author: Justice Thomas Justice Scalia,

text:
    CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT et al. v. DILLINGHAM CONSTRUCTION, N. A., INC., et al.
    No. 95-789.
    Argued November 5, 1996
    Decided February 18, 1997

      John M. Rea argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Vanessa L. Holton, Fred D. Lonsdale, Sarah Cohen, and H. Thomas Cadell, Jr.

      James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Edward D. Sieger. a brief for

      Richard N. Hill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Washington et al. by Christine 0. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, and Lynn D. W. Hendrickson and Jeff B. Kray, Assistant Attorneys General, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Victoria A. Graffeo, Solicitor General, and Daniel F. De Vita and M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady, Attorney General of Delaware, Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Margery S. Bronster, Attorney General of Hawaii, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hiíbert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, and Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Laurence J. Cohen, Terry R. Yellig, Laurence Gold, Marsha S. Berzon, and Donald J. Capuano; for the California Association of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association et al. by Robert E. Jesinger; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell; and for the National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc., by Gary L. Lieber. for Associated Build-
      tors Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al. by Mark R. Thierman; and for Signatory Members of the Coalition to Preserve ERISA Preemption by Maurice Baskin.

        Baskin. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. by Mary Ellen Signorille, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees,

        Melvin Radowitz, and Daniel Feinberg; for the Associated General Contractors of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr., Michael E. Kennedy, William.G. Jeffery, and David P. Wolds; for the' California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association et al. by James P. Watson; and for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, Stephen A Bokat, Mona C. Zeiberg, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of California requires a contractor on a public works project to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project’s locale. An exception to this requirement permits a contractor to pay a lower wage to workers participating in an approved apprenticeship program. This case presents the question whether the pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., supersedes California’s prevailing wage law to the extent that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an unapproved program. We conclude that California’s law does not “relate to” employee benefit plans, and thus is not pre-empted.

I

A

Since 1931, the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §§ 276a to 276a-5, has required that the wages paid on federal public works projects equal wages paid in the project’s locale on similar, private construction jobs. California, in 1937, adopted a similar statute, which requires contractors who are awarded public works projects to pay their workers “not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1771 (West 1989). Under both the Davis-Bacon Act and California’s prevailing wage law, public works contractors may pay less than the prevailing journeyman wage to apprentices in apprenticeship programs that meet standards promulgated under the National Apprenticeship Act, 50 Stat. 664, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §50 (known popularly as the Fitzgerald Act). See 29 CFR § 29.5(b)(5) (1996); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1777.5 (West 1989 and Supp. 1997). In most circumstances, California public works contractors are not obliged to employ apprentices, but if they do, the apprentice wage is only permitted for those apprentices in approved programs. is

programs. The federal arbiter of apprenticeship program adequacy is the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT), located within the Department of Labor. An apprenticeship program that seeks to provide federal public works contractors with apprentice-wage-eligible apprentices must receive the blessing of either the BAT or a “State Apprenticeship Agency.” 29 CFR §29.3 (1996). Since 1978, California’s state apprenticeship agency, the California Apprenticeship Council (CAC), has been authorized under 29 CFR §29.12 to approve apprenticeship programs for federal purposes. App. 37. California has also charged the CAC with approving apprenticeship programs for purposes of California’s prevailing wage statute. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 3071 (West 1989). Pursuant to the Fitzgerald Act, the United States Secretary of Labor has promulgated apprenticeship program standards. 29 CFR §29.5 (1996). California has adopted its own apprenticeship standards, 8 Cal. Code Regs. §212 (1996), that are “substantively similar” to the federal standards. Southern Cal. Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council, 4 Cal. 4th 422, 434, 841 P. 2d 1011, 1017 (1992) (Southern Cal. ABC). The CAC uses its own standards whether approving an apprenticeship program for federal or for state purposes.

An apprenticeship program in California may be sponsored by an individual employer, an individual labor union, a group of employers, a group of labor organizations, or by a joint management-labor venture (a so-called joint apprenticeship committee). See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §3075 (West 1989).

B

In the spring of 1987, respondent Dillingham Construction was awarded a public works contract as the general contractor for the construction of the Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility. Dillingham subcontracted electronic installation work to respondent Manuel J. Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media.

When Sound Systems Media was awarded the subcontract, it was signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement that provided a wage scale for apprentices, and required Sound Systems Media to contribute to a CAC-approved apprenticeship program, the Northern California Sound and Communications Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee.

In May 1988, after work on the project was underway, the existing union withdrew its representation of Sound Systems Media employees. Two months later, Sound Systems Media entered a new collective-bargaining agreement with a different union. That agreement, like the earlier one, included a scale of wages for apprentices and provided for an affiliation with a joint apprenticeship committee, the Electronic and Communications Systems Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (Electronic and Communications Systems JATC). Sound Systems Media relied on this new committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage provided in the collective-bargaining agreement. The Electronic and Communications Systems JATC, however, did not seek CAC approval until August 1989 and did not gain approval until October 1990. That approval was not retroactive.

In March 1989, yet another union filed a complaint against Sound Systems Media with petitioner Division of Apprenticeship Standards of the California Department of Industrial Relations. Petitioner issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham Construction and Sound Systems Media, charging that Sound Systems Media had violated Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1771 (West 1989) by paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from a nonapproved program. The County of Sonoma was ordered to withhold certain moneys from Dillingham Construction for the violation.

