text:
    No. A-83 (O. T. 1994).
    Richley et al. v. Gaines et al.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   Application for stays of execution of sentences of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. A-87 (O. T. 1994).
    Holmes v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 94-5469 (A-81).
    Clines v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 4, 1994
    No. A-79 (O. T. 1994).
    Richley v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction,
   ante this page. Amendment to the application for stay of execution is treated as a motion for reconsideration and is denied.

Justice Scalia would not treat the amendment as a motion for reconsideration and therefore registers no vote. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. A-83 (O. T. 1994).
    Richley et al. v. Gaines et al.,
   ante, p. 1272. Amendment to the application for stays of executions is treated as a motion for reconsideration and is denied.

Justice Scalia would not treat the amendment as a motion for reconsideration and therefore registers no vote. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    August 5, 1994
    No. 94-5016 (A-56).
    Fierro v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 9, 1994
    No. 93-1940.
    Royal Sovereign Corp. et al. v. Beverly Hills Fan Co.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    August 11, 1994
    No. A-64 (O. T. 1994).
    No. A-75 (O. T. 1994).
    Louisiana et al. v. Hays et al.; and United States v. Hays et al.
    Justice Scalia would deny the applications.
   Applications for stay, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Civil Action No. CV 92-1522S, filed July 25, 1994, is stayed pending the timely filing of statements as to jurisdiction in this Court. Should such statements be so timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this Court’s action on the appeals. If the judgment should be affirmed, or the appeals dismissed, this stay shall expire automatically. In the event jurisdiction is noted or postponed, this order shall remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    August 18, 1994
    No. 94-5107.
    Moore v. Reynolds, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    August 24, 1994
    No. A-41 (93-1988).
    Rabin v. United States Intelligence et al.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-42 (O. T. 1994).
    Bueno v. Colorado.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   Dist. Ct., Douglas County, Colo. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Scalia and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-1389.
    In re Disbarment of Schwartz.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1066.]


text:
    No. D-1392.
    In re Disbarment of Bledsoe.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1104.]


text:
    No. D-1396.
    In re Disbarment of Cairo.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1104.]


text:
    No. D-1399.
    In re Disbarment of Agajanian.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1139.]


text:
    No. D-1400.
    In re Disbarment of Pegg.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1139.]


text:
    No. D-1401.
    In re Disbarment of Hunt.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1140.]


text:
    No. D-1404.
    In re Disbarment of Yamada.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 511 U. S. 1140.]


text:
    No. D-1405.
    In re Disbarment of Warner.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1201.]


text:
    No. D-1406.
    In re Disbarment of Brennan.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1201.]


text:
    No. D-1407.
    In re Disbarment of Anast.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1201.]


text:
    No. D-1409.
    In re Disbarment of Beller.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1202.]


text:
    No. D-1410.
    In re Disbarment of Vander Vort.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1217.]


text:
    No. D-1412.
    In re Disbarment of Lederberg.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1232.]


text:
    No. D-1434.
    In re Disbarment of Perry.
   It is ordered that Harold L. Perry, of Oakland, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1435.
    In re Disbarment of McGreevy.
   It is ordered that Timothy J. McGreevy, of Sioux Falls, S. D., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1436.
    In re Disbarment of Sims.
   It is ordered that William Sims, of Buffalo, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1437.
    In re Disbarment of Jones.
   It is ordered that Fred Everett Jones, of Memphis, Tenn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1438.
    In re Disbarment of Kennedy.
   It is ordered that Patrick James Kennedy, of Dallas, Tex., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1439.
    In re Disbarment of Crist.
   It is ordered that John A. Crist, of Middletown, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice,of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1440.
    In re Disbarment of Offstein.
   It is ordered that Jerrold N. Offstein, of San Francisco, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1441.
    In re Disbarment of Hamer.
   It is ordered that Brenda Joyce Hamer, of Glendale, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1442.
    In re Disbarment of Feldman.
   It is ordered that Richard Stewart Feldman, of Ushers, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1443.
    In re Disbarment of Kagan.
   It is ordered that Philip I. Kagan, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1444.
    In re Disbarment of Gasperi.
   It is ordered that Edward M. Gasperi, of Saratoga Springs, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1445.
    In re Disbarment of Sparrow.
   It is ordered that Victor H. Sparrow III, of Washington, D. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1446.
    In re Disbarment of Kenderian.
   It is ordered that Ronald V. Kenderian, of Alpine, N. J., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1447.
    In re Disbarment of Cregan.
   It is ordered that Lawrence Vincent Cregan, of Youngstown, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1448.
    In re Disbarment of Crowley.
   It is ordered that James Tyner Crowley, of Cleveland, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1449.
    In re Disbarment of Levine.
   It is ordered that Leslie Ira Levine, of Mt. Kisco, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 92-8717.
    No. 93-880.
    No. 93-1033.
    No. 93-1254.
    No. 93-1348.
    No. 93-1522.
    No. 93-1732.
    No. 93-1745.
    No. 93-1746.
    No. 93-1771.
    No. 93-1778.
    No. 93-1797.
    No. 93-1798.
    No. 93-1799.
    No. 93-1862.
    No. 93-5418.
    No. 93-6220.
    No. 93-7060.
    Robinson v. Texas, Madsen et al. v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., et al., Chandler v. United States, Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board, Adams v. United States, Maravilla et al. v. United States, Gilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty, Kilpatrick v. State Bar of Texas, Tweedy v. American Airlines, Inc., Casillan et al. v. Regional Transportation District et al., Shaw v. United States, Insurance Company of North America et al. v. Morton International, Inc., Rood v. Pinellas County et al., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum et al., Messa v. Foley, Secretary of Department of Labor and Industry of Pennsylvania, et al., Reed v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al., Johnson v. Illinois, Wickliffe v. Farley, Warden, et al., McCollum v. North Carolina, Bacigalupo v. California, Montiel v. California, Buchanan v. United States, Duvall v. Administrator, Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, et al., Hopkins v. United States, Darden-Bey et al. v. United States, Turner v. Lumadue, Jackson v. Department of the Treasury, Gaydos v. National Fire Insurance Co. et al., Freeman v. United States, In re McCurdy, Jackson v. Makel, Warden, In re Jackson, Ponce-Bran v. California Faculty Assn. et al., Jones v. Washington, Warden, Resnover v. Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, et al., Arditi v. Runyon, Postmaster General, DeVitto v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Cooper et al. v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole et al., Merit v. United States, Watts v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (two cases), Buhl v. United States, Romano v. United States, In re Andersen,
   ante, p. 1246;

ante, p. 753;

ante, p. 1227;

511 U. S. 1069;

ante, p. 1204;

ante, p. 1219;

ante, p. 1221;

ante, p. 1236;

ante, p. 1236;

ante, p. 1221;

ante, p. 1222;

ante, p. 1245;

ante, p. 1237;

ante, p. 1222;

ante, p. 1238;

ante, p. 339;

ante, p. 1227;

510 U. S. 1124;

No. 93-7200.

