text:
    No. 00-1137.
    Mihn Van Bui v. Alarcon, Director, California Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 00-1186.
    Alvarez v. Boyd.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1199.
    Rodriguez-Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1203.
    Cassell v. Kurily et ux.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1213.
    Gould et ux. v. United States; and Holywell Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 229 F. 3d 1142.


text:
    No. 00-1243.
    Love v. Carter, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6720.
    Berrio-Callejas v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6900.
    King v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6916.
    Schreiber v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6963.
    Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7136.
    Thomas v. Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7310.
    Ingram v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7326.
    Hunt v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7620.
    Workman v. Bell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7625.
    Plantz v. Massie, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7626.
    McCoy v. Prunty, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7628.
    Baker v. Corcoran, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7630.
    Lockett v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional
   Division.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7631.
    Marsh v. Soares, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7633.
    Lynch v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7634.
    McKibben v. Head, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7638.
    Jennings-Jones v. Children’s Harbor, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7641.
    Mackey v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7646.
    Madsen v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7647.
    Johnson v. Choate et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7650.
    Miller v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7651.
    Perry v. Blackwell, Administrator, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7652.
    James v. Hearvy et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7653.
    Salinas Mestiza v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7655.
    McCallup v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7658.
    Ziegler v. Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7659.
    Metzenbaum v. Mark Glassman, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7660.
    Taylor v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7662.
    Sontag v. Mechling, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Waynesburg.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7663.
    Rodriguez v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7664.
    Underwood v. Calderon, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7665.
    White v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7668.
    Sutton v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7670.
    Willis v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7671.
    Webb v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7673.
    Twyman v. King County, Washington, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7675.
    Thompson v. Okanagan House, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7681.
    Stone v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7684.
    Adams v. LeMaster, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7686.
    Jackson v. Hargett, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7687.
    Sims v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7691.
    Coddington v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7694.
    Smith v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7700.
    Bunnich v. Stegall, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7701.
    Bryant v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7702.
    Lee v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7703.
    Diaz v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7704.
    Metheny et al. v. Hammonds.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7709.
    Vaughn v. Kemna, Superintendent, Crossroads Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7725.
    Davis v. Halter, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7748.
    Tipp v. AmSouth Bank, N. A.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7750.
    Lasiter v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7754.
    Martinez v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7760.
    Al-Din, aka Parker v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7762.
    Frank v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7764.
    Gissendaner v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7778.
    Shafer v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7780.
    Richards v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7781.
    Richardson v. Albertson’s, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7788.
    Pace v. Dukes, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7792.
    Voss v. Mills, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7795.
    Ruffin v. Monroe et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7805.
    In re Pierce.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7811.
    O’Neill v. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7817.
    Jefferson v. Cambra, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7818.
    Lucey v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7821.
    Ducker v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7832.
    Foster v. United States.
   C..A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7838.
    Irvin v. Michigan Parole Board et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7846.
    Burr v. Goord, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7869.
    Golden v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7875.
    Durbin v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7879.
    Berry v. Folsom State Prison et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7888.
    Brown v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7896.
    Archuleta v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7897.
    Albert v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7900.
    Alves v. United Services Automobile Assn. et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7908.
    Rahman v. Pease et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7919.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7936.
    Jones v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7940.
    Clifford v. Tice et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7947.
    Dew v. Clarke, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7966.
    Wilson v. Johnson, Civil Commitment Referral Coordinator, Minnesota Department of Corrections.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7969.
    Sueing v. Michigan Department of Corrections.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7974.
    Muhannad v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7986.
    Nails v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7987.
    Nails v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7994.
    Covillion v. Covillion.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7997.
    Avnaim v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8018.
    Burr v. McGinnis, Superintendent, Southport Correctional Facility.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8025.
    Dawson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8030.
    Choate v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8040.
    Durflinger v. Ryder, Superintendent, Monroe Correctional Complex.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8047.
    Leslie v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8074.
    Stephens v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8092.
    Duran v. Kirtland & Packard, LLP.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8103.
    Jaramillo-Ponce v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8107.
    Ball v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8109.
    Quintana-Orosco v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8110.
    Rutledge v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8115.
    Maldonado v. Hill, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8131.
    Fernandez-Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8132.
    Fuentes v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8134.
    Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8137.
    Guerrero v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8139.
    Noel v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8145.
    Cruz v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8160.
    Sheppard v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8163.
    Vanatter v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8165.
    Zamora-Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8166.
    Webb v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8168.
    Ross v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8172.
    Dudley v. United States Sentencing Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8176.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8180.
    Dodson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8181.
    Hinton, aka Baldwin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8182.
    Felici v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8186.
    Hadden v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8189.
    Feaster v. Beshears, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8190.
    Horton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8195.
    Burnette v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8204.
    Calderon-Leal v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8208.
    Curlee v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8211.
    Montague v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8213.
    Bastian v. Government of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8217.
    Mortimer v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8220.
    Feliciano v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8222.
    Isham v. Randle, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8225.
    Francis v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8229.
    Herrera v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8230.
    Hatcher v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8237.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8238.
    Hicks v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8244.
    Flowers v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8247.
    Holmes v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8252.
    Harrell, aka Johnson, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8253.
    Gonzales v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8256.
    Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8263.
    Bragg v. Morgan, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8270.
    Holmes v. Conroy, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8274.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8279.
    Ganey v. Chester, Superintendent, Craven Correctional Institution, et al.
   :C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8289.
    Dolenz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8291.
    Chaguala-Carrillo v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8298.
    Canty v. Booker, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8299.
    Dabeit v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8300.
    Sanchez-Avalos v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8303.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8308.
    Harrison, aka Iorizzo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8309.
    Hart/Cross v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8311.
    Abraham v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8315.
    McClaren v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8320.
    Clark v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8322.
    Lopez-Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8324.
    McDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8334.
    Sambrano Villarreal v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8335.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8336.
    Ramos Reyes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8338.
    Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8354.
    Reyes-Romero v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8357.
    Morris v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8359.
    Lindsay v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8396.
    Steele v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8412.
    Gray v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1024.
    Gordon, Trustee v. Alcatel Contracting, Inc.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6745.
    Chandler v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to amend petition for writ of certio-rari granted. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-640.
    No. 00-695.
    No. 00-702.
    No. 00-706.
    No. 00-766.
    No. 00-5597.
    No. 00-5693.
    No. 00-5758.
    No. 00-6004.
    No. 00-6200.
    No. 00-6683.
    No. 00-6779.
    No. 00-6894.
    No. 00-6950.
    No. 00-6981.
    McGuire et al. v. Rock County Board of Supervisors et al., Musser v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., Judge v. Hatch et al., Hogan Management Services v. Martino, dba North Georgia Orthopaedics, Judge v. Superior Court of California, Rodriguez Reyna v. Stewart et al., Huff v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Broseh v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Jackson v. Ramsey County, Leverton v. City of Houston Police Department et al., Hawkins v. United States, Luria v. Luria, Washington v. Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners, Banks v. Pizzingrilli, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Littlejohn v. United States, Denney v. Kansas, Tilli v. Department of Housing and Urban Development et al., Ellis v. United States, Norwood v. United States,
   ante, p. 1073;

