author:
Justice Kennedy Justice Stevens,
      Justice Breyer,

text:
    HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.
    No. 03-5554.
    Argued Miarch 22, 2004 —
    Decided June 21, 2004

      Robert E. Dolan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James R Logan, Jr., and Harriet E. Cummings.

      Conrad Hafen, Senior Deputy Attorney General of Nevada, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, and David Allison.

      Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General

      Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Joel M. Gershowitz.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and Mark A. Berman; for the Cato Institute by Timothy Lynch and M. Christine Klein; for the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Edward R. McNicholas, and Rebecca K. Troth; and for John Gilmore by James P. Harrison.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the National Association of Police Organizations by Joel D. Bertoc-chi and Philip Allen Lacovara.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Electronic Frontier Foundation by Robert Weisberg; for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. by Marc Rotenberg and David L. Sobel; and for PrivacyActivism et al. by William M. Simpich.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). He challenges his conviction under the Fourth and Fifth- Amendments to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

The sheriff’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.

The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had “any identification on [him],” which we understand as a request to produce a driver’s license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer’s request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest.

We now know that the. man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with “willfully resisting], delaying] or obstructing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office” in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 199.280 (2003). The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying out his duties under § 171.123, a Nevada statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part:

“1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.
“3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.”

Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court agreed that Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself as required by §171.123 “obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty” in violation of §199.280. App. 5. Hiibel was convicted and fined $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed, rejecting Hiibel’s argument that the application of § 171.123 to his case violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. 118 Nev. 868, 59 P. 3d 1201 (2002). Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was denied without opinion. We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 965 (2003).

II

NRS § 171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as a “stop and identify” statute. See Ala. Code §15-5-30 (West 2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-103(1) (2003); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6) (2003); Fla. Stat. §856.021(2) (2003); Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-36(b) (2003); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/107-14 (2004); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-2402(1) (2003); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. §84.710(2) (2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-829 (2003); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (Lexis 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-3 (2004); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50(1) (West 2004); N. D. Cent. Code §29-29-21 (2003); R. I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-1 (2003); Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §1983 (Supp. 2003); Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (2003). See also Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 Rutgers L. J. 585 (1981); Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1057 (1984).

Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a model code that permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of committing a crime and “demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.” Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942). Other statutes are based on the text proposed by the American Law Institute as part of the Institute’s Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code § 250.6, Comment 4, pp. 392-393 (1980). The provision, originally designated §250.12,- provides that a person who is loitering “under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes.” §250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13) (1961). In some States, a suspect’s refusal to identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a factor to be considered in whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to identify himself without penalty.

Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave “a good Account of themselves,” 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, §2 (1744), a power that itself reflected common-law rights of private persons to “arrest any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself....” 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, § 6, p. 130 (6th ed. 1787). In recent decades, the Court has found constitutional infirmity in traditional vagrancy laws. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law. See id., at 167-171.

The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity. See id., at 51-52. Absent that factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the risk of “arbitrary and abusive police practices” was too great and the stop was impermissible. Id., at 52. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 (1983). The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give an officer “ ‘credible and reliable’ ” identification when asked to identify himself. Id., at 360. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in “ ‘virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.’” Ibid, (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result)).

The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, the petitioner has not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Ko-lender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer “credible and reliable” identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS § 171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his name. See 118 Nev., at 875, 59 P. 3d, at 1206 (opinion of Young, C. J.) (“The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists”). As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means — a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make — the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. See id., at 876-877, 59 P. 3d, at 1206-1207.

Ill

Hiibel argues that his conviction cannot stand because the officer’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.

Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. “[Interrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 216 (1984). Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Delgado, supra, at 216; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975). To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer’s action must be “ ‘justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry, supra, at 20). For example, the seizure cannot continue for an excessive period of time, see United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709 (1983), or resemble a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 212 (1979).

Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229 (1985) (“[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice”); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U. S. 811, 816 (1985) (“[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtain additional information”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time”).

Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.

Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer. See Brown, 443 U. S., at 53, n. 3. Petitioner draws our attention to statements in prior opinions that, according to him, answer the question in his favor. In Terry, Justice White stated in a concurring opinion that a person detained in an investigative stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.” 392 U. S., at 34. The Court cited this opinion in dicta in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984), a decision holding that a routine traffic stop is not a custodial stop requiring the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In the course of explaining why Terry stops have not been subject to Miranda, the Court suggested reasons why Terry stops have a “nonthreatening character,” among them the fact that a suspect detained during a Terry stop “is not obliged to respond” to questions. See Berkemer, supra, at 439, 440. According to petitioner, these statements establish a right to refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop.

We do not read these statements as controlling. The passages recognize that the Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case concerns a different issue, however. Here, the source of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment. Further, the statutory obligation does not go beyond answering an officer’s request to disclose a name. See NRS § 171.123(3) (“Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer”). As a result, we cannot view the dicta in Berkemer or Justice White’s concurrence in Terry as answering the question whether a State' can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry stop.

The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979). The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its duration, Place, supra, at 709, or its location, Dunaway, supra, at 212. A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Petitioner argues that the Nevada statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement, in effect allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious. According to petitioner, this creates a risk of arbitrary police conduct that the Fourth Amendment does not permit. Brief for Petitioner 28-33. These are familiar concerns; they were central to the opinion in Papachristou, and also to the decisions limiting the operation of stop and identify statutes in Kolender and Brown. Petitioner’s concerns are met by the requirement that a Terry stop must be justified at its inception and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” the initial stop. 392 U. S., at 20. Under these principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. The Court noted a similar limitation in Hayes, where it suggested that Terry may permit an officer to determine a suspect’s identity by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only if there is “a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime.” 470 U. S., at 817. It is clear in this case that the request for identification was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” the stop. Terry, supra, at 20. The officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.

IV

Petitioner further contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27, 34-38 (2000).

Respondents urge us to hold that the statements NRS § 171.123(3) requires are nontestimonial, and so outside the Clause’s scope. We decline to resolve the case on that basis. “[T]o be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 210 (1988). See also Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 35. Stating one’s name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity. Production of identity documents might meet the definition as well. As we noted in Hubbell, acts of production may yield testimony establishing “the existence, authenticity, and custody of items [the police seek].” Id., at 41. Even if these required actions are testimonial, however, petitioner’s challenge must fail because in this case disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.

The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 598 (1896) (noting that where “the answer of the witness will not directly show his infamy, but only tend to disgrace him, he is bound to answer”). A claim of Fifth Amendment privilege must establish

“ ‘reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer .... [T]he danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things, — not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.’ ” Id., at 599-600 (quoting Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q. B. 1861) (Cockburn, C. J.)).

As we stated in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445 (1972), the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination “protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Suspects who have been granted immunity from prosecution may, therefore, be compelled to answer; with the threat of prosecution removed, there can be no reasonable belief that the evidence will be used against them. See id., at 453.

In this case petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951). As best we' can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business. Even today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name could have been used against him in a criminal case. While we recognize petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.

The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement is also important. One’s identity is, by definition, unique; yet it is, in another sense, a universal characteristic. Answering, a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555 (1990) (suggesting that “fact[s] the State could readily establish” may render “any testimony regarding existence or authenticity [of them] insufficiently incriminating”); cf. California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 432 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). In every criminal case, it is known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582, 601-602 (1990) (principal opinion of Brennan, J.). Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.

The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is

Affirmed.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

The Nevada law at issue in this case imposes a narrow duty to speak upon a specific class of individuals. The class includes only those persons detained by a police officer “under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime” — persons who are, in other words, targets of a criminal investigation. The statute therefore is directed not “at the public at large,” but rather “at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U. S. 70, 79 (1965).

Under the Nevada law, a member of the targeted class “may not be compelled to answer” any inquiry except a command that he “identify himself.” Refusal to identify oneself upon request is punishable as a crime. Presumably the statute does not require the detainee to answer any other question because the Nevada Legislature realized that the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling the target of a criminal investigation to make any other statement. In my judgment, the broad constitutional right to remain silent, which derives from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” is not as circumscribed as the Court suggests, and does not admit even of the narrow exception defined by the Nevada statute.