Respondents filed suit to prevent petitioners from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that ERISA pre-empted enforcement of the prevailing wage law. Respondents argued that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was an “employee welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA §3(1), 29 U.S.C. §1002(1), and that California’s prevailing wage statute “relate[d] to” it, and was therefore superseded by ERISA’s pre-emption provision, § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The District Court agreed that the prevailing wage statute “relate[d] to” ERISA plans, but con-eluded that pre-emption was forestalled by ERISA’s saving clause, § 514(d), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(d). Pre-emption of the prevailing wage statute, the District Court determined, would “impair the purposes of the Fitzgerald Act and its regulations within the meaning of ERISA’s savings clause.” Dillingham Constr. N. A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 778 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (ND Cal. 1991).

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 57 F. 3d 712 (1995). Agreeing with the District Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was an employee welfare benefit plan and that §1777.5 “relate[d] to” it. Id., at 718-719. Because California’s prevailing wage statute was not an “enforcement mechanism” of the Fitzgerald Act, however, the Ninth Circuit parted company with the District Court and held that § 1777.5 was not preserved by ERISA’s saving clause. Id., at 721. The decision of the Court of Appeals accorded with that of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in National Elevator Industry, Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F. 2d 1555, cert. denied, 506 U. S. 953 (1992). Both decisions conflict— as to whether a state prevailing wage law “relate[s] to” apprenticeship programs, and as to the reach of the saving clause — with that of the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Minnesota Dept. of Labor and Industry, 47 F. 3d 975 (1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1133 (1996), and now reverse.

II

Both lower courts determined, and neither party disputes, that the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC was a “plan, fund, or program [that] was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . apprenticeship or other training programs.” §3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1). The question thus presented to us is whether California’s prevailing wage statute “relate[s] to” that “employee welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA’s pre-emption clause.

Since shortly after its enactment, we have endeavored with some regularity to interpret and apply the “unhelpful text” of ERISA’s pre-emption provision. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 656 (1995). We have long acknowledged that ERISA’s pre-emption provision is “clearly expansive.” Id., at 655. It has

“a ‘broad scope,’ Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), and an ‘expansive sweep,’ Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987); and ... it is ‘broadly worded,’ Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 138 (1990), ‘deliberately expansive,’ Pilot Life, supra, at 46, and ‘conspicuous for its breadth,’ [FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 58 (1990)].” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384 (1992).

Our efforts at applying the provision have yielded a two-part inquiry: A “law ‘relate[s] to’ a covered employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) ‘if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to such a plan.’ ” District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125, 129 (1992) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1983)). Under the latter inquiry, we have held pre-empted a law that “impos[ed] requirements by reference to [ERISA] covered programs,” Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, supra, at 130-131; a law that specifically exempted ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 828, n. 2, 829-830 (1988); and a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA' plan, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 140 (1990). Where a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey, or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation, as in Greater Washington Bd. of Trade and Ingersoll-Rand, that “reference” will result in pre-emption.

A law that does not refer to ERISA plans may yet be pre-empted if it has a “connection with” ERISA plans. Two Terms ago, we recognized that an “uncritical literalism” in applying this standard offered scant utility in determining Congress’ intent as to the extent of § 514(a)’s reach. Travelers, 514 U. S., at 656. Rather, to determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to “the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,” ibid., as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans, id., at 658-659.

As is always the case in our pre-emption jurisprudence, where “federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation,... we have worked on the ‘assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Id., at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)) (citation omitted).

A

Respondents and several of their amici urge us to conclude that § 1777.5 makes “reference to” ERISA plans. Because it seems that approved apprenticeship programs need not necessarily be ERISA plans, we decline to do so.

On its face, § 1777.5 appears to allow the lower apprentice wage only to a contractor who acquires apprentices through a “joint apprenticeship committee” — an apprenticeship program sponsored by the collective efforts of management and organized labor. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§3075, 3076 (West 1989). Were this the true extent of the prevailing wage law’s reach, respondents’ “reference to” argument might be more persuasive. The CAC has, however, promulgated regulations making clear that the class of apprenticeship program sponsors who may provide approved apprentices is broader. See 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 230.1(a) (1992) (“Registered apprentices can only be obtained from the Apprenticeship Committee of the craft or trade in the area of the site of the public work” (emphasis added)); id., § 228(c) (defining an apprenticeship committee as “an apprenticeship program sponsor”); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §3075 (West 1989) (stating that an “apprenticeship program sponsor may be a joint apprenticeship committee, unilateral management or labor apprenticeship committee, or an individual employer”). An apprenticeship program, it would seem, can be maintained by a single employer, and its costs can be defrayed out of that employer’s general assets.

To comport with § 302(c)(6) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 186(c)(6), the expenses of any joint apprenticeship committee must be defrayed out of moneys placed into a separate fund. The existence of that fund triggers ERISA coverage over programs like that of the Electronic and Communications Systems JATC. See ERISA Advisory Op. No. 94-14A (Apr. 20, 1994). But an employee benefit program not funded through a separate fund is not an ERISA plan. In Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989), we recognized a distinction between vacation benefits paid out of an accumulated fund and those paid out of an employer’s general assets. A fund established to pay vacation benefits, we held, constituted an employee welfare benefit plan; the policy at issue in Morash, whereby vacation benefits were paid out of general assets, did not. The distinction, we concluded, was compelled by ERISA’s object and policy:

“In enacting ERISA, Congress’ primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds. To that end, it established extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary-duty requirements to insure against the possibility that the employee’s expectation of the benefit would be defeated through poor management by the plan administrator.” Id., at 115 (citation and footnote omitted).

