who was not a member of the AU and who was not applying for AFDC assistance. See King, supra, at 311 (a “ ‘substitute father,’ ” defined as any able-bodied man who cohabited with the mother of the needy children in or outside her home); Lewis, supra, at 554 (“an adult male person assuming the role of spouse to the mother,” such as a common-law husband, or a nonadopting stepfather not legally obligated to support the children); Van Lare, supra, at 339, 340 (a “nonpaying lodge[r],” who was “a person not a recipient of AFDC”). Accord, Bray v. Dowling, 25 F. 3d 135, 144 (CA2 1994) (the federal availability regulations “were established to address specific concerns regarding the imputation of income from non-AFDC sources”), cert. pending, No. 94-5845.

The California Rule has no such effect. The combined income of the three-person AU comprising the granddaughter and two grandnieces of Mrs. Edwards is not calculated with reference to the income either of Mrs. Edwards herself or of anyone else inside or outside the Edwards household who is not a member of the AU and who is not applying for AFDC assistance. In sum, the California Rule does not violate any of the three federal regulations on which the Court of Appeals relied.

III

Respondents offer two alternative grounds to support the judgment below. Neither has merit, and we may dispose of them quickly.

First, respondents argue that the California Rule is an invalid expansion of the family filing unit rule, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38). According to respondents, when Congress decreed that all members of a nuclear family must be grouped together in a single AU, it intended to prevent States from including any additional persons in that AU (as does the California Rule). We reject the notion that Congress’ directive regarding the composition of assistance units “occupied the field” and thereby pre-empted States from adopting any additional rules touching this area. What we said about “workfare” in New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 414 (1973), applies here as well: “If Congress had intended to pre-empt state plans and efforts in such an important dimension of the AFDC program . . . , such intentions would in all likelihood have been expressed in direct and unambiguous language.” The language of § 602(a)(38) requires States to embrace the family filing unit rule; it does not further limit States’ discretion in a direct or unambiguous manner.

Second, respondents argue that the California Rule violates two other federal regulations that require equitable treatment among AFDC recipients. See 45 CFR § 233.10(a)(1) (1993) (“[T]he eligibility conditions imposed ... must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups”); § 233.20(a)(l)(i) (“[T]he determination of need and amount of assistance for all applicants [must] be made on an objective and equitable basis”). Assuming that these provisions even “creat[e] a ‘federal right’ that is enforceable under [42 U. S. C.] § 1983,” Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990), we find that the California Rule affirmatively fosters equitable treatment among AFDC recipients.

For example, prior to September 1991 a caretaker relative responsible for three brothers having no outside income would have received AFDC benefits of $694 per month on their behalf. Yet before the California Rule was applied to her household, Mrs. Edwards received monthly benefits of $901 for the three girls for whom she cared. See supra, at 148. The $207 difference is due solely to the fact that in one household all of the children are siblings, while in the other they are not. The potential mequities in the absence of the California Rule are even greater. Six needy siblings living in the same household in California could have received up to $1,057 per month in benefits before September 1991. But prior to the California Rule’s adoption, six needy nonsiblings who lived in the same household could have received as much as $2,046, or almost double. See n. 1, supra. The California Rule sensibly and equitably eliminates these disparities by providing that equally sized and equally needy households will receive equal AFDC assistance. Thus, the rule does not violate the equitable treatment regulations.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the California Rule does not violate federal law. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Between July 1, 1989, and August 31, 1991, California adhered to the following schedule of maximum monthly AFDC payments:

        Number of •persons in AU Maximum aid payment Per capita payment

      1 $ 341 $341.00
      2 560 280.00
      3 694 231.33
      4 824 206.00
      5 940 188.00
      6 1,057 176.17
      7 1,160 165.71
      8 1,265 158.13
      9 1,366 151.78
      10 or more 1,468 146.80
      Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment in No. CV-S 91 1473 (ED Cal.), p. 7 (Feb. 13,1992). Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 488 (1970) (reproducing similar Maryland schedule.) The current schedule is set forth in Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994), as modified by §§ 11450.01(a), (b) and 11450.015(a).

