author: Justice Scalia

text:
    NEW YORK v. HILL
    No. 98-1299.
    Argued November 2, 1999
    Decided January 11, 2000

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Robert Mastrocola argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Howard R. Relin.

      Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

      Brian Shiffrin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Edward John Nowak, by appointment of the Court, 527 U. S. 1002, and Stephen J. Bird.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether defense counsel’s agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.

I

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U. S. C. App. § 2; 11A U. L. A. 48 (1995) (listing jurisdictions). As “a eongressionally sanctioned interstate compact” within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 8, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981).

A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner in another State’s custody begins the process by filing a detainer, which is a request by the State’s criminal justice agency that the institution in which the prisoner is housed hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is imminent. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U. S. 43, 44 (1993). After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a “request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.” Art. 111(a). Upon such a request, the prisoner “shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days,” “provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” Ibid. Resolution of the charges can also be triggered by the charging jurisdiction, which may request temporary custody of the prisoner for that purpose. Art. IV(a). In such a ease, “trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state,” subject again to continuances for good cause shown in open court. Art. IV(c). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the applicable statutory period, the LAD requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Art. V(e).

In this case, New York lodged a detainer against respondent, who was a prisoner in Ohio. Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to Article III of the IAD, and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges. Defense counsel filed several motions, which, it is uncontested, tolled the time limits during their pendency.

On January 9, 1995, the prosecutor and defense counsel appeared in court to set a trial date. The following colloquy ensued:

“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, [the regular attorney] from our office is engaged in a trial today. He told me that the Court was to set a trial date today. I believe the Court may have preliminarily discussed a May 1st date, and [the regular attorney] says that would fit in his calendar.
“The Court: How is that with the defense counsel?
“[Defense Counsel]: That will be fine, Your Honor.” 164 Misc. 2d 1032, 1035, 627 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 236 (Cty. Ct., Monroe County 1995).

The court scheduled trial to begin on May 1.

On April 17, 1995, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the LAD’s time limit had expired. The trial court found that as of January 9, 1995, when the trial date was set, 167 nonexcludable days had elapsed, so that if the subsequent time period was chargeable to the State, the 180-day time period had indeed expired. However, the trial court concluded that “[d]efense counsel’s explicit agreement to the trial date set beyond the 180 day statutory period constituted a waiver or abandonment of defendant’s rights under the IAD.” Id., at 1036, 627 N. Y. S. 2d, at 237. Accordingly, the court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.

Respondent was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment for lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S. 2d 126 (1997). The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment against respondent be dismissed; defense counsel’s agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondent’s speedy trial rights under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U. S. 1111 (1999).

II

No provision of the IAD prescribes the effect of a defendant’s assent to delay on the applicable time limits. We have, however, “in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,” articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U. S. 196, 200-201 (1995), and we have recognized that “[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are .. . subject to waiver,” Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923, 936 (1991). In accordance with these principles, courts have agreed that a defendant may, at least under some circumstances, waive his right to object to a given delay under the IAD, although they have disagreed on what is necessary to effect a waiver. See, e. g., People v. Jones, 197 Mich. App. 76, 80, 495 N. W. 2d 159, 160 (1992) (waiver if prisoner “either expressly or impliedly, agrees or requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the terms of the IAD”); Brown v. Wolff, 706 F. 2d 902, 907 (CA9 1983) (waiver if prisoner “affirmatively requests to be treated in a manner contrary to the procedures prescribed by the IAD”); Drescher v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148, 267 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1990) (waiver if there is a “showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue. “[Wjhether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.” United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993). For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464-465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel. “Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has — and must have — full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 417-418 (1988). As to many decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is “deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’ ” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 451 (1965), and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill, 11 F. 3d 223, 226-227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such matters is the last.

Scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. This case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of all protection of the IAD’s time limits or of the IAD generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in trial. When that subject is under consideration, only counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment of the delay to the defendant’s case. Likewise, only counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense would even be prepared to proceed any earlier. Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for such routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: In allowing the court to grant “good-cause continuances” when either “prisoner or his counsel” is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. 111(a) (emphasis added).

Respondent offers two arguments for affirmance, both of which go primarily to the propriety of allowing waiver of any sort, not to the specifics of the waiver here. First, he argues that by explicitly providing for the grant of “good-cause continuances,” the IAD seeks to limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override those limitations. It is of course true that waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured. E. g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255, 258-259 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 9 (1959). That is not, however, the situation here. To be sure, the “necessary or reasonable continuance” provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant’s objection. But the specification in that provision that the “prisoner or his counsel” must be present suggests that it is directed primarily, if not indeed exclusively, to prosecution requests that have not explicitly been agreed to by the defense. As applied to, agreed-upon extensions, we think its negative implication is dubious — and certainly not clear enough to constitute the “affirmative indication” required to overcome the ordinary presumption that waiver is available. Mezzanatto, supra, at 201.

