author: Justice Thomas

text:
    BOGAN et al. v. SCOTT-HARRIS
    No. 96-1569.
    Argued December 3, 1997
    Decided March 3, 1998

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Thomas E. Shirley, Bruce A. Assad, and Robert J. Marchand.

      Harvey A. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Siobhan M. Sweeney and Eric Schnapper

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., and Mary E. O’Neil; for the Massachusetts Municipal Association et al. by George J. Leontire; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles Rothfeld.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities. In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials performing legislative functions, are entitled to the same protection. They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by respondent constituted legislative activities. We agree on both counts and therefore reverse the judgment below.

I — !

Respondent Janet Seott-Harris was administrator of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, from 1987 to 1991. In 1990, respondent received a complaint that Dorothy Bilt-cliffe, an employee serving temporarily under her supervision, had made repeated racial and ethnic slurs about her colleagues. After respondent prepared termination charges against Biltcliffe, Biltcliffe used her political connections to press her case with several state and local officials, including petitioner Marilyn Roderick, the vice president of the Fall River City Council. The city council held a hearing on the charges against Biltcliffe and ultimately accepted a settlement proposal under which Biltcliffe would be suspended without pay for 60 days. Petitioner Daniel Bogan, the mayor of Fall River, thereafter substantially reduced the punishment.

While the charges against Biltcliffe were pending, Mayor Bogan prepared his budget proposal for the 1992 fiscal year. Anticipating a 5 to 10 percent reduction in state aid, Bogan proposed freezing the salaries of all municipal employees and eliminating 135 city positions. As part of this package, Bogan called for the elimination of DHHS, of which respondent was the sole employee. The city council ordinance committee, which was chaired by Roderick, approved an ordinance eliminating DHHS. The city council thereafter adopted the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 2, with petitioner Roderick among those voting in favor. Bogan signed the ordinance into law.

Respondent then filed suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against the city, Bogan, Roderick, and several other city officials. She alleged that the elimination of her position was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint against Biltcliffe. The District Court denied Bogan’s and Roderick’s motions to dismiss on the ground of legislative immunity, and the case proceeded to trial. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, et al., Civ. 91-12057-PBS (Mass., Jan. 27, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city, Bogan, and Roderick liable on respondent’s First Amendment claim, concluding that respondent’s constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination of her position. On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District Court again denied Bogan’s and Roderick’s claims of absolute legislative immunity, reasoning that “the ordinance amendment passed by the city council was an individually-targeted administrative act, rather than a neutral, legislative elimination of a position which incidentally resulted in the termination of plaintiff.” Id., at 20.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Scott-Harris v. Fall River, 134 F. 3d 427 (1997). Although the court concluded that petitioners have “absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative activities,” id., at 440, it held that their challenged conduct was not “legislative,” id., at 441. Relying on the jury’s finding that “constitutionally sheltered speech was a substantial or motivating factor” underlying petitioners’ conduct, the court reasoned that the conduct was administrative, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan “relied on facts relating to a particular individual [respondent] in the decisionmaking calculus.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997).

II

The principle that legislators are absolutely immune from liability for their legislative activities has long been recognized in Anglo-American law. This privilege “has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” and was “taken as a matter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372 (1951). The Federal Constitution, the Constitutions of many of the newly independent States, and the common law thus protected legislators from liability for their legislative activities. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6; Tenney, supra, at 372-375.

Recognizing this venerable tradition, we have held that state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities. See Tenney, supra (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 202-204 (1881) (interpreting the federal Speech and Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, to provide similar immunity to Members of Congress). We explained that legislators were entitled to absolute immunity from suit at common law and that Congress did not intend the general language of § 1983 to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason.” Tenney, supra, at 376. Because the common law accorded local legislators the same absolute immunity it accorded legislators at other levels of government, and because the rationales for such immunity are fully applicable to local legislators, we now hold that local legislators are likewise absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their legislative activities.

The common law at the time § 1983 was enacted deemed local legislators to be absolutely immune from suit for their legislative activities. New York’s highest court, for example, held that municipal aldermen were immune from suit for their discretionary decisions. Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio 595 (1845). The court explained that when a local legislator exercises discretionary powers, he “is exempt from all responsibility by action for the motives which influence him, and the manner in which such duties are performed. If corrupt, he may be impeached or indicted, but the law will not tolerate an action to redress the individual wrong which may have been done.” Id., at 599. These principles, according to the court, were “too familiar and well settled to require illustration or authority.” Id., at 599-600.