Benefits paid out of an employer’s general assets presented risks indistinguishable from “the danger of defeated expectations of wages for services performed,” a hazard with which ERISA is unconcerned. Ibid.

The Secretary has carried this funded/unfunded distinction into areas that are, we think, analogous to that of apprenticeship programs. See, e. g., 29 CFR §2510.3-l(k) (1994) (scholarship programs paid for out of an employer’s general assets are not ERISA plans); §2510.3-l(b)(3)(iv) (training provided on the job with general assets does not constitute ERISA plan); see also ERISA Advisory Op. No. 94-14A (Apr. 20,1994) (apprenticeship programs paid for out of trust funds are ERISA plans); ERISA Advisory Op. No. 83-32A (June 21, 1983) (in-house professional development program financed out of general assets is not an ERISA plan). Although none of these regulations specifically answers the question whether an unfunded apprenticeship program is covered by ERISA, they suggest — as does our decision in Morash — that it is not.

Section 1777.5, then, “functions irrespective of. . . the existence of an ERISA plan.” Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U. S., at 139. An apprenticeship program meeting the substantive standards set forth in the Fitzgerald Act regulations can be approved whether or not its funding apparatus is of a kind as to bring it under ERISA. See Southern Cal. ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 429, n. 1, 841 P. 2d, at 1014, n. 1. Section 1777.5 is indifferent to the funding, and attendant ERISA coverage, of apprenticeship programs. Accordingly, California’s prevailing wage statute does not make reference to ERISA plans. We turn now to the question whether it nonetheless has a “connection with” such plans.

B

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., we held that the New York Human Rights Law, which prohibited “employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy,” and New York’s Disability Benefits Law, which required “employers to pay employees specific benefits,” “relate[d] to” ERISA plans. 463 U. S., at 97. Shaw and other of our ERISA pre-emption decisions, see, e. g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52 (1990); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981), presented us with state statutes that “mandated employee benefit structures or their administration”; in those cases, we concluded that these requirements amounted to “connection^] with” ERISA plans. See Travelers, 514 U. S., at 658.

The state law at issue in Travelers, our most recent exercise in ERISA pre-emption, stands in considerable contrast. That statute regulated hospital rates, and required hospitals to exact surcharges (ranging from 9% to 24% of the rate set under the statute) from patients whose hospital bills were paid by any of a variety of non-Blue Cross/Blue Shield providers. Because ERISA plans, as might be expected, were predominant among the purchasers of insurance, see Brief for Petitioner in Travelers, O. T. 1994, No. 93-1408, p. 1-2, the statute was asserted to run afoul of ERISA’s preemption provision. The differential rates charged to commercially insured patients and to patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield (collectively “the Blues”) made commercial insurance relatively more expensive — and relatively less attractive. The resulting cost variations encouraged insurance purchasers, including ERISA plans, to provide insurance benefits through the Blues. Commercial insurers argued that these cost variations and their resulting economic effects had a “connection with” those ERISA plans, requiring pre-emption of the law that dictated them.

We upheld the statute. The “indirect economic influence” of the surcharge, we noted, did not “bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.” 514 U. S., at 659. Nor did the indirect influence of the surcharge “preclude uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishe[d] to provide one.” Id., at 660. Indeed, if ERISA were concerned with any state action — such as medical-care quality standards or hospital workplace regulations — that increased costs of providing certain benefits, and thereby potentially affected the choices made by ERISA plans, we could scarcely see the end of ERISA’s pre-emptive reach, and the words “relate to” would limit nothing. Id., at 660-661. We also noted that several States regulated hospital charges at the time that ERISA was enacted, and yet neither ERISA’s language nor legislative history made any mention of pre-empting these state efforts.

We think that, in every relevant respect, California’s prevailing wage statute is indistinguishable from New York’s surcharge program. At the outset, we note that apprenticeship standards and the wages paid on state public works have long been regulated by the States. As discussed in Part I-A, supra, California has required that prevailing wages be paid on its public works projects for nearly as long as Congress has required them to be paid on federal projects, and for more than 40 years prior to the enactment of ERISA. Similarly, California has legislated in the apprenticeship area for the better part of this century. See, e. g., The Shelley - Maloney Apprentice Labor Standards Act, 1939 Cal. Stat. 220, codified at Cal. Lab. Code §3070 et seq. Congress, in the Fitzgerald Act, recognized pre-existing state efforts in regulating apprenticeship programs and apparently expected that those efforts would continue. See 29 U. S. C. §50 (directing the Secretary of Labor “to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of apprenticeship”); see also H. R. Rep. No. 945, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).

That the States traditionally regulated these areas would not alone immunize their efforts; ERISA certainly contemplated the pre-emption of substantial areas of traditional state regulation. The wages to be paid on public works projects and the substantive standards to be applied to apprenticeship training programs are, however, quite remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned— “ ‘reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like.’ ” Travelers, supra, at 661 (quoting Shaw, 463 U. S., at 98). A reading of § 514(a) resulting in the pre-emption of traditionally state-regulated substantive law in those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be “unsettling,” Travelers, 514 U. S., at 665. Given the paucity of indication in ERISA and its legislative history of any intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt state apprenticeship training standards, or state prevailing wage laws that incorporate them, we are reluctant to alter our ordinary “assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act.” Rice, 331 U. S., at 230. Accordingly, as in Travelers, we address the substance of the California statute with the presumption that ERISA did not intend to supplant it.

