author: Justice Thomas

text:
    WILSON v. ARKANSAS
    No. 94-5707.
    Argued March 28, 1995
    Decided May 22, 1995

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      John Wesley Hall, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Kent G. Holt, Vada Berger, and David R. Raupp, Assistant Attorneys General, and Andrew D. Leipold.

      Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States as . amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Paul A. Engelmayer, and Deborah Watson.

         Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Ephraim Margolin filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Rochman, Assistant Attorney General, and Eleni M. Constantine, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Gale A Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. “Jay” Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty Montgomery of Ohio, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charlie Condon of South Carolina, Mark Bennett of South Dakota, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; for Wayne County, Michigan, by John D. O’Hair and Timothy A Baughman; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Rickard M. Weintraub, Robert L. Desckamps, and Bernard J. Farber.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

At the time of the framing, the common law of search and seizure recognized a law enforcement officer’s authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence and authority. In this case, we hold that this common-law “knock and announce” principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.

I

During November and December 1992, petitioner Sharlene Wilson made a series of narcotics sales to an informant acting at the direction of the Arkansas State Police. In late November, the informant purchased marijuana and methamphetamine at the home that petitioner shared with Bryson Jacobs. On December 30, the informant telephoned petitioner at her home and arranged to meet her at a local store to buy some marijuana. According to testimony presented below, petitioner produced a semiautomatic pistol at this meeting and waved it in the informant’s face, threatening to kill her if she turned out to be working for the police. Petitioner then sold the informant a bag of marijuana.

The next day, police officers applied for and obtained warrants to search petitioner’s home and to arrest both petitioner and Jacobs. Affidavits filed in support of the warrants set forth the details of the narcotics transactions and stated that Jacobs had previously been convicted of arson and firebombing. The search was conducted later that afternoon. Police officers found the main door to petitioner’s home open. While opening an unlocked screen door and entering the residence, they identified themselves as police officers and stated that they had a warrant. Once inside the home, the officers seized marijuana, methamphetamine, valium, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition. They also found petitioner in the bathroom, flushing marijuana down the toilet. Petitioner and Jacobs were arrested and charged with delivery of marijuana, delivery of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana.

Before trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. Petitioner asserted that the search was invalid on various grounds, including that the officers had failed to “knock and announce” before entering her home. The trial court summarily denied the suppression motion. After a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of all charges and sentenced to 32 years in prison.

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction on appeal. 317 Ark. 548, 878 S. W. 2d 755 (1994). The court noted that “the officers entered the home while they were identifying themselves,” but it rejected petitioner’s argument that “the Fourth Amendment requires officers to knock and announce prior to entering the residence.” Id., at 553, 878 S. W. 2d, at 758 (emphasis added). Finding “no authority for [petitioner’s] theory that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth Amendment,” the court concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the Fourth Amendment required suppression of the evidence. Ibid.

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to whether the common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. 513 U. S. 1014 (1995). We hold that it does, and accordingly reverse and remand.

II

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” In evaluating the scope of this right, we have looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 624 (1991); United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418-420 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925). “Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable,” New Jersey v. T. L. Q, 469 U. S. 325, 337 (1985), our effort to give content to this term may be guided by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment. An examination of the common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to entering.

Although the common law generally protected a man’s house as-“his castle of defence and asylum,” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *288 (hereinafter Blackstone), common-law courts long have held that “when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.” Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B. 1603). To this rule, however, common-law courts appended an important qualification:

“But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors . . . , for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it . . . Ibid., 77 Eng. Rep., at 195-196.

See also Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 137, 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (Crown 1757) (“[N]o precise form of words is required in a case of this kind. It is sufficient that the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under a proper authority . . .”); Lee v. Gansell, Lofft 374, 381-382, 98 Eng. Rep. 700, 705 (K. B. 1774) (“[A]s to the outer door, the law is now clearly taken” that it is privileged; but the door may be broken “when the due notification and demand has been made and refused”).

Several prominent founding-era commentators agreed on this basic principle. According to Sir Matthew Hale, the “constant practice” at common law was that “the officer may break open the door, if he be sure the offender is there, if after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to open the door.” See 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *582. William Hawkins propounded a similar principle: “the law doth never allow” an officer to break open the door of a dwelling “but in cases of necessity,” that is, unless he “first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give him admittance.” 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 14, § 1, p. 138 (6th ed. 1787). Sir William Blackstone stated simply that the sheriff may “justify breaking open doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered.” 3 Blackstone *412.

The common-law knock and announce principle was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law. Most of the States that ratified the Fourth Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes generally incorporating English common law, see, e. g., N. J. Const. of 1776, §22, in 5 Federal and State Constitutions 2598 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (“[T]he common law of England... shall still remain in force, until [it] shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature”); N. Y. Const. of 1777, Art. 35, in id., at 2635 (“[S]uch parts of the common law of England ... as ... did form the law of [New York on April 19, 1775] shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same”); Ordinances of May 1776, ch. 5, § 6, in 9 Statutes at Large of Virginia 127 (W. Hening ed. 1821) (“[T]he common law of England ... shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony”), and a few States had enacted statutes specifically embracing the common-law view that the breaking of the door of a dwelling was permitted once admittance was refused, see, e. g., Act of Nov. 8, 1782, ch. 15, ¶ 6, in Acts and Laws of Massachusetts 193 (1782); Act of Apr. 13, 1782, ch. 39, §3, in 1 Laws of the State of New York 480 (1886); Act of June 24, 1782, ch. 317, § 18, in Acts of the General Assembly of New-Jersey (1784) (reprinted in The First Laws of the State of New Jersey 293-294 (J. Cushing comp. 1981)); Act of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 925, § 5, in 10 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 255 (J. Mitchell & H. Flanders comp. 1904). Early American courts similarly embraced the common-law knock and announce principle. See, e. g., Walker v. Fox, 32 Ky. 404, 405 (1834); Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 189 (1846); Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. 302, 305 (1849). See generally Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499, 504-508 (1964) (collecting cases).