Shortly after § 1988 was enacted, the Mississippi Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, holding that town aider-men could not be held liable under state law for their role in the adoption of an allegedly unlawful ordinance. Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109, 30 Am. Rep. 508 (1877). The court explained that “[i]t certainly cannot be argued that the motives of the individual members of a legislative assembly, in voting for. a particular law, can be inquired into, and its supporters be made personally liable, upon an allegation that they acted maliciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the law.” Id., at 111, 30 Am. Rep., at 509. The court thus concluded that “[w]henever the officers of a municipal corporation are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are clothed with all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mistaken use.” Ibid.

Treatises of that era confirm that this was the pervasive view. A leading treatise on municipal corporations explained that “[w]here the officers of a municipal corporation are invested with legislative powers, they are exempt from individual liability for the passage of any ordinance within their authority, and their motives in reference thereto will not be inquired into.” 1 J. Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations §313, pp. 326-327 (3d ed. 1881) (emphasis in original). Thomas Cooley likewise noted in his influential treatise on the law of torts that the “rightful exemption” of legislators from liability was “very plain” and applied to members of “inferior legislative bodies, such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils, and the like.” Cooley 376; see also J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law § 744 (1889) (noting that municipal legislators were immune for their legislative functions); Mechem §§644-646 (same); Throop, supra n. 4, § 709, at 671 (same).

Even the authorities cited by respondent are consistent with the view that local legislators were absolutely immune for their legislative, as distinct from ministerial, duties. In the few eases in which liability did attach, the courts emphasized that the defendant officials lacked discretion, and the duties were thus ministerial. See, e. g., Morris v. The People, 3 Denio 381, 395 (N. Y. 1846) (noting that the duty was “of a ministerial character only”); Caswell v. Allen, 7 Johns. 63, 68 (N. Y. 1810) (holding supervisors liable because the act was “mandatory55 and “[n]o discretion appeared] to [have been] given to the supervisors”). Respondent’s heavy reliance on our decision in Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1871), is misguided for this very reason. In that case, we held that local legislators could be held liable for violating a court order to levy a tax sufficient to pay a judgment, but only because the court order had created a ministerial duty. Id., at 138 (“The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct”). The treatises cited by respondent confirm that this distinction between legislative and ministerial duties was dispositive of the right to absolute immunity. See, e. g., Cooley 377 (stating that local legislators may be held liable only for their “ministerial” duties); Meehem §647 (same).

Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds support not only in history, but also in reason. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 376 (stating that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason”). The rationales for according absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 279 (1990) (noting, in the context of addressing local legislative action, that “any restriction on a legislator’s freedom undermines the ‘public good’ by interfering with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic process”); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 201-204 (federal legislators); Tenney, supra, at 377 (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 405 (regional legislators). Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace. See Tenney, supra, at 377 (citing “the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial”). And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 816 (1982).

Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government. Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are often protected by sovereign immunity. Lake Country Estates, supra, at 405, n. 29 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978)). And, of course, the ultimate cheek on legislative abuse — the electoral process — applies with equal force at the loeal level, where legislators are often more closely responsible to the electorate. Cf. Tenney, supra, at 378 (stating that “[s]elf-diseipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses”).

Any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by our opinion in Lake Country Estates. There, we held that members of an interstate regional planning agency were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Bereft of any historical antecedent to the regional agency, we relied almost exclusively on Tenney’s description of the purposes of legislative immunity and the importance of such immunity in advancing the “public good.” Although we expressly noted that local legislators were not at issue in that ease, see Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 404, n. 26, we considered the regional legislators at issue to be the functional equivalents of loeal legislators, noting that the regional agency was “comparable to a county or municipality” and that the function of the regional agency, regulation of land use, was “traditionally a function performed by loeal governments.” Id., at 401-402. Thus, we now make explicit what was implicit in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.

