author: Justice Thomas

text:
    HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. et al. v. JACOBSON et al.
    No. 97-1287.
    Argued November 2,1998
    Decided January 25, 1999

      Paul T Cappuccio argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Kenneth W. Starr, Richard A. Cor-dray, Christopher Landau, Marcy J. K. Tiffany, T barren Jackson, and Robert F. Walker.

      Lisa Schiavo Blati argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Marvin Krislov, James J. Keightley, and Stuart L. Brown.

      Seth Kupferberg argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard Dorn and I. Philip Sipser.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the ERISA Industry Committee et al. by Michael S. Horne, John M. Vine, and Caroline M. Brown; and for the Hughes Aircraft Retirees Association et al. by David E. Gordon.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AT&T, RCA, and Boeing Employees by Norman Zolot and Kent Cprek; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Stephen R. Bruce, Jeffrey Lewis, and Paula A. Brantmr.

        Mary Ellen Signorille and Melvin Radowitz filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons as amicus curiae.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Five retired beneficiaries of a defined benefit plan, subject to the terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., filed a class action lawsuit against their former employer, Hughes Aircraft Company (Hughes), and the Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan (Plan). They claim that Hughes violated ERISA by amending the Plan to provide for an early retirement program and a noneontribu-tory benefit structure. The Ninth Circuit held that ERISA may prohibit these amendments. We reverse.

I

According to the complaint, Hughes has provided the Plan for its employees since 1955. Prior to 1991, the Plan required mandatory contributions from all participating employees, in addition to any contributions made by Hughes. Section 3.1 of the Plan defines Hughes’ funding obligations:

“The cost of Benefits under the Plan, to the extent not provided by contributions of Participants . . . shall be provided by contributions of [Hughes] not less than in such amounts, and at such times, as the Plan Enrolled Actuary shall certify to be necessary, to fund Benefits under the Plan ....”

In addition, §3.2 provides that Hughes’ contributions shall not fall below the “amount necessary to maintain the quali-fled status of the Plan ... and to comply with all applicable legal requirements.” But §6.2 of the Plan gives Hughes “the right to suspend its contributions to the Plan at any time,” so long as doing so does not “create an ‘accumulated funding deficiency’ ” under ERISA.

By 1986, as a result of employer and employee contributions and investment growth, the Plan’s assets exceeded the actuarial or present value of accrued benefits by almost $1 billion. In light of this Plan surplus, Hughes suspended its contributions in 1987, which it has not resumed. Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the employee contribution requirement remains operational.

Two amendments Hughes made to the Plan are the subject of the present litigation. In 1989, Hughes established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. Subsequently, Hughes again amended the Plan to provide that, effective January 1, 1991, new participants could not contribute to the Plan, and would thereby receive fewer benefits. Existing members could continue to contribute or opt to be treated as new participants. The Plan obligations created by these amendments constitute the only use of the Plan’s assets other than paying the pre-existing obligations under the original contributory benefit structure. The Plan’s assets substantially exceed the minimum amount needed to fund all current and future defined benefits.

In January 1992, respondents filed this class action on behalf of all Plan participants who had contributed to the Plan and who are or may become eligible to receive benefits designated for contributing participants. The District Court granted Hughes’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. 105 F. 3d 1288 (1997), amended, 128 F. 3d 1305 (1998). The majority concluded that the 1991 amendment may have terminated the Plan and created two plans: one consisting of pre-existing members and the other consisting of new participants. Distinguishing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U. S. 882 (1996), as concerning a plan funded solely by employer contributions, the majority held that the act of amending the Plan triggered ERISA’s fiduciary provisions. The majority also thought that the employees who were members of the contributory structure had a vested interest in the Plan’s surplus.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents had alleged six causes of action in their complaint. Specifically, respondents claimed that Hughes had violated ERISA’s prohibition against using employees’ vested, non-forfeitable benefits to meet its obligations by depleting the surplus to fund the noncontributory structure. §203, 29 U. S. C. § 1053(a). They further argued that Hughes had violated ERISA’s anti-inurement prohibition, § 403(e)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1103(c)(1), by benefiting itself at the expense of the Plan’s surplus. Respondents also alleged that Hughes had breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA in three ways: amending the Plan in 1989 to fund a program outside of the Plan’s purposes violated § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); amending the Plan in 1991 to create the noncontributory structure violated § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1)(D); and using the surplus assets to fund noncontributory benefits for those who had never contributed to the Plan violated §404, 29 U. S. C. §1104. Finally, respondents claimed that the alleged termination of the Plan had violated § 4044(d)(3)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1344(d)(3)(A), which requires that residual assets in a terminated plan be distributed to its beneficiaries.

The dissenting judge concluded that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint. He reasoned that an amendment to a pre-existing plan does not affect the availability of the plan’s pool of assets for funding pre-existing obligations and cannot be characterized as a termination; interpreted Spink to stand for the proposition that the act of amending a plan does not trigger fiduciary duties; and observed that employees who contribute to a defined benefit plan do not have an interest in that plan’s surplus.

The majority’s decision is in tension with our decision in Spink, where we held that “the act of amending a pension plan does not trigger ERÍSA’s fiduciary provisions,” 517 U. S., at 891, and with other Circuits’ decisions. See, e. g., Brillinger v. General Elec. Co., 130 F. 3d 61 (CA2 1997), cert. pending, No. 97-1834; American Flint Glass Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F. 3d 574 (CA3 1995); Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 F. 3d 828 (CA3), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 956 (1994); Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F. 3d 1184 (CA7 1994); Phillips v. Bebber, 914 F. 2d 31 (CA4 1990) (per curiam). We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1093 (1998), and now reverse.

