author:
      Per Curiam.
      Justice Stevens,

text:
    MAZUREK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA v. ARMSTRONG et al.
    No. 96-1104.
    Decided June 16, 1997
   Per Curiam.

In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. 1995 Mont. Laws, ch. 321, §2 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 50-20-109 (1995)). Similar rules exist in 40 other States in the Nation. The Montana law was challenged almost immediately by respondents, who are a group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant practicing in Montana. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an “undue burden” within the meaning of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (Mont. 1995). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment, holding that respondents had shown a “fair chance of success on the merits” of their claim, and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive relief under Circuit precedent. 94 F. 3d 566, 567-568 (1996). The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to reconsider the “balance of hardships” and determine whether entry of a preliminary injunction was ultimately warranted. Ibid. The District Court has not yet reconsidered the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, but it has entered (based on the parties’ stipulations) an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), and has postponed its hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until our disposition of petitioner’s certiorari petition. Order Granting Injunction Pending Appeal, No. CV 95-083-GF-PGH (Mont., Nov. 5, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-32a. As a consequence, Montana’s physician-only requirement is unenforceable at the present time against respondent Susan Cahill, who is the only nonphysician licensed to perform abortions in Montana.

The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that respondents had established a “fair chance of success on the merits” of their constitutional challenge is inconsistent with our treatment of the physician-only requirement at issue in Casey. That requirement involved only the provision of information to patients, and not the actual performance of abortions, yet we nonetheless held — overruling our prior holding in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 448 (1983) — that the limitation to physicians was valid. Casey, supra, at 884-885. We found that “[s]ince there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, ... it is not an undue burden.” 505 U. S., at 884-885 (emphasis added). The District Court, quoting this precise passage, held: “There exists insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion [that] the requirement that a licensed physician perform an abortion would amount, ‘in practical terms, to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.’ Accordingly, it is unlikely that [respondents] will prevail upon their suggestion that the requirement constitutes an ‘undue burden’ within the meaning of Casey.” 906 F. Supp., at 567 (quoting Casey, supra, at 884 (emphasis added)).

The Court of Appeals never contested this District Court conclusion that there was “insufficient evidence” in the record that the requirement posed a “‘substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.’” Instead, it held that the physician-only requirement was arguably invalid because its purpose, according to the Court of Appeals, may have been to create a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions. 94 F. 3d, at 567. But even assuming the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ implicit premise — that a legislative purpose to interfere with the constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right (here it is uncontested that there was insufficient evidence of a “substantial obstacle” to abortion) could render the Montana law invalid — there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative purpose here. We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes produce harmful results, see, e. g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 246 (1976); much less do we assume it when the results are harmless. One searches the Court of Appeals’ opinion in vain for any mention of any evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature. If the motion at issue here were a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and if the plaintiff’s only basis for proceeding with the suit were a claim of improper legislative purpose, one would demand some evidence of that improper purpose in order to avoid a nonsuit. And what is at issue here is not even a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, as to which the requirement for substantial proof is much higher. “It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, pp. 129-130 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

Respondents claim in this Court that the Montana law must have had an invalid purpose because “all health evidence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis” for the law. Brief in Opposition 7. Respondents contend that “the only extant study comparing the complication rates for first-trimester abortions performed by [physician-assistants] with those for first-trimester abortions performed by physicians found no significant difference.” Ibid. But this line of argument is squarely foreclosed by Casey itself. In the course of upholding the physician-only requirement at issue in that case, we emphasized that “[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be 'performed by others.” 505 U. S., at 885 (emphasis added). Respondents fall back on the fact that an antiabortion group drafted the Montana law. But that says nothing significant about the legislature’s purpose in passing it.

Today’s dissent, for its part, claims that “there is substantial evidence indicating that the sole purpose of the statute was to target a particular licensed professional” (respondent Susan Cahill). Post, at 979-980. It is true that the law “targeted” Cahill in the sense that she was the only nonphy-sician performing abortions at the time it was passed. But it is difficult to see how that helps rather than harms respondents’ case. The dissent does not claim that this was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, nor was that the basis on which the Court of Appeals relied. (Such a contention would be implausible as applied to a provision so commonplace as to exist in 40 other States, see n. 1, supra.) And the basis on which the Court of Appeals did rely (that the purpose of the law may have been to create a “substantial obstacle” to abortion) is positively contradicted by the fact that only a single practitioner is affected. That is especially so since under the old scheme Cahill could only perform abortions with a licensed physician (who also performs abortions) present, see Brief in Opposition 4, meaning that no woman seeking an abortion would be required by the new law to travel to a different facility than was previously available. All this strongly supports the District Court’s finding, after hearing testimony, that there was insufficient evidence that the law created a “substantial obstacle” to abortion. And there is simply no evidence that the legislature intended the law to do what it plainly did not do.

The Court of Appeals’ decision is also contradicted by our repeated statements in past cases — none of which was so much as cited by the Court of Appeals, despite the District Court’s discussion of two of them — that the performance of abortions may be restricted to physicians. We first expressed this view (although it was not necessary to our holding) in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 165 (1973), saying that “[t]he State may define the term ‘physician,’... to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.” We reiterated this view in Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U. S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam), where, in the course of holding that the Federal Constitution posed no bar to the conviction of a person with no medical training for the performance of an abortion, we said that “prosecutions for abortions conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interference.” Finally, in Akron, in the course of striking down a requirement that licensed physicians rather than other medical personnel provide specified information to patients (the holding overruled in Casey), we emphasized that our prior cases “left no doubt that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions.” 462 U. S., at 447 (citing Roe, supra, at 165, and Menillo, supra, at 11).

Respondents urge us to ignore the error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment because the case comes to us prior to the entry of a final judgment in the lower courts. It is true that we are ordinarily reluctant to exercise our certiorari jurisdiction in that circumstance. See, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 258 (1916). But our cases make clear that there is no absolute bar to review of nonfinal judgments of the lower federal courts, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 98 (1976); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377 (1945); see also R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice §4.18 (7th ed. 1993) (citing cases), and we conclude here that reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in a summary disposition is appropriate, for two reasons. First, as already noted, the Court of Appeals’ decision is clearly erroneous under our precedents. Second, the lower court’s judgment has produced immediate consequences for Montana — in the form of a Rule 62(c) injunction against implementation of its law pending the District Court’s resolution of respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction — and has created a real threat of such consequences for the six other States in the Ninth Circuit that have physician-only requirements. Indeed, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit seeking to challenge those States’ laws may well be able to meet the threshold “fair chance of success” requirement for a preliminary injunction merely by alleging an improper purpose for the physician-only rule, since, as noted above, the Court of Appeals did not appear to rely on any evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for certio-rari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join,

dissenting.

The Court may ultimately prove to be correct in its conclusion that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the District Court’s refusal to preliminarily enjoin that portion of the statute disqualifying Susan Cahill from performing abortions in Montana. Nevertheless, I do not agree that this decision has sufficient importance to justify review of the merits at this preliminary stage of the proceeding. The background of the litigation and a comment on the Court of Appeals’ discussion of legislative motive will help to explain why I am not persuaded that the Court’s summary disposition is appropriate.

