text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Louise Livingston, the Widow and sole Executrix of the last Will and Testament of Edward Livingston, deceased, and Cora Livingston, the only Child and forced Heir of said Edward Livingston, and the Wife of Thomas Barton.
   This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States fdr.the District of Louisiana, and was a claiip under the Bastrop grant. It was included in the opinion of the court in the preceding case of the United States v. The Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, — which see. .


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Ann M. Callender, Elizabeth Callender, Christopher G. Callender, and Stanhope Callender, of the State of New York, and Frances Callender, the Wife of Thomas Slidell, and Caroline Callender, the Wife of Edward Ogden, of the State of Louisiana, said Persons being the Widow and Heirs of’the late Thomas Callender; Sidonia Pierce Lewis, Wife of Peter K. Wagner, John Lawson Lewis, Louisa Maria Lewis, Theodore Lewis, Eliza Cornelia Lewis, Alfred Hampden Lewis, Algernon Sidney Lewis, George Washington Lewis, Benjamin Franklin Lewis, and Joshua Lewis, a Minor, represented by Eliza Magioni, the Widow of Alfred Jefferson Lewis, his Mother and Natural Tutrix, all of the State of Louisiana, the said persons herein acting as the Heirs of the late Joshua Lewis and America Lawson, his Wife, and also the Cohens, with Mary P. Bowman of Columbus Lawson; Mary P. Larson, the Wife of John Bowman, of the State of Tennessee, Coheir with the last above named Persons of Columbus Lawson; Catharine Pauline Baker, the Widow of Blaize Cenas, and now the Wife of William Christy, and Hilary B. Cenas, Augustus Henry Cenas, and Augustus St. John, Richard Brenen Blanché, and George Christy, the last four being Minors, and represented by Pauline St. John, the Widow of Peter Cenas, their Mother and Natural Tutrix, all of the State of Louisiana; Jonathan Montgomery and Michel Musson, the Testamentary Executors of the late William Nott, of the State of Louisiana, and the Heirs of Nathaniel Amory, of the State of Rhode Island.
   This, like the two preceding cases, was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, and involved the validity of the Bastrop grant. It was argued together with that of the United States against the Mayor, Aldermen, and Inhabitants of Philadelphia and New Orleans, and was included in the same judgment. See the concluding part of the opinion of the court in the last-named case.


author: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Sarah Turner, the Wife of Jared D. Tyler, who is authorized and assisted herein by her said Husband; Eliza Turner, Wife of John A. Quitman, who is in like manner authorized and assisted by her said Husband; Henry Turner, and George W. Turner, Heirs and Legal Representatives of Henry Turner, deceased.
    The decision of this court in the case of the United States v. King and Coxe (3 Howard, 773, and 7 Howard, 833) again affirmed, yíz. that the contract between the Baron de Carondelet and the Marquis de Maison-Bouge conveyed no interest in the land to Maison-Bouge, but was merely intended to mark out by certain and definite boundaries the limits of the establishment which he was authorized to form.
    The contract must be judged of according to the laws of Spain; but under those laws, whenever there was an intention to grant private property, words were air ways used which severed the property from the public domain.
    The absence in this case of the royal order of 1795, and of all testimony respecting the genuineness of the certificate of survey by Trudeau, makes no difference in the decision of the court. ■ The construction of the grant was the main point of that case, and is also of this.
    Whether or not the instrument was a perfect and complete grant by the! laws of Spain, was a question for the court, and not for the jury.
    The case of the United States v. King and Coxe explained.
    .This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District Court of Louisiana.
    It was a petition filed in the District Court by the appellees,, who claimed a tract of land under the Maison-Rouge grant.-

      The District Court decided in favor of the petitioners, and the United States appealed to this court..
    It was submitted by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General), for the United States, upon the ground that this court had already decided, in the case of United States v. King (3 Howard, 773, and 7 Howard, 833), that the grant was invalid.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the count.

. This is an appeal from the decree of the District Court, jf the United States for the District of Louisiana. The proci jdings were instituted by the appellees against the United St '.,es, according to the acts of Congress of May 26,1824, ana. June ¿17,1844; and they claim title to a parcel of land in the State of Louisiana, under an instrument of writing executed by the Baron de Carondelet, on -the 20th of June, 1797, in favor of the Marquis de Maison-Rouge. The .conveyances by which they deduce title to themselves from him are set forth in the petition. The case turned altogether, in the District Court, upon . the construction and effect of the document ab.ove mentioned; and this is the only question arising on this appeal. .

The appellees insist that this instrument of writing .conveyed, to the Marquis de Maison-Rouge either the legal or equitable title to the. thirty superficial leagues of land described in the-plan of Trudeau annexed to the instrument. But the question which they propose to raise has already been decided. The in-' strument under which they claim title came under the consider-. ation.of this court in the case of the United States v. King and Coxe, reported in 3 Howard, 773, and 7 Howard; 833. Arid in the last-mentioned report it will be seen that the construction and effect; .of this instrument was at that time directly before the court, and the decision of the case depended upon it. The question was then fully and carefully examined and corisidered, and the court held that this instrument of writing conveyed no interest in the land to Maison-Rouge, as his private property; and that it was intended merely to mark out by certain and definite boundaries the. limit? of the establishment'he was authorized to form, according to the stipulations of a previous contract which he had entered into with the Spanish government, in 1795. And as regarded that previous contract the court said: “ It will- be observed that this contract contains no stipulation in favor of Maison-Rouge. All the engagements on the part of the government are in. favor of the emigrants who should accept the conditions. Indeed, it seems to have been no part of the purposes of this agreement to regulate the compensation which he was to receive for' his services. Its only object, as appears by the concluding sentence, was to make known the offers made by the Spanish government to those who were disposed to come. It was therefore to be shown by the Marquis to those whom he invited to remove to tins establishment, and it does not appear to have been thought necessary, and perhaps was not desirable, that his compensation or his interest in forming the colony should be made public. That, was a matter between him and the Spanish authorities, which doubtless was understood on both sides. And whether it was to be in money, or in a future grant of land, does not appear. Certainly’ it was not to be in the land on ■ which this establishment was to be formed, because the government was pledged to grant it to the colonists.”