II

Our review of the six claims recognized by the Ninth Circuit requires us to interpret a number of ERISA’s provisions. As in any ease of statutory construction, our analysis begins with “the language of the statute.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992). And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992).

A

Respondents’ vested-benefits and anti-inurement claims proceed on the erroneous assumption that they had an interest in the Plan’s surplus, which, with respect to the anti-inurement claim, was used exclusively to benefit Hughes. These claims fail because the 1991 amendment did not affect the rights of pre-existing Plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own benefit.

To understand why respondents have no interest in the Plan’s surplus, it is essential to recognize the difference between defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans, such as Hughes’. A defined contribution plan is one where employees and employers may contribute to the plan, and “‘the employer’s contribution is fixed and the employee receives whatever level of benefits the amount contributed on his behalf will provide.’ ” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359, 364, n. 5 (1980) (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581, 593, n. 18 (1977)). A defined contribution plan “provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s account.” ERISA §3(34); 29 U.S.C. §1002(34). “[U]nder such plans, by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of funds in the plan to cover promised benefits,” Nachman, supra, at 364, n. 5, since each beneficiary is entitled to whatever assets are dedicated to his individual account.

A defined benefit plan, on the other hand, consists of a general pool of assets rather than individual dedicated accounts. Sueh a plan, “as its name implies, is one where the employee, upon retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment.” Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 154 (1993); see also Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U. S. 714, 717 (1989); ERISA §3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). The asset pool may be funded by employer or employee contributions, or a combination of both. See ERISA § 204(c); 29 U. S. C. § 1054(c). But the employer typically bears the entire investment risk and — short of the consequences of plan termination — must cover any underfunding as the result of a shortfall that may occur from the plan’s investments. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 232 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 2 J. Mamorsky, Employee Benefits Law § 8.04 (1998). Conversely, if the defined benefit plan is overfunded, the employer may reduce or suspend his contributions. See Nachman, supra, at 363-364, n. 5 (quoting Alabama Power Co., supra, at 593, n. 18) (noting that “ ‘the employer’s contribution is adjusted to whatever level is necessary’ ” to provide the defined benefits).

The structure of a defined benefit plan reflects the risk borne by the employer. Given the employer’s obligation to make up any shortfall, no plan member has a claim to any particular asset that composes a part of the plan’s general asset pool. Instead, members have a right to a certain defined level of benefits, known as “accrued benefits.” That term, for purposes of a defined benefit plan, is defined as “the individual’s accrued benefit determined under the plan [and ordinarily is] expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age.” ERISA § 3(23)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(23)(A). In order to prevent a subsequent downward adjustment in benefits below a member’s contribution amount, a defined benefit plan participant has a nonforfeitable right to the greater of (1) the benefits provided under the plan or (2) an amount derived from the employee’s accumulated contributions, determined using an interest rate fixed by statute. See § 204(c)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1054(c)(2)(B); see also §3(23)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A); § 204(c)(2)(C), 29 U. S. C. § 1054(c)(2)(C). Given this accumulated contribution floor, plan members generally have a non-forfeitable right only to their “accrued benefit,” so that a plan’s actual investment experience does not affect their statutory entitlement. Since a decline in the value of a plan’s assets does not alter accrued benefits, members similarly have no entitlement to share in a plan’s surplus — even if it is partially attributable to the investment growth of their contributions.

Therefore, Hughes could not have violated ERISA’s vesting requirements by using assets from the surplus attributable to the employees’ contributions to fund the noneontribu-tory structure. ERISA’s vesting requirement is met “if an employee’s rights in his accrued benefit derived from his own contributions are nonforfeitable,” assuming that such are not limited to a certain percentage of benefits depending on the employee’s years of service. §§203(a)(l)-(2), 29 U. S. C. §§ 1053(a)(1) — (2). The vesting provision “sets the minimum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified years of service.” Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 569 (1979). Otherwise, the “level of benefits” is determined by “the private parties, not the Government.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 511 (1981). Hence, this provision does not concern items such as a return on investment that fall outside of the definition of “accrued benefit.” ERISA §§3(23)(A), 203(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23)(A), 1053(a). Assuming that an employee’s minimum accrued benefit is provided, this section is not implicated. Hughes never deprived respondents of their accrued benefits. Indeed, when it implemented the noncontributory structure, Hughes permitted the Plan’s existing participants to switch into the new structure. Since respondents do not allege that Hughes has ever withdrawn accrued benefits or otherwise nonforfeitable interests from the pre-existing members, this vesting claim is meritless.

Respondents further contend that, even if they have no interest in the Plan’s assets, the creation of the new contributory structure permitted Hughes to use assets from the surplus attributable to employer and employee contributions for its sole and exclusive benefit, in violation of ERISA’s anti-inurement provision. This section provides, in relevant part:

“[T]he assets of a plan [except as otherwise provided in the statute] shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” § 403(e)(1); 29 U. S. C. § 1103(c)(1).