Since 1977, respondent Cahill, a licensed physician’s assistant, has been performing first-trimester abortions in Kalispell, Montana, under the supervision of Dr. James Armstrong. She is the only nonphysician in Montana who performs abortions.

Since 1974, Montana law has provided that an abortion could be performed only by a licensed physician. See Mont. Code Ann. § 50 — 20—109(l)(a) (1995). Because the term “licensed physician,” as used in that statute, was construed to include licensed physician assistants working under the direct supervision of a physician pursuant to a state approved plan, it did not disqualify Cahill from continuing her work with Dr. Armstrong.

In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted the statute at issue in this litigation. This statute banned physician assistants from performing abortions, provided that second-trimester abortions could only be performed in licensed hospitals, and prohibited any form of advertising of abortion services. See 1995 Mont. Laws, ch. 321. The record strongly indicates that the physician assistant provision was aimed at excluding one specific person — respondent Cahill— from the category of persons who could perform abortions. Although this is not apparent on the face of the statute, the parties agree that because Cahill is the only physician assistant who performs abortions in the State of Montana, she is the only person affected by the ban. Furthermore, the legislative hearings preceding the enactment of the statute contain numerous references to Cahill by name, and the injunction against enforcement of this provision of the statute pending the appeal applies only to Cahill.

The likelihood that the legislature may have enacted the statute for the sole purpose of targeting Cahill is suggested by the fact that the other two provisions in the 1995 Act— the hospitalization requirement and the advertising ban— were clearly invalid because they were reenactments of two provisions that already had been held unconstitutional in earlier litigation, and that the State, in this litigation, conceded to be unconstitutional. This history, together with Cahill’s claim that the same antiabortion groups who had repeatedly targeted Cahill and Armstrong’s practice were the proponents of the 1995 legislation, provided the basis for Ca-hill’s argument that the statute was invalid as a bill of attainder, as well as an undue burden on the right to an abortion.

The discussion of legislative motive in the opinion of the Court of Appeals was a response to two decisions of this Court that suggest that such an inquiry is sometimes proper. In determining whether the “requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult,” within the meaning of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 901 (1992), the Court of Appeals looked to our recent decisions in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996). Today, the Court ignores those cases, but concludes that the record is barren of evidence of any improper motive. As the discussion above indicates, this is not quite accurate; there is substantial evidence indicating that the sole purpose of the statute was to target a particular licensed professional. The statute removed the only physician assistant in the State who could perform abortions, yet there was no evidence that her practice posed any greater health risks than those performed by doctors with the assistance of unlicensed personnel. When one looks at the totality of circumstances surrounding the legislation, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the legislature’s predominant motive was to make abortions more difficult.

In any event, the Court of Appeals did not reach the constitutional issue that is presented by this litigation. The Court of Appeals simply remanded this action to the District Court because it found that the District Court had unduly confined its analysis of what constitutes an impermissible purpose. Although the parties stipulated to the entry of a limited injunction pending appeal that temporarily protects Cahill and no one else, there is no indication yet from either the District Court or the Court of Appeals that either a permanent or preliminary injunction will ever be entered against enforcement of the physician-only provision of the statute.

As I read the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court, this case involves an extremely narrow issue concerning the State’s power to reduce by one the small number of professionals in Montana who can lawfully perform abortions in that State. I do not perceive the slightest threat to the 40 “physician only” laws cited at the outset of the Court’s opinion, particularly since some of these States might allow licensed assistants to perform abortions under the supervision of a physician as was the practice in Montana prior to 1995. Because physician assistants working under the supervision of a physician might be included in the definition of “physician,” it is not clear at this stage that the Court of Appeals’ decision challenges any of this Court’s statements (for the most part dicta), ante, at 974-975, that a State may restrict the performance of abortions to physicians. I think the Court would be well advised to await further developments in the case before intervening. Surely, the Court of Appeals’ determination that a further inquiry into the facts is appropriate before making a final decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction does not provide a proper basis for summary action in this Court.

Having decided to take the case, however, it does seem to me that the Court should provide some enlightenment as to whether the Court of Appeals misread this Court’s opinions in Miller and Shaw v. Hunt.

In my judgment, the petition for certiorari should be denied.

       See Ala. Admin. Code Rules 420-5-l-.01(2)(k), 420-5-l-.03(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (limiting performance of abortions to “physicians duly licensed in the State of Alabama;” which in turn requires meeting the criteria in Ala. Code §34-24-70 (Supp. 1996)); Alaska Stat. Ann. §§08.64.200, 18.16.010(a)(1) (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-61-101(a) (1993); id., § 17-95-403 (1995); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §123405 (West 1996) (as interpreted under prior statutory designation in 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991)); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-107 (1991 and Supp. 1996); id., §§ 18-6-101(1), 18-6-102 (1986); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 19-13-D54(a) (1997) (limiting performance of abortions to “person[s] licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Connecticut,” which in turn requires meeting the criteria in Conn. Gen. Stat. §20-10 (Supp. 1997)); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 24, §§1720, 1790(a) (Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. §§390.001(l)(a), 390.001(3) (1993); id., §§458.311, 459.0055 (1991 and Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-141(a) (1996); id., §43-34-27 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§453-4, 453-16(a)(1) (1993); Idaho Code §18-608 (1997); id., §§54-1803(3), 54-1803(4) (1994); Ill. Comp. Stat., eh. 225, §60/11 (1993); id., eh. 720, §§510/2(2), 510/ 3.1 (1993); Ind. Code §§ 16-18-2-202,16-18-2-282,16-34-2-l(l)(A) (1993); id., §25-22.5-3-1 (1995); Iowa Code §148.3 (Supp. 1997); id., §707.7 (Supp. 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§311.571, 311.750 (Michie 1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37:1272 (West Supp. 1997); id., §§40:1299.35.1, 40:1299.35.2(A) (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §1598(3)(A) (1992); id.. Tit. 32, §§2571, 3271 (Supp. 1996); Md. Health Code Ann. §20-208 (1996); Md. Health Occ. Code Ann. § 14-307 (Supp. 1995); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 112, §§ 2,12K, 12L, 12M (1996); Minn. Stat. §§ 145.412, subd. 1(1), 147.02 (1989) (limiting performance of abortions to licensed physicians and “physieianfs] in training under the supervision of... licensed physieian[s]”); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-25-3 (1995); id., §97-3-3(1) (1994) (as interpreted in Spears v. State, 278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973)); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 188.015(5), 188.020 (1996); id., §334.031 (1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-335 (1995); id., §71-1,104 (Supp. 1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. §442.250(l)(a) (1991); id., §630.160 (1995); N. J. Admin. Code § 13:35-4.2(b) (1997) (limiting performance of abortions to “physieian[s] licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of New Jersey,” which in turn requires meeting the criteria in N. J. Stat. Ann. §§45:9-6, 45:9-7 (West 1991), and N. J. Stat. Ann. §45:9-8 (West Supp. 1997)); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§30-5-l(C), 30-5-3 (1994) (as interpreted in N. M. Op. Atty. Gen. 90-19 (1990)); N. M. Stat. Ann. §61-6-11 (1996); N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-45.1(a) (1993); id., §90-9 (Supp. 1996); N. D. Cent. Code §14-02.1-04(1) (1991); id., §43-17-18 (1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2919.11 (1996); id., §§4731.091, 4731.41 (1994); Okla. Stat., Tit. 59, §493.1 (Supp. 1997); id., Tit. 63, §1-731(A) (1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3203, 3204(a) (1983 and Supp. 1997); 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§271.6, 422.28 (1996); R. I. Code R. 14.000.009, 600.1 (1996) (limiting performance of abortions to “physicians licensed under the [applicable provisions of Rhode Island law],” which in turn requires meeting the criteria in R. I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-2 (1995)); S. C. Code Ann. § 40-47-90 (Supp. 1996) (as implemented by S. G. Code Ann. Regs. §§81-80, 81-81, 81-90 (Supp. 1996)); S. C. Code Ann. §§44-41-10(b), 44-41-20 (1985); S. D. Codified Laws §34-23A-l(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§34-23A-3, 34-23A-4, 34-23A-5 (1994); id., §36-4-11 (Supp. 1997); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(b) (1992); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 4495b, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. §§58-67-302, 58-68-302 (Supp. 1996); id., §76-7-302(1) (1995); Va. Code Ann. §§18.2-71, 18.2-72, 18.2-73, 18.2-74 (1996); id., §54.1-2930 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code §§9.02.110, 9.02.120, 9.02.170(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§18.57.020, 18.71.050 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. §448.01(5) (1988); id., § 940.15(5) (1996); Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-303 (Supp. 1996); id., § 35-6-111 (1994).