“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467 (1966). It is a “settled principle” that “the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes,” but “they have no right to compel them to answer.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 727, n. 6 (1969). The protections of the Fifth Amendment are directed squarely toward those who are the focus of the government's investigative and prosecutorial powers. In a criminal trial, the indicted defendant has an unqualified right to refuse to testify and may not be punished for invoking that right. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288, 299-300 (1981). The unindicted target of a grand jury investigation enjoys the same constitutional protection even if he has been served with a subpoena. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760, 767-768 (2003). So does an arrested suspect during custodial interrogation in a police station. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467.

There is no reason why the subject of police interrogation based on mere suspicion, rather than probable cause, should have any lesser protection. Indeed, we have said that the Fifth Amendment’s protections apply with equal force in the context of Terry stops, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), where an officer’s inquiry “must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for [the stop’s] initiation,’” Ber-kemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984) (some internal quotation marks omitted). “Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee á moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond.” Ibid. See also Terry, 392 U. S., at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation”). Given our statements to the effect that citizens are not required to respond to police officers’ questions during a Terry stop, it is no surprise that petitioner assumed, as have we, that he had a right not to disclose his identity.

The Court correctly observes that a communication does not enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege unless it is testimonial. Although the Court declines to resolve this question, ante, at 189, I think it clear that this case concerns a testimonial communication. Recognizing that whether a communication is testimonial is sometimes a “difficult question,” Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 214-215 (1988), we have stated generally that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of information from the accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause,” id., at 211 (citations omitted). While “[t]he vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privilege,” id., at 213-214, certain acts and physical evidence fall outside the privilege. In all instances, we have afforded Fifth Amendment protection if the disclosure in question was being admitted because of its content rather than some other aspect of the communication.

Considered in light of these precedents, the compelled statement at issue in this case is clearly testimonial. It is significant that the communication must be made in response to a question posed by a police officer. As we recently explained, albeit in the different context of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, “[w]hatever else the term [‘testimonial’] covers, it applies at a minimum ... to police interrogations.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 68 (2004). Surely police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as an interrogation, and it follows that responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.

Rather than determining whether the communication at issue is testimonial, the Court instead concludes that the State can compel the disclosure of one’s identity because it is not “incriminating.” Ante, at 189. ' But our cases have afforded Fifth Amendment protection to statements that are “incriminating” in a much broader sense than the Court suggests. It has “long been settled that [the Fifth Amendment’s] protection encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence even though the statements themselves are not incriminating and are not introduced into evidence.” United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27, 37 (2000). By “incriminating” we have meant disclosures that “could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used,” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445 (1972) — communications, in other words, that “would furnish a link in the chain of' evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime,” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951). Thus, “[compelled testimony that communicates information that may ‘lead to incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the information itself is not inculpatory.” Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 38 (quoting Doe, 487 U. S., at 208, n. 6).

Given a proper understanding of the category of “incriminating” communications that fall within the Fifth Amendment privilege, it is clear that the disclosure of petitioner’s identity is protected. The Court reasons that we should not assume that the disclosure of petitioner’s “name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in [a] chain of evidence needed to prosecute him.” Ante, at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted). But why else would an officer ask for it? And why else would the Nevada Legislature require its disclosure only when circumstances “reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime”? If the Court is correct, then petitioner’s refusal to cooperate did not impede the police investigation. Indeed, if we accept the predicate for the Court’s holding, the statute requires nothing more than a useless invasion of privacy. I think that, on the contrary, the Nevada Legislature intended to provide its police officers with a useful law enforcement tool, and that the very existence of the statute demonstrates the value of the information it demands.

A person’s identity obviously bears informational and incriminating worth, “even if the [name] itself is not inculpa-tory.” Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 38. A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases. And that information, in turn, can be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution. It is therefore quite wrong to suggest that a person’s identity provides a link in the chain to incriminating evidence “only 'in unusual circumstances.” Ante, at 191.

The officer in this case told petitioner, in the Court’s words, that “he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification.” Ante, at 181. As the target of that investigation, petitioner, in my view, acted well within his rights when he opted to stand mute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Souter and Jus-

tice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

Notwithstanding the vagrancy statutes to which the majority refers, see ante, at 183-184, this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents make clear that police may conduct a Terry stop only within circumscribed limits. And one of those limits invalidates, laws that compel responses to police questioning.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court considered whether police, in the absence of probable cause, can stop, question, or frisk an individual at all. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the ‘“right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person.’ ” Id., at 9 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891)). At the same time, it recognized that in certain circumstances, public safety might require a limited “seizure,” or stop, of an individual against his will. The Court consequently set forth conditions circumscribing when and how the police might conduct a Terry stop. They include what has become known as the “reasonable suspicion” standard. 392 U. S., at 20-22. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, set forth further conditions. Justice White wrote: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.” Id., at 34.

