author: Justice Stevens

text:
    RICHARDS et al. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al.
    No. 95-386.
    Argued March 26, 1996
    Decided June 10, 1996

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      William J. Baxley argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Joel E. Dillard.

      William M. Slaughter argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Richard H. Walston.

        Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley filed a brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 37 (1940), we held that it would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind litigants to a judgment rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties and in which they were not adequately represented. The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama that we review today presents us with the same basic question in a somewhat different context.

I

Jason Richards and Fannie Hill (petitioners) are privately employed in Jefferson County, Alabama. In 1991 they filed a complaint in the Federal District Court challenging the validity of the occupation tax imposed by Jefferson County Ordinance 1120, which had been adopted in 1987. That action was dismissed as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. They then commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County.

Petitioners represent a class of all nonfederal employees subject to the county’s tax. Petitioners alleged that the tax, which contains a lengthy list of exemptions, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and similar provisions of the Alabama Constitution. Because $10 million of the annual proceeds from the county tax have been pledged to the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center for a period of 20 years, the court permitted the center to intervene and support Jefferson County’s defense of its tax.

The county moved for summary judgment on the ground that petitioners’ claims were barred by a prior adjudication of the tax in an earlier action brought by the acting director of finance for the city of Birmingham and the city itself. That earlier action had been consolidated for trial with a separate suit brought by three county taxpayers, and the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the tax in the resulting appeal. See Bedingfield v. Jefferson County, 527 So. 2d 1270 (1988). After examining the course of this prior litigation, the trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment as to the state constitutional claims, but refused to do so as to the federal claims because they had not been decided by either the trial court or the Alabama Supreme Court in Bedingfield.

On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims as well as the state claims were barred by the adjudication in Bedingfield. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed. The majority opinion noted that in Alabama, as in most States, a prior judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes the relitigation of a claim if there is a “substantial identity of the parties” and if the “same cause of action” is presented in both suits. 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (1995). Moreover, the court explained, the prior judgment is generally “ ‘res judicata not only as to all matters litigated and decided by it, but as to all relevant issues which could have been but were not raised and litigated in the suit.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 735 (1946)).

The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that even though the opinion in Bedingfield did not mention any federal issue, the judgment in that case met these requirements. The court gave three reasons for this conclusion: (1) The complaints in the earlier case had alleged that the county tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and an equal protection issue had been argued in the appellate briefs, 662 So. 2d, at 1129; (2) the taxpayers in Bedingfield adequately represented petitioners because their respective interests were “essentially identical,” 662 So. 2d, at 1130; and (3) in pledging tax revenues and issuing bonds in 1989, the county and the intervenor “could have relied on Bedingfield as authoritatively establishing that the county occupational tax was not unconstitutional for the reasons asserted by the Bedingfield plaintiffs,” 662 So. 2d, at 1130.

Justice Maddox dissented. He agreed with the trial judge that no federal constitutional claim had been adjudicated in Bedingfield. 662 So. 2d, at 1130-1131. Moreover, he concluded that the mere fact that the theory advanced by the petitioners in this case could have been asserted in Beding-field constituted an insufficient reason for barring this action. 662 So. 2d, at 1131-1132.

We now conclude that the State Supreme Court’s holding that petitioners are bound by the adjudication in Bedingfteld deprived them of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

II

State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464, 475 (1918). We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is. “fundamental in character.” Id., at 476.

The limits on a state court’s power to develop estoppel rules reflect the general consensus “ ‘in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in perso-nam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.’ Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940).... This rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’ 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4449, p. 417 (1981).” Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755, 761-762 (1989). As a consequence, “[a] judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.” Id., at 762; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 329 (1971).

Of course, these principles do not always require one to have been a party to a judgment in order to be bound by it. Most notably, there is an exception when it can be said that there is “privity” between a party to the second case and a party who is bound by an earlier judgment. For example, a judgment that is binding on a guardian or trustee may also bind the ward or the beneficiaries of a trust. Moreover, although there are clearly constitutional limits on the “privity” exception, the term “privity” is now used to describe various relationships between litigants that would not have come within the traditional definition of that term. See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, ch. 4 (1980) (Parties and Other Persons Affected by Judgments).

In addition, as we explained in Wilks:

“We have recognized an exception to the general rule when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 41-42 (1940) (‘class’ or ‘representative’ suits); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (same); Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 154-155 (1979) (control of litigation on behalf of one of the parties in the litigation). Additionally, where a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate, legal proceedings may terminate pre-existing rights if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 529-530, n. 10 (1984) (‘[P]roof of claim must be presented to the Bankruptcy Court ... or be lost’); Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478 (1988) (nonclaim statute terminating unsubmitted claims against the estate).” 490 U. S., at 762, n. 2.

Here, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that res ju-dicata applied because petitioners were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action. 662 So. 2d, at 1130. We now consider the propriety of that determination.

III

We begin by noting that the parties to the Bedingfield case failed to provide petitioners with any notice that a suit was pending which would conclusively resolve their legal rights. That failure is troubling because, as we explained in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), the right to be heard ensured by the guarantee of due process “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” Id., at 314; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 812 (1985); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 212-213 (1962). Nevertheless, respondents ask us to excuse the lack of notice on the ground that petitioners, as the Alabama Supreme Court concluded, were adequately represented in Bedingfield.

Our answer is informed by our decision in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S., at 40-41. There, certain property owners brought suit to enforce a restrictive covenant that purported to forbid the sale or lease of any property within a defined area to “any person of the colored race.” Id., at 37-38. By its terms the covenant was not effective unless signed by the owners of 95 per cent of frontage in the area. At trial, the defendants proved that the signers of the covenant owned only about 54 percent of the frontage. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the covenant was enforceable because the issue had been resolved in a prior suit in which the parties had stipulated that the owners of 95 percent had signed. Id., at 38 (referring to Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934)).

Despite the fact that the stipulation was untrue, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the second action was barred by res judicata. See Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. 2d 37 (1939). Because the plaintiff in the earlier case had alleged that she was proceeding “on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other property owners in the district,” id., at 372, 24 N. E. 2d, at 39, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that all members of that “class,” including the defendants challenging the stipulation in the present action, were bound by the decree. We reversed.