       Since the record does not support a conclusion that “the legislature’s predominant motive,” post, at 980, was to create a “substantial obstacle” to abortion, it is quite unnecessary to address “whether the Court of Appeals misread this Court’s opinions in Miller [v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995),] and Shaw,” post, at 981.

       The dissent says that the Court of Appeals did not resolve any important issue of law in this ease, but instead merely remanded to the District Court after “determining] that a further inquiry into the facts [was] appropriate.” Post, at 981. We disagree. The Court of Appeals expressly found, and it was necessary to its disposition, that respondents had shown a “fair chance of success” on their claim of undue burden. 94 F. 3d 566, 567-568 (CA9 1996). As already explained, that determination of law is inconsistent with our precedents.

       See Alaska Stat. Ann. §§08.64.200, 18.16.010(a)(1) (1996); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §123405 (West 1996) (as interpreted under prior statutory designation in 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991)); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§453-4, 453-16(a)(l) (1993); Idaho Code §18-608 (1997); id., §§54-1803(3), 54-1803(4) (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 442.250(l)(a) (1991); id., §630.160 (1995); Wash. Rev. Code §§9.02.110, 9.02.120, 9.02.170(4) (Supp. 1997); id., §§ 18.57.020, 18.71.050 (Supp. 1997).

       The dissent contends that some States which restrict the performance of abortions to licensed physicians may define “licensed physician” to include “physician-assistant” when the latter works under the former’s supervision; thus, the dissent says, the Court of Appeals’ decision may not in fact be inconsistent with the physician-only regimes of other States. Post, at 980-981. But the provisions of state law to which the dissent points reflect the general definition of what qualifies as the “authorized practice” of medicine, without making any specific reference to abortion. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §§ 458.303(l)(a), 458.327(1), 458.347 (1991 and Supp. 1997); post, at 980-981, n. 7 (citing statutes). Thus, for example, under Florida law, the performance of an abortion by a physician-assistant would not constitute “practicing] medicine . . . without a license” for purposes of the felony defined in Fla. Stat. Ann. §458.327(1) (Supp. 1997), but there is no reason to think it would not violate the more specific prohibition on the performance of abortions by persons other than “a doctor of medicine or osteopathic medicine licensed by the state under chapter 458 or chapter 459,” Fla. Stat. §§390.001(l)(a), 390.001(3) (1993). A formal opinion by the Attorney General of California has reached precisely this conclusion under that State’s law: “[W]e cannot accept the notion that the Legislature meant to gainsay th[e] carefully tailored and highly specific determination [that abortions should be performed by licensed physicians] when it . . . adopted the general language of the Physician Assistant Practice Act.” 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101, 108 (1991).

       See Doe v. Esch, No. CV-93-060-GF-PGH (Nov. 26, 1993), App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (enjoining State from enforcing the licensed physician provision against a physician assistant, supervised by a licensed physician, who has received approval from the State Board of Medical Examiners to conduct abortions); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 37-20-403 (1993) (recognizing physician assistant as agent of the supervising physician); id., § 37-20-303 (1995) (authorizing Board of Medical Examiners to approve physician assistant utilization plans detailing range of physician assistants’ practice); 906 F. Supp. 561, 564 (Mont. 1995) (noting that the Montana Board of Medical Examiners construed its authority to include approval of Cahill’s utilization plan allowing her to perform first-trimester abortions).

       See Minutes of Committee on Public Health, Welfare & Safety, Montana Senate, 54th Legislature (Mar. 10,1995), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a-60a.

       “1. The injunction shall apply only to Plaintiff Susan Cahill and will allow her to practice under those terms in effect prior to October 1, 1995. Plaintiff Cahill must be supervised by a licensed physician and shall operate under the physician assistant-certified utilization plan previously approved by the Montana State Board of Medical Examiners that includes the performance of abortions pursuant to the provisions of Mont. Code Ann. Title 37, chapter 20. No other physician assistants-certified will be allowed to perform abortions in Montana under the terms of this stipulation or the Court’s order.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a.

       In Doe v. Esch, supra, the court enjoined enforcement of the hospitalization requirement, and in Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682 (Mont. 1976), the court held that the advertising and solicitation prohibition were unconstitutional.

       Respondents challenged these two provisions — along with the ban on performance of abortions by physician assistants, and the State did not contest that it was bound by the prior judgments from enforcing these prohibitions. See 906 F. Supp., at 563.

       The Court of Appeals reasoned: “Legislative purpose to accomplish a constitutionally forbidden result may be found when that purpose was ‘the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision.’ Miller[, 515 U. S., at 916]. Such a forbidden purpose may be gleaned both from the structure of the legislation and from examination of the process that led to its enactment. Shaw[, 517 U. S., at 905-907]. A determination of purpose in the present ease, then, may properly require an assessment of the totality of circumstances surrounding the enactment of Chapter 321, and whether that statute in fact can be regarded as serving a legitimate health function.” 94 F. 3d 566. 567 (CA9 1996).

