author: Justice Kennedy

text:
    NEAL v. UNITED STATES
    No. 94-9088.
    Argued December 4, 1995
    Decided January 22, 1996

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Donald Thomas Bergerson, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 963, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael J. Costello.

      Paul R. Q. Wolf son argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

        Peter Goldberger and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The policy of sentencing drug offenders based on the amount of drugs involved, straightforward enough in its simplest formulation, gives rise to complexities, requiring us again to address the methods for calculating the weight of LSD sold by a drug trafficker. We reject petitioner’s contention that the revised system for determining LSD amounts under the United States Sentencing Guidelines requires reconsideration of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences, and we adhere to our former decision on the subject.

I

LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) is such a powerful narcotic that the average dose contains only 0.05 milligrams of the pure drug. The per-dose amount is so minute that in most instances LSD is transferred to a carrier medium and sold at retail by the dose, not by weight. In the typical case, pure LSD is dissolved in alcohol or other solvent, and the resulting solution is applied to paper or gelatin. The solvent evaporates; the LSD remains. The dealer cuts the paper or gel into single-dose squares for sale on the street. Users ingest the LSD by swallowing or licking the squares or drinking a beverage into which the squares have been mixed.

In 1988, petitioner Meirl Neal was arrested for selling 11,456 doses of LSD on blotter paper. The combined weight of the LSD and the paper was 109.51 grams. Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841, and one count of conspiracy to possess LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. At the initial sentencing, the method for determining the weight of the illegal mixture or substance was the same under the Guidelines and the statute directing minimum sentences. The determinative amount was the whole weight of the blotter paper containing the drug. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n: * (Nov. 1987) (1987 USSG). Because the total weight of the LSD and blotter paper exceeded 10 grams, the District Court found petitioner subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence specified in 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(v). Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, the indicated sentence was even greater than the statutory minimum: The quantity of the drugs and petitioner’s prior convictions resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, even after an adjustment for petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime. The District Court imposed concurrent sentences of 192 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be followed by five years of supervised release.

In November 1993, the United States Sentencing Commission revised the method of calculating the weight of LSD in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, App. C., Arndt. 488 (Nov. 1995) (1995 USSG). Departing from its former approach of weighing the entire mixture or substance containing LSD, the amended Guideline instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight of 0.4 milligrams. Id., §2Dl.l(c), n. (H). The revised Guideline was retroactive, id., App. C, Arndt. 502, and one month later petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence, see 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2). He contended that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was 4.58 grams (11,456 doses x 0.4 milligrams). For that amount, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines would be 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. The 10-year statutory minimum of § 841(b)(l)(A)(v) was no bar to a reduced sentence, petitioner argued, because the presumptive-weight method of the Guidelines should also control the mandatory minimum calculation. The 4.58 grams attributable to him by the Guidelines method would be well short of the 10 grams necessitating a 10-year minimum sentence.

The District Court, following our recent decision in Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991), ruled that the blotter paper must be weighed in determining whether petitioner crossed the 10-gram threshold of § 841(b)(l)(A)(v). It held that the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years still applied to petitioner notwithstanding the sentencing range under the Guidelines. Since the Guidelines no longer authorized a sentence above the statutory minimum, the District Court reduced petitioner’s sentence to 120 months on each count.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this, and it affirmed petitioner’s sentence. 46 F. 3d 1405 (1995).

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether the revised Guideline governs the calculation of the weight of LSD for purposes of § 841(b)(1). 515 U. S. 1141 (1995). Compare United States v. Muschik, 49 F. 3d 512, 518 (CA9 1995) (Guideline method should be used under § 841(b)(1)), cert. pending, No. 95-156, with United States v. Boot, 25 F. 3d 52, 55 (CA1 1994); United States v. Kinder, 64 F. 3d 757, 759 (CA2 1995), cert. pending, No. 95-6746; United States v. Hanlin, 48 F. 3d 121, 124 (CA3 1995); United States v. Pardue, 36 F. 3d 429, 431 (CA5 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1113 (1995); United States v. Andress, 47 F. 3d 839, 840 (CA6 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Stoneking, 60 F. 3d 399, 402 (CA8 1995) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 95-5410; United States v. Mueller, 27 F. 3d 494, 496-497 (CA10 1994); United States v. Pope, 58 F. 3d 1567, 1570 (CA11 1995).

II

Congress has tried different punishment schemes to combat the menace of drug trafficking. Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, penalties depended upon whether or not a drug was classified as a narcotic. Chagrined by the resulting sentencing disparities, Congress amended the narcotics laws in 1984 to calculate penalties by the weight of the pure drug involved. See Chapman, 500 U. S., at 460-461. Focusing on the pure drug, however, often allowed retail traffickers, who supplied street markets with mixed or diluted drugs ready for consumption, to receive sentences lighter than what Congress deemed necessary. Id., at 461. In passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, “Congress adopted a ‘market-oriented’ approach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence.” Chapman, supra, at 461; H. R. Rep. No. 99-845, pt. 1, pp. 11-12, 17 (1986). The Act provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of “a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of various controlled substances, including LSD. 21 U. S. C. §§841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) and (B)(i)-(viii). Trafficking in 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing LSD earns the offender at least 10 years in prison. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v).

In Chapman, we interpreted the provision of the Act that provided a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in an LSD “mixture or substance” that weighed one gram or more, see § 841(b)(l)(B)(v). We construed “mixture” and “substance” to have their ordinary meaning, observing that the terms had not been defined in the statute or the Sentencing Guidelines and had no distinctive common-law meaning. 500 U. S., at 461-462. Reasoning that the “LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper . . . [and] cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it,” id., at 462, we held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, is determinative under the statute, id., at 468.