No. 93-7631.

No. 93-7680.

No. 93-7724.

No. 93-8220.

No. 93-8423.

No. 93-8442.

No. 93-8478.

No. 93-8485.

No. 93-8490.

No. 93-8869.

No. 93-8893.

No. 93-8924.

No. 93-8925.

No. 93-8970.

No. 93-8975.

No. 93-9025.

No. 93-9040.

No. 93-9041.

No. 93-9042.

No. 93-9120.

No. 93-9162.

No. 93-9255.

No. 93-9365.

No. 93-9433.

ante, p. 1254;

ante, p. 1253;

ante, p. 1253;

ante, p. 1228;

511 U. S. 1074;

ante, p. 1229;

ante, p. 1223;

ante, p. 1239;

511 U. S. 1144;

ante, p. 1239;

511 U. S. 1134;

ante, p. 1234;

ante, p. 1224;

ante, p. 1218;

ante, p. 1241;

ante, p. 1241;

ante, p. 1246;

ante, p. 1224;

ante, p. 1225;

ante, p. 1225;

ante, p. 1212;

ante, p. 1242;

ante, p. 1243;

ante, p. 1245; and

ante, p. 1234. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 93-44.
    Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.,
   ante, p. 622. Petition of Daniels Cablevision for rehearing denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 93-1715.
    No. 93-8482.
    No. 93-8992.
    Jarmusik v. Merit Systems Protection Board, Eldridge v. Johnson et al., Lorah v. Department of Human Rights,
   511 U. S. 1143;

511 U. S. 1092; and

ante, p. 1241. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    August 29, 1994
    No. 93-1551.
    Preston et al. v. Frantz et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    September 1, 1994
    No. 94-5887 (A-156).
    Otey v. Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, et al.
    Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 6, 1994
    No. 93-9279.
    Hernandez v. Biscayne Aqua-Center, Inc.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    September 7, 1994
    No. 94-5240.
    Whitaker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    September 8, 1994
    No. 93-404.
    Gustafson et al. v. Alloyd Co., Inc., fka Alloyd Holdings, Inc., et al.
    Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg dissent from the entry of the foregoing order.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 510 U. S. 1176.] The parties are ordered to file on or before Tuesday, October 11, 1994, supplemental briefs addressing the question whether §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 applies to secondary transactions as well as to initial offerings of securities. Oral argument in this case, presently scheduled for October 11, 1994, is postponed.


text:
    September 9, 1994
    No. 93-1937.
    Wachs et al. v. Trevino, a Minor, By and Through Her Next Friend, Her Grandmother, Cruz.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 93-1151.
    Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1218.] This case will be heard on oral argument October 11, 1994, in place of No. 93-404, Gustafson et al. v. Alloyd Co., Inc., et al.


text:
    September 14, 1994
    No. A-20 (94-5859).
    Giles v. Snow et al.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-72 (O. T. 1994).
    McCurdy v. Crandell, Warden.
   Application for bail, addressed to Justice Breyer and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-103 (94-5808).
    Brockman v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-157 (O. T. 1994).
    Duffy et al. v. Wetzler et al.
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-1415.
    In re Disbarment of Margolis.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1232.]


text:
    No. D-1427.
    In re Disbarment of Schechterman.
   Lawrence Schechterman, of Boca Raton, Fla., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 2, 1994 [ante, p. 1268], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1429.
    In re Disbarment of Bernard.
   Donald Ray Bernard, of Seabrook, Tex., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 2, 1994 [ante, p. 1269], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1443.
    In re Disbarment of Kagan.
   It having been reported to the Court that Philip I. Kagan, of Toms River, N. J., has died, the rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 24, 1994 [ante, p. 1276], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1450.
    In re Disbarment of Karch.
   It is ordered that Richard L. Karch, of Los Angeles, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1451.
    In re Disbarment of Linder.
   It is ordered that Robert Alan Linder, of Batavia, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1452.
    In re Disbarment of Mitwol.
   It is ordered that Michael Roger Mitwol, of Palm Harbor, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1453.
    In re Disbarment of Zelman.
   It is ordered that Allan G. Zelman, of Arlington, Mass., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1454.
    In re Disbarment of Anthony.
   It is ordered that William D. Anthony, of Pittsburgh, Pa., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1455.
    In re Disbarment of Wong.
   It is ordered that Allan Yon Kwong Wong, of Somerville, Mass., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1456.
    In re Disbarment of Freedman.
   It is ordered that Kenneth B. Freedman, of Stow, Mass., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    September 15, 1994
    No. 94-6046 (A-192).
    Gutierrez v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
    Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 19, 1994
    No. 94-201.
    Stephens, Commissioner of Insurance of Kentucky, in His Capacity as Liquidator of Delta America Re Insurance Co. v. Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (IRB).
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    September 23, 1994
    No. 94-218 (A-183).
    City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, et al. v. Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation et al. (two cases).
    Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition and this application.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to vacate the judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut and then to remand the cases to the District Court for further consideration in light of Johnson v. De Grandy, ante, p. 997. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment forthwith. Application for stay, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, dismissed as moot.


