text:
    NEW JERSEY v. NEW YORK
    No. 120,
    Orig.
    Decided May 21, 1998
    Decree entered May 17, 1999
   DECREE

The Court having exercised original jurisdiction over this controversy between two sovereign States; the issues raised having been heard in an evidentiary proceeding before the Special Master appointed by the Court; the Court having heard argument on the Final Report of the Special Master and the exceptions filed by the state parties; the Court having issued its opinion on the issues raised in the exceptions, which is reported at 523 U. S. 767 (1998); and the Special Master having submitted his Report Upon Recommittal;

It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed as Follows:

I

The State of New Jersey’s prayer that she be declared to be sovereign over the landfilled portions of Ellis Island added by the Federal Government after 1834 is granted and the State of New York is enjoined from enforcing her laws or asserting sovereignty over the portions of Ellis Island that lie within the State of New Jersey’s sovereign boundary as set forth in paragraph 4 of this decree.

HH HH

The sovereign boundary between the State of New Jersey and the State of New York is as set forth in Article First of the Compact of 1834, enacted into law in both States and approved by Congress.

1 — 1 HH 1 — 1

The State of New York remains sovereign under Article Second of the Compact of 1834 of and over the original Ellis Island, to the low-water mark, and the pier area built on landfill, as the Island and pier were structured in 1834, as more particularly depicted on the 1857 United States Coast Survey of New York Harbor.

IV

The boundary between the two States on Ellis Island is as depicted on the map of Ellis Island, Showing Boundary Between States of New Jersey and New York, dated December 1,1998, which is appended hereto, infra. The boundary between the two States, as depicted on the appended map, lies along the line described as follows:

Beginning at a point with North (NAD83) metric coordinates of North 207 180.7849 (latitude North 40 degrees 41 minutes 54.92285 seconds) and East 188 879.9657 (longitude West 74 degrees 02 minutes 23.75137 seconds), said point being (a) South 45 degrees 42 minutes 50 seconds East along the northeasterly granite block wall of the Ferry Slip about 502 feet from the northwesterly terminus of said wall and thence being (b) North 46 degrees 39 minutes 35.7 seconds East about 10 feet to said point of beginning; thence the following courses and distances:

(1) N 42 degrees 10 minutes 59.1 a 61.150 feet to a point; thence

(2) N 45 degrees 24 minutes 60.990 feet to a point; thence

(3) N 46 degrees 1.813 feet to a point; thence

(4) N 45 degrees 33 minutes 03.3 seconds a 9.193 feet to a point; thence

(5) N 45 degrees 42 minutes 35.4 seconds a 24.972 feet to a point; thence

(6) S 42 degrees 23 minutes 50.8 seconds E, a distance of

I.947 feet to a point; thence

(7) N 45 degrees 15 minutes 54.9 seconds E, a distance of 19.092 feet to a point; thence

(8) S 46 degrees 25 minutes 55.5 seconds E, a distance of 14.147 feet to a point; thence

(9) S 69 degrees 37 minutes 24.8 seconds E, a distance of 4.667 feet to a point; thence

(10) S 67 degrees 54 minutes 46.2 seconds E, a distance of 4.654 feet to a point; thence

(11) S 70 degrees 49 minutes 58.4 seconds E, a distance of 12.373 feet to a point; thence

(12) S 79 degrees 45 minutes 36.8 seconds E, a distance of 9.844 feet to a point; thence

(13) N 86 degrees 16 minutes 07.0 seconds E, a distance of

II.526 feet to a point; thence

(14) N 72 degrees 30 minutes 15.3 seconds E, a distance of 12.058 feet to a point; thence

(15) N 61 degrees 34 minutes 34.0 seconds E, a distance of 13.787 feet to a point; thence

(16) N 37 degrees 42 minutes 57.5 seconds E, a distance of 11.851 feet to a point; thence

(17) N 01 degrees 43 minutes 14.9 seconds E, a distance of 14.569 feet to a point; thence

(18) N 22 degrees 53 minutes 06.4 seconds W, a distance of 13.500 feet to a point; thence

(19) N 48 degrees 57 minutes 00.8 seconds W, a distance of 17.321 feet to a point; thence

(20) N 48 degrees 15 minutes 36.6 seconds W, a distance of 13.988 feet to a point; thence

(21) N 51 degrees 26 minutes 12.9 seconds W, a distance of 17.345 feet to a point; thence

(22) N 43 degrees 49 minutes 22.3 seconds W, a distance of 12.907 feet to a point; thence

(23) N 54 degrees 54 minutes 43.1 seconds W, a distance of 30.552 feet to a point; thence

(24) N 70 degrees 20 minutes 46.2 seconds W, a distance of 26.016 feet to a point; thence

(25) N 49 degrees 2B minutes 55.3 seconds W, a distance of 10.372 feet to a point; thence

(26) N 05 degrees 34 minutes 48.6 seconds W, a distance of 10.927 feet to a point; thence

(27) N 00 degrees 17 minutes 59.9 seconds W, a distance of 11.938 feet to a point; thence

(28) N 23 degrees 17 minutes 40.4 seconds W, a distance of 14.698 feet to a point; thence

(29) N 53 degrees 00 minutes 04.3 seconds W, a distance of 11.113 feet to a point; thence

(30) N 57 degrees 55 minutes 46.1 seconds W, a distance of 11.654 feet to a point; thence

(31) N 63 degrees 34 minutes 20.5 seconds W, a distance of 11.655 feet to a point; thence

(32) N 70 degrees 09 minutes 45.4 seconds W, a distance of 10.498 feet to a point; thence

(33) N 64 degrees 39 minutes 53.0 seconds W, a distance of 15.628 feet to a point; thence

(34) N 42 degrees 57 minutes 16.5 seconds W, a distance of 9.906 feet to a point; thence

(35) N 20 degrees 46 minutes 20.1 seconds W, a distance of 9.693 feet to a point; thence

(36) N 24 degrees 35 minutes 59.2 seconds W, a distance of 11.411 feet to a point; thence

(37) N 18 degrees 46 minutes 40.9 seconds W, a distance of 9.902 feet to a point; thence

(38) N 00 degrees 00 minutes 00.0 seconds E, a distance of 12.938 feet to a point; thence