       Mrs. Edwards does not receive AFDC assistance for herself. As explained in the text, the family filing unit rule requires parents to apply for assistance along with their children. But apart from this rule, caretaker relatives need not apply for assistance along with the needy children for whom they care, although they may do so.

       See Bray v. Dowling, 25 F. 3d 135 (CA2 1994) (New York policy), cert. pending, No. 94-5845; Wilkes v. Gomez, 32 F 3d 1324 (CA8 1994) (Minnesota rule), cert. pending, No. 94-6929; MacInnes v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 412 Mass. 790, 593 N. E. 2d 222 (1992); Morrell v. Flaherty, 338 N. C. 230, 449 S. E. 2d 175 (1994).

       Section 233.20(a)(2)(viii) provides:
      “[T]he money amount of any need item included in the standard will not be prorated or otherwise reduced solely because of the presence in the household of a non-legally responsible individual; and the [state] agency will not assume any contribution from such individual for the support of the assistance unit....”
      Section 233.20(a)(3)(ii) provides in part:
      “[I]n determining need and the amount of the assistance payment, . . . :
      “(D) Income ... and resources available for current use shall be considered. To the extent not inconsistent with any other provision of this chapter, income and resources are considered available both when actually available and when the applicant or recipient has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and maintenance.”
      Section 233.90(a)(1) provides:
      “The determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such cases) the unemployment of his or her parent who is the principal earner will be made only in relation to the child’s natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child’s stepparent who is married, under State law, to the child’s natural or [adoptive] parent and is legally obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children. Under this requirement, the inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a ‘substitute parent’ or ‘man-in-the-house’ or any individual other than one described in this paragraph is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State ....”

       Although needy children will receive less in per capita benefits under the California Rule, this reduction affects only children who share a household. California is simply recognizing the economies of scale that inhere in such living arrangements. See, e. g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 599 (1987) (crediting “‘the common sense proposition that individuals living with others usually have reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are shared’” (quoting Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2 1979))).

       We are aware that in certain situations in which a member of a consolidated AU begins to receive outside income (such as monthly child support payments, an inheritance, or even lottery winnings), the household would receive a larger AFDC monthly payment if the recipient (along with all members of her nuclear family, as required by the federal family filing unit rule) terminated her participation in the AFDC program. See, e. g., Gilliard, 483 U. S., at 591 (citing example from prior to federal rule’s adoption). Were California law to forbid a person to “opt out” of the AFDC program in these situations, it might be said that the State had reduced AFDC assistance to the AU’s remaining members based solely on the presence or the income of a person who is not applying for such assistance.
      We find it unnecessary to determine whether California law ever forbids a person who begins receiving outside income to opt out of the AFDC program. Certainly, nothing in the California Rule itself speaks to this issue. Furthermore, because respondents challenged the California Rule on its face by seeking to enjoin its enforcement altogether, see First Amended Complaint in No. CV-S 91 1473 (ED Cal.), pp. 16-17 (Jan. 10, 1992), they could not sustain their burden even if they showed that a possible application of the rule (in concert with another statute or regulation) violated federal law. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (a facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [rule] would be valid”). Though an as-applied challenge that presented the opt-out issue in a concrete factual setting might require a court to decide it, such a challenge is not now before us.