Second, respondent argues that the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not waive society’s rights. It is true that a “right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 (1945) (emphasis added). The conditional clause is essential, however: It is not true that any private right that also benefits society cannot be waived. In general, “[i]n an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979). We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests. See, e. g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464 (waiver of right to counsel).

Society may well enjoy some benefit from the IAD’s time limits: Delay can lead to a less accurate outcome as witnesses become unavailable and memories fade. See, e. g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 56-57 (1968). On the other hand, some social interests served by prompt trial are less relevant here than elsewhere. For example, because the would-be defendant is already incarcerated in another jurisdiction, society’s interests in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial and in preventing further criminal activity (or avoiding the costs of pretrial detention) are simply not at issue. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972). In any case, it cannot be argued that society’s interest in the prompt resolution of outstanding charges is so central to the IAD that it is part of the unalterable “statutory policy,” Brooklyn Savings Bank, supra, at 704. In fact, the time limits do not apply at all unless either the prisoner or the receiving State files a request. Thus, the IAD “eontemplate[s] a de~ gree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability.” Mezzanatto, 513 U. S., at 206.

Finally, respondent argues that even if waiver of the IAD’s time limits is possible, it can be effected only by affirmative conduct not present here. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a similar view, stating that the speedy trial rights guaranteed by the IAD may be waived either “explicitly or by an affirmative request for treatment that is contrary to or inconsistent with those speedy trial rights.” 92 N. Y. 2d, at 411, 704 N. E. 2d, at 545. The court concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to the trial date here was not an “affirmative request” and therefore did not constitute a waiver. Id., at 412, 704 N. E. 2d, at 546. We agree with the State that this makes dismissal of the indictment turn on a hyperteehnical distinction that should play no part. As illustrated by this case, such an approach would enable defendants to escape justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits, and then recanting later on. Nothing in the IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuse — and given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice — we decline to adopt it.

* * *

The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

       It was suggested at oral argument that agreement in open court to a trial date outside the allowable time period can itself be viewed as a “necessary or reasonable continuance” for “good cause shown in open court.” Although an agreed-upon trial date might sometimes merit this description, it is far from clear that it always does so, or that it does so here. Because we find waiver, we do not consider under what circumstances an agreed-upon delay could fit within the good-cause provision.

       This feature, among others, makes respondent’s analogy to the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq., inapt. The time limits of the Speedy Trial Act begin to run automatically rather than upon request, §§ 3161(a), (b); dismissal may sometimes be without prejudice, §§ 3162(a)(1), (2), United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 332-333 (1988); and waiver is expressly allowed in certain limited circumstances, 18 U. S. C. § 3162(a)(2). In any event, the question of waiver under the Speedy Trial Act is not before us today, and we express no view on the subject.

       In concluding that objection to a specified delay may be waived, we are mindful that the sending State may have interests distinct from those of the prisoner and the receiving State. This case does not involve any objection from the sending State, and we do not address what recourse the sending State might have under the IAD when the receiving State and prisoner agree to, and the court allows, an inordinate delay. Cf. Article V(e) (“At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHIEF Justice Rehnquist Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW
    No. 98-1036.
    Argued November 2, 1999
    Decided January 12, 2000

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, ScALtA, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Soxjter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 126.

      Richard A. Devine argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos, and Veronica Ximena Calderon.

      Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.

      James B. Koch argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lynn N. Weisberg and Thomas G. Gardiner

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, Robert C. Maier and Alejandro Almaguer, Assistant Solicitors, and Thomas R. Keller, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
        Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Michael P. Easley of North Carolina, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark L. Barnett of South Dakota, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia; for the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney by John D. O'Hair, pro se, Timothy A Baughman, and Jeffrey Caminsky; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Ine., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Richard Weintraub; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the National Association of Police Organizations et al. by Stephen R. McSpadden.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey Grossman, and Barbara E. Bergman; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, George H. Kendall, and Laura E. Hankins; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him, and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a four-car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers.

As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Burén, Officer Nolan observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their ear southbound, watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his ear and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a .38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. The officers arrested Wardlow.

The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. App. 14. Following a stipulated bench trial, Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow’s conviction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 287 Ill. App. 3d 367, 678 N. E. 2d 65 (1997).

The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N. E. 2d 484 (1998). While rejecting the Appellate Court’s conclusion that Wardlow was not in a high crime area, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that sudden flight in such an area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 310, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486. Relying on Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), the court explained that although police have the right to approach individuals and ask questions, the individual has no obligation to respond. The person may decline to answer and simply go on his or her way, and the refusal to respond, alone, does not provide a legitimate basis for an investigative stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 311-312, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486-487. The court then determined that flight may simply be an exercise of this right to “go on one’s way,” and, thus, could not constitute reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 312, 701 N. E. 2d, at 487.

The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the “high crime area” factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a Terry stop. Finding no independently suspicious circumstances to support an investigatory detention, the court held that the stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1097 (1999), and now reverse.