(39) N 05 degrees 54 minutes 22.1 seconds W, a distance of 10.933 feet to a point; thence

(40) N 16 degrees 33 minutes 01.3 seconds W, a distance of 13.823 feet to a point; thence

(41) N 33 degrees 24 minutes 44.2 seconds W, a distance of 14.301 feet to a point; thence

(42) N 25 degrees 46 minutes 09.6 seconds W, a distance of 12.076 feet to a point; thence

(43) N 37 degrees 08 minutes 48.1 seconds W, a distance of 10.350 feet to a point; thence

• (44) N 32 degrees 03 minutes 52.4 seconds W, a distance of 12.833 feet to a point; thence

(45) N 31 degrees 19 minutes 03.9 seconds W, a distance of 12.144 feet to a point; thence

(46) N 17 degrees 53 minutes 21.4 seconds W, a distance of 10.377 feet to a point; thence

(47) N 06 degrees 53 minutes 43.1 seconds W, a distance of 13.535 feet to a point; thence

(48) N 03 degrees 03 minutes 10.4 seconds E, a distance of 9.388 feet to a point; thence

(49) N 11 degrees 29 minutes 11.7 seconds W, a distance of 11.926 feet to a point; thence

(50) N 34 degrees 52 minutes 31.2 seconds W, a distance of 10.056 feet to a point; thence

(51) N 30 degrees 47 minutes 02.9 seconds W, a distance of 10.258 feet to a point; thence

(52) N 17 degrees 53 minutes 21.4 seconds W, a distance of 10.377 feet to a point; thence

(53) N 00 degrees 21 minutes 53.8 seconds W, a distance of 9.813 feet to a point; thence

(54) N 18 degrees 34 minutes 20.5 seconds W, a distance of 8.242 feet to a point; thence

(55) N 06 degrees 10 minutes 47.7 seconds W, a distance of 9.870 feet to a point; thence

(56) N 04 degrees 25 minutes 03.0 seconds W, a distance of 14.606 feet to a point; thence

(57) N 21 degrees 57 minutes 38.0 seconds W, a distance of 8.356 feet to a point; thence

(58) N 28 degrees 19 minutes 29.9 seconds W, a distance of 10.011 feet to a point; thence

(59) N 23 degrees 19 minutes 03.8 seconds W, a distance of 3.947 feet to a point; thence

(60) N 24 degrees 12 minutes 42.3 seconds W, a distance of 10.211 feet to a point; thence

(61) N 09 degrees 17 minutes 00.8 seconds W, a distance of 13.173 feet to a point; thence

(62) N 26 degrees 15 minutes 31.2 seconds E, a distance of 10.454 feet to a point; thence

(63) N 48 degrees 14 minutes 50.4 seconds E, a distance of 12.483 feet to a point; thence

(64) S 87 degrees 53 minutes 19.2 seconds E, a distance of 13.572 feet to a point; thence

(65) S 64 degrees 54 minutes 13.5 seconds E, a distance of 10.905 feet to a point; thence

(66) S 68 degrees 55 minutes 21.0 seconds E, a distance of 12.861 feet to a point; thence

(67) S 70 degrees 10 minutes 04.3 seconds E, a distance of 12.159 feet to a point; thence

(68) S 59 degrees 59 minutes 42.3 seconds E, a distance of 10.248 feet to a point; thence

(69) S 65 degrees 02 minutes 32.3 seconds E, a distance of 10.961 feet to a point; thence

(70) S 56 degrees 22 minutes 33.9 seconds E, a distance of 15.011 feet to a point; thence

(71) S 65 degrees 01 minutes 07.5 seconds E, a distance of 12.135 feet to a point; thence

(72) S 72 degrees 23 minutes 43.3 seconds E, a distance of 13.639 feet to a point; thence

(73) N 72 degrees 50 minutes 17.1 seconds E, a distance of 13.344 feet to a point; thence

(74) N 77 degrees 08 minutes 45.2 seconds E, a distance of 9.552 feet to a point; thence

(75) S 86 degrees 40 minutes 12.7 seconds E, a distance of 17.217 feet to a point; thence

(76) S 66 degrees 15 minutes 01.8 seconds E, a distance of 10.242 feet to a point; thence

(77) S 71 degrees 54 minutes 34.2 seconds E, a distance of 9.863 feet to a point; thence

(78) S 87 degrees 15 minutes 10.449 feet to a point; thence 26.6 seconds E, a distance of

(79) S 54 degrees 29 minutes 11.516 feet to a point; thence 54.5 seconds E, a distance of

(80) S 57 degrees 20 minutes 8.686 feet to a point; thence 20.7 seconds E, a distance of

(81) S 47 degrees 36 minutes 48.0 seconds E, a distance of 10.662 feet to a point; thence

(82) S 43 degrees 13 minutes 26.2 seconds E, a distance of 11.407 feet to a point; thence

(83) S 45 degrees 24 minutes 22.8 seconds E, a distance of 12.463 feet to a point; thence

(84) S 63 degrees 26 minutes 05.8 seconds E, a distance of 10.482 feet to a point; thence

(85) S 63 degrees 56 minutes 07.2 seconds E, a distance of 12.802 feet to a point; thence

(86) S 68 degrees 51 minutes 36.6 seconds E, a distance of 10.051 feet to a point; thence

(87) S 83 degrees 55 minutes 39.2 seconds E, a distance of 11.816 feet to a point; thence

(88) S 87 degrees 14 minutes 27.2 seconds E, a distance of 10.387 feet to a point; thence

(89) S 47 degrees 05 minutes 24.6 seconds E, a distance of 12.117 feet to a point; thence

(90) S 33 degrees 17 minutes 23.9 seconds E, a distance of 12.412 feet to a point; thence

(91) S 36 degrees 11 minutes 13.6 seconds E, a distance of 11.538 feet to a point; thence

(92) S 62 degrees 43 minutes 23.7 seconds E, a distance of 13.501 feet to a point; thence

(93) S 84 degrees 13 minutes 03.4 seconds E,ta distance of 9.926 feet to a point; thence

(94) S 71 degrees 39 minutes 48.0 seconds E, a distance of 11.523 feet to a point; thence