Like New York’s surcharge requirement, the apprenticeship portion of the prevailing wage statute does not bind ERISA plans to anything. No apprenticeship program is required by California law to meet California’s standards. See Southern Cal. ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 428, 841 P. 2d, at 1013. If a contractor chooses to hire apprentices for a public works project, it need not hire them from an approved program (although if it does not, it must pay these apprentices journeyman wages). So, apprenticeship programs that have not gained CAC approval may still supply public works contractors with apprentices. Unapproved apprenticeship programs also may supply apprentices to private contractors. The effect of §1777.5 on ERISA apprenticeship programs, therefore, is merely to provide some measure of economic incentive to comport with the State’s requirements, at least to the extent that those programs seek to provide apprentices who can work on public works projects at a lower wage.

Apprenticeship programs have confronted these differential economic incentives since well before the enactment of ERISA, and would face them today even if California had no prevailing wage statute. To supply apprentices eligible for the apprenticeship wage to federal public works contractors, an apprenticeship program must meet the standards promulgated by California under the Fitzgerald Act. What is more, with or without the possibility of being able to provide apprentices eligible for a lower wage on public projects, apprenticeship programs in California have other incentives to seek CAC approval. See Southern Cal. ABC, supra, at 429, 841 P. 2d, at 1013 (“In California, additional financial incentives exist in the form of direct financial subsidies for training provided by approved programs,” and because “an apprentice who completes an approved training program obtains a certificate of completion naming him or her a skilled journeyman in the chosen trade”). It cannot be gainsaid that §1777.5 has the effect of encouraging apprenticeship programs — including ERISA plans — to meet the standards set out by California, but it has not been demonstrated here that the added inducement created by the wage break available on state public works projects is tantamount to a compulsion upon apprenticeship programs.

The effect of the prevailing wage statute on ERISA-covered apprenticeship programs in California is substantially similar to the effect of New York law on ERISA plans choosing whether to provide health insurance benefits in New York through the Blues, or through a commercial carrier. The prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans. In this regard, it is “no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.” Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort. We thus conclude that California’s prevailing wage laws and apprenticeship standards do not have a “connection with,” and therefore do not “relate to,” ERISA plans.

Ill

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ordered.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

concurring.

Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has accepted certiorari in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts of Appeals regarding ERISA preemption of various sorts of state law. The rate of accept-anee, moreover, has not diminished (we have taken two more ERISA pre-emption cases so far this Term), suggesting that our prior decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law.

I join the Court’s opinion today because it is a fair description of our prior case law, and a fair application of the more recent of that case law. Today’s opinion is no more likely than our earlier ones, however, to bring clarity to this field— precisely because it does obeisance to all our prior cases, instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in some of them have in effect been abandoned. Our earlier cases sought to apply faithfully the statutory prescription that state laws are pre-empted “insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” Hence the many statements, repeated today, to the effect that the ERISA pre-emption provision has a “broad scope,” an “expansive sweep,” is “broadly worded,” “deliberately expansive,” and “conspicuous for its breadth.” Ante, at 324. But applying the “relate to” provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else. Accord, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995). The statutory text provides an illusory test, unless the Court is willing to decree a degree of pre-emption that no sensible person could have intended — which it is not.

I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the “relate to” claúse of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in which ordinary field pre-emption applies — namely, the field of laws regulating “employee benefit plants] described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title,” 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). Our new approach to ERISA pre-emption is set forth in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 99 (1993): “[W]e discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional pre-emption analysis.” I think it accurately describes our current ERISA jurisprudence to say that we apply ordinary field pre-emption, and, of course, ordinary conflict preemption. See generally Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) (explaining general principles of field and conflict pre-emption); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) (field pre-emption); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963) (conflict pre-emption). Nothing more mysterious than that; and except as establishing that, “relates to” is irrelevant.

       The Fitzgerald Act provides: “The Secretary of Labor is authorized and directed to formulate and promote the furtherance of labor standards necessary to safeguard the welfare of apprentices, to extend the application of such standards by encouraging the inclusion thereof in contracts of apprenticeship, to bring together employers and labor for the formulation of programs of apprenticeship, [and] to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of apprenticeship ....” 29U.S. C. §50. ’

       Section 3(1) defines an “employee welfare benefit plan” as: “[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants ... (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services ....” 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1) (emphasis added). any and

       The pre-emption clause provides that ERISA all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.” § 1144(a).

       ERISA’s saving clause provides that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any laws of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.” § 1144(d).

       We are told that “[m]ost state-approved apprenticeship programs in the construction industry in California appear to be ERISA plans.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17, n. 8. Between April and June 1994, California had 175 joint apprenticeship programs and 13 “unilateral” ones. Ibid. As noted above, the costs of the joint apprenticeship programs are necessarily defrayed out of separate funds. The Government points out that some of the 13 unilateral programs may also have separate funds. Ibid. No party before us has established that all programs do. Cf. The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 711 (CA2 1994) (noting that 88% of “non-elderly Americans have private health care insurance through [ERISA] plans”), rev’d by New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995).