Petitioner contends that the method approved in Chapman is no longer appropriate. In his view, the Commission intended its dose-based method to supplant the actual-weight method used in Chapman, and we should not presume that the Commission would recognize two inconsistent schemes for sentencing LSD traffickers, cf. 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d (stating purposes of making offense levels in §2D1.1 “proportional to the levels established by statute” and providing “a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses”). Petitioner concedes, as he must, that the Commission does not have the authority to amend the statute we construed in Chapman. He argues, nonetheless, that the Commission is the agency charged with interpretation of penalty statutes and expert in sentencing matters, so its construction of § 841(b)(1) should be given deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 887 (1984). Congress intended the Commission’s rulemaking to respond to judicial decisions in developing a coherent sentencing regime, see Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991), so, petitioner contends, deference is appropriate even though the Commission’s interpretation postdated Chapman. In the alternative, he urges that we reassess Chapman in light of the Commission’s revised method, which was formed from careful study of retail drug markets. Although Chapman established that the weight of the blotter paper must be taken into account, it did not address how courts should do so. The Commission has filled the gap, petitioner maintains, by assigning a constructive weight to the LSD and carrier for each dose.

While acknowledging that the Commission’s expertise and the design of the Guidelines may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts, we conclude that the Commission’s choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in Chapman. In any event, principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to our earlier decision.

The Commission was born of congressional disenchantment with the vagaries of federal sentencing and of the parole system. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 366 (1989) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its legislative history). The Commission is directed to “establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system” that meet congressional goals set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2) and that, within a regime of individualized sentencing, eliminate unwarranted disparities in punishment of similar defendants who commit similar crimes. See 28 U. S. C. §§991(b)(l)(A)-(B). Congress also charged the Commission with the duty to measure and monitor the effectiveness of various sentencing, penal, and correctional practices. § 991(b)(2). In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission has the authority to promulgate, review, and revise binding guidelines to “establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors, among others.” Mistretta, supra, at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(a), (b), (c), and (o).

Like 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1), the Sentencing Guidelines calibrate the punishment of drug traffickers according to the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. From their inception in 1987, the Guidelines have used a detailed Drug Quantity Table as a first step in determining the sentence. See 1995 USSG §2D1.1(c); 1987 USSG §2D1.1. The current Table has 17 tiers, each with specified weight ranges for different controlled substances. The weight ranges reflect the Commission’s assessment of equivalent culpability among defendants who traffic in different types of drugs, and so all defendants in the same tier are assigned the same base offense level. See 1995 USSG § 2D 1.1(c). Once the base offense level is adjusted for other factors, it yields a specific sentencing range depending on the defendant’s criminal history. See 1995 USSG § 1B1.1.

Although the mandatory-minimum statute and the Guidelines both turn upon drug quantities, the Commission itself has noted that “mandatory mínimums are both structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing guidelines and the goals the guidelines seek to achieve.” United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 26 (Aug. 1991).

“The sentencing guidelines system is essentially a system of finely calibrated sentences. For example, as the quantity of drugs increases, there is a proportional increase in the sentence. In marked contrast, the mandatory mínimums are essentially a flat, tariff-like approach to sentencing. Whereas guidelines seek a smooth continuum, mandatory mínimums result in ‘cliffs.’ The ‘cliffs’ that result from mandatory mínimums compromise proportionality, a fundamental premise for just punishment, and a primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.” Id., at iii.

Despite incongruities between the Guidelines and the mandatory sentencing statute, the Commission has sought to make the Guidelines parallel to the scheme of § 841(b)(1) in most instances. See 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 10 (“The Commission has used the sentences provided in, and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)), as the primary basis for the guideline sentences”). As a general rule, the Commission adopts the same approach to weighing drugs as the statute does: “Unless otherwise specified, the' weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1(c), n. (A); see also 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 1 (“‘Mixture or substance’ as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U. S. C. § 841, except as expressly provided”); 1987 USSG §2D1.1, n. * (weighing rule intended to be “[consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act”). For most narcotics, there will be no inconsistency in the calculations of drug quantities.

After study of the LSD trade, however, the Commission in 1993 decided it could no longer follow that general rule for LSD offenses and fulfill the statutory directive to promote proportionate sentencing. The Commission determined that “[bjecause the weights of LSD carrier media vary widely and typically far exceed the weight of the controlled substance itself,... basing offense levels on the entire weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but different carrier weights), as well as sentences disproportionate to those for other, more dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. To remedy the problem, the Commission revised its Guideline to provide:

“In the case of LSD on a carrier medium (e. g., a sheet of blotter paper), do not use the weight of the LSD/carrier medium. Instead, treat each dose of LSD on the carrier medium as equal to 0.4 mg of LSD for the purposes of the Drug Quantity Table.” 1995 USSG §2Dl.l(c), n. (H).

Under the amendment, a court determines the defendant’s base offense level in the Drug Quantity Table by multiplying the number of doses of LSD involved by 0.4 milligrams. The Commission submitted the amendment to Congress, which did not disapprove it in the 180 days allotted by statute. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(p). The amended Guideline took effect on November 1,1993, and was in force when petitioner was resentenced.

As a threshold matter, it is doubtful that the Commission intended the constructive-weight method of the Guidelines to displace the actual-weight method that Chapman requires for statutory minimum sentences. The commentary, which is the authoritative construction of the Guidelines absent plain inconsistency or statutory or constitutional infirmity, Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993), states that the new method is to be used “for purposes of determining the base offense level.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. The next paragraph of the commentary repeats the point: The new method will make “the offense level for LSD on a carrier medium . . . [less than] that for the same number of doses of PCP,” “harmonize offense levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled substances,” and “avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the applicable offense level.” Ibid. This would be obscure language to choose if the Commission were attempting an interpretation of the statute as well as a revision of the Guidelines, for offense levels are not relevant to the mandatory-minimum calculation.