Our own cases have acknowledged that the common-law principle of announcement is “embedded in Anglo-American law,” Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958), but we have never squarely held that this principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. We now so hold. Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be preceded by an announcement. The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests. As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. See Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 38 (1963) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has been recognized from the early common law that... breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances”); see also, e. g., White & Wiltsheire, 2 Rolle 137, 138, 81 Eng. Rep. 709, 710 (K. B. 1619) (upholding the sheriff’s breaking of the door of the plaintiff’s dwelling after the sheriff’s bailiffs had been imprisoned in plaintiff’s dwelling while they attempted an earlier execution of the seizure); Pugh v. Griffith, 7 Ad. & E. 827, 840-841, 112 Eng. Rep. 681, 686 (K. B. 1838) (holding that “the necessity of a demand ... is obviated, because there was nobody on whom a demand could be made” and noting that White & Wiltsheire leaves open the possibility that there may be “other occasions where the outer door may be broken” without prior demand).

Indeed, at the time of the framing, the common-law admonition that an officer “ought to signify the cause of his coming,” Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep., at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep., at 195, had not been extended conclusively to the context of felony arrests. See Blakey, supra, at 503 (“The full scope of the application of the rule in criminal cases . . . was never judicially settled”); Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & Ald. 592, 593, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (K. B. 1819) (“It is not at present necessary for us to decide how far, in the case of a person charged with felony, it would be necessary , to make a previous demand of admittance before you could justify breaking open the outer door of his house”); W. Murfree, Law of Sheriffs and Other Ministerial Officers § 1163, p. 631 (1st ed. 1884) (“[Although there has been some doubt on the question, the better opinion seems to be that, in cases of felony, no demand of admittance is necessary, especially as, in many cases, the delay incident to it would enable the prisoner to escape”). The common-law principle gradually was applied to cases involving felonies, but at the same time the courts continued to recognize that under certain circumstances the presumption in favor of announcement necessarily would give way to contrary considerations.

Thus, because the common-law rule was justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would avoid “the destruction or breaking of any house ... by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue,” Semayne’s Case, supra, at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep., at 196, courts acknowledged that the presumption in favor of announcement would yield under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence. See, e. g., Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822) (plaintiff who “had resolved ... to resist even to the shedding of blood .. . was not within the reason and spirit of the rule requiring notice”); Mahomed v. The Queen, 4 Moore 289, 247, 13 Eng. Rep. 293, 296 (P. C. 1843) (“While he was firing pistols at them, were they to knock at the door, and to ask him to be pleased to open it for them? The law in its wisdom only requires this ceremony to be observed when it possibly may be attended with some advantage, and may render the breaking open of the outer door unnecessary”). Similarly, courts held that an officer may dispense with announcement in cases where a prisoner escapes from him and retreats to his dwelling. See, e. g., ibid.; Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300, 304 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1833). Proof of “demand and refusal” was deemed unnecessary in such cases because it would be a “senseless ceremony” to require an officer in pursuit of a recently escaped arrestee to make an announcement prior to breaking the door to retake him. Id., at 304. Finally, courts have indicated that unannounced entry may be justified where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given. See Ker, supra, at 40-41 (plurality opinion); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 305-306, 294 P. 2d 6, 9 (1956).

We need not attempt a comprehensive catalog of the relevant countervailing factors here. For now, we leave to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We simply hold that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

III

Respondent contends that the judgment below should be affirmed because the unannounced entry in this case was justified for two reasons. First, respondent argues that police officers reasonably believed that a prior announcement would have placed them in peril, given their knowledge that petitioner had threatened a government informant with a semiautomatic weapon and that Mr. Jacobs had previously been convicted of arson and firebombing. Second, respondent suggests that prior announcement would have produced an unreasonable risk that petitioner would destroy easily disposable narcotics evidence.

These considerations may well provide the necessary justification for the unannounced entry in this case. Because the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address their sufficiency, however, we remand to allow the state courts to make any necessary findings of fact and to make the determination of reasonableness in the first instance. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1048, 259 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848 (1989) (“Announcement and demand for entry at the time of service of a search warrant [are] part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness”); People v. Saeckao, 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531, 544 N. E. 2d 745, 749 (1989) (“[T]he presence or absence of such an announcement is an important consideration in determining whether subsequent entry to arrest or search is constitutionally reasonable”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Commonwealth v. Goggin, 412 Mass. 200, 202, 587 N. E. 2d 785, 787 (1992) (“Our knock and announce rule is one of common law which is not constitutionally compelled”).

       This “knock and announce” principle appears to predate even Semayne’s Case, which is usually cited as the judicial source of the common-law standard. Semayne’s Case itself indicates that the doctrine may be traced to a statute enacted in 1275, and that at that time the statute was “but an affirmance of the common law.” 5 Co. Rep., at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep., at 196 (referring to 3 Edw. I, ch. 17, in 1 Statutes at Large from Magna Carta to Hen. 6 (O. Ruffhead ed. 1769) (providing that if any person takes the beasts of another and causes them “to be driven into a Castle or Fortress,” if the sheriff makes “solem[n] deman[d]” for deliverance of the beasts, and if the person “did not cause the Beasts to be delivered incontinent,” the King “shall cause the said Castle or Fortress to be beaten down without Recovery”)).

       In Miller, our discussion focused on the statutory requirement of announcement found in 18 U. S. C. § 3109 (1958 ed.), not on the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. See 357 U. S., at 306, 308, 313. See also Sabbath v. United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8 (1968) (suggesting that both the “common law” rule of announcement and entry and its “exceptions” were codified in § 3109); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,40-41 (1963) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that an unannounced entry was reasonable under the “exigent circumstances” of that case, without addressing the antecedent question whether the lack of announcement might render a search unreasonable under other circumstances).

       Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of petitioner’s suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclusion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement. Analogizing to the “independent source” doctrine applied in Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 805, 813-816 (1984), and the “inevitable discovery” rule adopted in Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 440-448 (1984), respondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Breyer

license: Public Domain

text:
    FIRST OPTIONS OF CHICAGO, INC. v. KAPLAN et al.
    No. 94-560.
    Argued March 22, 1995
    Decided May 22, 1995

      Bkeyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      James D. Holzhauer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Timothy S. Bishop, Stephen P. Bedell, Timothy G. McDermott, and Kenneth E. Wile.