This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by the analysis we first applied in Terry. In Terry, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 392 U. S., at 30. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity. Terry, supra, at 27.

Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. App. 8. It was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 144, 147-148 (1972).

In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Sokolow, supra, at 8-9. Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on eommonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.

Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id., at 498. And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437 (1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.

Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two individuals pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and periodically conferring. 392 U. S., at 5-6. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity. Id., at 30.

In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers found respondent in possession of a handgun, and arrested him for violation of an Illinois firearms statute. No question of the propriety of the arrest itself is before us.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The State of Illinois asks this Court to announce a “bright-line rule" authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Brief for Petitioner 7-36. Respondent counters by asking us to adopt the opposite 'per se rule — that the fact that a person flees upon seeing the police can never, by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary investigative stop of the kind authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Brief for Respondent 6-31.

The Court today wisely endorses neither per se rule. Instead, it rejects the proposition that “flight is ... necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity,” ante, at 125, adhering to the view that “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion . . . is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” but must be determined by looking to “the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture,” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Abiding by this framework, the Court concludes that “Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity.” Ante, at 125.

Although I agree with the Court’s rejection of the per se rules proffered by the parties, unlike the Court, I am persuaded that in this case the brief testimony of the officer who seized respondent does not justify the conclusion that he had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Before discussing the specific facts of this case, I shall comment on the parties’ requests for a per se rule.

I

In Terry v. Ohio, we first recognized “that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest,” 392 U. S., at 22, an authority permitting the officer to “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes,” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7. We approved as well “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 27. Cognizant that such police intrusion had never before received constitutional imprimatur on less than probable cause, id., at 11-12, 20, we reflected upon the magnitude of the departure we were endorsing. “Even a limited search,” we said, “constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.” Id., at 24-25.

Accordingly, we recognized only a “narrowly drawn authority” that is “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons.” Id., at 27, 26. An officer conducting an investigatory stop, we farther explained, must articulate “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418 (1981). That determination, we admonished, “becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 21. In undertaking that neutral scrutiny “based on all of the circumstances,” a court relies on “certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; see also ante, at 125. “[T]he relevant inquiry” concerning the inferences and conclusions a court draws “is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 10.

The question in this ease concerns “the degree of suspicion that attaches to” a person’s flight — or, more precisely, what “commonsense conclusions” can be drawn respecting the motives behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons — to catch up with a Mend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature — any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. A pedestrian might also run because he or she has just sighted one or more police officers. In the latter instance, the State properly points out “that the fleeing person may be, inter alia, (1) an escapee from jail; (2) wanted on a warrant; (3) in possession of contraband, (i. e. drugs, weapons, stolen goods, etc.); or (4) someone who has just committed another type of crime.” Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4. In short, there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person’s flight is suspicious, and undeniably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons.

Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either per se rule. The inference we can reasonably draw about the motivation for a person’s flight, rather, will depend on a number of different circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the person’s behavior was otherwise unusual might be relevant in specific eases. This number of variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on the sole fact that flight began after a police officer appeared nearby.

Still, Illinois presses for a per se rule regarding “unprovoked flight upon seeing a clearly identifiable police officer.” Id., at 7. The phrase “upon seeing,” as used by Illinois, apparently assumes that the flight is motivated by the presence of the police officer. Illinois contends that unprovoked flight is “an extreme reaction,” id., at 8, because innocent people simply do not “flee at the mere sight of the police,” id., at 24. To be sure, Illinois concedes, an innocent person — even one distrustful of the police — might “avoid eye contact or even sneer at the sight of an officer,” and that would not justify a Terry stop or any sort of 'per se inference. Id., at 8-9. But, Illinois insists, unprovoked flight is altogether different. Such behavior is so “aberrant” and “abnormal” that a per se inference is justified. Id., at 8-9, and n. 4.

Even assuming we know that a person runs because he sees the police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to ease. Flight to escape police detection, we have said, may have an entirely innocent motivation:

“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’ Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury — not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.” Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 499, 511 (1896).

In addition to these concerns, a reasonable person may conclude that an officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger — either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.

Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.” Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient. In any event, just as we do not require “scientific certainty” for our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can sometimes indicate suspicious motives, see ante, at 124-125, neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.

