text:
    No. D-1685.
    In re Disbarment of Reilly.
    [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1218.]
   Disbarment entered.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. D-1686.
    In re Disbarment of Jones.
    [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1218.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-1687.
    In re Disbarment of Gottfried.
    [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1231.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-1688.
    In re Disbarment of Garrigan.
    [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1242.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-1689.
    In re Disbarment of Taylor.
    [For earlier order herein, see 517 U. S. 1242.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-1703.
    In re Disbarment of Abramson.
   Herbert W. Abramson, of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on August 5, 1996 [ante, p. 1038], is discharged.


text:
    No. D-1708.
    In re Disbarment of Lehman.
   Stephen Edward Lehman, of Spartanburg, S. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1709.
    In re Disbarment of Hoare.
   Michael J. Hoare, of St. Louis, Mo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1710.
    In re Disbarment of Sandvoss.
   Rolf H. G. Sandvoss, of Mt. Kisco, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1711.
    In re Disbarment of Essrick.
   Carol Barbara Essrick, of Burtonsville, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1712.
    In re Disbarment of Hatcher.
   John E. Hatcher, Jr., of Orlando, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1713.
    In re Disbarment of Spann.
   Ronald Thomas Spann, of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1714.
    In re Disbarment of Schoor.
   Michael Mer-cier Schoor, of Irving, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1715.
    In re Disbarment of Gribetz.
   Kenneth Gri-betz, of Monsey, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1716.
    In re Disbarment of Grossman.
   Marc Elliot Grossman, of White Plains, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1717.
    In re Disbarment of Levin.
   M. Louis Levin, of Phoenix, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 96-228.
    In re Shaw et al.
   Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration of petition for writ of mandamus granted. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 96-5601 (A-120).
    Johnson v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections.
   Ct. Common Pleas of Jasper County, S. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-5629 (A-128).
    Mata v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 Ariz. 319, 916 P. 2d 1035.


text:
    August 22, 1996
    No. 95-9366.
    Little v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 96-5679 (A-142).
    In re Mata.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    August 27, 1996
    No. D-1693.
    In re Disbarment of Sheffey.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1015.]


text:
    No. D-1694.
    In re Disbarment of Cook.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1015.]


text:
    No. D-1707.
    In re Disbarment of Barnett.
   Elliott B. Barnett, of Delray Beach, Fla., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on August 5, 1996 [ante, p. 1038], is discharged.


text:
    No. D-1718.
    In re Disbarment of LaRene.
   N. C. Deday LaRene, of Detroit, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 94-9689.
    No. 95-1530.
    No. 95-1671.
    No. 95-1672.
    No. 95-1881.
    No. 95-1787.
    No. 95-1817.
    O’Leary v. United States, Glavey v. Dime Savings Bank of New York, Soffer v. Queens College of the City University of New York, Black Television Workshop of Los Angeles, Inc., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., Ware et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., Flatley v. Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, et al., Kornman et vir, Individually and on Behalf of Their Dependent Son, Kornman v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana, Robinett v. United States, $227,865 in United States Currency v. United States, Jackson et ux. v. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, Gray v. Netherland, Warden, Wapnick v. United States, Janneh v. The Regency et al., Nava v. United States Soccer Federation, Slaton v. Miller, Superintendent, Correctional Industrial Complex, Pendleton, Indiana, Youngs v. Wheless, Bankruptcy Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, et al., Calhoun v. Allen et al., Tucker v. Montgomery Ward Credit Corp., Holliday v. Page, Tedder v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Ruel v. Saco & Biddeford Savings Institution et al., Faish v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Wilder v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Siegel v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Bell v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., Borden v. Massachusetts, Brennan v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Araya v. University of the District of Columbia, Grismore v. Ryder Truck Rental et al., Stancil v. Moo & Oink, Inc., Felker v. Turpin, Warden, In re Rivera, Williams v. Abbey Medical, Inc., LeBon v. United States, Ballenger v. Mississippi, Holly v. Mississippi, Pizzo v. Cain, Warden, et al., and Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management,
   516 U. S. 850;

517 U. S. 1221;

517 U. S. 1245;

ante, p. 1017;

ante, p. 1017;

ante, p. 1019;

ante, p. 1007;

No. 95-1843.

No. 95-1866.

No. 95-1909.

No. 95-6510.

No. 95-8335.

No. 95-8425.

No. 95-8455.

No. 95-8528.

No. 95-8566.

No. 95-8570.

No. 95-8589.

No. 95-8599.

No. 95-8623.

No. 95-8636.

No. 95-8660.

No. 95-8671.

No. 95-8681.

No. 95-8682.

No. 95-8756.

No. 95-8771.

No. 95-8772.

No. 95-8780.

No. 95-8798.

No. 95-8836.

ante, p. 1020;

ante, p. 1007;

ante, p. 1020;

ante, p. 152;

ante, p. 1021;

517 U. S. 1224;

517 U. S. 1225;

517 U. S. 1214;

517 U. S. 1247;

517 U. S. 1247;

517 U. S. 1248;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1009;

ante, p. 1009;

ante, p. 1022;

ante, p. 1009;

ante, p. 1010;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 1024;

517 U. S. 1238;

ante, p. 651;

No. 95-8848.

No. 95-8850.

No. 95-8875.

No. 95-8926.

No. 95-8944.

No. 95-8952.