About 10 years later, the Court, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979), held that police lacked “any reasonable suspicion” to detain the particular petitioner and require him to identify himself. Id., at 53. The Court noted that the trial judge had asked the following: “ ‘I’m sure [officers conducting a Terry stop] should ask everything they possibly could find out. What I’m asking is what’s the State’s interest in gutting a man in jail because he doesn’t want to answer....’” Id., at 54 (Appendix to opinion of the Court) (emphasis in original). The Court referred to Justice White’s Terry concurrence. 443 U. S., at 53, n. 3. And it said that it “need not decide” the matter. Ibid.

Then, five years later, the Court wrote that an “officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984) (emphasis added). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Terry suspect “must be free to . . . decline to answer the questions put.to him”); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125 (2000) (stating that allowing officers to stop and question a fleeing person “is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning”).

This lengthy history — of concurring opinions, of references, and of clear explicit statements — means that the Court’s statement in Berkemer, while technically dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law. And that law has remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.

There is no good reason now to reject this generation-old statement of the law. There are sound reasons rooted in Fifth Amendment considerations for adhering to this Fourth Amendment legal condition circumscribing police authority to stop an individual against his will. See ante, at 192-196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Administrative considerations also militate against change. Can a State, in addition to requiring a stopped individual to answer “What’s your name?” also require an answer to “What’s your license number?” or “Where do you live?” Can a police officer, who must know how to make a Terry stop, keep track of the constitutional answers? After all, answers to any of these questions may, or may not, incriminate, depending upon the circumstances.

Indeed, as the Court points out, a name itself — even if it is not “Killer Bill” or “Rough ’em up Harry” — will sometimes provide the police with “a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense.” Ante, at 191. The majority reserves judgment about whether compulsion is permissible in such instances. Ibid. How then is a police officer in the midst of a Terry stop to distinguish between the majority’s ordinary case and this special case where the majority reserves judgment?

The majority presents no evidence that the rule enunciated by Justice White and then by the Berkemer Court, which for nearly a generation has set forth a settled Terry-stop condition, has significantly interfered with law enforcement. Nor has the majority presented any other convincing justification for change. I would not begin to erode a clear rule with special exceptions.

I consequently dissent.

       Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123(1) (20.03).

       §171.123(3).

       In this case, petitioner was charged with violating §199.280, which makes it a crime to “willfully resis[t], dela[y] or obstruct] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.” A violation of that provision is a misdemeanor unless a dangerous weapon is involved.

       The Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 6 (1964).

       A suspect may be made, for example, to provide a blood sample, Schmerber v. California, 384 U, S. 757, 765 (1966), a voice exemplar, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 7 (1973), or a handwriting sample, Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-267 (1967).

       See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582, 598-599 (1990) (respondent’s answer to the “birthday question” was protected because the “content of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired”); Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 211, n. 10 (1988) (“The content itself must have testimonial significance”); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 410-411 (1976) (“[H]owever incriminating the contents of the accountant’s workpapers might be, the act of producing them — the only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to do — would not itself involve testimonial self-incrimination”); Gilbert, 388 U. S., at 266-267 (“A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection”); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 223 (1967) (“[I]t deserves emphasis that this case presents no question of the admissibility in evidence of anything Wade said or did at the lineup which implicates his privilege”).

       Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123(1) (2003). The Court suggests that furnishing identification also allows the investigating officer to assess the threat to himself and others. See ante, at 186. But to the extent that officer or public safety is immediately at issue, that concern is sufficiently alleviated by the officer’s ability to perform a limited patdown search for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 25-26 (1968).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
      Justice Thomas
      Justice Ginsburg,

license: Public Domain

text:
    AETNA HEALTH INC., fka AETNA U. S. HEALTHCARE INC., et al. v. DAVILA
    No. 02-1845.
    Argued March 23, 2004 —
    Decided June 21, 2004

      Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs in No. 02-1845 were Mark A. Perry, J. Edward Neugebauer, John B. Shely, Kendall M. Gray, and Roy T Englert, Jr. On the briefs in No. 03-83 were Robert N. Eccles and Jonathan D. Hacker.