The probative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is a function of the varied circumstances in which it occurs. Sometimes those inferences are entirely consistent with the presumption of innocence, sometimes they justify further investigation, and sometimes they justify an immediate stop and search for weapons. These considerations have led us to avoid categorical rules concerning a person’s flight and the presumptions to be drawn therefrom:

“Few things . . . distinguish an enlightened system of judicature from a rude and barbarous one more than the manner in which they deal with evidence. The former weighs testimony, whilst the latter, conscious perhaps of its inability to do so or careless of the consequences of error, at times rejects whole portions m masse, and at others converts pieces of evidence into rules of law by investing with conclusive effect some whose probative force has been found to be in general considerable. . .. Our ancestors, observing that guilty persons usually fled from justice, adopted the hasty conclusion that it was only the guilty who did so ... so that under the old law, a man who fled to avoid being tried for felony forfeited all his goods even though he were acquitted .... In modern times more correct views have prevailed, and the evasion of or flight from justice seems now nearly-reduced to its true place in the administration of the criminal law, namely, that of a circumstance — a fact which it is always of importance to take into consideration, and combined with others may afford strong evidence of guilt, but which, like any other piece of presumptive evidence, it is equally absurd and dangerous to invest with infallibility.” Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 419-420 (1896) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Unprovoked flight,” in short, describes a category of activity too broad and varied to permit a per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation for the activity. While the innocent explanations surely do not establish that the Fourth Amendment is always violated whenever someone is stopped solely on the basis of an unprovoked flight, neither do the suspicious motivations establish that the Fourth Amendment is never violated when a Terry stop is predicated on that fact alone. For these reasons, the Court is surely correct in refusing to embrace either per se rule advocated by the parties. The totality of the circumstances, as always, must dictate the result.

1 — I i — I

Guided by that totahty-of-the-circumstances test, the Court concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion to stop respondent. Ante, at 125. In this respect, my view differs from the Court’s. The entire justification for the stop is articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some facts are perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insufficiency leads me to conclude that the Court’s judgment is mistaken.

Respondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after noon on September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d 484, 485, n. 1 (1998). Nolan was part of an eight-officer, four-car caravan patrol team. The officers were headed for “one of the areas in the 11th District [of Chicago] that’s high [in] narcotics traffic.” App. 8. The reason why four cars were in the caravan was that “[n]ormally in these different areas there’s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers.” Ibid. Officer Nolan testified that he was in uniform on that day, but he did not recall whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car. Id., at 4.

Officer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four patrol cars that “were all earavaning eastbound down Van Burén.” Id., at 8. Nolan first observed respondent “in front of 4035 West Van Burén.” Id., at 7. Wardlow “looked in our direction and began fleeing.” Id., at 9. Nolan then “began driving southbound down the street observing [respondent] running through the gangway and the alley southbound,” and observed that Wardlow was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm. Id., at 6, 9. After the car turned south and intercepted respondent as he “ran right towards us,” Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a “protective search,” which revealed that the bag under respondent’s arm contained a loaded handgun. Id., at 9-11.

This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or unmarked car, Officer Nolan could not recall the answer. Id., at 4. He was not asked whether any of the other three ears in the caravan were marked, or whether any of the other seven officers were in uniform. Though he explained that the size of the caravan was because “[n]ormally in these different areas there’s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers,” Officer Nolan did not testify as to whether anyone besides Wardlow was nearby 4035 West Van Burén. Nor is it clear that that address was the intended destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted the record, “it appears that the officers were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren.” 287 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370-371, 678 N. E. 2d 65, 67 (1997). Officer Nolan’s testimony also does not reveal how fast the officers were driving. It does not indicate whether he saw respondent notice the other patrol cars. And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part of it, had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.

Indeed, the Appellate Court thought the record was even “too vague to support the inference that . . . defendant’s flight was related to his expectation of police focus on him.” Id., at 371, 678 N. E. 2d, at 67. Presumably, respondent did not react to the first three cars, and we cannot even be sure that he recognized the occupants of the fourth as police officers. The adverse inference is based entirely on the officer’s statement: “He looked in our direction and began fleeing.” App. 9.

No other factors sufficiently support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Though respondent was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm, there is nothing at all suspicious about that. Certainly the time of day — shortly after noon— does not support Illinois’ argument. Nor were the officers “responding to any call or report of suspicious activity in the area.” 183 Ill. 2d, at 315, 701 N. E. 2d, at 488. Officer Nolan did testify that he expected to find “an enormous amount of people,” including drug customers or lookouts, App. 8, and the Court points out that “[i]t was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee,” ante, at 124. This observation, in my view, lends insufficient weight to the reasonable suspicion analysis; indeed, in light of the absence of testimony that anyone else was nearby when respondent began to run, this observation points in the opposite direction.

The State, along with the majority of the Court, relies as well on the assumption that this flight occurred in a high crime area. Even if that assumption is accurate, it is insufficient because even in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked flight does not invariably lead to reasonable suspicion. On the contrary, because many factors providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a high crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979); see also n. 15, supra.

It is the State’s burden to articulate facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S., at 52; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). In my judgment, Illinois has failed to discharge that burden. I am not persuaded that the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk.

I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment to reverse the court below.

      The state courts have differed on whether unprovoked flight is sufficient grounds to constitute reasonable suspicion. See, e. g., State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N. W. 2d 763 (1990) (flight alone is sufficient); Platt v. State, 589 N. E. 2d 222 (Ind. 1992) (same); Harris v. State, 205 Ga. App. 813, 423 S. E. 2d 723 (1992) (flight in high crime area sufficient); State v. Hicks, 241 Neb. 357, 488 N. W. 2d 359 (1992) (flight is not enough); State v. Tucker, 136 N. J. 158, 642 A. 2d 401 (1994) (same); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N. W. 2d 451 (1985) (same); People v. Wilson, 784 P. 2d 325 (Colo. 1989) (same).