       Some of the States that have physician-only laws also have statutes that broadly define the medical duties that physicians can delegate to physician assistants. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§20-12a, 20-12d (Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. §458.347 (Supp. 1997); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 225, §§95/1,95/ 4(3) (1993 and Supp. 1997); Ind. Code §§25-27.5-5-2, 25-27.5-6-3 (1995); Iowa Code §§148C.l, 148C.4 (1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§37:1360.22(5), 37:1360.28, 37:1360.31.A(1), 37:1360.31.B (West Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, §3270-A (Supp. 1996); Mass. Gen. Laws § 112:9E (1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. §71-1,107.17 (1996); R. I. Gen. Laws §5-54-8 (1995). My research indicates that Montana and California are the only States that explicitly prohibit physician assistants from performing abortions. See 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991) (declining to construe the physician assistant statute to allow physician assistants to perform abortions).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    March 3, 1997
    No. 95-1028.
    United States v. Fadem et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347 (1997).


text:
    No. D-1752.
    In re Disbarment of Frieze.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1004.]


text:
    No. D-1756.
    In re Disbarment of Allen.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1005.]


text:
    No. D-1786.
    In re Disbarment of Maroney.
   John W. Ma-roney, of Portland, Ore., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. M-61.
    Joseph et al. v. Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. et al.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. M-62.
    Dunbar v. Iowa.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court’s Rule 14.5 denied.


text:
    No. 96-79.
    Boggs v. Boggs et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 957.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to file a supplemental brief as amicus curiae after argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-272.
    Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1002.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-318.
    Richardson et al. v. McKnight.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1002.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-491.
    Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1003.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-cus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-651.
    Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al. v. Homar.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-5955.
    Richards v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. [Cer-tiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-511.
    Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
   D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of appellees for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 96-542.
    McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of Southern States Police Benevolent Association for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 96-1324.
    Zarnes v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7773.
    In re Bonner.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 96-7613.
    No. 96-7730.
    In re Snipe; and In re Williams.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 96-795.
    Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 95-746.
    Linscomb v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 95-8279.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-845.
    Anderson et al. v. Clow et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-846.
    CEMEX, S. A. v. United States et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-895.
    Franklin et al. v. Hiser.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-922.
    Merchants Bank of California, N. A. v. Mardula.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-943.
    Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Butler et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-968.
    CIGNA HealthCare of Connecticut, Inc. v. Napoletano et al.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-985.
    Chamorro-Torres v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1015.
    Robokoff et al. v. Women’s Choice of Bergen County.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1018.
    Wilson, By and Through Wilson as Conservator of the Person and Estate of Wilson, et al. v. Brother Records, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1024.
    Ohio Association of Independent Schools et al. v. Goff et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1032.
    Cincinnati Enquirer, a Division of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1046.
    Shaper v. Tracy, Tax Commissioner of Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1047.
    County of Nassau et al. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1048.
    Zielinski v. Oak Forest Police Pension Board.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1074.
    Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1083.
    Life College, Inc. v. Mangum, Director, Nonpublic Postsecondary Education Commission, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1113.
    Rosati v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1119.
    Boyle v. Colorado Board of Medical Examiners.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1147.
    Lark v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1164.
    LaPlant v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1169.
    Du Vall v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1176.
    DiSanto v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1192.
    Falcon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-5938.
    Trevino-Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6227.
    Woods et al. v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6570.
    Osume v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6608.
    Dexter v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6899.
    Clarke v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7245.
    Block v. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Correction, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7246.
    Myers v. Shumacher et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7249.
    Ford v. Wilson.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7255.
    Gilliam v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7260.
    Slagel v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7262.
    Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7267.
    Hualde-Redin et al. v. First Federal Savings Bank.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7270.
    Elliott v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7278.
    Taylor v. Love, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7280.
    Stephen v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7288.
    Harrington v. California Committee of Bar Examiners.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7291.
    Sing Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7293.
    Azubuko v. Montgomery, Clerk-Magistrate, District Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7294.
    Levine v. Goord, Commissioner, New York Department of Correctional Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7296.
    Nickel v. Hannigan, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7297.
    Bonner v. Alabama Department of Human Resources et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7304.
    Tatum v. Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden III et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7306.
    Mulligan v. Barnett Bank of Central Florida, N. A.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7307.
    Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7308.
    Timmons v. Turner, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7310.
    Vrettos v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7313.
    Willis v. Parrish et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7317.
    Carter v. Hopkins, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7318.
    Carter v. Neustrup.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7319.
    Arigoni v. Massachusetts et al.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7320.
    Ellison v. Forrest City, Arkansas, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7322.
    Gallego v. Wilson et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7323.
    Day v. Painter, Sheriff, Midland County, Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7324.
    Hendrickson v. Minnesota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7326.
    Scott v. Nachman.
   Cir. Ct., City of Newport News, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7327.
    Holcomb v. Thompson, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7359.
    Drinkard v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7398.
    Hopper v. Goosbly et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7410.
    Reyna v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7414.
    Phidd v. Connecticut.
   App. Ct. Conn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7443.
    Jackson v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7444.
    Mixon v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7459.
    Adkins v. Gilmore, Attorney General of Virginia, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7489.
    Johnson v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7527.
    McKinley v. District of Columbia Department of Human Services.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7528.
    Moretz v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7540.
    Asonye v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7548.
    Ontiveros v. Dorsey, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7552.
    Oliver v. Fuch et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7578.
    Glenn v. Bartlett, Superintendent, Elmira Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7579.
    Barnett v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7580.
    Gray v. Nielson.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7581.
    Huff v. Chapleau, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7590.
    Caffrey v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7603.
    Marozsan v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7605.
    Sawyers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7611.
    Mack v. Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7622.
    Cardenas Cuellar v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7623.
    Chatriand v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7648.
    McDonnell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7653.
    Genins v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7666.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7669.
    Wood-Ede v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7672.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7673.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7677.
    Doherty v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7687.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7688.
    Shaffer v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7690.
    Swaney v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7693.
    Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7698.
    Johnson v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7700.
    McKinney v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7705.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7706.
    Sandoval et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7710.
    Dempsey v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7711.
    Greschner v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7725.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-850.
    City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, Trustee of the William A. Bowen Trust Agreement.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Motion of Florida League of Cities, Inc., et al. for leave to file .a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-860.
    Roe v. Kentucky Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of petitioner for leave to file redacted appendices to petition for writ of certiorari granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1027.
    Michigan v. Fernengel.
   Ct. App. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma -pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 95-8502.
    No. 96-409.
    Tidik v. Tidik, Drobny et ux. v. United States, Coulter et al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Inc., et al., Goulding v. United States, Bell v. United States Postal Service, Morris et ux. v. United States et al., Cooper v. Malone et al., Parker v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Bast v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Womble v. North Carolina, Wronke v. Canady, Fox v. United States, In re Delespine,
   519 U. S. 1076;

519 U. S. 1055;

No. 96-423.

No. 96-809.

No. 96-835.

No. 96-5170.

No. 96-6427.

No. 96-6517.

No. 96-6617.

No. 96-6668.

No. 96-6737.

No. 96-6813.

No. 96-6932.

