text:
    No. D-2079.
    In re Disbarment of Quaintance.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 526 U. S. 1156.]


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. D-2081.
    In re Disbarment of Berfield.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1001.]


text:
    No. D-2082.
    In re Disbarment of Lopez.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1002.]


text:
    No. D-2083.
    In re Disbarment of Goble.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1019.]


text:
    No. D-2084.
    In re Disbarment of Giamanco.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1019.]


text:
    No. D-2085.
    In re Disbarment of Maglaras.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1019.]


text:
    No. D-2086.
    In re Disbarment of Smith.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1019.]


text:
    No. D-2090.
    In re Disbarment of Boncek.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1032.]


text:
    No. D-2098.
    In re Disbarment of Harris.
   Robert H. Harris, of Woodmere, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2099.
    In re Disbarment of Hernandez.
   Rodolfo Hernandez, of El Paso, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2100.
    In re Disbarment of Mmahat.
   John A. Mma-hat, of Metairie, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 96-8963.
    No. 97-9361.
    No. 98-10.
    No. 98-1481.
    No. 98-1672.
    No. 98-1680.
    No. 98-1703.
    No. 98-1787.
    No. 98-1793.
    No. 98-1814.
    No. 98-1815.
    No. 98-1830.
    No. 98-1873.
    No. 98-7589.
    No. 98-7670.
    No. 98-8077.
    No. 98-8352.
    No. 98-8426.
    No. 98-8444.
    No. 98-8468.
    No. 98-8677.
    No. 98-8678.
    Jarrett v. Toxic Action Wash et al., Jones v. United States, Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, Senior Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, et al., Koster v. United States, Meade v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., et al., Skurnick v. Raake, Brazell v. Savannah Electric & Power Co., Estate of Oliver, Deceased, by Richardson, Personal Representative v. Florida et al., Kolb v. Texas, Cannings v. Librarian of Congress et al.; Cannings v. Librarian of Congress et al.; and Evelyn v. Librarian of Congress et al., Dachman v. United States, Richardson v. Albertson's, Inc., et al., In re Font, King v. Poppell et al., Petreykov et al. v. Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, et al., King v. Upshaw, Warden, et al., Shivaee v. Virginia et al., Loftis v. Catoe, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., Patmon v. Oklahoma et al., In re Artis, Moore v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Minniecheske v. Shawano County et al., In re Williams Lewis, Pearson v. Catoe, Duckworth v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Visintine v. United States, Rives v. County of Monmouth et al., Jordan v. Mississippi, Olick v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al., Harris v. Ballard et al., Mantilla v. United States, Travis v. Ohio, Burns v. Mississippi, Parise v. United States, Martini v. Rosewell et al., Chambers v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Smith v. Mississippi,
   522 U. S. 827; ante, p. 373; ante, p. 423; ante, p. 1021; ante, p. 1005; ante, p. 1036; ante, p. 1036; ante, p. 1038; ante, p. 1005; ante, p. 1038; ante, p. 1038; ante, p. 1038; ante, p. 1039; 526 U. S. 1117; 525 U. S. 1167; 526 U. S. 1072; 526 U. S. 1101; 526 U. S. 1119; 526 U. S. 1120; 526 U. S. 1049; 526 U. S. 1103; 526 U. S. 1148; 526 U. S. 1144; 526 U. S. 1162; ante, p. 1007; ante, p. 1008; ante, p. 1024; ante, p. 1026; ante, p. 1040; ante, p. 1041; 526 U. S. 1152; ante, p. 1041; ante, p. 1041; 526 U. S. 1164; ante, p. 1010; ante, p. 1029; and ante, p. 1043. Petitions for rehearing denied.

No. 98-8736.

No. 98-8843.

No. 98-8874.

No. 98-8933.

No. 98-8983.

No. 98-9062.

No. 98-9097.

No. 98-9127.

No. 98-9131.

No. 98-9140.

No. 98-9142.

No. 98-9195.

No. 98-9278.

No. 98-9496.

No. 98-9567.


text:
    No. 98-6022.
    Rosenthal v. Banks, Administrative Appeals Judge, Department of Health and Human Services,
   525 U. S. 972. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 30, 1999
    No. 99-105.
    Southern Union Co. v. Morse.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    August 31, 1999
    No. 99-6003 (A-177).
    In re Leisure.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 98-9808 (A-102).
    Jones v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    No. 99-5975 (A-175).
    Leisure v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, et al.; and Leisure v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-6004 (A-178).
    Leisure v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 1, 1999
    No. 99-5746 (A-151).
    Weeks v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Cheep Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted. Motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 99-6016 (A-180).
    Leisure v. Schriro, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. . Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution and the petition for writ of certiorari.


text:
    No. 99-6017 (A-181).
    Leisure v. Schriro, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution and the petition for writ of certiorari.


text:
    No. 99-6018 (A-182).
    Leisure v. Missouri et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    September 8, 1999
    No. A-210 (O. T. 1999).
    Arkansas Abolitionist Committee v. Arkansas.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death of Alan Willett, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    September 9, 1999
    No. A-189 (99-6035).
    Taylor v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    September 10, 1999
    No. A-962.
    Roquemore v. Rice, Warden, et al.
   Application for certificate of appealability, addressed to Justice Kennedy and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 98-405.
    No. 98-406.
    Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board; and Price et al. v. Bossier Parish School Board.
   D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 525 U. S. 1118.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-818.
    Rice v. Cayetano, Governor of Hawaii.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 526 U. S. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-822.
    Friends of the Earth, Inc., et al. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 525 U. S. 1176.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-1036.
    Illinois v. Wardlow.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, 526 U. S. 1097.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-1170.
    Portuondo, Superintendent, Fishkill Correctional Facility v. Agard.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 526 U. S. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-1299.
    New York v. Hill.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Certiorari granted, 526 U. S. 1111.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-1682.
    United States et al. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.
   D. C. Del. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1021.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 98-1960.
    Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., a Division of Bill Harbert International, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 98-1696.
    United States v. Johnson.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, October 22, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 19, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, December 1, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1701.
    No. 98-1706.
    United States v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.; and International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, October 22, 1999. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 19, 1999. Reply briefs, if any, are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1811.
    Geier et al. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, October 22, 1999. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 19, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1904.
    United States et al. v. Weatherhead.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, October 22, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 19, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Wednesday, December 1, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 99-51.
    Gutierrez et al. v. Ada et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, October 22, 1999. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 19, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, November 29, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1539.
    No. 98-7947.
    No. 98-8120.
    No. 98-8437.
    No. 98-8752.
    No. 98-8836.
    No. 98-8882.
    No. 98-8980.
    No. 98-8987.
    No. 98-9029.
    No. 98-9032.
    No. 98-9288.
    No. 98-9331.
    No. 98-9376.
    No. 98-9453.
    No. 98-9458.
    No. 98-9478.
    No. 98-9480.
    No. 98-9500.
    Glavey v. Highland Lakes Country Club & Community Assn., Ewing v. California, Spearman v. United States, Traft v. American Threshold Industries, Inc., Edwards v. Franchini et al., Hazley v. City of Akron et al., Fields v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, Smith v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Epley v. West et al., Lumbef v. Arden Fair Apartments et al., Lumbef v. Stanford Medical Group et al., In re Harrison-Bey, Cardwell v. Watkins, Lawrence v. Moats, Warden, et al., Deutsch v. United States, Petreykov et al. v. City of New York, Everett v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Norris v. Slater, Secretary of Transportation, In re Mauldin,
   526 U. S. 1115; 526 U. S. 1054; ante, p. 1039; 526 U. S. 1120; 526 U. S. 1124; 526 U.S. 1162; ante, p. 1007; 526 U. S. 1163; 526 U. S. 1150; ante, p. 1025; ante, p. 1025; 526 U. S. 1144; ante, p. 1026;