      James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Howard M. Radzely, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Edward D. Sieger.

      David Maltax, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for the State of Texas et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Greg Abbott,
      Attorney General, Barry R. McBee, First Assistant Attorney General, Edward D. Burbach, Deputy Attorney General, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Ranee L. Craft and Kristo-fer S. Monson, Assistant Solicitors General, and Anabelle Rodriguez, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Phill Kline of Kansas, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. “Jay” Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington.

      George Parker Young argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Eric Schnapper.

       Together with No. 03-83, CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc., dba CIGNA Cory. v. Calad et al, also on certiorari to the same court.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AAHP-HIAA et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Edward C. DuMont, Kenneth A. Bamberger, and Stephanie W. Kanwit; for the Association of Federal Health Organizations by Anthony F. Shelley and James R. Barnett; and for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Glen D. Nager, Traci L. Lovitt, Stephen A Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP et al. by Sarah Lem Lock, Michael Schuster, and Judith L. Lichtman; for the American College of Legal Medicine by Miles J. Zaremski; for the American Medical Association et al. by Gary W. Howell, Thomas Campbell, Jon N. Ekdahl, Leonard A Nelson, and Donald P. Wilcox; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Daniel M. Soloway, Jeffrey Robert White, • and David S. Casey, Jr.; for the California Consumer Health Care Council et al. by Eugene R. Anderson, Rhonda D. Orin, Daniel J. Healy, and David Trueman; for Community Rights Counsel et al. by Timothy J. Dow-ling; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; for Families USA et al. by Jeffrey Lewis; for the Health Administration Responsibility Project by Sharon J. Arkin and Harvey S. Frey; for the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws by Gerald
        A McHugh, Jr., and Gregory B. Heller; for United Policyholders by Arnold R. Levinson; and for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. by Mr. Zaremski.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In these consolidated cases, two individuals sued their respective health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for alleged failures to exercise ordinary care in the handling of coverage decisions, in violation of a duty imposed by the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§88.001-88.003 (West 2004 Supp. Pamphlet). We granted certiorari to decide whether the individuals’ causes of action are completely pre-empted by the “interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme,” Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 146 (1985), found at § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a) et seq. 540 U. S. 981 (2003). We hold that the causes of action are completely pre-empted and hence removable from state to federal court. The Court of Appeals, having reached a contrary conclusion, is reversed.

I

A

Respondent Juan Davila is a participant, and respondent Ruby Calad is a beneficiary, in ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans. Their respective plan sponsors had entered into agreements with petitioners, Aetna Health Inc. and CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc., to administer the plans. Under Davila’s plan, for instance, Aetna reviews requests for coverage and pays providers, such as doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes, which perform covered services for members; under Calad’s plan sponsor’s agreement, CIGNA is responsible for plan benefits and coverage decisions.

Respondents both suffered injuries allegedly arising from Aetna’s and CIGNA’s decisions not to provide coverage for certain treatment and services recommended by respondents’ treating physicians. Davila’s treating physician prescribed Vioxx to remedy Davila’s arthritis pain, but Aetna refused to pay for it. Davila did not appeal or contest this decision, nor did he purchase Vioxx with his own resources and seek reimbursement. Instead, Davila began taking Na-prosyn, from which he allegedly suffered a severe reaction that required extensive treatment and hospitalization. Calad underwent surgery, and although her treating physician recommended an extended hospital stay, a CIGNA discharge nurse determined that Calad did not meet the plan’s criteria for a continued hospital stay. CIGNA consequently denied coverage for the extended hospital stay. Calad experienced postsurgery complications forcing her to return to the hospital. She alleges that these complications would not have occurred had CIGNA approved coverage for a longer hospital stay.