No. 95-9071.

ante, p. 1016;

517 U. S. 1239;

517 U. S. 1249;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1026. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 95-7855.
    Morris v. United States,
   516 U. S. 1181. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 29, 1996
    No. 95-1974.
    No. 95-1982.
    Southwestern Bell Corp. et al. v. Great Western Directories, Inc., et al.; and Great Western Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    September 4, 1996
    No. 95-1919.
    Poway Unified School District et al. v. Lovell, a Minor, By and Through Her Guardian ad Litem, Lovell, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this

Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. A-140 (O. T. 1996).
    No. A-144 (O. T. 1996).
    No. A-159 (O. T. 1996).
    Bentsen et al. v. Vera et al.; Lawson et al. v. Vera et al.; and Laney et al. v. Vera et al.
   D. C. S. D. Tex. Applications for stay, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    September 5, 1996
    No. D-1695.
    In re Disbarment of Schneider.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1015.]


text:
    No. D-1696.
    In re Disbarment of Morrow.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1032.]


text:
    No. D-1697.
    In re Disbarment of Koss.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1032.]


text:
    No. D-1719.
    In re Disbarment of Golkin.
   Alan R. Golkin-, of Niagara Falls, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1720.
    In re Disbarment of Bertagnolli.
   James Sheridan Bertagnolli, of Castle Rock, Colo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 95-813.
    Bennett et al. v. Spear et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Bennett v. Plenert, 517 U. S. 1102.] Motion of petitioners and amici curiae California et al. to permit California et al. to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 95-928.
    Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for City Savings, F. S. B.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1133.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 95-939.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1170.] The parties are directed to brief the question of applicability of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to this case. Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., September 12, 1996. Twenty typewritten copies of each brief may be filed initially in order to meet the September 12 filing date. Forty copies of the brief prepared under this Court’s Rule 33.1 are to be filed as soon as possible thereafter.


text:
    No. 95-966.
    No. 95-977.
    O’Gilvie et al., Minors v. United States; and O’Gilvie v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1102.] Motion of petitioner in No. 95-977 for divided argument denied. Motion of petitioners in No. 95-966 for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-1065.
    Schenck et al. v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1170.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-1201.
    Lopez et al. v. Monterey County, California, et al.
   D. C. N. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1118.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-1225.
    United States v. Brockamp, Administrator of the Estate of McGill, Deceased; and United States v. Scott.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1282.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 95-1595.
    Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Youpee et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1282.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 95-1726.
    United States v. LaBonte et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1016.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 95-1263.
    Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1133.] Motion of Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    September 6, 1996
    No. A-151 (O. T. 1996).
    Dupree et al. v. Moore et al.
   Application to vacate the stay entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    September 10, 1996
    No. A-174 (95-939).
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1170.] Applications of the parties for leave to file supplemental briefs in excess of the page limitations, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted, but the briefs may not exceed 20 pages.


text:
    September 11, 1996
    No. 96-86.
    Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    No. A-183 (O. T. 1996).
    Felker v. Turpin, Warden.
   Application, for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    September 16, 1996
    No. 95-939.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1170.] Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.


text:
    September 17, 1996
    No. 96-5998 (A-205).
    In re Stewart.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    September 19, 1996
    No. A-110 (96-5496).
    Hicks v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for bail, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-133 (96-5882).
    Pararas-Carayannis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Kennedy and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1004 (96-232).
    Dubin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for bail, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 96-5975 (A-210).
    Atkins v. Moore, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections.
   Ct. Common Pleas of Charleston County, S. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 20, 1996
    No. D-1691.
    In re Disbarment of Burkhart.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1002.]


text:
    No. D-1698.
    In re Disbarment of McAtee.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1032.]


text:
    No. D-1721.
    In re Disbarment of Bartron.
   R. Greg Bar-tron, of Watertown, S. D., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1722.
    In re Disbarment of Cunningham.
   Willie Lorena Cunningham, of San Antonio, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1723.
    In re Disbarment of Peavy.
   Don E. Peavy, Sr., of Fort Worth, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1724.
    In re Disbarment of Parks.
   Michael Lynn Parks, of Houston, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1725.
    In re Disbarment of Hughes.
   Jim D. Hughes, of Rockport, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1726.
    In re Disbarment of Caron.
   Robert E. Caron, of Troy, Mich., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1727.
    In re Disbarment of Adams.
   Eugene Joseph Adams, of New City, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1728.
    In re Disbarment of Mestman.
   Gary Leo Mestman, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 95-259.
    No. 95-779.
    Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., et al.; and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 516 U. S. 1171.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-789.
    California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement et al. v. Dillingham Construction, N. A., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1133.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-1268.
    Maryland v. Wilson.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 1003.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-1376.
    Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1154.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 95-974.
    Arizonans for Official English et al. v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1102.] Motion of respondent Maria-Kelly Yniguez for divided argument denied. Motion of respondent Arizona for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 95-1184.
    Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1232.] Motions of National Association of State Departments of Agriculture et al., Washington Apple Commission et al., and American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 95-1402.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Hubert, Deceased, C & S Sovran Trust Co. (Georgia) N. A., Co-Executor.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1166.] Motion of American College of Trust and Estate Counsel for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 95-1425.
    No. 95-1460.
    Abrams et al. v. Johnson et al.; and United States v. Johnson et al.
   D. C. S. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 517 U. S. 1207.] Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 95-1717.
    United States v. Lanier.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1004.] Motions of American Civil Liberties Union et al., NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., Southern Poverty Law Center et al., and Vivian Forsythe-Archie et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 95-1723.
    Grimmett, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Siragusa, et al. v. Brown et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1003.] Motions of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys and Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, MDL No. 1069, et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    September 26, 1996
    No. 96-5660.
    Velarde v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    October 1, 1996
    No. 95-2031.
    Young et al. v. Fordice et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss. Probable jurisdiction noted. Brief of appellants is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Briefs of appellees are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 95-1621.
    Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai et ux.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Industrial Indemnity Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 95-1858.
    Vacco, Attorney General of New York, et al. v. Quill et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of Agudath Israel of America, Carl Anderson, Commissioner, et al., United States Catholic Conference et al., and Catholic Medical Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12,1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10,1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply. Case is set for oral argument in tandem with No. 96-110, Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al., infra, p. 1057.


text:
    No. 95-1872.
    Strate, Associate Tribal Judge, Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, et al. v. A-1 Contractors et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 95-1873.
    Adams et al. v. Robertson et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 95-8736.
    Ogbomon v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pawperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 96-110.
    Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of American Medical Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply. Case is set for oral argument in tandem with No. 95-1858, Vacco, Attorney General of New York, et al. v. Quill et al., supra, p. 1055.


