text:
    No. 95-1184.
    Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., et al.,
   ante, p. 457. Petition of Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., et al. for rehearing denied. Petition of Gerawan Farming, Inc., et al. for rehearing denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 96-9070.
    Smith v. United States,
   ante, p. 1110. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    September 16, 1997
    No. 97-5032.
    Bledsoe v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    September 22, 1997
    No. 97-127.
    St. Ledger et al. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    No. 97-329.
    Penguin Books USA, Inc., et al. v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    No. 97-6078 (A-234).
    In re Turner.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    September 23, 1997
    No. 97-6123 (A-239).
    In re McDonald.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    September 24, 1997
    No. 97-5935.
    Kesterson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    September 29, 1997
    No. D-1806.
    In re Disbarment of Morath.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 520 U. S. 1262.]


text:
    No. D-1808.
    In re Disbarment of Kirk.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 520 U. S. 1262.]


text:
    No. D-1815.
    In re Disbarment of Barnes.
   Brenda Powers Barnes, of Santa Monica, Cal., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that her name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on June 23,1997 [ante, p. 1102], is discharged.


text:
    No. D-1820.
    In re Disbarment of Franzen.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1133.]


text:
    No. D-1824.
    In re Disbarment of Barron.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1134.]


text:
    No. D-1826.
    In re Disbarment of Piccirilli.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1134.]


text:
    No. D-1828.
    In re Disbarment of Newell.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1134.]


text:
    No. D-1829.
    In re Disbarment of Dyson.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1135.]


text:
    No. D-1834.
    In re Disbarment of Apollo.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1135.]


text:
    No. D-1835.
    In re Disbarment of Beckman.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1135.]


text:
    No. D-1839.
    In re Disbarment of Saranello.
   Joseph Anthony Saranello, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1840.
    In re Disbarment of Gilbert.
   Ronald Bart Gilbert, of Miami, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1841.
    In re Disbarment of Segal.
   Theodore Joseph Segal, of Phoenix, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1842.
    In re Disbarment of Steward.
   Harrison B. Steward III, of Orlando, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1843.
    In re Disbarment of Tuccori.
   Lawrence Stanley Tuccori, of Fresno, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1844.
    In re Disbarment of Davis.
   James Herman Davis, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1845.
    In re Disbarment of Kadish.
   Charles Kadish, of Buffalo Grove, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1846.
    In re Disbarment of Jackson.
   Andrew D. Jackson, of Whiting, Ind., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1847.
    In re Disbarment of Wolhar.
   Robert C. Wolhar, Jr., of Georgetown, Del., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1848.
    In re Disbarment of Gilleran.
   Robert Thomas Gilleran, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1849.
    In re Disbarment of Pickett.
   Neal Yar-borough Pickett, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1850.
    In re Disbarment of Marcus.
   Lyn H. Marcus, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1851.
    In re Disbarment of Smith.
   Nicholas Smith, of Plymouth, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1852.
    In re Disbarment of Greene.
   Lawrence R. Greene, of Detroit, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1853.
    In re Disbarment of Thornton.
   Kenneth W. Thornton, Jr., of Georgetown, S. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 day's, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1854.
    In re Disbarment of Fisher.
   Robert Patrick Fisher, of Scotts Valley, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1855.
    In re Disbarment of Hopewell.
   Richard James Hopewell, of Sioux Falls, S. D., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 120, Orig.
    New Jersey v. New York.
   Motions of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States et al., New York Landmarks Conservancy et al., and New York Historical Society et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in due course. Motion of New York for leave to file a surre-ply brief denied. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1116.]


text:
    No. 96-188.
    General Electric Co. et al. v. Joiner et ux.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1114.] Motions of Ardith Cavallo and Association of Trial Lawyers of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 96-370.
    Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1209.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-976.
    Hudson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1165.] Motion of Ohio et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 96-1291.
    Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1185.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-1337.
    County of Sacramento et al. v. Lewis et al.,
   Personal Representatives of the Estate of Lewis, Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1250.] Motion of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 96-1395.
    King, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. Erickson et al.; and King, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. McManus et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1117.] Motion of International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 96-1469.
    United States v. Ramirez.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1103.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 96-1482.
    Lexecon Inc. et al. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 520 U. S. 1227.] Motion of respondent Joseph W. Cotchett et al. for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 97-29.
    Texas v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted. Brief of appellant is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of appellees is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1584.
    Campbell v. Louisiana.
   Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1693.
    Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 4 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1768.
    Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: “Whether 17 U. S. C. § 504(c) permits or requires a jury trial in actions for statutory damages for copyright infringement.” Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1923.
    Cohen v. de la Cruz et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1925.
    Caterpillar Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13,1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5,1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-1971.
    Rivet et al. v. Regions Bank of Louisiana et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13,1997. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15,1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-8516.
    Bousley v. Brooks, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 97-115.
    Kawaauhau et vir v. Geiger.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, November 13, 1997. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 15, 1997. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, January 5,1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    October 1, 1997
    No. M-9 (A-248).
    Adanandus v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 97-6231 (A-253).
    Adanandus v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    BROWN v. WILLIAMS et al.
    No. 97-5370.
    Decided October 20, 1997
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Carson Lynn Brown seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis in order that he may file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which dismissed his appeal after he failed to pay the required filing fee.

We deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He is allowed until November 10, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by this Court’s Rule 38(a) and to submit his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Petitioner has a history of abusing this Court’s certiorari process. In 1994, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner informa pauperis status. Brown v. Brown, 513 U. S. 1040 (1994). Undeterred by this action, petitioner has continued filing frivolous petitions with this Court. To date, petitioner has filed eight petitions over the last eight years, each of which has been denied without recorded dissent. In the instant petition, Brown alleges that certain prison officials conspired to violate his constitutional rights by, inter alia, denying him access to the courts and sabotaging his laundry, and that the District Judge below was biased against him as an “African Jew.” These claims are patently frivolous.

We enter this order barring prospective in forma pauperis filings by petitioner for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Because petitioner has limited his abuse of the certiorari process to noneriminal cases, we limit our sanction accordingly.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.


author: Justice O’Connor

text:
    STATE OIL CO. v. KHAN et al.
    No. 96-871.
    Argued October 7, 1997
    Decided November 4, 1997

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      John Baumgartner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Paul Kalinich

      Acting Assistant Attorney General Klein argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Melamed, Edward C. DuMont, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, and David Seidman.

      Anthony S. DiVincenzo argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. '

      Pamela Jones Harbour, Deputy Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for the state parties as amici curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara Gott Billet, Solicitor General, and Stephen D. Houck, Robert L. Hubbard, Darrell M. Joseph, and John A. Ioannou, Assistant Attorneys General, Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, and Daveed A. Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, and J. Jordan Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, and Patricia A. Conners, Assistant Attorney General, Calvin E. Halloway, Sr., Attorney General of Guam, Margery S. Bron-ster, Attorney General of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, and Brett T DeLcmge, Deputy Attorney General, Jim Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, and Barbara Preiner, Solicitor General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh, Solicitor General, Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, and John W. Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Ellen S. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Fredrick H. Hoffecker, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, and James F. Steel, Deputy Attorney General, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Frankie Sue Bel Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Steven M. Houran, Acting Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Walter L. Maroney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Laurel A. Price, Deputy Attorney General, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Susan G. White, Assistant Attorney General, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, and K. D. Sturgis, Assistant Attorney General, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Laurie J. Loveland, Solicitor General, D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and James A. Donahue III, Acting Chief Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, 'John Knox Walkup, Attorney General of Tennessee, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Dennis Garvey, Interim Deputy Attorney General, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, and Laquita A. Hamilton, Deputy Attorney General, James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General of "Virginia, and Frank Seales, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christine 0. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, and Jon P. Ferguson, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Kevin J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, and William U. Hill, Attorney General of Wyoming.

       Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Automobile Manufacturers Association et al. by Stephen M. Shapiro, Roy T. Englert, Jr., Donald M. Falk, Phillip D. Brady, and Charles H. Lockwood II; for the American Petroleum Institute by Edwin M. Zimmerman, Robert A. Long, Jr., G. William Frick, Harry M. Ng, and Douglas W. Morris; for the Business Roundtable by Thomas B. Leary and Robert C. Weinbaum; and for the Newspaper Association of America et al. by William T. Lifland, Patricia Farren, David S. J. Brown, Rene P. Milam, Peter C. Gould, Andrew Merdek, William T. Garcia, Cristina L. Mendoza, and George Freeman.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Richard M. Steuer; for the Coalition for Fair Consumer Pricing by Steven B. Feirman, Barry M. Heller, H. Bret Lowell, Philip F. Zeidman, and Stanley J. Adelman; for the Minnesota Service Station and Convenience Store Association et al. by Gary E. Persian and Paul E. Slater; for the National Association of Manufacturers by Mark L. Davidson, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the National Automobile Dealers Association by Paul R. Norman; for the National Beer Wholesalers Association, Inc., by Ernest Gellhorn, Donald I. Baker, and W. Todd Miller; and for the Service Station Dealers of America by Peter H. Gunst.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, “[e]very contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” is illegal. In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968), this Court held that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of that statute. In this ease, we are asked to reconsider that decision in light of subsequent decisions of this Court. We conclude that Albrecht should be overruled.

Respondents, Barkat U. Khan and his corporation, entered into an agreement with petitioner, State Oil Company, to lease and operate a gas station and convenience store owned by State Oil. The agreement provided that respondents would obtain the station’s gasoline supply from State Oil at a price equal to a suggested retail price set by State Oil, less a margin of B.25 cents per gallon. ' 'Under the agreement, respondents could charge any amount for gasoline sold to the station’s customers, but if the price charged was higher than > State Oil’s suggested retail price, the excess was to be rebated to State Oil. Respondents could sell gasoline for less than State Oil’s suggested retail price, but any such decrease would reduce their 3.25 cents-per-gallon margin.

About a year after respondents began operating the gas station, they fell behind in lease payments. State Oil then gave notice of its intent to terminate the agreement and commenced a state court proceeding to evict respondents. At State Oil’s request, the state court appointed a receiver to operate the gas station. The receiver operated the station for several months without being subject to the price restraints in respondents’ agreement with State Oil. According to respondents, the receiver obtained an overall profit margin in excess of 3.25 cents per gallon by lowering the price of regular-grade gasoline and raising the price of premium grades.