! — I HH

Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” Tenney, supra, at 376, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ conduct in this case was not legislative because them actions were specifically targeted at respondent. Relying on the jury’s finding that respondent’s constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind petitioners’ conduct, the court concluded that petitioners necessarily “relied on facts relating to a particular individual” and “devised an ordinance that targeted [respondent] and treated her differently from other managers employed by the City.” 134 F. 3d, at 441. Although the Court of Appeals did not suggest that intent or motive can overcome an immunity defense for activities that are, in fact, legislative, the court erroneously relied on petitioners’ subjective intent in resolving the logically prior question of whether their acts were legislative.

Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute immunity “would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives.” Ten- ney, 341 U. S., at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, it simply is “not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators.” Ibid. We therefore held that the defendant in Ten-ney had acted in a legislative capacity even though he allegedly singled out the plaintiff for investigation in order “to intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights.” Id., at 871 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners’ actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they were. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick’s acts of voting for an ordinance were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan’s introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. We have recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731-734 (1980); Bogan’s actions were legislative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482, 490 (1932) (noting “the legislative character of the President’s function in approving or disapproving bills”); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 372-373 (1932) (recognizing that a Governor’s signing or vetoing of a bill constitutes part of the legislative process).

Respondent, however, asks us to look beyond petitioners’ formal actions to consider whether the ordinance was legislative in substance. We need not determine whether the formally legislative character of petitioners’ actions is alone sufficient to entitle petitioners to legislative immunity, because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. And the city council, in eliminating DHHS, certainly governed “in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act.” Tenney, supra, at 379. Thus, petitioners’ activities were undoubtedly legislative.

*i* *i*

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

       Respondent dropped several other defendants from the suit, and the District Court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Robert Connors, the Fall River City Administrator. Only the city, Bogan, and Roderick were appellants in the Court of Appeals, and only the latter two are petitioners in this Court.

       The court held that the city was not liable because the jury could reasonably infer unlawful intent only as to two of the dty council members, and municipal liability could not rest “on so frail a foundation.” 134 F. 3d, at 440.

       The “regional” legislature in Lake Country Estates was the governing body of an agency created by a compact between two States to coordinate and regulate development in a region encompassing portions of both States. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S., at 394.

       The court distinguished “discretionary” duties, which were protected absolutely, and “ministerial” duties, which were not. Although the court described the former as “judicial” in nature, it was merely using the term broadly to encompass the “discretionary3’ acts of officials. See 1 Denio, at 599 (“[I]f his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld, according to his own view of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature judicial”). The legislators' actions in Wilson were unquestionably legislative in both form and substance. Thus, Wilson was widely, and correctly, cited as a leading case regarding legislative immunity. See, e. g., T. Cooley, Law of Torts 377, n. 1 (1880) (hereinafter Cooley); F. Meehem, Law of Public Offices and Officers § 644, p. 431, n. 1 (1890) (hereinafter Mechem); M. Throop, Law Relating to Public Officers § 709, p. 671, n. 1 (1892).

       It is thus not surprising that several Members of this Court have recognized that the rationale of Lake Country Estates essentially settled the question of immunity for local legislators. See Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 664, n. 6 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 407-408 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); see also Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 278 (1990) (explaining that the same considerations underlying Tenney and Lake Country Estates applied to contempt sanctions against local legislators). In fact, the argument for absolute immunity for local legislators may be stronger than for the regional legislators in Lake Country Estates, because immunity was historically granted to local legislators and because the legislators in Lake Country Estates were unelected and thus less directly accountable to the public. See Lake Country Estates, supra, at 407 (Marshall, X, dissenting in part).

       Because of our conclusion that petitioners are entitled to absolute legislative immunity, we need not address the third question on which we granted certiorari: whether petitioners proximately caused an injury cognizable under § 1983.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Ginsburg

license: Public Domain

text:
    KAWAAUHAU et vir v. GEIGER
    No. 97-115.
    Argued January 21, 1998
    Decided March 3, 1998

      GlNSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Norman W. Pressman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Teresa A. Generous, .Ronald J. Mann, and Edward B. Greensfelder.

      Laura K. Grandy argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

        Gary Klein filed a brief for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another” is not dischargeable. 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The question before us is whether a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, falls within this statutory exception. We hold that it does not and that the debt is dischargeable.

I

In January 1983, petitioner Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from respondent Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Geiger examined Kawaauhau and admitted her to the hospital to attend to the risk of infection resulting from the injury. Although Geiger knew that intravenous penicillin would have been more effective, he prescribed oral penicillin, explaining in his testimony that he understood his patient wished to minimize the cost of her treatment.

