author: Justice Stevens

text:
    CENTRAL GREEN CO. v. UNITED STATES
    No. 99-859.
    Argued October 80,2000
    Decided February 21, 2001

      Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Timothy Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, W. Allen Bennett, and Erik S. Jaffe.

      David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Wax-man, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, and Irene M. Solet

        M. Reed Hopper filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Incident to the authorization of a massive flood control project for the Mississippi River in 1928, Congress enacted an immunity provision which stated that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.” 45 Stat. 535, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 702c. At issue in this case is the meaning of the words “floods or flood waters.” The narrow question presented is whether those words encompass all the water that flows through a federal facility that was designed and is operated, at least in part, for flood control purposes. The Ninth Circuit, relying upon a broader construction of §702e than some other federal courts have adopted, concluded that they do. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 529 U. S. 1017 (2000), and now reverse.

r — I

Petitioner owns 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California’s San Joaquin Valley. The Madera Canal, a federal facility that has been leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through petitioner’s property. In 1996, petitioner brought this action against respondent United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the canal had caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs for petitioner. Petitioner did not allege that any physical failure of the dam caused the damage to its property. The complaint sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2671 et seq., as well as injunctive relief. Relying on the immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. §702c, the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Accepting petitioner’s submission that the Madera Canal was used for irrigation purposes, the District Court nevertheless dismissed the complaint because the parties agreed that the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, and that flood control was one of the purposes of that project. The District Court’s decision was dictated by an earlier Ninth Circuit case, which held that if a ‘“project has flood control as one of its purposes, and the events giving rise to the action were not wholly unrelated to the project,’ ” immunity necessarily attached.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with petitioner that the Madera Canal “serves no flood control purpose,” but nevertheless held that immunity attached “solely because it is a branch of the Central Valley Project.” 177 F. 3d 834, 839 (1999). As the Ninth Circuit put it, “[although the water in the Madera Canal was not held for the purpose of flood control, because it was part of the Central Valley Project, it was ‘not wholly unrelated,’ to flood control.” Ibid, (emphasis added). In so holding, however, the court recognized that the Government would probably not have enjoyed immunity in at least three other Circuits where the courts require a nexus between flood control activities and the harm done to the plaintiff. Noting the “harsh result of [the] decision,” the Ninth Circuit frankly acknowledged that “[t]he ‘not wholly unrelated’ test applied by this and other circuits reads broadly an already broadly written grant of immunity.” Ibid. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, under such a test, there would seem to be no “set of facts where the government is not immune from damage arising from water that at one time passed through part of the Central Valley or other flood control project.” Ibid.

HH H — I

Not until more than a half century after its enactment did this Court have occasion to interpret §702c. In a consolidated case arising out of two separate accidents, we held that the section “bars recovery where the Federal Government would otherwise be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2671 et seq., for personal injury caused by the Federal Government’s negligent failure to warn of the dangers from the release of floodwaters from federal flood control projects.” United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 599 (1986).

The principal issue in the James case was whether the statutory word “damage” encompassed not just property damage, but also personal injuries and death. In light of the legislative history, which it reviewed at some length, id., at 606-609,610-612, the Court concluded that the best reading of the statutory text was one which was both broader and less literal, and which encompassed the claims at issue in the two cases before the Court.

In both instances, the injuries were caused by the turbulent current generated by unwarned releases of waters from a reservoir after the Army Corps of Engineers had determined that the waters were at “flood stage.” The fact that the injuries were caused by “flood waters” was undisputed. In its opinion, the Court held that the language of the statute covered the two accidents because the “injuries occurred as a result of the release of waters from reservoirs that had reached flood stage.” Id., at 604.

Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in James included a passage that lends support to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case. In that passage, the Court wrote:

“Nor do the terms 'flood’ and 'flood waters’ create any uncertainty in the context of accidents such as the ones at issue in these cases. The Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry floodwaters. It is thus clear from § 702c’s plain language that the terms ‘flood’ and ‘flood waters’ apply to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control.” Id., at 605 (emphasis added).

The sentence that we have italicized and, in particular, the phrase “related to flood control” have generated conflicting opinions among the Courts of Appeals. In an attempt to make sense of what is admittedly confusing dicta, some courts have focused on whether the damage relates in some, often tenuous, way to a flood control project, rather than whether it relates to “floods or flood waters.” However, more than one court has pointed out that, if read literally, the sentence sweeps so broadly as to make little sense. Moreover, the sentence was unquestionably dictum because it was not essential to our disposition of any of the issues contested in James. It is therefore appropriate to resort to the text of the statute, as illuminated by our holding in James, rather than to that isolated comment, to determine whether the water flowing through the Madera Canal that allegedly caused the damage to petitioner’s pistachio orchards is covered by § 702c. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 627 (1935) (dicta “may be followed if sufficiently persuasive” but are not binding). See also U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 24 (1994).