text:
    No. A-190 (O. T. 1994).
    Miller, Governor of Georgia, et al. v. Johnson et al.; Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and United States v. Johnson et al.
    No. A-200 (O. T. 1994).
    No. A-203 (O. T. 1994).
   Applications for stay, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Civil Action No. 194-008, dated September 12, 1994, is stayed pending the timely filing of statements as to jurisdiction in this Court. Should such statements be so timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this Court’s action on the appeals. If the judgment should be affirmed, or the appeals dismissed, this stay shall expire automatically. In the event jurisdiction is noted, or postponed, this order shall remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications.


text:
    September 26, 1994
    No. A-196 (94-5319).
    Clark v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the disposition by this Court of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay terminates automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    No. D-1411.
    In re Disbarment of Karsch.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1217.]


text:
    No. D-1414.
    In re Disbarment of Woodside.
   Jon Lee Woodside, of Portland, Ore., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on June 27, 1994 [ante, p. 1232], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1416.
    In re Disbarment of Meyer.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1233.]


text:
    No. D-1418.
    In re Disbarment of Griffith.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1267.]


text:
    No. D-1422.
    In re Disbarment of Mosely.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1268.]


text:
    No. D-1423.
    In re Disbarment of Okocha.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1268.]


text:
    No. D-1433.
    In re Disbarment of Corces.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1269.]


text:
    No. D-1437.
    In re Disbarment of Jones.
   Fred Everett Jones, of Memphis, Tenn., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. The rule to show cause, heretofore issued on August 24, 1994 [ante, p. 1275], is hereby discharged.


text:
    No. D-1457.
    In re Disbarment of Gerlin.
   It is ordered that William Lance Gerlin, of Coral Gables, Fla., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1458.
    In re Disbarment of Cole.
   It is ordered that David Patten Cole, of Columbia, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1459.
    In re Disbarment of Durusau.
   It is ordered that Patrick L. Durusau, of Conyers, Ga., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 92-2038.
    Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer et al., dba DeeBees.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1029.] Motion of respondents for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 93-768.
    Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1234.] Motion of Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 93-1121.
    Plaut et al. v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1141.] Motions of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., and Michael B. Dashjian for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 93-1151.
    Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1218.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.

Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 93-1199.
    Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1105.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 93-1260.
    United States v. Lopez.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1029.] Motion of Coalition to Stop Gun Violence et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time denied.


text:
    No. 93-1456.
    U. S. Term Limits, Inc., et al. v. Thornton et al.; and Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas v. Hill et al.
    No. 93-1828.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1218.] Motion of petitioners U. S. Term Limits, Inc., et al. for additional time for oral argument granted, and their motion for divided argument denied. Motion of the Attorney General of Arkansas for additional time for oral argument and for divided argument granted, and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Motion of respondents for additional time for oral argument granted, and their motion for divided argument denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted, and an additional 15 minutes allotted for that purpose.


text:
    No. 93-1612.
    NationsBank of North Carolina, N. A., et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al.; and Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al.
    No. 93-1613.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1141.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 93-1636.
    Swint et al. v. Chambers County Commission et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1204.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 93-1660.
    Arizona v. Evans.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. [Certiorari granted, 511 U. S. 1126.] Motion of Washington Legal Foundation et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 93-1462.
    California Department of Corrections et al. v. Ramon Morales.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1577.
    Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Corp., International Trademark Association, and American Bar Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1783.
    Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8,1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1823.
    Missouri et al. v. Jenkins et al. (two cases).
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1841.
    Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8,1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1883.
    Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services, et al. v. Edwards, Guardian ad Litem for Edwards, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 93-1935.
    Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of Chamber of Commerce of the United States and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 94-226.
    Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 8, 1994. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 6, 1994. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 20, 1994. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 94-5004.
    Williams v. Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 30, 1994
    No. 93-1462 (A-204).
    California Department of Corrections et al. v. Ramon Morales.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1287.] Application for stay, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted, and it is ordered that the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, case No. 92-56262, is stayed pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


author: Justice Scalia, Circuit Justice.

text:
    EDWARDS, GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA, et al. v. HOPE MEDICAL GROUP FOR WOMEN et al.
    No. A-124.
    Decided August 17, 1994
   Justice Scalia, Circuit Justice.

Applicants, officers of the State of Louisiana, ask that I stay an order entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana which enjoins them from enforcing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40:1299.34.5 (West 1992) while at the same time accepting federal Medicaid funds pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 343, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). The District Court stayed its judgment until 5 p.m. on August 19,1994. Yesterday, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously denied the applicants’ motion for stay pending appeal.

Section 40:1299.34.5 provides in relevant part:

“[N]o public funds . . . shall be used in any way for, to assist in, or to provide facilities for an abortion, except when the abortion is medically necessary to prevent the death of the mother.”

The District Court concluded that this statute was inconsistent with what it determined to be the requirement of Title XIX, as modified by the 1994 version of the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 103-112, §509, 107 Stat. 1113, that States participating in the Medicaid program fund medically necessary abortions upon fetuses conceived by acts of rape or incest. Accordingly, it ordered applicants either to cease enforcing §40:1299.34.5 or to withdraw from participation in the Medicaid program. Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards, No. 94-1129 (ED La., July 28, 1994).

The practice of the Justices has consistently been to grant a stay only when three conditions obtain. There must be a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted, a significant possibility that the judgment below will be reversed, and a likelihood of irreparable harm (assuming the applicants’ position is correct) if the judgment below is not stayed. Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers). Moreover, when a district court judgment is reviewable by a court of appeals that has denied a motion for a stay, the applicant seeking an overriding stay from this Court bears “an especially heavy burden,” Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers).

Under this standard, I have no authority to stay the judgment here. The only issue potentially worthy of certiorari is the premise underlying the District Court’s decision: that Title XIX requires States participating in the Medicaid program to fund abortions (at least “medically necessary” ones) unless federal funding for those procedures is proscribed by the Hyde Amendment. The Courts of Appeals to address this question have uniformly supported that premise. See Roe v. Casey, 623 F. 2d 829, 831, 834 (CA3 1980); Hodgson v. Board of County Comm'rs of Hennepin, 614 F. 2d 601, 611 (CA8 1980); Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F. 2d 196, 199 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 448 U. S. 907 (1980); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F. 2d 121, 126-127, 134 (CA1), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 952 (1979). We have already denied certiorari in two of those cases, and it is in my view a certainty that four Justices will not be found to vote for certiorari on the Title XIX question unless and until a conflict in the Circuits appears.