As the language makes clear, the section focuses exclusively on whether fund assets were used to pay pension benefits to plan participants, without distinguishing either between benefits for new and old employees under one or more benefit structures of the same plan, or between assets that make up a plan’s surplus as opposed to those needed to fund the plan’s benefits. Respondents do not dispute that Hughes used fund assets for the sole purpose of paying pension benefits to Plan participants. Furthermore, at all times, Hughes satisfied its continuing obligation under the provisions of the Plan and ERISA to assure that the Plan was adequately funded. See Plan § 6.2; ERISA § 302,29 U. S. C. § 1082. In other words, Hughes did not act impermissibly by using surplus assets from the contributory structure to add the noncontributory structure to the Plan. The act of amending a pre-existing plan cannot as a matter of law create two de facto plans if the obligations (both preamendment and post-amendment) continue to draw from the same single, unsegregated pool or fund of assets. ERISA provides an employer with broad authority to amend a plan, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78 (1995), and nowhere suggests that an amendment creating a new benefit structure also creates a second plan. Because only one plan exists and respondents do not allege that Hughes used any of the assets for a purpose other than to pay its obligations to the Plan’s beneficiaries, Hughes could not have violated the anti-inurement provision under ERISA § 403(e)(1).

B

Each of respondents’ fiduciary duty claims must fail because ERISA’s fiduciary provisions are inapplicable to the amendments. This conclusion follows from our decision in Spink, where we considered whether amending a plan to require the conditioning of benefit payments under an early retirement program on the participants’ release of employment-related claims was a prohibited transaction under ERISA § 406(a). 517 U. S., at 885. We explained:

“Plan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries. As we said with respect to the amendment of welfare benefit plans, ‘[e]m-ployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA,-for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.’ When employers undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust.” Id., at 890 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, supra, at 78 (citations omitted)).

We made clear in Spink that our reasoning applied both to “pension benefit plans” and “welfare benefit plans,” since “[t]he definition of fiduciary makes no distinction between persons exercising authority over” these different types of plans. 517 U. S., at 890-891. Our conclusion applies with equal force to persons exercising authority over a contributory plan, a noncontributory plan, or any other type of plan. Our holding did not turn, as the Court of Appeals below thought, on the type of plan being amended for the simple reason that the plain language of the statute defining fiduciary makes no distinction. See id., at 891; ERISA § 404(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a) (specifying duties of a “fiduciary... with respect to a plan”). Rather, it turned on whether the employer's act of amending its plan constituted an exercise of fiduciary duty. In Spink, we concluded it did not. 517 U. S., at 891.

The same act of amending here also does not constitute the action of a fiduciary, although Hughes’ Plan happens to be one to which employees contribute. In general, an employer’s decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer’s fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the administration of the plan’s assets. See id., at 890. ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not implicated where Hughes, acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how such benefits are calculated. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 91 (1983) (describing how ERISA does not mandate that “employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits”). A settlor’s powers include the ability to add a new benefit structure to an existing plan. Respondents’ three fiduciary duty claims are directly foreclosed by Spink’s holding that, without exception, “[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.” 517 U. S., at 890.

Respondents attempt to circumvent this conclusion by arguing that the amendments amounted to a sham transaction. Specifically, respondents argue that Hughes — by effectively increasing certain employees’ wages through either providing increased retirement incentives or including those employees in the Plan’s noneontributory structure — reduced its labor costs by spending down the Plan’s surplus to cover its own obligations. In Spink, we noted in passing that if a transaction constituted “merely a sham transaction, meant to disguise an otherwise unlawful transfer of assets to a party in interest, . . . that might present a different question.” Id., at 895, n. 8. Even assuming that a sham transaction may implicate a fiduciary duty, the incidental benefits conferred upon Hughes when it amended the Plan are not impermissible under the statute. It is irrelevant whether Hughes received lower labor costs or other such incidental benefits from implementing the noneontributory structure under the 1991 amendment. As we noted in Spink:

, “[A]mong the ‘incidental’ and thus legitimate benefits that a plan sponsor may receive from the operation of a pension plan are attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred compensation, settling or avoiding strikes, providing increased compensation without increasing wages, increasing employee turnover, and reducing the likelihood of lawsuits by encouraging employees who would otherwise have been laid off to depart voluntarily.” Id., at 898-894 (citation omitted).

Receipt of these types of benefits no more constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties than they would constitute improper inurement or otherwise violate ERISA. To find that such benefits somehow violated the statute would forestall employers’ efforts to implement a pension plan. ERISA, by and large, is concerned with “ensuring] that employees will not be left emptyhanded once employers have guaranteed them certain benefits,” id., at 887, not with depriving employers of benefits incidental thereto. In sum, respondents have failed to show that Hughes labored under fiduciary duties or engaged in a sham transaction.

C

Finally, respondents allege that the 1991 amendment requires a court to order petitioners to terminate the Plan. ERISA itself plainly spells out the circumstances under which a plan terminates. In a section entitled, “[ejxelusive means of plan termination,” the statute provides:

“Except in the case of a termination for which proceedings are otherwise instituted by the [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] as provided in section 1342 of this title, a single-employer plan may be terminated only in a standard termination under subsection (b) of this section or a distress termination under subsection (c) of this section.” §4041(a)(1), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(1).

Subsections (b) and (c) concern the two ways by which an employer may voluntarily terminate a plan. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1341(b) and (c); see also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 638-639 (1990). Based on the language of the statute, these means constitute the sole avenues for voluntary termination. See Germain, 503 U. S., at 254 (explaining that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there”).