      John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Manuel Kaplan were Donald L. Perelman, Richard A. Koffman, and David G.

      Leitch. Gary A. Rosen filed a brief for respondent Carol Kaplan.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Futures Association et al. by Daniel J. Roth; and for the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., et al. by Lydia Gavalis.

        Gerald F. Rath, Steven W. Hansen, and Stuart J. Kaswell filed a brief for the Securities Industry Association as amicus curiae.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider two questions about how courts should review certain matters under the federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V): (1) how a district court should review an arbitrator’s decision that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and (2) how a court of appeals should review a district court’s decision confirming, or refusing to vacate, an arbitration award.

I

The case concerns several related disputes between, on one side, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and, on the other side, three parties: Manuel Kaplan; his wife, Carol Kaplan; and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI), whose trading account First Options cleared. The disputes center on a “workout” agreement, embodied in four separate documents, which governs the “working out” of debts to First Options that MKI and the Kaplans incurred as a result of the October 1987 stock market crash. In 1989, after entering into the agreement, MKI lost an additional $1.5 million. First Options then took control of, and liquidated, certain MKI assets; demanded immediate payment of the entire MKI debt; and insisted that the Kaplans personally pay any deficiency. When its demands went unsatisfied, First Options sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.

MKI, having signed the only workout document (out of four) that contained an arbitration clause, accepted arbitration. The Kaplans, however, who had not personally signed that document, denied that their disagreement with First Options was arbitrable and filed written objections to that effect with the arbitration panel. The arbitrators decided that they had the power to rule on the merits of the parties’ dispute, and did so in favor of First Options. The Kaplans then asked the Federal District Court to vacate the arbitration award, see 9 U. S. C. § 10 (1988 ed., Supp. V), and First Options requested its confirmation, see § 9. The court confirmed the award. Nonetheless, on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the Kaplans that their dispute was not arbitrable; and it reversed the District Court’s confirmation of the award against them. 19 F. 3d 1503 (1994).

We granted certiorari to consider two questions regarding the standards that the Court of Appeals used to review the determination that the Kaplans’ dispute with First Options was arbitrable. 513 U. S. 1040 (1994). First, the Court of Appeals said that courts “should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over the merits of any particular dispute.” 19 F. 3d, at 1509 (emphasis added). First Options asked us to decide whether this is so (i. e., whether courts, in “reviewing the arbitrators’ decision on arbitrability,” should “apply a de novo standard of review or the more deferential standard applied to arbitrators’ decisions on the merits”) when the objecting party “submitted the issue to the arbitrators for decision.” Pet. for Cert. i. Second, the Court of Appeals stated that it would review a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate a commercial arbitration award (and the correlative grant of a motion to confirm it) “de novo” 19 F. 3d, at 1509. First Options argues that the Court of Appeals instead should have applied an “abuse of discretion” standard. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F. 2d 679, 681-682 (CA11 1992).

II

The first question — the standard of review applied to an arbitrator’s decision about arbitrability — is a narrow one. To understand just how narrow, consider three types of disagreement present in this case. First, the Kaplans and First Options disagree about whether the Kaplans are personally liable for MKI’s debt to First Options. That disagreement makes up the merits of the dispute. Second, they disagree about whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits. That disagreement is about the arbitrability of the dispute. Third, they disagree about who should have the primary power to decide the second matter. Does that power belong primarily to the arbitrators (because the court reviews their arbitrability decision deferentially) or to the court (because the court makes up its mind about arbitrability independently)? We consider here only this third question.

Although the question is a narrow one, it has a certain practical importance. That is because a party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits of its dispute (say, as here, its obligation under a contract). But, where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or she, in effect, has relinquished much of that right’s practical value. The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision, but the court will set that decision aside only in very unusual circumstances. See, e. g., 9 U. S. C. § 10 (award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; arbitrator exceeded his powers); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 436-437 (1953) (parties bound by arbitrator’s decision not in “manifest disregard” of the law), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477 (1989). Hence, who — court or arbitrator — has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.

We believe the answer to the “who” question (1 e., the standard-of-review question) is fairly simple. Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, see, e. g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., ante, at 57; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985), so the question “who has the primary power to decide arbitrability” turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter. Did the parties agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration? If so, then the court’s standard for reviewing the arbitrator’s decision about that matter should not differ from the standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed to arbitrate. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986) (parties may agree to arbitrate arbitrability); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 583, n. 7 (1960) (same). That is to say, the court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances. See, e. g., 9 U. S. C. § 10. If, on the other hand, the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely, independently. These two answers flow inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes — but only those disputes — that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. See, e. g., AT&T Technologies, supra, at 649; Mastrobuono, ante, at 57-58, and n. 9; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 271 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 625-626.

We agree with First Options, therefore, that a court must defer to an arbitrator’s arbitrability decision when the parties submitted that matter to arbitration. Nevertheless, that conclusion does not help First Options win this case. That is because a fair and complete answer to the standard-of-review question requires a word about how a court should decide whether the parties have agreed to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration. And, that word makes clear that the Kaplans did not agree to arbitrate arbitrability here.

When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally (though with a qualification we discuss below) should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. See, e. g., Mastrobuono, ante, at 62-63, and n. 9; Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 475-476 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 492-493, n. 9 (1987); G. Wilner, 1 Domke on Commercial Arbitration § 4:04, p. 15 (rev. ed. Supp. 1993) (hereinafter Domke). The relevant state law here, for example, would require the court to see whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration. See, e. g., Estate of Jesmer v. Rohlev, 241 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 609 N. E. 2d 816, 820 (1993) (law of the State whose law governs the workout agreement); Burkett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 600, 608, 534 A. 2d 819, 823-824 (1987) (law of the State where the Kaplans objected to arbitrability). See generally Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 626.

This Court, however, has (as we just said) added an important qualification, applicable when courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability: Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and unmistakable] ” evidence that they did so. AT&T Technologies, supra, at 649; see Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 583, n. 7. In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the question “who (primarily) should decide arbitrability” differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question “whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement” — for in respect to this latter question the law reverses the presumption. See Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 626 (“ ‘[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration’ ”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1983)); Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582-583.