text:
    No. 96-126.
    Chandler et al. v. Miller, Governor of Georgia, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 12, 1996. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 10, 1996. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, December 27, 1996. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    October 2, 1996
    No. 95-1745.
    United States v. Lopez.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 95-1521.
    United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, et al. v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1003.] The parties are directed to brief the question of applicability of §633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-701 (“Authority to Determine Visa Processing Procedures”) (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1152(a)(1))) to this case and whether this case is moot. Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., October 11,1996. Twenty typewritten copies of each brief may be filed initially in order to meet the October 11 filing date. Forty copies of the brief prepared under this Court’s Rule 33.1 are to be filed as soon as possible thereafter.


text:
    October 3, 1996
    No. 95-1441.
    Blessing, Director, Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Freestone et al., on Behalf of Their Minor Children.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 517 U. S. 1186.] Motion of respondents to consider remanding this case or dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted in light of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 denied.


text:
    No. 96-6220 (A-245).
    In re Bell.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to this Court’s Rule 20.3 denied. Petition for appropriate writ pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) denied.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, et al. v. LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS, INC., et al.
    No. 95-1521.
    Argued October 15, 1996
    Decided October 21, 1996

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting, Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Michael Jay Singer, and Robert M. Loeb.

      Daniel Wo If argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were William R. Stein and Robert B. Jobe.

   Per Curiam.

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of § 633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-701).


author: Per Curiam. Justice Scalia,

text:
    CALIFORNIA et al. v. ROY
    No. 95-2025.
    Decided November 4, 1996
   Per Curiam.

A California court convicted respondent Kenneth Roy of the robbery and first-degree murder of Archie Mannix. The State’s theory, insofar as is relevant here, was that Roy, coming to the aid of a confederate who was trying to rob Mannix, helped the confederate kill Mannix. The trial judge gave the jury an instruction that permitted it to convict Roy of first-degree murder as long as it concluded that (among other things) Roy, “with knowledge of” the confederate’s “unlawful purpose” (robbery), had helped the confederate, i. e., had “aid[ed],” “promote[d],” “encourage[d],” or “instigate[d]” by “act or advice ... the commission of” the confederate’s crime. The California Supreme Court later held in People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561, 674 P. 2d 1318, 1326 (1984), that an identical instruction was erroneous because of what it did not say, namely, that state law also required the jury to find that Roy had the “knowledge [and] intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating” the confederate’s crime. Id., at 561, 674 P. 2d, at 1326 (emphasis added). Despite this error, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Roy’s conviction because it found the error “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). The California Supreme Court denied postconviction relief.

Subsequently Roy, pointing to the same instructional error, asked a Federal District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the request because, in its view, the error was harmless. Indeed, the District Court wrote that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate’s purpose and helped him but also found that Roy did not intend to help him. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. Roy v. Gomez, 55 F. 3d 1483 (1995).

The Ninth Circuit later heard the case en bane and reversed the District Court. It held that the instructional error was not harmless. 81 F. 3d 863 (1996). In doing so, the majority applied a special “harmless error” standard, which it believed combined aspects of our decisions in Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263 (1989) (per curiam), and O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432 (1995). The Ninth Circuit described the standard as follows:

“[T]he omission is harmless only if review of the facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted element.” 81 F. 3d, at 867 (emphasis in original).

As we understand that statement in context, it meant:

“[T]he omission [of the ‘intent’ part of the instruction] is harmless only if review of the facts found by the jury [namely, assistance and knowledge] establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted element [namely, ‘intent’].” Ibid.

The State of California, seeking certiorari, argues that this definition of “harmless error” is far too strict and that this Court’s decisions require application of a significantly less strict “harmless error” standard in cases on collateral review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993); O’Neal, supra.

We believe that the State, and the dissenting judges in the Ninth Circuit, are correct about the proper standard. The Ninth Circuit majority drew its special standard primarily from a concurring opinion in Carella, supra, a case that dealt with legal presumptions. The concurrence in that case set out the views of several Justices about the proper way to determine whether an error in respect to the use of a presumption was “harmless.” Subsequent to Carella, however, this Court held that a federal court reviewing a state-court determination in a habeas corpus proceeding ordinarily should apply the “harmless error” standard that the Court had previously enunciated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946), namely, “whether the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” Brecht, supra, at 637 (citing Kotteakos, supra, at 776). The Court recognized that the Kotteakos standard did not apply to “‘structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards,’ ” 507 U. S., at 629, but held that the Kotteakos standard did apply to habeas review of what the Court called “trial errors,” including errors in respect to which the Constitution requires state courts to apply a stricter, Chapman-type standard of “harmless error” when they review a conviction directly. 507 U. S., at 638. In O’Neal, supra, this Court added that where a judge, in a habeas proceeding, applying this standard of harmless error, “is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error,” the habeas “petitioner must win.” Id., at 437.

The case before us is a case for application of the “harmless error” standard as enunciated in Brecht and O’Neal. This Court has written that “constitutional error” of the sort at issue in Carella is a “trial error,” not a “structural error,” and that it is subject to “harmless error” analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 306-307 (1991). The state courts in this case applied harmless-error analysis of the strict variety, and they found the error “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, supra, at 24. The specific error at issue here — an error in the instruction that defined the crime — is, as the Ninth Circuit itself recognized, as easily characterized as a “misdescription of an element” of the crime, as it is characterized as an error of “omission.” 81 F. 3d, at 867, n. 4. No one claims that the error at issue here is of the “structural” sort that “‘def[ies] analysis by “harmless error” standards.’” Brecht, supra, at 629. The analysis advanced by the Ninth Circuit, while certainly consistent with the concurring opinion in Carella, does not, in our view, overcome the holding of Brecht, followed in O’Neal, that for reasons related to the special function of habeas courts, those courts must review such error (error that may require strict review of the Chapman-type on direct appeal) under the Kotteakos standard. Thus, we are convinced that the “harmless error” standards enunciated in Brecht and O’Neal should apply to the “trial error” before us as enunciated in those opinions and without the Ninth Circuit’s modification.

For these reasons, we grant respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the Ninth Circuit’s determination, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Ginsburg joins as to Part I,

concurring.