ante, p. 1012; ante, p. 1028; ante, p. 1028; ante, p. 1043; ante, p. 1043; and ante, p. 1002. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    September 14, 1999
    No. 99-6147 (A-220).
    In re Davis.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    September 16, 1999
    No. 99-6143 (A-222).
    Mueller v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    September 21, 1999
    No. 99-425.
    Wallace et al. v. Stiehl, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed as to Linda Adams under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    No. 99-210.
    Hospital Service District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish et al. v. Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C., et al.; City of Bossier City et al. v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center; and Richland Parish Hospital Service District 1-B, dba Richland Parish Medical Center, et al. v. Abraham et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed as to City of Bossier City et al. v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    September 23, 1999
    No. 99-5630 (A-232).
    Sullivan v. Snyder, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    No. 99-6315 (A-254).
    Sullivan v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Souter, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 24, 1999
    No. 98-1961.
    International Business Machines Corp. et al. v. McAuley et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    No. 99-6201 (A-235).
    Green v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-6278 (A-244).
    Green v. North Carolina.
   Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Pitt County, N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-6313 (A-252).
    Green v. Lee, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-6319 (A-256).
    Green v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 27, 1999
    No. A-241 (99-451).
    Lewis, Warden, et al. v. Garcia Delgado.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in case No. 97-56162, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, granted pending disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall continue pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.


text:
    September 28, 1999
    No. 98-791.
    No. 98-796.
    Kimel et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al.; and United States v. Florida Board of Regents et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 525 U. S. 1121.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 98-1288.
    Village of Willowbrook et al. v. Olech.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1667.
    Baral v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: “Whether a remittance of estimated taxes or of taxes withheld from wages is a payment of tax that is subject to the limitation on tax refunds set forth in § 6511(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6511(b)?” Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1856.
    Hill et al. v. Colorado et al.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 8 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 8 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 98-1949.
    Pegram et al. v. Herdrich.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of American Association of Health Plans et al. and Washington Legal Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 98-2043.
    Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 99-5.
    No. 99-29.
    United States v. Morrison et al.; and Brzonkala v. Morrison et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Briefs of petitioners are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing -counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Briefs of respondents are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. Reply briefs, if any, are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 99-137.
    Garner, Former Chairman of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles of Georgia, et al. v. Jones.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12,1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court's Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 99-138.
    Troxel et vir v. Granville.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondent is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


text:
    No. 99-161.
    Weisgram et al. v. Marley Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 2 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioners is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Friday, November 12, 1999. Brief of respondents is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, December 13, 1999. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, December 30, 1999. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    BRANCATO v. GUNN et al.
    No. 98-9913.
    Decided October 12, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Braneato seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Braneato is allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Braneato in noneriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Braneato has abused this Court’s certiorari process. On June 7, 1999, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Braneato in forma 'pauperis status with respect to a petition for certio-rari. See Brancato v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 526 U. S. 1157. Prior to the Rule 39.8 denial, Braneato had filed six petitions for certiorari, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Braneato’s total number of frivolous filings to eight.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Brancato’s abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal eases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Braneato from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and eases cited, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    ANTONELLI v. CARIDINE et al.
    No. 98-9933.
    Decided October 12, 1999

      Together with No. 99-5445, Antonelli v. United States, also on motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.

   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Antonelli seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny these requests as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Antonelli is allowed until November 2,1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Antonelli in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Antonelli has abused this Court’s certiorari and extraordinary writ processes. On June 21, 1993, and November 29, 1993, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Antonelli informa pau-peris status with respect to two petitions for certiorari. See Antonelli v. Illinois, 509 U. S. 902, Antonelli v. O’Malley, 510 U. S. 988. Prior to the two Rule 39.8 denials, Anto-nelli had filed 34 petitions for certiorari and 2 petitions for extraordinary writs, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. Since the two Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli has filed 17 petitions for certiorari, all of which were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent. The instant 2 petitions for certiorari thus bring Antonellfs total number of frivolous filings to 57.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Antonellfs abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Antonelli from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and eases cited, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    JUDD v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS et al.
    No. 99-5260.
    Decided October 12, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Judd seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Judd is allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Judd in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Judd has abused this Court’s certiorari and extraordinary writ processes. On May 30, 1995, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Judd informa pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. See In re Judd, 515 U. S. 1101. Prior to this Rule 39.8 denial, Judd had filed six petitions for certiorari, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. Since the Rule 39.8 denial, Judd has filed four petitions for certiorari, all of which were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent. The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Judd’s total number of frivolous filings to 12.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Judd’s abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noneriminal eases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Judd from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and eases cited, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    DEMPSEY v. MARTIN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
    No. 99-5283.
    Decided October 12, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Dempsey seeks leave to proceed in forma pawperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Dempsey is allowed until November 2,1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Dempsey in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Dempsey has abused this Court’s certiorari and extraordinary writ processes. On October 5, 1992, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. See Dempsey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 506 U. S. 810. At that time, Dempsey had filed II petitions for certiorari and 1 petition for an extraordinary writ, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. Since that time, Dempsey has filed five petitions for certiorari, all of which were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent. The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Dempsey’s total number of frivolous filings to 19.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Dempsey’s abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noneriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Dempsey from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    PRUNTY v. BROOKS et al.
    No. 99-5316.
    Decided October 12, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Prunty seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Prunty is allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Prunty in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Prunty has abused this Court’s certiorari process. On April 19, 1999, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Prunty in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certio-rari. See Prunty v. Holschuh, 526 U. S. 1063. At that time, Prunty had filed eight petitions for certiorari, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Prunty’s total number of frivolous filings to 10.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Prunty’s abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Prunty from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    FLIPPO v. WEST VIRGINIA
    No. 98-8770.
    Decided October 18, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of a “homicide crime scene” was denied on the ground that the police were entitled to make a thorough search of any crime scene and the objects found there. Because the rule applied directly conflicts with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), we reverse.