In James, we held that the phrase “floods or flood waters” is not narrowly confined to those waters that a federal project is unable to control, and that it encompasses waters that are released for flood control purposes when reservoired waters are at flood stage. That holding, however, is vastly different from the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 702c, under which immunity attaches simply because the Madera Canal is part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, and flood control is one of the purposes served by that project. The holding in James also differs from the less attenuated and more fact-specific position advanced by the Government, which would require us to take judicial notice of evidence that the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project and, indeed, the Madera Canal itself can and do serve flood control purposes. We ultimately conclude that the judgment cannot be upheld under either rationale, but begin with a description of the Central Valley Project and an explanation of the factual basis for the Government’s submission.

III

We begin by observing that water can be either a liability or an asset. The Mississippi River flood of 1927 was unquestionably an example of the former. That flood in turn led to the enactment of the 1928 Flood Control Act. Similar, though less extreme, floods of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers in California provided an important motivation for the authorization of the Central Valley Project. Although that project has not completely eliminated flooding on either river, it has succeeded in converting a huge liability into an immensely valuable asset. Justice Jackson described the magnitude of that transformation in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 389 U. S. 725 (1950):

“This is a gigantic undertaking to redistribute the principal fresh-water resources of California. Central Valley is a vast basin, stretching over 400 miles on its polar axis and a hundred in width, in the heart of California. Bounded by the Sierra Nevada on the east and by coastal ranges on the west, it consists actually of two separate river valleys which merge in a single pass to the sea at the Golden Gate. Its rich acres, counted in the millions, are deficient in rainfall and must remain generally arid and unfruitful unless artificially watered.
“To . . . make water available where it would be of greatest service, the State of California proposed to re-engineer its natural water distribution. This project was taken over by the United States in 1935 and has since been a federal enterprise. The plan, in broad outline, is to capture and store waters of both rivers and many of their tributaries in their highland basins, in some cases taking advantage of the resulting head for generation of electric energy. . . . [T]he waters of the San Joaquin will be arrested at Friant, where they would take leave of the mountains, and will be diverted north and south through a system of canals and sold to irrigate more than a million acres of land, some as far as 160 miles away. A cost of refreshing this great expanse of semiarid land is that, except for occasional spills, only a dry river bed will cross the plain below the dam. Here, however, surplus waters from the north are utilized, for through a 150-mile canal Sacramento water is to be pumped to the cultivated lands formerly dependent on the San Joaquin.” Id., at 728-729.
“The Central Valley basin development envisions, in one sense, an integrated undertaking, but also an aggregate of many subsidiary projects, each of which is of first magnitude. It consists of thirty-eight major dams and reservoirs bordering the valley floor and scores of smaller ones in headwaters. It contemplates twenty-eight hydropower generating stations. It includes hundreds of miles of main canals, thousands of miles of laterals and drains, electric transmission and feeder lines and substations, and a vast network of structures for the control and use of water on two million acres of land already irrigated, three million acres of land to be newly irrigated, 360,000 acres in the delta needing protection from intrusions of salt water, and for municipal and miscellaneous purposes including cities, towns, duck clubs and game refuges. These projects are not only widely separated geographically, many of them physically independent in operation, but they are authorized in separate acts from year to year and are to be constructed at different times over a considerable span of years.” Id., at 733.

Justice Jackson’s description of the magnitude of the Central Valley Project makes one proposition perfectly clear: to characterize every drop of water that flows through that immense project as “flood water” simply because flood control is among the purposes served by the project unnecessarily dilutes the language of the statute. The text of the statute does not include the words “flood control project.” Rather, it states that immunity attaches to “any damage from or by floods or flood waters . . . .” Accordingly, the text of the statute directs us to determine the scope of the immunity conferred, not by the character of the federal project or the purposes it serves, but by the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage and the purposes behind their release.

IV

The Government has asked us to take judicial notice of certain basic facts about the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project and about the waters flowing through that division and, more particularly, through the Madera Canal. Although petitioner will have an opportunity to challenge those details on remand, we accept them for purposes of this opinion.