       We granted certiorari solely on the question whether the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Therefore, we express no opinion as to the lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.

       We added that a Terry Brisk “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly.” 392 U. S., at 17. The resentment engendered by that intrusion is aggravated, not mitigated, if the officer’s entire justification for the stop is the belief that the individual is simply trying to avoid contact with the police or move from one place to another — as he or she has a right to do (and do rapidly). See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (“We have expressly identified this ‘right to remove from one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an attribute of personal liberty5 protected by the Constitution” (citation omitted)); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497-498 (1983) (plurality opinion); Terry, 392 U. S., at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also ante, at 125.

       If the fleeing person exercises his or her right to remain silent after being stopped, only in the third of the State’s four hypothetical categories is the stop likely to lead to probable cause to make an arrest. And even in the third category, flight does not necessarily indicate that the officer is “dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968).

       Compare, e. g., Proverbs 28:1 (“The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are as bold as a lion”) with Proverbs 22:3 (“A shrewd man sees trouble coming and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty”).
      I have rejected reliance on the former proverb in the past, because its “ivory-towered analysis of the real world” fails to account for the experiences of many citizens of this country, particularly those who are minorities. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 630, n. 4 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). That this pithy expression fails to capture the total reality of our world, however, does not mean it is inaccurate in all instances.

       Of course, Terry itself recognized that sometimes behavior giving rise to reasonable suspicion is entirely innocent, but it accepted the risk that officers may stop innocent people. 392 U. S., at 30. And as the Court correctly observes, it is ''undoubtedly true” that innocent explanations for flight exist, but they do not “establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Ante, at 125. It is equally true, however, that the innocent explanations make the single act of flight sufficiently ambiguous to preclude the adoption of a -per se rule.
      In Terry, furthermore, reasonable suspicion was supported by a concatenation of acts, each innocent when viewed in isolation, that when considered collectively amounted to extremely suspicious behavior. See 392 U. S., at 5-7, 22-23. Flight alone, however, is not at all like a “series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warran[t] further investigation.” Id., at 22. Nor is flight similar to evidence which in the aggregate provides “fact on fact and clue on clue afford[ing] a basis for the deductions and inferences,” supporting reasonable suspicion. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 419 (1981).

       Nowhere in Illinois’ briefs does it specify what it means by “unprovoked.” At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers precipitate a flight by threats of violence, that flight is “provoked.” But if police officers in a patrol car — with lights flashing and siren sounding — descend upon an individual for the sole purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the ensuing flight is “unprovoked.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18, 20.

       Statistical studies of bystander victimization are rare. One study attributes this to incomplete recordkeeping and a lack of officially compiled data. See Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler, Hooper, & Julian, Stray Bui-lets and “Mushrooms”: Random Shootings of Bystanders in Pour Cities, 1977-1988, 5 J. of Quantitative Criminology 297, 303 (1989). Nonetheless, that study, culling data from newspaper reports in four large cities over an 11-year period, found “substantial increases in reported bystander killings and woundings in all four cities.” Id., at 306. From 1986 to 1988, for example, the study identified 250 people who were killed or wounded in bystander shootings in the four survey cities. Id., at 306-311. Most significantly for the purposes of the present case, the study found that such incidents “rank at the top of public outrage.” Id., at 299. The sali-eney of this phenomenon, in turn, “violate[s] the routine assumptions” of day-to-day affairs, and, “[w]ith enough frequency... it shapes the conduct of daily life.” Ibid.

       See Johnson, Americans’ Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: Survey Findings, Nat. Institute of Justice J. 13 (Sept. 1997) (reporting study by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in April 1996, which found that 48% of African-Americans consider “police brutality and harassment of African-Americans a serious problem” in their own community); President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 183-184 (1967) (documenting the belief, held by many minorities, that field interrogations are conducted “indiscriminately” and “in an abusive ... manner,” and labeling this phenomenon a “principal problem” causing 'friction” between minorities and the police) (cited in Terry, 392 U. S., at 14, n. 11); see also Casimir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N. Y. Daily News, Mar. 26, 1999, p. 34 (informal survey of 100 young black and Hispanic men living in New York City; 81 reported having been stopped and frisked by police at least once; none of the 81 stops resulted in arrests); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae 17-19 (reporting figures on disproportionate street stops of minority residents in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and St. Petersburg, Florida); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, S. Smith, Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety in 12 Cities 25 (June 1998) (African-American residents in 12 cities are more than twice as likely to be dissatisfied with police practices than white residents in same community).