519 U. S. 1040;

519 U. S. 1059;

519 U. S. 1078;

519 U. S. 883;

519 U. S. 1062;

519 U. S. 1064;

519 U. S. 1081;

519 U. S. 1095;

519 U. S. 1096;

519 U. S. 1068; and

519 U. S. 1054. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 95-6649.
    Jones v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,
   516 U. S. 1057. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 17, 1997
    No. 95-1546.
    Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., aka SMC Corp., et al. v. Festo Corp.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17.


text:
    No. 96-874.
    Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., ante, p. 17.


text:
    No. 96-939.
    Brandt, as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Southeast Banking Corp., et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Southeast Bank, N. A., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213 (1997).


text:
    No. A-598.
    Geske & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-1764.
    In re Disbarment of Mincey.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.]


text:
    No. D-1765.
    In re Disbarment of Fiore.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.]


text:
    No. D-1766.
    In re Disbarment of Pitt.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 519 U. S. 1075.]


text:
    No. D-1778.
    In re Disbarment of Rudd.
   Jeffrey D. Rudd, of Roanoke, Va., having requested to resign as a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on February 18, 1997 [519 U. S. 1105], is discharged.


text:
    No. D-1787.
    In re Disbarment of Levy.
   Gerald Levy, of Parsippany, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1788.
    In re Disbarment of Auriemma.
   Robert C. Auriemma, of Towaco, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-1789.
    In re Disbarment of Denker.
   Aaron David Denker, of Mt. Laurel, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. M-32.
    Billy-Eko v. United States.
   Motion for reconsideration of order denying motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time [519 U. S. 991] denied.


text:
    No. M-63.
    No. M-64.
    Pringle v. Davis et al.; and Milnes v. Fletcher Pacific Construction Co.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 96-511.
    Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
   D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 519 U. S. 1025.] Motion of James J. Clancy for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 96-651.
    Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al. v. Homar.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1052.] Motion of National Treasury Employees Union for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted to be divided as follows: respondent, 20 minutes; National Treasury Employees Union, 10 minutes.


text:
    No. 96-1037.
    No. 96-1059.
    No. 96-1102.
    Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians et al. v. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. South Carolina et al. v. Environmental Technology Council.
   Ct. Civ. App. Okla.;

C. A. 9th Cir.; and

C. A. 4th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 96-1330.
    Black v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6673.
    Steven L. et al. v. Board of Education of Downers Grove Grade School District No. 58. Veale et ux. v. Citibank, F. S. B. Guerriero v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir.;

No. 96-7348.

No. 96-7397.

C. A. 11th Cir.; and

App. Ct. Mass. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until April 7, 1997, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 96-6867.
    O’Dell v. Netherland, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1050.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Robert S. Smith, Esq., of New York, N. Y., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 96-7185.
    Bates v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1108.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that C. Richard Oren, Esq., of Rochester, Ind., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 96-7824.
    No. 96-7899.
    In re Ijemba; and In re Williams.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 96-7382.
    No. 96-7495.
    In re Martin; and In re Atkins.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 96-188.
    General Electric Co. et al. v. Joiner et ux.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 96-670.
    Foster, Governor of Louisiana, et al. v. Love et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 96-779.
    Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 95-1096.
    Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-235.
    California Franchise Tax Board v. MacFarlane.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-684.
    Jones v. Runyon, Postmaster General.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-766.
    Argent Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-812.
    Hines v. Franklin Homes, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-815.
    D’Amelia v. Doe.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-851.
    Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-856.
    Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-868.
    Conley v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-900.
    Viswanathan v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-904.
    Zimmerman et al. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-908.
    Fort Stewart Association of Educators v. Weston et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-915.
    Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., et al. v. Agency for Health Care Administration et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-924.
    Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-928.
    Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-942.
    First Security Bank et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-945.
    Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County, dba South Georgia Medical Center, et al.
   C. A. Ilth Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-959.
    Texas v. Clark.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-962.
    No. 96-1141.
    Price et al. v. City of Charlotte; and City of Charlotte v. Price et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 F. 3d 1241.


text:
    No. 96-1007.
    Oliver, Administratrix of the Estate of Oliver, Deceased, et al. v. Oshkosh Truck Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1013.
    Buster et al. v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1017.
    Weaver v. Department of Justice.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1038.
    Fischer et al. v. Philadelphia Electric Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1040.
    Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1054.
    Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1055.
    Paragon Properties Co. v. City of Novi.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1056.
    Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church et al. v. Sawyer et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1061.
    Madril v. Gallego.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1063.
    Pettco Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. White et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1066.
    Begier v. Begier.
   Ct. App. Cal, 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1069.
    Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1070.
    Feltner v. MCA Television, Ltd.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1072.
    Robb v. Mississippi Bar.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1079.
    No. 96-1229.
    Trevino v. Gates et al.; and Gates et al. v. Trevino.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 99 F. 3d 911.


text:
    No. 96-1084.
    Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J. V., et al.; and DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1085.
    McLemore et al. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1092.
    Crawford et al. v. Lungren, Attorney General of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1096.
    Baheth et al. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., nka Regions Bank, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1097.
    Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California et al. v. Canseco et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1103.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., dba Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Johnson et ux., as Representatives of the Estate of Johnson, Deceased.
   Ct. App. Okla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1105.
    Guice et al. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1106.
    Kuhn v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1110.
    Schroering v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1111.
    City and County of San Francisco et al. v. Carpenter et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1115.
    Vergara v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1117.
    United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan et al. v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1121.
    Bryan v. East Stroudsburg University.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1122.
    Hartman et al. v. Northern Services, Inc., nka Health Services Management, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1123.
    McClain v. Rho et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1124.
    Smith et ux. v. Roman et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1125.
    In re Broadbelt, Judge, Municipal Court of New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1127.
    United States v. Exxon Corp. and Subsidiaries.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1129.
    Moschetti v. Maryland.
   Cir. Ct. Howard County, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1130.
    Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1131.
    Volberg v. Pataki, Governor of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1135.
    City of Detroit Pension Fund et al. v. Prudential Securities, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1136.
    Helton v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1137.
    Tanca v. Nordberg, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1138.
    United States ex rel. Sylvester v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1144.
    Davis v. Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1145.
    Ugwu v. Arkansas.
   Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1155.
    Overfield v. Bonsignore et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1158.
    Suan See Chong et al. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1170.
    Mothershed v. Durbin et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1185.
    McGillivray v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1194.
    Jones v. Forest Industries Insurance Exchange.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1200.
    Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1209.
    Campbell v. Towse, Mayor, City of Alton, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1217.
    Flores v. FMC Corp. et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1220.
    Morewitz v. Ashmore.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1225.
    Markson et ux. v. A & W Investors Group, Inc.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1226.
    Shaffett v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1232.
    Califorrniaa v. Clinton, President of the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1235.
    Ilic v. Liquid Air Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1237.
    Patrick v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1244.
    Beyong Chul Choi v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1250.
    Fort v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1255.
    Rheinstrom v. Robinson, Administrator, Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1262.
    Volpe v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1266.
    Antonio Perez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1285.
    Denman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1292.
    Thanh Hai Vominh v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1298.
    Smallwood v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1302.
    Main v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1306.
    Emery v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1311.
    Severa v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6318.
    Rucci v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6561.
    Harvey v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6616.
    Beasley v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6653.
    No. 96-6658.
    Oboh v. United States; and Bowen v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 F. 3d 1082.