Respondents sued State Oil in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging in part that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act by preventing respondents from raising or lowering retail gas prices. According to the complaint, but for the agreement with State Oil, respondents could have charged different prices based on the grades of gasoline, in the same way that the receiver had, thereby achieving increased sales and profits. State Oil responded that the agreement did not actually prevent respondents from setting gasoline prices, and that, in substance, respondents did not allege a violation of antitrust laws by their claim that State Oil’s suggested retail price was not optimal.

The District Court found that the allegations in the complaint did not state a per se violation of the Sherman Act because they did not establish the sort of “manifestly anti-competitive implications or pernicious effect on competition” that would justify per se prohibition of State Oil’s conduct. App. 43-44. Subsequently, in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that respondents had failed to demonstrate antitrust injury or harm to competition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. The District Court held that respondents had not shown that a difference in gasoline pricing would have increased the station’s sales; nor had they shown that State Oil had market power or that its pricing provisions affected competition in a relevant market. Id., at 37a, 40a. Accordingly, the District Court entered summary judgment for State Oil on respondents’ Sherman Act claim. Id., at 40a.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 93 F. 3d 1358 (1996). The court first noted that the agreement between respondents and State Oil did indeed fix maximum gasoline prices by making it “worthless” for respondents to exceed the suggested retail prices. Id., at 1360. After reviewing legal and economic aspects of price fixing, the court concluded'that State Oil’s pricing scheme was a per se antitrust violation under Albrecht v. Herald Co., supra. Although the Court of Appeals characterized Albrecht as “unsound when decided” and “inconsistent with later decisions” of this Court, it felt constrained to follow that decision. 93 F. 3d, at 1363. In light of Albrecht and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U. S. 328 (1990) (ARCO), the court found that respondents could have suffered antitrust injury from not being able to adjust gasoline prices.

We granted certiorari to consider two questions, whether State Oil’s conduct constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act and whether respondents are entitled to recover damages based on that conduct. 519 U. S. 1107 (1997).

II

A

Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement “in restraint of trade,” this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints. See, e. g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U. S. 332, 342-343 (1982) (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898)). As a consequence, most antitrust claims are analyzed under a “rule of reason,” according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. 457 U. S., at 343, and n. 13 (citing Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918)).

Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for proeompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). Per se treatment is appropriate “[ojnce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.” Maricopa County, supra, at 344; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 19, n. 33 (1979). Thus, we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to “restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 458-459 (1986).

A review of this Court’s decisions leading up to and beyond Albrecht is relevant to our assessment of the continuing validity of the per se rule established in Albrecht. Beginning with Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911), the Court recognized the illegality of agreements under which manufacturers or suppliers set the minimum resale prices to be charged by their distributors. By 1940, the Court broadly declared all business combinations “formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce” illegal per se. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940). Accordingly, the Court condemned an agreement between two affiliated liquor distillers to limit the maximum price charged by retailers in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), noting that agreements to fix maximum prices, “no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.” Id., at 213.

In subsequent cases, the Court’s attention turned to arrangements through which suppliers imposed restrictions on dealers with respect to matters other than resale price. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963), the Court considered the validity of a manufacturer’s assignment of exclusive territories to its distributors and dealers. The Court determined that too little was known about the competitive impact of such vertical limitations to warrant treating them as per se unlawful. Id., at 263. Four years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967), the Court reconsidered the status of exclusive dealer territories and held that, upon the transfer of title to goods to a distributor, a supplier’s imposition of territorial restrictions on the distributor was “so obviously destructive of competition” as to constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id., at 379. In Schwinn, the Court acknowledged that some vertical restrictions, such as the conferral of territorial rights or franchises, could have procompetitive benefits by allowing smaller enterprises to compete, and that such restrictions might avert vertical integration in the distribution process. Id., at 379-380. The Court drew the line, however, at permitting manufacturers to control product marketing once dominion over the goods had passed to dealers. Id., at 380.

Albrecht, decided the following Term, involved a newspaper publisher who had granted exclusive territories to independent carriers subject to their adherence to a maximum price on resale of the newspapers to the public. Influenced by its decisions in Socony-Vacuum, Kiefer-Stewart, and Schwinn, the Court concluded that it was per se unlawful for the publisher to fix the maximum resale price of its newspapers. 390 U. S., at 152-154. The Court acknowledged that “[mjaximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations,” but nonetheless condemned maximum price fixing for “substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market.” Id., at 152.

Albrecht was animated in part by the fear that vertical maximum price fixing could allow suppliers to discriminate against certain dealers, restrict the services that dealers could afford to offer customers, or disguise minimum price fixing schemes. Id., at 152-153. The Court rejected the notion (both on the record of that case and in the abstract) that, because the newspaper publisher “granted exclusive territories, a price ceiling was necessary to protect the public from price gouging by dealers who had monopoly power in their own territories.” Id., at 153.