Accordingly, the application for a stay of the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    IN RE WHITAKER
    No. 93-9220.
    Decided October 11, 1994
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Fred Whitaker filed a petition for writ of mandamus and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 39. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, we deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner is allowed until November 1, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition for a writ of prohibition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Since 1987, petitioner has filed 23 claims for relief, including 18 petitions for certiorari, 9 of which have been filed in the last three Terms. That total also includes five petitions for extraordinary writs filed since June 1992. We have denied all of the petitions without recorded dissent. We have also denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8 for the last two petitions in which he has sought extraordinary relief. In re Whitaker, 511 U. S. 1105 (1994); In re Whitaker, 506 U. S. 983 (1992).

Petitioner’s current claim involves a civil action brought in the Alameda, California, Superior Court against Lake Merritt Lodge & Residence, alleging damages of $2 in illegal taxes. His legal arguments here are just as frivolous as those he has made in previous petitions.

Although petitioner has exhibited frequent filing patterns with respect to petitions for writ of certiorari, we limit our sanctions at this time to the type of relief requested today— styled as petitions for extraordinary writs. We have imposed similar sanctions in the past. See, e. g., In re Anderson, 511 U. S. 364 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989). As we concluded in Sindram:

“The goal of fairly dispensing justice ... is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests. Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations — filing fees and attorney’s fees — that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions. The risks of abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation. In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system.” 498 U. S., at 179-180 (citation omitted).

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Having already explained why the 1991 amendment to this Court’s Rule 39 was both unnecessary and ill considered, and having dissented from each of the dispositions cited by the Court today, I would only add that I remain convinced that the views expressed in those dissents are correct. Given the current state of our docket, there is a peculiar irony in the Court’s reliance, as a basis for singling out this petition for special treatment, on the supposed need to conserve its scarce resources so that it may achieve its “ ''goal of fairly dispensing justice/ ” ante, at 3.

I respectfully dissent.

      Rule 39.8 provides: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”

         In re Amendment to Rule 89, 500 U. S. 13, 15 (1991) (dissenting opinion).

       See In re Anderson, 511 U. S. 364, 366 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16, 17-19 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, 180-183 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 185-188 (1989). See also Day v. Day, 510 U. S. 1, 3 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U. S. 1067, 1069-1072 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES
    No. —.
    Decided October 31, 1994
   Per Curiam.

Anthony Austin pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Thomas Cochran, who had been appointed as Austin’s counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). That brief raised the issue of sentence computation, but concluded that no meritorious issues existed for appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Austin’s conviction and sentence. Cochran then informed Austin of the right to petition for certiorari. Austin responded with a request to file a petition on his behalf. In advance of the deadline for filing the petition, Cochran applied to this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel. We grant his application.

The Criminal Justice Act directs each district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the Circuit, to implement “a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(a). The Fourth Circuit plan contains a provision governing the duration of service by appointed counsel. Specifically, it provides:

“2. Appellate Counsel. Every attorney, including retained counsel, who represents a defendant in this court shall continue to represent his client after termination of the appeal unless relieved of further responsibility by the Supreme Court. Where counsel has not been relieved:
“If the judgment of this court is adverse to the defendant, counsel shall inform the defendant, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certio-rari. If the defendant, in writing, so requests, counsel shall prepare and file a timely petition for such a writ and transmit a copy to the defendant. Thereafter, unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Court or its clerk, or unless any applicable rule, order or plan of the Supreme Court shall otherwise provide, counsel shall take whatever further steps are necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, until the petition is granted or denied.” 4th Circuit Rules App. II, Rule V.2.

Cochran argues that the Rule subjects him to conflicting obligations. On the one hand, the Rule imposes a mandatory duty to file a petition even if the legal arguments are frivolous. On the other hand, this Court’s Rule 42.2 allows an award of damages or costs against him if he were to file a frivolous petition.

As a matter of pure text, Cochran’s interpretation is correct. The Fourth Circuit Rule does require the actions of appointed counsel to comply with this Court’s Rules, but only after the filing of a petition for certiorari. The Rule imposes a very clear mandate to file petitions at the client’s request, evidenced by the command “shall prepare and file.” The Fourth Circuit keeps plenty of company in mandating representation through the certiorari process, even when it may run counter to our Rules. Although the Fourth Circuit Rule provides a mechanism to seek relief from this obligation, Cochran is the first attorney to move for such relief, indicating that counsel feel encouraged or perhaps bound by these Rules to file petitions that rest on frivolous claims. These Circuit Rules may explain, in part, the dramatically increased number of petitions for certiorari on direct appeal from federal courts of appeals filed by persons in forma pauperis.

Consistent with the Criminal Justice Act, we have provided by Rule for the payment of counsel appointed by this Court to represent certain indigent defendants. See Rule 39.7 (“In a case in which certiorari has been granted or jurisdiction has been noted or postponed, this Court may appoint counsel to represent a party financially unable to afford an attorney to the extent authorized by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A”). But nothing in the Criminal Justice Act compels counsel to file papers in contravention of this Court’s Rules against frivolous filings. And though indigent defendants pursuing appeals as of right have a constitutional right to a brief filed on their behalf by an attorney, Anders v. California, supra, that right does not extend to forums for discretionary review. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 616-617 (1974). Our Rules dealing with the grounds for granting certiorari, and penalizing frivolous filings, apply equally to petitioners using appointed or retained counsel. We believe that the Circuit councils should, if necessary, revise their Criminal Justice Plans so that they do not create any conflict with our Rules. The plan should allow for relieving a lawyer of the duty to file a petition for certiorari if the petition would present only frivolous claims.