Respondents concede that no voluntary termination has occurred, but nevertheless contend that the 1991 amendment .worked an effective termination based on the common-law theory of a wasting trust. Under common law, a wasting trust is a trust whose purposes have been accomplished, such that the continuation of the trust would frustrate the settlor’s intent. See generally 4 A. Scott, Law of Trusts §§334, 337, 337.8 (4th ed. 1989); G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 1002,1007 (2d rev. ed. 1988). This claim also fails.

As an initial matter, because ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” Nachman, 446 U. S., at 361, and is “enormously complex and detailed,” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993), it should not be supplemented by extratextual remedies, such as the common-law doctrines advocated by respondents. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365, 376 (1990) (explaining that, “[a]s a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text”). Although trust law may offer a “starting point” for analysis in some situations, it must give way if it is inconsistent with “the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489, 497 (1996). Application of the wasting trust doctrine in this context would appear to be inconsistent with the language of ERISA’s termination provisions.

Even assuming that the wasting trust doctrine might apply in certain circumstances — an extremely doubtful proposition — it is by its own terms inapplicable here. As respondents concede, since the date of the 1991 amendment, the Plan has been accepting new members and paying all the promised benefits to eligible Plan participants. Furthermore, thousands of active participants in the contributory benefit structure continue to accrue benefits. Simply put, these circumstances can in no way be construed to constitute an enfeebled plan whose membership has dwindled to a mere remnant that would no longer benefit from the Plan’s administration. Therefore, the wasting trust doctrine cannot salvage respondents' termination claim.

* * *

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.

It is so ordered.

       This arrangement is commonly referred to as “contributory,” as compared to a plan whose members do not make contributions, which is commonly referred to as “noncontributory.” See generally S. Bruce, Pension Claims 22 (2d ed. 1993). But a contributory plan should not be confused with a “defined contribution plan” as defined by ERISA §3(34), 29 U.S.C. §1002(34).

       ERISA defines "accumulated funding deficiency” as
      "the excess of the total charges to the funding standard account for all plan years (beginning with the first plan year to which this part applies) over the total credits to such account for such years or, if less, the excess of the total charges to the alternative minimum funding standard account for such plan years over the total credits to such account for such years.” § 302(a)(2), 29 U. S. C. § 1082(a)(2).

       By contrast, an "accrued benefit” for purposes of defined contribution plans means “the balance of the individual’s account.” ERISA § 3(23)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B).

         Our conclusion is consistent with other Government pronouncements in this area. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has promulgated a treasury regulation that provides, for income tax purposes, a pension plan will not fail to be a “single plan” merely because the “plan has several distinct benefit structures.” Treas. Reg. § 1.414(1) — l(b)(l)(i), 26 CFR § 1.414(1) — 1(b)(1)(i) (1998). It further provides that "[a] plan is a 'single plan’ if and only if, on an ongoing basis, all of the plan assets are available to pay benefits to employees who are covered by the plan.” Ibid.; see also 29 CFR §2520.102-4 (1998) (“[A]n employee benefit plan may provide different benefits for various classes of participants and beneficiaries”).

       Respondents suggest that they may be regarded as cosettlors because they have contributed to the Plan’s corpus. However, merely making contributions does not make one akin to a settlor who is responsible for creating the plan. See generally G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §1, p. 4 (rev. 2d ed. 1984) (“The settlor of a trust is the person who intentionally causes it to come into existence” (footnote omitted; emphasis deleted)). Certainly, respondents do not contend that they are responsible for the creation of the Plan.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Scalia

license: Public Domain

text:
    YOUR HOME VISITING NURSE SERVICES, INC. v. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
    No. 97-1489.
    Argued December 2,1998
    Decided February 23, 1999

      Diana L. Gustin argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, John P. Schnitker, Harriet S. Robb, Bruce R. Granger, and Henry R. Goldberg

        Denise Rios Rodrigmz and Amy Blumberg Hafey filed a brief for the American Hospital Association et al. as amici curiae.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Medicare Act, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 290, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. II), the Secretary of Health and Human Services reimburses the providers of covered health services to Medicare beneficiaries, see §§ 1395f(b)(l), 1395h, 1395x(v)(l)(A). A provider seeking such reimbursement submits a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary (generally a private insurance company) that acts as the Secretary’s agent. See 42 CFR § 405.1801(b) (1997). The intermediary analyzes the cost report and issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the amount of reimbursement to which the provider is entitled for the year. See §405.1803.

As is relevant here, a dissatisfied provider has two ways to get this determination revised. First, a provision of the Medicare Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo, allows a provider to appeal, within 180 days, to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Board) — an administrative review panel that has the power to conduct an evidentiary hearing and affirm, modify, or reverse the intermediary’s NPR determination. The Board’s decision is subject to judicial review in federal district court. § 1395oo(f). Second, one of the Secretary’s regulations, 42 CFR §405.1885 (1997), permits a provider to request the intermediary, within three years, to reopen the reimbursement determination.

Petitioner Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc., owns and operates several entities that provide home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Petitioner submitted cost reports for the year 1989 to its fiscal intermediary, and did not seek administrative review of the resulting NPRs within 180 days. Within three years, however, it did ask the intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that “new and material” evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Petitioner sought to appeal that denial to the Board, but the Board dismissed the appeal on the ground that §405.1885 divested it of jurisdiction to review an intermediary’s refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination.