One night in 1996, petitioner and his wife were vacationing at a cabin in a state park. After petitioner called 911 to report that they had been attacked, the police arrived to find petitioner waiting outside the cabin, with injuries to his head and legs. After questioning him, an officer entered the building and found the body of petitioner’s wife, with fatal head wounds. The officers closed off the area, took petitioner to the hospital, and searched the exterior and environs of the cabin for footprints or signs of forced entry. When a police photographer arrived at about 5:30 a.m., the officers reentered the building and proceeded to “process the crime scene.” Brief in Opposition 5. For over 16 hours, they took photographs, collected evidence, and searched through the contents of the cabin. According to the trial court, “[a]t the crime scene, the investigating officers found on a table in Cabin 13, among other things, a briefcase, which they, in the ordinary course of investigating a homicide, opened, wherein they found and seized various photographs and negatives.” Indictment No. 96-F-119 (Cir. Ct. Fayette County, W. Va., May 28, 1997), App. A to Pet. for Cert., p. 2.

Petitioner was indicted for the murder of his wife and moved to suppress the photographs and negatives discovered in an envelope in the closed briefcase during the search. He argued that the police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the search and seizure.

In briefs to the trial court, petitioner contended that Mincey v. Arizona, supra, rejects a “crime scene exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The State also cited Mincey; it argued that the police may-conduct an immediate investigation of a crime scene to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction, id., at 394, and characterized the police activity in this case as “crime scene search and inventory,” Brief in Opposition 12. The State also relied on the “plain view” exception, Mincey, supra, at 393 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-510 (1978)), noting only, however, that the briefcase was unlocked.

In denying the motion, the trial court said nothing about inventory or plain view, but instead approved the search as one of a “homicide crime scene”:

“The Court also concludes that investigating officers, having secured, for investigative purposes, the homicide crime scene, were clearly within the law to conduet a thorough investigation and examination of anything and everything found within the crime scene area. The examination of [the] briefcase found on the table near the body of a homicide victim in this case is clearly something an investigating officer could lawfully examine.” App. A to Pet. for Cert., at 3.

After hearing an oral presentation of petitioner’s petition for appeal of this ruling, and with the full record before it, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review. No. 982196 (Jan. 13, 1999), App. B to Pet. for Cert.

A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967), none of which the trial court invoked here. It simply found that after the homicide crime scene was secured for investigation, a search of “anything and everything found within the crime scene area” was “within the law.” App. A to Pet. for Cert., at 3.

This position squarely conflicts with Mincey v. Arizona, supra, where we rejected the contention that there is a “murder scene exception” to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. We noted that police may make war-rantless entries onto premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene for possible other victims or a killer on the premises, id., at 392, but we rejected any general “murder scene exception” as “inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments— ... the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.” Id., at 395; see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17, 21 (1984) (per curiam). Mincey controls here.

Although the trial court made no attempt to distinguish Mincey, the State contends that the trial court’s ruling is supportable on the theory that petitioner’s direction of the police to the scene of the attack implied consent to search as they did. As in Thompson v. Louisiana, supra, at 23, however, we express no opinion on whether the search here might be justified as consensual, as “the issue of consent is ordinarily a factual issue unsuitable for our consideration in the first instance.” Nor, of course, do we take any position on the applicability of any other exception to the warrant rule, or the harmlessness vel non of any error in receiving this evidence. Any such matters, properly raised, may be resolved on remand. 469 U. S., at 21; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974).

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Circuit Court of West Virginia, Payette County, is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       The photographs included several taken of a man who appears to be taking off his jeans. Hie was later identified as Joel Boggess, a friend of petitioner and a member of the congregation of which petitioner was the minister. At trial, the prosecution introduced the photographs as evidence of petitioner’s relationship with Mr. Boggess and argued that the victim’s displeasure with this relationship was one of the reasons that petitioner may have been motivated to kill her.

       The State suggests that the trial court’s finding that the search was “within the law” could be read as premised on the theories of plain view, exigent circumstances, and inventory that the State advanced below. No trace of this reasoning appears in the trial court’s opinion, which instead appears to undermine the State’s interpretation. It seems implausible that the court found that there was a risk of intentional or accidental destruction of evidence at a “secured” crime scene or that the authorities were performing a mere inventory search when the premises had been secured for “investigative purposes” and the officers opened the briefcase “in the ordinary course of investigating a homicide.” Nor does the court’s validation of “investiga[ting] and examin[ing]... anything and everything found within the crime scene area,” including photographs inside a closed briefcase, apparently rest on the plain-view exception. App. A to Pet. for Cert., at 2, 3.


text:
    IN RE BAUER
    No. 99-5440.
    Decided October 18, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Bauer seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 89.8. Bauer is allowed until November 8, 1999, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any farther petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Bauer in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1.

Bauer has repeatedly abused this Court’s certiorari and extraordinary writ processes. On October 4, 1993, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Bauer in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. See In re Bauer, 510 U. S. 807. Prior to the Rule 39.8 denial, Bauer had filed three petitions for certiorari and five petitions for extraordinary writs, all of which were both frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. Since the Rule 39.8 denial, Bauer has filed two petitions for certio-rari, both of which were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent. The instant petition for mandamus thus brings Bauer’s total number of frivolous filings to 12.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Bauer’s abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Bauer from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    TEXAS et al. v. LESAGE et al.
    No. 98-1111.
    Decided November 29, 1999
   Per Curiam.