The two major rivers supplying water to the Central Valley Project are the Sacramento in the north, and the San Joaquin in the south. From its headwaters in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, the San Joaquin flows in a southwesterly direction into a reservoir, known as Millerton Lake, just above the Friant Dam. The reservoir has a storage capacity of 520,500 acre-feet of water. In dry years, the total flow in the river does not produce that amount, but on average, the annual flow apparently approximates Wz times the reservoir’s capacity. Water is released through outlets in the dam that send it down the San Joaquin River, and also through outlets that direct it into either the Madera Canal to the northwest, or the Friant-Kern Canal to the southeast. When the water level exceeds 678 feet, it flows over the dam’s spillway into the San Joaquin. At that point, the river can accommodate a flow of 8,000 cubic feet per second without flooding. The Madera Canal can accommodate 1,200 cubic feet per second, and the Friant-Kern another 4,500 cubic feet per second. Thus, a total release of 13,700 cubic feet per second in three directions would not appear to include any “flood water.”

The Madera Canal, which is about 40 miles in length, is used primarily for irrigation purposes. Water that enters the canal at the Friant Dam is purchased by farmers who either use it immediately or store it for future use. As a result, the amount of water that enters the canal is larger than the quantity that may flow into the Chowchilla River at its terminus. Except in years of extreme drought, the Madera Irrigation District provides contracting farmers with “a dependable water supply” of approximately 138,000 acre-feet of “Class 1 water.” In addition, “if, as, and when it can be made available,” the District sells “Class 2 water” to the farmers at a price that is lower than the Class 1 price because of the “uncertainty as to availability and time of occurrence.” Thus, again in a literal sénse, it seems clear that none of the Class 1 or Class 2 water sold by the District and purchased by the farmers to store or irrigate their lands includes any “flood water.”

Water that is not purchased under either class simply flows through the canal into the Chowchilla River. As the Government points out, that excess may include flood water. However, given the fact that the canal can accommodate a flow of 1,200 cubic feet per second, which amounts to about 2,380 acre-feet per day, it is entirely possible that over the span of a year, several times the amount of Class 1 and Class 2 waters described in the papers submitted by the Government could flow through the canal without causing anything approaching a flood. Nevertheless, according to the Government, because the Madera Canal is available to divert water that might otherwise produce a flood on the San Joaquin and flood control is among the purposes served by the canal, § 702c immunity must attach to all the water that flows through the canal. Under the Government’s approach, this would be true even if the water never approached flood stage and the terminus of the canal was parched at the end of the summer. Admittedly, it is possible to read the “related to” portion of the dictum from James to support that result, but neither the language of the statute itself, nor the holding in James, even arguably supports such a strange conclusion. Accordingly, we disavow that portion of James' dicta.

Y

This case does raise a difficult issue because the property damage at issue was allegedly caused by continuous or repeated flows occurring over a period of years, rather than by a single, discrete incident. It is relatively easy to determine that a particular release of water that has reached flood stage is “flood water,” as in James, or that a release directed by a power company for the commercial purpose of generating electricity is not, as in Henderson v. United States, 965 F. 2d 1488 (CA8 1992). It is, however, not such a simple matter when damage may have been caused over a period of time in part by flood waters and in part by the routine use of the canal when it contained little more than a trickle. The fact that a serious flood did occur in the San Joaquin in 1997 creates the distinct possibility that flood waters may have surged down the Madera Canal and harmed petitioner’s property.

For present purposes, we merely hold that it was error to grant the Government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and that it is the text of § 702c, as informed by our holding in James, rather than the broad dictum in that opinion, that governs the scope of the United States’ immunity from liability for damage caused “by floods or flood waters.” Accordingly, in determining whether § 702c immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       App. to Pet. for Cert. 15 (quoting Washington v. East Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 105 F. 3d 517, 520 (1997)v.

       Citing Fryman v. United States, 901 F. 2d 79 (CA7 1990); Boyd v. United States, 881 F. 2d 895 (CA10 1989); and Hayes v. United States, 585 F. 2d 701 (CA4 1978), the Ninth Circuit specifically identified the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits as ones which likely would have reached a different result.

       The first ease arose out of an incident at the Millwood Dam in Arkansas, when “the level of the Reservoir was such that the United States Corps of Engineers designated it at ‘flood stage.’ As part of the flood control function of the Millwood facility, the Corps of Engineers began to release water through the tainter gates. This release created a swift, strong current toward the underwater discharge.” 478 U. S., at 599. The second ease arose as a result of a decision by the Corps of Engineers to release waters in the reservoir of Bayou Courtableau Basin which “were at flood stage.” Id., at 601. The District Court found that §702c applied because the “ ‘gates were opened to prevent flooding and inundation landside of the drainage structure.’ ” Id., at 602 (emphasis added).

       The Court appended a footnote pointing out that the District Court in each case had found that the waters at issue had been “released from federal flood control facilities to prevent flooding” and that the Court of Appeals had upheld those findings “and assumed that ‘the waters in this [consolidated] case were floodwaters.’ ” See id,., at 606, n. 7.