The question which this appeal brings up is therefore res judicata. Nor does the court .perceive any ground for doubting the correctness of the opinion heretofore pronounced. And in the case arising under the claim of the Barón de Bastrop, in which the judgment of the court has just been delivered, the principles decided in the case of the United States v. King and Coxe have again been affirmed, after full argument by counsel and reconsideration by the court. The De Bastrop claim . was upon an instrument of writing similar to that in favor of Maison-Rouge, and executed on the same day by the-Baron de Carondelet, for a still larger tract of country than that destined and appropriated for the establishment of the Marqqis de Mai-son-Rouge. Undoubtedly the validity and effect of both of these instruments depend altogether upon the laws, ordinances, and usages of the Spanish government, prevailing in the province of Louisiana at the time they were made; and it is the duty of the court to expound them accordingly. And they are both strikingly unlike the grants for colonization authorized by the Laws of the Indies; and equally unlike the' grants usually made by the Spanish. authorities to persons undertaking to introduce into the province a certain number of colonists. In grants of this description, authorized by the Laws of the Indies and usually made by the provincial authorities, the colonists were introduced by the grantee free of' expense to the government, and the grant was the. equivalent for the service performed, and depended upon the number thus brought in. And in such cases the intention to grant as private property was always indicated in clear and appropriate words, which severed the land at once from the royal domain, and converted it into private property.

But in the cases of De Bastrop and Maison-Rouge the colonists are to be brought in .at the expense of the government itself, and supported for some time afterwards; and they are to receive their grants for the land allotted to them from the public authorities, and not from De Bastrop or Maison-Rouge. There would seem, therefore, to be no equivalent or consideration for these extensive grants, and certainly there are no words in either of the instruments that indicate an intention to convey to them as private property the land delineated for their respéctive establishments. On the contrary, as the colonists were to receive their titles and grants from the government, it follows necessarily that the entire title, legal and equitable,, must have remained in the government, and have been so understood by the parties. For otherwise this stipulation could not have been performed. And if 'the land designated for the establishment remained national property, and was not severed by these instruments from the national domain-, it passed to the United States as public property by the treaty of cession.

It is true that the contract of 1795, and the royal order which sanctioned it, and which are referred to in the instrument relied on by the petitioners, were not offered in evidence in this case, and are not in the record before us. And in the opinion of the court, reported in 7 Howard, 849, 850, it will be seen that this contract was regarded as furnishing a key to the construction of the instrument subsequently executed. But the court also held that the instrument of 1797, if construed by itself, conveyed to Maison-Rouge no right of property in the land; and, indeed, that it was not intelligible, unless taken in connection with the prior one. The omission, therefore, of the contract and royal order of 1795 in this record, will not distinguish this case from that of the United States v. King and Coxe.

It is proper also to say, that a question of fact which was ' very much discussed when the case of the United States v. King and Coxe was first before the court, and upon which the court at that time expressed an.opinion, is not in controversy upon the evidence in this record. In the case referred to, a great mass of testimony was offered on behalf of the United States, tending to show that the plan.of Trudeau annexed to the instrument of 1797 was not the one to which it intended to refer; that it referred to another, which designated land at a different place, and higher up the Ouachita River; that the survey .annexed was not made until the latter end of 1802 or the beginning of 1803, when negotiations were actually pending for the cession of the territory, and was then made in expectation of the cession to the United States, and the certificate antedated to cover the land now claimed.

But as the case of the United States v. King and Coxe was an action at'law, and brought up. to this court by writ of error, the questions of fact arising upon the evidence in the record . were not open to revision in the appellate court. The question above mentioned had been decided against the United States by the District Court, according to the Louisiana practice, without the intervention of a jury, and his decision, like the verdict of a jury, was conclusive as to the fact, where th'e case was brought up by writ of error. And this court, when their attention was'called to the subject, set aside the judgment and.reinstated the case, to be heard and determined on the questions of law, assuming the facts to be true as decided by the District Court.

In the present case, however, the. proceeding is according to the rules and principles of a court of equity, and the facts as well as the law are brought here for revision by the appeal. fThe genuineness,of the certificate of Trudeau would therefore be open to inquiry, if the evidence in the former case was in this record.

But none of the evidence offered on behalf of the United- ! States, of any description, in the case against King and Coxe, is contained in the record before us. The case appears to have been tried and determined in the District Court altogether upon testimony adduced by the appellees. They examined several witnesses to prove that Trudeau’s certificate was genuine, and not antedated. And as there was no opposing evidence, the opinion of the District Court upon,this part of the ease was undoubtedly correct.

As relates to the order itself of the Baron dé Carondelet, to which this plan was annexed, it appears that the original ih the Spanish language was produced and proved, and a copy is ■ contained, in the record; and with .it what purports to be á translation into the English language. By whom this translation was made does not appear; nor does the record show that it was proved by the testimony of any witness. It differs in material respects from that produced in the case of the United States v. King and Coxe, which will be found in the report in 3 Howard, and also from that contained in the report of the committee of the House of Representatives in Yol. III. of American State Papers, p. 410 (Public Lands). The two last-mentioned translations are substantially, if not precisely,-the •same, and- conform to the original. But the one sent up in this record is evidently incorrect.

There is likewise a translation Set out by the appellees in ’ their petition, differing from the one offered in evidence, and approaching, very nearly to the -two translations of which we have spoken. But this also is inaccurate, and omits the-word “ conditions,” when speaking of the contract under which Maison-Rouge was to form his establishment. But these erroneous translations are not entitled to consideration in- expounding this instrument, since the original is in evidence and must speak for itself.