I

I agree with what the Court decides in its per curiam opinion: that the Brecht-O’Neal standard for reversal of the conviction (“grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error”), see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993), and O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432 (1995), rather than the more stringent Chapman standard (inability to find the error “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”), see Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), applies to the error in this case when it is presented, not on direct appeal, but as grounds for habeas corpus relief. The Ninth Circuit did not apply that more deferential standard, and I therefore concur in the remand.

I do not understand the opinion, however, to address the question of what constitutes the harmlessness to which this more deferential standard is applied — and on that point the Ninth Circuit was quite correct. As we held in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275 (1993), a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime, and absent such a verdict the conviction must be reversed, “no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be.” Id., at 279. A jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime means, of course, a verdict that he is guilty of each necessary element of the crime. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 522-523 (1995). Formally, at least, such a verdict did not exist here: The jury was never asked to determine that Roy had the “intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating” his confederate’s crime. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561, 674 P. 2d 1318, 1326 (1984).

The absence of a formal verdict on this point cannot be rendered harmless by the fact that, given the evidence, no reasonable jury would have found otherwise. To allow the error to be cured in that fashion would be to dispense with trial by jury. “The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.” Sullivan, supra, at 280. The error in the present case can be harmless only if the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces this one or if it is impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find without finding this point as well. See Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). I concur in the remand so that the Ninth Circuit may determine whether there is “grave doubt” that this is so, rather than (what it did) determine whether it is impossible to “be certain” that this is so, 81 F. 3d 863, 867 (1996). Elsewhere in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit purported to be applying the O’Neal standard, stating that “[w]hen the reviewing court is unable to conclude the jury necessarily found an element that was omitted from the instructions,” it “can only be ‘in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error,’ ” 81 F. 3d, at 868 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, supra, at 437). That seems to me to impart to the determination a black-and-white character which it does not possess, any more than other determinations possess it. It can be “the better view,” but far from “certain,” that, given the facts in the record, no juror could find x without also finding y. What O’Neal means is that, when the point is arguable, the State’s determination of harmless error must be sustained.

II

One final point: I write as I have written only because the Court has rejected the traditional view of habeas corpus relief as discretionary. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 720 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But for that precedent, I would be content to grant federal habeas relief for this sort of state-court error only when there has been no opportunity to litigate it before, or when there is substantial doubt, on the .facts, whether the defendant was guilty. See ibid.


author: Justice O’Connor

text:
    LOPEZ et al. v. MONTEREY COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al.
    No. 95-1201.
    Argued October 8, 1996
    Decided November 6, 1996

      Joaquin G. Avila argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert Rubin, Anthony Chavez, Antonia Hernández, and Richard M. Pearl.

      Alan Jenkins argued the cause for the United States as amictts curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, De-puty Solicitor General Bender, Steven H. Rosen-baum, and Eileen Penner.

      Daniel G. Stone, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for state appellees were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Floyd D. Shimomura, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Linda A. Cabatic, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.

        Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Paul C. Saunders, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Armvine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, Samuel L. Walters, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Steven R. Shapiro, Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline A. Berrien filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amid curiae urging reversal.

        Sharon L. Broivne and Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

        Barbara McDowell and Elwood G. Lui filed a brief for the California Judges Association as amicus curiae.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal presents a challenge to an order by a three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California that authorized Monterey County to conduct judicial elections under an election plan that has not received federal approval pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

HH

The State of California has 58 counties, one of which is Monterey County (hereinafter County). In 1971, the Attorney General designated the County a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(b). 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971); see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1995). As a result, the County became subject to the federal preelearance requirements set forth in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Section 5 governs changes in voting procedures, with the purpose of preventing jurisdictions covered by its requirements from enacting or seeking to administer voting changes that have a discriminatory purpose or effect. As a jurisdiction covered by §5, Monterey County must obtain federal preclearance — either administrative or judicial — of any voting practice different from the practices in effect on November 1, 1968. To obtain administrative preclearance of a changed voting practice, a covered jurisdiction submits the enactment to the Attorney General of the United States. If the Attorney General does not formally object to the new procedure within 60 days of submission, the jurisdiction may enforce the legislation. A covered jurisdiction may also obtain judicial preclearance — either directly or after the Attorney General has objected to the voting change — by securing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory judgment that the new practice “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . ..” Ibid.

or . . On November 1, 1968, the County had nine inferior court districts. Two of these districts were municipal court districts, each served by two judges, and the other seven were justice court districts, each served by a single judge. Both municipal and justice courts were trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal courts served districts with populations exceeding 40,000, and justice courts served those districts with smaller populations. The justice courts differed from the municipal courts in other respects. They were not courts of record and were served by judges who often worked part time and did not have to be members of the bar. Comment, Trial Court Consolidation in California, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1081, 1086 (1974). (On January 1, 1990, however, a state constitutional amendment specified that all courts, including justice courts, were courts of record. Cal. Const., Art. VI, §1 (1988). A few years later, California voters eliminated justice courts altogether. Art. VI, §§ 1, 5(b).)

Each of the municipal and justice courts operated separately and independently. Judges for each court were elected at large by the voters of their respective districts, and they served only the judicial district in which they were elected. The municipal and justice court districts varied widely in population and judicial workloads. For example, a 1972 survey showed that the Monterey-Carmel Municipal Court District had a population of 106,700, with more than enough work for two full-time judges. By contrast, the San Ardo Justice Court District had a population of 3,500, with a caseload that required less than a quarter of one judge’s time.

Between 1972 and 1983, the County adopted six ordinances, which ultimately merged the seven justice court districts and the two municipal court districts into a single, countywide municipal court, served by nine judges whom County residents elected at large. (At present, 10 judges serve on the municipal court.) Each judge was elected to serve for a term of six years. Judicial elections were conducted under various interim schemes in 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1982. Additionally, the County conducted at-large, countywide judicial elections in 1986, 1988, and 1990.