       See, e.g., Washington v. East Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 105 F. 3d 517 (CA9 1997); Williams v. United States, 957 F. 2d 742 (CA10 1992); Dawson v. United States, 894 F. 2d 70 (CA3 1990); DeWitt Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 878 F 2d 246 (CA8 1989). This approach, however, can be overinclusive. As Judge Easterbrook has pointed out: “The ‘management of a flood control project’ includes building roads to reach the beaches and hiring staff to run the project. If the Corps of Engineers should allow a walrus-sized pothole to swallow tourists’ cars on the way to the beach, or if a tree-trimmer’s car should careen through some picnickers, these injuries would be ‘associated with’ flood control. They would occur within the boundaries of the project, and but for the effort to curtail flooding the injuries would not have happened. Yet they would have nothing to do with management of flood waters, and it is hard to conceive that they are ‘damage from or by floods or flood waters’ within the scope of § 702c.’ ” Fryman v. United States, 901 F. 2d, at 81. More to the point, such an approach is also inconsistent with the statutory language. See infra, at 434.

       “Other circuits recognize that such a sweeping grant of immunity makes little sense in light of the text and purpose of the Act.” Cantrell v. United States Dept. of Army Corps of Engineers, 89 F. 3d 268, 271 (CA6 1996). See also Fryman, 901 F. 2d, at 81 (“James was so broadly written that it cannot be applied literally”).

       In addition to concluding that the word “damage” includes personal injury and death, the Court also rejected the previously arguable propositions that the Federal Government’s subsequent waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act had impliedly repealed § 702c; and that the immunity applied only to the flood control on the Mississippi River authorized by the 1928 Act.

       The Chowchilla flows in a westerly direction into the San Joaquin, which in turn flows in a northwesterly direction at that point. 9

       In some exceptional circumstances, irrigation contractors may be obligated to buy Class 2 water at a particular time. However, contractors still pay for the water, regardless of the potential inconvenience with respect to the timing or date of delivery.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice O'Connor

license: Public Domain

text:
    LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
    No. 99-1331.
    Argued November 29, 2000
    Decided February 21, 2001

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Roy C. Dripps argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Gail G. Renskaw.

      James V. O’Brien argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Justice O'Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns a seaman’s ability to sue a vessel owner in state court for personal injuries sustained aboard a vessel. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime claims, but the jurisdictional statute “sav[es] to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). Another statute grants vessel owners the right to seek limited liability in federal court for claims of damage aboard their vessels. 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. In this case, the District Court, after conducting proceedings to preserve the vessel owner’s right to seek limited liability, dissolved the injunction that prevented the seaman from litigating his personal injury claims in state court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the vessel owner had a right to contest liability in federal court, and that the seaman did not have a saved remedy in state court. The question presented is whether the District Court abused its discretion in dissolving the injunction.

I

Petitioner, James F. Lewis, worked as a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle, owned by respondent, Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. Petitioner claims that on March 17,1998, he was injured aboard the M/V Karen Michelle when he tripped over a wire and hurt his back. App. 12. In April 1998, petitioner sued respondent in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois. Petitioner claimed negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. §688, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel owner, or crew members. Ibid.; Plamals v. S. S. “Pinar Del Rio,” 277 U. S. 151, 155-156 (1928). Unseaworthiness is a claim under general maritime law based on the vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea. See generally Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 550 (1960). A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. See generally Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 527-528 (1938). Petitioner did not demand a jury trial in state court.

In anticipation of petitioner’s suit, respondent had filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act or Act), 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. The District Court followed the procedure for a limitation action provided in Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F. The court entered an order approving a surety bond of $450,000, representing respondent’s interest in the vessel. The court ordered that any person with a claim for the events of March 17, 1998, file a claim with the court within a specified period. The court then enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits against respondent related to the incident on March 17,1998. App. 30-33.

Petitioner filed an answer to respondent’s complaint, a claim for damages for injury, and a motion to dissolve the restraining order. Petitioner averred that he was the sole claimant concerning the events of March 17, 1998. He waived any claim of res judicata concerning limited liability based on a state court judgment; he stipulated that respondent could relitigate issues relating to the limitation of liability in District Court. Id., at 72. Petitioner later stipulated that the value of his claim was less than the value of the limitation fund, id., at 102, recanting his earlier allegation that his claim exceeded the vessel’s value.

The District Court dissolved the restraining order that prevented petitioner from proceeding with his cause of action in state court. In re Complaint of Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (ED Mo. 1998). The court recognized that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability. The court also noted, however, that the statute that confers exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime claims to federal courts contains a clause that saves to suitors “all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). The court reasoned that “a tension exists between the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the admiralty courts to determine a vessel owner’s right to limited liability and the savings to suitors clause.” 31 F. Supp. 2d, at 1168.