Respondent Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, applied for admission to the Ph.D. program in counseling psychology at the University of Texas’ Department of Education for the 1996-1997 academic year. In the year Lesage applied, the school received 223 applications for the program and offered admission to roughly 20 candidates. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22. It is undisputed that the school considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The school rejected Lesage’s application and offered admission to at least one minority candidate. Lesage filed suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief. He alleged that, by establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process, the school had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. III), and 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d.

Petitioners sought summary judgment, offering evidence that, even if the school’s admissions process had been completely colorblind, Lesage would not have been admitted. At least 80 applicants had higher undergraduate grade point averages (GPA’s) than Lesage, 152 applicants had higher Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores, and 73 applicants had both higher GPA’s and higher GRE scores. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23. In an affidavit, Professor Ricardo Ainslie, one of two members of the school’s admissions committee, stated that Lesage’s personal statement indicated that he had “ 'a rather superficial interest in the field with a limited capacity to convey his interests and ideas,’ ” and that his letters of recommendation were “weak.” Id., at A-24. Ainslie stated that Lesage’s application was rejected early in the review process, when the committee was winnowing the full application pool to a list of 40. Ibid. The District Court concluded that “any consideration of race had no effect on this particular individual’s rejection,” and that there was “uncontested evidence that the students ultimately admitted to the program ha[d] credentials that the committee considered superior to Plaintiffs.” Id., at A-26 to A-27. It therefore granted summary judgment for petitioners with respect to all of Lesage’s claims for relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 158 F. 3d 213 (1998). The court did not review the District Court’s conclusion that there was no genuine issue as to whether the school would have rejected Lesage under a colorblind admissions process. Instead, it held that such a determination was “irrelevant to the pertinent issue on summary judgment, namely, whether the state violated Lesage’s constitutional rights by rejecting his application in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions program.” Id., at 222. An applicant who was rejected at a stage of the review process that was race conscious, the court reasoned, has “suffered an implied injury”— the inability to compete on an equal footing. Ibid. Because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the stage of review during which Lesage’s application was eliminated was in some way race conscious, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case for trial. Ibid.

Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate on Lesage’s §1983 action seeking damages for the school’s rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if petitioners conclusively established that Lesage would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy, its decision is inconsistent with this Court’s well-established framework for analyzing such claims. Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration. See id., at 287. See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 (1998); Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 675 (1996). Our previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same: The government can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive.

Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.

Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is “the inability to compete on an equal footing.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995). But where there is no allegation of an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government’s conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any finding of liability.

Lesage’s second amended complaint sought injunctive relief and alleged that petitioners “have established and are maintaining, under color of the laws of the State of Texas, an affirmative action admissions program at the College of Education that classifies applicants on the basis of race and ethnicity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22 (emphasis added). But in deciding that summary judgment was improper, the Court of Appeals did not distinguish between Lesage’s retrospective claim for damages and his forward-looking claim for injunctive relief based on continuing discrimination. Further, in their petition for certiorari, petitioners assert that “[t]he case at bar differs from Ada-rand because there is no allegation that the department of counseling psychology continues to use race-based admissions subsequent to the Fifth Circuit’s Hopwood v. State of Texas[, 78 F. 3d 932, cert. denied, 518 U. S. 1033 (1996),] decision.” Pet. for Cert. 13. The brief in opposition does not contest this statement. It therefore appears, although we do not decide, that Lesage has abandoned any claim that the school is presently administering a discriminatory admissions process.

Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that petitioners were not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage’s § 1983 claim for damages relating to the rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect.

Lesage also asserted claims under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 2000d. Whether these claims remain, and whether Lesage has abandoned his claim for injunctive relief on the ground that petitioners are continuing to operate a discriminatory admissions process, are matters open on remand. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Justice Breyer

text:
    FIORE v. WHITE, WARDEN, et al.
    No. 98-942.
    Argued October 12, 1999
    Decided November 30, 1999
    Breyer, J., delivered the opmion for a unammous Court.

      James Brandon Lieber argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were M. Jean Clickner and Harold Gondelman.

      Robert A. Grad, Assistant Executive Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General, pro se, and Andrea F. McKenna, Senior Deputy Attorney General.

        Saul M. Pilchen, Peter Goldberger, and Lisa Bondareff Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urging reversal.
      A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, Michael B. Billingsley, Assistant Attorney General, Dan Schweitzer, and Thomas R. Keller, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania convicted codefend-ants William Fiore and David Searpone of violating a provision of Pennsylvania law forbidding any person to “operate a hazardous waste” facility without a “permit.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993) (reprinted at Appendix A, infra). Each codefendant appealed to a different intermediate state court, one of which affirmed Fiore’s conviction, the other of which reversed Searpone’s. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review of Fiore’s case, and his conviction became final. However, that court agreed to review Searpone’s case, and it subsequently held that the statutory provision did not apply to those who, like Searpone and Fiore, possessed a permit but deviated radically from the permit’s terms. Consequently, it set aside Searpone’s conviction.

In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 634 A. 2d 1109 (1993), Fiore asked the Pennsylvania courts to reconsider his identical conviction. They denied his request. He then brought a federal habeas corpus petition in which he argued, among other things, that Pennsylvania’s courts, either as a matter of Pennsylvania law or as a matter of federal constitutional law, must apply the Scarpone interpretation of the statute to his identical ease. If this proposition of law is correct, he asserted, it would follow that the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence at all with respect to one essential element of the crime (namely, the lack of a permit). On this reasoning, Fiore concluded that the Federal Constitution requires his release. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970).

The Federal District Court granted the habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. We agreed to review the appellate court’s rejection of Fiore’s claim. Before deciding whether the Federal Constitution requires that Fiore’s conviction be set aside in light of Scarpone, we first must know whether Pennsylvania itself considers Scarpone to have explained what Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), always meant, or whether Pennsylvania considers Scarpone to have changed the law. We invoke the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s certification procedure in order to obtain that court’s view of the matter. See Appendix B, infra.

I

The relevant background circumstances include the following.

1. Fiore owned and operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in Pennsylvania. Scarpone was the facility’s general manager. Pennsylvania authorities, while conceding that Fiore and Searpone possessed a permit to operate the facility, claimed that their deliberate alteration of a monitoring pipe to hide a leakage problem went so far beyond the terms of the permit that the operation took place without a permit at all. A jury convicted them both of having “operate[d] a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility” without a “permit.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993); see Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Ct. Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty., Pa., Jan. 19, 1988), p. 2, App. 6 (marking date of conviction as Feb. 18, 1986). The trial court upheld the conviction, despite the existence of a permit, for, in its view, the “alterations of the . . . pipe represented such a significant departure from the terms of the existing permit that the operation of the hazardous waste facility was im-permitted’ after the alterations were undertaken ....” Id., at 48, App. 44.

2. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 742 (1998) (granting the Superior Court jurisdiction over all appeals from a final order of a court of common pleas). That court affirmed the conviction “on the basis of the opinion of the court below.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, No. 00485 PGH 1988 (May 12, 1989), pp. 2-3, App. 99-100. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Fiore leave to appeal on March 13, 1990; shortly thereafter, Fiore’s conviction became final.

3. Fiore’s codefendant, Searpone, appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §762(a)(2)(ii) (1998) (granting the Commonwealth Court jurisdiction over appeals in regulatory criminal cases). That court noted the existence of a “valid permit,” found the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the statute “strained at best,” and set Scarpone’s conviction aside. Scarpone v. Commonwealth, 141 Pa. Commw. 560, 567, 596 A. 2d 892, 895 (1991). The court wrote:

“The alteration of the monitoring pipe was clearly a violation of the conditions of the permit. But to say that the alteration resulted in the operation of a new facility which had not been permitted is to engage in a semantic exercise which we cannot accept. . . . [W]e will not let [the provision’s] language be stretched to include activities which clearly fall in some other subsection.” Ibid.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion. It wrote:

“[T]he Commonwealth did not make out the crime of operating a waste disposal facility without a permit.... Simply put, Mr. Searpone did have a permit. . . . [T]o conclude that the alteration constituted the operation of a new facility without a permit is a bald fiction we cannot endorse.... The Commonwealth Court was right in reversing Mr. Searpone’s conviction of operating without a permit when the facility clearly had one.” Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa., at 279, 634 A. 2d, at 1112.

4. Fiore again asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case, once after that court agreed to review Scarporie’s ease and twice more after it decided Searpone. See Appellee’s Supplemental App. in No. 97-3288 (CA3), pp. 59, 61 (including docket sheets reflecting Fiore’s filings on Jan. 30, 1992, Jan. 24, 1994, and Oct. 18, 1994). The court denied those requests.

5. Fiore then sought collateral relief in the state courts. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pa., refused to grant Fiore’s petition for collateral relief — despite Searpone — because “at the time of... conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise,” and “[t]he petitioner is not entitled to a retroactive application of the interpretation of the law set forth in Scarpone.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), p. 6. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, both because Fiore had previously litigated the claim and because Fiore’s “direct appeal was no longer pending when the Supreme Court made the ruling which [Fiore] now seeks to have applied to his case.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, 445 Pa. Super. 401, 416, 665 A. 2d 1185, 1193 (1995).

6. Fiore sought federal habeas corpus relief. As we previously pointed out, supra, at 25, he argued that Pennsylvania had imprisoned him ‘Tor conduct which was not criminal under the statutory section charged.” App. 194. The Federal District Court, acting on a Magistrate’s recommendation, granted the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, however, primarily because it believed that “state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.” 149 F. 3d 221, 222 (1998).

7. We subsequently granted Fiore’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that his conviction be set aside.

HH h — I

Fiore essentially claims that Pennsylvania produced no evidence whatsoever of one element of the crime, namely, that he lacked “a permit.” The validity of his federal claim may depend upon whether the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone was always the statute’s meaning, even at the time of Fiore’s trial. Scarpone marked the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the statute; previously, Pennsylvania’s lower courts had been divided in their interpretation. Fiore’s and Searpone’s trial court concluded that § 6Q18.401(a)’s “permit” requirement prohibited the operation of a hazardous waste facility in a manner that deviates from the permit’s terms, and the Superior Court, in adjudicating Fiore’s direct appeal, accepted the trial court’s interpretation in a summary unpublished memorandum. Then, the Commonwealth Court, in Scarpone’s direct appeal, specifically rejected the interpretation adopted by the Superior Court in Fiore’s case. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone set forth its authoritative interpretation of the statute, affirming the Commonwealth Court only after Fiore’s conviction became final. For that reason, we must know whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in Scarpone stated the correct understanding of the statute at the time Fiore’s conviction became final, or whether it changed the interpretation then applicable. Compare, e. g., Buradus v. General Cement Prods. Co., 52 A. 2d 205, 208 (Pa. 1947) (stating that “[i]n general, the construction placed upon a statute by the courts becomes a part of the act,/rom the very beginning”), with Commonwealth v. Fiore, supra, at 416-417, 665 A. 2d, at 1193; Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), at 6 (refusing to apply the Scarpone interpretation because “at the time of [Fiore’s] conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise”).

Ill

We certify the following question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to that court’s Rules Regarding Certification of Questions of Pennsylvania law:

Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A. 2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore’s conviction became final?

We respectfully request that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accept our certification petition because, in our view, the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case.

We recommend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court designate William Fiore (the petitioner here) as appellant and both Gregory White, Warden, and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the respondents here) as appellees.

The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a copy of this opinion and the briefs and records filed with this Court in this ease. Judgment and further proceedings in this ease are reserved pending our receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OP THE COURT

Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993) provides:

“No person or municipality shall store, transport, treat, or dispose of hazardous waste within this Commonwealth unless such storage, transportation, treatment, or disposal is authorized by the rules and regulations of the department; no person or municipality shall own or operate a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility unless such person or municipality has first obtained a permit for the storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste from the department; and, no person or municipality shall transport hazardous waste within the Commonwealth unless such person or municipality has first obtained a license for the transportation of hazardous waste from the department.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 6018.606(f) establishes criminal penalties for a violation of § 6018.401 and provides:

“Any person who stores, transports, treats, or disposes of hazardous waste within the Commonwealth in violation of [§ 6018.401]... shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $2,500 but not more than $100,000 per day for each violation or to imprisonment for not less than two years but not more than ten years, or both.” (Footnote omitted.)