Petitioner then brought the instant action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board’s dismissal and of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen. In an unpublished opinion, the District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen, and rejected petitioner’s alternative contention that the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1381, or the mandamus statute, § 1361, gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary’s refusal directly. It accordingly dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 182 F. 3d 1135 (CA6 1997). We granted certiorari. 524 U. S. 925 (1998).

I

The primary issue in this case is whether the Board has jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary’s refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. The regulation that authorizes reopening provides that “[j]urisdietion for reopening a determination . . . rests exclusively with that administrative body that rendered the last determination or decision.” 42 CFR § 405.1885(c) (1997). In this litigation, the Secretary defends the position set forth in the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual §2926, App. A, ¶ B.4 (Sept. 1993): “A refosal by the intermediary to grant a reopening requested by the provider is not appealable to the Board, pursuant to 42 CFR § 405.1885(c)_” The Secretary construes the' regulation to mean that where, as here, the intermediary is the body that rendered the last determination with respect to the cost reports at issue, review by the Board of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen would divest the intermediary of its “exclusiv[e]” “[jjurisdiction for reopening a determination.” Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that “jurisdiction” in § 405.1885(c) refers only to original jurisdiction over the reopening question, and not to appellate jurisdiction to review the intermediary’s refusal. Even if it should win on this point, however, petitioner would only establish that the Board’s otherwise extant appellate jurisdiction has not been excluded; it would still have to establish that the Board’s appellate jurisdiction is somewhere conferred. Another regulation, §405.1889, says that an intermediary’s affirmative decision to reopen and revise a reimbursement determination “shall be considered a separate and distinct determination” to which the regulations authorizing appeal to the Board are applicable; but it says nothing about appeal of a refusal to reopen. Petitioner must thus establish the Board’s appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the unelabo-rated text of the Medicare Act itself.

Petitioner relies upon 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(l)(A)(i), which says that a provider may obtain a hearing before the Board with respect to a cost report if the provider “is dissatisfied with a final determination of. .. its fiscal intermediary .. . as to the amount of total program reimbursement due the provider ... for the period covered by such report. . . .” Petitioner maintains that the refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination constitutes a separate “final determination ... as to the amount of total program reimbursement due the provider.” The Secretary, on the other hand, maintains that this phrase does not include a refusal to reopen, which is not a “final determination ... as to the amount,” but rather the refusal to make a new determination. The Secretary’s reading of § 1395oo(a)(l)(A)(i) frankly seems to us the more natural — but it is in any event well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, and hence entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984).

The reasonableness of the Secretary’s construction of the statute is farther confirmed by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), in which we held that § 205(g) of the Social Security Act does not authorize judicial review of the Secretary’s decision not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for benefits. In reaching this conclusion we relied, in part, upon two considerations: that the opportunity to reopen a benefit adjudication was afforded only by regulation and not by the Social Security Act itself; and that judicial -review of a reopening denial would frustrate the statutory purpose of imposing a 60-day limit on judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on an initial claim for benefits. Id., at 108. Similar considerations apply here. The right of a provider to seek reopening exists only by grace of the Secretary, and the statutory purpose of imposing a 180-day limit on the right to seek Board review of NPRs, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3), would be frustrated by permitting requests to reopen to be reviewed indefinitely.

Finally, we do not think that the Secretary’s position is inconsistent with 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)(ii), which provides that the Secretary’s cost-reimbursement regulations shall “provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments where, for a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive.” Petitioner asserts that the reopening regulations, as construed by the Secretary, do not create a “suitable” procedure for making “retroactive corrective adjustments” because an intermediary’s refusal to reopen a determination is not subject to administrative review. In support of this assertion, petitioner decries the “double standard” inherent in a procedure that allows the intermediary to reopen (during the 8-year period) for the purpose of recouping overpayments, but to deny reopening when alleged underpayments are at issue.

This argument fails for two reasons. First, and most importantly, petitioner’s construction of § lS95x(v)(l)(A)(ii) is inconsistent with our decision in Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402 (1993), in which we held that the Secretary reasonably construed clause (ii) to refer to the year-end reconciliation of monthly payments to providers, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395g, with the total amount of program reimbursement determined by the intermediary. Although we did not specifically consider the procedure for reopening determinations after the year’s books are closed, we think our conclusion there — that clause (ii) refers to the year-end book balancing — forecloses petitioner’s contention that clause (ii) requires any particular procedure for reopening reimbursement determinations. And second, the procedures for obtaining reimbursement would not be “unsuitable” simply because an intermediary’s refusal to reopen is not administratively reviewable. Medicare providers already have the right under § 1395oo(a)(3) to appeal an intermediary’s reimbursement determination to the Board. Title 42 CFR §405.1885 (1997) generously gives them a second chance to get the decision changed — this time at the hands of the intermediary itself, but without the benefit of administrative review. That is a “suitable” procedure, especially in light of the traditional rule of administrative law that an agency’s refusal to reopen a closed case is generally “ ‘committed to agency discretion by law”’ and therefore exempt from judicial review. See ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987). As for the alleged “double standard,” given the administrative realities we would not be shocked by a system in which underpayments could never 'be the basis for reopening. The few dozen fiscal intermediaries often need three years within which to discover overpay-ments in the tens of thousands of NPRs that they issue, while each of the tens of thousands of sophisticated Medicare-provider recipients of these NPRs is generally capable of identifying an underpayment in its own NPR within the 180-day time period specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1895oo(a)(3). Petitioner’s invocation of gross unfairness is also refuted by the Secretary’s representation that fiscal intermediaries grant between 30 and 40 percent of providers’ requests to reopen reimbursement determinations. Brief for Respondent 27, n. 11.