But, this difference in treatment is understandable. The latter question arises when the parties have a contract that provides for arbitration of some issues. In such circumstances, the parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration. And, given the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration, see, e. g., Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 626, one can understand why the law would insist upon clarity before concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter. See Domke § 12.02, p. 156 (issues will be deemed arbitrable unless “it is clear that the arbitration clause has not included” them). On the other hand, the former question — the “who (primarily) should decide arbitrability” question — is rather arcane. A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers. Cf. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1508-1509 (1959), cited in Warrior & Gulf, 363 U. S., at 583, n. 7. And, given the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the “who should decide arbitrability” point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide. Ibid. See generally Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219-220 (1985) (Arbitration Act’s basic purpose is to “ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate”).

On the record before us, First Options cannot show that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the arbitrators decide (i. e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrability. First Options relies on the Kaplans’ filing with the arbitrators a written memorandum objecting to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction. But merely arguing the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate that issue, i. e., a willingness to be effectively bound by the arbitrator’s decision on that point. To the contrary, insofar as the Kaplans were forcefully objecting to the arbitrators deciding their dispute with First Options, one naturally would think that they did not want the arbitrators to have binding authority over them. This conclusion draws added support from (1) an obvious explanation for the Kaplans’ presence before the arbitrators (i. e., that MKI, Mr. Kaplan’s wholly owned firm, was arbitrating workout agreement matters); and (2) Third Circuit law that suggested that the Kaplans might argue arbitrability to the arbitrators without losing their right to independent court review, Teamsters v. Western Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Assn., 574 F. 2d 783, 786-788 (1978); see 19 F. 3d, at 1512, n. 13.

First Options makes several counterarguments: (1) that the Kaplans had other ways to get an independent court decision on the question of arbitrability without arguing the issue to the arbitrators (e. g., by trying to enjoin the arbitration, or by refusing to participate in the arbitration and then defending against a court petition First Options would have brought to compel arbitration, see 9 U. S. C. § 4); (2) that permitting parties to argue arbitrability to an arbitrator without being bound by the result would cause delay and waste in the resolution of disputes; and (3) that the Arbitration Act therefore requires a presumption that the Kaplans agreed to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision, not the contrary. The first of these points, however, while true, simply does not say anything about whether the Kaplans intended to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision. The second point, too, is inconclusive, for factual circumstances vary too greatly to permit a confident conclusion about whether allowing the arbitrator to make an initial (but independently reviewable) arbitrability determination would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution process. And, the third point is legally erroneous, for there is no strong arbitration-related policy favoring First Options in respect to its particular argument here. After all, the basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, Dean Witter Reynolds, supra, at 219-220, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, “ ‘are enforced according to their terms,’ ” Mastrobuono, ante, at 54 (quoting Volt Information Sciences, 489 U. S., at 479), and according to the intentions of the parties, Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U. S., at 626. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U. S., at 271. That policy favors the Kaplans, not First Options.

We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts.

Ill

We turn next to the standard a court of appeals should apply when reviewing a district court decision that refuses to vacate, see 9 U. S. C. § 10 (1988 ed., Supp. V), or confirms, see §9, an arbitration award. Although the Third Circuit sometimes used the words “de novo” to describe this standard, its opinion makes clear that it simply believes (as do all Circuits but one) that there is no special standard governing its review of a district court’s decision in these circumstances. Rather, review of, for example, a district court decision confirming an arbitration award on the ground that the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration should proceed like review of any other district court decision finding an agreement between parties, e. g., accepting findings of fact that are not “clearly erroneous” but deciding questions of law de novo. See 19 F. 3d, at 1509.

One Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit, has said something different. Because of federal policy favoring arbitration, that court says that it applies a specially lenient “abuse of discretion” standard (even as to questions of law) when reviewing district court decisions that confirm (but not those that set aside) arbitration awards. See, e.g., Robbins v. Day, 954 F. 2d, at 681-682. First Options asks us to hold that the Eleventh Circuit’s view is correct.

We believe, however, that the majority of Circuits is right in saying that courts of appeals should apply ordinary, not special, standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. For one thing, it is undesirable to make the law more complicated by proliferating review standards without good reasons. More importantly, the reviewing attitude that a court of appeals takes toward a district court decision should depend upon “the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts,” not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular substantive result. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U. S. 225, 231-233 (1991). The law, for example, tells all courts (trial and appellate) to give administrative agencies a degree of legal leeway when they review certain interpretations of the law that those agencies have made. See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984). But no one, to our knowledge, has suggested that this policy of giving leeway to agencies means that a court of appeals should give extra leeway to a district court decision that upholds an agency. Similarly, courts grant arbitrators considerable leeway when reviewing most arbitration decisions; but that fact does not mean that appellate courts should give extra leeway to district courts that uphold arbitrators. First Options argues that the Arbitration Act is special because the Act, in one section, allows courts of appeals to conduct interlocutory review of certain antiarbitration district court rulings (e. g., orders enjoining arbitrations), but not those upholding arbitration (e.g., orders refusing to enjoin arbitrations). 9 U. S. C. § 16 (1988 ed., Supp. V). But that portion of the Act governs the timing of review; it is therefore too weak a support for the distinct claim that the court of appeals should use a different standard when reviewing certain district court decisions. The Act says nothing about standards of review.

We conclude that the Court of Appeals used the proper standards for reviewing the District Court’s arbitrability determinations.