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT

“RULES REGARDING CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
“1. This Court will accept Certification Petitions, on a trial basis, from January 1,1999 to January 1, 2000.
“2. Any of the following courts may file a Certification Petition with this Court:
“a. The United States Supreme Court; or
“b. Any United States Court of Appeals.
“3. A court may file a Certification Petition either on the motion of a party or sua sponte.
“A. A Certification Petition shall contain the following:
“a. A brief statement of the nature and stage of the proceedings in the petitioning court;
“b. A brief statement of the material facts of the ease; “c. A statement of the question or questions of Pennsylvania law to be determined;
“d. A statement of the particular reasons why this Court should accept certification; and “e. A recommendation about which party should be designated Appellant and which Appellee in subsequent pleadings filed with this Court.
“f. The petitioning court shall attach to the Certification Petition copies of any papers filed by the parties regarding certification, e. g., a Motion for Certification, a Response thereto, a Stipulation of Facts, etc.” Pa. Rules of Court, p. 745 (1999).


author: CHIEF Justice Rehnquist Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens,

text:
    LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT v. UNITED REPORTING PUBLISHING CORP.
    No. 98-678.
    Argued October 13, 1999
    Decided December 7, 1999

      Rehnqtjist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Sc alia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Sc alia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 41. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, Sou-ter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 42. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 44.

      Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David Boies, James K. Hahn, and Frederick N. Merkin.

      Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, and John,S'. Koppel.

      Bruce J Ennis argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Guylyn R. Cummins and Marcelle E. Mihaila

      A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schijf, Deputy Solicitor General, and Daniel Smirlock, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Margery S. Bron-ster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Direct Marketing Association by Robert L. Sherman; for the Individual Reference Services Group et al. by Ronald L. Plesser, James J. Halpert, and Emilio W. Cividanes; for Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc., by David

        Brian Smallman; for the Newsletter Publishers Association by James E. Grossberg and Jay Ward Brown; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Jane E. Kirtley, Samuel P. Spencer, Richard M. Schmidt, and Xenia M. Boone; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by David H. Remes, Daniel J Popeo, and Richard A Samp.

   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

California Govt. Code Ann. § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999) places two conditions on public access to arrestees’ addresses — that the person requesting an address declare that the request is being made for one of five prescribed purposes, and that the requester also declare that the address will not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service.

The District Court permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute was facially invalid because it unduly burdens commercial speech. We hold that the statutory section in question was not subject to a “facial” challenge.

Petitioner, the Los Angeles Police Department, maintains records relating to arrestees. Respondent, United Reporting Publishing Corporation, is a private publishing service that provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals to its customers, who include attorneys, insurance companies, drug and alcohol counselors, and driving schools.

Before July 1,1996, respondent received arrestees’ names and addresses under the old version of § 6254, which generally required state and local law enforcement agencies to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 6254(f) (West 1995). Effective July 1,1996, the state legislature amended § 6254(f) to limit the public’s access to arrest-ees’ and victims’ current addresses. The amended statute provides that state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public:

“[T]he current address of every individual arrested by the agency and the current address of the victim of a crime, where the requester declares under penalty of perjury that the request is made for a scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpose, or that the request is made for investigation purposes by a licensed private investigator . . . except that the address of the victim of [certain crimes] shall remain confidential. Address information obtained pursuant to this paragraph shall not be used directly or indirectly to sell a prod-uet or service to any individual or group of individuals, and the requester shall execute a declaration to that effect under penalty of perjury.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999).

Sections 6254(f)(1) and (2) require that state and loeal law enforcement agencies make public, inter alia, the name, occupation, and physical description, including date of birth, of every individual arrested by the agency, as well as the circumstances of the arrest. Thus, amended § 6254(f) limits access only to the arrestees’ addresses.

Before the effective date of the amendment, respondent sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U. S. C. § 1988, to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On the effective date of the statute, petitioner and other law enforcement agencies denied respondent access to the address information because, according to respondent, “[respondent’s] employees could not sign section 6254(f)(3) declarations.” Brief for Respondent 5. Respondent did not allege, and nothing in the record before this Court indicates, that it ever “declared] under penalty of perjury” that it was requesting information for one of the prescribed purposes and that it would not use the address information to “directly or indirectly . . . sell a product or service,” as would have been required by the statute. See § 6254(f)(3).

Respondent then amended its complaint and sought a temporary restraining order. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order, and, a few days later, issued a preliminary injunction. Respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. In granting the motion, the District Court construed respondent’s claim as presenting a facial challenge to amended § 6254(f). United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 823 (SD Cal. 1996). The court held that the statute was facially invalid under the First Amendment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s facial invalidation. United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F. 3d 1133 (CA9 1998). The court concluded that the statute restricted commercial speech, and, as such, was entitled to “ ‘a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.’” Ibid. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978)). The court applied the test set out in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980), and found that the asserted governmental interest in protecting arrestees’ privacy was substantial. But, the court held that “the numerous exceptions to § 6254(f)(3) for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, and investigative purposes render the statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment.” 146 F. 3d, at 1140. The court noted that “[hjaving one’s name, crime, and address printed in the local paper is a far greater affront to privacy than receiving a letter from an attorney, substance abuse counselor, or driving school eager to help one overcome his present difficulties (for a fee, naturally),” and thus that the exceptions “undermine and counteract” the asserted governmental interest in preserving arrestees’ privacy. Ibid. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent and upheld the injunction against enforcement of § 6254(f)(3). We granted certiorari. 525 U. S. 1121 (1999).

We hold that respondent was not, under our eases, entitled to prevail on a “facial attack” on § 6254(f)(3).

Respondent’s primary argument in the District Court and the Court of Appeals was that § 6254(f)(3) was invalid on its face, and respondent maintains that position here. But we believe that our cases hold otherwise.

The traditional rule is that “a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610 (1973)).

Prototypical exceptions to this traditional rule are First Amendment challenges to statutes based on First Amendment overbreadth. “At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech . . . the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing ‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.’ ” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520-521 (1972) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965)). “This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their right for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 520-521. See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).

In Gooding, for example, the defendant was one of a group that picketed an Army headquarters building carrying signs opposing the "Vietnam war. A confrontation with the police occurred, as a result of which Gooding was charged with “ ‘using opprobrious words and abusive language ... tending to cause a breach of the peace.’ ” 405 U. S., at 518-519. In Thornhill, the defendant was prosecuted for violation of a statute forbidding any person to “ ‘picket the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise-’ ” 310 U. S., at 91.

This is not to say that the threat of criminal prosecution is a necessary condition for the entertainment of a facial challenge. We have permitted such attacks on statutes in appropriate circumstances where no such threat was present. See, e. g., National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569 (1998) (entertaining a facial challenge to a public funding scheme); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 (1997) (entertaining a landowner’s facial challenge to a local redevelopment plan); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U. S. 143 (1995) (entertaining a facial challenge to a state regulation restructuring the disbursal of welfare benefits).