The County’s reorganization of its inferior court system took place against a backdrop of state laws governing the general administration and organization of state courts. State law authorizes a county board of supervisors, “[a]s public convenience requires,. .. [to] divide the county into judicial districts for the purpose of electing judges . . . .” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976). The board also “may change district boundaries and create other districts.” Ibid.; see also Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §25200 (West 1988) (“The board of supervisors may divide the county into election . . . and other districts required by law, change their boundaries, and create other districts, as convenience requires”). A county’s judicial election scheme must comply with several state constitutional and statutory requirements. Municipal court districts must include at least 40,000 residents, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 5(a); cities may not be split into more than one judicial district, ibid,.; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §71040 (West 1976); municipal court judges must be residents of the judicial district to which they are elected or appointed, § 71140; and, according to the State, judges’ jurisdictional and electoral bases must be coextensive, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 16(b); Koski v. James, 47 Cal. App. 3d 349, 354, 120 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1975).

In addition to these generally applicable laws, the state legislature has enacted various pieces of legislation directed at the judicial systems of particular California counties, including laws aimed specifically at Monterey County’s judicial system. Cal. Govt. Code Ann., Tit. 8, ch. 10 (West 1993). Some of these laws have reflected changes in the County’s judicial districts resulting from the consolidation process. The State has also enacted legislation dealing with the administration of the County’s judicial system, such as appointment and compensation of court personnel. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§73564-73569 (West 1993).

Although it was subject to § 5 preclearance requirements, the County did not submit any of the consolidation ordinances for federal preclearance under § 5. The State, however, in 1983 submitted for administrative preclearance a state law, 1983 Cal. Stats., ch. 1249, that mentioned Monterey County’s prospective consolidation of the last two justice court districts with the remaining municipal court district. The Department of Justice requested additional information concerning this aspect of the state legislation. In its response, the State included the last of the County’s six consolidation ordinances, which was adopted in 1983. The Attorney General interposed no objection to the 1983 state law. The State’s submission may well have served to preclear the 1983 county ordinance. See 28 CFR §51.14(2) (1981); 28 CFR § 51.15(a) (1987). The United States points out, however, that the 1983 submission to the Department of Justice did not identify or describe any of the County’s previous consolidation ordinances. The State does not contest this point. Thus, under our precedent, these previous consolidation ordinances do not appear to have received federal preclearance approval. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 657-658 (1991); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 249 (1984).

On September 6, 1991, appellants, five Hispanic voters residing in the County, sued the County in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the County had violated §5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of the six judicial district consolidation ordinances it had adopted between 1972 and 1983. They raised no claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or constitutional challenge. A three-judge District Court was convened. On. March 31,1993, the District Court ruled that the challenged ordinances were election changes subject to §5 and consequently unenforceable without federal preclearance. The District Court directed the County to submit the ordinances to federal officials for preclearance. It also denied the County’s motion to join the State as an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), finding that the State had no legally protected interest in the outcome of the action.

In August 1993, the County a action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking judicial preclearance of the challenged ordinances. Appellants intervened. But before that court made any findings, the County voluntarily dismissed its action, without prejudice. The County and appellants subsequently stipulated that the County was “ ‘unable to establish that the [consolidation ordinances] adopted by the County between 1968 and 1983 did not have the effect of denying the right to vote to Latinos in Monterey County due to the retrogressive effect several of these ordinances had on Latino voting strength ....’” 871 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N. D. Cal. 1994). The parties thereupon returned to the three-judge District Court, and several years of litigation ensued. and appellants ceased to litigate

In essence, the County the case as adversaries. Instead, they embarked on a joint attempt, opposed by the State and others as intervenors, to persuade the District Court to order a judicial election plan they viewed as less retrogressive than an at-large, countywide election scheme. In late 1993 and early 1994, the County and appellants jointly proposed two plans to the District Court. Each plan divided the County into different election areas, with judges from each area to serve on the countywide municipal court. The State objected to these schemes on the ground that they contravened California law, including the constitutional requirements that a judge’s jurisdictional and electoral bases be coextensive, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 16(b), and that cities not be split into more than one judicial district, Art. VI, §5(a). Appellants and the County acknowledged these conflicts, but asked the District Court to suspend operation of these state constitutional provisions in the County.

For some time, the District Court was reluctant to implement either of the proposed plans, ruling that it was “not satisfied that a plan necessarily ha[s] to conflict with [Article VI, § 16(b) in order to meet the requirements of] the Voting Rights Act.” 871 F. Supp., at 1256. Finally, the County and appellants filed with the District Court a stipulation that the County could not ‘devise or prepare any plan for the election of municipal court judges in Monterey County that [did] not conflict with at least one state law and still complied] with the Voting Rights Act.’ ” Id., at 1257. The parties supported the stipulation with information on County demographics, the presence of politically cohesive Hispanic communities and Anglo bloc voting, and a legacy of discrimination that had affected Hispanic citizens’ right to vote. They also set forth a number of potential election plans that they believed complied with § 5, all of which violated some aspect of state law.

In June 1994, the District Court decided to give appellants, the County, the State, and the United States, which had at this point weighed in as amicus curiae, another chance to develop a workable solution. It enjoined the upcoming 1994 elections. It directed the County to attempt to obtain changes in state law that would permit the implementation of a judicial election plan that complied with §5 requirements. It asked the State to assist the County in creating an acceptable judicial election plan. Nevertheless, in late 1994, the parties were back in court, still without a satisfactory plan. The County had sought amendments to the State Constitution and statutes, but was unsuccessful.

In a December 20, 1994, order, the District Court concluded that it had to devise a remedy that would permit judicial elections to take place, pending implementation of a permanent, federally precleared voting plan. Otherwise, voters would be deprived of their right to elect judges. The District Court recognized that neither appellants nor County thought feasible a return to the election scheme in effect on November 1, 1968. Instead, it decided to adopt one of the plans the County and appellants previously had proposed. Under this scheme, the County was divided into four election districts. Voters in three of the districts, in which Hispanics constituted a majority, would each elect one judge. Voters in the fourth district would elect the other seven judges. Judges elected under the plan would serve for 18-month terms, until January 1997. All 10 judges would serve on the countywide municipal court. The District Court acknowledged that the interim plan was inconsistent with state law, but reasoned that the intrusion on state interests was minimal. The County submitted the interim plan to the Attorney General for preclearance, and it was precleared on March 6, 1995. In a special election conducted on June 6,1995, seven judges were elected. (Apparently, terms of three of the judges holding seats in the seven-member election district had not expired by June 1995.) is-