(95) S 45 degrees 21 minutes 45.5 seconds E, a distance of 13.966 feet to a point; thence

(96) S 37 degrees 11 minutes 27.6 seconds E, a distance of 15.613 feet to a point; thence

(97) S 63 degrees 45 minutes 09.6 seconds E, a distance of 15.122 feet to a point; thence

(98) S 70 degrees 24 minutes 57.6 seconds E, a distance of 13.798 feet to a point; thence

(99) S 59 degrees 24 minutes 14.4 seconds E, a distance of 16.700 feet to a point; thence

(100) S 60 degrees 38 minutes 32.1 seconds E, a distance of 13.768 feet to a point; thence

(101) S 48 degrees 52 minutes 16.5 seconds E, a distance of 11.782 feet to a point; thence

(102) S 80 degrees 54 minutes 35.0 seconds E, a distance of 12.659 feet to a point; thence

(103) S 83 degrees 25 minutes 05.0 seconds E, a distance of 13.086 feet to a point; thence

(104) S 79 degrees 49 minutes 56.0 seconds E, a distance of 11.683 feet to a point; thence

(105) S 85 degrees 36 minutes 04.7 seconds E, a distance of 13.038 feet to a point; thence

(106) S 81 degrees 54 minutes 20.0 seconds E, a distance of 14.204 feet to a point; thence

(107) N 90 degrees 00 minutes 00.0 seconds E, a distance of 9.375 feet to a point; thence

(108) S 80 degrees 20 minutes 42.1 seconds E, a distance of 15.279 feet to a point; thence

(109) S 47 degrees 58 minutes 47.4 seconds E, a distance of 16.153 feet to a point; thence

(110) S 23 degrees 55 minutes 21.0 seconds E, a distance of 9.094 feet to a point; thence

(111) S 38 degrees 34 minutes 09.6 seconds E, a distance of 18.546 feet to a point; thence

(112) S 30 degrees 17 minutes 47.2 seconds E, a distance of 12.885 feet to a point; thence

(113) S 13 degrees 08 minutes 27.9 seconds E, a distance of 16.494 feet to a point; thence

(114) S 05 degrees 16 minutes 03.7 seconds E, a distance of 17.700 feet to a point; thence

(115) S 17 degrees 09 minutes 57.4 seconds E, a distance of 12.494 feet to a point; thence

(116) S 45 degrees 00 minutes 00.0 seconds E, a distance of 4.419 feet to a point; thence

(117) S 18 degrees 43 minutes 50.9 seconds E, a distance of 11.483 feet to a point; thence

(118) S 15 degrees 34 minutes 21.2 seconds E, a distance of 11.873 feet to a point; thence

(119) S 28 degrees 42 minutes 40.4 seconds E, a distance of 14.181 feet to a point; thence

(120) S 41 degrees 33 minutes 09.4 seconds E, a distance of 11.024 feet to a point; thence

(121) S 56 degrees 56 minutes 54.8 seconds E, a distance of 10.887 feet to a point; thence

(122) S 45 degrees 24 minutes 12.5 seconds E, a distance of 12.551 feet to a point; thence

(123) S 42 degrees 16 minutes 25.3 seconds E, a distance of 13.937 feet to a point; thence

(124) S 59 degrees 20 minutes 23.7 seconds E, a distance of 12.134 feet to a point; thence

(125) S 46 degrees 10 minutes 08.9 seconds E, a distance of 10.830 feet to a point; thence

(126) S 34 degrees 45 minutes 21.3 seconds E, a distance of 11.183 feet to a point; thence

(127) S 21 degrees 48 minutes 05.1 seconds E, a distance of 12.453 feet to a point; thence

(128) S 04 degrees 31 minutes 35.3 seconds W, a distance of 15.047 feet to a point; thence

(129) S 23 degrees 00 minutes 39.1 seconds E, a distance of 22.544 feet to a point; thence

(130) S 09 degrees 43 minutes 39.3 seconds E, a distance of 13.317 feet to a point; thence

(131) S 02 degrees 45 minutes 32.8 seconds W, a distance of 20.774 feet to a point; thence

(132) S 02 degrees 54 minutes 27.9 seconds W, a distance of 19.713 feet to a point; thence

(133) S 11 degrees 36 minutes 10.4 seconds E, a distance of 16.780 feet to a point; thence

(134) S 24 degrees 37 minutes 24.8 seconds E, a distance of 13.200 feet to a point; thence

(135) S 27 degrees 06 minutes 38.6 seconds E, a distance of 14.675 feet to a point; thenee

(136} S 23 degrees 53 minutes 42.6 seconds E, a distance of 10.801 feet to a point; thence

(137) S 39 degrees 13 minutes 03.4 seconds E, a distance of 7.018 feet to a point; thence

(138) S 18 degrees 39 minutes 13.1 seconds E, a distance of 10.357 feet to a point; thence

(139) S 09 degrees 11 minutes 48.0 seconds W, a distance of 6.648 feet to a point; thence

(140) S 78 degrees 18 minutes 38.3 seconds W, a distance of 5.553 feet to a point; thence

(141) S 89 degrees 32 minutes 03.1 seconds W, a distance of 7.688 feet to a point; thence

(142) N 58 degrees 58 minutes 45.6 seconds W, a distance of 10.794 feet to a point; thence

(143) N 61 degrees 57 minutes 19.1 seconds W, a distance of 7.577 feet to a point; thence

(144) N 62 degrees 20 minutes 12.3 seconds W, a distance of 8.750 feet to a point; thence

(145) N 60 degrees 15 minutes 18.4 seconds W, a distance of 7.054 feet to a point; thence

(146) N 60 degrees 42 minutes 51.3 seconds W, a distance of 13.544 feet to a point; thence

(147) S 65 degrees 42 minutes 51.0 seconds W, a distance of 11.245 feet to a point; thence

(148) S 32 degrees 24 minutes 24.0 seconds W, a distance of 8.513 feet to a point; thence

(149) S 36 degrees 24 minutes 59.0 seconds E, a distance of 9.475 feet to a point; thence

(150) S 67 degrees 50 minutes 01.2 seconds W, a distance of 5.467 feet to a point; thence

(151) S 66 degrees 40 minutes 56.2 seconds W, a distance of 3.947 feet to a point; thence