In a vigorous dissent, Justice Harlan asserted that the majority had erred in equating the effects of maximum and minimum price fixing. Id., at 156-168. Justice Harlan pointed out that, because the majority was establishing a per se rule, the proper inquiry was “not whether dictation of maximum prices is ever illegal, but whether it is always illegal.” Id., at 165-166. He also faulted the majority for conclusively listing “certain unfortunate consequences that maximum price dictation might have in other cases,” even as it rejected evidence that the publisher’s practice of fixing maximum prices counteracted potentially anticompetitive actions by its distributors. Id., at 165. Justice Stewart also dissented, asserting that the publisher’s maximum price fixing scheme should be properly viewed as promoting competition, because it protected consumers from dealers such as Albrecht, who, as “the only person who could sell for home delivery the city’s only daily morning newspaper,” was “a monopolist within his own territory.” Id., at 168.

Nine years later, in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 438 U. S. 36 (1977), the Court overruled Schwinn, thereby rejecting application of a per se rule in the context of vertical nonprice restrictions. The Court acknowledged the principle of stare decisis, but explained that the need for clarification in the law justified reconsideration of Schwinn:

“Sineé its announcement, Schwinn has been the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the decision, and a number of the federal courts confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have sought to limit its reach. In our view, the experience of the past 10 years should be brought to bear on this subject of considerable commercial importance.” 433 U. S., at 47-49 (footnotes omitted).

The Court considered the historical context of Schwinn, noting that Schwinn’s per se rule against vertical nonpriee restrictions came only four years after the Court had refused to endorse a similar rule in White Motor Co., and that the decision neither explained the “sudden change in position,” nor referred to the accepted requirements for per se violations set forth in Northern Pacific R. Co. 433 U. S., at 51-52. The Court then reviewed scholarly works supporting the economic utility of vertical nonprice restraints. See id., at 54-57 (citing, e. g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 506 (1965)). The Court concluded that, because “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than — as in Schwinn — upon formalistic line drawing,” the appropriate course would be “to return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.” GTE Sylvania, supra, at 58-59.

In GTE Sylvania, the Court declined to comment on Albrechts per se treatment of vertical maximum price restrictions, noting that the issue “involve[d] significantly different questions of analysis and policy.” 483 U. S., at 51, n. 18. Subsequent decisions of the Court, however, have hinted that the analytical underpinnings of Albrecht were substantially weakened by GTE Sylvania. We noted in Mari-copa County that vertical restraints are generally more defensible than horizontal restraints. See 457 U. S., at 348, n. 18. And we explained in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U. S. 335, 341-342 (1987), that decisions such as GTE Sylvania “recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition even as it reduces intrabrand competition.”

Most recently, in ARCO, 495 U. S. 328 (1990), although Al-brecht’s continuing validity was not squarely before the Court, some disfavor with that decision was signaled by our statement that we would “assume, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, maximum price fixing is subject to the per se rule.” 495 U. S., at 335, n. 5. More significantly, we specifically acknowledged that vertical maximum price fixing “may have procompetitive interbrand effects,” and pointed out that, in the wake of GTE Sylvania, “[t]he proeompetitive potential of a vertical maximum price restraint is more evident. . . than it was when Albrecht was decided, because exclusive territorial arrangements and other nonprice restrictions were unlawful per se in 1968.” 495 U. S., at 348, n. 13 (citing several commentators identifying proeompetitive effects of vertical maximum price fixing, including, e. g., P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 340.30b, p. 378, n. 24 (1988 Supp.); Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1553 (1989); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 887-890 (1981)) (hereinafter Easterbrook).

B

Thus, our reconsideration of Albrecht’s continuing validity is informed by several of our decisions, as well as a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of vertical restraints. Our analysis is also guided by our general view that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition. See, e. g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 726 (1988). “Low prices,” we have explained, “benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.” ARCO, supra, at 340. Our interpretation of the Sherman Act also incorporates the notion that condemnation of practices resulting in lower prices to consumers is “especially costly” because “cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 594 (1986).

So informed, we find it difficult to maintain that vertically imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation. As Chief Judge Posner wrote for the Court of Appeals in this ease:

“As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monopsonist he cannot squeeze his dealers’ margins below a competitive level; the attempt to do so would just drive the dealers into the arms of a competing supplier. A supplier might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly position.... [Sjuppose that State Oil, perhaps to encourage ... dealer services ... has spaced its dealers sufficiently far apart to limit competition among them (or even given each of them an exclusive territory); and suppose further that Union 76 is a sufficiently distinctive and popular brand to give the dealers in it at least a modicum of monopoly power. Then State Oil might want to place a ceiling on the dealers’ resale prices in order to prevent them from exploiting that monopoly power folly. It would do this not out of disinterested malice, but in its commercial self-interest. The higher the price at which gasoline is resold, the smaller the volume sold, and so the lower the profit to the supplier if the higher profit per gallon at the higher price is being snared by the dealer.” 93 F. 3d, at 1362.

See also R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 281-282 (1978) (“There could, of course, be no anticonsumer effect from [the type of price fixing considered in Albrecht], and one suspects that the paper has a legitimate interest in keeping subscriber prices down in order to increase circulation and maximize revenues from advertising”).