       In its 1994 Transmittal, see supra, at 149, HHS examined all of the federal AFDC rules at issue in this case — the three availability regulations, the statutory family filing unit rule, and the equitable treatment regulations. The agency concluded: “Apart from complying with [the family filing unit rule and a related rule], States are authorized to set the State-wide policy, to be applied in all cases, whether and under what conditions two or more assistance units in the same household are to be consolidated or retained as separate units.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 35. Because we have independently reached the same conclusion, we have no occasion to decide whether we must defer to the agency’s position. Cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 150 (1991) (“It is well established ‘that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference’ ” (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986))).


author: Justice Breyer

text:
    QUALITEX CO. v. JACOBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC.
    No. 93-1577.
    Argued January 9, 1995
    Decided March 28, 1995

      Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Donald G. Mulack argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Christopher A. Bloom, Edward J. Chalfie, Heather C. Steinmeyer, and Ava B. Campagna.

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorneys General Hunger and Bingaman, Diane P. Wood, James A. Feldman, William Ranter, Marc Richman, Nancy J. Linck, Albin F. Drost, Nancy C. Slutter, and Linda Moneys Isacson.

      Laurence D. Strick argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Bar Association of the District of Columbia by Bruce T. Wieder, Sheldon H. Klein, and Linda S. Paine-Powell; for B. F. Goodrich Co. by Lawrence S. Robbins and Mary Ann Tucker; for the Crosby Group, Inc., by Robert D. Yeager; for Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Corp. by David C. Gryce; for the Hand Tools Institute et al. by James E. Siegel, Witold A. Ziarno, and Rosemarie Biondi-Tofano; for' Intellectual Property Owners by George R. Powers, Neil A Smith, and Herbert C. Wamsley; for the International Trademark Association by Christopher C. Larkin, Joan L. Dillon, and Morton David Goldberg; and for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. by Michael W. Schwartz and Marc Wolinsky.

        Arthur M. Handler filed a brief for the Private Label Manufacturers Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), permits the registration of a trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color. We conclude that, sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements. And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark.

I

The case before us grows out of petitioner Qualitex Company’s use (since the 1950’s) of a special shade of green-gold color on the pads that it makes and sells to dry cleaning firms for use on dry cleaning presses. In 1989, respondent Jacobson Products (a Qualitex rival) began to sell its own press pads to dry cleaning firms; and it colored those pads a similar green gold. In 1991, Qualitex registered the special green-gold color on press pads with the Patent and Trademark Office as a trademark. Registration No. 1,633,711 (Feb. 5, 1991). Qualitex subsequently added a trademark infringement count, 15 U. S. C. § 1114(1), to an unfair competition claim* § 1125(a), in a lawsuit it had already filed challenging Jacobson’s use of the green-gold color.

Qualitex won the lawsuit in the District Court. 21 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1457 (CD Cal. 1991). But, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment in Qualitex’s favor on the trademark infringement claim because, in that Circuit’s view, the Lanham Act does not permit Qualitex, or anyone else, to register “color alone” as a trademark. 13 F. 3d 1297, 1300, 1302 (1994).

The Courts of Appeals have differed as to whether or not the law recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark. Compare NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F. 2d 1024, 1028 (CA7 1990) (absolute prohibition against protection of color alone), with In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F. 2d 1116, 1128 (CA Fed. 1985) (allowing registration of color pink for fiberglass insulation), and Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F. 2d 219, 224 (CA8 1993) (declining to establish per se prohibition against protecting color alone as a trademark). Therefore, this Court granted certiorari. 512 U. S. 1287 (1994). We now hold that there is no rule absolutely barring the use of color alone, and we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

II

The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to “register” a trademark, 15 U. S. C. § 1052 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), and to prevent his or her competitors from using that trademark, § 1114(1). Both the language of the Act and the basic underlying principles of trademark law would seem to include color within the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark. The language of the Lanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It says that trademarks “includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.” §1127. Since human beings might use as a “symbol” or “device” almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive. The courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC’s three chimes), and even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread). See, e. g., Registration No. 696,147 (Apr. 12,1960); Registration Nos. 523,616 (Apr. 4, 1950) and 916,522 (July 13, 1971); In re Clarke, 17 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1238, 1240 (TTAB 1990). If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?