Witnesses, it appears, were examined in the District. Court, to prove that this instrument was a perfect and complete grant by the laws of Spain then in force in the province of Louisiana in relation to grants of land; and the counsel for the . appellees moved for an issue upon this point, to be tried by the'jury. This motion was properly refused by the court, and the issues which the court directed were confined to questions of fact. The Spanish laws which formerly prevailed in Louisiana, and upon which the titles to land in that State depend, must be judicially noticed and expounded by the Court, like the laws affecting titles to real property in any other State. They are. questions of law and not questions of fact, and are always so regarded and treated in the courts of Louisiana. And it veannever be maintained in the courts of the United States that the'laws of any State of this Union are to be treated as the laws of a foreign nation, and ascertained and determined as a matter of fact, by a jury, upon the testimony of witnesses. And if the Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana before the cession to the United States were to be regarded as foreign laws, which-the courts could not judicially notice, the titles to land in that'State would become unstable and insecure; and their validity or invalidity would, in many instances, depend upon the varying opinions of witnesses, and the fluctuating verdicts of juries, deciding upon questions of law which they could not, from the nature of their pursuits and studies, be supp'osed to comprehend.

The testimony offered on this subject was objected to by the district attorney, but would seem to have been received by the court. It is not material., however, to inquire whether it was received or not. -For the only question before us is, whether the instrument of writing of 1797, under which the petitioners claimed title, was or was not correctly expounded by the District Court. And whether he arrived at his conclusion from the language of the instrument itself, or was influenced by the oral testimony, is not important. In éither case, the'decision that this instrument \fas a grant to the Marquis de Maison- . Rouge of the thirty square leagues of land therein mentiohed - as his private property, is, in the judgment (of this-court, erro-, neous. And as the title of the appellees rests entirely upon 'this supposed grant, the -decree in their favor .must be reversed, and the petition dismissed.

■ Mr. Justice McLEAN, Mr.. Justice WAYNE, Mr. Justice ■ McKINLEY, and Mr. Justice GRIER dissented.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is ordered and decreed by this court that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimants.


text:
    John H. Bennett, Plaintiff in error, v. Samuel F. Butterworth.

    In Texas, the common law has been adopted, but the forms and rules of pleading in common law cases have not; and although the forms of proceedings and practice in the State courts have been adopted in the District Court of the United States, yet such adoption must not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equitynor as authorizing legal and equitable claims tp be blended together in one suit.
    The Constitution of the United States has recognized the distinction between law and equity, and it must be observed in the federal courts, although there is no' distinction between them by the laws of Texas.
    Where a petition was filed claiming certain negroes, to whom the defendant set up a title as being his own property, and the jury brought in a verdict awarding a sum of money to the plaintiff, which was released, and then the court gave judgment that the plaintiff should recover the negroes, these proceedings were irregular, and-the judgment must bé reversed.
    They cannot be assimilated to proceedings in chancery, or treated as such by tbi3 ' court. There is nothing like a bill or answer, as prescribed by the rules of this court, nor any statement of the evidence upon which the judgment could be revised.
    The case must, therefore, be considered as amase at law, the rules of which require that the verdict must find the matter in issue between the parties, and the judgment must follow the verdict.
    Here neither was the case, and the errors being patent upon the records, the judgment is open to revision in this court, without any motion in arrest of. judgment being made or exception taken in the court below.
    This ease was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas.
    In 1848, Butterworth filed the following petition against Bennett: —

      “ To the Honorable J. C. Watrous, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the District of the State of Texas, and which court has also Circuit Court powers.
    “ The petition of Samuel F. Butterworth, who is a, citizen of the State of New York, against John H. Bennett, who is a Citizen of the State of Texas, would respectfully represent unto your honor, that heretofore, viz. on the day of March, 1846, at to wit, in the district aforesaid, he, your petitioner, was lawfully seized and possessed of four negroes, slaves for life, whose names and descriptions are as follows, viz.: Billy, a negro man, of a dark complexion, aged about twelve years, of the value of five hundred dollars; Lindsey, a negro man, of a dark complexion, aged twenty-two years, and of the value of one thousand dollars; Betsy, a mulatto woman, of a light complexion, aged about thirty years, and of the value of eight hundred dollars ; and Alexander, a boy of a very light complexion, aged about four years, and of four hundred dollars value, of his own property. And being so possessed, your petitioner, afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, in the district aforesaid, casually lost the same out of his possession, and the same, afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, in the district aforesaid, came to the possession of the defendant by find ■ ing. And your petitioner charges, that the said defendant, well knowing the said negro slaves to be the property of your petitioner, and of right to belong and appertain to him, hath not as yet delivered the above-described negroes', or any or either of them, although often requested so to do, to your petitioner; but hath hitherto wholly refused so to do, and hath detained, and still doth detain, the same from your petitioner, who says he has received damages, by reason of the detention of the slaves aforesaid, of five thousand dollars.