IV

Finally, First Options argues that, even if we rule against it on the standard-of-review questions, we nonetheless should hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its ultimate conclusion that the merits of the Kaplan/First Options dispute were not arbitrable. This factbound issue is beyond the scope of the questions we agreed to review.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.


text:
    March 3, 1995
    No. A-643 (94-8262).
    Lackey v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court.


text:
    March 6, 1995
    No. 94-379.
    Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., et al. v. Summit Coffee Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561 (1995).


text:
    No.---.
    Moore, Guardian ad Litem v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Inc.
   Motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted.


text:
    No. A-543.
    Ply v. Washington.
   Application for bond, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-610 (94-8080).
    Hearn v. Wellington Leasing Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay of eviction, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-1486.
    In re Disbarment of Collins.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1073.]


text:
    No. D-1487.
    In re Disbarment of Oji.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1073.]


text:
    No. D-1489.
    In re Disbarment of Israel.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1073.]


text:
    No. D-1492.
    In re Disbarment of Wohlfarth.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1073.]


text:
    No. D-1507.
    In re Disbarment of Bain.
   David Lee Bain, of San Diego, Cal., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on February 21, 1995 [513 U. S. 1143], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1519.
    In re Disbarment of High.
   It is ordered that John Emerson High, of West Chester, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1520.
    In re Disbarment of Discipio.
   It is ordered that Francis M. Discipio, of Oak Brook, 111., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 121, Orig.
    Louisiana v. Mississippi et al.
   Exceptions of Louisiana to the Report of the Special Master set for argument in due course. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 513 U. S. 997.]


text:
    No. 93-1170.
    United States et al. v. National Treasury Employees Union et al.,
   513 U. S. 454. Each side shall bear its own costs in this case. See this Court’s Rule 43.2.


text:
    No. 94-558.
    No. 94-627.
    United States v. Hays et al.; and Louisiana et al. v. Hays et al.
   D. C. W. D. La. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 513 U. S. 1056.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 94-631.
    No. 94-797.
    No. 94-929.
    Miller et al. v. Johnson et al.; Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and United States v. Johnson et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 513 U. S. 1071.] Motions of Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials and National Voting Rights Institute for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 94-749.
    Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1071.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 94-7852.
    Williams et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 27, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 94-8044.
    In re Agrio.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 93-1638.
    Morgan v. Swint et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-830.
    No. 94-831.
    USX Corp., fka United States Steel Corp. v. United States; and Phillips et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-849.
    McDade v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-870.
    Garcia v. City of Chicago et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1060.
    Clark Equipment Co. et al. v. Habecker, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Habecker, Deceased, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1074.
    Prytz v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1077.
    Hunziker et al. v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1200.
    Williams v. City of Granite Shoals, Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1207.
    Mandanici v. Town of Monroe.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1209.
    Kamin et al. v. T. L. C. Services, Inc.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1210.
    Horn’s Poultry, Inc. v. Norwest Transportation, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1212.
    Camp v. Ruffin, dba Harper Trucks, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1214.
    Chan et al. v. Society Expeditions, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1217.
    Baker et al. v. Illinois Department of Revenue et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1219.
    Wagshal v. Foster et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1220.
    BP Chemicals (HITCO), Inc. v. Gaylord et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1221.
    City and County of Denver, Colorado v. Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1222.
    Tilson v. Forrest City Police Department et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1228.
    Salazar v. Whink Products Co.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1236.
    Matias et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1249.
    Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1250.
    Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Assn.
   Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1306.
    Estate of Ravetti v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1324.
    Sluys et al. v. Grant et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1325.
    Jackson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1338.
    Bolivar v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1349.
    Peevy et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6289.
    Neelley v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6720.
    Kokoraleis v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6785.
    Kikumura v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6896.
    Carter v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6935.
    Dukes v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7205.
    Cunningham v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7209.
    Sherrod v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7330.
    Garcia v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7530.
    Griffin v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7595.
    Smith v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7603.
    Fox v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7610.
    McCaleb v. Jones, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7619.
    Brown v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7620.
    Williams v. Metropolitan Transit Authority et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7622.
    Rattler v. Department of Veterans Affairs.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7625.
    Etemad v. California Department of Water Resources Control Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7626.
    Arensberg v. Brown, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7627.
    Northington v. Court of Appeals of Michigan et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7635.
    Latine v. Mann, Superintendent, Shawangunk Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7641.
    Dix v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7642.
    Almendarez v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7645.
    Fellman v. Poole, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7646.
    Carroll v. North Carolina.
   Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Robeson County, N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7649.
    Simione v. Gillis, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7651.
    Shea v. Pierceton Trucking Co., Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7663.
    Johnson v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7725.
    Lane v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7732.
    Hoenig v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7786.
    Shelton v. Raney, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7804.
    Posada v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7819.
    McDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7823.
    McCann v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7850.
    Goldman v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7855.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7859.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7860.
    Ovalle-Marquez v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7863.
    Braxton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7867.
    Lee v. Murphy, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7871.
    Swann v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7874.
    Lardell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7875.
    Okiyama v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7882.
    Marzullo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7884.
    Hogan v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7885.
    Huggins v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7886.
    Gonzalez-Rincon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7894.
    Mortenson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7897.
    Giddings v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7907.
    Arreguine v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7910.
    No. 94-7933.
    Caldwell v. United States; and Yung v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7918.
    Sanders v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7919.
    Czarny v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7921.
    Rose v. Morton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7922.
    Pearson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7923.
    Arango v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7925.
    Bonham v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7926.
    Koff v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7928.
    Stanton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7929.
    Sias v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7932.
    Lloyd v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7934.
    Zukinta v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7935.
    Groessel v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7940.
    Ferguson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7941.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7946.
    Reeves v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7947.
    Pena et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7949.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7952.
    Butler v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7954.
    Martinez-Herrera v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7955.
    McGee v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7962.
    Barnes v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7963.
    Boyd v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7964.
    Broadus et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7969.
    Markling v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7970.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7973.
    Acosta-Lao v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7979.
    Frank v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7982.
    Toro-Nino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7983.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8012.
    Carter v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-732.
    Alabama v. Bonner.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1283.
    Qualls v. Regional Transportation District et al.; and Qualls et al. v. Regional Transportation District et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondents for award of damages and double costs granted, and respondents are awarded a total of $500 to be paid by petitioners to counsel for respondents on or before March 27, 1995. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7971.
    Nevcherlian v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 94-5352.
    No. 94-6795.
    No. 94-6888.
    No. 94-6949.
    No. 94-6982.
    No. 94-6987.
    Moore v. Pennsylvania, Bradvica v. Jones, Warden, Juels v. Deutsche Bank AG, Gilmore v. Gregg et al., Schaffer v. Bevevino et al., Hall et al. v. Local Union 1183, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Pizzo v. Whitley, Warden, et al., Mizkun v. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, et al., Baez v. Douglas County Commission et al.,
   513 U. S. 1114;

513 U. S. 1092;

513 U. S. 1096;

513 U. S. 1130;

513 U. S. 1116;

513 U. S. 1116;

No. 94-6992.