text:
    No. 96-6714.
    Bermudez-Reyes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6758.
    No. 96-6921.
    Mordan v. United States; and Tauil-Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 88 F. 3d 576.


text:
    No. 96-6759.
    Fletcher v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6780.
    Goins v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6898.
    Akamiokhor v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6967.
    Sadowski v. National Credit Union Administration et al. (two judgments).
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-6990.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7011.
    Foster v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7022.
    Washington v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7063.
    Valdez-Mejia v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7089.
    Heatwole v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7186.
    Fullwood v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7254.
    Emerson v. Gilmore, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7273.
    Smith v. Pick ’n Save et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7301.
    Williams v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7334.
    Scott v. Dime Savings Bank of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7340.
    Rosenbalm v. DeMorales, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7344.
    Sheets v. Moore.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7346.
    Saiyed v. Washington.
   Super. Ct. Wash., King County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7347.
    Ruthers v. Gulch, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7349.
    Southern v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7350.
    Smith v. White et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7355.
    Finberg v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board of Pennsylvania et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7356.
    George v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7367.
    Mitchell v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7385.
    Lux et ux. v. County of Spotsylvania et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7386.
    Wall v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7388.
    Pigram v. Thymes et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7389.
    Hays v. Alabama et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7391.
    Bishop v. Bishop.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7401.
    Ferrell v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7405.
    Herman v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7408.
    Brayall et vir v. Dart Industries et al.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7409.
    Sisco v. Ault, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7418.
    Marchman v. Cole.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7419.
    Todd v. Newberry, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7420.
    Johnson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7434.
    Wiggins v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7440.
    Turner v. Kuykendall.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7442.
    Johnson v. Miller, Superintendent, Correctional Industrial Complex, Pendleton, Indiana.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7445.
    Jae v. Coyne.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7447.
    Artis v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7450.
    Lidman v. Department of State et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7451.
    Jackson v. Champion, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7453.
    Tobie v. Department of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7456.
    Ledet v. United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7465.
    Finks v. Ames Department Stores, Inc.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7468.
    Green v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7470.
    Dodd v. Oliver et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7472.
    Douglas v. Sylvester et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7476.
    Vann v. Darden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7478.
    Thompson v. Trusty, Judge, District Court of Kentucky, Kenton County.
   Cir. Ct. Kenton County, Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7480.
    Bunnell v. Shell Oil Station et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Warren County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7481.
    Hawkins v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7482.
    Henderson v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7483.
    Dyer v. Stevens et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7485.
    Howard v. Cain, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7486.
    Fitzpatrick v. Boyer et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7487.
    Morgan, aka Holliday v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7488.
    Mmubango v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7492.
    Grace et al. v. Burrill et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7497.
    Burks v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7500.
    Wafer v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7501.
    Wafer v. Gay et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7502.
    Spiegelman v. Reprise Records et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7507.
    Zaragoza v. Cianchetti, Judge, Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7508.
    Atkins v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7510.
    Grant v. McCoy, Superintendent, Cayuga Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7514.
    Crawford v. Hawaii.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7523.
    Edwards v. Andrews, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7524.
    French v. Pepe, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7534.
    Wesley v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7536.
    Abernathy v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7538.
    Burnett v. Willette.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7543.
    Brewer v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7604.
    Laureano v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7609.
    Tadros v. Brooklyn Developmental Center et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7614.
    Spruill v. Gillis, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7638.
    Standifird v. Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7645.
    Cuong Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7649.
    Nicolau v. New York State Department of Social Services.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7650.
    Jones v. Toombs, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7657.
    Watts v. Railroad Retirement Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7658.
    Wooten v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7659.
    Azubuko v. First National Bank of Boston et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7663.
    Bouie v. Peterson, Archivist of the United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7674.
    Harris v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7695.
    Propes v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7697.
    Brown v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7702.
    Boykins v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7708.
    Rowe v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7718.
    Edelbacher v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7719.
    Dies v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7721.
    Smart v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7722.
    No. 96-7736.
    No. 96-7745.
    No. 96-7767.
    Ryion v. United States; Bruce v. United States; Bruce v. United States; and Riales v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 100 F. 3d 957.


text:
    No. 96-7723.
    Martineau v. City of Cypress et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7724.
    Khanna v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7728.
    Monaco et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7733.
    Alexander v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7735.
    Craig v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7738.
    Carrasco Ramos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7739.
    Bowman v. Gammon, Superintendent, Moberly Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7741.
    Berard v. Gorczyk, Commissioner, Vermont Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7743.
    Torres v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7744.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7750.
    Farmer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7752.
    Gallagher v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7755.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7756.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7757.
    Porter v. West, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7759.
    Grant v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7762.
    Hendrickson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7763.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7764.
    DeGerolamo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7766.
    Prou v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7770.
    Webber v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7771.
    Trevino v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7776.
    No. 96-7786.
    Jarrett v. United States; and Glover v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 97 F. 3d 234.


text:
    No. 96-7781.
    Bustamante v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7784.
    Carpenter v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7785.
    Atlas v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7788.
    Leal v. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7789.
    Malkiewicz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7794.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7795.
    Ogbuehi v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7797.
    Animashaum v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7800.
    Tillman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7801.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7803.
    Keys v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7805.
    Cottrell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7806.
    Adkins v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7808.
    Woodall v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7809.
    Renfroe v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7810.
    Ramirez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7811.
    Ochoa v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7812.
    Ramos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7813.
    Philips v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7814.
    Sindram v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7816.
    Pacheco-Maldonado v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7817.
    Peters v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7819.
    Alston v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7821.
    Timber et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7825.
    Ivy v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7828.
    Morrison v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7834.
    Crite v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7835.
    Pielech et al. v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7836.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7837.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7838.
    Marks, aka Bush, aka Young, aka Hansen v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7846.
    Douglas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7847.
    Eckerson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7855.
    Mollenhour v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7857.
    Brekke et vir v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7859.
    Powell v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7860.
    Riddick v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7861.
    Wooten v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7863.
    McKoy v. Morris, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7867.
    Mason v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7868.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7870.
    Hayes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7876.
    Baramdyka v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7880.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7881.
    Morales v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7884.
    Withers v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7886.
    Hill v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7887.
    Gonzalez v. Kuhlmann, Superintendent, Sullivan Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7889.
    DeWitte et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7894.
    Clark v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7897.
    Burdex v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7903.
    Velazquez-Overa v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7908.
    Hooper v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7910.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7912.
    Osias v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7913.
    Alvarado Orozco v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7915.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7939.
    Houston v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7948.
    Galvan v. Hurley, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-7949.
    Hunter v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Scalia,

text:
    No. 95-576.
    Williams et al. v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join,

dissenting.