(152) S 73 degrees 02 minutes 40.9 seconds W, a distance of 5.358 feet to a point; thence

(153) S 82 degrees 11 minutes 37.0 seconds W, a distance of 7.822 feet to a point; thence

(154) S 75 degrees 34 minutes 45.2 seconds W, a distance of 9.035 feet to a point; thence

(155) S 54 degrees 44 minutes 03.2 seconds W, a distance of 10.717 feet to a point; thence

(156) S 87 degrees 27 minutes 47.7 seconds W, a distance of 9.885 feet to a point; thence

(157) S 71 degrees 24 minutes 08.2 seconds W, a distance of 13.914 feet to a point; thence

(158) S 71 degrees 06 minutes 50.1 seconds W, a distance of 15.061 feet to a point; thence

(159) S 83 degrees 21 minutes 17.0 seconds W, a distance of 12.962 feet to a point; thence

(160) S 65 degrees 16 minutes 21,7 seconds W, a distance of 10.459 feet to a point; thence

(161) S 87 degrees 31 minutes 20.6 seconds W, a distance of 13.012 feet to a point; thence

(162) N 86 degrees 13 minutes 02.5 seconds W, a distance of 15.158 feet to a point; thence

(163) S 83 degrees 50 minutes 33.1 seconds W, a distance of 15.150 feet to a point; thence

(164) N 86 degrees 04 minutes 18.1 seconds W, a distance of 14.597 feet to a point; thence

(165) N 73 degrees 38 minutes 51.4 seconds W, a distance of 10.878 feet to a point; thence

(166) N 71 degrees 39 minutes 48.0 seconds W, a distance of 11.523 feet to a point; thence

(167) N 60 degrees 04 minutes 59.0 seconds W, a distance of 12.907 feet to a point; thence

(168) N 36 degrees 49 minutes 18.7 seconds W, a distance of 14.912 feet to a point; thence

(169) N 44 degrees 13 minutes 20.2 seconds W, a distance of 9.768 feet to a point; thence

(170) N 36 degrees 01 minutes 38.5 seconds W, a distance of 11.051 feet to a point; thence

(171) N 21 degrees 30 minutes 05.2 seconds W, a distance of 8.867 feet to a point; thence

(172) N 77 degrees 42 minutes 17.0 seconds W, a distance of 9.979 feet to a point; thence

(173) N 84 degrees 45 minutes 45.1 seconds W, a distance of 7.531 feet to a point; thence

(174) N 61 degrees 55 minutes 39.0 seconds W, a distance of 9.563 feet to a point; thence

(175) N 29 degrees 24 minutes 45.0 seconds W, a distance of 10.690 feet to a point; thence

(176) N 80 degrees 08 minutes 03.1 seconds W, a distance of 5.83(3 feet to a point; thence

(177) N 72 degrees 52 minutes 01.2 seconds W, a distance of 8.698 feet to a point; thence

(178) N 85 degrees 37 minutes 20.1 seconds W, a distance of 13.101 feet to a point; thence

(179) S 88 degrees 52 minutes 55.8 seconds W, a distance of 12.815 feet to a point; thence

(180) N 90 degrees 00 minutes 00.0 seconds W, a distance of 4.313 feet to a point; thence

(181) S 49 degrees 21 minutes 03.9 seconds W, a distance of 8.155 feet to a point; thence

(182) S 46 degrees 39 minutes 35.7 seconds W, a distance of 99.169 feet to the point and place of beginning.

V

The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as may from time to time be considered necessary or desirable to give proper force and effect to this Decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties.

VI

The States of New Jersey and New York shall share equally in the compensation for the Special Master and his assistants, and for expenses of this litigation incurred by the Special Master in this controversy.

[Ellis Island Boundary map follows this page.]


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHIEF Justice Rehnquist Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    WILSON et al. v. LAYNE, DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL, et al.
    No. 98-83.
    Argued March 24, 1999
    Decided May 24, 1999

      Kehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 618.

      Richard K. Willard argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were David H. Coburn, James S. Felt, Richard Seligman, Steven R. Shapiro, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Dwight H. Sullivan.

      Lawrence R Fletcher-Hill, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for the state respondents. With him on the brief were J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Carmen M. Shepard, Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew H. Baida and John B. Howard, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General. Richard A. Cordray filed a brief for the federal respondents.

      A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for ABC, Inc., et al. by Lee Levine, James E. Grossberg, Jay Ward Brown, Henry S. Hober-man, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Susanna M. Lowy, Harold W. Fuson, Jr., Barbara Wartelle Wall, Ralph E. Goldberg, Karl ene W. Goller, Jerry S. Birenz, Slade R. Metcalf, Jack N. Goodman, David S. J. Brown, René P. Milam, George Freeman, and Jane E. Kirtley.

   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

While executing an arrest warrant in a private home, police officers invited representatives of the media to accompany them. We hold that such a “media ride-along” does violate the Fourth Amendment, but that because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the search in this ease took place, the officers are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

I

In early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved “Operation Gunsmoke,” a special national fugitive apprehension program in which United States Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend dangerous criminals. The “Operation Gunsmoke” policy statement explained that the operation was to concentrate on “armed individuals wanted on federal and/or state and local warrants for serious drug and other violent felonies.” App. 15. This effective program ultimately resulted in over 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan areas. Brief for Federal Respondents Layne et al. 2.

One of the dangerous as “Operation Gunsmoke” was Dominic Wilson, the son of petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic Wilson had violated his probation on previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with intent to rob, and the police computer listed “caution indicators” that he was likely to be armed, to resist arrest, and to “assaul[t] police.” App. 40. The computer also listed his address as 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville, Maryland. Unknown to the police, this was actually the home of petitioners, Dominic Wilson’s parents. Thus, in April 1992, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants for Dominic Wilson, one for each of his probation violations. The warrants were each addressed to “any duly authorized peace officer,” and commanded such officers to arrest him and bring him “immediately” before the Circuit Court to answer an indictment as to his probation violation. The warrants made no mention of media presence or assistance.

In the early morning hours of April 16,1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States Marshals and Montgomery County Police officers assembled to execute the Dominie Wilson warrants. The team was accompanied by a reporter and a photographer from the Washington Post, who had been invited by the Marshals to accompany them on their mission as part of a Marshals Service ride-along policy.