We recognized the “familiar doctrine . . . that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present, or . . . the relationship between the parties present and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in judgment for the latter.” Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 42-43. We concluded, however, that because the interests of those class members who had been a party to the prior litigation were in conflict with the absent members who were the defendants in the subsequent action, the doctrine of representation of absent parties in a class suit could not support the decree.

Even assuming that our opinion in Hansberry may be read to leave open the possibility that in some class suits adequate representation might cure a lack of notice, but cf., id., at 40; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 177 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S., at 319, it may not be read to permit the application of res judicata here. Our opinion explained that a prior proceeding, to have binding effect on absent parties, would at least have to be “so devised and applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue.” 311 U. S., at 43; cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S., at 811-812. It is plain that the Bedingfield action, like the prior proceeding in Hansberry itself, does not fit such a description.

The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the “taxpayers in the Bedingfield action adequately represented the interests of the taxpayers here,” 662 So. 2d, at 1130 (emphasis added), but the three county taxpayers who were parties in Bedingfield did not sue on behalf of a class; their pleadings did not purport to assert any claim against or on behalf of any nonparties; and the judgment they received did not purport to bind any county taxpayers who were nonparties. That the acting director of finance for the city of Birmingham also sued in his capacity as both an individual taxpayer and a public official does not change the analysis. Even if we were to assume, as the Alabama Supreme Court did not, that by suing in his official capacity, the finance director intended to represent the pecuniary interests of all city taxpayers, and not simply the corporate interests of the city itself, he did not purport to represent the pecuniary interests of county taxpayers like petitioners.

As a result, there is no reason to suppose that the Beding-field court took care to protect the interests of petitioners in the manner suggested in Hansberry. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the individual taxpayers in Beding-field understood their suit to be on behalf of absent county taxpayers. Thus, to contend that the plaintiffs in Beding-field somehow represented petitioners, let alone represented them in a constitutionally adequate manner, would be “to attribute to them a power that it cannot be said that they had assumed to exercise.” Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 46.

Because petitioners and the Bedingfield litigants are best described as mere “strangers” to one another, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S., at 762, we are unable to conclude that the Bedingfield plaintiffs provided representation sufficient to make up for the fact that petitioners neither participated in, see Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 154 (1979), nor had the opportunity to participate in, the Bedingfield action. Accordingly, due process prevents the former from being bound by the latter’s judgment.

IV

Respondents contend that, even if petitioners did not receive the kind of opportunity to make their case in court that due process would ordinarily ensure, the character of their action renders the usual constitutional protections inapplicable. They contend that invalidation of the occupation tax would have disastrous consequences on the county, which has made substantial commitments of tax revenues based on its understanding that Bedingfield determined the constitutionality of the tax. Respondents argue that in cases raising a public issue of this kind, the people may properly be regarded as the real party in interest and thus that petitioners received all the process they were due in the Bedingfield action.

Our answer requires us to distinguish between two types of actions brought by taxpayers. In one category are cases in which the taxpayer is using that status to entitle him to complain about an alleged misuse of public funds, see, e. g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486-489 (1923), or about other public action that has only an indirect impact on his interests, e. g., Stromberg v. Board of Ed. of Bratenahl, 64 Ohio St. 2d 98, 413 N. E. 2d 1184 (1980), Tallassee v. State ex rel. Brunson, 206 Ala. 169, 89 So. 514 (1921). As to this category of cases, we may assume that the States have wide latitude to establish procedures not only to limit the number of judicial proceedings that may be entertained but also to determine whether to accord a taxpayer any standing at all.

Because the guarantee of due process is not a mere form, however, there obviously exists another category of taxpayer cases in which the State may not deprive individual litigants of their own day in court. By virtue of presenting a federal constitutional challenge to a State’s attempt to levy personal funds, petitioners clearly bring an action of this latter type. Cf. ibid, (distinguishing between “public” and “private” actions). Indeed, we have previously struck down as a violation of due process a state court’s decision denying an individual taxpayer any practicable opportunity to contest a tax on federal constitutional grounds. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930). There, we explained:

“We are not now concerned with the rights of the plaintiff on the merits, although it may be observed that the plaintiff’s claim is one arising under the Federal Constitution and, consequently, one on which the opinion of the state court is not final .... Our present concern is solely with the question whether the plaintiff has been accorded due process in the primary sense, — whether it has had an opportunity to present its case and be heard in its support. . . . [WJhile it is for the state courts to determine the adjective as well as the substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.” Id., at 681-682.

In any event, the Alabama Supreme Court did not hold here that petitioners’ suit was of a kind that, under state law, could be brought only on behalf of the public at large. Cf. Corprew v. Tallapoosa County, 241 Ala. 492, 3 So. 2d 53 (1941) (discussing state statutory quo warranto proceedings). To conclude that the suit may nevertheless be barred by the prior action in Bedingfield would thus be to deprive petitioners of their “chose in action,” which we have held to be a protected property interest in its own right. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 429-430 (1982); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S., at 812 (relying on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S., at 37. Thus, we are not persuaded that the nature of petitioners’ action permits us to deviate from the traditional rule that an extreme application of state-law res judicata principles violates the Federal Constitution.

Of course, we are aware that governmental and private entities have substantial interests in the prompt and determinative resolution of challenges to important legislation. We do not agree with the Alabama Supreme Court, however, that, given the amount of money at stake, respondents were entitled to rely on the assumption that the Bedingfield action “authoritatively established]” the constitutionality of the tax. 662 So. 2d, at 1130. A state court’s freedom to rely on prior precedent in rejecting a litigant’s claims does not afford it similar freedom to bind a litigant to a prior judgment to which he was not a party. That general rule clearly applies when a taxpayer seeks a hearing to prevent the State from subjecting him to a levy in violation of the Federal Constitution.

V

Because petitioners received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property. Accordingly, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

        Richards v. Jefferson County, 789 F. Supp. 369 (ND Ala.), affirmance order, 983 F. 2d 237 (CA11 1992).