       See, e. g., Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug War’s Emphasis on Law Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 11, 1991, p. A2, col. 1 (“Black leaders complained that innocent people were picked up in the drug sweeps .... Some teen-agers were so scared of the task force they ran even if they weren’t selling drugs”).
      Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and people living in high crime areas. See Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N. Y. Times Magazine, June 20, 1999, p. 85 (reporting that in 2-year period, New York City Police Department Street Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which resulted in arrest); Casimir, supra n. 7 (reporting that in 1997, New York City’s Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stop-and-frisks, only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest). Even if these data were race neutral, they would still indicate that society as a whole is paying a significant cost in infringement on liberty by these virtually random stops. See also n. 1, supra.

       The Chief of the Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Police Department, for example, confirmed that “sizeable percentages of Americans today— especially Americans of color — still view policing in the United States to be discriminatory, if not by policy and definition, certainly in its day-to-day application.” P. Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Interim Report of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling 46 (Apr. 20, 1999) (hereinafter Interim Report). And a recent survey of 650 Los Angeles Police Department officers found that 25% felt that ‘“racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority citizens currently exists and contributes to a negative interaction between police and the community.’” Report of the Independent Comm’n on the Los Angeles Police Department 69 (1991); see also 5 United States Comm’n on Civil Rights, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Communities: Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination, The Los Angeles Report 26 (June 1999).

       New Jersey’s Attorney General, in a recent investigation into allegations of racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike, concluded that “minority motorists have been treated differently [by New Jersey State Troopers] than non-minority motorists during the course of traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike.” “(Tlhe problem of disparate treatment is real — not imagined,” declared the Attorney General. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that this disparate treatment “engender[s] feelings of fear, resentment, hostility, and mistrust by minority citizens.” See Interim Report 4, 7. Recently, the United States Department of Justice, citing this very evidence, announced that it would appoint an outside monitor to oversee the actions of the New Jersey State Police and ensure that it enacts policy changes advocated by the Interim Report, and keeps records on racial statistics and traffic stops. See Kocieniewski, U. S. Will Monitor New Jersey Police on Race Profiling, N. Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1999, p. A1, col. 6.
      Likewise, the Massachusetts Attorney General investigated similar allegations of egregious police conduct toward minorities. The report stated: “We conclude that Boston police officers engaged in improper, and unconstitutional, conduct in the 1989-90 period with respect to stops and searches of minority individuals.... Although we cannot say with precision how widespread this illegal conduct was, we believe that it was sufficiently common to justify changes in certain Department practices. .
      “Perhaps the most disturbing evidence was that the scope of a number of Terry searches went far beyond anything authorized by that case and indeed, beyond anything that we believe would be acceptable under the federal and state constitutions even where probable cause existed to conduct a full search incident to an arrest. Forcing young men to lower their trousers, or otherwise searching inside their underwear, on public streets or in public hallways, is so demeaning and invasive of fundamental precepts of privacy that it can only be condemned in the strongest terms. The fact that not only the young men themselves, but independent witnesses complained of strip searches, should be deeply alarming to all members of this community.” J. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Report of the Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division on Boston Police Department Practices 60-61 (Dec. 18, 1990).

      Taking into account these and other innocent motivations for unprovoked flight leads me to reject Illinois’ requested per se rule in favor of adhering to a totality-of-the-circumstances test. This conclusion does not, as Illinois suggests, “establish a separate Terry analysis based on the individual characteristics of the person seized.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. My rejection of a per se rule, of course, applies to members of all races.
      It is true, as Illinois points out, that Terry approved of the stop and frisk procedure notwithstanding “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain.” 392 U. S., at 14. But in this passage, Terry simply held that such concerns would not preclude the use of the stop and frisk procedure altogether. See id., at 17, n. 14. Nowhere did Terry suggest that such concerns cannot inform a court’s assessment of whether reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a particular stop existed.

       As a general matter, local courts often have a keener and more informed sense of local police practices and events that may heighten these concerns at particular times or locations. Thus, a reviewing court may accord substantial deference to a local court’s determination that fear of the police is especially acute in a specific location or at a particular time.

       Illinois’ reliance on the common law as a conclusive answer to the issue at hand is mistaken. The sources from which it gleans guidance focus either on flight following an accusation of criminal activity, see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *387 (“For flight... on an accusation of treason, felony, or even petit larceny ... is an offence carrying with it a strong presumption of guilt” (emphasis added in part)), or are less dogmatic than Illinois contends, compare Brief for Petitioner 15 (“[A] person’s flight was considered ... conclusive proof of guilt”) with A. Burrill, Circumstantial Evidence 472 (1856) (“So impressed was the old common law with considerations of this kind, that it laid down the rule, which passed into a maxim, — that flight from justice was equivalent to confession of guilt-But this maxim... was undoubtedly expressed in too general and sweeping terms”).

       At the suppression hearing, the State failed to present testimony as to the time of respondent’s arrest. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, took notice of the time recorded in Officer Nolan’s arrest report. See 183 Ill. 2d, at 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d, at 485, n. 1.

       The population of the 11th district is over 98,000 people. See Brief for the National Association of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae App. II.