We recognize that the Albrecht decision presented a number of theoretical justifications for a per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing. But criticism of those premises abounds. The Albrecht decision was grounded in the fear that maximum price fixing by suppliers could interfere with dealer freedom. 390 U. S., at 152. In response, as one commentator has pointed out, “the ban on maximum resale price limitations declared in Albrecht in the name of ‘dealer freedom’ has actually prompted many suppliers to integrate forward into distribution, thus eliminating the very independent trader for whom Albrecht professed solicitude.” 8 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1635, p. 395 (1989) (hereinafter Areeda). For example, integration in the newspaper industry since Albrecht has given rise to litigation between independent distributors and publishers. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 729.7, pp. 599-614 (1996 Supp.).

The Albrecht Court also expressed the concern that maximum prices may be set too low for dealers to offer consumers essential or desired services. 390 U. S., at 152-153. But such conduct, by driving away customers, would seem likely to harm manufacturers as well as dealers and consumers, making it unlikely that a supplier would set such a price as a matter of business judgment. See, e. g., Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit, 40 Antitrust Bull. 1, 60 (1995); Blair & Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1007, 1034 (1991). In addition, Albrecht noted that vertical maximum price fixing could effectively channel distribution through large or specially advantaged dealers. 390 U. S., at 153. It is unclear, however, that a supplier would profit from limiting its market by excluding potential dealers. See, e. g., Easterbrook 905-908. Further, although vertical maximum price fixing might limit the viability of inefficient dealers, that consequence is not necessarily harmful to competition and consumers. See, e. g., id., at 907; Lopatka, supra, at 60.

Finally, Albrecht reflected the Court’s fear that maximum price fixing could be used to disguise arrangements to fix minimum prices, 390 U. S., at 153, which remain illegal per se. Although we have acknowledged the possibility that maximum pricing might mask minimum pricing, see Maricopa County, 457 U. S., at 348, we believe that such conduct — as with the other concerns articulated in Albrecht— can be appropriately recognized and punished under the rule of reason. See, e. g., Easterbrook 901-904; see also Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L. J. 1487, 1490, n. 17 (1983).

Not only are the potential injuries cited in Albrecht less serious than the Court imagined, the per se rule established therein could in fact exacerbate problems related to the unrestrained exercise of market power by monopolist-dealers. Indeed, both courts and antitrust scholars have noted that Albrecht’s rule may actually harm consumers and manufacturers. See, e. g., Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19 F. 3d 745, 753 (CA1 1994) (Breyer, C. J.); Areeda ¶ 1636a, at 395; G. Mathewson & R. Winter, Competition Policy and Vertical Exchange 13-14 (1985). Other commentators have also explained that Al-brecht’s per se rule has even more potential for deleterious effect on competition after our decision in GTE Sylvania, because, now that vertical nonprice restrictions are not unlawful per se, the likelihood of dealer monopoly power is increased. See, e. g., Easterbrook 890, n. 20; see also ARCO, 495 U. S., at 343, n. 13. We do not intend to suggest that dealers generally possess sufficient market power to exploit a monopoly situation. Such retail market power may in fact be uncommon. See, e. g., Business Electronics, 485 U. S., at 727, n. 2; GTE Sylvania, 433 U. S., at 54. Nor do we hold that a ban on vertical maximum price fixing inevitably has anticompetitive consequences in the exclusive dealer context.

After reconsidering Albrecht’s rationale and the substantial criticism the decision has received, however, we conclude that there is insufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing. That is so not only because it is difficult to accept the assumptions underlying Albrecht, but also because Albrecht has little or no relevance to ongoing enforcement of the Sherman Act. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 777, and n. 25 (1984). Moreover, neither the parties nor any of the amici curiae have called our attention to any cases in which enforcement efforts have been directed solely against the conduct encompassed by AlbrecMs, per se rule.

Respondents argue that reconsideration of Albrecht should require “persuasive, expert testimony establishing that the per se rule has distorted the market.” Brief for Respondents 7. Their reasoning ignores the fact that Albrecht itself relied solely upon hypothetical effects of vertical maximum price fixing. Further, Albrecht’s, dire predictions have not been borne out, even though manufacturers and suppliers appear to have fashioned schemes to get around the per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing. In these circumstances, it is the retention of the rule of Albrecht, and not, as respondents would have it, the rule’s elimination, that lacks adequate justification. See, e. g., GTE Sylvania, supra, at 58-59.

Respondents’ reliance on Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U. S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258 (1972), is similarly misplaced, because those decisions are clearly inapposite, having to do with the antitrust exemption for professional baseball, which this Court has described as “an aberration ... resting] on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs,” id., at 282. In the context of this ease, we infer little meaning from the fact that Congress has not reacted legislatively to Albrecht. In any event, the history of various legislative proposals regarding price fixing seems neither clearly to support nor to denounce the per se rule of Albrecht. Respondents are of course free to seek legislative protection from gasoline suppliers of the sort embodied in the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 92 Stat. 322, 15 U. S. C. § 2801 et seq. For the reasons we have noted, however, the remedy for respondents’ dispute with State Oil should not come in the form of a per se rule affecting the conduct of the entire marketplace.

c

Despite what Chief Judge Posner aptly described as Al-brechts "infirmities, [and] its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,” 93 F. 3d, at 1363, there remains the question whether Albrecht deserves continuing respect under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of Appeals was correct in applying that principle despite disagreement with Al-brecht, for it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.