The issue in this ease is the constitutionality of an injunction against abortion protesters. The injunction limits their First Amendment activities to a sidewalk separated from the clinic that is the object of their protest by a busy four-lane avenue. The ease has made its way back here after we set aside the Supreme Court of California’s earlier judgment approving the injunction, 7 Cal. 4th 860, 873 P. 2d 1224 (1994), and remanded the case so that the court could reconsider its holding in light of our decision in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994). 513 U. S. 956 (1994). On remand, the Supreme Court of California concluded that the provision in question “is equally valid under the new standard set forth in Madsen,” and therefore “reaf-ftrmfed] the judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.” 10 Cal. 4th 1009, 1012, 898 P. 2d 402, 404 (1995). That was in my view patent error, and has been confirmed as such by Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357 (1997). I think it important to the dignity of this Court and the integrity of its processes to set aside what can only be regarded as an intentional evasion of its decrees. I would grant the petition for certiorari, summarily reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, and remand for further proceedings.

This case — unlike Schenck — is not one in which the record reveals instances of serious unlawful conduct by clinic protesters. The following was the testimony of Janice Sehoenfeld, the “escort coordinator” of the clinic, at the hearing on the application for a permanent injunction:

“Q. Did you ever see any of this group of defendants prevent somebody from getting in the front door of the clinic?
“A. No.
“Q. Did you ever see them manhandle any of your clients?
“A. No.
“Q. Was anybody, to the best of your knowledge, that wanted to get an abortion, prevented from getting an abortion?
“A. No.
“Q. Did you ever attempt to make a citizen’s arrest of any of the defendants?
“A. No, I did not.
“Q. Do you know if any of them were ever arrested?
“A. Not at the Vallejo clinic, that I know of. Some have been in other Operation Rescue activity.
“Q. Did you ever see any of the defendants prevent any cars from parking in the parking lot?
“A. Not prevent them from parking, no.” Tr. 54-55.

This is a record so devoid of threatening physical confrontation it would make an old-fashioned union organizer blush. Yet the trial court entered — and the Supreme Court of California approved— an injunction severely curtailing the speech rights of clinic protesters in a public forum.

The basis for that injunction — and for the Supreme Court of California’s initial approval of it — was the perceived government interest in preventing “increased stress and anxiety” among abortion patients. 7 Cal. 4th, at 872-876, 873 P. 2d, at 1230-1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court of California explained, “emotionally jarring confrontations with anti-abortion pickets or sidewalk ‘counselors’ may pose serious health risks.” Id., at 874, 873 P. 2d, at 1232. The “substantial governmental interest in protecting the patients’ physical and emotional health and safety” justified restricting the abortion opponents to areas far removed from the clinic. Id., at 876, 873 P. 2d, at 1233.

This holding was no longer supportable after we vacated the Supreme Court of California’s judgment in light of Madsen, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Madsen, in disallowing an injunction which prevented abortion opponents from approaching persons seeking services at an abortion clinic, said:

“Absent evidence that the protesters’ speech is independently proseribable (i. e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, this provision cannot stand.” 512 U. S., at 774 (citation omitted).

Despite this holding, the Supreme Court of California, on remand, did not abandon but reaffirmed its assertion that avoiding upset to the clinic’s clients justified keeping the protesters at a distance. 10 Cal. 4th, at 1021, 898 P. 2d, at 410. When the defendants again petitioned us for certiorari, we held the ease pending our decision in Schenck.

Whatever glimmer of hope Madsen might have left regarding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of California’s “emotional upset” justification was entirely snuffed by Schenck, in which we reiterated, in the most unmistakable terms, that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting the “right of the people approaching and entering [clinics] to be left alone” on the public streets, 519 U. S., at 383. Schenck would require, without further analysis, a reversal of the judgment here, but for one additional factor: In its second opinion in this case — after our remand in light of Madsen — the California Supreme Court for the first time discerned a second state interest in support of the injunction: an interest in “ensuring unfettered access” to the clinic, 10 Cal. 4th, at 1022, 898 P. 2d, at 410. This, it should be noted with suspicion, is an interest which the court had expressly disclaimed in its first opinion, saying that “the critical issue [is] not access, but health and safety.” 7 Cal. 4th, at 879, n. 10, 873 P. 2d 1235, n. 10.

It is not normally our practice to scrutinize the record support for the grounds asserted by state courts or lower federal courts as a basis for rejecting constitutional claims. We have, however, sometimes been disposed to do so when the abridgment of First Amendment rights was at issue. See, e. g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 915, and n. 50 (1982); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963). And we should in my view always be disposed to do so when the grounds are newly minted after a remand, contradict what was said before the remand, and bear indication of an attempt to evade the consequences of our holding prompting the remand. That is the case here; and an examination of the record for support of the newly minted ground discloses that it does not exist.

The trial court made many findings regarding activities tending to cause, not blocking of the entrances to the clinic parking lot, but “increased stress and anxiety” to clinic patrons and staff: protesters “confront and intimidate women seeking [respondent’s] services,” “force . . . ‘counseling’ upon [respondent’s] staff and clients,” “have called staff ‘murderers’ or asked them not to ‘kill babies’ in the presence of small children,” “have pursued [respondent’s] clients to their cars or public transportation in an effort to distribute literature and the plastic fetuses,” and “bring small children to the area who run up and down the public sidewalk in front of plaintiff’s premises.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-43a. The trial court also made findings regarding the impact of these activities on respondent, its patrons, and its staff: “[Respondent] must escort its clients through picket lines and [petitioners’] ‘picketers/eounselors’ in its parking lot,” and “[t]he conduct of [petitioners] and their picketers/eounselors have [sic] caused some of the women seeking counselling or services from plaintiff to become emotionally distraught.” Ibid. But the only finding remotely related to access to the clinic is the following: Protesters “stand directly in front of [respondent’s] office door and interfer [sic] with or obstruct entrance to and from [respondent’s] clinic.” Id., at 42a. This finding (which, by the way, has no support in the record if it is interpreted to mean physical obstruction) pertains to behavior at the entrance to the clinic — which is some 100 feet inside the parking lot, from which the injunction (without objection) excludes the protesters entirely. It obviously cannot support excluding protesters from the public sidewalk adjoining the entrances to the parking lot, where it has never been so much as suggested that any blocking of access occurred. The Supreme Court of California’s opinion misrepresents this, saying that “the trial court found here, that petitioners had significantly blocked driveways . . . .” 10 Cal. 4th, at 1023, 898 P. 2d, at 411. The only authority cited for this proposition is that portion of the court’s own pre-Madsew opinion which recites (inter alia) the trial court’s finding that protesters “pursued patients to their cars . . . to distribute literature.” 7 Cal. 4th, at 867, 873 P. 2d, at 1227. This obviously does not establish (or even suggest) that petitioners “blocked driveways.”