ante, p. 1075;

ante, p. 1075;

ante, p. 1075;

ante, p. 1077;

ante, p. 945;

ante, p. 912;

ante, p. 1081;

ante, p. 967;

ante, p. 1016;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 1056;

ante, p. 1090;

ante, p. 1092;

ante, p. 1057;

No. 00-7301.

No. 00-7341.

No. 00-7372.

No. 00-7374.

ante, p. 1130;

ante, p. 1130;

ante, p. 1103; and

ante, p. 1103. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 1, 2001
    No. 00A746 (00-8727).
    McCarver v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending disposition of the petition for writ of cer-tiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the issuance of the mandate of this Court.


text:
    No. 00-8735 (00A755).
    Akers, by Lee, as Next Friend v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution.


author: Justice Souter

text:
    DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al. v. KLAMATH WATER USERS PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
    No. 99-1871.
    Argued January 10, 2001
    Decided March 5, 2001

      Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, Matthew M. Collette, John Leshy, and Scott Bergstrom.

      Andrew M. Eitchings argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul S. Simmons and Donald B. Ayer

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Campo Band of Mission Indians et al. by Susan M. Williams and Gwenellen P. Janov; and for the Klamath Tribes et al. by Tracy A Labin, Carl Ullman, Curtis Berkey, Thomas P. Schlosser, Reid Peyton Chambers, Jill E. Grant, Dan Rey-Bear, Alice E. Walker, John B. Carter, Peter G. Chestnut, Rodney B. Lewis, Stephen V. Quesenberry, and Gregory M. Quinlan.

        Lucy A Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Bruce W Sandford filed a brief for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
      Briefs of amid curiae were filed for the City of Tacoma, Washington, by J Richard Creatura; and for United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., by William W. Taylor III, Michael R. Smith, and Eleanor H. Smith.

   Justice Souter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Documents in issue here, passing between Indian Tribes and the Department of the Interior, addressed tribal interests subject to state and federal proceedings to determine water allocations. The question is whether the documents are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, as “intra-agency memorandums or letters” that would normally be privileged in civil discovery. 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). We hold they are not.

Í — 4

Two separate proceedings give rise to this case, the first a planning effort within the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, and the second a state water rights adjudication in the Oregon courts. Within the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Klamath Project or Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate territory in Klamath County, Oregon, and two northern California counties. In 1995, the Department began work to develop a long-term operations plan for the Project, to be known as the Klamath Project Operation Plan (Plan), which would provide for allocation of water among competing uses and competing water users. The Department asked the Klamath as well as the Hoopa Valley, Karuk, and Yurok Tribes (Basin Tribes) to consult with Reclamation on the matter, and a memorandum of understanding between the Department and the Tribes recognized that “[t]he United States Government has a unique legal relationship with Native American tribal governments,” and called for “[assessment, in consultation with the Tribes, of the impacts of the [Plan] on Tribal trust resources.” App. 59, 61.

During roughly the same period, the Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe alone in an Oregon state-court adjudication intended to allocate water rights. Since the Bureau is responsible for administering land and water held in trust for Indian tribes, 25 U. S. C. § la; 25 CPR subeh. H, pts. 150-181 (2000), it consulted with the Klamath Tribe, and the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims ultimately submitted by the United States for the benefit of the Klamath Tribe. The Bureau does not, however, act as counsel for the Tribe, which has its own lawyers and has independently submitted claims on its own behalf.

Respondent, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), is a nonprofit association of water users in the Klamath River Basin, most of whom receive water from the Klamath Project, and whose interests are adverse to the tribal interests owing to scarcity of water. The Association filed a series of requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. 0. § 552, seeking access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes during the relevant time period. The Bureau turned over several documents but withheld others as exempt under the attorney work-product and deliberative process privileges. These privileges are said to be incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” § 552(b)(5). The Association then sued the Bureau under FOIA to compel release of the documents.