       They were joined in the action by George Dykes and Joan Dykes, employees of the Federal Government who also work in the county. The Dykes represent a separate class of federal employees whose claims are not before us.

       After granting the petition to consider both the equal protection challenge to the tax scheme, and the due process challenge to the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that their claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we entered an order dismissing the writ to the extent that it included the equal protection question and directing the parties to address at oral argument only the question whether the application of res judicata afforded petitioners due process. 516 U. S. 983 (1996). Because petitioners raised their due process challenge to the application of res judi-cata in their application for rehearing to the Alabama Supreme Court, that federal issue has been preserved for our review. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 85-87, n. 9 (1980).

         “The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 48; Greenleaf Ev., §§ 522-523. The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 277; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 436. And as a State may not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 423), so it cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party nor in privity with a party therein.” 247 U. S., at 476.

       Of course, mere notice may not suffice to preserve one’s right to be heard in a case such as the one before us. The general rule is that “[t]he law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger.” Chase Nat. Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U. S. 431, 441 (1934); but cf. Penn-Central Merger and N &W Inclusion Cases, 389 U. S. 486, 505, n. 4 (1968) (noting that absent parties were invited to intervene by the court).

       We need not decide here whether public officials are always constitutionally adequate representatives of all persons over whom they have jurisdiction when, as here, the underlying right is personal in nature. Cf. Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at Local Level, Inc., 430 U. S. 259, 263, n. 1 (1977) (voting rights challenge by county residents not barred by county’s prior suit); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4458, p. 518 (1981); infra, at 803-805.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Scalia

license: Public Domain

text:
    WHREN et al. v. UNITED STATES
    No. 95-5841.
    Argued April 17, 1996
    Decided June 10, 1996

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Lisa Burget Wright argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were A. J Kramer, Neil H. Jaffee, and G. Allen Dale.

      James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Paul A. Engelmayer.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro and Susan N. Herman; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Natman Schaye and Walter B. Nash III.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joan Killeen and Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Christina V. Kuo, Deputy Attorney General; and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
        Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, and Jan Graham of Utah.

        Richard S. Michaels and Jeff Rubin filed a brief for the California District Attorney’s Association as amicus curiae.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.

I

On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a “high drug area” of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time — more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.

Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment with violating various federal drug laws, including 21 U. S. C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity; and that Officer Soto’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle—to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations—was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion, concluding that “the facts of the stop were not controverted,” and “[t]here was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop.” App. 5.

Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding with respect to the suppression issue that, “regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.” 53 F. 3d 371, 374-375 (CADC 1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1036 (1996).

II

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of this provision. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975). An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See Prouse, supra, at 659; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam).

Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been violated. See 18 D. C. Mun. Regs. §§2213.4 (1995) (“An operator shall . . . give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle”); 2204.3 (“No person shall turn any vehicle ... without giving an appropriate signal”); 2200.3 (“No person shall drive a vehicle ... at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions”). They argue, however, that “in the unique context of civil traffic regulations” probable cause is not enough. Since, they contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists. Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s occupants. To avoid this danger, they say, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the normal one (applied by the Court of Appeals) of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop; but rather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given.

A

Petitioners contend that the standard they propose is consistent with our past cases’ disapproval of police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens as pretexts for pursuing other investigatory agendas. We are reminded that in Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1, 4 (1990), we stated that “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence”; that in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 372 (1987), in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought it significant that there had been “no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation”; and that in New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987), we observed, in upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative inspection, that the search did not appear to be “a 'pretext’ for obtaining evidence of . . . violation of . . . penal laws.” But only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. In each case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes. See Bertine, supra, at 371-372; Burger, supra, at 702-703.

Petitioners also rely upon Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980) (per curiam), a case which, like this one, involved a traffic stop as the prelude to a plain-view sighting and arrest on charges wholly unrelated to the basis for the stop. Petitioners point to our statement that “[tjhere was no evidence whatsoever that the officer’s presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about the occupants” of the car. Id., at 4, n. 4. That dictum at most demonstrates that the Court in Bannister found no need to inquire into the question now under discussion; not that it was certain of the answer. And it may demonstrate even less than that: If by “pretext” the Court meant that the officer really had not seen the car speeding, the statement would mean only that there was no reason to doubt probable cause for the traffic stop.

It would, moreover, be anomalous, to say the least, to treat a statement in a footnote in the per curiam Bannister opinion as indicating a reversal of our prior law. Petitioners’ difficulty is not simply a lack of affirmative support for their position. Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 584, n. 3 (1983), we held that an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials was not rendered invalid “because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an informant’s tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana.” We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), we held that a traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search,” id., at 221, n. 1; and that a lawful post-arrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was not motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches, see id., at 236. See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260, 266 (1973). And in Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978), in rejecting the contention that wiretap evidence was subject to exclusion because the agents conducting the tap had failed to make any effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized acquisitions be minimized, we said that “[sjubjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.” We described Robinson as having established that “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” 436 U. S., at 136, 138.

We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

B

Recognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers, petitioners disavow any intention to make the individual officer’s subjective good faith the touchstone of “reasonableness.” They insist that the standard they have put forward — whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given — is an “objective” one.

But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police from doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different reasons. Petitioners’ proposed standard may not use the word-“pretext,” but it is designed to combat nothing other than the perceived “danger” of the pretextual stop, albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases. Instead of asking whether the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind.

Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such fashion that the court cannot take into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained by the fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option. If those cases were based only upon the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent, petitioners’ attempt to root out subjective vices through objective means might make sense. But they were not based only upon that, or indeed even principally upon that. Their principal basis — which applies equally to attempts to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means — is simply that the Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236 (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed”) (footnotes omitted); Gustafson, supra, at 266 (same). But even if our concern had been only an evidentiary one, petitioners’ proposal would by no means assuage it. Indeed, it seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a “reasonable officer” would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation. While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide objective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable — an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity.

Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable, cf. Gustafson, supra, at 265; United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 755-756 (1979), and can be made to turn upon such trivialities. The difficulty is illustrated by petitioners’ arguments in this case. Their claim that a reasonable officer would not have made this stop is based largely on District of Columbia police regulations which permit plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.” Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992), reprinted as Addendum to Brief for Petitioners. This basis of invalidation would not apply in jurisdictions that had a different practice. And it would not have applied even in the District of Columbia, if Officer Soto had been wearing a uniform or patrolling in a marked police cruiser.

Petitioners argue that our cases support insistence upon police adherence to standard practices as an objective means of rooting out pretext. They cite no holding to that effect, and dicta in only two cases. In Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960), the petitioner had been arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), on the basis of an administrative warrant that, he claimed, had been issued on pretextual grounds in order to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to search his room after his arrest. We regarded this as an allegation of “serious misconduct,” but rejected Abel’s claims on the ground that “[a] finding of bad faith is ... not open to us on th[e] record” in light of the findings below, including the finding that “ ‘the proceedings taken by the [INS] differed in no respect from what would have been done in the case of an individual concerning whom [there was no pending FBI investigation],’” id., at 226-227. But it is a long leap from the proposition that following regular procedures is some evidence of lack of pretext to the proposition that failure to follow regular procedures proves (or is an operational substitute for) pretext. Abel, moreover, did not involve the assertion that pretext could invalidate a search or seizure for which there was probable cause — and even what it said about pretext in other contexts is plainly inconsistent with the views we later stated in Robinson, Gustafson, Scott, and Villamonte-Marquez. In the other case claimed to contain supportive dicta, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), in approving a search incident to an arrest for driving without a license, we noted that the arrest was “not a departure from established police department practice.” Id., at 221, n. 1. That was followed, however, by the statement that “[w]e leave for another day questions which would arise on facts different from these.” Ibid. This is not even a dictum that purports to provide an answer, but merely one that leaves the question open.

f — i hH t — 4

In what would appear to be an elaboration on the "reasonable officer” test, petitioners argue that the balancing inherent in any Fourth Amendment inquiry requires us to weigh the governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as we have here. That balancing, petitioners claim, does not support investigation of minor traffic infractions by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles; such investigation only minimally advances the government’s interest in traffic safety, and may indeed retard it by producing motorist confusion and alarm — a view said to be supported by the Metropolitan Police Department’s own regulations generally prohibiting this practice. And as for the Fourth Amendment interests of the individuals concerned, petitioners point out that our cases acknowledge that even ordinary traffic stops entail “a possibly unsettling show of authority”; that they at best "interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time” and at worst “may create substantial anxiety,” Prouse, 440 U. S., at 657. That anxiety is likely to be even more pronounced when the stop is conducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars.

It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a “reasonableness” determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause. That is why petitioners must rely upon cases like Prouse to provide examples of actual “balancing” analysis. There, the police action in question was a random traffic stop for the purpose of checking a motorist’s license and vehicle registration, a practice that — like the practices at issue in the inventory search and administrative inspection cases upon which petitioners rely in making their “pretext” claim — involves police intrusion without the probable cause that is its traditional justification. Our opinion in Prouse expressly distinguished the case from a stop based on precisely what is at issue here: “probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations.” Id., at 661. It noted approvingly that “[t]he foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon observed violations,” id., at 659, which afford the “‘quantum of individualized suspicion’ ” necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained, id., at 654-655 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 560). What is true of Prouse is also true of other cases that engaged in detailed “balancing” to decide the constitutionality of automobile stops, such as Martinez-Fuerte, which upheld checkpoint stops, see 428 U. S., at 556-562, and Brignoni-Ponce, which disallowed so-called “roving patrol” stops, see 422 U. S., at 882-884: The detailed “balancing” analysis was necessary because they involved seizures without probable cause.

Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to perform the “balancing” analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests — such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), unannounced entry into a home, see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), entry into a home without a warrant, see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 (1984), or physical penetration of the body, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985). The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken “outbalances” private interest in avoiding police contact.

Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the “multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations” is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement.

For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.

* * *

Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of the convictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct. The judgment is

Affirmed.

      1 An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 369 (1976).

       An administrative inspection is the inspection of business premises conducted by authorities responsible for enforcing a pervasive regulatory scheme — for example, unannounced inspection of a mine for compliance with health and safety standards. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 599-605 (1981).


author: Justice Kennedy

text:
    DEGEN v. UNITED STATES
    No. 95-173.
    Argued April 22, 1996
    Decided June 10, 1996

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Andrew L. Frey, Alan E. Untereiner, and Daniel W. Stewart.

      Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Public Citizen by Alan B. Morrison and Allison M. Zieve; and for Ghaith R. Pharaon by Richard F. Lawler.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider whether a United States District Court may strike the filings of a claimant in a forfeiture suit and grant summary judgment against him for failing to appear in a related criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held this to be a proper exercise of the District Court’s inherent authority. We reverse.

A federal grand jury in Nevada indicted Brian Degen for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day in 1989 that it unsealed the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint. The Government sought to forfeit properties in California, Nevada, and Hawaii, allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen’s drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. 84 Stat. 1276, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(6) — (a)(7). An affidavit by an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency accompanied the complaint and recounted instances of Degen’s alleged drug smuggling during the previous 20 years.

Degen is a citizen of the United States and of Switzerland, his father having been born there. Degen moved to Switzerland with his family in 1988. He has not returned to face the criminal charges against him, and we are advised that Switzerland’s extradition treaty with the United States does not oblige either country to turn its nationals over to the other. While remaining outside this country, however, Degen did file an answer in the civil action to contest the forfeiture. Among other things, he contended the Government’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, 46 Stat. 758, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1621, and based on an unlawful retroactive application of the forfeiture laws.

The District Court in the forfeiture case did not consider any of these arguments. Instead it granted the Government’s motion to strike Degen’s claims and entered summary judgment against him. The court held Degen was not entitled to be heard in the civil forfeiture action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 755 F. Supp. 308 (1990). After another two years consumed by procedural matters (for the most part involving attempts by Degen’s wife to contest the forfeiture), the District Court entered a final order vesting title to the properties in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47 F. 3d 1511 (1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1070 (1996).