At around 6:45 a.m., the officers, with media representatives in tow, entered the dwelling at 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Rockville. Petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson were still in bed when they heard the officers enter the home. Petitioner Charles Wilson, dressed only in a pair of briefs, ran into the living room to investigate. Discovering at least five men in street clothes with guns in his living room, he angrily demanded that they state their business, and repeatedly cursed the officers. Believing him to be an angry Dominic Wilson, the officers quickly subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson next entered the living room to investigate, wearing only a nightgown. She observed her husband being restrained by the armed officers.

When their protective sweep was completed, the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not in the house, and they departed. During the time that the officers were in the home, the Washington Post photographer took numerous pictures. The print reporter was also apparently in the living room observing the confrontation between the police and Charles Wilson. At no time, however, were the reporters involved in the execution of the arrest warrant. Brief for Federal Respondents Layne et al. 4. The Washington Post never published its photographs of the incident.

Petitioners sued the law enforcement personal capacities for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971) (the U. S. Marshals Service respondents), and Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department respondents). They contended that the officers’ actions in bringing members of the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

On interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a panel reversed and held that respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was twice reheard en banc, where a divided Court of Appeals again upheld the defense of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the actions of the police violated the Fourth Amendment. It concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time of the search) that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the Fourth Amendment, the right allegedly violated by respondents was not “clearly established” and thus qualified immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4 1998). Five judges dissented, arguing that the officers’ actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the clearly established protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated in this case. Id., at 119 (opinion of Murnaghan, J.)

Recognizing a split among the Circuits on we granted certiorari in this case and another raising the same question, Hanlon v. Berger, 525 U. S. 981 (1998), and now affirm the Court of Appeals, although by different reasoning.

I — H

Petitioners sued the federal officials under Bivens and the state officials under §1983. Both Bivens and §1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See § 1983; Bivens, supra, at 397. But government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982).

Although this case involves suits under both §1983 and Bivens, the qualified immunity analysis is identical under either cause of action. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394, n. 9 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 340, n. 2 (1986). A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity “must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Conn v. Gabbert, ante, at 290. This order of procedure is designed to “spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 232 (1991). Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 840-842, n. 5 (1998). We now turn to the Fourth Amendment question.

In 1604, an English court made the now-famous observation that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.” Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B.). In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blaekstone noted that

“the law of England has so particular and tender a regal’d to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of antient Rome .... For this reason no doors can in general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the private.” 4 Commentaries 223 (1765-1769).

The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 4 (emphasis added). See also United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[FJhysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”).

Our decisions have applied these basic principles Fourth Amendment to situations, like the one in this case, in which police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 602 (1980), we noted that although clear in its protection of the home, the common-law tradition at the time of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment was ambivalent on the question whether police could enter a home without a warrant. We were ultimately persuaded that the “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic” meant that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police could not enter a home to make an arrest. Id., at 601, 603-604: We decided that “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id., at 603.

Here, of course, the officers had such a warrant, and they were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. But it does not necessarily follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a photographer with them. In Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 140 (1990), we held “[i]f the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.” While this does not mean that every police action while inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the warrant, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705 (1981) (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detainer of homeowner while police search the home pursuant to warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 325 (1987). See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 87 (1987) (“[T]he purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of the search”).

Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Respondents concede that the reporters did not engage in the execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police in their task. The reporters therefore were not present for any reason related to the justification for police entry into the home — the apprehension of Dominic Wilson.

This is not a case in which the presence of the third parties directly aided in the execution of the warrant. Where the police enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property, the presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has long been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition. See, e. g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (K. B. 1765) (in search for stolen goods ease, “Tt]he owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place. He must attend at the execution of the warrant to shew them to the officer, who must see that they answer the description”) (quoted with approval in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 628 (1886)).

Respondents argue presence Post reporters in the Wilsons’ home nonetheless served a number of legitimate law enforcement purposes. They first assert that officers should be able to exercise reasonable discretion about when it would “further their law enforcement mission to permit members of the news media to accompany them in executing a warrant.” Brief for Federal Respondents Layne et al. 15. But this claim ignores the importance of the right of residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment. It may well be that media ride-alongs further the law enforcement objectives of the police in a general sense, but that is not the same as furthering the purposes of the search. Were such generalized “law enforcement objectives” themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment, the protections guaranteed by that Amendment’s text would be significantly watered down.

Respondents next argue presence could serve the law enforcement purpose of publicizing the government’s efforts to combat crime, and facilitate accurate reporting on law enforcement activities. There is certainly language in our opinions interpreting the First Amendment which points to the importance of “the press” in informing the general public about the administration of criminal justice. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 491-492 (1975), for example, we said “in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.” See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 572-573 (1980). No one could gainsay the truth of these observations, or the importance of the First Amendment in protecting press freedom from abridgment by the government. But the Fourth Amendment also protects a very important right, and in the present case it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs must be judged.

Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home. And even the need for accurate reporting on police issues in general bears no direct relation to the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a home in order to execute a felony arrest warrant.

Finally, respondents argue that the presence of third parties could serve in some situations to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and also to protect the safety of the officers. While it might be reasonable for police officers to themselves videotape home entries as part of a “quality control” effort to ensure that the rights of homeowners are being respected, or even to preserve evidence, cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (noting the use of a “mounted video camera” to record the details of a routine traffic stop), such a situation is significantly different from the media presence in this case. The Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons’ home were working on a story for their own purposes. They were not present for the purpose of protecting the officers, much less the Wilsons. A private photographer was acting for private purposes, as evidenced in part by the fact that the newspaper and not the police retained the photographs. Thus, although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, see supra, at 611-612, the presence of these third parties was not.

The reasons advanced by respondents, taken in their entirety, fall short of justifying the presence of media inside a home. We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.

HH

Since the police action in this ease violated petitioners Fourth Amendment right, we now must decide whether this right was clearly established at the time of the search. See Siegert, 500 U. S., at 232-233. As noted above, Part II, supra, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 818. What this means in practice is that “whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow, supra, at 819); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 397.