No. 94-6993.

No. 94-7043.

513 U. S. 1116;

513 U. S. 1099; and

513 U. S. 1117. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 94-6177.
    Ridings v. United States,
   513 U. S. 976. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 9, 1995
    No. 94-1251.
    Farron v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    March 17, 1995
    No. 94-8465 (A-660).
    Williams v. Gramley, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    March 20, 1995
    No. 93-1907.
    Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Mother Frances Hospital of Tyler, Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, ante, p. 87.


text:
    No.---.
    No.---.
    Bilzerian v. Securities and Exchange Commission; Will v. Will; Hess v. Lander College, aka Lander University; Johnson v. United States; and Greene v. Drexel Burnham Lambert.
    No.---,
    No.---.
    No.---.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No.---.
    Mines v. Texas.
   Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted.


text:
    No. A-499.
    Solimine v. United States District Court.
   D. C. Mass. Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Con-nor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-1491.
    In re Disbarment of Kukla.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1073.]


text:
    No. D-1495.
    In re Disbarment of Humphreys.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1074.]


text:
    No. D-1496.
    In re Disbarment of Hotze.
   T. Wilson Hotze, of Richmond, Va., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on January 17, 1995 [513 U. S. 1108], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1497.
    In re Disbarment of Skinner.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1124.]


text:
    No. D-1498.
    In re Disbarment of White.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 513 U. S. 1124.]


text:
    No. D-1521.
    In re Disbarment of Wilson.
   It is ordered that Robert J. Wilson, of Ardmore, Okla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1522.
    In re Disbarment of Mitchell.
   It is ordered that Nicholas R Mitchell, of Greenville, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1523.
    In re Disbarment of Rubin.
   It is ordered that Richard J. Rubin, of New York, N. Y, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1524.
    In re Disbarment of Carson.
   It is ordered that Patricia A. Carson, of San Francisco, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1525.
    In re Disbarment of Handy.
   It is ordered that Gary R. Handy, of San Diego, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1526.
    In re Disbarment of Rutledge.
   It is ordered that William Eugene Rutledge, of Birmingham, Ala., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 120, Orig.
    New Jersey v. New York.
   Motion of the City of New York for leave to intervene as a party defendant referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 513 U. S. 924.]


text:
    No. 94-455.
    Johnson et al. v. Jones.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1071.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 94-771.
    Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1071.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 94-631.
    No. 94-797.
    No. 94-929.
    Miller et al. v. Johnson et al.; Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and United States v. Johnson et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 513 U. S. 1071.] Motion of Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument denied. Motion of appellants Lucious Abrams, Jr., et al. for divided argument and for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of appellants Zell Miller et al. for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: appellants Zell Miller et al., 20 minutes; and United States, 10 minutes. Request for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 94-820.
    Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1106.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 94-834.
    No. 94-835.
    North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas et al.; and Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 513 U. S. 1072.] Motion of petitioner Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., for divided argument denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 94-7524.
    No. 94-7734.
    Toski v. McDonnell et al. O’Hara v. San Diego County Department of Social Services.
   C. A. 11th Cir.; and