In an ordinary case a citizen has a right to a hearing to contest the forfeiture of his property, a right secured by the Due Process Clause, United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 48-62 (1993); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972); McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259, 266-267 (1871), and implemented by federal rule, Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Nonetheless, the Government argues, the District Court’s inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen’s claims under what some courts have labeled the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine.” We have sustained, to be sure, the authority of an appellate court to dismiss an appeal or writ in a criminal matter when the party seeking relief becomes a fugitive. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U. S. 234, 239 (1993); Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876). The question before us is whether the doctrine should be extended to allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant because he is a fugitive from, or otherwise is resisting, a related criminal prosecution. The Courts of Appeals to consider the question have come to different conclusions (compare the decision here and in United States v. Eng, 951 F. 2d 461 (CA2 1991), with United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F. 3d 1151 (CA7 1994), and United States v. $83,320 in United States Currency, 682 F. 2d 573 (CA6 1982)), precipitating our grant of certiorari in this case.

Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630-631 (1962); United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). The extent of these powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 764 (1980). In many instances the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule. Carlisle v. United States, ante, at 426; Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U. S. 250, 254 (1988). Principles of deference counsel restraint in resorting to inherent power, Chambers v. NASCO, supra, at 44, and require its use to be a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it, Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, supra, at 244; Thomas v. Am, 474 U. S. 140, 146-148 (1985).

In accord with these principles, we have held federal courts do have authority to dismiss an appeal or writ of certiorari if the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending. Several reasons have been given for the rule. First, so long as the party cannot be found, the judgment on review may be impossible to enforce. This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, supra, at 97: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692 (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189 (1949). Second, we have said an appellant’s escape “disentitles” him “to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam). The cases cited so far involved the dismissal of fugitives’ petitions in this Court. In reviewing similar practices in state courts for conformity with the Due Process Clause, we have noted further reasons for them: Disentitlement “discourages the felony of escape and encourages voluntary surrenders,” and “promotes the efficient, dignified operation” of the courts. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U. S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam) (using those reasons to justify refusing to reinstate an appeal even once an escaped appellant is recaptured). See also Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138 (1897).

Against this backdrop came our decision four Terms ago in Ortega-Rodriguez. The defendant had escaped from federal custody after conviction but before sentencing. He was sentenced in absentia, but later was recaptured and resentenced; he then filed an appeal, which was dismissed on the authority of Smith v. United States, supra, and the other disentitlement cases just described. We reversed, holding those precedents did not justify dismissal of an appeal by a fugitive recaptured before the appeal was filed. We noted the judgment of the Court of Appeals would be enforceable against the appellant, and that his earlier absence, when no appeal was pending, did not threaten the dignity of the court imposing the sanction. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U. S., at 244-246. We did not rule out the possibility of appellate disentitlement where necessary to prevent actual prejudice to the Government from a fugitive’s extended absence, id., at 249, but we concluded the sanction of disentitlement was unjustified as a sanction applicable to all cases where an escape once had occurred, id., at 249-251. We conduct a similar examination of the disentitlement imposed here, and find it likewise unjustified.

There is no risk in this case of delay or frustration in determining the merits of the Government’s forfeiture claims or in enforcing the resulting judgment. The Government has shown probable cause to forfeit the property, and Degen must refute the showing or suffer its loss. Since the court’s jurisdiction over the property is secure despite Degen’s absence, there is no danger the court in the forfeiture suit will waste its time rendering a judgment unenforceable in practice.

The Government is on stronger ground in suggesting the criminal prosecution against Degen might be compromised by his participation in the forfeiture case. The problem stems from the differences between the discovery privileges available to Degen in each case. See Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F. 2d 1198, 1203-1204 (CA Fed. 1987); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F. 2d 478, 487 (CA5 1962). A criminal defendant is entitled to rather limited discovery, with no general right to obtain the statements of the Government’s witnesses before they have testified. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 16(a)(2), 26.2. In a civil case, by contrast, a party is entitled as a general matter to discovery of any information sought if it appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). The Government contends Degen might use the rules of civil discovery in the forfeiture suit to gain an improper advantage in the criminal matter, prying into the prosecution’s ease in a manner not otherwise permitted.

These problems are not uncommon when criminal and civil forfeiture suits are pending at the same time, but they are made acute by Degen’s absence. If he were in federal custody, the risk of compromising the criminal case could be avoided by staying the civil suit until the prosecution is over. 21 U. S. C. § 881(i). Cf. United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 9 (1970). Degen rendered this solution impractical by frustrating the prosecution of the criminal case against him. The criminal trial cannot begin until he returns, Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255 (1993); if the civil matter were subordinated to the criminal, the forfeiture could be held in abeyance for an indefinite time. This delay would be prejudicial to the Government, for if its forfeiture claims are good, its right to the properties is immediate. We nonetheless are satisfied the District Court has the means to resolve these dilemmas without resorting to a rule forbidding all participation by the absent claimant.

First, the District Court has its usual authority to manage discovery in a civil suit, including the power to enter protective orders limiting discovery as the interests of justice require. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). Decisions in the Courts of Appeals have sustained protective orders to prevent parties from using civil discovery to evade restrictions on discovery in criminal cases. See, e. g., In re Ramu Corp., 903 F. 2d 312, 316-317, 320-321 (CA5 1990); United States v. Stewart, 872 F. 2d 957, 962-963 (CA10 1989); Campbell v. Eastland, supra, at 487. See also Capital Engineering & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Weinberger, 695 F. Supp. 36, 41-42 (DC 1988); Founding Church of Scientology v. Kelley, 77 F. R. D. 378, 380-381 (DC 1977).

Second, the court can exercise its discretion to manage the civil litigation to avoid interference with the criminal case. If, for instance, the Government were unable to rebut De-gen’s arguments except by revealing confidential details of the criminal investigation, the court could consider controlling or limiting the form of proof, or in an extreme case even the theories it permits the absent party to pursue, to prevent him from exploiting the asymmetries he creates by participating in one suit but not the other.