The District Court found two exceptions to exclusive federal jurisdiction under which a claimant is allowed to litigate his claim in state court. The first is where the value of the limitation fund exceeds the total value of all claims asserted against the vessel owner. The second is where a single claimant brings an action against the vessel owner seeking damages in excess of the value of the vessel. The court concluded that it should dissolve the injunction in this case because petitioner met the limited fund exception and probably met the single claimant exception as well. Id., at 1169, and n. 3. The court decided to retain jurisdiction over the limitation action to protect the vessel owner’s right to limitation in the event that the state proceedings necessitated further proceedings in federal court.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in dissolving the injunction. 196 F. 3d 900 (1999). The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, recognized potential tension between the saving to suitors clause in the jurisdictional statute and the Limitation Act. The Court of Appeals, however, perceived no conflict between those provisions in the instant case. The Court of Appeals explained that a court must consider whether the vessel owner has the right to remain in federal court and whether the claimant is seeking a saved remedy in another forum. The court concluded that respondent had a right to seek exoneration from liability, not merely limitation of liability, in federal court. The court also concluded that because petitioner did not request a trial by jury, he had not sought a saved remedy in state court. The court determined that there was no substantive difference between the remedies afforded petitioner in state court and federal court. For these reasons, the court held that there was no basis for dissolving the injunction.

We granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1202 (2000), to resolve a conflict between the Eighth Circuit’s decision and the decisions of other Courts of Appeals. Compare 196 F. 3d 900 (CA8 1999), with Kreta Shipping S. A. v. Preussag International Steel Corp., 192 F. 3d 41 (CA2 1999), Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F. 3d 1032 (CA11 1996), and Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F. 2d 1480 (CA5 1992).

II

A

Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution vests federal courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified this grant of exclusive original jurisdiction, but “sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.” Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77. In the intervening years, Congress has revised the language of the saving to suitors clause, but its substance has remained largely unchanged. See 28 U. S. C. §§41(3) and 871 Third (1940 ed.) (“saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it”); 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (1946 ed., Supp. II) (“saving to the libellant or petitioner in every case any other remedy to which he is otherwise entitled”); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 79, 63 Stat. 101 (“saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled”). The jurisdictional statute now states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (emphasis added).

What the drafters of the Judiciary Act intended in creating the saving to suitors clause is not entirely clear and has been the subject of some debate. See, e. g., 1 J. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 474 (1971). Compare Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117, 139-149 (1993), with Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction, A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 361, 387-390 (1999). This Court theorized that the saving to suitors clause was “inserted, probably, from abundant caution, lest the exclusive terms in which the power is conferred on the District Courts might be deemed to have taken away the concurrent remedy which had before existed. This leaves the concurrent power where it stood at common law.” New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344, 390 (1848).

In early cases we defined the limits of the clause. For instance, proceedings in rem were deemed outside the scope of the clause because an in rem action was not a common law remedy, but instead a proceeding under civil law. See, e. g., The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 571-572 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 (1867). We later distinguished between the concept of rights and remedies. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 383-384 (1918). In Che-lentis, we held that maritime law governs a seaman’s right to recovery against a vessel owner for his injuries aboard the vessel. We explained that “[t]he distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental. A right is a well founded or acknowledged claim; a remedy is the means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury.” Id., at 384.

In a subsequent case, the Court defined the saving to suitors clause as a grant to state courts of in personam jurisdiction, concurrent with admiralty courts. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 123 (1924). We held enforceable an arbitration agreement between an owner of a steamship and a company that chartered the ship. We reasoned that agreements to arbitrate were valid under admiralty law, and that the State of New York had the power to confer on its courts the authority to compel parties to submit to arbitration. We explained that the state arbitration law merely provided a remedy in state court:

“The ‘right of a common law remedy,’ so saved to suitors, does not . . . include attempted changes by the States in the substantive admiralty law, but it does include all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved. It includes remedies in pais, as well as proceedings in court; judicial remedies conferred by statute, as well as those existing at the common law; remedies in equity, as well as those enforceable in a court of law.” Id., at 123-124.

Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims. See also Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346 U. S. 556, 560-561 (1954); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 533-534 (1873).

B

Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special rights, duties, rules, and procedures. See, e. g., 46 U. S. C. App. § 721 et seq. (wrecks and salvage); § 741 et seq. (suits in admiralty by or against vessels or cargoes of the United States); 46 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (merchant seamen protection and relief). Among these provisions is the Limitation Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. The Act allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner’s interest in the vessel. The central provision of the Act provides:

“The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.” § 183(a).

See also § 183(b) (requiring supplemental fund for some vessels for personal injury and death claimants).