Sup. Ct. Cal. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until April 10, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 94-8154.
    In re Trice.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 94-7582.
    No. 94-7840.
    No. 94-8067.
    In re Englefield; In re Herron; and In re Uboh.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 94-889.
    IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., Trustee, et al. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, Conservator for Franklin Savings Assn.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-921.
    Tri-State Steel Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-936.
    Montana Sulphur & Chemical Co. v. Reich, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-982.
    O’Neill et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-990.
    Living Will Center et al. v. NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1053.
    Levine v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1055.
    Sysco Corp. v. Tone Brothers, Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1057.
    Hazel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1090.
    Public Utility District No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, Washington v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1093.
    Northeast Utilities Service Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1104.
    BW Parkway Associates Partnership v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1109.
    Del Crane Medical Corp. v. California Department of Health Services.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1112.
    Workman v. Jordan et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1114.
    Kirkpatrick v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1122.
    St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1127.
    Voge v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1128.
    Florida Cellular Mobil Communications Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1146.
    Walsh v. Southwest Flagler Associates, Ltd.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1151.
    Footman et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1161.
    No. 94-1310.
    Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas et al.; and Texas et al. v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1203.
    Rinier et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1227.
    Verrichia et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Revenue et al.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1229.
    Caulfield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1233.
    Blaze Construction Co., Inc. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1234.
    United Capitol Insurance Co. v. Nichols & Associates Tryon Properties, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1235.
    Midland Central Appraisal District v. Midland Industrial Service Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1238.
    Turner v. Jabe, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1243.
    Radloff et ux. v. First American National Bank of St. Cloud, N. A., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1252.
    Davis v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1253.
    Sharp v. Sharp; and Sharp v. Connelly.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1255.
    Sexton v. City of Twinsburg.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1256.
    City of Edgerton et al. v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1262.
    Paul v. Farmland Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1263.
    Metzger v. West et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1266.
    Thibodo et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1270.
    Johnson, Individually and as Heir to and/or Personal Representative of the Estate of Gaston, Deceased v. Dallas Independent School District et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1271.
    Carlisle, as Next Friend of Carlisle v. Munna.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Fulton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1272.
    City of Richmond et al. v. Fuller et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1273.
    Moore et al. v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1277.
    McKenna v. District Court of New Mexico, Second Judicial District.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1280.
    Willman v. Heartland Hospital East et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1281.
    Crow Tribe of Indians v. Campbell Farming Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1285.
    Garmon v. Alabama State Bar.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1286.
    Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 490 Severance and Retirement Fund et al. v. Appleton, Trustee for the Liquidation of First Ohio Securities Co., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1288.
    Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Eller & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1290.
    Clark v. Groose et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1294.
    Everett, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Everett, Deceased, et al. v. Continental Bank, N. A.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1301.
    Hood v. Herald.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1303.
    Hoover v. National Transportation Safety Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1312.
    Henderson et al. v. Oregon Department of Agriculture et al.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1315.
    Bennett v. Arkansas.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1322.
    Colon v. Apex Marine Corp., c/o Westchester Shipping Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1323.
    Bryan et al. v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Center, aka Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1358.
    Linton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1362.
    Estate of Ravetti v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1369.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1382.
    Jacob v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1434.
    Camoscio v. Pokaski et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6675.
    Sanchez-Montoya v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6707.
    M. R. et al. v. Cox et al.
   Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6933.
    Aguilar-Higuerra v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-6940.
    Foster v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7025.
    Shores v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7099.
    Beauchamp v. Murphy, Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7111.
    Ayala v. United States; Castrejon-Ortiz v. United States; Hernandez-Renteria v. United States; Moreno-Argueta v. United States; Cortes-Cebrera v. United States; Castro-Sanchez v. United States; Alvarado-Maldonado v. United States; Ruiz-Alvarez v. United States; Ledesma-Castillo v. United States; Morales v. United States; Prieto-Arauza v. United States; Cervantes-Parra v. United States; Linares v. United States; Rodriguez-Esquivel v. United States; Alba-Esqueda v. United States; and Lopez-DeLaRosa v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7313.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7315.
    Casey v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7324.
    Ingle v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7329.
    Garner v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7342.
    Mounts v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7357.
    Staley v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7359.
    Phillips v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7388.
    Harper v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7394.
    Hicks v. Thomas, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7403.
    Brewer v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7434.
    Ullyses-Salazar v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7436.
    McCright v. Borg, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7455.
    Fudge v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7513.
    O’Connor v. Nevada et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7621.
    Jackson v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7629.
    Black v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7631.
    Torres Garcia v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7664.
    Christian v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7666.
    Condino v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7669.
    Woodard v. Burt, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7670.
    Paige v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7672.
    Price v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7678.
    Armstrong v. Young.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7681.
    Thompson v. Rasberry et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7682.
    Villareal v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7683.
    Gomez v. Oregon State Board of Parole.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7684.
    Granviel v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7686.
    Greene v. McFadden, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7687.
    Fields v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7691.
    Sorens v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7692.
    Quinones v. Kelly, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7693.
    Ritchey v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7694.
    Wakefield v. Borough of North Plainfield et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7698.
    Johnson v. Blalock et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7699.
    Loomis v. Idaho et al.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7703.
    McQueen v. Mata et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7704.
    Weinstein v. Lasover et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7710.
    Conrad v. Todd, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7723.
    Dillbeck v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7724.
    Judd v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7730.
    Harper v. Hatcher Trailer Park.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7733.
    Adams v. Rice et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7735.
    Robinson v. City of Sylvania, Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7736.
    Price v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7738.
    Wyatt v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7739.
    Omuso v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7742.
    Webb v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7752.
    Steele v. Chicago Police Department et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7753.
    Sims v. LeFevre, Superintendent, Franklin Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7754.
    Seagle v. Merkel et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7755.
    Sigmon v. Bishop et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7760.
    Johnson v. Kamminga et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7764.
    Lloyd v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7768.
    King v. Cooke et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7774.
    McNack v. Runyon, Postmaster General, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7776.
    Bouscher v. Pierce County, Washington, et al.; and Bouscher v. Oregon et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7777.
    Ferguson v. Domovich, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7782.
    Garcia v. Bunnell, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7788.
    Harris v. Rocha, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7790.
    Daniel v. Peters, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7791.
    Campos v. Peters, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7794.
    Burke v. Szabo, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7796.
    Castro v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7799.
    Holston v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7801.
    Harris v. Lawler.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7802.
    Daniels v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7803.
    James v. Whitley, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7808.
    Wilkins v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7811.
    Poe v. Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7812.
    Lovall v. Bianchi, Judge, District Court of Texas, Harris County.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7813.
    Lepiscopo v. Thomas, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7814.
    Nickens v. Melton.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7815.
    Moity v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas.
   16th Jud. Dist. Ct., St. Martin Parish, La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7818.
    Kiczenski v. LeCureux, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7821.
    Lambert v. Pasquotank County Department of Social Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7822.
    Lovall v. Park Plaza Hospital et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7824.
    Jones v. Sandahl et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7825.
    McDonald v. Polk County, Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7826.
    Gibbs v. Oklahoma Department of Rehabilitation Services.
   Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7827.
    Savinski v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7830.
    White v. Local 166, United Plant Guard Workers of America.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7832.
    Gibbs v. Oklahoma Department of Rehabilitation Services.
   Ct. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7833.
    Gibbs v. Department of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7834.
    Gregory v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7839.
    James v. McBride, Superintendent, Westville Correctional Center.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7844.
    Strauss v. Holman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7846.
    Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7854.
    Walker v. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7856.
    Hardiman v. Ford et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7858.
    Lightfoot v. Nagle, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7861.
    Patterson v. Noland et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7862.
    Rowe v. Texas Rehabilitation Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7864.
    Cochran v. Johnson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7877.
    Sharrock v. Romer, Governor of Colorado, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7878.
    Ortiz v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7880.
    In re Vohra.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7881.
    Lancaster v. Presley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7883.
    Hill v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Southern Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7888.
    Samel v. Abramajtys, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7889.
    Cluke v. Higgins, Superintendent, Central Missouri Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7890.
    Wilson v. Spitz et al.
   Cir. Ct. Greenbriar