We approach the reconsideration of decisions of this Court with the utmost caution. Stare decisis reflects “a policy judgment that fin most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting)). It "is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). This Court has expressed its reluctance to overrule decisions involving statutory interpretation, see, e. g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977), and has acknowledged that stare decisis concerns are at their acme in eases involving property and contract rights, see, e. g., Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. Both of those concerns are arguably relevant in this case.

But “[sjtare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Ibid. In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience. Thus, the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 688 (1978). As we have explained, the term “restraint of trade,” as used in § 1, also “invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” Business Electronics, 485 U. S., at 732; see also GTE Sylvania, 433 U. S., at 53, n. 21; McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 372-373 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, this Court has reconsidered its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question. See, e. g., Copperweld Corp., supra, at 777; GTE Sylvania, supra, at 47-49; cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940).

Although we do not “lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in error,” we have noted that “different sorts of agreements” may amount to restraints of trade “in varying times and circumstances,” and “[i]t would make no sense to create out of the single term ‘restraint of trade’ a chronologically schizoid statute, in which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed where it was.” Business Electronics, supra, at 731-732. Just as Schwinn was “the subject of continuing controversy and confusion” under the “great weight” of scholarly criticism, GTE Sylvania, supra, at 47-48, Albrecht has been widely criticized since its inception. With the views underlying Albrecht eroded by this Court’s precedent, there is not much of that decision to salvage. See, e. g., Neal v. United States, 516 U. S. 284, 295 (1996); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-481 (1989).

Although the rule of Albrecht has been in effect for some time, the inquiry we must undertake requires considering “ ‘the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.’” GTE Sylvania, supra, at 53, n. 21 (quoting Schwinn, 388 U. S., at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). As the Court noted in ARCO, 495 U. S., at 336, n. 6, there has not been another ease since Albrecht in which this Court has “confronted an unadulterated vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement.” Now that we confront Albrecht directly, we find its conceptual foundations gravely weakened.

In overruling Albrecht, we of course do not hold that all vertical maximum price fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical maximum priee fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements subject-to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule of reason. In our view, rule-of-reason analysis will effectively identify those situations in which vertical maximum price fixing amounts to anticompetitive conduct.

There remains the question whether respondents are entitled to recover damages based on State Oil’s conduct. Although the Court of Appeals noted that “the district judge was right to conclude that if the rule of reason is applicable, Khan loses,” 93 F. 3d, at 1362, its consideration of this case was necessarily premised on Albrecht's per se rule. Under the circumstances, the matter should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the first instance. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Justice Ginsburg

text:
    BATES v. UNITED STATES
    No. 96-7185.
    Argued October 7, 1997
    Decided November 4, 1997

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a. unanimous Court.

      C. Richard Oren, by appointment of the Court, 520 U. S. 1114, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellin-ger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Daniel S. Goodman.

         Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the meaning of § 490(a) (Pub. L. 99-498), 100 Stat. 1491, as added, 20 U. S. C. § 1097(a) (1988 ed.), which declared it a felony “knowingly and willfully” to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The United States acknowledges that § 1097(a) demanded allegation and proof of the defendant’s intentional conversion of loan funds to his own use or the use of a third party. The question presented is whether § 1097(a) demanded, in addition, allegation and proof that the defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud someone — either the United States as loan guarantor, as the District Court read the measure, or another. We hold, in accord with the Court of Appeals, that specific intent to. injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by § 1097(a).

I

. The indictment in this ease, App. 2-12, alleged the following facts. James and Laurenda Jackson ówned and operated Education America, Inc., a for-profit consulting and management firm for technical and vocational schools. In December 1986, the Jacksons acquired the Acme Institute of Technology, a not-for-profit technical school located in South Bend, Indiana, which offered associate degree programs in electronic engineering, and tool, die, and plastics mold design. After the acquisition, the Jacksons appointed Bates— then the vice president of Education America — to serve as treasurer of Acme’s board of trustees.

On April 30, 1987, James Jackson, as president of Acme, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV federal Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. See 20 U. S. C. § 1070 et seq. (1988 ed.). Acme’s participation hinged upon both its continued accreditation by an approved accrediting association and Jackson’s promise to comply with all applicable statutes and regulations.

Under the GSL program, banks and other private institutions lent money to Acme students for tuition and other educational expenses. The Federal Government administered the program and guaranteed payment if a student borrower defaulted. Acme would receive a loan check directly from the lender, endorse the check, and credit the amount of the check against the student’s tuition debt. If a GSL student withdrew from Acme before the term ended, the governing regulations, 34 CFR §§668.22 and 682.606 (1990), required Acme to return to the lender a portion of the loan proceeds, based upon how late in the term the student withdrew and how much the student had paid at that point. Refunds to the lender, the applicable regulation, §682.607, instructed, were to be made within a specified period (30 or 60 days) following the student’s withdrawal. The lender would then deduct the refund from the amount that the student owed. If Acme did not refund the loans to the lender, the student — and if she defaulted, the Government — would remain liable for the full amount of the loan.