Congress passed the Limitation Act in 1851 “to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of industry.” Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 121 (1872). See also British Transport Comm’n v. United States, 354 U. S. 129, 133-135 (1957); Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383, 385 (1941). The Act also had the purpose of “putting American shipping upon an equality with that of other maritime nations” that had their own limitation acts. The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 128 (1894). See also Norwich Co., supra, at 116-119 (discussing history of limitation acts in England, France, and the States that led to the passage of the Limitation Act).

The Act is not a model of clarity. See 2 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 299 (2d ed. 1994) (“Th[e] 1851 Act, badly drafted even by the standards of the time, continues in effect today”). Having created a right to seek limited liability, Congress did not provide procedures for determining the entitlement. This Court did not have an opportunity to review the Act in detail until 20 years after its enactment. See Norwich Co., supra. Deeming the Act “incapable of execution” without further instructions to courts, id., at 123, we designed the procedures that govern a limitation action, and promulgated them the same Term, see Supplementary Rules of Practice in Admiralty, 13 Wall, xii-xiv. We later explained that the scheme “was sketched in outline” by the Act, and “the regulation of details as to the form and modes of proceeding was left to be prescribed by judicial authority.” Providence & New York S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 590 (1883).

The 1872 rules were “intended to facilitate the proceedings of the owners of vessels for claiming the limitation of liability secured by the statute.” The “Benefactor,” 103 U. S. 239, 244 (1880). Under the rules, a vessel owner seeking limitation of liability had to file a petition. The district court would obtain an appraisal of the vessel’s value or the owner’s interest in the vessel, and ensure that payment or some guarantee of payment was deposited with the court. The court would then order all claimants to appear. Supplementary Rule of Practice in Admiralty 54, 13 Wall., at xii-xiii. In the process of seeking limited liability, the owner was permitted to contest the fact of liability. Rule 56, 13 Wall., at xiii. The ability to contest liability relieved vessel owners of the “very onerous” English rule, which required vessel owners to confess liability in order to seek the benefit of limitation. The “Benefactor,” supra, at 243 (“[T]his court, in preparing the rules of procedure for a limitation of liability, deemed it proper to allow a party seeking such limitation to contest any liability whatever”). The claimants would then contest the vessel owner’s claims for exoneration and limitation of liability. Rule 56, 13 Wall., at xiii. If the owner succeeded in its effort to limit liability, but was not exonerated, the court was responsible for distributing the fund deposited in the court among the claimants. Rule 55, 13 Wall., at xiii.

The procedure for a limitation action is now found in Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F. Much like its predecessor provisions, Rule F sets forth the process for filing a complaint seeking exoneration from, or limitation of, liability. The district court secures the value of the vessel or owner’s interest, marshals claims, and enjoins the prosecution of other actions with respect to the claims. In these proceedings, the court, sitting without a jury, adjudicates the claims. The court determines whether the vessel owner is liable and whether the owner may limit liability. The court then determines the validity of the claims, and if liability is limited, distributes the limited fund among the claimants.

C

Some tension exists between the saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act. One statute gives suitors the right to a choice of remedies, and the other statute gives vessel owners the right to seek limitation of liability in federal court. We confronted this tension in Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531 (1931). The respondent in Langnes was employed on the petitioner’s vessel. The employee sued the vessel owner in state court for $25,000 for personal injuries suffered aboard the vessel. The vessel owner later filed a petition for limitation of liability in Federal District Court. The District Court enjoined any further proceedings in state court and issued a notice that all claimants appear. The employee filed his claim in District Court. The parties stipulated that the vessel was worth no more than $5,000.

The employee sought dissolution of the injunction. He argued that the state court had jurisdiction over his claim, that he was the only possible claimant, that there was only one vessel owner, and therefore the vessel owner could claim the benefit of the Limitation Act by proper pleading in state court. The District Court denied the motion and proceeded to decide the merits, concluding that the vessel owner was not liable. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of limitation.

On review, this Court concluded that both courts erred in failing to recognize that the state court was competent to hear the employee’s personal injury claim and the vessel owner’s claim for limitation. In our view, the choice before the District Court was whether it should retain the limitation action and preserve the right of the vessel owner but destroy the right of the employee in state court to a common law remedy, or allow the action in state court to proceed and preserve the rights of both parties. We concluded that the latter course was just. We decided that the District Court should have dissolved the injunction and allowed the employee to proceed with his claim in state court, and retained jurisdiction over the petition for limitation of liability in the event that the state proceedings necessitated further proceedings in federal court. We explained that the District Court’s decision is “one of discretion in every case,” and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 544.