       Of course, it would be a different case if the officers had credible information respecting that specific street address which reasonably led them to believe that criminal activity was afoot in that narrowly defined area.

       Officer Nolan also testified that respondent “was looking at us,” App. 5 (emphasis added), though this minor clarification hardly seems sufficient to support the adverse inference.


author: CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

text:
    RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. CONDON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, et al.
    No. 98-1464.
    Argued November 10, 1999
    Decided January 12, 2000

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein.

      Charlie Condon, pro se, Attorney General of South Carolina, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Treva Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, and Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Electronic Privacy Information Center by Marc Rotenberg; for the Feminist Majority Foundation et al. by Erwin Chemerinsky; and for the Screen Actors Guild et al.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, John J. Park, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas H. Odom, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F Easley of North Carolina, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of "Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the Home School Legal Defense Association by Michael P. Farris; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles A Rothfeld; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Anne M. Hayes and Deborah J. La Fetra; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson; and for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Gregg P. Leslie.

   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U. S. G. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments (DMVs). We hold that in enacting this statute Congress did not run afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997).

The DPPA regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained in the records of state DMVs. State DMVs require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person’s name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering an automobile. Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. 29466, 29468, 29469 (1993); 140 Cong. Rec. 7929 (1994) (remarks of Rep. Goss). These sales generate significant revenues for the States. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F. 3d 1000, 1002 (CA7 1998) (noting that the Wisconsin Department of Transportation receives approximately $8 million each year from the sale of motor vehicle information).

The DPPA establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States’ ability to disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent. The DPPA generally prohibits any state DMV, or officer, employee, or contractor thereof, from “knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record.” 18 U. S. C. § 2721(a). The DPPA defines “personal information” as any information “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” but not including “information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status.” § 2725(3). A “motor vehicle record” is defined as “any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles.” §2725(1).

The DPPA’s ban on disclosure of personal information does not apply if drivers have consented to the release of their data. When we granted certiorari in this case, the DPPA provided that a DMV could obtain that consent either on a case-by-case basis or could imply consent if the State provided drivers with an opportunity to block disclosure of their personal information when they received or renewed their licenses and drivers did not avail themselves of that opportunity. §§ 2721(b)(11), (13), and (d). However, Public Law 106-69, 113 Stat. 986, which was signed into law on October 9, 1999, changed this “opt-out” alternative to an “opt-in” requirement. Under the amended DPPA, States may not imply consent from a driver’s failure to take advantage of a state-afforded opportunity to block disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver’s affirmative consent to disclose the driver’s personal information for use in surveys, marketing, solicitations, and other restricted purposes. See Pub. L. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986 §§ 350(c), (d), and (e), App. to Supp. Brief for Petitioners 1(a), 2(a).

The DPPA’s prohibition of nonconsensual disclosures is also subject to a number of statutory exceptions. For example, the DPPA requires disclosure of personal information “for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, the Clean Air Act, and chapters 301,305, and 321-331 of title 49.” 18 U. S. C. § 2721(b) (1994 ed., Supp. Ill) (citations omitted). The DPPA 'permits DMVs to disclose personal information from motor vehicle records for a number of purposes.

The DPPA’s provisions do not apply solely to States. The Act also regulates the resale and redisclosure of drivers’ personal information by private persons who have obtained that information from a state DMV. 18 U. S. C. § 2721(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). In general, the Act allows private persons who have obtained drivers’ personal information for one of the aforementioned permissible purposes to further disclose that information for any one of those purposes. Ibid. If a State has obtained drivers’ consent to disclose their personal information to private persons generally and a private person has obtained that information, the private person may redisclose the information for any purpose. Ibid. Additionally, a private actor who has obtained drivers’ information from DMV records specifically for direct-marketing purposes may resell that information for other direct-marketing uses, but not otherwise. Ibid. Any person who rediscloses or resells personal information from DMV records must, for five years, maintain records identifying to whom the records were disclosed and the permitted purpose for the resale or rediselosure. Ibid.

The DPPA establishes several penalties to be imposed on States and private actors that fail to comply with its requirements. The Act makes it unlawful for any “person” knowingly to obtain or disclose any record for a use that is not permitted under its provisions, or to make a false representation in order to obtain personal information from a motor vehicle record. §§ 2722(a) and (b). Any person who knowingly violates the DPPA may be subject to a criminal fine, §§ 2723(a), 2725(2). Additionally, any person who knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses information from a state motor vehicle record for a use other than those specifically permitted by the DPPA may be subject to liability in a civil action brought by the driver to whom the information pertains. §2724. While the DPPA defines “person” to exclude States and state agencies, §2725(2), a state agency that maintains a “policy or practice of substantial noncompliance” with the Act may be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the United States Attorney General of not more than $5,000 per day of substantial noncompliance. § 2723(b).