A few of the Circuits have adopted plans that accommodate this Court’s Rules in some fashion. For instance, the First Circuit only requires appointed counsel to continue representation at the Supreme Court level if “the person requests it and there are reasonable grounds for counsel properly to do so.” 1st Circuit Rule 46.5(c). If counsel determines a petition would be frivolous, he must inform the First Circuit and request leave to withdraw. See also 2d Circuit Rules App. A, Rule III.5. The Sixth Circuit takes a different tack, insulating counsel from violation of its Rules (though not, of course, from violation of our Rules) so long as he proceeds according to his best professional judgment, without resorting to the approval of the appellate court. Its recently amended Rule states: “Court appointed counsel is obligated to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States if the client requests that such a review be sought and, in counsel’s considered judgment, there are grounds for seeking Supreme Court review.” 6th Circuit Rule 12(f) (emphasis in original). We do not believe that the Criminal Justice Act compels either approach. From an administrative point of view, however, we think a plan requiring approval of the court of appeals is preferable, because attorneys are more likely to avail themselves of this avenue for relief if they have the endorsement of the court to back up their own judgment.

       See D. C. Circuit Rules App. VIII, Rule IV (“The duties of representation by counsel on appeal, where the appeal has been unsuccessful, shall extend to advising the party of the right to file a petition for writ of certiorari .... If the party so requests, counsel shall prepare and file such a petition”) (emphasis added); 3d Circuit Rules Addendum B, Rule III.6 (same); 5th Circuit Rules App. C, Rule 4 (same); 7th Circuit Rules App. II, Rule V.3 (same); 8th Circuit Rules App. Rule V (same); 9th Circuit Rules App. A, §4(c) (same); 10th Circuit Rules Addendum I, Rule II.D (same); 11th Circuit Rules Addendum 4(f)(4) (same).

       Since this Court received Cochran’s motion, another attorney has filed a petition for certiorari raising the same issue. Anderson v. United States, No. 94-5958.

       For the October 1983 Term, we received 523 petitions for certiorari on direct review in criminal cases from informa pauperis petitioners in federal courts. That number increased fourfold by the October 1993 Term with 2,053 petitions. That increase stands in contrast with the increase in criminal petitions on direct review from state courts — an increase of only 50% in that same 10-year period.


author: Justice O’Connor

text:
    UNITED STATES v. SHABANI
    No. 93-981.
    Argued October 3, 1994
    Decided November 1, 1994
    O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, and Joseph Douglas Wilson.

      Dennis P. Riordan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Alan M. Caplan and Marc J. Zilversmit.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This ease asks us to consider whether 21 U. S. C. § 846, the drug conspiracy statute, requires the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We conclude that it does not.

I

According to the grand jury indictment, Reshat Shabani participated in a narcotics distribution scheme in Anchorage, Alaska, with his girlfriend, her family, and other associates. Shabani was allegedly the supplier of drugs, which he arranged to be smuggled from California. In an undercover operation, federal agents purchased cocaine from distributors involved in the conspiracy.

Shabani was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. He moved to dismiss the indictment because it did not allege the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which act, he argued, was an essential element of the offense. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Hon.. H. Russel Holland, denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, Shabani again raised the issue and asked the court to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act was required for conviction. The District Court noted that Circuit precedent did not require the allegation of an overt act in the indictment but did require proof of such an act at trial in order to state a violation of § 846. Recognizing that such a result was “totally illogical,” App. 29, and contrary to the language of the statute, Judge Holland rejected Shabani’s proposed jury instruction, id., at 36. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court sentenced Shabani to 160 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 993 F. 2d 1419 (1993). The court acknowledged an inconsistency between its cases holding that an indictment under § 846 need not allege an overt act and those requiring proof of such an act at trial, and it noted that the latter cases “stand on weak ground.” Id., at 1420. Nevertheless, the court felt bound by precedent and attempted to reconcile the two lines of cases. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although the Government must prove at trial that the defendant has committed an overt act in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, the act need not be alleged in the indictment because “‘[cjourts do not require as detailed a statement of an offense’s elements under a conspiracy count as under a substantive count.’ ” Id., at 1422, quoting United States v. Tavelman, 650 F. 2d 1133, 1137 (CA9 1981).

Chief Judge Wallace wrote separately to point out that in no other circumstance could the Government refrain from alleging in the indictment an element it had to prove at trial. He followed the Circuit precedent but invited the Court of Appeals to consider the question en banc because the Ninth Circuit, “contrary to every other circuit, clings to a problematic gloss on 21 U. S. C. § 846, insisting, despite a complete lack of textual support in the statute, that in order to convict under this section the government must prove the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 993 F. 2d, at 1422 (concurring opinion). For reasons unknown, the Court of Appeals did not grant en banc review. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1108 (1994), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the 11 other Circuits that have addressed the question, all of which have held that § 846 does not require proof of an overt act.

II

Congress passed the drug conspiracy statute as §406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. It provided: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” Id., at 1265. As amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377, the statute currently provides: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 21 U. S. C. § 846. The language of neither version requires that an overt act be committed to farther the conspiracy, and we have not inferred such a requirement from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes. In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), Justice Holmes wrote, “[W]e can see no reason for reading into the Sherman Act more than we find there,” id., at 378, and the Court held that an overt act is not required for antitrust conspiracy liability. The same reasoning prompted our conclusion in Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945), that the Selective Service Act “does not require an overt act for the offense of conspiracy.” Id., at 340.

Nash and Singer follow the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307-308 (1992). We have consistently held that the common law understanding of conspiracy “does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability.” Nash, supra, at 378; see also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651, 659 (1951); Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464, 468 (1895) (“At common law it was neither necessary to aver nor prove an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy...”). Respondent contends that these decisions were rendered in a period of unfettered expansion in the law of conspiracy, a period which allegedly ended when the Court declared that “we will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 404 (1957) (citations omitted). Grünewald, however, was a statute of limitations case, and whatever exasperation with conspiracy prosecutions the opinion may have expressed in dictum says little about the views of Congress when it enacted § 846.

As to those views, we find it instructive that the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, contains an explicit requirement that a conspirator “do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” In light of this additional element in the general conspiracy statute, Congress’ silence in § 846 speaks volumes. After all, the general conspiracy statute preceded and presumably provided the framework for the more specific drug conspiracy statute. “Nash and Singer give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on §371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, it dispenses with such a requirement.” United States v. Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 284 (CA7 1992). Congress appears to have made the choice quite deliberately with respect to § 846; the same Congress that passed this provision also enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, § 802(a) of which contains an explicit requirement that “one or more of [the conspirators] does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy,” id., at 936, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1511(a).