In Anderson, we explained that what “clearly established” means in this context depends largely “upon the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to be identified.” 483 U. S., at 639. “[Cjlearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity means that “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id., at 640 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 270 (1997).

It could plausibly be asserted that any violation of the Fourth Amendment is “clearly established,” since it is clearly established that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to the actions of police. Some variation of this theory of qualified immunity is urged upon us by petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 37, and seems to have been at the core of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, see 141 F. 3d, at 123. However, as we explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established. 483 U. S., at 641. In this case, the appropriate question is the objective inquiry whether a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed. Cf. ibid.

a police officer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media observers along during the execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful. First, the constitutional question presented by this ease is by no means open and shut. The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of homeowners from entry without a warrant, but there was a warrant here. The question is whether the invitation to the media exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant. Accurate media coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general principles of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the Amendment.

Second, although media ride-alongs one had apparently become a common police practice, in 1992 there were no judicial opinions holding that this practice became unlawful when it entered a home. The only published decision directly on point was a state intermediate court decision which, though it did not engage in an extensive Fourth Amendment analysis, nonetheless held that such conduct was not unreasonable. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 180, 154—155, 295 N. W. 2d 768, 782 (App. 1980). From the federal courts, the parties have only identified two unpublished District Court decisions dealing with media entry into homes, each of which upheld the search on unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right to privacy theories. Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (ND Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (SD Cal. 1980). These cases, of course, cannot “clearly establish” that media entry into homes during a police ride-along violates the Fourth Amendment.

At a slightly higher level of Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F. 2d 697 (CA6 1992), in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that there were material issues of fact precluding summary judgment on the question whether police exceeded the scope of a search warrant by allowing a private security guard to participate in the search to identify stolen property other than that described in the warrant. Id., at 709. Bills, which was decided a mere five weeks before the events of this case, did anticipate today's holding that police may not bring along third parties during an entry into a private home pursuant to a warrant for purposes unrelated to those justifying the warrant. Id., at 706. However, we cannot say that even in light of Bills, the law on third-party entry into homes was clearly established in April 1992. Petitioners have not brought to our attention any eases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of eases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.

Finally, important to our conclusion was the reliance by the United States marshals in this case on a Marshals Service ride-along policy that explicitly contemplated that media who engaged in ride-alongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part of fugitive apprehension arrests. The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department also at this time had a ride-along program that did not expressly prohibit media entry into private homes. Deposition of Sheriff Raymond M. Eight, in No. PJM-94-1718, p. 8. Such a policy, of course, could not make reasonable a belief that was contrary to a decided body of case law. But here the state of the law as to third parties accompanying police on home entries was at best undeveloped, and it was not unreasonable for law enforcement officers to look and rely on their formal ride-along policies.

Given such an undeveloped state of the law, the officers in this case cannot have been “expected to predict the future course of constitutional law.” Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 321 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 557 (1967). Between the time of the events of this case and today’s decision, a split among the Federal Circuits in fact developed on the question whether media ride-alongs that enter homes subject the police to money damages. See 141 F. 3d, at 118-119; Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F. 3d 680 (CA2 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1062 (1995); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F. 3d 445 (CA8 1996), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1148 (1997); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F. 3d 505 (CA9 1997), cert. granted, 525 U. S. 981 (1998). If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.

For the foregoing reasons,

Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Like every other federal appellate judge dressed the question, I share the Court’s opinion that it violates the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a private dwelling during the execution of a warrant unless the homeowner has consented or the presence of the third parties is in aid of the execution of the warrant. I therefore join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.

In my view, against this type of trespass was clearly established long before April 16,1992. My sincere respect for the competence of the typical member of the law enforcement profession precludes my assent to the suggestion that “a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful.” Ante, at 615. I therefore disagree with the Court’s resolution of the conflict in the Circuits on the qualified immunity issue. The clarity of the constitutional rule, a federal statute (18 U. S. C. § 3105), common-law decisions, and the testimony of the senior law enforcement officer all support my position that it has long been clearly established that officers may not bring third parties into private homes to witness the execution of a warrant. By contrast, the Court’s opposing view finds support in the following sources: its bare assertion that the constitutional question “is by no means open and shut,” ante, at 615; three judicial opinions that did not directly address the constitutional question, ante, at 616; and a public relations booklet prepared by someone in the United States Marshals Service that never mentions allowing representatives of the media to enter private property without the owner’s consent, ante, at 617.

In its decision today the Court has not announced a new rule of constitutional law. Rather, it has refused to recognize an entirely unprecedented request for an exception to a well-established principle. Police action in the execution of a warrant must be strictly limited to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. That principle, like the broader protection provided by the Fourth Amendment itself, represents the confluence of two important sources: our English forefathers’ traditional respect for the sanctity of the private home and the American colonists’ hatred of the general warrant.

The contours of the rule are fairly ante, at 609-611 of its opinion, and in the cases that it cites on those pages. All of those cases were decided before 1992. None of those cases — nor, indeed, any other of which I am aware — identified any exception to the rule of law that the Court repeats today. In fact, the Court’s opinion fails to identify a colorable rationale for any such exception. Respondents’ position on the merits consisted entirely of their unpersuasive factual submission that the presence of representatives of the news media served various legitimate— albeit nebulous — law enforcement purposes. The Court’s cogent rejection of those post hoe rationalizations cannot be characterized as the announcement of a new rule of law.

During my service on argue scores of cases raising Fourth Amendment issues. Generally speaking, the Members of the Court have been sensitive to the needs of the law enforcement community. In virtually all of them at least one Justice thought that the police conduct was reasonable. In fact, in only a handful did the Court unanimously find a Fourth Amendment violation. That the Court today speaks with a single voice on the merits of the constitutional question is unusual and certainly lends support to the notion that the question is indeed “open and shut.” Ante, at 615.

But the more should have been perfectly obvious to the officers that then “invitation to the media exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant.” Ibid. Despite reaffirming that clear rule, the Court nonetheless finds that the mere presence of a warrant rendered the officers’ conduct reasonable. The Court fails to cite a single case that even arguably supports the proposition that using official power to enable news photographers and reporters to enter a private home for purposes unrelated to the execution of a warrant could be regarded as a “reasonable” invasion of either property or privacy.