A color is also capable of satisfying the more important part of the statutory definition of a trademark, which requires that a person “us[e]” or “inten[d] to use” the mark

“to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 15 U. S. C. § 1127.

True, a product’s color is unlike “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive” words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F. 2d 4, 9-10 (CA2 1976) (Friendly, J.); see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S. 763, 768 (1992). The imaginary word “Suntost,” or the words “Suntost Marmalade,” on a jar of orange jam immediately would signal a brand or a product “source”; the jam’s orange color does not do so. But, over time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a product or its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual, such as pink on a firm’s insulating material or red on the head of a large industrial bolt) as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have come to identify and distinguish the goods — i. e., “to indicate” their “source” — much in the way that descriptive words on a product (say, “Trim” on nail clippers or “Car-Freshner” on deodorizer) can come to indicate a product’s origin. See, e. g., J. Wiss & Sons Co. v. W. E. Bassett Co., 59 C. C. P. A. 1269, 1271 (Pat.), 462 F. 2d 567, 569 (1972); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 162,164 (SDNY 1967). In this circumstance, trademark law says that the word (e. g., “Trim”), although not inherently distinctive, has developed “secondary meaning.” See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982) (“[Secondary meaning” is acquired when “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself”). Again, one might ask, if trademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary meaning to act as a mark, why would it not permit a color, under similar circumstances, to do the same?

We cannot find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where that color has attained “secondary meaning” and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand (and thus indicates its “source”). In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” 1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §2.01[2], p. 2-3 (3d ed. 1994) (hereinafter McCarthy), for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item — the item with this mark — is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. The law thereby “encourage[s] the production of quality products,” ibid., and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale. See, e. g., 3 L. Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 17.03 (4th ed. 1983); Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 T. M. Rep. 267, 271-272 (1988); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985); S. Rep. No. 100-515, p. 4 (1988). It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark — not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign — that permits it to serve these basic purposes. See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. Law & Econ. 265, 290 (1987). And, for that reason, it is difficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark.

Neither can we find a principled objection to the use of color as a mark in the important “functionality” doctrine of trademark law. The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 U. S. C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity). See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 119-120 (1938) (Brandéis, J.); Inwood Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 863 (White, J., concurring in result) (“A functional characteristic is ‘an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product,’ and, after expiration of a patent, it is no more the property of the originator than the product itself”) (citation omitted). Functionality doctrine therefore would require, to take an imaginary example, that even if customers have come to identify the special illumination-enhancing shape of a new patented light bulb with a particular manufacturer, the manufacturer may not use that shape as a trademark, for doing so, after the patent had expired, would impede competition — not by protecting the reputation of the original bulb maker, but by frustrating competitors’ legitimate efforts to produce an equivalent illumination-enhancing bulb. See, e. g., Kellogg Co., supra, at 119-120 (trademark law cannot be used to extend monopoly over “pillow” shape of shredded wheat biscuit after the patent for that shape had expired). This Court consequently has explained that, “[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional,” and cannot serve as a trademark, “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,” that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. Inwood Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 850, n. 10. Although sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to source identification) in making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not. And, this latter fact — the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality — indicates that the doctrine of “functionality” does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark. See Owens-Corning, 774 F. 2d, at 1123 (pink color of insulation in wall “performs no non-trademark function”).

It would seem, then, that color alone, at least sometimes, can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other significant function. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1202.04(e), p. 1202-13 (2d ed. May, 1993) (hereinafter PTO Manual) (approving trademark registration of color alone where it “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” provided that “there is [no] competitive need for colors to remain available in the industry” and the color is not “functional”); see also 1 McCarthy §§3.01[1], 7.26, pp. 3-2, 7-113 (“requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a trademark” are that it be (1) a “symbol,” (2) “use[d] ... as a mark,” (3) “to identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made or sold by others,” but that it not be “functional”). Indeed, the District Court, in this case, entered findings (accepted by the Ninth Circuit) that show Qualitex’s green-gold press pad color has met these requirements. The green-gold color acts as a symbol. Having developed secondary meaning (for customers identified the green-gold color as Qualitex’s), it identifies the press pads’ source. And, the green-gold color serves no other function. (Although it is important to use some color on press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the court found “no competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally usable.” 21 U. S. P. Q. 2d, at 1460.) Accordingly, unless there is some special reason that convincingly militates against the use of color alone as a trademark, trademark law would protect Qualitex’s use of the green-gold color on its press pads.