Furthermore, after a catalog of reasons for adopting the dose-based method, the Commission ends with the observation that “[Nonetheless, this approach does not override the applicability of ‘mixture or substance’ for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; §5Gl.l(b)).” Ibid. The citation of Chapman in tandem with § 5G1.1(b), which advises that “[w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence,” suggests that the Guidelines calculation is independent of the statutory calculation, and that the statute controls if they conflict. The Commission seems to do no more than acknowledge that, whether or not its method would be preferable for the statute and Guideline alike, it has no authority to override the statute as we have construed it.

Were we, for argument’s sake, to adopt petitioner’s view that the Commission intended the commentary as an interpretation of § 841(b)(1), and that the last sentence of the commentary states the Commission’s view that the dose-based method is consistent with the term “mixture or substance” in the statute, he still would not prevail. The Commission’s dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. The Guideline does take into account some of the weight of the carrier medium (because the average weight of an LSD dose is 0.05 milligrams, 0.35 of the Commission’s constructive weight per dose of 0.4 milligrams is attributable to the medium, see 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d), but we held in Chapman that § 841(b)(1) requires “the entire mixture or substance ... to be weighed when calculating the sentence.” 500 U. S., at 459. In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the Commission in order to reject its alleged contrary interpretation. Once we have determined a statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against that settled law. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 536-537 (1992); Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990).

Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that “Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.” Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977). We have overruled our precedents when the intervening development of the law has “removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989) (citations omitted). Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress’ original intent, NLRB v. Longshoremen, 473 U. S. 61, 84 (1985), our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes. Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed a more desirable “approach” to calculating LSD quantities, cf. 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. We, however, do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute. True, there may be little in logic to defend the statute’s treatment of LSD; it results in significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offenders relative to other narcotics traffickers. (Although the number of doses petitioner sold seems high, the quantities of other narcotics a defendant would have to sell to receive a comparable sentence under the statute yield far more doses, see United States v. Marshall, 908 F. 2d 1312, 1334 (CA7 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991).) Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.

Like Chapman, this case involves a petitioner who sold LSD on blotter paper, the “carrier of choice” involved in “the vast majority of cases.” 500 U. S., at 466. Just as we declined in Chapman to entertain “hypothetical cases ... involving very heavy carriers and very little LSD” in resolving a due process challenge, ibid., we do not address how § 841(b)(1) should be applied in those cases.

We hold that § 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ATTWOOD v. SINGLETARY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    No. 95-6710.
    Decided January 22, 1996
   Per Curiam.

Pro se petitioner Robert Attwood requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Attwood is allowed until February 12,1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Attwood in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Attwood has abused this Court’s certiorari process. In November 1995, we twice invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Attwood in forma pauperis status. See Attwood v. Smith and Att-wood v. Palm Beach Post, post, p. 963. At that time, Att-wood had filed seven petitions in this Court during the prior year, and he has filed two since. All were patently frivolous and were denied without recorded dissent.

We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Attwood’s abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Attwood from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Because experience with the administration of orders like the one the Court is entering in this case today has merely reinforced my conviction that our “limited resources” would be used more effectively by simply denying petitions that are manifestly frivolous, I respectfully dissent. Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my colleagues to return to “the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court’s history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989) (per curiam), and In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam).” See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).


author: Justice Scalia Justice Breyer,

text:
    BEHRENS v. PELLETIER
    No. 94-1244.
    Argued November 7,1995
    Decided February 21, 1996

      & ALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 314.

      Leñará G. Weiss argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Christine A. Murphy.

      Cornelia T. L. Pillará argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara L. Herwig, and Richard A. Olderman.

      Samuel T. Rees, by appointment of the Court, 515 U. S. 1101, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Michael J. White.

        Louise H. Renne, Dennis Aftergut, G. Scott Emblidge, Ronald R. Ball, David J. Erwin, J. Kenneth Brown, Norman Herring, Edward J. Foley, Charles J. Williams, James K. Hahn, Katherine J. Hamilton, Gregory P. Friamos, Edward J. Cooper, Rene Auguste Chouteau, Mark G. Sellers, David B. Brearley, and Robert E. Murphy filed a brief for the City and County of San Francisco as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), we held that a district court’s rejection of a defendant’s qualified-immunity defense is a “final decision” subject to immediate appeal under the general appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. §1291. The question presented in this case is whether a defendant’s immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment.

I

In 1983, South Coast Savings and Loan Association, a new institution, applied to the Federal Home .Loan Bank Board (FHLBB or Board) for the approval necessary to obtain account insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).- Under FHLBB regulations, approval of new institutions was to be withheld if their “financial policies or management” were found to be “unsafe” for any of various reasons, including “character of the management.” 12 CFR § 571.6(b) (1986). Accordingly, when FHLBB approved South Coast for FSLIC insurance in March 1984, it imposed a number of requirements, including the condition that South Coast “provide for employment of a qualified full-time executive managing officer, subject to approval by the Principal Supervisory Agent” — FHLBB’s term for the president of the regional Home Loan Bank when operating in his oversight capacity on behalf of FHLBB. Record, Exh. B, Resolution No. 84-164, ¶ 10(p) (Mar. 29, 1984). The Board’s resolution also required that, for a period of three years, any change in South Coast’s chief management position be approved by FHLBB. Ibid.

Shortly after obtaining FHLBB’s conditional approval, South Coast was succeeded in interest by Pioneer Savings and Loan Association, another new institution. Pioneer named respondent Pelletier as its managing officer, subject to FHLBB consent, which Pioneer sought in mid-May 1985. Only a few weeks earlier, however, on April 23, 1985, FHLBB had declared insolvent Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association, where respondent had at one time held a senior executive position. An inquiry by FSLIC pointed to potential misconduct by high-level management of the failed institution, which ultimately became the subject of an FSLIC lawsuit against several Beverly Hills officers, including respondent.