II

The absence of judicial opinions expressly holding that police violate the Fourth Amendment if they bring media representatives into private homes provides scant support for the conclusion that in 1992 a competent officer could reasonably believe that it would be lawful to do so. Prior to our decision in United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259 (1997), no judicial opinion specifically held that it was unconstitutional for a state judge to use his official power to extort sexual favors from a potential litigant. Yet, we unanimously concluded that the defendant had fair warning that he was violating his victim’s constitutional rights. Id., at 271 (“The easiest cases don’t even arise” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nor am I persuaded that the absence of rulings on the precise Fourth Amendment issue presented in this case can plausibly be explained by the assumption that the police practice was common. I assume that the practice of allowing media personnel to “ride along” with police officers was common, but that does not mean that the officers routinely allowed the media to enter homes without the consent of the owners. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918 (1976), there has long been a widespread practice for firefighters to allow photographers to enter disaster areas to take pictures, for example, of the interior of buildings severely damaged by fire. But its conclusion that such media personnel were not trespassers rested on a doctrine of implied consent — a theory wholly inapplicable to forcible entries in connection with the execution of a warrant.

In addition to case, court opinions — none of which addresses the Fourth Amendment — as the ostensible basis for a reasonable officer’s belief that the rule in Semayne’s Case was ripe for reevaluation. See ante, at 616. Two of the cases were decided in 1980 and the third in 1984. In view of the clear restatement of the rule in the later opinions of this Court, cited ante, at 611, those three earlier decisions could not possibly provide a basis for a claim by the police that they reasonably relied on judicial recognition of an exception to the basic rule that the purposes of the police intrusion strictly limit its scope.

were reported makes such theoretical reliance especially anomalous. Moreover, as the Court acknowledges, the claim rejected in each of those cases was predicated on the media’s alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ “unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right to privacy theories,” ante, at 616, rather than a claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the press to observe the execution of the warrant. Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (ND Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2872 (SD Cal. 1980). As for the other ease, Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N. W. 2d 768 (App. 1980) — cited by the Court, ante, at 616, for the proposition that the officer’s conduct was “not unreasonable” — it actually held that the defendants’ motion to dismiss should have been denied because the allegations supported the conclusion that the officer committed a trespass when he allowed a third party to enter the plaintiff’s property. Since that conclusion was fully consistent with a number of common-law cases holding that similar conduct constituted a trespass, it surely does not provide any support for an officer’s assumption that a similar trespass would be lawful.

Far better an ing of the relevant law is provided by the testimony of the Sheriff of Montgomery County, the commanding officer of three of the respondents: “ We would never let a civilian into a home.... That’s just not allowed.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 41.

Ill

The most disturbing aspect of the Court’s ruling on the qualified immunity issue is its reliance on a document discussing “ride-alongs” apparently prepared by an employee in the public relations office of the United States Marshals Service. The text of the document, portions of which are set out in an appendix, makes it quite clear that its author was not a lawyer, but rather a person concerned with developing the proper public image of the Service, with a special interest in creating a favorable impression with the Congress. Although the document occupies 14 pages in the joint appendix and suggests handing out free Marshals Service T-shirts and caps to “grease the skids,” it contains no discussion of the conditions which must be satisfied before a news-person may be authorized to enter private property during the execution of a warrant. App. 12. There are guidelines about how officers should act and speak in front of the camera, and the document does indicate that “the camera” should not enter a private home until a “signal” is given. Id., at 7. It does not, however, purport to give any guidance to the marshals regarding when such a signal should be given, whether it should ever be given without the consent of the homeowner, or indeed on how to carry out any part of their law enforcement mission. The notion that any member of that well-trained cadre of professionals would rely on such a document for guidance in the performance of dangerous law enforcement assignments is too farfetched to merit serious consideration.

* * *

The defense of qualified immunity exists to protect reasonable officers from personal liability for official actions later found to be in violation of constitutional rights that were not clearly established. The conduct in this case, as the Court itself reminds us, contravened the Fourth Amendment’s core protection of the home. In shielding this conduct as if it implicated only the unsettled margins of our jurisprudence, the Court today authorizes one free violation of the well-established rule it reaffirms.

I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF STEVENS, J.

“MEDIA RIDE-ALONGS

“The U. S. Marshals Service, like all federal agencies, ultimately serves the needs and interests of the American public when it accomplishes its designated duties. Keeping the public adequately informed of what the Service does can be viewed as a duty in its own right, and we depend on the news media to accomplish that.

"Media ‘ride-alongs’ are one effective an accurate picture of Deputy Marshals at work. Ride-alongs, as the name implies, are simply opportunities for reporters and camera crews to go along with Deputies on operational missions so they can see, and record, what actually happens. The result is usually a very graphic and dynamic look at the operational activities of the Marshals Service, which is subsequently aired on TV or printed in a newspaper, magazine, or book.

“However, successful ride-alongs don’t just ‘happen’ in a spontaneous fashion. They require carefiil planning and attention to detail to ensure that all goes smoothly and that the media receive an accurate picture of how the Marshals Service operates. This booklet describes considerations that are important in nearly every ride-along.” App. 4.

“Establish Ground Rules

“Another good idea — actually, it’s an essential one — is to establish ground rules at the start and convey them to the reporter and camera person. Address such things as what can be covered with cameras and when, any privacy restrictions that may be encountered, and interview guidelines. “Emphasize the need for safety considerations and explain any dangers that might be involved. Make the ground rules realistic but balanced — remember, the media will want good action footage, not just a mop-up scene. If the arrest is planned to take place inside a house or building, agree ahead of time on when the camera can enter and who will give the signal.” Id., at 7.

“The very best planning won’t result in a good ride-along if the Marshals Service personnel involved do not do their part. It’s a case of actions speaking as loudly as words, and both are important in getting the best media exposure possible.” Id., at 9.

“ Waving the Flag’

“One action of special consequence is ‘waving the flag’ of the Marshals Service. This is accomplished when Deputies can easily be recognized as USMS Deputies because they are wearing raid jackets, prominently displaying their badges, or exhibiting other easily identifiable marks of the Service. We want the public to know who you are and what kind of job you do. That is one of the goals of the ride-along. So having Deputy Marshals easily identified as such on camera is not just a whim — it’s important to the overall success of the ride-along.