Ill

Respondent Jacobson Products says that there are four special reasons why the law should forbid the use of color alone as a trademark. We shall explain, in turn, why we, ultimately, find them unpersuasive.

First, Jacobson says that, if the law permits the use of color as a trademark, it will produce uncertainty and unresolvable court disputes about what shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use. Because lighting (morning sun, twilight mist) will affect perceptions of protected color, competitors and courts will suffer from “shade confusion” as they try to decide whether use of a similar color on a similar product does, or does not, confuse customers and thereby infringe a trademark. Jacobson adds that the “shade confusion” problem is “more difficult” and “far different from” the “determination of the similarity of words or symbols.” Brief for Respondent 22.

We do not believe, however, that color, in this respect, is special. Courts traditionally decide quite difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or symbols are sufficiently similar, in context, to confuse buyers. They have had to compare, for example, such words as “Bonamine” and “Dramamine” (motion-sickness remedies); “Huggies” and “Dougies” (diapers); “Cheracol” and “Syrocol” (cough syrup); “Cyclone” and “Tornado” (wire fences); and “Mattres” and “1-800-Mattres” (mattress franchisor telephone numbers). See, e. g., G. D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F. 2d 385, 389 (CA7 1959); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enterprises, Ltd., 774 F. 2d 1144, 1146-1147 (CA Fed. 1985); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F. 2d 254, 262 (CA2 1957); Hancock v. American Steel & Wire Co. of N. J., 40 C. C. R A. (Pat.) 931, 935, 203 F. 2d 737, 740-741 (1953); Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F. 2d 675, 678 (CA2 1989). Legal standards exist to guide courts in making such comparisons. See, e.g., 2 McCarthy §15.08; 1 McCarthy §§11.24-11.25 (“[S]trong” marks, with greater secondary meaning, receive broader protection than “weak” marks). We do not see why courts could not apply those standards to a color, replicating, if necessary, lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally sold. See Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do It By the Numbers!, 84 T. M. Rep. 379, 405 (1994). Indeed, courts already have done so in cases where a trademark consists of a color plus a design, i. e., a colored symbol such as a gold stripe (around a sewer pipe), a yellow strand of wire rope, or a “brilliant yellow” band (on ampules). See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Tallman Conduit Co., 149 U. S. P. Q. 656, 657 (TTAB 1966); Amstead Industries, Inc. v. West Coast Wire Rope & Rigging Inc., 2 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1755, 1760 (TTAB 1987); In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167 U. S. P. Q. 255, 256 (TTAB 1970).

Second, Jacobson argues, as have others, that colors are in limited supply. See, e. g., NutraSweet Co., 917 F. 2d, at 1028; Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F. 2d 795, 798 (CA3 1949). Jacobson claims that, if one of many competitors can appropriate a particular color for use as a trademark, and each competitor then tries to do the same, the supply of colors will soon be depleted. Put in its strongest form, this argument would concede that “[h]undreds of color pigments are manufactured and thousands of colors can be obtained by mixing.” L. Cheskin, Colors: What They Can Do For You 47 (1947). But, it would add that, in the context of a particular product, only some colors are usable. By the time one discards colors that, say, for reasons of customer appeal, are not usable, and adds the shades that competitors cannot use lest they risk infringing a similar, registered shade, then one is left with only a handful of possible colors. And, under these circumstances, to permit one, or a few, producers to use colors as trademarks will “deplete” the supply of usable colors to the point where a competitor’s inability to find a suitable color will put that competitor at a significant disadvantage.