Geiger then departed on a business trip, leaving Kawaau-hau in the care of other physicians, who decided she should be - transferred to an infectious diseáse specialist. When Geiger returned, he canceled the transfer "and discontinued all antibiotics because'he believed the infection had subsided. Kawaauhau’s condition deteriorated over the next few days, requiring the amputation of her right leg below the knee.

KawaauhaUj joined by her husband Solomon, sued Geiger for malpractice. After a trial, the jury found Geiger liable and awarded the Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, moved to Missouri, where his wages were garnished by the Kawaauhaus. Geiger then petitioned for bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondisehargeable on the ground that it was a debt “for willful and malicious injury” excepted from discharge by 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Geiger’s treatment fell far below the appropriate standard of care and therefore ranked as “willful and malicious.” Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held the debt nondisehargeable. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 922-923 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In an unpublished order, the District Court affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-18 to A-22.

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 93 F. 3d 443 (1996), and a divided en banc court adhered to the panel’s position, 113 F. 3d 848 (1997) (en banc). Section 523(a)(6)’s exemption from discharge, the en banc court held, is confined to debts “based on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort.” Id., at 852. On this view, a debt for malpractice, because it is based on conduct that is negligent or reckless, rather than intentional, remains dischargeable.

The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of § 523(a)(6) diverged from previous holdings of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. See id., at 853 (citing Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F. 2d 392, 394 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987), and In re Franklin, 726 F. 2d 606, 610 (CA10 1984)). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 521 U. S. 1153 (1997), and now affirm the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.

II

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

“(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
“(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.”

The Kawaauhaus urge that the malpractice award fits within this exception because Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered inadequate medical care to Margaret Kawaauhau that necessarily led to her injury. According to the Kawaauhaus, Geiger deliberately chose less effective treatment because he wanted to cut costs, all the while knowing that he was providing substandard care. Such conduct, the Kawaauhaus assert, meets the “willful and malicious” specification of § 528(a)(6).

We confront this pivotal question concerning the scope of the “willful and malicious injury” exception: Does §523(a)(6)’s compass cover acts, done intentionally, that cause injury (as the Kawaauhaus urge), or only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury (as the Eighth Circuit ruled)? The words of the statute strongly support the Eighth Circuit’s reading.

The word “willful” in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that nondisehargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i. e., “reckless” or “negligent,” to modify “injury.” Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer’s mind the category “intentional torts,” as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend “the conse quences of an act,” not simply “the act itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment a, p. 15 (1964) (emphasis added).

The Kawaauhaus’ more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i. e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. Every traffic accident stemming from an initial intentional act — for example, intentionally rotating the wheel of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic — could fit the description. See 113 F. 3d, at 852. A “knowing breach of contract” could also qualify. See ibid. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the “well-known” guide that exceptions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly expressed.” Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558, 562 (1915).

Furthermore, “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988). Reading § 523(a)(6) as the Kawaauhaus urge would obviate the need for § 523(a)(9), which specifically exempts debts “for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance.” 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(9); see also §523(a)(12) (exempting debts for “malicious or reckless failure” to fulfill certain commitments owed to a federal depository institutions regulatory agency).

The Kawaauhaus heavily rely on Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904), which presented this question: Does an award of damages for “criminal conversation” survive bankruptcy under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’s exception from discharge for judgments in civil actions for “ 'willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another’ ”? Id., at 480. The Tinker Court held such an award a nondis-ehargeable debt. The Kawaauhaus feature certain statements in the Tinker opinion, in particular: “[An] act is willful ... in the sense that it is intentional and voluntary” even if performed “without any particular malice,” id., at 485; an act that “necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and maliciously, so as to come within the [bankruptcy discharge] exception,” id., at 487. See also id., at 486 (the statute exempts from discharge liability for “‘a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse’ ”) (quoting from definition of malice in Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K. B. 1825)).