“Of course, how the Deputies act and what they say is also crucial. During the ride-along virtually any statement made by Deputies just might end up as a quote, attributed to the person who made it. Sometimes that could prove embarrassing. A Deputy must try to visualize what his or her words will look like in a newspaper or sound like on TV. Being pleasant and professional at all times is key, and that includes not being drawn into statements of personal opinion or inappropriate comments. Using common sense is the rule.” Id., at 9-10.

“You also need to find out when the coverage will air or end up in print. Ask the reporter if he or she can keep you informed on that matter. You might ‘grease the skids’ for this by offering the reporter, camera person, or other media representatives involved a memento of the Marshals Service. Marshals Service caps, mugs, T-shirts, and the like can help establish a rapport with a reporter that can benefit you in the future.” Id., at 12.

“Getting to the Final Product

“Naturally, it’s important to see the final product of the ride-along when it airs on TV or appears in the newspaper. You should arrange to videotape any TV news coverage or clip the resulting newspaper stories and send a copy of the videotape or news clipping to the Offiee of Congressional and Public Affairs.” Id., at 13.

       The warrants were identical in all relevant respects. By way of example, one of them read as follows:

        “The State of Maryland, to any duly authorized peace officer, greeting: you are hereby commanded to take Dominic Jerome Wilson if he/she shall be found in your bailiwick, and have him immediately before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, now in session, at the Judicial Center, in Rockville, to answer an indictment, or information, or criminal appeals unto the State of Maryland, of and concerning a certain charge of Robbery [Violation of Probation] by him committed, as hath been presented, and so forth. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you then and there this writ. Witness.” App. 36-37.

       Even though such actions might violate the Fourth Amendment, if the police are lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth Amendment is the presence of the media and not the presence of the police in the home. We have no occasion here to decide whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by the media representatives.

       See, e. g., Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 919 (1976) (it '“is a widespread practice of long-standing’” for media to accompany officers into homes), cert, denied, 431 U. S. 930 (1977); Zoglin, Live on the “Vice Beat, Time, Dec. 22, 1986, p. 60 (noting “the increasingly common practice of letting TV crews tag along on drug raids”).

       A booklet distributed to marshals recommended that “fugitive apprehension cases . . . normally offer the best possibilities for ride-alongs.” App. 4-5. In its discussion of the best way to make ride-alongs useful to the media and portray the Marshals Service in a favorable light, the booklet noted that reporters were likely to want to be able to shoot “good action footage, not just a mop-up scene.” It advised agents that “[i]f the arrest is planned to take place inside a house or building, agree ahead of time on when the camera can enter and who will give the signal.” Id., at 7.

       It is important to emphasize that there is no split in Circuit authority on the merits of the constitutional issue. Nor, as I explain infra, at 622-624, do I believe that any District Court had reached a conclusion at odds with the Court’s Fourth Amendment holding. Any conflict was limited to the qualified immunity issue. Three Circuits rejected the defense whereas the Fourth and the Eighth accepted it. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F. 3d 680, 686 (CA2 1994); Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F. 2d 697 (CA6 1992); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F. 3d 505 (CA9 1997); 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4 1998) (en banc); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F. 3d 445 (CA8 1996).

      The Florida Supreme Court held:
      “The trial court properly determined from the record before it that there was no genuine issue of material fact insofar as the entry into respondent’s home by petitioner’s employees became lawful and non-actionable pursuant to the doctrine of common custom, usage, and practice and since it had been shown that it was common usage, custom and practice for news media to enter private premises and homes under the circumstances present here.

      “‘The fire was a disaster of great public interest.... [I]t has been a longstanding custom and practice throughout the country for representatives of the news media to enter upon private property where disaster of great public interest has occurred.’ ” 340 So. 2d, at 917-918.
      gests that the “widespread practice” referred to in the Florida court’s opinion was police practice; it was not.

      Indeed, the trary authority, took pains to distinguish this ease:
      “We will not imply a consent as a known that news representatives want to enter a private building after or even during a newsworthy event within the building. That knowledge is no basis for an implied consent by the possessor of the building to the entry.... We conclude that custom and usage have not been shown in fact or law to confer an implied consent upon news representatives to enter a building under the circumstances presented by this case.” Prahl v. Bro-samle, 98 Wis. 2d 130,149-150,295 N. W. 2d 768,780 (App. 1980).

       5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K. B. 1604).

       As the Court notes, the subject, Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F. 2d 697 (CA6 1992), “anticipateEd] today’s holding that police may not bring along third parties during an entry into a private home pursuant to a warrant for purposes unrelated to those justifying the warrant.” Ante, at 616-617.

       In the Fourth Circuit, unreported opinions may not be considered in the course of determining qualified immunity. Hogan v. Carter, 85 F. 3d 1113, 1118 (1996).

        Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d, at 154-155, 295 N. W. 2d, at 782 (“A new trial must be had with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims for trespass against Lieutenant Kuenning and Dane Country .... Lieutenant Kuenning had no authority to extend a consent to [the press] to enter the land of another. Although entry by Lieutenant Kuenning was privileged, he committed a trespass by participating in the trespass by [the press]”).
      Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim against the newscaster because he was not acting under color of state law. As the basis for rejecting the § 1983 action “for invasion of privacy based on disclosure of the incident,” the court further held that “[w]e are unwilling to accept the proposition that the filming and television broadcast of a reasonable search and seizure, without more, result in unreasonableness.” 98 Wis. 2d, at 138, 295 N. W. 2d, at 774. Important to its conclusion was its observation that, unlike the unnecessary male participation in body searches of schoolgirls in Doe v. Duter, 407 F. Supp. 922 (WD Wis. 1976), “jn]either the search of Dr. Prahl and his premises nor the film or its broadcast has been shown to include intimate, offensive or vulgar aspects.” 98 Wis. 2d, at 138, 295 N. W. 2d, at 774. The reporter in question was stationed in the entryway of the building and was able to film into the plaintiff’s office during the police interview.

       See, e.g., seems, indeed, to be no principle of law better settled, and for which numerous authorities may be cited if necessary, than this: that all persons who wrongfully contribute in any manner to the commission of a trespass, are responsible as principals, and each one is liable to the extent of the injury done”); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 13, p. 72 (5th ed. 1984).