The FSLIC suit had not yet been filed at the time Pioneer sought the Board’s consent to hire respondent; but FSLIC’s pending investigation into Beverly Hills’ collapse caused petitioner Behrens, the FHLBB “Supervisory Agent” then responsible for monitoring Pioneer’s operations, to write Pioneer on May 8,1986, withholding approval and advising that respondent be replaced. On receipt of the letter Pioneer asked respondent to resign and, when he refused, fired him.

Three years later, in 1989, respondent brought suit in federal court, naming petitioner as defendant in a complaint that included Bivens damages claims for two alleged constitutional wrongs. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Respondent charged, first, that petitioner’s action in writing a letter that had effectively discharged him from his post at Pioneer, in summary fashion and without notice or opportunity to be heard, violated his right to procedural due process. Second, he claimed that he had been deprived of substantive due process by petitioner’s alleged interference with his “clearly established and Constitutionally protected property and liberty rights ... to specific employment and to pursue his profession free from undue governmental interference.” First Amended Complaint ¶ 38, reprinted in App. 7, 16. The complaint alleged that petitioner’s letter, along with other, continuing efforts to harm respondent’s reputation, had cost respondent not only his position at Pioneer, but also his livelihood within the savings and loan industry. The complaint also contained other claims — against petitioner and against the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (petitioner’s immediate employer), FHLBB, and the United States; none of these is relevant to the present appeal.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. With regard to the Bivens claims, he asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions, taken in a governmental capacity, “d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). The District Court ruled in favor of petitioner on the statute-of-limitations ground and therefore dismissed the procedural due process Bivens claim, and the substantive due process Bivens claim to the extent it related to petitioner’s letter and respondent’s loss of employment at Pioneer. It refused, however, to dismiss respondent’s suit “to the extent [it was] based on other alleged subsequent acts of defendant] preventing and continuing to prevent [respondent] from securing employment.” Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89-969 (CD Cal., Oct. 5, 1989), reprinted in App. 27-28. The court also denied petitioner’s summary judgment motion, without prejudice, on the ground that it was premature given the lack of discovery.

Petitioner immediately appealed the District Court’s implicit denial of his qualified-immunity defense regarding the remaining Bivens claim. The Court of Appeals entertained the appeal, notwithstanding its interlocutory nature, holding that “a denial of qualified immunity is an appealable ‘final’ order under the test set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949) . . . , regardless of whether that denial takes the form of a refusal to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss or a denial of summary judgment.” Pelle-tier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 870 (CA9 1992). It said in dictum, however, that a defendant claiming qualified immunity could not “take advantage of the several opportunities for immediate appeal afforded him by bringing repeated pretrial appeals,” and that “[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a government official is entitled to and all that we will entertain.” Id., at 870-871. On the merits of the appeal, the court rejected the argument that petitioner enjoyed qualified immunity because he had not violated any “clearly established right.” It said that the question whether respondent had a constitutionally protected property interest in his Pioneer employment (subject, as it was, to regulatory approval) was not properly before the court, since the claims relating specifically to his discharge had been dismissed as time barred. Id., at 871-872. (The Court of Appeals noted in dictum, however, id., at 869, n. 6, that the District Court had applied an unduly short limitations period.) With respect to the claimed deprivation of post-Pioneer employment, the court held that the “nebulous theories of conspiracy” set out in respondent’s complaint — although “insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment” — made out a proper Bivens claim. 968 F. 2d, at 872-873.

Upon remand, the District Court reversed its earlier statute-of-limitations ruling in light of the Court of Appeals’ dictum, and reinstated the claims relating to employment at Pioneer. After discovery, petitioner moved for .summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, contending that his actions had not violated any “clearly established” right of respondent regarding his employment at Pioneer or elsewhere. The District Court denied the motion with the unadorned statement that “[m]aterial issues of fact remain as to defendant Behrens on the Bivens claim.” Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89-0969 (CD Cal., Sept. 6, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which, on respondent’s motion, the District Court certified as frivolous. In an unpublished order, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal “for lack of jurisdiction.” Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. 94-56507 (CA9, Nov. 17, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. la. We granted certio-rari, 514 U. S. 1035 (1995).

II

Section 1291 of Title 28, U. S. C., gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over “all final decisions” of district courts, except those for which appeal is to be had to this Court. The requirement of finality precludes consideration of decisions that are subject to revision, and even of “fully consummated decisions [that] are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). It does not, however, bar review of all prejudgment orders. In Cohen, we described a “small class” of district court decisions that, though short of final judgment, are immediately appealable because they “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Ibid. See also Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 142-145 (1993) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)). The issue in the present case is the extent to which orders denying governmental officers’ assertions of qualified immunity come within the Cohen category of appealable decisions.

As set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), the qualified-immunity defense “shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” id., at 818 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978)). Harlow adopted this criterion of “objective legal reasonableness,” rather than good faith, precisely in order to “permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial.” 457 U. S., at 819, 813. Unsurprisingly, then, we later found the immunity to be “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal [immunity] question.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 526. And, as with district-court rejection of claims to other such entitlements distinct from the merits, see, e. g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct, supra, at 145-146 (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 662 (1977) (right not to be subjected to double jeopardy), we held that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell, supra, at 530. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 311-312 (1995).

While Mitchell did not say that a defendant could appeal from denial of a qualified-immunity defense more than once, it clearly contemplated that he could raise the defense at successive stages:

“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.” 472 U. S., at 526 (citation omitted).

Thus, Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a “final” judgment subject to immediate appeal. Since an unsuccessful appeal from a denial of dismissal cannot possibly render the later denial of a motion for summary judgment any less “final,” it follows that petitioner’s appeal falls within §1291 and dismissal was improper.