       In fact, the very same Congress that enacted ERISA adopted, a short time later, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA), Pub. L. 93-641,88 Stat. 2225, §§ 1-3, repealed by Pub. L. 99-660, title VII, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799, which “sought to encourage and help fund state responses to growing health care costs and the widely diverging availability of health services.” Travelers, supra, at 665. The NHPRDA had in mind a system akin to New York’s, and we thought it unlikely that the Congress that enacted ERISA would later have sought to encourage a state program that ERISA would pre-empt.

       In Travelers, we were convinced that Congress did not intend preemption of New York’s law both by the lack of any positive indication that Congress harbored such an intent, and by indirect evidence — the NHPRDA — that the Congress that enacted ERISA did not intend to supersede state laws like New York’s regulation of hospital charges. 514 U. S., at 664-668. We face here a similar absence of positive indications on the part of Congress that apprenticeship or prevailing wage statutes would be superseded. The United States further argues that the Fitzgerald Act is analogous to the NHPRDA: Were we to hold §1777.5 preempted “[tjhat result ‘would leave States without the authority to do just what Congress was expressly trying to induce them to do by enacting the Fitzgerald Act.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In Travelers, we thought it implausible that the Congress that enacted ERISA intended to pre-empt state laws that the same Congress subsequently sought to encourage with the NHPRDA. It is not, however, inconceivable for the ERISA Congress to intend the pre-emption of state statutes resulting from the pre-existing Fitzgerald Act. So, the United States’ analogy is not decisive. It does, however, aid our conclusion that Congress’ silence on the pre-emption of state statutes that Congress previously sought to foster counsels against pre-emption here.

       Respondents and two of their amici point to bills introduced in Congress for the purpose, at least in part, of overruling lower court decisions holding prevailing wage statutes like California’s pre-empted. See Brief for Respondent 23, Brief for Signatory Members of the Coalition to Preserve ERISA Pre-emption as Amicus Curiae 11, and Brief for Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 26-27 (all citing H. R. 1036, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1580, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). It is argued that Congress’ unwillingness to amend § 514(a) in response to these decisions is evidence that Congress believed that those opinions accurately interpreted ERISA’s pre-emptive scope. We have rejected similar arguments before. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
        Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 114 (1989); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one”). is

       In New York, we are told, “approximately half of all construction is not subject to state or federal prevailing wage requirements.” Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae 21, n. 14 (citing F. W. Dodge Division, McGraw-Hill Information Systems, Inc. (1996)).

       It may also be that, because California’s standards are “substantively similar,” Southern California ABC, 4 Cal. 4th, at 434, 841 P. 2d, at 1017, to the federal standards, multistate apprenticeship programs are not saddled with “the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 142 (1990). Then again, the area of apprenticeship training may be one where uniformity of substantive standards across States is impossible. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (“[P]revailing wages in different States — or even in different areas of a single State — may vary substantially, and training requirements for membership in skilled trades may also vary among different trades, different communities, and different States”). We need not resolve this question. Suffice it to say that the federal and state apprenticeship standards are not mandatory, and California’s standards do not result in disuniformities different in kind from those that would exist without them.

       It is not conclusive as to California’s apprenticeship programs, but we note that some data support the conclusion that the prevailing wage break for approved apprenticeship programs does not present ERISA plans with a Hobson’s choice. Amici State of Washington et al. inform us that “[w]hile the federal government and twenty-seven of the thirty-one states which have prevailing wage laws have [a wage break], it is estimated that only fifty percent of apprentices in this country are in state or federally ‘approved’ programs.” Brief for State of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae 20, and n. 13.

       Because we determine that § 1777.5 does not “relate to” ERISA plans, we need not determine whether ERISA’s saving clause, § 514(d), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(d), nonetheless forestalls pre-emption. the

       In addition to the case at bar, the Court has addressed the application of ERISA’s pre-emption provision in the following eases: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav.

        Bank, 510 U. S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85 (1983); and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981).

       See Boggs v. Boggs, cert. granted, post, p. 957; De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, cert, granted, post, p. 926.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Thomas

license: Public Domain

text:
    ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO.
    No. 95-1376.
    Argued November 6, 1996
    Decided February 18, 1997

      Allen M. Lenchek argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Erie Schnapper, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, and Charles Stephen Ralston.

      Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, C. Gregory Stewart, and Gwendolyn Young Reams.

      L. Chris Butler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Patricia McHugh Lambert

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Paul C. Saunders, Marc L. Fleischaker, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Judith H. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, Helen

        L. Norton, Stephen R. Shapiro, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Martha F. Davis; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Douglas A Hedin and Robert Belton.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by J. Thomas Kil-patrick, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment” who have either availed themselves of Title VII’s protections or assisted others in so doing. 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). We are asked to decide in this case whether the term “employees,” as used in § 704(a), includes former employees, such that petitioner may bring suit against his former employer for postemployment actions allegedly taken' in retaliation for petitioner’s having filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the term “employees” in § 704(a) referred only to current employees and therefore petitioner’s claim was not cognizable under Title VII. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1154 (1996), and now reverse.

I

Respondent Shell Oil Co. fired petitioner Charles T. Robinson, Sr., in 1991. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that respondent had discharged him because of his race. While that charge was pending, petitioner applied for a job with another company. That company contacted respondent, as petitioner’s former employer, for an employment reference. Petitioner claims that respondent gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge.