      “ In consideration of the premises, your petitioner prays your honor to grant him a summons, directed to the marshal of this district, and commanding him to summon the said defendant to be and appear at the next term of this court, to be held fof this district, at the. city of Galveston, on the first Monday in February next, then and there to answer the allegations contained in this petition; and that, upon the trial of the cause, your petitioner may . have a judgment in specie for the said negroes, together with damages for the detention of the same, and also the costs of suit; and such other and further relief grant in the premises as shall be in accordance with right and justice; and, as in duty bound, he will ever pray, &c.
    “ Samuel Yerger, Attorney for Petitioner.”
    To this petition the defendant demurred, pleaded not guilty, and filed two special pleas. The demurrer was afterwards overruled, and the two special pleas stricken out.
    In June, 1849, the defendant filed an amended answer, consisting of two special pleas. The second was demurred to by the plaintiff, and the demurrer sustained; so that there remained •only the first plea, to which the plaintiff also demurred, but his demurrer was overruled, and he then replied. ’ The case then went to trial' upon this plea and general replication. These pleadings have been stated thus particularly, in order to ascertain what was the issue upon which the parties went to trial. -
    The plea of the defendant set up a title to the slaves in. himself; averring that a dispute had existed between Butter-worth and one John D. Amis and one Junius Amis, which had been left to arbitration; that the referees had decided; amongst other things, that Butterworth should transfer certain negroes to Amis; that Butterworth delivered the negroes, which were those in question; that Amis sold the negroes to him, Bennett; and the plea concluded in this way: —
    “Wherefore the said John H. Bennett says the,said four negroes are his property, and not the property of the said Butterworth, and of this he puts himself upon the country.”
    To this plea Butterwerth replied, that all the parties to the submission and decision in-the plea set out did not assent and agree to the same, and that Butterworth did not sell, convey, and deliver the negroes in the petition mentioned in compliance with the terms, or any of the terms, of the said decision.
    Upon these allegations a jury was sworn, who found the following verdict:—
    . “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff twelve hundred dollars, the value of the four negro slaves in . suit, with six and a quarter cents damages.
    “ C. C. Herbert, Foreman.”
    And thereupon the plaintiff, by his attorney, in open court, released the said judgment for twelve hundred dollars as aforesaid. It is therefore considered by the court, that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the negro man' Lindsey; the negro woman Betsy and her child; and the negro boy Billy, the negro slaves in the petition of plaintiff mentioned, and also six and a fourth cents, the damages by the jurors aforesaid assessed, and also his costs about his suit in this behalf expended.-
    And thereafter, to wit,- on the 25th day of August, 1849, ■ the following order was made in said suit, to wit: —
    “ Samuel F. Butterworth v. J. H. Bennett.
    “ On this day came on for hearing, by consent'of parties, the motion filed by defendant’s counsel, to set aside the verdict, for reasons therein set forth; after argument heard, the court being ' sufficiently advised, it is ordered that the motion be overruled.
    And afterwards, to wit, on the 25th day of August, 1849, the- following order was made, to wit: —

      “ Samuel F. Butterworth v, J. H. Bennett.
    “ The counsel of defendant in this cause tendered his bill of exception to the opinion of the court herein, which was signed by the judge, and ordered to be filed of record; which bill of exceptions is in the words following, to wit: —
    “ United States District Court, District of Texas, Spring Term, 1849.

      “ Samuel F. Butterworth v. John H. Bennett.
    “ Be it remembered, that on this day, the 25th of August, 1849, the following judgment was rendered in the above-named cause, to wit: On this day came the parties, by their attorneys, and thereupon the demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s petition- came on, and was argued, and because it seems to the court that the law is for the plaintiff, it is considered by the court that the demurrer be overruled. ' And the plaintiff’s demurrer to defendant’s first and second plea in his amended answer at the present term also came on, and was argued; and because it seems to the court that on the'said first plea the law is for the defendant, it is considered by the court that the demurrer to the 'said first plea be overruled; and the plaintiff thereupon replied to said first plea. And because the law on said second plea is for the plaintiff, it is considered that said demurrer to said plea be sustained.
    “ And upon motion of plaintiff, by his attorney, it is ordered that the second and third pleas filed in defendant’s answer at a former term be stricken out.
    “ And thereupon came a jury of good and lawful men, to wit, William • Alexander, Daniel Marston, Alexander Moore, John Church, William B. Gayle, Elisha B. Cogswell, C. C. Herbert, James G. Sheppard, Ephraim McLean, A. C. Crawford, William G. Davis, and William M. Sergeant, who, being elected, tried, and sworn well and truly to try the issue joined,-after some, time returned into court the following verdict, to wit: ‘.We, the jury, find for the plaintiff twelve hundred dollars, the value of the four negro slaves in suit, with six and a quarter cents damages. C. C. Herbert, foreman.’ And thereupon the plaintiff, by his attorney, in open court, released the said judgment for twelve hundred dollars, as aforesaid. It is therefore considered by the court, that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the negro man Lindsey, the negro woman Betsy and her child, and the negro boy-Billy,, the negro slaves in the petition of/plaintiff mentioned, and also six and a fourth cents, the damages by the jurors aforesaid assessed, and also his costs about his suit in this behalf expended. .

      “ To the entry of said judgment the defendant objects, on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the verdict of the jury; but the objection was by the court overruled. The said verdict is in words and figures as follows: 4— ‘ We, the jury, find for the plaintiff twelve hundred dollars, the value of the four negro slaves in the suit, with six and a quarter cents damages.’ And the motion of the defendant to set aside said verdict, and for a new trial," having been heard, was by the court overruled. To which opinion of the court, as well in-caúsing said judgment to be sustained as in refusing to set -aside said verdict, the defendant excepts, ánd tenders this his bill of exceptions, which is signed, sealed, and made a part of the record. John C. Watrous.”
    Upon this exception, the case came, up to this court, and • was argued by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Harris, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Walker and Mr. Volney Howard, for the defendant in error.
    The counsel for the plaintiff in error contended, — ■
    I. That the verdict was illegal, and ought to have been set aside.
    1. It will be seen, by reference to the plaintiff’s petition,— particularly to .the prayer thereof, — that this suit was brought for the recovery of the slaves “ in specie,” (not for the recovery of their value,) and for damages for their Unlawful detention. The important issue, viz. whether thé right of property was in the plaintiff or the defendant, was, in the verdict of the jury, entirely omitted. See Coffin v. Jones, 11 Pick. 45.
    2. It did not embrace all 1he issues, which it should have done. See Crouch v. Martin, 3 Blackford, 256; Patterson v. U. States, 2 Wheat. 223; Jewett v. Davis, 6 N. Hamp. 518.
    3. It should have found the value of each of the slaves separately.
    II. That the judgment was illegal, because it was not responsive to the verdict.
    The counsel for the defendant in error contended, that
    This was a suit by petition, under the statute laws of Texas, for four-.slaves, claimed by plain+iff below, and damages for illegal detention. The suit was for the specific slaves, and not for their value. The issue joined was as to the ownership of the slaves ; which issue the jury, in fact, found for the plaintiff. If there be any error inform, it.is cured by the verdict, and -the amendment laws of Texas. Act of Texas, 1846, p. 202, '§ 7 ; p. 365, § 5.; p. 392, § 104; pr393, § 115; pp. 396,397, §§ 132,133.