Third, of course, Degen’s absence entitles him to no advantage. If his unwillingness to appear in person results in noncompliance with a legitimate order of the court respecting pleading, discovery, the presentation of evidence, or other matters, he will be exposed to the same sanctions as any other uncooperative party. A federal court has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders, including dismissal in an appropriate case. Again, its powers include those furnished by federal rule, see, e. g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 37, 41(b); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U. S. 639 (1976) (per curiam); Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U. S. 197, 212 (1958); cf. United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 F. 2d 636, 641-642 (CA1 1988), and by inherent authority, see, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S., at 44-45; Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S., at 630-633; Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F. 3d 1406, 1416-1417 (CA5 1995); Zebrowski v. Hanna, 973 F. 2d 1001, 1006 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C. J.).

The details of these steps are committed to the discretion of the District Court; it would be premature to consider now the precise measures the court should adopt as the case proceeds. The existence of these alternative means of protecting the Government’s interests, however, shows the lack of necessity for the harsh sanction of absolute disentitlement. Consideration of some of Degen’s defenses, such as the statute of limitations, appears to require little discovery. If they have merit, the Government should not prevail; if they are groundless, the Government’s interests will not be compromised by their consideration.

We have yet to consider two other purposes said to be advanced by disentitlement: The need to redress the indignity visited upon the District Court by Degen’s absence from the criminal proceeding, and the need to deter flight from criminal prosecution by Degen and others. Both interests are substantial, but disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for advancing them. Without resolving whether Degen is a fugitive in all the senses of the word debated by the parties, we acknowledge disquiet at the spectacle of a criminal defendant reposing in Switzerland, beyond the reach of our criminal courts, while at the same time mailing papers to the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be honored. Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 681-682, n. 2 (1985). A court-made rule striking Degen’s claims and entering summary judgment against him as a sanction, however, would be an arbitrary response to the conduct it is supposed to redress or discourage.

The right of a citizen to defend his property against attack in a court is corollary to the plaintiff’s right to sue there. McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall., at 267. For this reason we have held it unconstitutional to use disentitlement similar to this as punishment for rebellion against the United States, ibid., or, in at least one instance, for contempt of court, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 413-414 (1897). We need not, and do not, intimate a view on whether enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority would violate due process, cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932). It remains the case, however, that the sanction of disentitlement is most severe and so could disserve the dignitary purposes for which it is invoked. The dignity of a court derives from the respect accorded its judgments. That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by too free a recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on the merits.

There would be a measure of rough justice in saying Degen must take the bitter with the sweet, and participate in the District Court either for all purposes or none. But the justice would be too rough. A court’s inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise. There was no necessity to justify the rule of disentitlement in this case; to strike Degen’s filings and grant judgment against him would be an excessive response to the concerns here advanced.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for farther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Justice Thomas

text:
    EXXON CO., U. S. A., et al. v. SOFEC, INC., et al.
    No. 95-129.
    Argued March 19,1996
    Decided June 10, 1996

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Shirley M. Hufstedler argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.

      George Playdon argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Pacific Resources, Inc., et al. were James W. McCartney, Theodore G. Dimitry, Eugene J. Silva, and Richard H. Page. Kenneth W. Starr, Edward W. Warren, Richard A. Cordray, Randall K. Schmitt, David W Proudfoot, and John R. Lacy filed a brief for respondents Sofec, Inc., et al.

        Thomas J. Wagner and Chester D. Hooper filed a brief for the Maritime Law Association of the United States as amicus curiae.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397 (1975), we abandoned the “divided damages” rule previously applied to claims in admiralty for property damages, and adopted the comparative fault principle for allocating damages among parties responsible for an injury. In this case we affirm that the requirement of legal or “proximate” causation, and the related “superseding cause” doctrine, apply in admiralty notwithstanding our adoption of the comparative fault principle.

I

This case arises from the stranding of a tanker, the Exxon Houston, several hours after it broke away from a Single Point Mooring System (SPM) owned and operated by the HIRI respondents and manufactured by respondent Sofec, Inc. The Houston was engaged in delivering oil into HIRI’s pipeline through two floating hoses, pursuant to a contract between Exxon and respondent PRII, when a heavy storm broke the chafe chain linking the vessel to the SPM. As the vessel drifted, the oil hoses broke away from the SPM. The parting of the second hose at approximately 1728 nautical time was designated below as the “breakout.” The hoses were bolted to the ship, and a portion of the second hose remained attached to the ship. So long as the hose was attached to and trailing from the ship, it threatened to foul the ship’s propeller, and consequently the ship’s ability to maneuver was restricted.

During the 2 hours and 41 minutes following the breakout, the captain of the Houston, Captain Coyne, took the ship through a series of maneuvers described in some detail in the District Court’s findings of fact. The District Court found that by 1803, a small assist vessel, the Nene, was able to get control of the end of the hose so that it was no longer a threat to the Houston. See 54 F. 3d 570, 572 (CA9 1995). Between 1803 and 1830, Captain Coyne maneuvered the Houston out to sea and away from shallow water. The District Court, and on appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, found that by 1830, the Houston had successfully avoided the peril resulting from the breakout. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65; 54 F. 3d, at 578-579. The ship had “reached a safe position,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 64, and was “heading out to sea and in no further danger of stranding,” id., at 65; 54 F. 3d, at 578.

Many of Captain Coyne’s actions after 1830 were negligent, according to the courts below. Most significant was his failure to have someone plot the ship’s position between 1830 and 2004, a period during which the crews of the Houston and the Nene were working to disconnect the hose from the Houston. Without knowing his position, Captain Coyne was unable to make effective use of a navigational chart to check for hazards. The courts found that this failure to plot fixes of the ship’s position was grossly and extraordinarily negligent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61; 54 F. 3d, at 578. The District Court found that “Captain Coyne’s decisions were made calmly, deliberately and without the pressure of an imminent peril.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60. His failure to plot fixes after 1830 “was entirely independent of the fact of breakout; he voluntarily decided not to plot fixes in a situation where he was able to plot fixes.” Id., at 64.