Early opinions in the Ninth Circuit dealing with the drug conspiracy statute simply relied on our precedents interpreting the general conspiracy statute and ignored the textual variations between the two provisions. See United States v. Monroe, 552 F. 2d 860, 862 (CA9), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 972 (1977), citing United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671 (1975); United States v. Thompson, 493 F. 2d 305, 310 (CA9), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 834 (1974), citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 86-88 (1915). Two other Courts of Appeals were led down the same path, see United States v. King, 521 F. 2d 61, 63 (CA10 1975); United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F. 2d 484, 490 (CA8 1973), but both subsequently recognized the misstep and rejected their early interpretations, see United States v. Covos, 872 F. 2d 805, 810 (CA8 1989); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F. 2d 1280, 1294 (CA10 1988).

What the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize we now make explicit: In order to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378 (1992), is not to the contrary. In that case, an indictment under § 846 alleged two overt acts which had formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction for attempting to manufacture drugs. The defendant argued that the Government had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508 (1990), overruled, United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688 (1993), by using evidence underlying the prior conviction “to prove an essential element of an offense” charged in the second prosecution. We held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the conspiracy charge. Justice Stevens, writing separately, thought that our double jeopardy discussion was unnecessary partly because “there is no overt act requirement in the federal drug conspiracy statute,” Felix, supra, at 392 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Shabani argues that, by not responding to this point, the Court implicitly held that § 846 requires proof of overt acts; otherwise, the double jeopardy discussion would have been merely advisory. The procedural history of Felix, however, belies this contention. The disputed evidence was offered not to prove overt acts qua overt acts, but to prove the existence of a conspiracy. The lower court in Felix noted that it was “mindful that 21 U. S. C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act..." United States v. Felix, 926 F. 2d 1522, 1529, n. 7 (CA10 1991). Nevertheless, evidence of such acts raised double jeopardy concerns because it “tended to show the criminal agreement for the conspiracy,” an indisputably essential element of the offense. Ibid. Indeed, Justice Stevens also argued that “the overt acts did not establish an agreement between Felix and his co-conspirators.” Felix, 503 U. S., at 392. In light of the lower court opinion, it is apparent that we rejected this point — rather than Justice Stevens’ construction of §846 — before reaching the double jeopardy issue. In any event, Shabani’s strained reading of Felix is of little consequence for precedential purposes, since “[questions which ‘merely lurk in the record’ are not resolved, and no resolution of them may be inferred.” Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 183 (1979), quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925).

Shabani reminds us that the law does not punish criminal thoughts and contends that conspiracy without an overt act requirement violates this principle because the offense is predominantly mental in composition. The prohibition against criminal conspiracy, however, does not punish mere thought; the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus and has been so viewed since Regina v. Bass, 11 Mod. 55, 88 Eng. Rep. 881, 882 (K. B. 1705) (“[T]he very assembling together was an overt act”); see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975) (“Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act”) (citations omitted).

Finally, Shabani invokes the rule of lenity, arguing that the statute is unclear because it neither requires an overt act nor specifies that one is not necessary. The rule of lenity, however, applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute. See, e. g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 374 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239-241 (1993). That is not the case here. To require that Congress explicitly state its intention not to adopt petitioner’s reading would make the rule applicable with the “mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction,” id., at 239, a result supported by neither lenity nor logic.

As the District Court correctly noted in this case, the plain language of the statute and settled interpretive principles reveal that proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

      See United States v. Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 285 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 991 (1992); United States v. Clark, 928 F. 2d 639, 641 (CA4 1991); United States v. Figueroa, 900 F. 2d 1211, 1218 (CA8), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 942 (1990); United States v. Paiva, 892 F. 2d 148, 155 (CA1 1989); United States v. Onick, 889 F. 2d 1425, 1432 (CA5 1989); United States v. Cochran, 883 F. 2d 1012, 1017-1018 (CA11 1989); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F. 2d 1280, 1294 (CA10 1988); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F. 2d 307, 308-309 (CADC 1987); United States v. Bey, 736 F. 2d 891, 894 (CA3 1984); United States v. Dempsey, 733 F. 2d 392, 396 (CA6), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 983 (1984); United States v. Knuckles, 581 F. 2d 305, 311 (CA2), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 986 (1978).


author: Justice Scalia

text:
    U.S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO. v. BONNER MALL PARTNERSHIP
    No. 93-714.
    Argued October 4, 1994
    Decided November 8, 1994

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Brandford Anderson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dale G. Higer and David B. Levant.

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Ronald J. Mann, Leonard Schaitman, and John P. Schnitker.

      John Ford Elsaesser, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on- the brief were Isaac M. Pachulski, K. John Shaffer, and Barbara Buchanan.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha et al. by Herbert H. Mintz, Robert D. Litowitz, Jean Burke Fordis, David S. Forman, and William L. Androlia; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., by Jill E. Fisch, Arthur H. Bryant, and Leslie A. Brueckner.

   Justice Scalia

The question in this case is whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil judgments of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or certio-rari sought.

I

In 1984 and 1985, Northtown Investments built the Bonner Mall in Bonner County, Idaho, with financing from a bank in that State. In 1986, respondent Bonner Mall Partnership (Bonner) acquired the mall, while petitioner U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (Bancorp) acquired the loan and mortgage from the Idaho bank. In 1990, Bonner defaulted on its real estate taxes and Bancorp scheduled a foreclosure sale.

The day before the sale, Bonner filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. It filed a reorganization plan that depended on the “new value exception” to the absolute priority rule. Ban-corp moved to suspend the automatic stay of its foreclosure imposed by 11 U. S. C. § 362(a), arguing that Bonner’s plan was unconfirmable as a matter of law for a number of reasons, including unavailability of the new value exception. The Bankruptcy Court eventually granted the motion, concluding that the new value exception had not survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. The court stayed its order pending an appeal by Bonner. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reversed, In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 142 B. R. 911 (1992); Bancorp took an appeal in turn, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F. 3d 899 (1993).