By the time of the District Court ruling, seven documents remained in dispute, three of them addressing the Plan, three concerned with the Oregon adjudication, and the seventh relevant to both proceedings. See 189 F. 3d 1034,1036 (CA9 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-49a. Six of the documents were prepared by the Klamath Tribe or its representative and were submitted at the Government’s behest to the Bureau or to the Department’s Regional Solicitor; a Bureau official prepared the seventh document and gave it to lawyers for the Klamath and Yurok Tribes. See ibid.

The District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. It held that each document qualified as an inter-agency or intra-agency communication for purposes of Exemption 5, and that each was covered by the deliberative process privilege or the attorney work-product privilege, as having played a role in the Bureau’s deliberations about the Plan or the Oregon adjudication. See 189 P. 3d, at 1036, App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-32a, 56a-65a.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 189 P. 3d 1034 (1999). It recognized that some Circuits had adopted a “functional” approach to Exemption 5, under which a document generated outside the Government might still qualify as an “intra-agency” communication. See id., at 1037-1038. The court saw no reason to go into that, however, for it ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that “the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.” Id., at 1038. The court said that “[t]o hold otherwise would extend Exemption 5 to shield what amount to ex parte communications in contested proceedings between the Tribes and the Department.” Ibid. Judge Hawkins dissented, for he saw the documents as springing “from a relationship that remains consultative rather than adversarial, a relationship in which the Bureau and Department were seeking the expertise of the Tribes, rather than opposing them.” Id., at 1045. He saw the proper enquiry as going not to a document’s source, but to the role it plays in agency decisionmaking. See id., at 1039. We granted certiorari in view of the decision’s significant impact on the relationship between Indian tribes and the Government, 530 U. S. 1304 (2000), and now affirm.

II

Upon request, POIA mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency, see 5 U. S. C. § 552, unless the documents fall within enumerated exemptions, see § 552(b). “[T]hese limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not seereey, is the dominant objective of the Act,” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 361 (1976); “[consistent with the Act's goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have been consistently given a narrow compass,” Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U. S. 136, 151 (1989); see also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615, 630 (1982) (“FQLA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”).

A

Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). To qualify, a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.

Our prior cases on Exemption 5 have addressed the second condition, incorporating civil discovery privileges. See, e. g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792, 799-800 (1984); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 148 (1975) (“Exemption 5 withholds from a member of the public documents which a private party could not discover in litigation with the agency”). So far as they might matter here, those privileges include the privilege for attorney work-product and what is sometimes called the “deliberative process” privilege. Work product protects “mental processes of the attorney,” United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 238 (1975), while deliberative process covers “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated,” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance “the quality of agency decisions,” id., at 151, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government, see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1973); see also Weber Aircraft Corp., supra, at 802.

The point is not to protect Government secrecy pure and simple, however, and the first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second; the communication must be “inter-agency or intra-agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). Statutory definitions underscore the apparent plainness of this text. With exceptions not relevant here, “agency” means “each authority of the Government of the United States,” §551(1), and “includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government..., or any independent regulatory agency,” § 552(f).

Although neither the terms of the exemption nor the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders, some Courts of Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government may nevertheless qualify as an “intra-agency” memorandum under Exemption 5. See,- e. g., Hoover v. Dept. of Interior, 611F. 2d 1132, 1137-1138 (CA5 1980); Lead Industries Assn. v. OSHA, 610 F. 2d 70, 83 (CA2 1979); Soucie v. David, 448 F. 2d 1067 (CADC 1971). In Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1 (1988), Justice Scaua, joined by Justices O’Connor and White, explained that “the most natural meaning of the phrase ‘intra-agency memorandum’ is a memorandum that is addressed both to and from employees of a single agency,” id., at 18, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). But his opinion also acknowledged the more expansive reading by some Courts of Appeals:

“It is textually possible and ... in accord with the purpose of the provision, to regard as an intra-agency memorandum one that has been received by an agency, to assist it in the performance of its own functions, from a person acting in a governmentally conferred capacity other than on behalf of another agency — e. g., in a capacity as employee or consultant to the agency, or as employee or officer of another governmental unit (not an agency) that is authorized or required to provide adviee to the agency.” Ibid.

Typically, courts taking the latter view have held that the exemption extends to communications between Government agencies and outside consultants hired by them. See, e. g., Hoover, supra, at 1138 (“In determining value, the government may deem it necessary to seek the objective opinion of outside experts rather than rely solely on the opinions of government appraisers”); Lead Industries Assn., supra, at 83 (applying Exemption 5 to , cover draft reports “prepared by outside consultants who had testified on behalf of the agency rather than agency staff”); see also Government Land Bank v. GSA, 671 P. 2d 663, 665 (CA5 1982) (“Both parties agree that a property appraisal, performed under contract by an independent professional, is an ‘intra-agency’ document for purposes of the exemption”). In such cases, the records submitted by outside consultants played essentially the same part in an agency’s process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done. To be sure, the consultants in these cases were independent contractors and were not assumed to be subject to the degree of control that agency employment could have entailed; nor do we read the cases as necessarily assuming that an outside consultant must be devoid of a definite point of view when the agency contracts for its services. But the fact about the consultant that is constant in the typical cases is that the consultant does not represent an interest of its own, or the interest of any other client, when it advises the agency that hires it. Its only obligations are to truth and its sense of what good judgment calls for, and in those respects the consultant functions just as an employee would be expected to do.