Around the end of 1987, pursuant to decisions made by the Jacksons and Bates, Acme initiated a pattern and practice of not making GSL refunds. On April 14,1988, James Jackson sent a letter to Acme’s director ordering him, effective the following month, to “tally [Acme’s] receipts for the preceding month and remit a management fee of 10% of [the] total receipts to Education America, Inc.” App. 4. The letter also told the director to pay the Jacksons a monthly salary. The letter further stated: “If the above creates a cash shortfall in your school, money will be loaned back to you to cover the shortfall.” See ibid. Bates, serving as Acme’s chief financial officer, permitted these fee and salary payments to take priority over*the GSL refunds, and specifically instructed other Acme employees not to make the required GSL refunds. In late 1988 or early 1989, Education America officials ordered Acme to stop using a special bank account that segregated the unearned student-loaned tuition from the general account. Acme’s former owners had used this special account to ensure that funds were always available for timely refunds to lenders.

By October 1988, Acme had amassed roughly $55,000 in unmade GSL refunds. Acme’s financial aid director sent James Jackson a letter in January 1989 to draw Jackson’s attention to the gravity of the unmade refunds, which then totaled $68,000. By March 1989, Acme’s refund liability had grown to approximately $85,000. In a letter dated March 13, 1989, Bates, as Education America’s vice president, released Acme’s financial aid director from all responsibility concerning GSL refunds, as she had requested. The letter stated that unmade refunds were “solely the responsibility and decision of the corporate office.” See id., at 5.

In April 1989, the National Association of Trade and Technical Schools, a national accrediting association, conducted an on-site audit of Acme to determine whether it should continue to accredit the school. A month later, the Association reported to the Department of Education that Acme had “inadequately demonstrated its ability to make appropriate and timely refunds,” and had “loaned substantial amounts of money to [James Jackson,] the chief trustee.” The report also noted evidence that management fees had been “upstream[ed]” to Education America. See ibid. Acme subsequently lost its accreditation, and the Department of Education notified the school on April 7, 1990, that effective March 8, 1990, Acme was no longer eligible to participate in the GSL program. On June 5, 1990, Acme ceased operations. During Bates’s tenure as Acme’s chief financial officer, the school amassed $139,649 in unmade refunds, not including interest and certain special allowances.

On September 8,1994, a federal grand jury indicted Bates on twelve counts of “knowingly and willfully misapply[ing],” id., at 11, federally insured student loan funds between January 15, 1990, and June 15, 1990, in violation of 20 U. S. C. § 1097(a) (1988 ed.) and 18 U. S. C. §2 (1988 ed.). On February 7, 1995, Bates filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. He argued, and the District Court agreed, that conviction under § 1097(a) for willful misapplication required an allegation of the defendant’s “intent to injure or defraud the United States.” 96 F. 3d 964, 967 (CA7 1996). Because the indictment lacked such an allegation, the District Court dismissed it.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and reinstated the prosecution. 96 F. 3d 964 (1996). The Court of Appeals concluded that § 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that “the defendant misapplied — i. e;, converted — Title IV funds and that he did so knowingly and willfully.” Id., at 970. The Seventh Circuit's decision conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kammer, 1 F. 3d 1161, 1165-1166 (1993), which held that § 1097(a) requires the Government to allege and prove that the defendant had an “intent to defraud” the United States. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 519 U. S. 1108 (1997), and now affirm the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.

II

Our inquiry begins with the text of 20 U. S. C. § 1097(a) (1988 ed.). At the time of the offenses charged in the indictment, the measure provided in relevant part: “Any person who knowingly and willfully embezzles, misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud, false statement, or forgery any funds, assets, or property provided or insured under this subchapter .. . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.”

. The text of § 1097(a) does not include an “intent to defraud” state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face. In contrast, § 1097(d), enacted at the same time as § 1097(a), makes it a felony “knowingly and willfully” to “destroCy] or eoneea[l] any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States” (emphasis added). As this Court has reiterated: “ ‘[Wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)).

Despite the contrasting language of §§ 1097(a) and (d), Bates urges that an “intent to defraud” is an essential, albeit unexpressed, element of the offenses charged against him. For this argument, Bates relies primarily upon the District Court’s reasoning in this ease. The District Court, like the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Kammer, 1 F. 3d, at 1165, looked to decisions interpreting 18 U. S. C. § 656, which proscribes -willful misapplication of bank funds. The Courts of Appeals unanimously agree that § 656 requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted with an intent to “injure or defraud” the bank or “deceive” a bank officer, even though the statute, on its face, contains no such element. In another case involving a different defendant named Bates, the Seventh Circuit explained why §656 included an “intent to injure or defraud” element:

“The current statutory language does not expressly require any proof of [fraudulent or injurious] intent. Originally the statute did require proof of intent to ‘injure or defraud’ the hank or ‘deceive’ a bank officer but these words were inadvertently dropped in the course of a technical revision of the criminal code. To avoid making every unauthorized loan by a bank officer a willful misapplication of bank funds, courts . . . read the missing words back into the section.” United States v. Bates, 852 F. 2d 212, 215 (1988).