County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7895.
    Sampang v. Virginia et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7896.
    Esty v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7899.
    DeVoll et ux. v. Burdick Painting, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7902.
    Dawkins v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7905.
    Finocchi v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7906.
    Hardin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7920.
    Barnes v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7939.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7959.
    Okoro v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7960.
    Quiroz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7967.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7972.
    Rothberg v. Quadrangle Development Corp. et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7975.
    Cole v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7976.
    Hairston v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7985.
    Hillstrom v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7987.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7988.
    Day v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7989.
    Dehler v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7995.
    Belton v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-7997.
    Fuller v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8000.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8001.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8002.
    No. 94-8029.
    Gresham v. United States; and Gilchrist v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8003.
    Davis v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8011.
    Blackmon v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8013.
    Perez, aka Ceballos v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8016.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8018.
    James v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8020.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8021.
    Hill v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8022.
    Pollard v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8023.
    Pope v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8027.
    Schwemberger v. Regents of the University of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8028.
    Howard v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8030.
    Martinez-Cigarroa v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8031.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8040.
    Borges v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8041.
    Ballesteros v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8043.
    Conner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8047.
    Rodriguez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8048.
    Ochoa v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8049.
    Lombardo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8052.
    No. 94-8053.
    Young v. United States; and Greider v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8058.
    Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8063.
    Lanham v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8064.
    Liskiewicz v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8068.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8069.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8071.
    Keith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8072.
    Kelly v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8073.
    Burney v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8075.
    Elrod v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8076.
    Grajales v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8079.
    Hines v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8082.
    Bunge v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8083.
    Billops v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8085.
    Barlow v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8087.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8089.
    Flynn v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8090.
    Georgescu v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8091.
    Ford v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8093.
    Higgins v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8094.
    Sutton v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8099.
    Yuk Rung Tsang v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8100.
    Thompson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8102.
    Ali-Daggao v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8105.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8111.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8112.
    Nelson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8114.
    Tutiven v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8126.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8132.
    Cannon v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8150.
    Boyce v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8151.
    Bowden v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8152.
    Cardenas-Triana v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8161.
    Wray v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-890.
    No. 94-907.
    National Railway Labor Conference v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. et al.; and Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 94-1131.
    No. 94-1269.
    Chrysler Corp. v. Kearns; and Kearns v. Chrysler Corp. et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Arnold, White & Durkee for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 94-1131 granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1237.
    Keystone Chapter Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor and Industry.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1248.
    O’Bryan, Parent and Next Friend of O’Bryan, et al. v. Volkswagen of America et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1289.
    Class, Warden, et al. v. Williams.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1302.
    Crawford v. LaMantia et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 94-7751.
    Raitport v. American Telephone & Telegraph et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Con-nor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 93-9242.
    No. 94-941.
    No. 94-1006.
    Sands et al. v. United States, Duncan, Warden v. Henry, King v. Young et al., Mass et al. v. City of Carlsbad et al., Bashara v. United States, Searles v. Relic et al., Williams v. Borg & Warner Automotive Electronics & Mechanical System Corp., Rodriguez Mendoza v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al., Harris v. 7232 Pleasant View Drive, Fanny v. Levy et al., Rawlins v. Olson et al., Cazeau, aka LaFleur v. Pennsylvania State Police et al., Hummer v. United States, Wardlaw v. Burt, Warden, McKenzie v. Weer, Warden, DeGrijze v. Schwartz et al., Connelly v. Grossman et al.,
   513 U. S. 838;

513 U. S. 364;

513 U. S. 1127;

No. 94-1018.

No. 94-6260.

No. 94-6673.

No. 94-6825.

No. 94-6851.

No. 94-6912.

No. 94-6916.

No. 94-6967.

No. 94-7002.

No. 94-7036.

No. 94-7044.

No. 94-7055.

No. 94-7066.

No. 94-7424.

513 U. S. 1128;

513 U. S. 1115;

513 U. S. 1128;

513 U. S. 1093;

513 U. S. 1094;

513 U. S. 1129;

513 U. S. 1129;

513 U. S. 1130;

513 U. S. 1117;

513 U. S. 1100;

513 U. S. 1131;

513 U. S. 1118;

513 U. S. 1131; and

513 U. S. 1171. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 94-6146.
    Alonso v. Municipal Court of California, County of Ventura (California, Real Party in Interest),
   513 U. S. 975. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 21, 1995
    No. 94-8438 (A-689).
    Williams v. Clarke, Director, Nebraska Department of Correctional Services.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    No. 94-8536 (A-704).
    Free v. Peters, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Applica-

tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    March 27, 1995
    No. 94-1105.
    Texas v. United States.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.


text:
    No. 94-742.
    Harleysville Life Insurance Co. v. Mardell.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U. S. 352 (1995).


text:
    No. 94-197.
    Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services, et al. v. Green et al.,
   513 U. S. 557. Motion of respondents to amend the judgment denied. Motion of respondents to retax costs granted.


text:
    No. 94-1175.
    Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 94-7908.
    Williams et ux. v. Arnold & Arnold Law Firm et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until April 17, 1995, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 94-1355.
    In re Lyon.
   Ct. App. Alaska. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-8254.
    No. 94-8322.
    In re Klvana; and In re Voth.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 94-7957.
    In re Barnes.
   Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 94-1244.
    Behrens v. Pelletier.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 94-1340.
    Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 94-7427.
    Libretti v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 94-770.
    Anderson v. Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-873.
    Foster v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1096.
    American Republic Insurance Co. v. Superintendent of Insurance of Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1102.
    Spragens v. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1182.
    Cutinello et al. v. Whitley, Director, Illinois Department of Revenue, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1183.
    NorAm Energy Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1187.
    Smith v. Ricks et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1264.
    Dufresne et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1276.
    Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lufthansa German Airlines.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1296.
    Kelch v. Hardison, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1297.
    No. 94-1313.
    Longo, Mayor of the City of Garfield Heights, et al. v. Zilich; and Zilich v. Longo, Mayor of the City of Garfield Heights, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1298.
    Propst et al. v. Bitzer et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1307.
    Shong-Ching Tong v. First Interstate Services Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1311.
    California et al. v. Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1318.
    In re Hurley.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1319.
    Leslie v. Raney.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1321.
    Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Minstar, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1326.
    Center for Auto Safety Inc. v. Athey, Secretary of State of Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1327.
    Brayton v. City of New Brighton.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1331.
    Colt Industries Operating Corporation Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees v. Henglein et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1335.
    Arizona v. Averyt et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1336.
    Delaye v. Agripac, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1341.
    Hyde Park Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Court of Claims of Illinois et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1345.
    Serben v. Inter-City Manufacturing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1353.
    Manno v. New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 94-1370.
    Edmond v. Newman Whitney, a Division of Newman Machine Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.