B

The Department purports to rely on this consultant corollary to Exemption 5 in arguing for its application to the Tribe’s communications to the Bureau in its capacity of fiduciary for the benefit of the Indian Tribes. The existence of a trust obligation is not, of course, in question, see United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U. S. 700, 707 (1987); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). The fiduciary relationship has been described as “one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law,” F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982), and has been compared to one existing under a common law trust, with the United States as trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as beneficiaries, and the property and natural resources managed by the United States as the trust corpus. See, e. g., Mitchell, supra, at 225. Nor is there any doubt about the plausibility of the Government’s assertion that the candor of tribal communications with the Bureau would be eroded without the protections of the deliberative process privilege recognized under Exemption 5. The Department is surely right in saying that confidentiality in communications with tribes is conducive to a proper discharge of its trust obligation.

From the recognition of this interest in frank communication, which the deliberative process privilege might protect, the Department would have us infer a sufficient justification for applying Exemption 5 to communications with the Tribes, in the same fashion that Courts of Appeals have found sufficient reason to favor a consultant’s advice that way. But the Department’s argument skips a necessary step, for it ignores the first condition of Exemption 5, that the communication be “intra-agency or inter-agency.” The Department seems to be saying that “intra-agency” is a purely conclusory term, just a label to be placed on any document the Government would find it valuable to keep confidential.

There is, however, no textual justification for draining the first condition of independent vitality, and once the intra-agency condition is applied, it rules out any application of Exemption 5 to tribal communications on analogy to consultants’ reports (assuming, which we do not decide, that these reports may qualify as intra-agency under Exemption 5). As mentioned already, consultants whose communications have typically been held exempt have not been communicating with the Government in their own interest or on behalf of any person or group whose intereste might be affected by the Government action addressed by the consultant. In that regard, consultants may be enough like the agency’s own personnel to justify calling their communications “intra-agency.” The Tribes, on the contrary, necessarily communicate with the Bureau with their own, albeit entirely legitimate, interests in mind. While this fact alone distinguishes tribal communications from the consultants’ examples recognized by several Courts of-Appeals, the distinction is even sharper, in that the Tribes are self-advocates at the expense of others seeking benefits inadequate to satisfy everyone.

As to those documents bearing on the Plan, the Tribes are obviously in competition with nontribal claimants, including those irrigators represented by the respondent. App. 66-71. The record shows that documents submitted by the Tribes included, among others, “a position paper that discusses water law legal theories” and “addresses issues related to water rights of the tribes,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-43a, a memorandum “contain[ing] views on policy the BIA could provide to other governmental agencies,” “views concerning trust resources,” id., at 44a, and a letter “conveying the views of the Klamath Tribes concerning issues involved in the water rights adjudication,” id., at 47a. While these documents may not take the formally argumentative form of a brief, their function is quite apparently to support the tribal claims. The Tribes are thus urging a position necessarily adverse to the other claimants, the water being inadequate to satisfy the combined demand. As the Court of Appeals said, “[t]he Tribes’ demands, if satisfied, would lead to reduced water allocations to members of the Association and have been protested by Association members who fear water shortages and economic injury in dry years.” 189 F. 3d, at 1035.

The Department insists that the Klamath Tribe’s consultant-like character is clearer in the circumstances of the Oregon adjudication, since the Department merely represents the interests of the Tribe before a state court that will make any decision about the respective rights of the contenders. Brief for Petitioners 42-45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 4-6. But it is not that simple. Even if there were no rival interests at stake in the Oregon litigation, the Klamath Tribe would be pressing its own view of its own interest in its communications with the Bureau. Nor could that interest be ignored as being merged somehow in the fiduciary interest of the Government trustee; the Bureau in its fiduciary capacity would be obliged to adopt the stance it believed to be in the beneficiary’s best interest, not necessarily the position espoused by the beneficiary itself. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 176, Comment a (1957) (“[I]t is the duty of the trustee to exercise such care and skill to preserve the trust property as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property ...”).

But, again, the dispositive point is that the apparent object of the Tribe’s communications is a decision by an agency of the Government to support a claim by the Tribe that is necessarily adverse to the interests of competitors. Since there is not enough water to satisfy everyone, the Government’s position on behalf of the Tribe is potentially adverse to other users, and it might ask for more or less on behalf of the Tribe depending on how it evaluated the tribal claim compared with the claims of its rivals. The ultimately adversarial character of tribal submissions to the Bureau therefore seems the only fair inference, as confirmed by the Department’s acknowledgment that its “obligation to represent the Klamath Tribe necessarily coexists with the duty to protect other federal interests, including in particular its interests with respect to the Klamath Project.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 8; cf. Nevada v. United States, 463 U. S. 110, 142 (1983) (“[W]here Congress has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for reclamation projects, and has even authorized the inclusion of reservation lands within a project, the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for purposes of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent different interests”). 'Hie position of the Tribe as beneficiary is thus a far cry from the position of the paid consultant.

Quite apart from its attempt to draw a direct analogy between tribes and conventional consultants, the Department argues that compelled release of the documents would itself impair the Department’s performance of a specific fiduciary obligation to protect the confidentiality of communications with tribes. Because, the Department argues, traditional fiduciary standards forbid a trustee to disclose information acquired as a trustee when it should know that disclosure would be against the beneficiary’s interests, excluding the Tribes’ submissions to the Department from Exemption 5 would handicap the Department in doing what the law requires. Brief for Petitioners 36-37. And in much the same vein, the Department presses the argument that “FOIA is intended to cast light on existing government practices; it should not be interpreted and applied so as to compel federal agencies to perform their assigned substantive functions in other than the normal manner.” Id., at 29.