Shortly after the June 1995 special election, this Court issued its decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), which prompted the three-judge District Court to reconsider the soundness of its interim election plan. Miller, ruled the District Court, cast, “substantial doubt” on the constitutionality of its previous order, “as that plan used race as a significant factor in dividing the County into election areas.” App. 167. Without ruling that the interim plan was in fact unconstitutional, the District Court decided to change course. It denied the County’s request to extend the terms of judges elected in the 1995 special election, concerned that such an extension would be “inappropriate” in light of the possible constitutional infirmity of the interim plan. A return to the judicial election system in existence before the adoption of the consolidation ordinances was not “legal, feasible or desired.” Ibid. In the District Court’s view, its only option was to order the County to conduct an at-large, countywide judicial election in March 1996, while enjoining future elections pending preclearance of a permanent plan. Judges elected in 1996 would serve for the usual 6-year terms. The District Court also joined the State as an indispensable party, based on the State’s argument that the County was doing nothing more than administering a state statute that required countywide elections, rather than administering its own county ordinance. Thus, in essence, four years after the filing of the complaint in this ease, the District Court ordered the County to hold elections under the very same scheme that appellants originally challenged under § 5 as unprecleared.

On January 22, 1996, appellants filed an emergency application in this Court to enjoin the 1996 elections pending appeal. We granted the application on February 1, 516 U. S. 1104 (1996), and noted probable jurisdiction on April 1, 517 U. S. 1118 (1996).

a

>

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies whenever a covered jurisdiction “enact[s] or seek[s] to administer any . . . standard, practice, or procedure” different from that in force on the date of § 5 coverage. As a threshold matter, the State contends that, although the County perhaps should have submitted the consolidation ordinances to federal authorities before implementing them, intervening changes in California law have transformed the County’s judicial election scheme into a state plan. Therefore, asserts the State, the County is not administering County consolidation ordinances in conducting municipal court elections, but is merely implementing California law, for which § 5 preclearance is not needed. The District Court was “not persuaded” by this argument, but ruled that the State could continue to seek to show that the County was merely administering California law. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976); see also Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §25200 (West 1988). We leave this issue about the scope of §5 to the District Court to resolve on remand. the District

The State Court did not have the opportunity to address. The State contends that appellants’ suit was barred by laches; that it is constitutionally improper to designate the County a covered jurisdiction under § 5; and that the consolidation ordinances did not alter a voting “standard, practice, or procedure” subject to §5 preclearance. We express no view on these claims, leaving it to the District Court to decide them in the first instance.

B

A jurisdiction subject to §5’s requirements must obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance before implementing a voting change. No new voting practice is enforceable unless the covered jurisdiction has succeeded in obtaining preclearance. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S., at 652-653; McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 137 (1981); Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975) (per curiam). If a voting change subject to § 5 has not been precleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation of the change. Clark v. Roemer, supra, at 652-653 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 572 (1969)). The District Court’s order that the County conduct elections under the unprecleared, at-large judicial election plan conflicts with these principles and with our decision in Clark v. Roemer, supra.

Clark concerned the propriety of a three-judge District Court’s refusal to enjoin elections under an unprecleared Louisiana judicial election plan. There, Louisiana had not submitted for preclearance a number of statutory and constitutional voting changes relating to elections of state judges, many of which were adopted in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. Id., at 649. The District Court nonetheless, permitted elections to go forward, with the winners allowed to take office if Louisiana filed a judicial preclearance action within 90 days. Id., at 651. We held that the District Court erred in authorizing these elections in the absence of preclearance, pointing out that although Louisiana had been aware for at least three years that the judgeships were not precleared, it had still failed to file for judicial preclearance. Id., at 655.

We acknowledged in Clark that earlier decisions such as Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), and Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978) (per curiam), held that where a covered jurisdiction had already conducted elections under an unprecleared plan, it might be appropriate for the district court to afford local officials an opportunity to seek federal approval before ordering a new election. 500 U. S., at 654. But those cases raised an issue different from the one in Clark. In Perkins and Berry, the District Courts confronted the question whether to set aside illegal elections that had already taken place. By contrast, the District Court in Clark had to decide whether to allow illegal elections to go forward in the first place. In this situation, “§ 5’s prohibition against implementation of unprecleared changes required the District Court to enjoin the election.” 500 U. S., at 654.

The District Court faced fundamentally the same problem here as in Clark. The County did not preclear the ordinances as required by § 5. For several years, the County had been on notice that its electoral changes were subject to §5’s preclearance requirements, yet it never obtained judicial or administrative preclearance of the consolidation ordinances. In Clark, we left open the question whether a district court may ever deny a §5 plaintiff’s motion for an injunction and allow a covered jurisdiction to conduct an election under an unprecleared voting plan. We suggested that “[a]n extreme circumstance might be present if a seat’s unprecleared status is not drawn to the attention of the [covered jurisdiction] until the eve of the election and there are equitable principles that justify allowing the election to proceed.” Id., at 654-655. We found no such exigency to exist in Clark, and we find none here.

The State contends that there is a difference between a district court’s failing to enjoin an unprecleared election scheme — the situation in Clark — and its ordering, pursuant to its equitable remedial authority, an election under an unprecleared plan. Regardless whether this distinction is meaningful, it does not advance the argument that the County’s judicial elections may be held without § 5 preclearance. We have recognized, at least in cases raising claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, that §5 preclearance requirements may not apply where a district court independently crafts a remedial electoral plan. McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, 148-150 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp. 18-19 (1975)). But where a court adopts a proposal “reflecting the policy choices ... of the people [in a covered jurisdiction] . . . the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is applicable.” 452 U. S., at 153. The at-large, countywide system under which the District Court ordered the County to conduct elections undoubtedly “reflected] the policy choices” of the County; it was the same system that the County had adopted in the first place. It was, therefore, error for the District Court to order elections under that system before it had been precleared by either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

We appreciate the predicament that the District Court faced. The County did not submit the consolidation ordinances for preclearance when they were adopted many years ago, and the District Court concluded that changes have occurred in the intervening years that make unrealistic a return to the judicial election plan of 1968, now nearly 30 years old. Since there may be no practical way to go back to the 1968 plan, simply enjoining the elections would leave the County without a judicial election system. The County and appellants seem unable to fashion an election plan that does not contravene the California Constitution, and the State has vigorously opposed each of the parties’ proposals as violative of state law.