Petitioner subsequently sued under § 704(a), alleging retaliatory discrimination. On respondent’s motion, the District Court dismissed the action, adhering to previous Fourth Circuit precedent holding that § 704(a) does not apply to former employees. Petitioner appealed, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel decision, and thereafter affirmed the District Court’s determination that former employees may not bring suit under § 704(a) for retaliation occurring after termination of their employment. 70 F. 3d 325 (1995).

We granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on this issue.

II

A

Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989); see also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992).

The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136, 139 (1991). In this case, consideration of those factors leads us to conclude that the term “employees,” as used in § 704(a), is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former employees.

At first blush, the term “employees” in § 704(a) would seem to refer to those having an existing employment relationship with the employer in question. Cf. Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., ante, at 207-208 (interpreting the term “employees” in § 701(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)). This initial impression, however, does not withstand scrutiny in the context of § 704(a). First, there is no temporal qualifier in the statute such as would make plain that § 704(a) protects only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation. That the statute could have expressly included the phrase “former employees” does not aid our inquiry. Congress also could have used the phrase “current employees.” But nowhere in Title VII is either phrase used — even where the specific context otherwise makes clear an intent to cover current or former employees. Similarly, that other statutes have been more specific in their coverage of “employees” and “former employees,” see, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 1301(4) (1994 Supp. I) (defining “employee” to include “former employee”); 5 U. S. C. § 1212(a)(1) (including “employees, former employees, and applicants for employment” in the operative provision), proves only that Congress can use the unqualified term “employees” to refer only to current employees, not that it did so in this particular statute. lacks

so Second, Title VII’s definition of “employee” likewise lacks any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either current or past employment. Section 701(f) defines “employee” for purposes of Title VII as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f). The argument that the term “employed,” as used in § 701(f), is commonly used to mean “[performing work under an employer-employee relationship,” Black’s Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990), begs the question by implicitly reading the word “employed” to mean “is employed.” But the word “employed” is not so limited in its possible meanings, and could just as easily be read to mean “was employed.” the

Third, a number of other provisions in Title VII use the term “employees” to mean something more inclusive or different from “current employees.” For example, §§ 706(g)(1) and 717(b) both authorize affirmative remedial action (by a court or EEOC, respectively) “which may include ... reinstatement or hiring of employees.” 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-5(g)(1) and 2000e-16(b). As petitioner notes, because one does not “reinstate] ” current employees, that language necessarily refers to former employees. Likewise, one may hire individuals to be employees, but one does not typically hire persons who already are employees.

Section 717(b) requires federal departments and agencies to have equal employment opportunity policies and rules, “which shall include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him thereunder.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(b). If the complaint involves discriminatory discharge, as it often does, the “employee” who must be notified is necessarily a former employee. Similarly, § 717(e) provides that an “employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, . . . may file a civil action . . . 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c). Again, given that discriminatory discharge is a forbidden “personnel actio[n] affecting employees,” see § 717(a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(a), the term “employee” in § 717(c) necessarily includes a former employee. See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U. S. 549 (1988) (involving a discriminatory discharge action successfully brought under §717 by a former Postal Service employee).

Of course, there are Sections of Title VII where, in context, use of the term “employee” refers unambiguously to a current employee, for example, those sections addressing salary or promotions. See § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h) (allowing different standards of compensation for “employees who work'in different locations”); § 717(b), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(b) (directing federal agencies to establish a plan “to provide a maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest potential”).

But those examples at most demonstrate that the term “employees” may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section — not that the term has the same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. Once it is established that the term “employees” includes former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute. “his” be-

Respondent argues that the addition of the word fore “employees” narrows the scope of the provision. Brief for Respondent 19. That argument is true, so far as it goes, but it does not resolve the question before us — namely, in what time frame must the employment relationship exist. The phrase “his employees” could include “his” former employees, but still exclude persons who have never worked for the particular employer being charged with retaliation. that Con-

Nor are we convinced by respondent’s argument that Congress’ inclusion in § 704(a) of “applicants for employment” as persons distinct from “employees,” coupled with its failure to include “former employees,” is evidence of congressional intent not to include former employees. The use of the term “applicants” in § 704(a) does not serve to confine, by negative inference, the temporal scope of the term “employees.” Respondent’s argument rests on the incorrect premise that the term “applicants” is equivalent to the phrase “future employees.” But the term “applicants” would seem to cover many persons who will not become employees. Unsuccessful applicants or those who turn down a job offer, for example, would have been applicants, but not future employees. And the term fails to cover certain future employees who may be offered and will accept jobs without having to apply for those jobs. Because the term “applicants” in § 704(a) is not synonymous with the phrase “future employees,” there is no basis for engaging in the further (and questionable) negative inference that inclusion of the term “applicants” demonstrates intentional exclusion of former employees.

Finally, the use of the term “individual” in § 704(a), as well as in § 703(a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), provides no meaningful assistance in resolving this case. To be sure, “individual” is a broader term than “employee” and would facially seem to cover a former employee. But it would also encompass a present employee as well as other persons who have never had an employment relationship with the employer at issue. The term “individual,” therefore, does not seem designed to capture former employees, as distinct from current employees, and its use provides no insight into whether the term “employees” is limited only to current employees.