All of this boils down to requesting that we read an “Indian trust” exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question for reasons already explored. There is simply no support for the exemption in the statutory text, which we have elsewhere insisted be read strictly in order to serve FOIA’s mandate of broad disclosure, which was obviously expected and intended to affect Government operations. In FOIA, after all, a new conception of Government conduct was enacted into law, “‘a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’ ” Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U. S., at 142 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Gong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965)). “Congress believed that this philosophy, put into practice, would help ‘ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.’” 492 U. S., at 142 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 242 (1978)). Congress had to realize that not every secret under the old law would be seeret under the new.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

       The Government is “not technically acting as [the Tribes’] attorney. That is, the Tribes have their own attorneys, but the United States acts as trustee.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. “The United States has also filed claims on behalf of the Project and on behalf of other Federal interests” in the Oregon adjudication. Id., at 6. The Hoopa Valley, Karuk, and Yurok Tribes are not parties to the adjudication. Brief for Respondent 7.

       The majority in Julian did not address the question whether the documents at issue were “inter-agency or intra-agency” records within the meaning of Exemption 5, because it concluded that the documents would be routinely discoverable in civil litigation and therefore would not be covered by Exemption 5 in any event. 486 U. S., at 11-14.

       Because we conclude that the documents do not meet this threshold condition, we need not reach step two of the Exemption 5 analysis and enquire whether the communications would normally be discoverable in civil litigation. See United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792, 799 (1984).

       Courts of Appeals have recognized at least two instances of intra-agency consultants that arguably extend beyond what we have character-. ized as the typical examples. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 111 F. 3d 168 (CADC 1997), former Presidents were so treated in their Communications with the National Archives and Kecords Administration, even though the Presidents had their own, independent interests, id., at 171. And in Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F. 2d 781 (CADC 1980), Senators’ responses to the Attorney General’s questionnaires about the judicial nomination process were held exempt, even though we would expect a Senator to have strong personal views on the matter. We need not decide whether either instance should be recognized as intra-agency, even if communications with paid consultants are ultimately so treated. As explained above, the intra-ageney condition excludes, at the least, communications to or from an interested party seeking a Government benefit at the expense of other applicants.

       The Department points out that the Plan-related documents submitted by the Tribes were furnished to the Bureau rather than to Reclamation, a fact which the Department claims reinforces the conclusion that the documents were provided to the Department in its capacity as trustee. Brief for Petitioners 47. This fact does not alter our analysis, however, because we think that even communications made in support of the trust relationship fail to fit comfortably within the statutory text.

       We note that the Department cites the Restatement for the proposition that a “ ‘trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to disclose to a third person information which he has acquired as trustee where he should know that the effect of such disclosure would be detrimental to the interest of the beneficiary.’” Brief for Petitioners 36 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, Comment s (1957)). It is unnecessary for us to decide if the Department’s duties with respect to its communications with Indian tribes fit this pattern.

       The Department does not attempt to argue that Congress specifically envisioned that Exemption 5 would cover communications pursuant to the Indian trust responsibility, or any other trust responsibility. Although as a general rule we are hesitant to construe statutes in light of legislative inaction, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600 (1983), we note that Congress has twice considered specific proposals to protect Indian trust information, see Indian Amendment to Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 2652 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Indian Trust Information Protection Act of 1978, S. 2773,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). We do so because these proposals confirm the commonsense reading that we give Exemption 5 today, as well as to emphasize that nobody in the Federal Government should be surprised by this reading.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    OHIO v. REINER
    No. 00-1028.
    Decided March 19, 2001
   Per Curiam.

The Supreme Court of Ohio here held that a witness who denies all culpability does not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Because our precedents dictate that the privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty, and that the facts here are sufficient to sustain a claim of privilege, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.

Respondent was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex. The coroner testified at trial that Alex died from “shaken baby syndrome,” the result of child abuse. He estimated that Alex’s injury most likely occurred minutes before the child stopped breathing. Alex died two days later when he was removed from life support. Evidence produced at trial revealed that Alex had a broken rib and a broken leg at the time of his death. His twin brother Derek, who was also examined, had several broken ribs. Respondent had been alone with Alex for half an hour immediately before Alex stopped breathing. Respondent’s experts testified that Alex could have been injured several hours before his respiratory arrest. Alex was in the care of the family’s babysitter, Susan Batt, at that time. Batt had cared for the children during the day for about two weeks prior to Alex’s death. The defense theory was that Batt, not respondent, was the culpable party.

Batt informed the court in advance of testifying that she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. At the State’s request, the trial court granted her transactional immunity from prosecution pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2945.44 (1999). She then testified to the jury that she had refused to testify without a grant of immunity on the advice of counsel, although she had done nothing wrong. Batt denied any involvement in Alex’s death. She testified that she had never shaken Alex or his brother at any time, specifically on the day Alex suffered respiratory arrest. She said she was unaware of and had nothing to do with the other injuries to both children. The jury found respondent guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, reversed respondent’s conviction on grounds not relevant to our decision here. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal, on the alternative ground that Batt had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege and that the trial court’s grant of immunity under § 2945.44 was therefore unlawful. 89 Ohio St. 3d 342, 358, 731 N. E. 2d 662, 677 (2000). The court found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced respondent, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause Alex’s injuries.