The exposition in the Tinker opinion is less than crystalline. Counterbalancing the portions the Kawaauhaus emphasize, the Tinker Court repeatedly observed that the tort in question qualified in the common law as trespassory. Indeed, it ranked as “trespass vi et armis.” 193 U. S., at 482, 483. Criminal conversation, the Court noted, was an action akin to a master’s “action of trespass and assault ... for the battery of his servant,” id., at 482. Tinker thus placed criminal conversation solidly within the traditional intentional tort category, and we so confine its holding. That decision, we clarify, provides no warrant for departure from the current statutory instruction that, to be nondischargeable, the judgment debt must be “for willful and malicious injury.”

Subsequent decisions of this Court are in accord with our construction. In McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916), a broker “deprive[d] another of his property forever by deliberately disposing of it without semblance of authority.” Id., at 141. The Court held that this act constituted an intentional injury to property of another, bringing it within the discharge exception. But in Davis v. Aetna Ac ceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328 (1934), the Court explained that not every tort judgment for conversion is exempt from discharge. Negligent or reckless acts, the Court held, do not suffice to establish that a resulting injury is “wilful and malicious.” See id., at 332.

Finally, the Kawaauhaus maintain that, as a policy matter, malpractice judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor acted recklessly or carried no malpractice insurance. Congress, of course, may so decide. But unless and until Congress makes such a decision, we must follow the current direction § 523(a)(6) provides.

* * *

We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is

Affirmed.

       The jury awarded Margaret Kawaauhau $203,040 in special damages •and $99,000 in general damages. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 919 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In addition, the jury awarded Solomon Kawaauhau $18,000 in general damages for loss of consortium and $35,000 for emotional distress. Ibid.

       Although the record is not clear on this point, it appears that Dr. Geiger was not required by state law to cany .medical malpractice insurance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19.

         The word “willful” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “voluntary” or “intentional.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979). Consistently, legislative reports note that the word “willful” in § 523(a)(6) means “deliberate or intentional.” See S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 365 (1977).

       Sections 523(a)(9) and (12) were added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 and 1990 respectively. See Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 364 (1984), and Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4865 (1990).


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist

text:
    UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ
    No. 96-1469.
    Argued January 13, 1998
    Decided March 4, 1998

      Rehnqtjist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      jDavid C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and J. Douglas Wilson.

      Michael R. Levine argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Richard M. Weintraub, Bernard J. Farber, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, and James P. Manafc; and for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Elise Porter, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Garla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Cur-ran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jose Fuentes Agostini of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Richard Cullen of Virginia, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington.

        John Wesley Hall, Jr., and Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394 (1997), we held that so-called “no-knoek” entries are justified when police officers have a “reasonable suspicion” that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would “be dangerous or futile, or .. . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime.” In this ease, we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment holds officers to a higher standard than this when a “no-knoek” entry results in the destruction of property. We hold that it does not.

Alan Shelby was a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in the Oregon state prison system. On November 1,1994, the Tillamook County Sheriff’s Office took temporary custody of Shelby, expecting to transport him to the Tillamook County Courthouse, where he was scheduled to testify. On the way to the courthouse, Shelby slipped his handcuffs, knocked over a deputy sheriff, and escaped from custody.

It was not the first time Shelby had attempted escape. In 1991 he struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, assaulted a woman, stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle. Another time he attempted escape by using a rope made from torn bedsheets. He was reported to have made threats to kill witnesses and police officers, to have tortured people with a hammer, and to have said that he would “ ‘not do federal time.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. It was also thought that Shelby had had access to large supplies of weapons.

Shortly after learning of Shelby’s escape, the authorities sent out a press release, seeking information that would lead to his recapture. On November 3, a reliable confidential informant told Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent George Kim that on the previous day he had seen a person he believed to be Shelby at respondent Hernán Ramirez’s home in Boring, Oregon. Kim and the informant then drove to an area near respondent’s home, from where Kim observed a man working outside who resembled Shelby.

Based on this information, a Deputy United States Marshal sought and received a “no-knock” warrant granting permission to enter and search Ramirez’s home. Around this time, the confidential informant also told authorities that respondent might have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in his garage. In the early morning of November 5, approximately 45 officers gathered to execute the warrant. The officers set up a portable loudspeaker system and began announcing that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the officers believed might be in the garage.

Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, respondent believed that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his garage. The officers fired back and shouted “police.” At that point respondent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were trying to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his pistol away, and threw himself onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, he, his wife, and their child left the house and were taken into police custody. Respondent waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another gun that was inside the house, and that he was a convicted felon. Officers soon obtained another search warrant, which they used to return to the house and retrieve the two guns. Shelby was not found.