Indeed, it is easier to argue that the denial of summary judgment — the order sought to be appealed here — is the more “final” of the two orders. That is the reasoning the First Circuit adopted in holding that denial of a motion to dismiss on absolute-immunity grounds was not “final” where the defendant had stated that, if unsuccessful, he would later seek summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds: “Since the district court has not yet determined whether [the defendant] has qualified immunity, and that he will have to stand trial, its decision is not an appealable collateral order.” Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 707 (1988). The problem with this approach, however, is that it would logically bar any appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage where there is a possibility of presenting an immunity defense on summary judgment; that possibility would cause the motion-to-dismiss decision to be not “final” as to the defendant’s right not to stand trial. The First Circuit sought to avoid this difficulty by saying that the defendant could render the motion-to-dismiss denial final by waiving his right to appeal the summary judgment denial. See id., at 708. But quite obviously, eliminating the ability to appeal the second order does not eliminate the possibility that the second order will vindicate the defendant’s right not to stand trial, and therefore does not eliminate the supposed reason for declaring the first order nonfinal.

The source of the First Circuit’s confusion was its mistaken conception of the scope of protection afforded by qualified immunity. Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid “standing trial,” but also to avoid the burdens of “such pretrial matters as discovery ..., as ‘[inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’” Mitchell, supra, at 526 (emphasis added) (quoting from Harlow, supra, at 817). Whether or not a later summary judgment motion is granted, denial of a motion to dismiss is conclusive as to this right. We would have thought that these and other statements from Mitchell and Harlow had settled the point, questioned by Justice Breyer, see post, at 317, that this right is important enough to support an immediate appeal. If it were not, however, the consequence would be, not that only one pretrial appeal could be had in a given case, as Justice Breyer proposes, but rather, that there could be no immediate appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss but only from denial of summary judgment. That conclusion is foreclosed by Mitchell, which unmistakably envisioned immediate appeal of “[t]he denial of a defendant’s motion for dismissal or summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.” 472 U. S., at 527.

The Court of Appeals in the present case, in the first of its two decisions, rested its “one-appeal” pronouncement upon the proposition that resolving the question of entitlement to qualified immunity “should not require more than one judiciously timed appeal.” Pelletier, 968 F. 2d, at 871. It did not explain how this proposition pertains to the question of finality, but we suppose it could be argued that a category of appeals thought to be needless or superfluous does not raise a claim of right “too important to be denied review,” as our Cohen finality jurisprudence requires, see 337 U. S., at 546. In any event, the proposition is not sound. That one appeal on the immunity issue may not be enough is illustrated by the history of respondent’s claims for loss of employment at Pioneer in the present ease. Because these claims had initially been dismissed as time barred, the Court of Appeals refused to decide (and thus evidently regarded as an open question) whether one who holds his job subject to regulatory approval can assert a constitutionally cognizable expectation of continued employment. See Pelletier, supra, at 871-872. Thus, the question whether petitioner was entitled to immunity on these claims was not presented to any court until petitioner’s summary judgment motion — and, by operation of the Ninth Circuit’s one-appeal rule, has never been addressed by an appellate court.

That is assuredly an unusual set of circumstances, but even in a case proceeding in a more normal fashion resolution of the immunity question may “require more than one judiciously timed appeal,” because the legally relevant factors bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on summary judgment than on an earlier motion to dismiss. At that earlier stage, it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for “objective legal reasonableness.” On summary judgment, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the Harlow inquiry. It is no more true that the defendant who has unsuccessfully appealed denial of a motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment, than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss has no need to make a motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals expressed concern that a second appeal would tend to have the illegitimate purpose of delaying the proceedings. See 968 F. 2d, at 870-871. Undeniably, the availability of a second appeal affords an opportunity for abuse, but we have no reason to believe that abuse has often occurred. To the contrary, successive pretrial assertions of immunity seem to be a rare occurrence. Moreover, if and when abuse does occur, as we observed in the analogous context of interlocutory appeals on the issue of double jeopardy, “[i]t is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims.” Abney, 431 U. S., at 662, n. 8. In the present case, for example, the District Court appropriately certified petitioner’s immunity appeal as “frivolous” in light of the Court of Appeals’ (unfortunately erroneous) one-appeal precedent. This practice, which has been embraced by several Circuits, enables the district court to retain jurisdiction pending summary disposition of the appeal, and thereby minimizes disruption of the ongoing proceedings. See, e. g., Chuman v. Wright, 960 F. 2d 104, 105 (CA9 1992); Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F. 2d 444, 448-449 (CA6 1991); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F. 2d 572,576-577 (CA10 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F. 2d 1335, 1339 (CA7 1989). In any event, the question before us here — whether there is jurisdiction over the appeal, as opposed to whether the appeal is frivolous — must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order. “Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular case.” Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 405 (1957). See also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994). As we have said, an order denying qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an “issue of law,” Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 530, is immediately appealable.

Ill

Our rejection of the one-interlocutory-appeal rule does not dispose of this ease. Respondent proposes two other reasons why appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available. First, he argues that no appeal is available where, even if the District Court’s qualified-immunity ruling is reversed, the defendant will be required to endure discovery and trial on matters separate from the claims against which immunity was asserted. Respondent reasons that a ruling which does not reach all the claims does not “conclusively determin[e] the defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial,” id., at 527, and thus the order denying immunity cannot be said to be “final” within the meaning of Cohen.

It is far from clear that, given the procedural posture of the present case, respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the proposition for which he argues; but we will address the proposition on its merits. The Courts of Appeals have almost unanimously rejected it, and so do we. The Harlow right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general; when immunity with respect to those claims has been finally denied, appeal must be available, and cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition of other claims to the suit. Making appealability depend upon such a factor, particular to the case at hand, would violate the principle discussed above, that appealability determinations are made for classes of decisions, not individual orders in specific cases. Apart from these objections in principle, the practical effect of respondent’s proposal would be intolerable. If the district court rules erroneously, the qualified-immunity right not to be subjected to pretrial proceedings will be eliminated, so long as the plaintiff has alleged (with or without evidence to back it up) violation of one “clearly established” right; and both that and the further right not to be subjected to trial itself will be eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive relief (for which no “clearly established” right need be alleged).