Bancorp then petitioned for a writ of certiorari. After we granted the petition, 510 U. S. 1039 (1994), and received briefing on the merits, Bancorp and Bonner stipulated to a consensual plan of reorganization, which received the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. The parties agreed that confirmation of the plan constituted a settlement that mooted the case. Bancorp, however, also requested that we exercise our power under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Bonner opposed the motion. We set the vacatur question for briefing and argument. 511 U. S. 1002-1003 (1994).

II

Respondent questions our power to entertain petitioner’s motion to vacate, suggesting that the limitations on the judicial power conferred by Article III, see U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 1, “may, at least in some cases, prohibit an act of vacatur when no live dispute exists due to a settlement that has rendered a case moot.” Brief for Respondent 21 (emphasis in original).

The statute that supplies the power of vacatur provides:

“The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. §2106.

Of course, no statute could authorize a federal court to decide the merits of a legal question not posed in an Article III case or controversy. For that purpose, a case must exist at all the stages of appellate review. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975); Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895). But reason and authority refute the quite different notion that a federal appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of litigation once it has been determined that the requirements of Article III no longer are (or indeed never were) met. That proposition is contradicted whenever an appellate court holds that a district court lacked Article III jurisdiction in the first instance, vacates the decision, and remands with directions to dismiss. In cases that become moot while awaiting review, respondent’s logic would hold the Court powerless to award costs, e.g., Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. 359, 362-363 (1921), or even to enter an order of dismissal.

Article III does not prescribe such paralysis. “If a judgment has become moot [while awaiting review], this Court may not consider its merits, but may make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require.” Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 677 (1944). As with other matters of judicial administration and practice “reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding function” of the federal courts, Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ), Congress may authorize us to enter orders necessary and appropriate to the final disposition of a suit that is before us for review. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 389-390 (1989); see also id., at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Ill

The leading case on vacatur is United States v. Munsing-wear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950), in which the United States sought injunctive and monetary relief for violation of a price control regulation. The damages claim was held in abeyance pending a decision on the injunction. The District Court held that the respondent’s prices complied with the regulations and dismissed the complaint. While the United States’ appeal was pending, the commodity at issue was decontrolled; at the respondent’s request, the case was dismissed as moot, a disposition in which the United States acquiesced. The respondent then obtained dismissal of the damages action on the ground of res judicata, and we took the case to review that ruling. The United States protested the unfairness of according preclusive effect to a decision that it had tried to appeal but could not. We saw no such unfairness, reasoning that the United States should have asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court’s decision before the appeal was dismissed. We stated that “[t]he established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.” Id., at 39. We explained that vacatur “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.” Id., at 40. Finding that the United States had “slept on its rights,” id., at 41, we affirmed.

The parties in the present case agree that vacatur must be decreed for those judgments whose review is, in the words of Munsingwear, “ ‘prevented through happenstance’ ” — that is to say, where a controversy presented for review has “become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties.” Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82, 83 (1987). They also agree that vacatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court. The contested question is whether courts should vacate where mootness results from a settlement. The centerpiece of petitioner’s argument is that the Mun-singwear procedure has already been held to apply in such cases. Munsingwear’s description of the “established practice” (the argument runs) drew no distinctions between categories of moot cases; opinions in later cases granting vacatur have reiterated the breadth of the rule, see, e. g., Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U. S. 92, 93 (1979) (per curiam); and at least some of those cases specifically involved mootness by reason of settlement, see, e. g., Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaeffer Co., 474 U. S. 120 (1985) (per curiam).

But Munsingwear, and the post -Munsingwear practice, cannot bear the weight of the present case. To begin with, the portion of Justice Douglas’ opinion in Munsingwear describing the “established practice” for vacatur was dictum; all that was needful for the decision was (at most) the proposition that vacatur should have been sought, not that it necessarily would have been granted. Moreover, as Munsing-wear itself acknowledged, see 340 U. S., at 40, n. 2, the “established practice” (in addition to being unconsidered) was not entirely uniform, at least three cases having been dismissed for mootness without vacatur within the four Terms preceding Munsingwear. See, e. g., Schenley Distilling Corp. v. Anderson, 333 U. S. 878 (1948) (per curiam). Nor has the post-Munsingwear practice been as uniform as petitioner claims. See, e. g., Allen & Co. v. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc., 510 U. S. 1160 (1994); Minnesota Newspaper Assn., Inc. v. Postmaster General, 488 U. S. 998 (1989); St. Luke's Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals v. Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Center, 459 U. S. 1025 (1982). Of course all of those decisions, both granting vacatur and denying it, were per curiam, with the single exception of Karcher v. May, supra, in which we declined to vacate. This seems to us a prime occasion for invoking our customary refusal to be bound by dicta, e. g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 312, n. 11 (1967), and our customary skepticism toward per curiam dispositions that lack the reasoned consideration of a full opinion, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974). Today we examine vacatur once more in the light shed by adversary presentation.

The principles that have always been implicit in our treatment of moot cases counsel against extending Munsingwear to settlement. From the beginning we have disposed of moot cases in the manner “ ‘most consonant to justice’... in view of the nature and character of the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.” United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 477-478 (1916) (quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 302 (1892)). The principal condition to which we have looked is whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action. See Hamburg-Amerikanische, supra, at 478 (remanding a moot case for dismissal because “the ends of justice exact that the judgment below should not be permitted to stand when without any fault of the [petitioner] there is no power to review it upon the merits”); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S., at 362 (remanding for dismissal because “without fault of the plaintiff in error, the defendant in error, after the proceedings below,. . . causfed] the case to become moot”).

The reference to “happenstance” in Munsingwear must be understood as an allusion to this equitable tradition of vacatur. A party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment. See Hamburg-Amerikanische, supra, at 477-478. The same is true when mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below. See Walling, 321 U. S., at 675; Heitmuller, supra, at 362. Where mootness results from settlement, however, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice. The denial of vacatur is merely one application of the principle that “[a] suitor’s conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963) (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963)).