      There is no distinction in Texas between courts or suits at law or in equity. In the -case of slaves, from their peculiar character as house-servants, or from their necessary connection with plantations, a bill in equity may be filed to compel their delivery. Murphy v. Clark, 1 Smedes & Marsh. 221. An action lies in Texas for the specific slaves claimed, in which a statement of the facts by petition is all that is required.
    This case is not an action of detinue, but more closely resembles a replevin, which is not confined to cases of distress for rent. 1 Chitty’s Plead. 161,162,164.
    The release of the damages may have deprived the pMintiff of his alternate right to the.money, but the waiver of that alternate right could not deprive the plaintiff of his remedy under the judgment for the specific thing.
    The error, if any, should have been met by a motion below in arrest of judgment; whereas the motion (under which the exception was taken) was to set aside the verdict, which was substantially a motion for a new trial, the refusal of which furnishes no ground for a writ of error.
    The. action being by petition, in the nature of a bill in equity, for the specific delivery of the slaves, and the jury having found substantially the right of property.to be in the plaintiff, alt errors of form may be disregarded, and this court may enter now such judgment as should have been entered in the court below for the plaintiff.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas.

The common law has been adopted in Texas, but the forms and rules of pleading in common law cases have been abolished, and the parties are at liberty to. set out their respective claims and defences in any form that will bring them before the court. And as there is no distinction in its courts between cases at law and equity, it has been insisted in this case, on behalf of the defendant in error, that this court may regard the plaintiff’s petition either as a declaration at law or as a bill in equity.

Whatever may be the laws of Texas in this respect, they do not govern the proceedings in the courts of the United States. And. although the forms of proceedings and practice in the State courts have been adopted in the District Court, yet the adoption of the State practice must not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equity, nor as-authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended together in one suit. The Constitution of the United States, in creating and defining the judicial power of the general government, establishes this distinctiori between law and equity; and a party who claims a legal title must proceed at law, and may undoubtedly proceed according to the forms of practice in such cases in the State court. But if the- claim is an equitable one, he must proceed according to rules which this court has prescribed (under the authority of the act 'of August 23d, 1842), regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United States.

There is nothing in these proceedings which resembles a bill or answer in equity according to the. rules prescribed by this court, nor any evidence stated upon which a decree in equity could be revised in an appellate court. Nor was any equitable title set up by Butterworth, the plaintiff in the court below. He claimed in his petition a iegal title to the negroes, which the defendant denied, insisting that he himself was the legal owner. It was a suit at law to try a legal title.

The defendant (Bennett) in his plea or answer claimed under an award to which Butterworth and a certain Junius Amis and a certain John D. Amis were parties; and averred that, in execution of this award, the said negroes had been delivered by Butterworth to John D. Amis as his property, and by him afterwards transferred to Bennett for a valuable consideration. To this plea Butterworth replied, that all the parties to the submission and decision in the plea set out did not assent and agree to the same, and that Butterworth did not' sell, convey, and deliver the negroes in the petition mentioned, in compliance with the terras, .or any of the terms, of the said decision. And upon these allegations a jury was sworn, who found for Butterworth (the plaintiff in the court below) in the following words: “ We, the jury, find for the plaintiff twelve hundred' dollars, the value of the four negro slaves in suit, with six and a quarter cents damages,”

And the record proceeds to state, that thereupon the plaintiff (Butterworth), by his attorney, in open court, released the said judgment for $1,200; and thereupon the court adjudged that he recover of the defendant the four negroes mentioned in his petition, and the six and a quarter, cents assessed by the jury, ■and his costs.

It does not appear whether any direction to the jury, as to the law of the case, was asked for by either of the parties, or given by the court; we have nothing but the pleadings, confused and loose as they are, and the verdict and the judgment.

Now if any thing is settled in proceedings at law where a jury is impanelled to try the facts, it- is, that the verdict must find the matter in issue between the parties, and the judgmént of the court must conform to and follow the verdict.

But here the matter in issue was the property in these negroes, and the verdict does not find that they áre the property of the plaintiff or the defendant, but finds for the plaintiff their value, which was not in issue. It ought, therefore, to have been set aside upon the motion of either party, as no judgment could lawfully be entered upon it. It was a verdict'for a matter- different from that which they were impanelled to try.

In the next place, if any judgment could have been rendered on the verdict, it ought to have been a judgment for the money found by the jury. For the trial of facts by a jury would be of very little value, if, upon a verdict for money to a certain amount, the court could infer that the jury intended to find something else, and give a judgment for property instead of money. And lastly, when the plaintiff, in the District Court, released the $ 1,200 found by the jury, there was nothing of the verdict remaining, upon which the court could act or give judgment for either party, but the six and a quarter cents damages which the jury found in addition to the value.

The judgment is evidently erroneous, and must be reversed. And as these errors are patent upon the record, they are open to revision here, without any motion in arrest of judgment, or exception taken in the District Court.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Dis-' trict of Texas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.


author:
Justice O’Connor
      Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. GONZALES et al.
    No. 95-1605.
    Argued December 11, 1996
    Decided March 3, 1997

      Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Del-linger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

      Edward Bustamante, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Angela Avellanes, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, Roberto Albertorio, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 962, and Carter G. Phillips.