Second, respondent asserts that appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available because the denial rested on the ground that “[mjaterial issues of fact remain.” This, he contends, renders the denial unappealable under last Term’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S., at 313-318. That is a misreading of the case. Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, and Johnson surely does not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable. Johnson held, simply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly “separable” from the plaintiff’s claim, and hence there is no “final decision” under Cohen and Mitchell. See 515 U. S., at 313-318. Johnson reaffirmed that summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an “abstract issu[e] of law” relating to qualified immunity, id., at 317 — typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was “clearly established,” see, e. g., Mitchell, supra, at 530-535; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 190-193 (1984).

Here the District Court’s denial of petitioner’s summary judgment motion necessarily determined that certain conduct attributed to petitioner (which was controverted) constituted a violation of clearly established law. Johnson permits petitioner to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow standard of “objective legal reasonableness.” This argument was presented by petitioner in the trial court, and there is no apparent impediment to its being raised on appeal. And while the District Court, in denying petitioner’s summary judgment motion, did not identify the particular charged conduct that it deemed adequately supported, Johnson recognizes that under such circumstances “a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Johnson, supra, at 319. That is the task now facing the Court of Appeals in this case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Stevens joins,

dissenting.

I do not agree with the Court’s holding that those asserting a defense of qualified immunity are entitled, as a matter of course, to more than one interlocutory appeal. Rather, in my view, the law normally permits a single interlocutory appeal, and not more than one such appeal, from denials of a defendant’s pretrial motions to dismiss a case on grounds of qualified immunity. The “collateral order” doctrine’s basic rationale, this Court’s precedents, and several practical considerations lead to this conclusion.

I

This Court’s basic rationale for permitting an interlocutory appeal of a “collateral order” recognizes that interlocutory appeals are the exception, not the rule. Congress, with statutory exceptions not directly relevant here, has authorized appeals from “final” orders. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. In that way,

“Congress ... , by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration [and] . . . the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 325 (1940).

Judges have nonetheless created what is, in effect, a non-statutory exception, authorizing a special set of interlocutory appeals, where a trial court’s interlocutory order is a “collateral order” that satisfies the statutory term “final” for purposes of §1291. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545-547 (1949). The trial court’s interlocutory order is “collateral” (and “final”), however, only where it meets certain requirements. It must (1) “conclusively determine [a] disputed question,” (2) “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,” and (3) “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978).

These requirements explain why the courts have created the “collateral order” exception. The “effective unreview-ability” requirement means that failure to review the order on appeal now may cause a litigant permanent harm. The “conclusive determination” requirement means that appellate review now is likely needed to avoid that harm. The “separability” requirement means that review now will not likely force an appellate court to consider the same (or quite similar) questions more than once. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 311 (1995). Taken together, these requirements, as set forth in the Court’s cases, see, e. g., ibid.; Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U. S. 794, 799 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 276 (1988), help pick out a class of orders where the error-correcting benefits of immediate appeal likely outweigh the costs, delays, diminished litigation coherence, and waste of appellate court time potentially associated with multiple appeals. See, e. g., Johnson, supra, at 309-311; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 585-587 (4th ed. 1992).

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), the Court applied this rationale to a District Court order denying a claim of qualified immunity. The Court concluded that the District Court order, by sending the case to trial, could cause the litigant what (in terms of the immunity doctrine’s basic trial-avoiding purpose) would amount to an important harm. See id., at 526-527. Post-trial appellate review would come too late to avoid that harm. Ibid. And, the legal issue (where purely legal, see Johnson, supra, at 313-318) would often prove “separate” enough from the more basic substantive issues in the case to avoid significant duplication of appellate court time and effort. See 472 U. S., at 527-529; but see id., at 545-550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Hence, the “collateral order” doctrine’s basic rationale supported interlocutory appeal.

That same rationale, however, does not support two pretrial interlocutory appeals, the first from a denial of a, motion to dismiss a complaint, the second from a later, postappeal, denial of a motion for summary judgment. Consider the “separability” requirement. Both orders satisfy the literal terms of that requirement because the qualified immunity issues they resolve are both “separate,” in equal measure, from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. See ante, at 309-310, n. 3. But the reasoned principles and purposes underlying the “separability” requirement are not served by a rule that permits both orders to be appealed because the issues they raise are not normally “separate” one from the other. Rather, they will often involve quite similar issues, likely presented to different appellate court panels, thereby risking the very duplication and waste of appellate resources that the courts intended the “separability” requirement to avoid. See 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3911, pp. 333-334 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller).

Similarly, given the law’s promise of one pretrial interlocutory appeal, a litigant’s need for a second is much less pressing. The single interlocutory appeal can avoid much of, though not all of, the harm that Mitchell found. And, the remaining harm, as I shall next discuss, is not of a kind that the law considers important enough to justify an interlocutory appeal.

II

This Court’s precedents justify one interlocutory appeal, but not more, in the ordinary qualified immunity case. When it initially set forth the “collateral order” exception, the Court said that it applied to “that small class” of orders that determine claims of right “too important to be denied [immediate] review.” Cohen, supra, at 546 (emphasis added). In subsequent cases, and again today, the Court has reiterated that, to qualify for interlocutory appeal, the interest being asserted must be an important one. See, e. g., ante, at 308; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 878-879 (1994) (Cohen inquiry “simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement”); Coopers & Lybrand, supra, at 468 (disputed question must “resolve an important issue”); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U. S. 424, 436 (1985); see also Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 502 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our collateral order doctrine”). Because one pretrial appeal would normally prove sufficient to protect a government defendant’s qualified immunity interest in not standing trial, the right to take multiple interlocutory appeals will normally protect only the defendant’s additional interest in avoiding such pretrial burdens as discovery. Thus, the question, as Justice Scalia has pointed out, is whether this antidiscov-ery interest is “sufficiently important to overcome the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.” Id., at 503 (emphasis added). The relevant precedent indicates that, in the context of qualified immunity, it is not.