B

Finding that the term “employees” in § 704(a) is ambiguous, we are left to resolve that ambiguity. The broader context provided by other sections of the statute provides considerable assistance in this regard. As noted above, several sections of the statute plainly contemplate that former employees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII. See supra, at 342-343. Indeed, § 703(a) expressly includes discriminatory “discharge” as one of the unlawful employment practices against which Title VII is directed. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). Insofar as § 704(a) expressly protects employees from retaliation for filing a “charge” under Title VII, and a charge under § 703(a) alleging unlawful discharge would necessarily be brought by a former employee, it is far more consistent to include former employees within the scope of “employees” protected by § 704(a).

In further support of this view, petitioner argues that the word “employees” includes former employees because to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by § 704(a). See Brief for Petitioner 20-30. This is also the position taken by the EEOC. See Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 16-25; see 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 614.7(f). According to the EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the protection of § 704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims. Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 18-21.

Those arguments carry persuasive force given their coherence and their consistency with a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions: Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. Cf. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U. S. 117, 121-122 (1972) (National Labor Relations Act); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 292-293 (1960) (Fair Labor Standards Act). The EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII — for example, complaints regarding discriminatory termination. We agree with these contentions and find that they support the inclusive interpretation of “employees” in § 704(a) that is already suggested by the broader context of Title VII.

HH

We hold that the term “employees, as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, is ambiguous as to whether it includes former employees. It being more consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a), we hold that former employees are included within §704(a)’s coverage. Accordingly, the decision of the Fourth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.

       The other Courts of Appeals to have considered this issue have held that the term “employees” in § 704(a) does include former employees. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F. 3d 194, 198-200 (CA3), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1022 (1994); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F. 2d 1506, 1509 (CA11 1988); O’Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F. 2d 864, 869 (CA9 1982), overruled on other grounds by Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F. 2d 1477, 1481-1482 (CA9 1987) (en banc); Pantchenko v. C. B. Dolge Co., 581 F. 2d 1052, 1055 (CA2 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F. 2d 1162, 1165 (CA10 1977). The Fourth Circuit indicated that it joined the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Reed v. Shepard, 939 F. 2d 484, 492-493 (1991). But the Seventh Circuit has since repudiated the Fourth Circuit’s view of Reed. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F. 3d 881, 886 (1996).

       Our recent decision in Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., ante, p. 202, held that the term “employees” in § 701(b), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), referred to those persons with whom an employer has an existing employment relationship. See ante, at 207-208. But § 701(b) has two significant temporal qualifiers. The provision, which delimits Title * VIPs coverage, states that the Act applies to any employer “who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b) (emphasis added). The emphasized words specify the time frame in which the employment relationship must exist, and thus the specific context of that section did not present the particular ambiguity at issue in the present case.

       Other sections also seem to use the term “employees” to mean something other than current employees. Section 701(c) defines “employment agency” as “any person regularly undertaking ... to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(c). This language most naturally is read to mean “prospective employees.” Section 701(e) uses identical language when providing that a labor organization affects commerce if it “operates a hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an employer ....” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(e).

       Petitioner’s examples of non-Title VII cases using the term “employee” to refer to a former employee are largely irrelevant, except to the extent they tend to rebut a claim that the term “employee” has some intrinsically plain meaning. See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81, 83 (1971) (unemployed disabled worker); Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 239 (1967) (individual who had been fired); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960) (retired worker).


author: Justice Breyer

text:
    UNITED STATES v. BROCKAMP, administrator of the ESTATE OF McGILL, DECEASED
    No. 95-1225.
    Argued December 3, 1996
    Decided February 18, 1997

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Kent L. Jones, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, and Bridget M. Rowan.

      Robert F. Klueger argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

      Together with United States v. Scott, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 12.4).

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The two cases before us raise a single question. Can courts toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in §6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986? We hold that they cannot.

These two cases present similar circumstances. In each case a taxpayer initially paid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) several thousand dollars that he did not owe. In each case the taxpayer (or his representative) filed an administrative claim for refund several years after the relevant statutory time period for doing so had ended. In each case the taxpayer suffered a disability (senility or alcoholism), which, he said, explained why the delay was not his fault. And in each case he asked the court to extend the relevant statutory time period for an “equitable” reason, namely, the existence of a mental disability — a reason not mentioned in §6511, but which, we assume, would permit a court to toll the statutory limitations period if but only if, §6511 contains an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1996); see also Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 88 F. 3d 847, 852 (CA7 1996) (defining equitable tolling).

In both cases, the Ninth Circuit read §6511 as if it did contain an implied exception that would permit “equitable tolling.” It then applied principles of equity to each case. It found those principles justified tolling the statutory time period. And it permitted the actions to proceed. 67 F. 3d 260 (1995); judgt. order reported at 70 F. 3d 120 (1995). All other Circuits that have considered the matter, however, have taken the opposite view. They have held that §6511 does not authorize equitable tolling. See Amoco Production Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F. 3d 1464 (CA10 1996); Lovett v. United States, 81 F. 3d 143 (CA Fed. 1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F. 3d 691 (CA4 1995); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F. 2d 25 (CA1 1993) (per curiam); and Vintilla v. United States, 931 F. 2d 1444 (CA11 1991). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. And we conclude that the latter Circuits are correct.

The taxpayers rest their claim for equitable tolling upon Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case in which this Court considered the timeliness of an employee’s lawsuit charging his Government employer with discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The Court found the lawsuit untimely, but nevertheless tolled the limitations period. It held that the “rule of equitable tolling” applies “to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable” to Title VII suits against private employers. 498 U. S., at 94-95. The Court went on to say that the “same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” Id., at 95-96.