II

We also reject petitioner’s fallback argument that it is entitled to judicial review of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen. First, judicial review under the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, is precluded by 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), applicable to the Medicare Act by operation of § 1S95Ü, which provides that “[n]o action against... the [Secretary] or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331... of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subehapter.” Petitioner’s claim “arises under” the Medicare Act within the meaning of this provision because “'both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation’ ” of the claim are the Medicare Act. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 615 (1984).

Second, the lower courts properly declined to issue mandamus to order petitioner’s fiscal intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination. Even if mandamus were available for claims arising under the Social Security and Medicare Acts, petitioner would still not be entitled to mandamus relief because it has not shown the existence of a “clear nondiscretionary duty,” id., at 616, to reopen the reimbursement determination at issue. The reopening regulations do not require reopening, but merely permit it: “A determination of an intermediary ... may be reopened .. . by such intermediary ... on the motion of the provider affected by such determination,” 42 CFR § 405.1885(a) (1997) (emphasis added). To be sure, the Secretary’s Medicare Reimbursement Provider Manual §2931.2 (Feb. 1985) does provide that “[wjhether or not the intermediary will reopen a determination, otherwise final, will depend upon whether (1) new and material evidence has been submitted, or (2) a clear and obvious error was made, or (3) the determination is found to be inconsistent with the law, regulations and rulings, or general instructions.” But we hardly think that this disjunctive listing of factors was meant to convert a discretionary function into a mandatory one. As to factor (1), for example, it seems to us inconceivable that the existence of new and material evidence would alone require reopening, no matter how unpersuasive that evidence might be. The present case, we might note, involves evidence that was already before the intermediary at the time of its decision. The holding of ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, supra, that the decision whether to reopen, at least where no new evidence is at issue, is “‘committed to agency discretion by law5” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and hence unreviewable, see id., at 282, is squarely applicable.

The last point alone would suffice to defeat petitioner’s suggestion that we grant it the relief it requests under the judicial-review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706. In addition, however, we have long held that this provision is not an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

       The clause immediately following the quoted portion of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual reads “except for providers which are located within the jurisdiction of the U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where such a refusal to reopen is appealable.” §2926, App. A, ÍB.4. This exception obviously reflects, not an inconsistency in the Secretary’s position, but an acknowledgment of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of that position. See Oregon v. Bowen, 854 F. 2d 346 (1988).

       The relevant portion of § 205(g), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (1970 ed.), provided that “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days ...See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S., at 108.

       The Secretary urges us to hold that mandamus is altogether unavailable to review claims arising under the Medicare Act, in light of the second sentence of 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), which provides that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as” provided in the Medicare Act itself. We have avoided deciding this issue in the past, see, e. g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 616-617 (1984), and we again find it unnecessary to reach it today.


author: Justice Ginsburg

text:
    NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v. SMITH
    No. 98-84.
    Argued January 20,1999
    Decided February 23, 1999

      John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Martin Michaelson, Gregory G. Garre, John J. Kitchin, Robert W. McKinley, and Elsa Kircher Cole.

      Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Virginia A. Seitz.

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Irving L. Gornstein, and Dennis J. Dimsey.

        Rickard 0. Duvall, Robin L. Rosenberg, David A. Vaughan, and Sheldon Elliot Steinbach filed a brief for the American Council on Education et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Michael Bowers et al. by Barbara E. Ransom; for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., et al. by Adele P. Kimmel, Arthur H. Bryant, and J. Richard Cohen; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Marcia D. Greenberger, Leslie T. Annexstein, Lois G. Williams, and Dina R. Lassow.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This ease concerns the amenability of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA or Association) to a private action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The NCAA is an unincorporated association of approximately 1,200 members, including virtually all public and private universities and four-year colleges conducting major athletic programs in the United States; the Association serves to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of its members’ educational programs. Title IX proscribes sex discrimination in “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).

The complainant in this case, Renee M. Smith, sued the NCAA under Title IX alleging that the Association discriminated against her on the basis of her sex by denying her permission to play intercollegiate volleyball at federally assisted institutions. Reversing the District Court’s refusal to allow Smith to amend her fro se complaint, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the NCAA’s receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice to bring the Association within the scope of Title IX. We reject that determination as inconsistent with the governing statute, regulation, and Court decisions. Dues payments from recipients of federal funds, we hold, do not suffice to render the dues recipient subject to Title IX. We do not address alternative grounds, urged by respondent and the United States as amicus curiae, in support of Title IX’s application to the NCAA in this litigation, and leave resolution of those grounds to the courts below on remand.

f — i

Rules adopted by the NCAA govern the intercollegiate athletics programs of its member colleges and universities; “[b]y joining the NCAA, each member agrees to abide by and enforce [the Association’s] rules.” National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian, 488 U. S. 179, 183 (1988); see 1993-1994 NCAA Manual, NCAA Const., Arts. 1.2(h), 1.3.2, p. 1. Among these rules is the Postbaeealaureate Bylaw, which allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics only at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. See id., Bylaw 14.1.8.2, at 123.