Of course, even if there had been a finding of interference with free access to the parking lot, the challenged injunction would require further findings to establish that no restraint short of total exclusion of free speech from the public sidewalk — such as limiting the number of protesters — could have eliminated the interference. Cf. Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 823 (1994) (injunction imposing numerical limit on picketers). A conclusion that complete exclusion of protesters was necessary in this case would be difficult to square with the history of what happened: The trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order drafted by respondent, which permitted two picketers on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a-66a. Shortly thereafter, it issued a preliminary injunction increasing to four the number of picketers allowed on that sidewalk. Id., at 67a-68a. Despite this apparent sign of success — and without any request by respondent for more restrictive relief — 11 months later the trial court imposed the permanent injunction at issue here, banning all picketing in front of the clinic. The reason, of course, was that (as the Supreme Court of California concluded the first time around) the trial court was not concerned about “impeding access”; it was concerned about preventing “stress and anxiety.”'

Since the trial court did not find that the challenged injunction provision was necessary to secure access, the Supreme Court of California took it upon itself to provide the requisite finding. “[T]he evidence at trial,” the court proclaimed, “indicated that picketers had not followed the preliminary injunction . . . .” 10 Cal. 4th, at 1024, 898 P. 2d, at 411-412. For this the court offers no support other than citation of its earlier opinion in this case, 7 Cal. 4th, at 866-867, n. 2, 873 P. 2d, at 1227, n. 2, which in turn relies upon nothing more probative than the following testimony of Janice Schoenfeld:

“Q. Have you observed picket activity since the injunction?
“A. Yes, but they followed the injunction usually, except for picketers.
“MS. RYER: Thank you. I have nothing further. Thank you.
“THE COURT: You say that they followed the injunction?
“THE WITNESS: They followed the injunction, yes, since the injunction.” Tr. 52-53.

Even if the record did establish some violation of the preliminary injunction, it would still not establish a violation related to access, supporting the proposition that banishment to the other side of the avenue was “the only practicable means of ensuring unfettered access,” 10 Cal. 4th, at 1022, 898 P. 2d, at 410. As far as appears, any failure to “follo[w] the injunction” might have related to one of the many prohibitions that had nothing to do with obstructing access. Indeed, the odds are in favor of that, since almost all of the prohibitions in the preliminary injunction were of that character. The record simply does not contain the facts necessary to support the challenged provision in the name of protection of access.

This case having been held pending the issuance of our opinion in Schenck; and Schenck having come out four-square against the principal theory relied upon by the Supreme Court of California; it is quite impossible to understand why any disposition short of a reversal and remand would be appropriate. If we were prepared to take at face value the court’s post-Madsen-invented “obstruction of entrances” justification, then there was no reason to hold the case in the first place. The hold was correct, and today’s denial of certiorari smiles upon injustice to these petitioners and disregard of the processes of this Court. I dissent.

       There was no testimony that petitioners had blocked the entrance, but only statements that they had stood very close to the entrance, trying to pass literature or other material to those going in. See Tr. 17-18 (testimony of Janice Schoenfeld at hearing on preliminary injunction) (“I did not say they blocked the door. I said they stand very close to the door”) (“Q. Has any one of your clients ever been prevented from entering the clinic? A. No”); id., at 54 (testimony of Schoenfeld at hearing on permanent injunction) (“Q. Did you ever see any of this group of defendants prevent somebody from getting in the front door of the clinic? A. No”); id., at 65 (testimony of Marsha Anderson at hearing on permanent injunction) (“Q. Did you observe any of your patrons being denied entrance into the clinic by any of the defendants? A. I know they progressed to the front door, interrupted them, but not prohibited them”). Of course if, as the trial court believed, subjecting abortion clients to “emotional upset” was unlawful, forcing clients to expose themselves to such unlawful activity in order to enter or exit the clinic would constitute “interfering] with” their access — and that is evidently what the trial court had in mind.

       In a separate portion of its opinion, the Supreme Court of California stated (without any citation of record support) that “[o]ne of the tactics of the sidewalk picketers was to walk slowly across the driveway entrance, thereby delaying cars attempting to turn into the parking lot from the street.” 10 Cal. 4th, at 1012, 898 P. 2d, at 404. Apart from the fact that the trial court made no such finding in connection with its entry of the injunction, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-43a, “delaying” the entry of cars into the lot as an incidental result of lawful picket activity is by no means equivalent to “blocking driveways.”


text:
    No. 96-853.
    Mustang Fuel Corp. et al. v. Hatch et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 96-1041.
    McVicar, Warden v. Griffin.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1043.
    Gilmore, Warden v. Emerson.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1051.
    Illinois v. Nitz.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1090.
    CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Sirbaugh.
   Cir. Ct. Berkeley County, W. Va. Motion of Association of American Railroads for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1109.
    Davis v. AT&T Communications, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 96-1112.
    Martech USA, Inc. v. Hoeflich.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of Insurance Company of North America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-1173.
    Beeman et al. v. Cohen.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Community College League of California et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 96-796.
    No. 96-5996.
    No. 96-6205.
    No. 96-6287.
    No. 96-6589.
    No. 96-6678.
    No. 96-6787.
    No. 96-6864.
    No. 96-6904.
    Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Bickel et al., Moore v. Roberts, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, et al., Westley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Belcher v. Lesley et al., Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al., Stephen v. Prunty, Warden, Struve v. Park Place Apartments, Brown v. Turpin, Warden, Penland v. North Carolina,
   519 U. S. 1093;

519 U. S. 1093;

519 U. S. 1094;

519 U. S. 1031;

519 U. S. 1080;

519 U. S. 1095;

519 U. S. 1097;

519 U. S. 1098; and

519 U. S. 1098. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 94-9848.
    No. 96-594.
    No. 96-6581.
    Gresham v. Transportation Communications International Union et al., Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham, Lurie v. Caesar’s Tahoe, Inc., et al.,
   516 U. S. 860;

519 U. S. 1041; and

519 U. S. 1045. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 96-675.
    Guilbeau et ux. v. W. W. Henry Co. et al.,
   519 U. S. 1091. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed further herein informa pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 24, 1997
    No. 96-1034.
    No. 96-1108.
    Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States et al.; and Spice Entertainment Cos., Inc. v. Reno, Attorney General, et al.
   Affirmed on appeals from D. C. Del. Reported below: 945 F. Supp. 772.


text:
    No. 96-7621.
    Calamia v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio-rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433 (1997).


text:
    No. D-1790.
    In re Disbarment of Friedman.
   Bruce Michael Friedman, of Los Angeles, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. M-65.
    No. M-66.
    Hartnett v. Stein, dba Western Contruction Co.; and Tidik v. Kaufman et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 95-974.
    Arizonans for Official English et al. v. Arizona et al.,
   ante, p. 43. In this case, the parties shall bear their own costs.


text:
    No. 96-454.
    Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash et ux.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 96-552.
    Agostini et al. v. Felton et al.; and Chancellor, Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. v. Felton et al.
    No. 96-553.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 519 U. S. 1086.] Motion of Sarah Peter et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 96-663.
    Klehr et ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 519 U. S. 1073.] Motion of Plaintiffs Executive Committee MDL No. 1069 et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.