For one thing, the Court, when considering the kinds of orders that warrant interlocutory appeal, has identified as “sufficiently important” interests that are considerably more important than the ordinary interest in avoiding discovery. See, e. g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951) (interest in avoiding imprisonment; Excessive Bail Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 8); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (interest in avoiding trial; Double Jeopardy Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 5); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979) (interest in avoiding trial; Speech or Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §6); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993) (interest in avoiding trial; Eleventh Amendment immunity, U. S. Const., Amdt. 11).

For another thing, the Court has often said that the trouble, expense, and possible embarrassment associated with unnecessary litigation (interests rather like the qualified immunity antidiscovery interest) do not justify interlocutory appeal. See, e. g., Digital Equipment Corp., supra, at 881-882 (no interlocutory review of orders refusing to enforce a settlement agreement); Lauro Lines, supra, at 499 (no interlocutory review of orders refusing to enforce a forum selection clause); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 524 (1988) (no interlocutory review of orders refusing to dismiss a civil suit on grounds of immunity from civil process or forum non conveniens).

Further, until now litigants have not been able routinely to vindicate, through immediate appeal, a legal right to avoid discovery, 15B Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 123-130, even where the Constitution provides that antidiscovery right, see, e. g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 458-461 (1975) (no interlocutory appeal of order refusing to quash subpoena for materials that arguably violated subpoenaed party’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Although a litigant can sometimes appeal an adverse discovery ruling, to do so, the litigant typically must disobey the discovery order and then appeal a resulting citation for contempt of court. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Maness, supra, at 460-461; United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 532-533 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S., at 326-330; 15B Wright & Miller § 3914.23, at 140-155. But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 691 (1974) (allowing President Nixon to appeal from a discovery order without first incurring a contempt citation, because “traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal” would be “peculiarly inappropriate”). This “disobedience and contempt” requirement (somewhat analogous to a one-appeal limitation here) works, in part, because it “encourages reconsideration both by the party resisting discovery and by the party seeking discovery, and in part because it tends to limit appeals to issues that are both important and reasonably likely to lead to reversal.” 15B Wright & Miller § 3914.23, at 154; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 50, n. 8 (1987) (disobedience and contempt procedure “rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings”).

It seems highly anomalous for the law to deny a routine interlocutory appeal where the Constitution of the United States protects an antidiscovery interest, but to permit a routine appeal where the legal doctrine of qualified immunity protects a similar interest. Yet, today’s holding will either create just such an anomaly, or, as is more likely, it will generate many new interlocutory appeals as lower courts apply its principle wherever the Constitution, or other important legal doctrine, offers a litigant special anti-discovery protection.

The majority suggests that the importance of the anti-discovery interest protected by qualified immunity has already been “settled” by such precedents as Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). See ante, at 308. These cases do say that the qualified immunity defense, in its modern formulation, was meant, in part, “to protect public officials from the ‘broad-ranging discovery’ that can be ‘peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 646, n. 6 (1987) (quoting Harlow, supra, at 817). But the Court’s decision in Mitchell (that district court orders denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable) was concerned primarily with preserving defendants’ immunity from trial, not discovery. See 472 U. S., at 525 (“At the heart of the issue before .us is the question whether qualified immunity ... is in fact an entitlement not to stand trial”); see also Van Cauwenberghe, supra, at 524 (“The critical question, following Mitchell, is whether ‘the essence’ of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial”). The Court has never before suggested, much less “settled,” that the government defendant’s antidiscovery interest — independent of his interest in avoiding trial — is so important that it must be safeguarded by interlocutory appellate review.

Finally, this Court and its individual Members have, in recent years, cautioned against expanding the class of orders eligible for interlocutory appeal. See, e. g., Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S., at 868 (opinion of Souter, J.) (“[T]he ‘narrow’ exception should stay that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule”); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S., at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The Court’s] finality jurisprudence is sorely in need of further limiting principles, so that Cohen appeals will be, as we originally announced they would be, a ‘small class [of decisions].. . too important to be denied review’”); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U. S., at 440 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[W]e decline to ‘transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291’ ”) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 378 (1981)). Caution would seem especially appropriate where the Court is considering not one interlocutory appeal in a single case, but two.

III

Several important practical considerations also favor limiting the number of interlocutory qualified immunity appeals to one. The majority finds the necessary special harm in the fact that the qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials against discovery as well as trial; and it finds “separability” in the fact that a postdiscovery summary judgment motion likely asks a legal question that is conceptually distinct from the legal question posed by a prediscovery motion to dismiss a complaint. But, given this rationale, can one limit the number of appeals to just one or two? Would it not, in principle, justify several appeals where discovery, proceeding in stages, continuously turns up new facts, or where, after the close of the plaintiff’s case, an immediate appeal would avoid the litigation burden of presenting an entire defense case.

Still, even two pretrial appeals risk what Justice Story called “very great delays, and oppressive expenses,” Canter. v. American Ins. Co., 3 Pet. 307,318 (1830), which can “ossify civil rights litigation,” Abel v. Miller, 904 F. 2d 394, 396 (CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J.). The defendant in the present case, for example, so far has spent more than four years (of seven since the complaint’s filing) fighting, through interlocutory appeal, a case that he might well have won more quickly and easily either in the trial court or on appeal from an initially adverse judgment on the merits. Cf. Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 872-873 (CA9 1992) (expressing doubt that plaintiff’s complaint could survive a summary judgment motion). I concede that every added interlocutory appeal will serve the interests that underlie qualified immunity to some extent, for each will help a government defendant terminate meritless litigation. But each added appeal likely would serve those interests to an ever-diminishing degree while posing an ever-increasing threat to the appearance of evenhanded justice in civil rights cases. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S., at 476 (no immediate appeal of prejudgment order denying class certification, in part because such appeals would “operat[e] only in favor of plaintiffs”).