This argument is unpersuasive, however, largely because it relies on an occasional problem to justify a blanket prohibition. When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will likely be available for similar use by others. See, e.g., Owens-Corning, 774 F. 2d, at 1121 (pink insulation). Moreover, if that is not so — if a “color depletion” or “color scarcity” problem does arise — the trademark doctrine of “functionality” normally would seem available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences that Jacobson’s argument posits, thereby minimizing that argument’s practical force.

The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects [its] cost or quality.” Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S., at 850, n. 10. The functionality doctrine thus protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features. For example, this Court has written that competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where that color serves to identify the kind of medication (e. g., a type of blood medicine) in addition to its source. See id., at 853, 858, n. 20 (“[S]ome patients commingle medications in a container and rely on color to differentiate one from another”); see also J. Ginsburg, D. Goldberg, & A. Greenbaum, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 194-195 (1991) (noting that drug color cases “have more to do with public health policy” regarding generic drug substitution “than with trademark law”). And, the federal courts have demonstrated that they can apply this doctrine in a careful and reasoned manner, with sensitivity to the effect on competition. Although we need not comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the green color of farm machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to match) and have barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard boat motors (because black has the special functional attributes of decreasing the apparent size of the motor and ensuring compatibility with many different boat colors). See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (SD Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F. 2d 253 (CA8 1983); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F. 3d 1527, 1532 (CA Fed. 1994), cert. pending, No. 94-1075; see also Nor-Am Chemical v. O. M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1316, 1320 (ED Pa. 1987) (blue color of fertilizer held functional because it indicated the presence of nitrogen). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adds that, if a design’s “aesthetic value” lies in its ability to “confe[r] a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs,” then the design is “functional.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17, Comment c, pp. 175-176 (1993). The “ultimate test of aesthetic functionality,” it explains, “is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competition.” Id., at 176.

The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant non-trademark function — whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the “noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things,” G. Chesterton, Simplicity and Tolstoy 61 (1912)— courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient. That examination should not discourage firms from creating esthetically pleasing mark designs, for it is open to their competitors to do the same. See, e. g., W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F. 2d 334, 343 (CA7 1985) (Posner, J.). But, ordinarily, it should prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson’s hypothetical “color depletion” argument, when, and if, the circumstances of a particular case threaten “color depletion.”

Third, Jacobson points to many older cases — including Supreme Court cases — in support of its position. In 1878, this Court described the common-law definition of trademark rather broadly to “consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by another.” McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 254. Yet, in interpreting the Trademark Acts of 1881 and 1905, 21 Stat. 502, 33 Stat. 724, which retained that common-law definition, the Court questioned “[wjhether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark,” A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U. S. 166, 171 (1906), and suggested that the “product including the coloring matter is free to all who make it,” Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U. S. 143, 147 (1920). Even though these statements amounted to dicta, lower courts interpreted them as forbidding protection for color alone. See, e. g., Campbell Soup Co., 175 F. 2d, at 798, and n. 9; Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F. 2d 4, 9 (CA7 1950) (quoting Campbell Soup, supra, at 798).

These Supreme Court cases, however, interpreted trademark law as it existed before 1946, when Congress enacted the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act significantly changed and liberalized the common law to “dispense with mere technical prohibitions,” S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946), most notably, by permitting trademark registration of descriptive words (say, “U-Build-It” model airplanes) where they had acquired “secondary meaning.” See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F. 2d, at 9 (Friendly, J.). The Lanham Act extended protection to descriptive marks by making clear that (with certain explicit exceptions not relevant here)

“nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f) (1988 ed., Supp. V).