The court recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination applies where a witness’ answers “could reasonably ‘furnish a link in the chain of evidence’ ” against him, id., at 352, 731 N. E. 2d, at 673 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951)). Hoffman, it noted, requires the trial court to determine whether the witness has correctly asserted the privilege, and to order the witness to answer questions if the witness is mistaken about the danger of incrimination. Ibid. The court faulted the trial judge for failing to question sufficiently Batt’s assertion of the privilege. It noted that the Court of Appeals, in finding a valid privilege, failed to consider the prosecutor’s suggestion that Batt’s testimony would not incriminate her, and Batt’s denial of involvement in Alex’s abuse when questioned by the Children’s Services Board. The court held that “Susan Batt’s [trial] testimony did not incriminate her, because she denied any involvement in the abuse. Thus, she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege.” 89 Ohio St. 3d, at 355, 731 N. E. 2d, at 675 (emphasis in original). The court emphasized that the defense’s theory of Batt’s guilt was not grounds for a grant of immunity, “when the witness continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct.” Ibid.

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision that Batt was wrongly granted immunity under §2945.44 (and consequently, that reversal of respondent’s conviction was required) rested on the court’s determination that Batt did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege. In discussing the contours of that privilege, the court relied on our precedents. We have observed that “this Court retains a role when a state court’s interpretation of state law has been influenced by an accompanying interpretation of federal law.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 152 (1984). The decision at issue “fairly appears ... to be interwoven with the federal law,” and no adequate and independent state ground is clear from the face of the opinion. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983). We have jurisdiction over a state-court judgment that rests, as a threshold matter, on a determination of federal law. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 816 (1986) (“[T]his Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action”); St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 293-294 (1908).

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. As the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged, this privilege not only extends “to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.” Hoffman, 341 U. S., at 486. “[I]t need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Id., at 486-487.

We have held that the privilege’s protection extends only to witnesses who have "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” Id., at 486. That inquiry is for the court; the witness’ assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination. Ibid. A danger of “imaginary and unsubstantial character” will not suffice. Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 366 (1917). But we have never held, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did, that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary, we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment’s "basic functions ... is to protect innocent men . . . ‘who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421 (1957) (quoting Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 U. S. 551, 557-558 (1956)) (emphasis in original). In Grunewald, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s own mouth. 353 U. S., at 421-422.

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s determination that Batt did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege because she denied any involvement in the abuse of the children clearly conflicts with Hoffman and Grünewald. Batt had "reasonable cause” to apprehend danger from her answers if questioned at respondent’s trial. Hoffman, supra, at 486. Batt spent extended periods of time alone with Alex and his brother in the weeks immediately preceding discovery of their injuries. She was with Alex within the potential timeframe of the fatal trauma. The defense’s theory of the case was that Batt, not respondent, was responsible for Alex’s death and his brother’s uncharged injuries. In this setting, it was reasonable for Batt to fear that answers to possible questions might tend to incriminate her. Batt therefore had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

We do not, of course, address the question whether immunity from suit under § 2945.44 was appropriate. Because the Supreme Court of Ohio mistakenly held that the witness’ assertion of innocence deprived her of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the court’s judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

      Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2945.44 (1999) states in pertinent part: “In any criminal proceeding... if a witness refuses to answer or produce information on the basis of his 'privilege against self-incrimination, the court of common pleas... unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration of justice, shall compel the witness to answer or produce the information, if. . . [the prosecuting attorney so requests and] . . . [t]he court... informs the witness that by answering, or producing the information he will receive [transactional] immunity . . . .” (Emphasis added.)


author: Justice Kennedy

text:
    TRAFFIX DEVICES, INC. v. MARKETING DISPLAYS, INC.
    No. 99-1571.
    Argued November 29, 2000
    Decided March 20, 2001

      John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gregory G. Garre and Jeanne-Marie Marshall.

      Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Mark S. Davies.

      John A. Artz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John S. Artz, Robert P. Renke, and Lisa A Sarkisian

      Briefs of amid, ewriae urging reversal were filed for the Holmes Group, Inc., by James TK Dabney; for Panduit Corp. by Roy E. Hofer, Jerome Gilson, Cynthia A Homan, and Philip A Jones; and for Malla Pollack, pro se.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Intellectual Property Association by Louis T. Pirkey; and for Thomas & Betts Corp. by Sidney David and Roy H. Wepner.

        Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Marie V. Driscoll, and Helen Hill Mmsker filed a brief for the International Trademark Association as amicus curiae.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Temporary road signs with warnings like “Road Work Ahead” or “Left Shoulder Closed” must withstand strong gusts of wind. An inventor named Robert Sarkisian obtained two utility patents for a mechanism built upon two springs (the dual-spring design) to keep these and other outdoor signs upright despite adverse wind conditions. The holder of the now-expired Sarkisian patents, respondent Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI), established a successful business in the manufacture and sale of sign stands incorporating the patented feature. MDI’s stands for road signs were recognizable to buyers and users (it says) because the dual-spring design was visible near the base of the sign.

This litigation followed after the patents expired and a competitor, TrafFix Devices, Inc., sold sign stands with a visible spring mechanism that looked like MDI’s. MDI and TrafFix products looked alike because they were. When TrafFix started in business, it sent an MDI product abroad to have it reverse engineered, that is to say copied. Complicating matters, TrafFix marketed its sign stands under a name similar to MDI’s. MDI used the name “WindMaster,” while TrafFix, its new competitor, used “WindBuster.”

MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., against TrafFix for trademark infringement (based on the similar names), trade dress infringement (based on the copied dual-spring design), and unfair competition. TrafFix counterclaimed on antitrust theories. After the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered cross-motions for summary judgment, MDI prevailed on its trademark claim for the confusing similarity of names and was held not liable on the antitrust counterclaim; and those two rulings, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are not before us.