South Carolina law conflicts with the DPPAs provisions. Under that law, the information contained in the State’s DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester’s name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. S. C. Code Ann. §§56-3-510 to 56-3-540 (Supp. 1998). South Carolina’s DMV retains a copy of all requests for information from the State’s motor vehicle records, and it is required to release copies of all requests relating to a person upon that person’s written petition. §56-3-520. State law authorizes the South Carolina DMV to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle information, and it requires the DMV to allow drivers to prohibit the use of their motor vehicle information for certain commercial activities. §§ 56-3-530, 56-3-540.

Following the DPPA’s enactment, South Carolina and its Attorney General, respondent Condon, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court concluded that the Act is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution’s division of power between the States and the Federal Government. The court accordingly granted summary judgment for the State and permanently enjoined the Act’s enforcement against the State and its officers. See 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (1997). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Act violates constitutional prin-eiples of federalism. See 155 F. 3d 453 (1998). We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1111 (1999), and now reverse.

We of course begin with the time-honored presumption that the DPPA is a “constitutional exercise of legislative power.” Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 475 (1883); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 944 (1983).

The United States asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The United States bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a “thin[g] in interstate commerce,” and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 558-559 (1995). We agree with the United States’ contention. The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring. Because drivers’ information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation. We therefore need not address the Government’s alternative argument that the States’ individual, intrastate activities in gathering, maintaining, and distributing drivers’ personal information have a sufficiently substantial impact on interstate commerce to create a constitutional base for federal legislation.

But the fact that drivers’ personal information is, in the context of this case, an article in interstate commerce does not conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the DPPA. In New York and Printz, we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment. In New York, Congress commandeered the state legislative process by requiring a state legislature to enact a particular kind of law. We said:

“While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911).” 505 U. S., at 162.

In Printz, we invalidated a provision of the Brady Act which commanded “state and local enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.” 521 U. S., at 902. We said:

“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” Id., at 935.

South Carolina contends that the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment because it “thrusts upon the States all of the day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions,” Brief for Respondents 10, and thereby makes “state officials the unwilling implementors of federal policy,” id., at ll. South Carolina emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State’s employees to learn and apply the Act’s substantive restrictions, which are summarized above, and notes that these activities will consume the employees’ time and thus the State’s resources. South Carolina further notes that the DPPA’s penalty provisions hang over the States as a potential punishment should they fail to comply with the Act.

We agree with South Carolina’s assertion that the DPPA’s provisions will require time and effort on the part of state employees, but reject the State’s argument that the DPPA violates the principles laid down in either New York or Printz. We think, instead, that this case is governed by our decision in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505 (1988). In Baker, we upheld a statute that prohibited States from issuing unregistered bonds because the law “regulate[d] state activities,” rather than “seeking] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.” Id., at 514-515. We further noted:

“The [National Governor’s Association] nonetheless contends that § 310 has commandeered the state legislative and administrative process because many state legislatures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order to issue bonds in registered form and because state officials had to devote substantial effort to determine how best to implement a registered bond system. Such ‘commandeering’ is, however, an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.” Ibid.

Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz.

As a final matter, we turn to South Carolina’s argument that the DPPA is unconstitutional because it regulates the States exclusively. The essence of South Carolina’s argument is that Congress may only regulate the States by means of “generally applicable” laws, or laws that apply to individuals as well as States. But we need not address the question whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the DPPA is generally applicable. The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information — the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

       Disclosure is permitted for use “by any government agency” or by “any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State or local agency in carrying out its functions.” 18 U. S. C. § 2721(b)(1) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). The Act also allows States to divulge drivers’ personal information for any state-authorized purpose relating to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety, §2721(b)(14); for use in connection with car safety, prevention of car theft, and promotion of driver safety, §2721(b)(2); for use by a business to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted to that business and to prevent fraud or pursue legal remedies if the information that the individual submitted to the business is revealed to have been inaccurate, § 2721(b)(3); in connection with court, agency, or self-regulatory body proceedings, § 2721(b)(4); for research purposes so long as the information is not further disclosed or used to contact the individuals to whom the data pertain, § 2721(b)(5); for use by insurers in connection with claims investigations, antifraud activities, rating or underwriting, § 2721(b)(6); to notify vehicle owners that their vehicle has been towed or impounded, § 2721(b)(7); for use by licensed private investigative agencies or security services for any purpose permitted by the DPPA, §2721(b)(8); and in connection with private toll transportation services, §2721(b)(10).

       In the lower courts, the United States also asserted that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 155 F. 3d 453, 463-465 (1998); 972 F. Supp. 977-979, 986-992 (1997). The District Court and Court of Appeals rejected that argument. See 155 F. 3d, at 465; 972 F. Supp., at 992. The United States’ petition for certiorari and briefs to this Court do not address the §5 issue and, at oral argument, the Solicitor General expressly disavowed any reliance on it.

       South Carolina has not asserted that it does not participate in the interstate market for personal information. Rather, South Carolina asks that the DPPA be invalidated in its entirety, even as it is applied to the States acting purely as commercial sellers.