Further, as mentioned above, the majority’s rationale threatens added appeals, not simply in qualified immunity cases, but wherever an immunity-type doctrine (or any other important legal rule) seeks to protect litigants from trial. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and, Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy guarantee against successive prosecutions). It thereby threatens busy appellate courts with added numbers of essentially similar, if not repetitive, appeals, at a time when overloaded dockets threaten the federal appellate system. See Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F. R. D. 256, 257 (Apr. 30, 1992) (“One of the chief needs of our generation is to deal with the current appellate capacity crisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals. New could argue about the existence of such a crisis, born of spiraling federal filings and an increased tendency to appeal District Court decisions”); Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 132 (Dec. 1995) (“[I]f conditions seriously deteriorate in the courts of appeals, it may be necessary to consider some limitations on the right to appeal”). See generally T. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U. S. Courts of Appeals 31-51 (1994).

Finally, as a practical matter, where the benefits of immediate appellate review predominate in an individual case, a party still can seek court leave to appeal immediately under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) (permitting immediate review of nonfinal orders that involve a controlling and controversial question of law, the appellate resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”). This Court has- frequently observed that the availability of § 1292(b) review counsels against expanding other judicial exceptions to the rule against piecemeal appeals. See, e. g., Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 45-47 (1995); Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U. S., at 883; Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S., at 529-530; Richardson-Merrell Inc., 472 U. S., at 435; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U. S., at 378, n. 13; Coopers & Lybrand, supra, at 474-475, and n. 27; see also Parkinson v. April Industries, Inc., 520 F. 2d 650, 658-660 (CA2 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring). We should be especially reluctant to identify new categories of “collateral orders” now that Congress has, by adding 28 U. S. C. § 2072(c) to the Rules Enabling Act, “designated]... the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court ruling is ‘final’ and when an interlocutory order is appealable.” Swint, supra, at 48.

IV

In sum, purpose, precedent, and practicality all argue for one interlocutory qualified immunity appeal per case and no more. I believe that the Court, following Mitchell, should simply hold that qualified immunity interests, while important enough to justify one interlocutory appeal, are not important enough to justify two. It is not necessary to argue about whether the defendant “waived” a second appeal, see Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 708 (CA1 1988); nor, since the matter turns on “importance,” not conclusiveness, need the Court decide just how the timing of an interlocutory appeal affects the “finality” of the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint. See ante, at 307-308. Rather, a defendant asserting qualified immunity would remain free, as at present, to appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, or the defendant could wait, move for summary judgment, and appeal the motion’s denial, but he could not do both — either because the interest asserted in a first pretrial appeal is insufficiently important if the possibility remains of a second pretrial appeal, or because the interest asserted in a second pretrial appeal is insufficiently important if there has already been a first pretrial appeal.

As I said, precedent permits this result because, under that precedent, the importance of the interest (an interlocutory appeal is needed to protect) is one necessary requirement for application of the technical legal labels “final” or “collateral order.” More importantly, meaning in law depends upon an understanding of purpose. Law’s words, however technical they may sound, are not magic formulas; they must be read in light of their purposes, if we are to avoid essentially arbitrary applications and harmful results. For the reasons I have set forth, precedent, read in this way, does more than permit — it requires — a single interlocutory appeal. I therefore dissent.

       FHLBB, FSLIC, and the regulatory scheme described in this opinion no longer exist, having been eliminated by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,103 Stat. 183.

       Interestingly, however, Mitchell itself dealt with the second of two interlocutory appeals on immunity claims. See 472 U. S., at 515-519. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court assigned any significance to the successive aspect of the second appeal.

       Justice Breyer suggests that the second of two pretrial qualified-immunity appeals does not come within Cohen’s class of immediately ap-pealable final orders because it is insufficiently “separable” from the claim raised on the first appeal, see post, at 316. But the Cohen “separability” component asks whether the question to be resolved on appeal is “conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” Mitchell v. For-syth, 472 U. S. 511, 527 (1985). The appropriate comparison, then, is between the decision sought to be reviewed and the claim underlying the action itself — not between the decision and any previous appeal, as Justice Breyer suggests. And again, Mitchell clearly states that a denial of qualified immunity, whether on a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, is an “appealable ‘final decision.’” Id., at 530.

       We are aware of only five reported cases — Mitchell itself, Nelson v. Silverman, 999 F. 2d 417 (CA9 1993), Abel v. Miller, 904 F. 2d 394 (CA7 1990), Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F. 2d 43 (CA2 1989), and the present case — in which Courts of Appeals have been twice asked to review successive pretrial assertions of immunity. See Abel, supra, at 396 (“Paucity of precedent [on successive interlocutory appeals] must reflect the forbearance of public officials rather than lack of opportunity”); Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F. 2d 704, 706 (CA1 1988) (“[I]n every case we have found which permitted interlocutory review of an immunity ruling, the defendant’s entire claim to immunity was raised in a single proceeding”).

       See, e. g., McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F. 3d 944, 949 (CA6 1995); Green v. Brantley, 941 F. 2d 1146, 1148-1151 (CA11 1991) (en banc); Di Martini v. Ferrin, 889 F. 2d 922, 924-925 (CA9 1989), cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1204 (1991); Young v. Lynch, 846 F. 2d 960, 961-963 (CA4 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger Silas Mason Co., 844 F. 2d 714, 717-718 (CA10 1988); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F. 2d 736, 742, n. 1 (CA2 1988); Scott v. Lacy, 811 F. 2d 1153,1153-1154 (CA7 1987); De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F. 2d 1187, 1188-1190 (CA1 1986); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F. 2d 401, 403-404 (CA8 1984). Only the Third Circuit holds otherwise. See Prisco v. United States Dept. of Justice, 851 F. 2d 93, 95-96, cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1089 (1989).