Respondent Smith enrolled as an undergraduate at St. Bonaventure University, an NCAA member, in 1991. Smith joined the St. Bonaventure intercollegiate volleyball team in the fall of 1991 and remained on the team throughout the 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 athletie seasons. She elected not to play the following year.

Smith graduated from St. Bonaventure in 2% years. During the 1994-1995 athletic year, she was enrolled in a postgraduate program at Hofstra University; for the 1995-1996 athletie year, she enrolled in a different postgraduate program at the University of Pittsburgh. Smith sought to play intercollegiate volleyball during these athletic years, but the NCAA denied her eligibility on the basis of its postbacealau-reate restrictions. At Smith’s request, Hofstra and the University of Pittsburgh petitioned the NCAA to waive the restrictions. Each time, the NCAA refused to grant a waiver.

In August 1996, Smith filed this lawsuit pro se, alleging, among other things, that the NCAA’s refusal to waive the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw excluded her from participating in intercollegiate athletics at Hofstra and the University of Pittsburgh on the basis of her sex, in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. The complaint did not attack the Bylaw on its face, but instead alleged that the NCAA discriminates on the basis of sex by granting more waivers from eligibility restrictions to male than female postgraduate student-athletes. Complaint ¶ 26, Joint App. in Nos. 97-3346 and 97-3347 (CA3), p. 4 (hereinafter Joint App.); Amended Complaint ¶ 64, Joint App. 98.

Hie NCAA moved to dismiss Smith’s Title IX claim on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. In opposition, Smith argued that the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members’ receipt of federal funds. See Joint App. 55-56.

Concluding that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were “too far attenuated” to sustain a Title IX claim, the District Court dismissed the suit. 978 F. Supp. 213,219, 220 (WD Pa. 1997). Smith then moved the District Court for leave to amend her complaint to add Hofstra and the University of Pittsburgh as defendants, see Amended Complaint ¶ 63, Joint App. 97, and to allege that the NCAA “receives federal financial assistance through another recipient and operates an educational program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance,” id., ¶ 65, Joint App. 98. The District Court denied the motion “as moot, the court having granted [the NCAA’s) motion to dismiss.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s refusal to grant leave to amend the complaint. 139 F. 3d 180,190 (1998). The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that Smith’s original complaint failed to state a Title IX claim. Id., at 189. But Smith’s proposed amended complaint, the Court of Appeals said, “plainly alleges that the NCAA receives dues from member institutions, which receive federal funds.” Id., at 190. That allegation, the Third Circuit held, “would be sufficient to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds and would survive a motion to dismiss.” Ibid. Under the Third Circuit’s ruling, all Smith would need to prove on remand to proceed is that the NCAA receives members’ dues, a fact not in dispute.

The NCAA petitioned for this Court’s review, alleging that the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicted with Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U. S. 597 (1986). Pet. for Cert. 7-15. We granted certiorari, 524 U. S. 982 (1998), to decide whether a private organization that does not receive federal financial assistance is subject to Title IX because it receives payments from entities that do.

r*H f — I

Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Under the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA), 102 Stat. 28, 20 U. S. C. § 1687, a “program or activity” includes “all of the operations of... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education . . . any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.” § 1687(2)(A). The CRRA also provides institution-wide coverage for entities “principally engaged in the business of providing education” services, § 1687(8)(A)(ii), and for entities created by two or more covered entities, § 1687(4). Thus, if any part of the NCAA received federal assistance, all NCAA operations would be subject to Title IX.

We have twice before considered when an entity qualifies as a recipient of federal financial assistance. In Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 563-570 (1984), we held that a college receives federal financial assistance when it enrolls students who receive federal funds earmarked for educational expenses. Finding “no hint” that Title IX distinguishes “between direct institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students,” we concluded that Title IX “encompasses] all forms of federal aid to education, direct or indirect.” Id., at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U. S., at 603-612, we considered the scope of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in substantially the same terms that Title IX uses to prohibit sex discrimination. In that case, a group representing disabled veterans contended that the Department of Transportation had authority to enforce § 504 against commercial .air carriers by virtue of the Government’s extensive program of financial assistance to airports. We held that airlines are not recipients of federal funds received by airport operators for airport construction projects, even when the funds are used for projects especially beneficial to the airlines. Application of § 504 to all who benefited economically from federal assistance, we observed, would yield almost “limitless coverage.” 477 U. S., at 608. We concluded that “[t]he statute covers those who receive the aid, but does not extend as far as those who benefit from it.” Id., at 607.

The Court of Appeals determined “not [to] apply the Paralyzed Veterans Court’s definition of ‘recipient’ to Title IX,” 139 F. 3d, at 189, finding that definition inconsistent with 34 CFR § 106.2 (1997), a Title IX regulation issued by the Department of Education. The Third Circuit interpreted the Department’s regulation to define a “recipient” as “an entity ‘which operates an educational program or activity which receives or benefits’ from federal funds.” 139 F. 3d, at 189 (quoting § 106.2(h)). The court reasoned that § 106.2(h) extends Title IX to beneficiaries of federal funding as well as recipients. Applying the more limited rule of Paralyzed Veterans, the appeals court concluded, would “render the regulatory definition of ‘recipient’ under Title IX a nullity.” Ibid.