These complications do not, however, change the basic nature of the § 5 preclearance process. Congress designed the preclearance procedure “to forestall the danger that local decisions to modify voting practices will impair minority access to the electoral process.” McDaniel, 452 U. S., at 149 (footnote omitted). Congress chose to accomplish this purpose by giving exclusive authority to pass on the discriminatory effect or purpose of an election change to the Attorney General and to the District Court for the District of Columbia. As we explained in McDaniel, “[b]ecause a large number of voting changes must necessarily undergo the preclearance process, centralized review enhances the likelihood that recurring problems will be resolved in a consistent and expeditious way.” Id., at 151 (footnote omitted). Once a covered jurisdiction has complied with these preclearance requirements, § 5 provides no further remedy. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549-550.

This congressional choice in favor of specialized review necessarily constrains the role of the three-judge district court. On a complaint alleging failure to preclear election changes under § 5, that court lacks authority to consider the discriminatory purpose or nature of the changes. Perkins v. Matthews, supra, at 385 (“What is foreclosed to such district court is what Congress expressly reserved for consideration by the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General — the determination whether a covered change does or does not have the purpose or effect ‘of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color’ ”). The three-judge district court may determine only whether §5 covers a contested change, whether §5’s approval requirements were satisfied, and if the requirements were not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appropriate. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 129, n. 3 (1983); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren Cty., 429 U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam); Perkins, supra, at 385; Allen, supra, at 558-559. The goal of a three-judge district court facing a § 5 challenge must be to ensure that the covered jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate federal authorities for preclearanee as expeditiously as possible.

In this case, nearly five years after appellants brought their challenge, neither the Attorney General nor the District Court for the District of Columbia has yet made any findings regarding the retrogressive effect — or lack thereof — of the consolidation ordinances adopted between 1972 and 1983. The County dismissed its declaratory judgment action before the District Court for the District of Columbia made any findings, and it has never submitted the consolidation ordinances to the Attorney General for review. Although the District Court initially ordered the County to obtain preclearance of the ordinances, when the County failed to follow through, the District Court did not enforce its order.

The District Court itself holds some responsibility for protracting this litigation. Because of its concern that the judicial election plans proposed by the County and appellants unnecessarily conflicted with California law, the District Court several times ordered the parties to submit to it an election plan that complied both with §5’s substantive requirements and with state law, before the County submitted the plan to federal officials. In so doing, it interposed itself into the § 5 approval process in a way that the statute does not contemplate. Cf. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U. S. 37, 42-43 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren Cty., supra, at 645-647; Perkins, 400 U. S., at 385. In their briefs, both parties raise detailed arguments regarding the effect of the consolidation ordinances on the County’s minority voters, but § 5 requires either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia to resolve in the first instance whether the consolidated municipal court system is retrogressive compared to the system existing in 1968.

The County has not discharged its obligation to submit its voting changes to either of the forums designated by Congress. The requirement of federal scrutiny should be satisfied without further delay. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S., at 192. The State appears willing to assist the County in pursuing the issue before either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia, and its effort will doubtless be of assistance.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

      See, e. g., 1953 Cal. Stats., ch. 206, §2 (“This article applies to municipal court established in a district embracing the Cities of Carmel and Monterey”); 1975 Cal. Stats., eh. 966, § 2 (“This article applies only to municipal courts established in ... [a] district embracing the Cities of Monte-rey, Carmel, Seaside, Sand City, and Del Rey Oaks designated as the Monterey-Carmel Judicial District; [and a] district embracing the City of Salinas designated as the Salinas Judicial District”); 1977 Cal. Stats., eh. 995, § 1 (“This article applies to all of the municipal courts established in the County of Monterey, which are in judicial districts entitled as follows: the Monterey Peninsula Judicial District, the Salinas Judicial District, and the North Monterey County Judicial District”); 1979 Cal. Stats., eh. 694, § 2 (“There is in the County of Monterey, on and after the effective date of this section, a single municipal eourt district which embraces the former Salinas Judicial District, Monterey Peninsula Judicial District and North Monterey County Judicial District”); 1989 Cal. Stats., ch. 608, § 1 (codified at Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 73560 (West 1993)) (“This article applies to the Monterey County Municipal Court District, which encompasses the entire County of Monterey”).


author: Justice Scalia

text:
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. YUEH-SHAIO YANG
    No. 95-938.
    Argued October 15, 1996
    Decided November 13, 1996

      Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, and Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler.

      Howard Horn argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert L. Reeves, Franklin W. Nelson, and Bill Ong Hing

        Daniel J. Popeo and David A. Price filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

        Sandra E. Kupelian filed a brief for the American Immigration Lawyers Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Attorney General, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 95 Stat. 1616, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(H), may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection with his entry into the United States.

' Respondent Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, Hai-Hsia Yang, were born and married in the People’s Republic of China, and subsequently moved to Taiwan. In order to gain entry to the United States, they executed the following scheme: After divorcing respondent in Taiwan, Hai-Hsia traveled to the United States in 1978 and, using $60,000 provided by respondent, obtained a fraudulent birth certificate and passport in the name of Mary Wong, a United States citizen. Respondent then remarried Hai-Hsia in Taiwan under her false identity and fraudulently obtained an immigrant visa to enter the United States as the spouse of a United States citizen. In 1982, four years after his fraudulent entry, respondent submitted an application for naturalization, which fraudulently stated that his wife “Mary” was a United States citizen by birth and that respondent had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In 1985, while respondent’s naturalization application was still pending, respondent and his wife obtained another divorce in order to permit her to obtain a visa under her true name (as the relative of a daughter who had obtained United States citizenship).