After our decision, the employee was permitted to pursue his claim in state court. See Ex parte Green, 286 U. S. 437 (1932). In those proceedings, notwithstanding this Court’s recognition of the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation of liability in federal court, the employee sought to litigate that issue in state court. We approved of the District Court’s decision to enjoin any further proceedings in state court until the employee agreed to withdraw his submission on the issue of limited liability. Id., at 440.

We have also considered the conflict between the saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act in a case where several claimants attempted to sue a vessel owner in state court. Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U. S. 147 (1957). A pleasure yacht, the Blackstone, capsized after a collision with a tug that was push-towing a barge, injuring several persons and killing one. Claimants sued the owner of the tug and barge in state court actions. The owner filed a petition for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in federal court. The owner also filed a bond for the tug in the amount of approximately $119,000 and a bond for the barge in the amount of $165,000. The District Court enjoined other proceedings concerning the collision. Thereafter, the claimants made their demands for damages; the total claims were less than the amount of the two bonds. All claimants relinquished any right to damages in excess of that set forth in their claims. They further waived any claim of res judicata relating to the issue of the vessel owner’s ability to limit liability. The District Court decided to dissolve the injunction because the total limitation fund exceeded the amount of the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. In examining the Limitation Act and its history, we found it “crystal clear that the operation of the Act is directed at misfortunes at sea where the losses incurred exceed the value of the vessel and the pending freight.” Id., at 151. Where the value of the vessel and the pending freight exceed the claims, however, there is no necessity for the maintenance of the action in federal court. Id., at 152. The stipulations, in addition to other restrictions on the state court proceedings, ensured “beyond doubt that [the owner’s] right of limitation under the Act was fully protected.” Ibid. We explained that to expand the scope of exclusive jurisdiction to prevent the state court actions

“would transform the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their common-law rights, even where the limitation fund is known to be more than adequate to satisfy all demands upon it. The shipowner’s right to limit liability is not so boundless. The Act is not one of immunity from liability but of limitation of it and we read no other privilege for the shipowner into its language over and above that granting him limited liability. In fact, the Congress not only created the limitation procedure for the primary purpose of apportioning the limitation fund among the claimants where that fund was inadequate to pay the claims in full, but it reserved to such suitors their common-law remedies.” Id., at 152-153.

Since these decisions, the Courts of Appeals have generally permitted claimants to proceed with their claims in state court where there is only a single claimant, as in Langnes, or where the total claims do not exceed the value of the limitation fund, as in Lake Tankers. See, e. g., Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F. 3d 1032 (CA11 1996); Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F. 2d 1480 (CA5 1992). See also Kreta Shiffing S. A. v. Preussag International Steel Corp., 192 F. 3d 41 (CA2 1999) (foreign forum).

III

In the instant case, we believe that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in dissolving the injunction that prevented petitioner from pursuing his claims in state court. The District Court, guided by our prior cases, attempted to reconcile petitioner’s right to his remedy under the saving to suitors clause with respondent’s right to seek limited liability under the Limitation Act. The court dissolved the injunction against the state court proceedings after it concluded that respondent’s right to seek limitation of liability would be adequately protected. Respondent’s rights were protected by petitioner’s stipulation that his claim did not exceed the limitation fund, petitioner’s waiver of any defense of res judicata with respect to limitation of liability, and the District Court’s decision to stay the Limitation Act proceedings pending state court proceedings.

The Eighth Circuit held that the District Court should not have dissolved the injunction without first “finding... actual statutory conflict between the Limitation Act and the ‘saving to suitors’ clause in the case at bar.” 196 F. 3d, at 906. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no conflict here because respondent had a right to seek exoneration from liability in federal court, and petitioner did not have a saved remedy under the saving to suitors clause. That reasoning misapprehends this Court’s prior decisions.

In this case, there was a conflict between the saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act. Petitioner sued respondent in state court; under the saving to suitors clause, that court had jurisdiction to hear his claims. Respondent sought limited liability for petitioner’s claims in federal court; the Limitation Act granted the federal court jurisdiction over that action. Both parties selected legitimate forums for their claims, and therein lies the conflict. Had petitioner sought to institute in rem proceedings against respondent in state court, that court would have lacked jurisdiction because the saving to suitors clause does not reach actions in rem. Similarly, had respondent sought limited liability for payment of wages in federal court, that court would not have had jurisdiction under the Limitation Act because claims for wages due employees are not covered. 46 U. S. C. App. § 189. See also In re East River Towing Co., 266 U. S. 855, 367 (1924). Here, however, there appears to have been no obstacle to each party pursuing its claim in the forum of its choice, except the competing action.