At 1956, Captain Coyne initiated a final turn toward the shore. Because he had not plotted the ship’s position, Captain Coyne was unaware of its position until he ordered another crew member to plot the fix at 2004. Upon seeing the fix on the chart, the captain apparently realized that the ship was headed for a reef. Captain Coyne’s ensuing efforts to avoid the reef came too late, and moments later the ship ran aground, resulting in its constructive total loss. The District Court found that Captain Coyne’s decision to make this final turn “was not foreseeable.” Id., at 65.

Exxon filed a complaint in admiralty against the HIRI respondents and respondent Sofec for, inter alia, the loss of its ship and cargo. The complaint contained claims for breach of warranty, strict products liability, and negligence. HIRI filed a complaint against several third-party respondents, who had manufactured and supplied the chafe chain that held the tanker to the SPM.

Before trial, respondents suggested that Captain Coyne’s conduct was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship, and they moved to bifurcate the trial. Respondents and the third-party respondents disputed among themselves the cause of the breakout, and they apparently sought bifurcation of the trial to avoid lengthy proceedings to resolve those factual disputes prior to a determination whether Captain Coyne’s conduct was the superseding cause of Exxon’s injury. The District Court granted the motion, limiting the first phase of the trial to the issue of proximate causation with respect to actions taken after the breakout, and leaving the issue of causation of the breakout itself for the second phase.

Following a 3-week bench trial in admiralty, the District Court found that Captain Coyne’s (and by imputation, Exxon’s) extraordinary negligence was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the Houston’s, grounding. Id., at 63. The court entered final judgment against Exxon with respect to the loss of the Houston, and Exxon appealed.

The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s findings “that Captain Coyne had ample time, as well as opportunity and available manpower, to take precautions which would have eliminated the risk of grounding, and that his failure to do so amounted to extraordinary negligence, superseding any negligence of the defendants with regard to the breakout or provision of safe berth after the breakout,” were “well supported by the record,” and not clearly erroneous. 54 F. 3d, at 579. The court rejected Exxon’s contention that the captain’s actions were foreseeable reactions to the breakout; rather, it noted, Captain Coyne himself had explained that he did not plot fixes “because he felt it was unnecessary to do so.” Id., at 578.

Relying upon Circuit precedent, the court rejected Exxon’s legal argument that the doctrines of proximate causation and superseding cause were no longer applicable in admiralty in light of this Court’s decision in Reliable Transfer. “[A]n intervening force supersedes prior negligence” and thus breaks the chain of proximate causation required to impose liability on the original actor, the court held, “where the subsequent actor’s negligence was ‘extraordinary’ (defined as ‘neither normal nor reasonably foreseeable’).” 54 F. 3d, at 574. The court also rejected Exxon’s argument that the District Court erred in rendering judgment against Exxon on its breach of warranty claims. “Where, as here, the district court finds the injured party to be the superseding or sole proximate cause of the damage complained of, it cannot recover from a party whose actions or omissions are deemed to be causes in fact, but not legal causes of the damage.” Id., at 576. Finally, the court held that under the circumstances of the case, the District Court’s bifurcation of the trial was not an abuse of discretion. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 983 (1995).

II

Exxon makes four arguments for the reversal of the judgment below: (1) that the superseding cause doctrine does not or should not apply in admiralty; (2) that respondents’ breaches of warranty were causes in fact of the loss of the Houston and hence respondents should be liable for that loss; (3) that the lower courts’ finding that Captain Coyne’s extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of the loss of the Houston was in error; and (4) that the District Court abused its discretion and deprived Exxon of due process in bifurcating the issue of proximate causation from the other issues.

A

Exxon’s primary argument is that the proximate causation requirement, and the related superseding cause doctrine, are not or should not be applicable in admiralty. In particular, Exxon asserts that the lower courts’ refusal to allocate any share of damages to parties whose fault was a cause in fact of Exxon’s injury conflicts with our decision in Reliable Transfer.

We disagree. In Reliable Transfer, we discarded a longstanding rule that property damages in admiralty cases are to be divided equally between those liable for injury, “whatever the relative degree of their fault may have been,” 421 U. S., at 397, and adopted the comparative fault principle in its stead. The proximate causation requirement was not before us in Reliable Transfer, and we did not suggest that the requirement was inapplicable in admiralty. (Nor, for that matter, did we consider whether the injury had been proximately caused by the defendant in that case.)

There is nothing internally inconsistent in a system that apportions damages based upon comparative fault only among tortfeasors whose actions were proximate causes of an injury. Nor is there any repugnancy between the superseding cause doctrine, which is one facet of the proximate causation requirement, and a comparative fault method of allocating damages. As Professor Schoenbaum has said:

“The doctrine of superseding cause is . . . applied where the defendant’s negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable. It is properly applied in admiralty cases.
“. . . [T]he superseding cause doctrine can be reconciled with comparative negligence. Superseding cause operates to cut off the liability of an admittedly negligent defendant, and there is properly no apportionment of comparative fault where there is an absence of proximate causation.” 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3, pp. 165-166 (2d ed. 1994).

Indeed, the HIRI respondents assert that of the 46 States that have adopted a comparative fault system, at least 44 continue to recognize and apply the superseding cause doctrine. Brief for HIRI Respondents 28, and n. 31; id., at App. A (listing state-court decisions). Exxon does not take issue with this assertion and concedes that it is not aware of any state decision that holds otherwise. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.

Exxon also argues that we should in any event eschew in the admiralty context the “confusing maze of common-law proximate cause concepts”; a system in which damages are allocated based upon the degree of comparative fault of any party whose act was a cause in fact of injury is “fairer and simpler,” it says. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2. It is true that commentators have often lamented the degree of disagreement regarding the principles of proximate causation and confusion in the doctrine’s application, see, e. g., Keeton 263, but it is also true that proximate causation principles are generally thought to be a necessary limitation on liability, see, e. g., id., at 264, 293, 294, 312. Indeed, the system Exxon apparently proposes either would let proximate causation principles, with all of their complexity, creep back in as one factor in the “comparative fault” analysis itself, see n. 2, supra, or would produce extreme results. “In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond.” Keeton 264. Nevertheless,

“the careless actor will [not] always be held for all damages for which the forces that he risked were a cause in fact. Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous — that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity. Thus, if the [negligent] destruction of the Michigan Avenue Bridge had delayed the arrival of a doctor, with consequent loss of a patient’s life, few judges would impose liability.” Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F. 2d 708, 725 (CA2 1964), quoted in 1 Schoenbaum, supra, §5-3, at 164.