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ultimately learned of respondent’s unlawful entry, and in 1992 issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported. The INS maintained that respondent was de-portable under 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), because he was ex-cludable from the United States at the time of entry under the former 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(14), (19), and (20) (1988 ed.). Respondent conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under § 1251(a)(1)(H). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s denial of this request. The Board concluded that respondent was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. Although the Board did not consider respondent’s fraudulent entry in 1978 as itself an adverse factor, it did consider, among other things, respondent’s “acts of immigration fraud before and after his 1978 entry into the United States,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, including his first sham divorce to facilitate his wife’s unlawful entry, his 1982 application for naturalization, and his second sham divorce to assist his wife in obtaining an immigrant visa under her real name.

visa The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted respondent’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Yang v. INS, 58 F. 3d 452 (1995). The Ninth Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by considering as an adverse factor respondent’s participation in his wife’s fraudulent entry, because those acts were “inextricably intertwined with Mr. Yang’s own efforts to secure entry into the country and must be considered part of the initial fraud.” Id., at 453. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Board improperly considered respondent’s fraudulent application for naturalization as an adverse factor because that application “must be considered an extension of the initial fraud.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1110 (1996).

Section 1251(a)(1)(H) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“The provisions of this paragraph relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens described in section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) of this title [who have obtained a visa, documentation, entry or INA benefit by fraud or misrepresentation] . . . may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien ... who—
“(i) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and
"(ii) was possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of such entry except for those grounds of inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title [relating to possession of valid labor certifications, immigrant visas and entry documents] which were a direct result of that fraud or misrepresentation.”

The meaning of this language is clear. While it establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver of deportation, it imposes no limitations on the factors that the Attorney General (or her delegate, the INS, see 8 CFR §2.1 (1996)) may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief. We have described the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation under a related and similarly phrased provision of the INA as “ ‘an act of grace’ ” which is accorded pursuant to her “unfettered discretion,” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 354 (1956) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492 (1935)), and have quoted approvingly Judge Learned Hand’s likening of that provision to “ ‘a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President’s to pardon a convict,’” 351 U. S., at 354, n. 16 (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489, 491 (CA2 1950)).

Respondent contends, however, that the portion of § 1251(a)(l)(H)(ii) requiring the alien to be “otherwise admissible” — that is, not excludable on some ground other than the entry fraud — precludes the Attorney General from considering the alien’s fraudulent entry at all. The text will not bear such a reading. Unlike the prior version of the waiver-of-deportation statute at issue in INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214 (1966), under which the Attorney General had no discretion to deny a waiver if the statutory requirements were met, satisfaction of the requirements under § 1251(a)(1)(H), including the requirement that the alien have been “otherwise admissible,” establishes only the alien’s eligibility for the waiver. Such eligibility in no way limits the considerations that may guide the Attorney General in exercising her discretion to determine who, among those eligible, will be accorded grace. It could be argued that if the Attorney General determined that any entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how minor and no matter what the attendant circumstances, would cause her to withhold waiver, she would not be exercising the conferred discretion at all, but would be making a nullity of the statute. But that is a far cry from respondent’s argument that all entry fraud must be excused, which is untenable.

Respondent asserts (and the United States acknowledges) that it is the settled policy of the INS to disregard entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how egregious, in making the waiver determination. See Delmundo v. INS, 43 F. 3d 436, 440 (CA9 1994). This is such a generous disposition that it may suggest a belief on the part of the agency that the statute requires it; and such a belief is also suggested by the INS’s frequent concessions in litigation that the underlying fraud for which the alien is deportable “should not be considered as an adverse factor in the balancing equation,” Liwanag v. INS, 872 F. 2d 685, 687 (CA5 1989); see also Braun v. INS, 992 F. 2d 1016, 1020 (CA9 1993); Start v. INS, 803 F. 2d 539, 542 (CA9 1986), withdrawn, 862 F. 2d 787 (1988). (Such concessions were facilitated, no doubt, by the Ninth Circuit’s frequent intimations that the statute forbade consideration of the initial fraud. See Hernandez-Robledo v. INS, 777 F. 2d 536, 541 (1985); see also Braun, supra, at 1020; Delmundo, supra, at 441.) Before us, however, the United States disclaims such a position — and even if that were the agency’s view we could not permit it to overcome the unmistakable text of the law. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229-230 (1994). But that does not render the INS’s practice irrelevant. Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows — by rule or by settled course of adjudication — a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The INS has not, however, disregarded its general policy here; it has merely taken a narrow view of what constitutes “entry fraud” under that policy, excluding events removed in time and circumstance from respondent’s entry: his preentry and postentry sham divorces, and the fraud in his 1982 application for naturalization. The “entry fraud” exception being, under the current statute, a rule of the INS’s own invention, the INS is entitled, within reason, to define that exception as it pleases. The Ninth Circuit held that the acts of fraud counted against respondent can be described as “inextricably intertwined” with, or an “extension” of, the fraudulent entry itself because they were essential to its ultimate success or concealment. Perhaps so, but it is up to the Attorney General whether she will adopt an “inextricably intertwined” or “essential extension” augmentation of her “entry fraud” exception. It is assuredly rational, and therefore lawful, for her to distinguish aliens such as respondent who engage in a pattern of immigration fraud from aliens who commit a single, isolated act of misrepresentation. for the Ninth

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.

       Our jurisdiction over this matter is not in question. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), Div. C., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208,110 Stat. 3009, provides that “[notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under [Title 8 U. S. C.] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General _” IIRA § 306(a). That provision does not take effect, however, until April 1,1997. See IIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a) (as amended by Pub. L. 104-302, §2,110 Stat. 3656).

       The last clause of the quoted provision is less than artfully drawn, since the phrase “that fraud or misrepresentation” has no apparent antecedent. The antecedent was unmistakable in the prior version of the provision, which, in its prologue, that [the aliens] were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation.” 8 U. S. C. § 1251(f) (1988 ed.). In the prologue of the current provision, that explicit (but lengthy) reference to fraud or misrepresentation has been replaced by citation of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which uses almost the same language to define a class of excludable aliens. We think it if not obvious, then at least inevitable, that the phrase “that fraud or misrepresentation” refers to the fraud or misrepresentation for which waiver is sought, alluded to, through citation of § 1182 (a) (6)(G)(i), in the prologue.