I

We are concerned with the trade dress question. The District Court ruled against MDI on its trade dress claim. 971 F. Supp. 262 (ED Mich. 1997). After determining that the one element of MDI’s trade dress at issue was the dual-spring design, id., at 265, it held that “no reasonable trier of fact could determine that MDI has established secondary meaning” in its alleged trade dress, id., at 269. In other words, consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. As a second, independent reason to grant summary judgment in favor of TrafFix, the District Court determined the dual-spring design was functional. On this rationale secondary meaning is irrelevant because there can be no trade dress protection in any event. In ruling on the functional aspect of the design, the District Court noted that Sixth Circuit precedent indicated that the burden was on MDI to prove that its trade dress was nonfunctional, and not on TrafFix to show that it was functional (a rule since adopted by Congress, see 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V)), and then went on to consider MDFs arguments that the dual-spring design was subject to trade dress protection. Finding none of MDFs contentions persuasive, the District Court concluded MDI had not “proffered sufficient evidence which would enable a reasonable trier of fact to find that MDFs vertical dual-spring design is wow-functional.” 971 F. Supp., at 276. Summary judgment was entered against MDI on its trade dress claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the trade dress ruling. 200 F. 3d 929 (1999). The Court of Appeals held the District Court had erred in ruling MDI failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it had secondary meaning in its alleged trade dress, id., at 938, and had erred further in determining that MDI could not prevail in any event because the alleged trade dress was in fact a functional product configuration, id., at 940. The Court of Appeals suggested the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDFs trade dress. Basic to its reasoning was the Court of Appeals’ observation that it took “little imagination to conceive of a hidden dual-spring mechanism or a tri or quad-spring mechanism that might avoid infringing [MDFs] trade dress.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals explained that “[i]f TrafFix or another competitor chooses to use [MDFs] dual-spring design, then it will have to find some other way to set its sign apart to avoid infringing [MDFs] trade dress.” Ibid. It was not sufficient, according to the Court of Appeals, that allowing exclusive use of a particular feature such as the dual-spring design in the guise of trade dress would “hinde[r] competition somewhat.” Rather, “[exclusive use of a feature must ‘put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ before trade dress protection is denied on functionality grounds.” Ibid. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U. S. 159, 165 (1995)). In its criticism of the District Court’s ruling on the trade dress question, the Court of Appeals took note of a split among Courts of Appeals in various other Circuits on the issue whether the existence of an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the patentee’s claiming trade dress protection in the product’s design. 200 F. 3d, at 939. Compare Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F. 3d 246 (CA5 1997) (holding that trade dress protection is not foreclosed), Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F. 3d 277 (CA7 1998) (same), and Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F. 3d 1356 (CA Fed 1999) (same), with Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F. 3d 1498, 1500 (CA10 1995) (“Where a product configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent... it cannot receive trade dress protection”). To resolve the conflict, we granted cer-tiorari. 530 U. S. 1260 (2000).

H-t H-i

It is well established that trade dress can be protected under federal law. The design or packaging of a product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to identify the product with its manufacturer or source; and a design or package which acquires this secondary meaning, assuming other requisites are met, is a trade dress which may not be used in a manner likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods. In these respects protection for trade dress exists to promote competition. As we explained just last Term, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205 (2000), various Courts of Appeals have allowed claims of trade dress infringement relying on the general provision of the Lanharn Act which provides a cause of action to one who is injured when a person uses “any word, term name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... which is likely to cause confusion... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods.” 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Congress confirmed this statutory protection for trade dress by amending the Lanham Act to recognize the concept. Title 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.” This burden of proof gives force to the well-established rule that trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are functional. Qualitex, supra, at 164-165; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992). And in Wal-Mart, supra, we were careful to caution against misuse or overextension of trade dress. We noted that “product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification.” Id., at 213.

Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual property right sueh as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 160 (1989). Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances. “Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to significant advances in technology.” Ibid.

The principal question in this case is the effect of an expired patent on a claim of trade dress infringement. A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the trade dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.

In the case before us, the central advance claimed in the expired utility patents (the Sarkisian patents) is the dual-spring design; and the dual-spring design is the essential feature of the trade dress MDI now seeks to establish and to protect. The rule we have explained bars the trade dress claim, for MDI did not, and cannot, cany the burden of overcoming the strong evidentiary inference of functionality based on the disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of the expired patents.

The dual springs shown in the Sarkisian patents were well apart (at either end of a frame for holding a rectangular sign when one full side is the base) while the dual springs at issue here are close together (in a frame designed to hold a sign by one of its corners). As the District Court recognized, this makes little difference. The point is that the springs are necessary to the operation of the device. The fact that the springs in this very different-looking device fall within the claims of the patents is illustrated by MDFs own position in earlier litigation. In the late 1970’s, MDI engaged in a long-running intellectual property battle with a company known as Winn-Proof. Although the precise claims of the Sarkisian patents cover sign stands with springs “spaced apart,” U. S. Patent No. 8,646,696, col. 4; U. S. Patent No. 3,662,482, col. 4, the Winn-Proof sign stands (with springs much like the sign stands at issue here) were found to infringe the patents by the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F. 2d 1313 (1983). Although the Winn-Proof traffic sign stand (with dual springs close together) did not appear, then, to infringe the literal terms of the patent claims (which called for “spaced apart” springs), the Winn-Proof sign stand was found to infringe the patents under the doctrine of equivalents, which allows a finding of patent infringement even when the accused product does not fall within the literal terms of the claims. Id., at 1321-1322; see generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 620 U. S. 17 (1997). In light of this past ruling — a ruling procured at MDFs own insistence — it must be concluded the products here at issue would have been covered by the claims of the expired patents.