        Leah J. Prewitt, Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Placido G. Gomez, and Barbara Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked to decide whether a federal court may direct that a prison sentence under 18 U.- S. C. § 924(c) run concurrently with a state-imposed sentence, even though § 924(c) provides that a sentence imposed under that statute “shall [not] . . . run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” We hold that it may not.

I

Respondents were arrested in a drug sting operation during which two of them pulled guns on undercover police officers. All three were convicted in New Mexico courts on charges arising from the holdup. The state courts sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 13 to 17 years. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were convicted in federal court of committing various drug offenses connected to the sting operation, and conspiring to do so, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846. They were also convicted of using firearms during and in relation to those drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Respondents received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months in prison, of which 60 months reflected the mandatory sentence required for their firearms convictions. Pursuant to § 924(c), the District Court ordered that the portion of respondents’ federal sentences attributable to the drug convictions run concurrently with their state sentences, with the remaining 60 months due to the firearms offenses to run consecutively to both.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated respondents’ sentences for the firearms violations, on the ground that the § 924(c) sentences should have run concurrently with the state prison terms. 66 F. 3d 814 (1995). (The court also vacated respondents’ substantive drug convictions and dealt with various other sentencing issues not before us.) Although the Court of Appeals recognized that other Circuits had uniformly “held that §924(c)’s plain language prohibits sentences imposed under that statute from running concurrently with state sentences,” it nevertheless thought that “a literal reading of the statutory language would produce an absurd result.” Id., at 819. Feeling obliged to “venture into the thicket of legislative history,” id., at 820 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the court found a line in a Senate Committee Report indicating that “ ‘the mandatory sentence under the revised subsection 924(c) [should] be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense,’” ibid. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 313-314 (1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.)) (emphasis deleted). If this statement were applied literally, respondents would have to serve first their state sentences, then their 5-year federal firearms sentences, and finally the sentences for their narcotics convictions — even though the narcotics sentences normally would have run concurrently with the state sentences, since they all arose out of the same criminal activity. 65 F. 3d, at 821. To avoid this irrational result, the court held that “§924(c)’s mandatory five-year sentence may run concurrently with a previously imposed state sentence that a defendant has already begun to serve.” Id., at 819.

We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1003, and now vacate and remand.

II

Our analysis begins, as always, with the statutory text. Section 924(c)(1) provides:

“Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime ... , be sentenced to imprisonment for five years .... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the ... drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added).

The question we face is whether the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” “means what it -says, or whether it should be limited to some subset” of prison sentences, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980)—namely, only federal sentences. Read naturally, the word “any” has an expansive meaning, that is, “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976). Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, and so we must read § 924(c) as referring to all “term[s] of imprisonment,” including those imposed by state courts. Cf. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 358 (1994) (noting that statute referring to “any law enforcement officer” includes “federal, state, or local” officers); Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 15 (1871) (stating “it is quite clear” that a statute prohibiting the filing of suit “in any court” “includes the State courts as well as the Federal courts,” because “there is not a word in the [statute] tending to show that the words ‘in any court’ are not used in their ordinary sense”). There is no basis in the text for limiting § 924(c) to federal sentences.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggests that the word “any” as used in the first sentence of § 924(c) “unquestionably has the meaning ‘any federal.’” Post, at 14. In that first sentence, however, Congress explicitly limited the scope of'the phrase “any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime” to those “for which [a defendant] may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” Given that Congress expressly limited the phrase “any crime” to only federal crimes, we find it significant that no similar restriction modifies the phrase “any other term of imprisonment,” which appears only two sentences later and is at issue in this case. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“ ‘Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion’ ”).

The Court of Appeals also found ambiguity in Congress’ decision, in drafting § 924(c), to prohibit concurrent sentences instead of simply mandating consecutive sentences. 65 F. 3d, at 820. Unlike the lower court, however, we see nothing remarkable (much less ambiguous) about Congress’ choice of words. Because consecutive and concurrent sentences are exact opposites, Congress implicitly required one when it prohibited the other. This “ambiguity” is, in any event, beside the point because this phraseology has no bearing on whether Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run consecutively only to other federal terms of imprisonment.

Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). Indeed, far from clarifying the statute, the legislative history only muddies the waters. The excerpt from the Senate Report accompanying the 1984 amendment to § 924(c), relied upon by the Court of Appeals, reads:

“[T]he Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense.” S. Rep., at 313-314.

This snippet of legislative history injects into § 924(c) an entirely new idea — that a defendant must serve the 5-year prison term for his firearms conviction before any other sentences. This added requirement, however, is “in no way anchored in the text of the statute.” Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 583 (1994).

The Court of Appeals was troubled that this rule might lead to irrational results. Normally, a district court has authority to decide whether federal prison terms should run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison sentences. 18 U. S. C. § 3584(a) (vesting power in district court to run most prison terms either concurrently or consecutively); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §5G1.3 (Nov. 1995) (USSG) (guiding court’s discretion under § 3584(a)). If the prison terms for respondents’ other federal sentences could not begin until after their § 924(c) terms were completed, however,.the District Court would effectively be stripped of its statutory power to decide whether the sentences for the underlying narcotics offenses should run concurrently with respondents’ state terms of imprisonment. 65 F. 3d, at 822. The court observed that such a rule could lead to dramatically higher sentences, particularly for the respondents in this case. Perez, for example, is already serving a 17-year state prison term for his role in the holdup. Normally, his 7.25-year federal sentence for narcotics possession would run concurrently with that state term under USSG § 5G1.3(b); his 5-year firearm sentence under § 924(c) would follow both, for a total of 22 years in prison. If he must serve his federal narcotics sentence after his 5-year firearms sentence, however, he would face a total of 29.25 years in prison. 65 F. 3d, at 821.

Seeking to avoid this conflict between § 924(c) (as reinterpreted in light of its legislative history) and § 3584(a), the Court of Appeals held that § 924(c) only prohibited running federal terms of imprisonment concurrently. Ibid. It also reasoned that such a narrow reading was necessary because “there is no way in which a later-sentencing federal court can cause the mandatory 5-year § 924(c) sentence to be served before a state sentence that is already being served.” Ibid.