But the allowance of a facial overbreadth challenge to a statute is an exception to the traditional rule that “a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.” Ferber, supra, at 767 (citing Broadrick, supra, at 610). This general rule reflects two “cardinal principles” of our constitutional order: the personal nature of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication. 458 U. S., at 767. “By focusing on the factual situation before us, and similar cases necessary for development of a constitutional rule, we face ‘flesh and blood’ legal problems with data ‘relevant and adequate to an informed judgment.’” Id., at 768 (footnotes omitted).

Even though the challenge be based on the First Amendment, the overbreadth doctrine is not casually employed. “Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ and have employed it with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id., at 769 (citing Broadrick, supra, at 613). “‘[Fjacial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and ... its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from “pure speech” toward conduct and that conduct — even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws ....’” 458 U. S., at 770 (quoting Broadrick, supra, at 615). See also Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987).

The Court of Appeals held that § 6254(f)(3) was facially invalid under the First Amendment. Petitioner contends that the section in question is not an abridgment of anyone’s right to engage in speech, be it commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of the police department.

We believe that, at least for purposes of facial invalidation, petitioner’s view is correct. This is not a case in which the government is prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker already possesses. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476 (1995). The California statute in question merely requires that if respondent wishes to obtain the addresses of arrestees it must qualify under the statute to do so. Respondent did not attempt to qualify and was therefore denied access to the addresses. For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation, what we have before us is nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its possession. California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment. Cf. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 14 (1978).

To the extent that respondent’s “facial challenge” seeks to rely on the effect of the statute on parties not before the Court — its potential customers, for example — its claim does not fit within the case law allowing courts to entertain facial challenges. No threat of prosecution, for example, see Gooding, or cutoff of funds, see NEA, hangs over their heads. They may seek access under the statute on their own just as respondent did, without incurring any burden other than the prospect that their request will be denied. Resort to a facial challenge here is not warranted because there is “[no] possibility that protected speech will be muted.” Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977).

The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong to facially invalidate § 6254(f)(3). Respondent urges several grounds as alternative bases for affirmance, but none of them were passed on by the Court of Appeals and they will remain open on remand if properly presented and preserved there.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that, insofar as this case presents a facial challenge to the statute, the fact that it is formally nothing but a restriction upon access to government information is determinative. As the Court says, that fact eliminates any “chill” upon speech that would allow a plaintiff to complain about the application of the statute to someone other than himself.

I understand the Court’s opinion as not addressing the as-applied challenge to the statute, and as leaving that question open upon remand. That seems to me a permissible course, since the Court of Appeals’ judgment here affirmed without qualification the judgment of the District Court, which rested exclusively upon the facial unconstitutionality of the statute and hence purported to invalidate it in all its applications. Though there are portions of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that address the particular circumstances of this respondent, I do not read it as narrowing the facial invalidation, nor as offering as-applied invalidation as an alternative ground for affirmance.

I do not agree with Justice Ginsburg that what renders this statute immune from a facial challenge necessarily renders it immune from an as-applied challenge as well. A law that is formally merely a restriction upon access to information subjects no speaker to the risk of prosecution, and hence there is no need to protect such speakers by allowing someone else to raise their challenges to the law. But it is an entirely different question whether a restriction upon access that allows access to the press (which in effect makes the information part of the public domain), but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech rather than upon access to government information. That question — and the subsequent question whether, if it is a restriction upon speech, its application to this respondent is justified — is not addressed in the Court’s opinion.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice O’Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, which recognizes that California Government Code § 6254(f)(3) is properly analyzed as a restriction on access to government information, not as a restriction on protected speech. See ante, at 40. That is sufficient reason to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

As the Court observes, see ibid., the statute at issue does not restrict speakers from conveying information they already possess. Anyone who comes upon arrestee address information in the public domain is free to use that information as she sees fit. It is true, as Justice Scalia suggests, ante this page (concurring opinion), that the information could be provided to and published by journalists, and § 6254(f)(3) would indeed be a speech restriction if it then prohibited people from using that published information to speak to or about arrestees. But the statute contains no such prohibition. Once address information is in the public domain, the statute does not restrict its use in any way.

California could, as the Court notes, constitutionally decide not to give out arrestee address information at all. See ante, at 40. It does not appear that the selective disclosure of address information that California has chosen instead im-permissibly burdens speech. To be sure, the provision of address information is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak to or about arrestees, and once a State decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide how that benefit will be distributed. California could not, for example, release address information only to those whose political views were in line with the party in power. Cf. Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668 (1996) (local officials may not terminate an independent contractor for criticizing government policy). But if the award of the subsidy is not based on an illegitimate criterion such as viewpoint, California is free to support some speech without supporting other speech. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983).

Throughout its argument, respondent assumes that § 6254(f)(3)’s regime of selective disclosure burdens speech in the sense of reducing the total flow of information. Whether that is correct is far from clear and depends on the point of comparison. If California were to publish the names and addresses of arrestees for everyone to use freely, it would indeed be easier to speak to and about arrestees than it is under the present system. But if States were required to choose between keeping proprietary information to themselves and making it available without limits, States might well choose the former option. In that event, disallowing selective disclosure would lead not to more speech overall but to more secrecy and less speech. As noted above, this consideration could not justify limited disclosures that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint or some other proscribed criterion. But it does suggest that society’s interest in the free flow of information might argue for upholding laws like the one at issue in this case rather than imposing an all-or-nothing regime under which “nothing” could be a State’s easiest response.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting.

The majority’s characterization of this case as an improper facial challenge is misguided. Even a brief look at the complaint reveals that respondent unequivocally advanced both a facial and an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of California Government Code § 6254(f)(3) (hereinafter Amendment). In each of the six counts of its complaint, respondent explicitly challenged the Amendment on its face “and as applied.” Complaint ¶¶ 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 43. Respondent also alleged that it “will be and has already been injured in a serious way by the Amendment”; specifically, it claimed that it “has lost prospective clients and sales, and will ultimately be put out of business.” Id., ¶ 23. Finally, respondent has maintained before us that it continues to challenge the Amendment “on its face and as applied.” Brief for Respondent 15. It is, therefore, perfectly clear that respondent’s allegations of direct injury justified the decision of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of the Amendment.