This language permits an ordinary word, normally used for a nontrademark purpose (e. g., description), to act as a trademark where it has gained “secondary meaning.” Its logic would appear to apply to color as well. Indeed, in 1985, the Federal Circuit considered the significance of the Lanham Act’s changes as they related to color and held that trademark protection for color was consistent with the

“jurisprudence under the Lanham Act developed in accordance with the statutory principle that if a mark is capable of being or becoming distinctive of [the] applicant’s goods in commerce, then it is capable of serving as a trademark.” Owens-Corning, 774 F. 2d, at 1120.

In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act, revising portions of the definitional language, but left unchanged the language here relevant. § 134, 102 Stat. 3946, 15 U. S. C. § 1127. It enacted these amendments against the following background: (1) the Federal Circuit had decided Owens-Coming; (2) the Patent and Trademark Office had adopted a clear policy (which it still maintains) permitting registration of color as a trademark, see PTO Manual § 1202.04(e) (at p. 1200-12 of the January 1986 edition and p. 1202-13 of the May 1993 edition); and (3) the Trademark Commission had written a report, which recommended that “the terms ‘symbol, or device’ . . . not be deleted or narrowed to preclude registration of such things as a color, shape, smell, sound, or configuration which functions as a mark,” The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 T. M. Rep. 375, 421 (1987); see also 133 Cong. Rec. 32812 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (“The bill I am introducing today is based on the Commission’s report and recommendations”). This background strongly suggests that the language “any word, name, symbol, or device,” 15 U. S. C. § 1127, had come to include color. And, when it amended the statute, Congress retained these terms. Indeed, the Senate Report accompanying the Lanham Act revision explicitly referred to this background understanding, in saying that the “revised definition intentionally retains . . . the words ‘symbol or device’ so as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they function as trademarks.” S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 44. (In addition, the statute retained language providing that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration ... on account of its nature” (except for certain specified reasons not relevant here). 15 U. S. C. § 1052 (1988 ed., Supp. V).)

This history undercuts the authority of the precedent on which Jacobson relies. Much of the pre-1985 case law rested on statements in Supreme Court opinions that interpreted pre-Lanham Act trademark law and were not directly related to the holdings in those cases. Moreover, we believe the Federal Circuit was right in 1985 when it found that the 1946 Lanham Act embodied crucial legal changes that liberalized the law to permit the use of color alone as a trademark (under appropriate circumstances). At a minimum, the Lanham Act’s changes left the courts free to reevaluate the preexisting legal precedent which had absolutely forbidden the use of color alone as a trademark. Finally, when Congress reenacted the terms “word, name, symbol, or device” in 1988, it did so against a legal background in which those terms had come to include color, and its statutory revision embraced that understanding.

Fourth, Jacobson argues that there is no need to permit color alone to function as a trademark because a firm already may use color as part of a trademark, say, as a colored circle or colored letter or colored word, and may rely upon “trade dress” protection, under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, if a competitor copies its color and thereby causes consumer confusion regarding the overall appearance of the competing products or their packaging, see 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The first part of this argument begs the question. One can understand why a firm might find it difficult to place a usable symbol or word on a product (say, a large industrial bolt that customers normally see from a distance); and, in such instances, a firm might want to use color, pure and simple, instead of color as part of a design. Neither is the second portion of the argument convincing. Trademark law helps the holder of a mark in many ways that “trade dress” protection does not. See 15 U. S. C. § 1124 (ability to prevent importation of confusingly similar goods); § 1072 (constructive notice of ownership); § 1065 (incontestible status); § 1057(b) (prima facie evidence of validity and ownership). Thus, one can easily find reasons why the law might provide trademark protection in addition to trade dress protection.

IV

Having determined that a color may sometimes meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark and that respondent Jacobson’s arguments do not justify a special legal rule preventing color alone from serving as a trademark (and, in light of the District Court’s here undisputed findings that Qualitex’s use of the green-gold color on its press pads meets the basic trademark requirements), we conclude that the Ninth Circuit erred in barring Qualitex’s use of color as a trademark. For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is

Reversed.