The taxpayers, pointing to Irwin, argue that principles of equitable tolling would have applied had they sued private

defendants, e. g., had they sought restitution from private defendants for “Money Had and Received.” See C. Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading 220 (2d ed. 1934). They add that given Irwin’s language, there must be a “presumption” that limitations periods in tax refund suits against the Government can be equitably tolled. And, they say, that “presumption,” while “rebuttable,” has not been rebutted. They conclude that, given Irwin, the Ninth Circuit correctly tolled the statutory period for “equitable” reasons.

In evaluating this argument, we are willing to assume, favorably to the taxpayers but only for argument’s sake, that a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin’s negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? But see Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 153-154 (1960) (citing Curtis’s Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing common-law suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 382-383 (1933); see also Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1947) (describing collector suit as a fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). We can travel no further, however, along Irwin’s road, for there are strong reasons for answer-Irwin’s question in the Government’s favor.

Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c) (requiring suit for employment discrimination to be filed “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final [EEOC] action ... ”). But § 6511 uses language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Moreover, §6511 reiterates its limitations several times in several different ways. Section 6511 says, first, that a

“[c]laim for ... refund ... of any tax ... shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.” 26 U. S. C. §6511(a).

It then says that

“[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is filed . . . within such period.” § 6511(b)(1).

It reiterates the point by imposing substantive limitations:

“If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period ... the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. .. .” § 6511(b)(2)(A).

And

“[i]f the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” § 6511(b)(2)(B).

The Tax Code reemphasizes the point when it says that refunds that do not comply with these limitations “shall be considered erroneous,” §6514, and specifies procedures for the Government’s recovery of any such “erroneous” refund payment. §§ 6532(b), 7405. In addition, §6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include “equitable tolling.” See § 6511(d) (establishing special time limit rules for refunds related to operating losses, credit self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 610 (1990) (discussing mitigation provisions' set forth in 26 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1314); §507 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 961 (temporarily tolling limitations period during wartime).

To read an “equitable tolling” provision into these provisions, one would have to assume an implied exception for tolling virtually every time a number appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require tolling, not only procedural limitations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery — a kind of tolling for which we have found no direct precedent. Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, “equitable” exceptions into the statute that it wrote. There are no counter-indications. Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.

The nature of the underlying subject matter — tax collection — underscores the linguistic point. The IRS processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept, of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8-9. To read an “equitable tolling” exception into §6511 could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for “equitable tolling” which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification* See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1926) (deleting provision excusing tax deficiencies in the estates of insane or deceased individuals because of difficulties involved in defining incompetence). The nature and potential magnitude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute’s limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires.

The taxpayers’ counterrebuttal consists primarily of an interesting historical analysis of the Internal Revenue Code’s tax refund provisions. They try to show that §6511’s specific, detailed language reflects congressional concern about matters not related to equitable tolling. They explain some language, for example, in terms of a congressional effort to stop taxpayers from keeping the refund period open indefinitely through the device of making a series of small tax payments. See S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 (1924). They explain other language as an effort to make the refund time period and the tax assessment period coextensive. See H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (1942). Assuming all that is so, however, such congressional efforts still seem but a smaller part of a larger congressional objective: providing the Government with strong statutory “protection against stale demands.” Cf. United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528, 533 (1938) (statute of limitations bars untimely amendment of claim for additional refund). Moreover, the history to which the taxpayers point reveals that §6511’s predecessor tax refund provisions, like §6511, contained highly detailed language with clear time limits. See, e. g., § 281(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 301 (4-year limit on claims for overpayment of income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax and cap on refund amount); § 322(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,47 Stat. 242 (2-year limit for claim filing and corresponding limit on refund amount); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 808 (adopting current alternative time and amount limitations); see also §810 of the Revenue Act. of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 283 (imposing time and amount limits for estate tax refunds). And that history lacks any instance (but for the present cases) of equitable tolling. On balance, these historical considerations help the Government’s argument.

For these reasons, we conclude that Congress did not intend the “equitable tolling” doctrine to apply to §6511’s time limitations. The Ninth Circuit’s decisions are

Reversed.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    BIBLES, OREGON DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION
    No. 96-713.
    Decided February 18, 1997
   Per Curiam.

In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6), did not forbid disclosure of a mailing list maintained by petitioner for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and sought by respondent, the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon the “substantial public interest in knowing to whom the government is directing information, or as ONDA characterizes it, ‘propaganda,’ so that those persons may receive information from other sources that do not share the BLM’s self-interest in presenting government activities in the most favorable light” 83 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (1996) (emphasis added). “There is,” the Court of Appeals said, “a significant public interest in knowing with whom the government has chosen to communicate and in providing those persons with additional information . . ..” Id., at 1172 (emphasis added).

These statements, which are the sum total of the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the public interest in disclosure, make clear that the court’s judgment rested on a perceived public interest in “providing [persons on the BLM’s mailing list] with additional information.” That is inconsistent with our opinion in Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U. S. 487 (1994), which said that “the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis” is “the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would ‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their government is up to.’ ” Id., at 497 (emphasis added) (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 773 (1989)). “‘[T]he purposes for which the request for information is made,”’ we said, have no bearing on whether information must be disclosed under FOIA. 510 U. S., at 496 (quoting Reporters Comm, for Freedom of Press, supra, at 771).

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.