We see three flaws in this reasoning. First, the statutory texts of §§ 924(c) and 3584(a), unvarnished by legislative history, are entirely consistent. Section 924(c) specifies only that a court must not run a firearms sentence concurrently with other prison terms. It leaves plenty of room for a court to run other sentences—whether for state or federal offenses—concurrently with one another pursuant to § 3584(a) and USSG §5G1.3. The statutes clash only if we engraft onto § 924(c) a requirement found only in a single sentence buried in the legislative history: that the firearms sentence must run first. We therefore follow the text, rather than the legislative history, of § 924(c). By disregarding the suggestion that a district court must specify that a sentence for a firearms conviction be served before other sentences, we give full meaning to the texts of both §§ 924(c) and 3584(a). See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.) (“Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words ... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest”).

Second, even if we ignored the plain language of § 924(c) and required courts to list the order in which a defendant must serve the sentences for different convictions, we would thereby create a rule that is superfluous in light of § 3584(c). That statute instructs the Bureau of Prisons to treat multiple terms of imprisonment, whether imposed concurrently or consecutively, “for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” Ibid. As a practical matter, then, it makes no difference whether a court specifies the sequence in which each portion of an aggregate sentence must be served. We will not impose on sentencing courts new duties that, in view of other statutory commands, will be effectively meaningless.

Third, the Court of Appeals’ solution — to allow § 924(c) prison terms to run concurrently with state sentences — does not eliminate any anomaly that arises when a firearms sentence must run “first.” Although it is clear that a prison term under § 924(c) cannot possibly run before an earlier imposed state prison term, the same holds true when a prisoner is already serving a federal sentence. See § 3585(a) (providing that a federal prison term commences when the defendant is received into custody or voluntarily arrives to begin serving the sentence). Because it is impossible to start a § 924(c) sentence before any prison term that the prisoner is already serving, whether imposed by a state or federal court, limiting the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to state sentences does not get rid of the problem. Thus, we think that the Court of Appeals both invented the problem and devised the wrong solution.

Justice Breyer questions, in dissent, whether Congress wanted to impose a § 924(c) sentence on a defendant who is already serving a prison term pursuant to a virtually identical state sentencing enhancement statute. Post, at 15. A federal court could not (for double jeopardy reasons) sentence a person to two consecutive federal prison terms for a single violation of a federal criminal statute, such as § 924(c). If Congress cannot impose two consecutive federal § 924(c) sentences, the dissent argues, it is unlikely that Congress would have wanted to stack a § 924(c) sentence onto a prison term under a virtually identical state firearms enhancement. Ibid.

As we have already observed, however, the straightforward language of § 924(c) leaves no room to speculate about congressional intent. See supra, at 4-5. The statute speaks of “any term of imprisonment” without limitation, and there is no intimation that Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run consecutively only to certain types of prison terms. District courts have some discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines, of course, in cases where related offenses are prosecuted in multiple proceedings, to establish sentences “with an eye toward having such punishments approximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time . . . .” Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 404 (1995) (discussing USSG §5G1.3). See post, at 14-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). When Congress enacted § 924(c)’s consecutive-sentencing provision, however, it cabined the sentencing discretion of district courts in a single circumstance: When a defendant violates § 924(c), his sentencing enhancement under that statute must run consecutively to all other prison terms. Given this clear legislative directive, it is not for the courts to carve out statutory exceptions based on judicial perceptions of good sentencing policy.

Other language in § 924(c) reinforces our conclusion. In 1984, Congress amended § 924(c) so that its sentencing enhancement would apply regardless of whether the underlying felony statute “provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device.” Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138-2139. Congress thus repudiated the result we reached in Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398 (1980), in which we held that “prosecution and enhanced sentencing under § 924(c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhancement provision,” irrespective of whether the Government had actually sought an enhancement under that predicate statute. Id., at 404; see also Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 15 (1978) (holding that a federal court may not impose sentences under both § 924(c) and the weapon enhancement under the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, based on a single criminal transaction). Our holdings in these cases were based on our conclusion that the unamended text of § 924(c) left us with little “more than a guess” as to how Congress meant to mesh that statute with the sentencing enhancement provisions scattered throughout the federal criminal code. Simpson, supra, at 15; Busic, supra, at 405. The 1984 amendment, however, eliminated these ambiguities. At that point, Congress made clear its desire to run § 924(c) enhancements consecutively to all other prison terms, regardless of whether they were imposed under firearms enhancement statutes similar to § 924(c). We therefore cannot agree with Justice Breyer’s contention that our interpretation of § 924(c) distinguishes between “those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to undischarged federal, sentences.” Post, at 16. Both sorts of defendants face sentences for their other convictions that run concurrently with or consecutively to each other according to normal sentencing principles, plus an enhancement under § 924(c). In short, in light of the 1984 amendment, we think that Congress has foreclosed the dissent’s argument that § 924(c) covers only federal sentences.

Finally, we pause to comment on Justice Stevens’ concern over how today’s decision might affect other cases where “the state trial follows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concurrent sentence” that might be viewed as inconsistent with § 924(c). Post, at 12. That, of course, was not the sequence in which the respondents were sentenced in this case, and so we have no occasion to decide whether a later sentencing state court is bound to order its sentence to run consecutively to the § 924(c) term of imprisonment. See ibid. All that is before us today is the authority of a later sentencing federal court to impose a consecutive sentence under § 924(c). We are hesitant to reach beyond the facts of this case to decide a question that is not squarely presented for our review.

Ill

In sum, we hold that the plain language of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) forbids a federal district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under that statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal. The statute does not, however, limit the court’s authority to order that other federal sentences run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison terms — state or federal— under §3584.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Breyer joins,

dissenting.