The rationale for the rule that the disclosure of a feature in the claims of a utility patent constitutes strong evidence of functionality is well illustrated in this case. The dual-spring design serves the important purpose of keeping the sign upright even in heavy wind conditions; and, as confirmed by the statements in the expired patents, it does so in a unique and useful manner. As the specification of one of the patents recites, prior art “devices, in practice, will topple under the force of a strong wind.” U. S. Patent No. 3,662,482, col. 1. The dual-spring design allows sign stands to resist toppling in strong winds. Using a dual-spring design rather than a single spring achieves important operational advantages. For example, the specifications of the patents note that the “use of a pair of springs ... as opposed to the use of a single spring to support the frame structure prevents canting or twisting of the sign around a vertical axis,” and that, if not prevented, twisting “may cause damage to the spring structure and may result in tipping of the device.” U. S. Patent No. 3,646,696, col. 3. In the course of patent prosecution, it was said that “[t]he use of a pair of spring connections as opposed to a single spring connection . . . forms an important part of this combination” because it “forc[es] the sign frame to tip along the longitudinal axis of the elongated ground-engaging members.” App. 218. The dual-spring design affects the cost of the device as well; it was acknowledged that the device “could use three springs but this would unnecessarily increase the cost of the device.” Id., at 217. These statements made in the patent applications and in the course of procuring the patents demonstrate the functionality of the design. MDI does not assert that any of these representations are mistaken or inaccurate, and this is further strong evidence of the functionality of the dual-spring design.

Ill

In finding for MDI on the trade dress issue the Court of Appeals gave insufficient recognition to the importance of the expired utility patents, and their evidentiary significance, in establishing the functionality of the device. The error likely was caused by its misinterpretation of trade dress principles in other respects. As we have noted, even if there has been no previous utility patent the party asserting trade dress has the burden to establish the nonfunctionality of alleged trade dress features. MDI could not meet this burden. Discussing trademarks, we have said “ ‘[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a trademark, ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.’” Qualitex, 514 U. S., at 165 (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 850, n. 10 (1982)). Expanding upon the meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a functional feature is one the “exclusive use of [which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 514 U. S., at 165. The Court of Appeals in the instant case seemed to interpret this language to mean that a necessary test for functionality is “whether the particular product configuration is a competitive necessity.” 200 F. 3d, at 940. See also Vomado, 58 F. 3d, at 1507 (“Functionality, by contrast, has been defined both by our circuit, and more recently by the Supreme Court, in terms of competitive need”). This was incorrect as a comprehensive definition. As explained in Qualitex, supra, and Inwood, supra, a feature is also functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device. The Qualitex decision did not purport to displace this traditional rule. Instead, it quoted the rule as Inwood had set it forth. It is proper to inquire into a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” in cases of esthetic functionality, the question involved in Qual-itex. Where the design is ftmetional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In Quali-tex, by contrast, esthetic functionality was the central question, there having been no indication that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality.

The Court has allowed trade dress protection to certain product features that are inherently distinctive. Two Pesos, 505 U. S,, at 774. In Two Pesos, however, the Court at the outset made the explicit analytic assumption that the trade dress features in question (decorations and other features to evoke a Mexican theme in a restaurant) were not functional. Id., at 767, n. 6. The trade dress in those eases did not bar competitors from copying functional product design features. In the instant case, beyond serving the purpose of informing consumers that the sign stands are made by MDI (assuming it does so), the dual-spring design provides a unique and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind. Functionality having been established, whether MDI’s dual-spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.

There is no need, furthermore, to engage, as did the Court of Appeals, in speculation about other design possibilities, such as using three or four springs which might serve the same purpose. 200 F. 3d, at 940. Here, the functionality of the spring design means that competitors need not explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MBFs product; it is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be attempted.

Because the dual-spring design is functional, it is unnecessary for competitors to explore designs to hide the springs, say, by using a box or framework to cover them, as suggested by the Court of Appeals. Ibid. The dual-spring design assures the user the device will work. If buyers are assured the product serves its purpose by seeing the operative mechanism that in itself serves an important market need. It would be at cross-purposes to those objectives, and something of a paradox, were we to require the manufacturer to conceal the very item the user seeks.

In a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a product found in the patent claims, such as arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the springs, a different result might obtain. There the manufacturer could perhaps prove that those aspects do not serve a purpose within the terms of the utility patent. The inquiry into whether such features, asserted to be trade dress, are functional by reason of their inclusion in the claims of an expired utility patent could be aided by going beyond the claims and examining the patent and its prosecution history to see if the feature in question is shown as a useful part of the invention. No such claim is made here, however. MDI in essence seeks protection for the dual-spring design alone. The asserted trade dress consists simply of the dual-spring design, four legs, a base, an upright, and a sign. MDI has pointed to nothing arbitrary about the components of its device or the way they are assembled. The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. The Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer or seller. The Court of Appeals erred in viewing MDI as possessing the right to exclude competitors from using a design .identical to MDPs and to require those competitors to adopt a different design simply to avoid copying it. MDI cannot gain the exclusive right to produce sign stands using the dual-spring design by asserting that consumers associate it with the look of the invention itself. Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects the cost or quality of the article.” Inwood, 456 U.S., at 850, n. 10.

TrafFix and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, §8, cl. 8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress protection. Brief for Petitioner 38-36; Brief for Panduit Corp. as Amicus Curiae 3; Brief for Malla Pollack as Amicus Curiae 2. We need not resolve this question. If, despite the rule that functional features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to consider the matter. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.