In ruling upon whether a defendant’s blameworthy act was sufficiently related to the resulting harm to warrant imposing liability for that harm on the defendant, courts sitting in admiralty may draw guidance from, inter alia, the extensive body of state law applying proximate causation requirements and from treatises and other scholarly sources. See Keeton 279 (“ ‘The best use that can be made of the authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other’ ”) (quoting 1 T. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 110 (1906)).

B

Exxon’s argument that the District Court erred in rendering judgment against Exxon on its breach of warranty claims fares no better. Exxon implicitly argues that because the respondents breached various contractual warranties, they were “best situated” to prevent the loss of the Houston; and Exxon invokes a passage from Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315 (1964). In Italia Societa, we held that a stevedore breaches its implied warranty of workmanlike service to a shipowner when the stevedore nonnegligently supplies defective equipment that injures one of its employees during stevedoring operations. That case does not purport to deal with the proximate causation limitation for damages on a warranty claim and is not relevant to the question presented here.

We agree with the Ninth Circuit that where the injured party is the sole proximate cause of the damage complained of, that party cannot recover in contract from a party whose breach of warranty is found to be a mere cause in fact of the damage. Although the principles of legal causation sometimes receive labels in contract analysis different from the “proximate causation” label most frequently employed in tort analysis, these principles nevertheless exist to restrict liability in contract as well. Indeed, the requirement of foreseeability may be more stringent in the context of contract liability than it is in the context of tort liability. See East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 874-875 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 and Comment a, pp. 135-136 (1979); 11 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1344, pp. 227-228 (3d ed. 1968); 5 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1008, pp. 75-76 (1964); id., § 1019, at 113-116; cf. 3 E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.14, pp. 241-243 (1990) (Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), “impose[s] a more severe limitation on the recovery of damages for breach of contract than that applicable to actions in tort or for breach of warranty, in which substantial or proximate cause is the test”). The finding that Captain Coyne’s extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of Exxon’s injury suffices to cut off respondents’ liability for that injury on a contractual breach of warranty theory as well.

C

The legal question that we took this case to address is whether a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding and thus the sole proximate cause of its own injury can recover part of its damages from tortfeasors or contracting, partners whose blameworthy actions or breaches were causes in fact of the plaintiff’s injury. As we have held above, the answer is that it may not. Apparently anticipating that this legal issue would not likely be resolved in its favor, Exxon devotes a large portion of its briefs to arguing that the findings by the lower courts that Captain Coyne’s extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of Exxon’s injury were in error. The issues of proximate causation and superseding cause involve application of law to fact, which is left to the factfinder, subject to limited review. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 473-476 (1877); Keeton 320-321; 5 Corbin, supra, § 998, at 22-23. “A court of law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of errors in fact finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275 (1949); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 665 (1987); Reliable Transfer, 421 U. S., at 401, n. 2. Although Exxon identifies some tension in the various findings made by the courts below, we nevertheless conclude that Exxon has not made an "obvious and exceptional showing of error” that would justify our reversal of the courts’ ultimate conclusion, reached after a 3-week trial and review of a lengthy and complex record. Without necessarily ratifying the application of proximate causation principles by the courts below to the particular facts here, we decline to reconsider their conclusion.

D

Finally, Exxon argues that the District Court erred in bifurcating the trial. This issue is not within the questions upon which we granted certiorari. See Pet. for Cert. i. To the extent that Exxon argues that the issue involved here— whether one cause of injury is a superseding cause — can never be bifurcated from other issues, we reject that contention. Again, Exxon relies upon Reliable Transfer in asserting that the fault of all parties must be considered together in order that they may be compared. As explained above, that argument is wrong: A party whose fault did not proximately cause the injury is not liable at all. To the extent that Exxon argues that the District Court abused its discretion in dividing the trial in the particular way that it did here, we decline to address that argument.

The judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

       The Houston was owned and operated by petitioner Exxon Shipping Company, whose vessels carried crude oil for petitioner Exxon Company, U. S. A. We will refer to both of these companies as Exxon. The HIRI respondents are several affiliated corporations: Pacific Resources, Inc.; Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc.; PRI Marine, Inc.; and PRI International, Inc. (PRII).

       Some commentators have suggested that there may be a distinction between a system allocating damages on the basis of comparative culpability, and a system allocating damages on the basis of both comparative culpability and the degree to which fault proximately or foreseeably contributed to an injury. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, K. Keeton, & D. Owen, Pros-ser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 474 (5th ed. 1984)- (hereinafter Kee-ton); 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-4, p. 167 (2d ed. 1994); Owen & Whitman, Fifteen Years Under Reliable Transfer: 1975-1990, Developments in American Maritime Law in Light of the Rule of Comparative Fault, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 445, 476-483 (1991). We continue to use the term “comparative fault” employed in Reliable Transfer, but we do not mean thereby to take a position on which of these systems is the appropriate one, assuming that there is in fact a distinction between them.

       Exxon argues that the courts’ findings — that by 1803, the Nene had gained control of the end of the hose so that it was no longer a threat to the Houston, and that by 1830, the Houston had successfully avoided the peril resulting from alleged breaches of duty on respondents’ part, had “reached a safe position,” and was “heading out to sea and in no further danger of stranding” — are inconsistent with the apparently uncontested finding that the hose, which was suspended from the ship’s crane during efforts to disconnect the hose from the ship, caused the crane to topple at 1944, injuring a crewman. We note in this regard that the District Court expressly found that the captain’s failure to plot fixes after 1830 “was entirely independent of the fact of breakout” and that “he voluntarily decided not to plot fixes in a situation where he was able to plot fixes,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 64; the Court of Appeals also relied upon the fact that Captain Coyne himself had explained that he did not plot fixes “because he felt it was unnecessary to do so,” 54 F. 3d 570, 578 (CA9 1995).