Assuming, without deciding, that the Seventh Circuit’s reading of § 656 is correct, § 1097(a) never contained, as § 656 did, an “intent to defraud” requirement, a requirement present from the start and still contained in § 1097(d). In short, there is here neither text nor history warranting the construction of § 1097(a) that Bates urges us to adopt.

Nor does § 1097(a) set a “trap for the unwary,” as the Seventh Circuit suggested § 656 would if read to render felonious “every unauthorized loan by a bank officer.” See Bates, 852 F. 2d, at 215. Under the Seventh Circuit’s construction, § 1097(a) catches only the transgressor who intentionally exercises unauthorized dominion over federally insured student loan funds for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third party. “[Ijnnocent... maladministration of a business enterprise” or a use of funds that is simply “unwise,” see Brief for Petitioner 5, does not fit within that construction.

Bates also relies on a 1992 amendment to § 1097(a), which added “fails to refund” to the provision’s text. This change, Bates argues, establishes that the deliberate failure to return GSL funds, without an intent to defraud, was not previously an offense within § 1097(a)’s compass, but became one only under the statute’s current text. Congress’ 1992 amendment hardly means that § 1097(a) did not previously cover the conduct in question. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U. S. 187, 194 (1955) (“Subsequent amendments have clarified and not changed th[e earlier] principle.”). The three added words — “fails to refund” — simply foreclose any argument that § 1097(a) does not reach the failure to make refunds; those words do not make the argument a persuasive one. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 102-630, p. 513 (1992) (“[F]ailure to pay refunds does constitute criminal misapplication under current law. Language is added in this bill merely as a clarification.”).

Bates finally urges that, to the extent § 1097(a) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity supports interpretation of the provision to include fraudulent intent as an essential element of the offense of knowing and willful misapplication of funds. As we have explained, however, nothing in the text, structure, or history of § 1097(a) warrants importation of an “intent to defraud” requirement into the misapplication proscription. The rule of lenity, therefore, does not come into play. See United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 499 (1997). The Government need not charge or prove that Bates aimed to injure or defraud anyone, nor is it a defense that Bates hoped the Jacksons, the students, or someone else would pay the amount due the lenders so that the federal fisc would suffer no loss.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is

Affirmed.

       In 1992, Congress amended the GSL program and renamed it the Federal Family Education Loan Program. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-325, § 411(a)(1), 106 Stat. 510. Because the indictment in this case concerns only pre-1992 conduct, we refer to the program as the GSL program.

       The Department of Education since has consolidated the requirements of §§668.22 and 682.606 into the current §668.22. See 59 Fed. Reg. 61211 (1994).

       Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-498, § 490(a), 100 Stat. 1491.

        United States v. Whitlock, 663 F. 2d 1094, 1102 (CADC 1980); United States v. Wester, 90 F. 3d 592, 595 (CA1 1996); United States v. Castiglia, 894 F. 2d 533, 537 (CA2), cert. denied, 497 U. S. 1004 (1990); United States v. Thomas, 610 F. 2d 1166, 1174 (CA3 1979); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 858 (CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); United States v. McCord, 33 F. 3d 1434, 1448 (CA5 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Haley v. United States, 515 U. S. 1132 (1995); United States v. Woods, 877 F. 2d 477, 479 (CA6 1989); United States v. Crabtree, 979 F. 2d 1261, 1266 (CA7 1992), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 878 (1993); United States v. Ness, 665 F. 2d 248, 249 (CA8 1981); United States v. Wolfswinkel, 44 F. 3d 782, 786 (CA9 1995); United States v. Evans, 42 F. 3d 586, 589 (CA10 1994); United States v. Morales, 978 F. 2d 650, 652 (CA11 1992).

       Section 656 currently provides that any person “connected in any capacity with any Federal Reserve bank” or a related organization commits a felony if she “embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits” of the bank or related organization.

         Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), does not bear on our decision today. Ratzlaf decided only, in the particular statutory context of currency structuring, that knowledge of illegality was an element of 31 U. S. C. § 5322(a) as that provision was then framed. Ratzlaf did not involve the question presented here regarding § 1097(a), which is whether, in addition to a knowledge requirement, the Government must allege and prove an “intent to injure or defraud.”

       The Seventh Circuit’s “working definition” of § 1097(a) reads:
      “[Wjillful misapplication under § 1097(a) requires the government to allege and prove that the defendant consciously, voluntarily, and intentionally exercised unauthorized control or dominion over federally provided or guaranteed Title IV funds that interfered with the rights of the funds’ true owner(s), for the use and benefit of the defendant or a third person, while knowing that such an exercise of control- or dominion over the funds was a violation of the law.” 96 F. 3d, at 970.
      The Government argues that the Seventh Circuit erred in reading § 1097(a) to require proof that a defendant knew his misapplication violated the law. Brief for United States 21-22. However, the Government did not challenge by cross-petition any part of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, so the question whether the defendant must know his conduct was a violation of the law is not before us.

       As amended in 1992, § 1097(a) reads in relevant part:
      “Any person who knowingly and willfully embezzles, misapplies, steals, obtains by fraud, false statement, or forgery, or fails to refund any funds, assets, or property provided or insured under this subchapter... shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-325, §495,106 Stat. 631.