The Third Circuit’s reading of § 106.2(h) failed to give effect to the regulation in its entirety. Section 106.2(h) defines “recipient” to include any entity “to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance.” The first part of this definition makes clear that Title IX coverage is not triggered when an entity merely benefits from federal funding. Thus, the regulation accords with the teaching of Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans: Entities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not.

The Third Circuit’s conclusion that the NCAA would be subject to the requirements of Title IX if it received dues from its federally funded members is inconsistent with this precedent. Unlike the earmarked student aid in Grove City, there is no allegation that NCAA members paid their dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose. At most, the Association’s receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members. This showing, without more, is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage.

While the Court of Appeals dispositively relied on the NCAA’s receipt of members’ dues, it also noted distinctions between Paralyzed Veterans and this ease: The NCAA is “created by and comprised of” schools that receive federal fluids, and the Association governs its members “with respect to athletic rules.” 139 F. 3d, at 188. In these respects, the Third Circuit observed, the relationship between the Association and its members is “qualitatively different from that between airlines and airport operators.” Id., at 189. Evident as these distinctions may be, they do not bear on the narrow question we decide today — whether an entity that receives dues from recipients of federal funds is for that reason a recipient itself.

Ill

Smith, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, presses two alternative theories for bringing the NCAA under the prescriptions of Title IX. First, she asserts that the NCAA directly and indirectly receives federal financial assistance through the National Youth Sports Program NCAA administers. See Brief for Respondent 35-37, 39-41. Second, Smith argues that when a recipient cedes controlling authority over a federally funded program to another entity, the controlling entity is covered by Title IX regardless whether it is itself a recipient. See id., at 41-46; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-27.

As in Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., ante, at 253-254, and United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 72-73 (1998), we do not decide in the first instance issues not decided below.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Third Circuit and remand the ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw is an exception to the general NCAA rule restricting participation in intercollegiate athletics to students enrolled in a full-time program of studies leading to a baccalaureate degree. See 1993-1994 NCAA Manual, Bylaw 14.1.8.1, at 123. In full, the Post-baccalaureate Bylaw provides:
      “A student-athlete who is enrolled in a graduate or professional school of the institution he or she previously attended as an undergraduate (regardless of whether the individual has received a United States baccalaureate degree or its equivalent), a student-athlete who is enrolled and seeking a second baccalaureate or equivalent degree at the same institution, or a student-athlete who has graduated and is continuing as a full-time student at the same institution while taking course work that would lead to the equivalent of another major or degree as defined and documented by the institution, may participate in intercollegiate athletics, provided the student has eligibility remaining and such participation occurs within the applicable five-year or 10-semester period set forth in 14.2.” Bylaw 14.1.8.2.

       The complaint also stated a Sherman Act claim and a state contract law claim. The District Court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, 978 F. Supp. 213, 218 (WD Pa. 1997), and declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim, id., at 220. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Sherman Act claim, 139 F. 3d 180, 187 (CA3 1998), and this Court denied certiorari on that issue, see 524 U. S. 982 (1998).

       The scope of several other federal antidiscrimination measures is defined in nearly identical terms. See §601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000d (prohibiting race discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”); §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”); and §303 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,42 U. S. C. §6102 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).

       Congress enacted the CRRA in response to Part III of our decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 570-574 (1984), which concluded that Title IX, as originally enacted, covered only the specific program receiving federal funding. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 73 (1992) (noting that Congress endeavored, in the CRRA, “to correct what it considered to be an unacceptable decision on our part in Grove City”).

       Smith suggests that Paralyzed Veterans does not control the question presented here because that case involved a Government enforcement action while this is a private suit. This argument hinges on Smith’s position that the private right of action available under 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a) is potentially broader than the Government’s enforcement authority provided by § 1682. We reject this position. There is no express authorization for private lawsuits in Title IX; in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 717 (1979), we concluded that Congress had intended to authorize a private right of action even though it failed to do so expressly. We think it would be anomalous to assume that Congress intended the implied private right of action to proscribe conduct that Government enforcement may not check. See 20 U. S. C. § 1682 (authorizing federal administrative enforcement by terminating the federal funding of any noncomplying recipient, § 1682(1), or “by any other means authorized by law,” § 1682(2)).

       Smith’s brief to the Third Circuit alluded to these theories. See Brief for Appellant in Nos. 97-3346 and 97-3347 (CA3), pp. 5, 22 (arguing that the NCAA receives federal financial assistance through the National Youth Sports Program it operates); ibid, (arguing that an organization that assumes control over a federally funded program is thereby subject to Title IX).

       Two District Courts have found that the NCAA's relationship to the National Youth Sports Program creates an issue of fact regarding whether the NGAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. See Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 494 (NJ 1998) (denying NCAA’s motion for summary judgment in a Rehabilitation Act suit because “there are genuine questions of material fact as to whether the NCAA receives federal funds through the [National Youth Sports Program Fund]”); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., No. Civ. A. 97-131, 1997 WL 634376, *2 (ED Pa., Oct. 9,1997) (refusing NCAA’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VI action). Also, the Department of Health and Human Services has issued two letter determinations that the NCAA is a recipient of federal assistance by virtue of the Department’s grant to the National Youth Sports Program Fund. See Brief for United States as Amiens Curiae 19-20. We, of course, are not positioned to make or currently review factfindings on any alternative theory urged by respondent.