In deciding that the case should proceed in federal court, the Court of Appeals relied on two flawed premises: that the Limitation Act grants vessel owners a right to obtain exoneration from liability in federal court where limitation of liability is not at issue, and that the saving to suitors clause reserves to claimants only the right to receive a jury trial.

By its own terms, the Limitation Act protects the right of vessel owners to limit their liability to the value of the vessel, provided that the events or circumstances giving rise to the damage occurred without the vessel owner’s privity or knowledge. The Act was designed to encourage investment and protect vessel owners from unlimited exposure to liability. We have also made clear, however, that the scope of exclusive federal jurisdiction is proportional to the federal interest in protecting the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation of liability. See Lake Tankers, 354 U. S., at 153. We have explained that “[t]he Act is not one of immunity from liability but of limitation of it.” Id., at 152. We see no reason to revisit that conclusion and decline respondent’s invitation to expand the scope of the Act.

In construing the Limitation Act, this Court long ago determined that vessel owners may contest liability in the process of seeking limited liability, and we promulgated rules to that effect pursuant to our “power to regulate ... proceedings.” The “Benefactor,” 103 U. S., at 244; Supplementary Rule of Practice in Admiralty 56, 13 Wall., at xiii; Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F(2). Thus, we agree with respondent that a vessel owner need not confess liability in order to seek limitation under the Act. The Act and the rules of practice, however, do not create a freestanding right to exoneration from liability in circumstances where limitation of liability is not at issue. In this case, petitioner stipulated that his claim for damages would not exceed the value of the vessel and waived any claim of res judicata from the state court action concerning issues bearing on the limitation of liability. The District Court concluded that these stipulations would protect the vessel owner’s right to seek limited liability in federal court. Then, out of an “abundance of caution,” the court stayed the limitation proceedings so that it could act if the state court proceedings jeopardized the vessel owner’s rights under the Limitation Act. 31 F. Supp. 2d, at 1170-1171. We believe nothing more was required to protect respondent’s right to §eek a limitation of liability.

The district courts have jurisdiction over actions arising under the Limitation Act, and they have discretion to stay or dismiss Limitation Act proceedings to allow a suitor to pursue his claims in state court. If the district court concludes that the vessel owner’s right to limitation will not be adequately protected — where for example a group of claimants cannot agree on appropriate stipulations or there is uncertainty concerning the adequacy of the fund or the number of claims — the court may proceed to adjudicate the merits, deciding the issues of liability and limitation. See, e.g., Lake Tankers, supra, at 152; Port Arthur Towing Co. v. John W. Towing, Inc., 42 F. 3d 312, 314 (CA5 1995). But where, as here, the District Court satisfies itself that a vessel owner’s right to seek limitation will be protected, the decision to dissolve the injunction is well within the court’s discretion.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the District Court also erred in dissolving the injunction because petitioner had no saved remedy in state court. The Court of Appeals apparently treated as dispositive petitioner’s failure to demand a jury trial in state court. The jurisdictional statute, however, reserves to suitors “all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). Tracing the development of the clause since the Judiciary Act of 1789, it appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at common law. See, e. g., The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 (1867). We later explained that the clause extends to “all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.” Red Cross Line, 264 U. S., at 124. Trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors. See Lake Tankers, supra, at 153; Red Cross Line, supra, at 123-125.

The Court of Appeals concluded that forum choice could not be a saved remedy under the saving to suitors clause because a claimant does not have the ability to control the forum in which his claim will be heard. 196 F. 3d, at 909. The prospect that a vessel owner may remove a state court action to federal court, however, does not limit a claimant’s forum choice under the saving to suitors clause any more than other litigants’ forum choices may be limited. We have previously refused to hold that admiralty claims, such as a limitation claim, fall within the scope of federal question jurisdiction out of concern that saving to suitors actions in state court would be removed to federal court and undermine the claimant’s choice of forum. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 371-372 (1959). We explained that to define admiralty jurisdiction as federal question jurisdiction would be a “destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce.” Id., at 373. Moreover, in this case respondent raised a Jones Act claim, which is not subject to removal to federal court even in the event of diversity of the parties. See 28 U. S. C. § 1445(a) (incorporated by reference into the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a)). Respondent’s arguments to limit and enumerate the saved remedies under the saving to suitors clause must fail in view of the consistent recognition by Congress and this Court that both state and federal courts may be proper forums for adjudicating claims such as petitioner’s.

In sum, this Court’s case law makes clear that state courts, with all of their remedies, may adjudicate claims like petitioner’s against vessel owners so long as the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation of liability is protected. Respondent seeks to invert that rule, making run of the mill personal injury actions involving vessels a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction except where the claimant happens to seek a jury trial.. We reject that proposal and hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court’s decision to dissolve the injunction.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.