To determine whether the Amendment is valid as applied to respondent, it is similarly not necessary to invoke the overbreadth doctrine. That doctrine is only relevant if the challenger needs to rely on the possibility of invalid applications to third parties. In this case, it is the application of the Amendment to respondent itself that is at issue. Nor, in my opinion, is it necessary to do the four-step Central Hudson dance, because I agree with the majority that the Amendment is really a restriction on access to government information rather than a direct restriction on protected speech. For this reason, the majority is surely correct in observing that “California could decide not to give out ar-restee information at all without violating the First Amendment.” Ante, at 40. Moreover, I think it equally clear that California could release the information on a selective basis to a limited group of users who have a special, and legitimate, need for the information.

A different, and more difficult, question is presented when the State makes information generally available, but denies access to a small disfavored class. In this ease, the State is making the information available to scholars, news media, politicians, and others, while denying access to a narrow category of persons solely because they intend to use the information for a constitutionally protected purpose. As Justice Ginsburg points out, if the State identified the disfavored persons based on their viewpoint, or political affiliation, for example, the discrimination would clearly be invalid. See ante, at 43 (concurring opinion).

What the State did here, in my opinion, is comparable to that obviously unconstitutional discrimination. In this case, the denial of access is based on the fact that respondent plans to publish the information to others who, in turn, intend to use it for a commercial speech purpose that the State finds objectionable. Respondent’s proposed publication of the information is indisputably lawful — petitioner concedes that if respondent independently acquires the data, the First Amendment protects its right to communicate it to others. Brief for Petitioner 27; see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 496 (1975). Similarly, the First Amendment supports the third parties’ use of it for commercial speech purposes. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466, 472 (1988). Thus, because the State’s discrimination is based on its desire to prevent the information from being used for constitutionally protected purposes, I think it must assume the burden of justifying its conduct.

The only justification advanced by the State is an asserted interest in protecting the privacy of victims and arrestees. Although that interest would explain a total ban on access, or a statute narrowly limiting access, it is insufficient when the data can be published in the news media and obtained by private investigators or others who meet the Amendment’s vague criteria. This Amendment plainly suffers from the same "overall irrationality” that undermined the statutes at issue in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476, 488 (1995), and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173 (1999). By allowing such widespread access to the information, the State has eviscerated any rational basis for believing that the Amendment will truly protect the privacy of these persons. See Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U. S., at 493-495.

A different, and more likely, rationale that might explain the restriction is the State’s desire to prevent lawyers from soliciting law business from unrepresented defendants. This interest is arguably consistent with trying to uphold the ethics of the legal profession. Also at stake here, however, are the important interests of allowing lawyers to engage in protected speech and potentially giving criminal defendants better access to needed professional assistance. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 376 (1977). Ultimately, this state interest must fail because at its core it relies on discrimination against disfavored speech.

That the State might simply withhold the information from all persons does not insulate its actions from constitutional scrutiny. For even though government may withhold a particular benefit entirely, it “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). A contrary view would impermissibly allow the government to “‘produce a result which [it] eould not command directly.’” Ibid. It is perfectly clear that California could not directly censor the use of this information or the resulting speech. It follows, I believe, that the State’s discriminatory ban on access to information — in an attempt to prohibit persons from exercising their constitutional rights to publish it in a truthful and accurate manner — is equally invalid.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       Section 6254(f) provides, in pertinent part:
      “Other provisions of this subdivision notwithstanding, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation:
      “(1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds.
      “(2) Subject to the restrictions imposed by Section 841.5 of the Penal Code, the time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency and the time and nature of the response thereto, including, to the extent the information regarding crimes alleged or committed or any other incident investigated is recorded, the time, date, and location of occurrence, the time and date of the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, property, or weapons involved. The name of a victim of any crime defined by Section 220, 261, 262, 264, 264.1, 273a, 273d, 273.5, 286, 288, 288a, 289, 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, or 646.9 of the Penal Code may be withheld at the victim’s request, or at the request of the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor. When a person is the victim of more than one crime, information disclosing that the person is a victim of a crime defined by Section 220,261,262,264, 264.1, 273a, 273d, 286, 288, 288a, 289, 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, or 646.9 of the Penal Code may be deleted at the request of the victim, or the victim’s parent or guardian if the victim is a minor, in making the report of the crime, or of any crime or incident accompanying the crime, available to the public in compliance with the requirements of this paragraph.”

       Respondent challenged the statute as a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals did not pass on that challenge, nor do we.

      The majority suggests that respondent was denied the information simply because it “did not attempt to qualify’' under the statute. Ante, at 40. This suggestion assumes that respondent’s publication might qualify as “journalistic” even though it serves primarily as a mere conduit of data to prospective commercial users. The Amendment provides, however, that even a “journalistic” publication must sign, under risk of criminal prosecution for perjury, an affidavit stating that the information will “not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service to any individual or group of individuals.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999). Not coincidentally, that is precisely how respondent uses the information. Accordingly, not only is the belief that respondent would have qualified under the statute unrealistic, but the notion that respondent must put itself at risk of 2-to-4 years’ imprisonment in order to raise a constitutional challenge to a state statute is alarming, to say the least.

       The majority’s characterization of both the lower court decisions as simple facial invalidations is perplexing. See ante, at 36-37. The District Court explicitly phrased the issue presented as whether “the amendment to Cal. Gov. Code § 6254 [is] an unconstitutional limitation on plaintiff’s commercial speech.” United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 824 (SD Cal. 1996) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion by stating that it need not reach respondent’s “overbreadth arguments,” United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol, 146 F. 3d 1133, 1140, n. 6 (1998), clearly indicating that it was not deciding the case as a facial challenge.

       While there is no direct evidence that the State is acting with intended animus toward respondent and others’ speech, see Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 5, we have expressly rejected the argument that “discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas,” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 117 (1991).

         Our cases have repeatedly frowned on regulations that discriminate based on the content of the speech or the identity of the speaker. See, e. g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173, 190 (1999) (Government cannot restrict advertising for private casinos while allowing the advertising for tribal casinos); Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U. S., at 116 (government cannot “singl[e] out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income”); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 229 (1987) (a tax that applies to some magazines but not to others “is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a magazine’s tax status depends entirely on its content” (emphasis deleted)); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1984) (“Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment”); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 582 (1983) (a tax that “single[s] out the press for special treatment” is unconstitutional); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“[W]e have frequently condemned ... discrimination among different users of the same medium for expression”).