Respondent was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, ruling that the police officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 8109 because there were “insufficient exigent circumstances” to justify the police officers’ destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 91 F. 3d 1297 (1996). Applying Circuit precedent, that court concluded that while a “mild exigency” is sufficient to justify a no-knoek entry that can be accomplished without the destruction of property, “ 'more specific inferences of exigency are necessary’ ” when property is destroyed. Id., at 1301. It held that this heightened standard had not been met on the facts of this case. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 521 U. S. 1103 (1997).

In two recent eases we have considered whether and to what extent “no-knock” entries implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we reviewed the Arkansas Supreme Court’s holding that the common-law requirement that police officers knock and announce their presence before entering played no role in Fourth Amendment analysis. We rejected that conclusion, and held instead that “in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 934. We were careful to note, however, that there was no rigid rule requiring announcement in all instances, and left “to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 934, 936.

In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that police officers executing search warrants in felony drug investigations were never required to knock and announce their presence. We concluded that this blanket rule was overly broad and held instead that “[i]n order to justify a 'no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing them presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 394.

Neither of these cases explicitly addressed the question whether the lawfulness of a no-knock entry depends on whether property is damaged in the course of the entry. It is obvious from their holdings, however, that it does not. Under Richards, a no-knoek entry is justified if police have a “reasonable suspicion” that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or destructive to the purposes of the investigation. Whether such a “reasonable suspicion” exists depends in no way on whether police must destroy property in order to enter.

This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment speaks not at all to the manner of executing a search warrant. The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108-109 (1977) (per curiam), governs the method of execution of the warrant. Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.

Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. A reliable confidential informant had notified the police that Alan Shelby might be inside respondent’s home, and an officer had confirmed this possibility. Shelby was a prison escapee with a violent past who reportedly had access to a large supply of weapons. He had vowed that he would “‘not do federal time.’” The police certainly had a “reasonable suspicion” that knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or to others.

As for the manner in which the entry was accomplished, the police here broke a single window in respondent’s garage. They did so because they wished to discourage Shelby, or any other occupant of the house, from rushing to the weapons that the informant had told them respondent might have kept there. Their conduct was clearly reasonable and we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

Respondent also argues, however, that suppression is appropriate because the officers executing the warrant violated 18 U. S. C. §3109. This statutory argument fares no better. Section 3109 provides:

"The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”

Respondent contends that the statute specifies the only circumstances under which an officer may damage property in executing a search warrant, and that it therefore forbids all other property-damaging entries.

But by its terms § 3109 prohibits nothing. It merely authorizes officers to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting, arguendo, that the statute implicitly forbids some of what it does not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958), we noted that §3109’s "requirement of prior notice . .. before forcing entry ... codif[ied] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law.” We repeated this point in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8 (1968) (referring to §3109 as “codification” of the common law). In neither of these cases, however, did we expressly hold that §3109 also codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice before entry. In Miller the Government made “no claim ... of the existence of circumstances excusing compliance” and the question was accordingly not before us. 357 U. S., at 309. In Sabbath the Government did make such a claim, but because the record did “not reveal any substantial basis for the failure of the agents ... to announce their authority” we did not decide the question. We did note, however, that “[e]xceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized . . . and there is little'reason why those limited exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since they existed at common law, of which the statute is a codification.” 391 U. S., at 591, n. 8.

In this case the question is squarely presented. We remove whatever doubt may remain on the subject and hold that §3109 codifies the exceptions to the common-law announcement requirement. If § 3109 codifies the common law in this area, and the common law in turn informs the Fourth Amendment, our decisions in Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we concluded that the common-law principle of announcement is “an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,” but noted that the principle “was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances.” Id., at 934. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997), we articulated the test used to determine whether exigent circumstances justify a particular no-knock entry. Id., at 394. We therefore hold that § 3109 includes an exigent circumstances exception and that the exception’s applicability in a given instance is measured by the same standard we articulated in Richards. The police met that standard here and § 3109 was therefore not violated.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       It should be noted that our opinion in Richards came down after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case.