This case arose out of a criminal enterprise that violated both New Mexico law and federal law and gave rise to both state and federal prosecutions. It raises a narrow but important question concerning the scope of the prohibition against concurrent sentences contained in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). As the Government reads that provision, it prohibits the § 924(c) sentence from running concurrently with a state sentence that has already been imposed, but permits concurrent state and federal sentences when the federal prosecution precedes the state prosecution. Thus, the length of the total term of imprisonment — including both the state sentence and the federal sentence — is determined, in part, by the happenstance of which case is tried first.

Read literally, however, the text of § 924(c)(1) would avoid this anomalous result. Because the text broadly prohibits the § 924(c) sentence from running “concurrently with any other term of imprisonment” regardless of whether that other term is imposed before or after the federal sentence, if the statute is read literally, it would require state judges to make any state term of imprisonment run consecutively to the § 924(c) sentence. Alternatively, if the state trial follows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concurrent sentence (because she does not read § 924(c) as having any applicability to state sentences), the literal text would require the federal authorities to suspend the § 924(c) sentence until the state sentence has been served.

By relying so heavily on pure textual analysis, the Court’s opinion would appear to dictate this result. Like the Government, however, I do not think the statute can reasonably be interpreted as containing any command to state sentencing judges or as requiring the suspension of any federal sentences when concurrent state sentences are later imposed. Thus, common sense requires us to reject a purely literal reading of the text. The question that then arises is which is the better of two plausible nonliteral readings. Should the term “any other term of imprisonment” be narrowed by reading it to cover only “any other term of imprisonment that has already been imposed” as the Government argues, or “any other federal term of imprisonment,” as respondents contend?

For three reasons, I think it more likely that Congress intended the latter interpretation. First, it borders on the irrational to assume that Congress would actually intend the severity of the defendant’s punishment in a case of this kind to turn on the happenstance of whether the state or the federal prosecution was concluded first. Respondents’ reading of the statute avoids that anomaly. Second, when § 924(c) was amended in 1970 to prohibit concurrent sentences, see Title II, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1889, this prohibition applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying offense. When Congress amended the statute in 1984 to broaden the prohibition beyond the underlying offense, it said nothing about state sentences; if Congress had intended the amendment to apply to state as well as federal sentences, I think there would have been some mention of this important change in the legislative history. Furthermore, the 1984 amendment was part of a general revision of sentencing laws that sought to achieve more uniformity and predictability in federal sentencing. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 18 U. S. C. §8551 et seq. The anomaly that the Government’s reading of § 924(c) authorizes is inconsistent with the basic uniformity theme of the 1984 legislation. Finally, the context in which the relevant language appears is concerned entirely with federal sentencing. Indeed, the word “any” as used earlier in the section unquestionably has the meaning “any federal.”

Given the Government’s recognition of the fact that a completely literal reading of § 924(c)(1) is untenable, and the further fact that the Court offers nothing more than the dictionary definition of the word “any” to support its result, I think the wiser course is to interpret that word in the prohibition against concurrent sentences as having the same meaning as when the same word is first used in the statute.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Stevens joins,

dissenting.

I believe that Justice Stevens is right. Section 924(c) concerns federal, not state, sentences. Hence Congress intended the words “other term of imprisonment” to refer to other federal, not other state, “terms.” With respect to undischarged state sentences, therefore, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) is permissive, not mandatory. That is, it permits the federal sentencing judge to make a § 924(c) sentence and an undischarged state sentence concurrent.

Quite often, it will make little difference that, in this state/ federal circumstance, the consecutive/concurrent decision is permissive, not mandatory. That is because federal sentencing judges, understanding that §924 requires consecutive sentencing where undischarged federal sentences are at issue, would normally treat undischarged state sentences the same way. They would make the § 924(c) sentence consecutive to undischarged state sentences (even though § 924(c) would not force that result) in order to avoid treating similarly situated offenders differently. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 (Nov. 1995). Ordinarily, the fact that the State, rather than the Federal Government, imposed an undischarged sentence is irrelevant in terms of any sentencing objective.

In at least one circumstance, however, federal sentencing judges would probably not treat an undischarged state sentence as if it were federal. That is where the undischarged state sentence is a sentence under a state statute that itself simply mimics §92^(c). Such a situation cannot arise where the initial undischarged sentence is federal. Indeed, the Constitution would forbid any effort to apply § 924(c) twice to a single instance of gun possession. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977). But a State might have its own version of § 924(c), and a federal § 924(c) offender could be subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed under such a statute. To run a § 924(c) sentence consecutively in such an instance (even if constitutionally permissible, cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82 (1985)) would treat the state offender differently, and far more harshly, than any possible federal counterpart.

I am not inventing a purely hypothetical possibility. The State, in the very case before us, has punished respondents, in part, pursuant to a mandatory state sentence enhancement statute that has no counterpart in federal law but for § 924(c) itself, which the state statute, N. M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-16(A) (Supp. 1994), very much resembles. But cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 398-404 (1995). I understand that Congress wanted to guarantee that §924(c)’s sentence would amount to an additional sentence. But I do not see why Congress would have wanted to pile Pelion on Ossa in this way, adding the § 924(c) sentence to another sentence that does the identical thing. Nor do I believe that Congress would have intended potentially to create this kind of harsh distinction between those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to undischarged federal, sentences— a likely practical result of the majority’s holding. See id., at 404-406.

This reason, along with those that Justice Stevens has discussed, makes me think that Congress did intend § 924(c) to refer to federal sentences alone, and lead me to dissent in this close case.

       Reply Brief for United States 10-11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-10.

       “In a ease where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

       In the first sentence of § 924(c)(1) the word “any” is expressly confined to federal prosecutions. When the word is used a second time to describe “any other provision of law,” it is again quite obvious that it embraces only other provisions of federal law even though that limitation is implicit rather than explicit. Nowhere in § 924(c) is there any explicit reference to state law or state sentences.