In these respects the case stands no differently than it would if jurisdiction were lacking because the losing party failed to appeal at all. In Karcher v. May, supra, two state legislators, acting in their capacities as presiding officers of the legislature, appealed from a federal judgment that invalidated a state statute on constitutional grounds. After the jurisdictional statement was filed the legislators lost their posts, and their successors in office withdrew the appeal. Holding that we lacked jurisdiction for want of a proper appellant, we dismissed. The legislators then argued that the judgments should be vacated under Munsingwear. But we denied the request, noting that “[t]his controversy did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties. The controversy ended when the losing party— the [State] Legislature — declined to pursue its appeal. Accordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inapplicable to this case.” Karcher, 484 U. S., at 83. So, too, here.

It is true, of course, that respondent agreed to the settlement that caused the mootness. Petitioner argues that va-catur is therefore fair to respondent, and seeks to distinguish our prior cases on that ground. But that misconceives the emphasis on fault in our decisions. That the parties are jointly responsible for settling may in some sense put them on even footing, but petitioner’s case needs more than that. Respondent won below. It is petitioner’s burden, as the party seeking relief from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent responsibility for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur. Petitioner’s voluntary forfeiture of review constitutes a failure of equity that makes the burden decisive, whatever respondent’s share in the mooting of the case might have been.

As always when federal courts contemplate equitable relief, our holding must also take account of the public interest. “Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a va-catur.” Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress has prescribed a primary route, by appeal as of right and certiorari, through which parties may seek relief from the legal consequences of judicial judgments. To allow a party who steps off the statutory path to employ the secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of collateral attack on the judgment would — quite apart from any considerations of fairness to the parties — disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial system. Munsingwear establishes that the public interest is best served by granting relief when the demands of “orderly procedure,” 340 U. S., at 41, cannot be honored; we think conversely that the public interest requires those demands to be honored when they can.

Petitioner advances two arguments meant to justify vaca-tur on systemic grounds. The first is that appellate judgments in cases that we have consented to review by writ of certiorari are reversed more often than they are affirmed, are therefore suspect, and should be vacated as a sort of prophylactic against legal error. It seems to us inappropriate, however, to vacate mooted cases, in which we have no constitutional power to decide the merits, on the basis of assumptions about the merits. Second, petitioner suggests that “[vacating a moot decision, and thereby leaving an issue . . . temporarily unresolved in a Circuit, can facilitate the ultimate resolution of the issue by encouraging its continued examination and debate.” Brief for Petitioner 33. We have found, however, that debate among the courts of appeals sufficiently illuminates the questions that come before us for review. The value of additional intracircuit debate seems to us far outweighed by the benefits that flow to litigants and the public from the resolution of legal questions.

A final policy justification urged by petitioner is the facilitation of settlement, with the resulting economies for the federal courts. But while the availability of vacatur may facilitate settlement after the judgment under review has been rendered and certiorari granted (or appeal filed), it may deter settlement at an earlier stage. Some litigants, at least, may think it worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in the district court, or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur. And the judicial economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily much more extensive than those achieved by settlement on appeal. We find it quite impossible to assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon the frequency or systemic value of settlement.

Although the case before us involves only a motion to vacate, by reason of settlement, the judgment of a court of appeals (with, of course, the consequential vacation of the underlying judgment of the district court), it is appropriate to discuss the relevance of our holding to motions at the court-of-appeals level for vacatur of district-court judgments. Some opinions have suggested that vacatur motions at that level should be more freely granted, since district-court judgments are subject to review as of right. See, e. g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F. 3d 381, 384 (CA2 1993). Obviously, this factor does not affect the primary basis for our denying vacatur. Whether the appellate court’s seizure of the case is the consequence of an appellant’s right or of a petitioner’s good luck has no bearing upon the lack of equity of a litigant who has voluntarily abandoned review. If the point of the proposed distinction is that district-court judgments, being subject to review as of right, are more likely to be overturned and hence presumptively less valid: We again assert the inappropriateness of disposing of cases, whose merits are beyond judicial power to consider, on the basis of judicial estimates regarding their merits. Moreover, as petitioner’s own argument described two paragraphs above points out, the reversal rate for cases in which this Court grants certiorari (a precondition for our vacatur) is over 50% — more than double the reversal rate for appeals to the courts of appeals. See Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 589, 595, n. 25 (1991) (citing studies).

We hold that mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review. This is not to say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is produced in that fashion. As we have described, the determination is an equitable one, and exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in favor of such a course. It should be clear from our discussion, however, that those exceptional circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement provides for vacatur — which neither diminishes the voluntariness of the abandonment of review nor alters any of the policy considerations we have discussed. Of course even in the absence of, or before considering the existence of, extraordinary circumstances, a court of appeals presented with a request for vacatur of a district-court judgment may remand the case with instructions that the district court consider the request, which it may do pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

* * *

Petitioner’s motion to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is denied. The case is dismissed as moot. See this Court’s Rule 46.

It is so ordered.

       As described by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the new value exception “allows the shareholders of a corporation in bankruptcy to obtain an interest in the reorganized debtor in exchange for new capital contributions over the objections of a class of creditors that has not received full payment on its claims.” In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F. 3d 899, 901 (1993). We express no view on the existence of such an exception under the Bankruptcy Code.

       The Solicitor General, who has filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner, would apparently distinguish these unvacated cases on the ground that the dismissal was pursuant to this Court’s Rule 46.1 (or its predecessor), which provides for dismissal when “all parties... agrefe],” But such an exception to vacatur for mootness is not mentioned in Munsingwear; nor, we may add, do we see any reason of policy to commend it.

       We thus stand by Munsingwear’s dictum that mootness by happenstance provides sufficient reason to vacate. Whether that principle was correctly applied to the circumstances of that case is another matter. The suit for injunctive relief in Munsingwear became moot on appeal because the regulations sought to be enforced by the United States were annulled by Executive Order. See Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947). We express no view on Munsingwear’s implicit conclusion that repeal of administrative regulations cannot fairly be attributed to the Executive Branch when it litigates in the name of the United States.