       It is of no consequence that Shelby was not found. “[I]n determining the lawfulness of entry and the existence of probable cause we may concern ourselves only with what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry.” Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 40-41, n. 12 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.) (emphasis in original).

       After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated in this case, the Ninth Circuit farther concluded that the guns should be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for example, there was sufficient causal relationship between the breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence. Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).


author: Justice Scalia Justice Thomas,

text:
    ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC., et al.
    No. 96-568.
    Argued December 3, 1997
    Decided March 4, 1998
    Scaiia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 82.

      Nicholas Canaday III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Andre P. LaPlace and Eric Schnapper.

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Pinzler, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Beth S. Brinkmann, C. Gregory Stewart, J. Ray Terry, Jr., Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Carolyn L. Wheeler.

      Harry M. Reasoner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John H. Smither, Marie R. Yeates, Thomas H. Wilson, and Samuel Issacharoff.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Ellen Simon Sacks and Christopher P. Thorman; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Beatrice Dohrn, John Davidson, Ruth Harlow, Steven R. Shapiro, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Minna J. Kotkin; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Margaret A Harris and Anne Golden; for the National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc., by Catharine A MacKinnon; and for Law Professors by Nan D. Hunter.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; and for the Texas Association of Business & Chambers of Commerce by Jeffrey C. Londa and Linda Ottinger Headley.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII’s prohibition against “diserimina-t[ion]... because of... sex,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(I), when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex.

I

The District Court having granted summary judgment for respondents, we must assume the facts to be as alleged by petitioner Joseph Oncale. The precise details are irrelevant to the legal point we must decide, and in the interest of both brevity and dignity we shall describe them only generally. In late October 1991, Oncale was working for respondent Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., on a Chevron U. S. A., Inc., oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He was employed as a roustabout on an eight-man crew which included respondents John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson. Lyons, the crane operator, and Pippen, the driller, had supervisory authority, App. 41, 77, 43. On several occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by Lyons, Pippen, and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew. Pippen and Lyons also physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him with rape.

Oneale’s complaints to supervisory personnel produced no remedial action; in fact, the company’s Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen, told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen “picked [on] him all the time too,” and called him a name suggesting homosexuality. Id., at 77. Oncale eventually quit — asking that his pink slip reflect that he “voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.” Id., at 79. When asked at his deposition why he left Sundowner, Oncale stated: “I felt that if I didn’t leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex.” Id., at 71.

Oncale filed a complaint against Sundowner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that he was discriminated against in his employment because of his sex. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F. 3d 446, 451-452 (1994), the District Court held that “Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers.” App. 106. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that Garcia was binding Circuit precedent, and affirmed. 83 F. 3d 118 (1996). We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997).

H-4 H-i

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). We have held that this not only covers “terms” and “conditions” in the narrow contractual sense, but “evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” protects men as well as women, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682 (1983), and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race. “Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group.” Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 499 (1977). See also id., at 515-516, n. 6 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616 (1987), a male employee claimed that his employer discriminated against him because of his sex when it preferred a female employee for promotion. Although we ultimately rejected the claim on other grounds, we did not consider it significant that the supervisor who made that decision was also a man. See id., at 624-625. If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination “because of... sex” merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.

Courts have had little trouble with that principle in cases like Johnson, where an employee claims to have been passed over for a job or promotion. But when the issue arises in the context of a “hostile environment” sexual harassment claim, the state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances. Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this ease, have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII. See also, e. g., Goluszek v. H. P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (ND Ill. 1988). Other decisions say that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire). Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F. 3d 1191 (CA4 1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F. 3d 138 (CA4 1996). Still others suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. See Doe v. Belleville, 119 F. 3d 563 (CA7 1997).

We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discrimina-t[ion].. . because of. .. sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.

Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute. Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at “discrimination] . . . because of . . . sex.” We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.” Harris, supra, at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direet comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted “discrimination] ... because of... sex.”

And there is another requirement that prevents Title VII from expanding into a general civility code: As we emphasized in Meritor and Harris, the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U. S., at 21, citing Meritor, 477 U. S., at 67. We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace — such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation — for discriminatory “conditions of employment.”

We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” Harris, supra, at 23. In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field — even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.

III

Because we conclude that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

I concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment ease, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII’s statutory requirement that there be discrimination “because of... sex.”