Respondents brought separate suits in Texas state court against petitioners. Invoking THCLA § 88.002(a), respondents argued that petitioners’ refusal to cover the requested services violated their “duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions,” and that these refusals “proximately caused” their injuries. Ibid. Petitioners removed the cases to Federal District Courts, arguing that respondents’ causes of action fit within the scope of, and were therefore completely pre-empted by, ERISA § 502(a). The respective District Courts agreed, and declined to remand the cases to state court. Because respondents refused to amend their complaints to bring explicit ERISA claims, the District Courts dismissed the complaints with prejudice.

B

Both Davila and Calad appealed the refusals to remand to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated their cases with several others raising similar issues. The Court of Appeals recognized that state causes of action that “duplicate] or fal[l] within the scope of an ERISA § 502(a) remedy” are completely preempted and hence removable to federal court. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F. 3d 298, 305 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). After examining the causes of action available under § 502(a), the Court of Appeals determined that respondents’ claims could possibly fall under only two: § 502(a)(1)(B), which provides a cause of action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, and § 502(a)(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary duty to the plan.

Analyzing § 502(a)(2) first, the Court of Appeals concluded that, under Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U. S. 211 (2000), the decisions for which petitioners were being sued were “mixed eligibility and treatment decisions” and hence were not fiduciary in nature. 307 F. 3d, at 307-308. The Court of Appeals next determined that respondents’ claims did not fall within § 502(a)(1)(B)’s scope. It found significant that respondents “assert tort claims,” while § 502(a)(1)(B) “creates a cause of action for breach of contract,” id., at 309, and also that respondents “are not seeking reimbursement for benefits denied them,” but rather request “tort damages” arising from “an external, statutorily imposed duty of ‘ordinary care,’ ” ibid. From Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U. S. 355 (2002), the Court of Appeals derived the principle that complete pre-emption is limited to situations in which “States . . . duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA § 502(a),” and concluded that “[b]ecause the THCLA does not provide an action for collecting benefits,” it fell outside the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B). 307 F. 3d, at 310-311.

II

A

Under the removal statute, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant” to federal court. 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). One category of cases of which district courts have original jurisdiction is “[fjederal question” cases: cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” §1331. We face in these cases the issue whether respondents’ causes of action arise under federal law.

Ordinarily, determining whether a particular case arises under federal law turns on the “‘well-pleaded complaint’” rule. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1983). The Court has explained that

“whether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute[,J . . . must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in' anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76 (1914).

In particular, the existence of a federal defense normally does not create statutory “arising under” jurisdiction, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908), and “a defendant may not [generally] remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law,” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 10. There is an exception, however, to the well-pleaded complaint rule. “[W]hen a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption,” the state claim can be removed. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1, 8 (2003). This is so because “[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Ibid. ERISA is one of these statutes.

B

Congress enacted ERISA to “protect. . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries” by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and to “provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” 29 U. S. C. § 1001(b). The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans. To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, see ERISA § 514,29 U. S. C. § 1144, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be “exclusively a federal concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523 (1981).

ERISA’s “comprehensive legislative scheme” includes “an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.” Russell, 473 U. S., at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted). This integrated enforcement mechanism, ERISA § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), is a distinctive feature of ERISA, and essential to accomplish Congress’ purpose of creating a comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit plans. As the Court said in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41 (1987):

“[T]he detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. ‘The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’” Id., at 54 (quoting Russell, supra, at 146).

Therefore, any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted. See 481 U. S., at 54-56; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 143-145 (1990).

The pre-emptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58, 65-66 (1987), the Court determined that the similarity of the language used in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), and ERISA, combined with the “clear intention” of Congress “to make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of federal court jurisdiction in like manner as §301 of the LMRA,” established that ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)’s preemptive force mirrored the pre-emptive force of LMRA §301. Since LMRA §301 converts state causes of action into federal ones for purposes of determining the propriety of removal, see Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557 (1968), so too does ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Thus, the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with such “extraordinary pre-emptive power” that it “converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating á federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Metropolitan Life, 481 U. S., at 65-66. Hence, “causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of §502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” Id., at 66.

III

A

ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides:

“A civil action may be brought — (1) by a participant or beneficiary — ... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

This provision is relatively straightforward. If a participant or beneficiary believes that benefits promised to him under the terms of the plan are not provided, he can bring suit seeking provision of those benefits. A participant or beneficiary can also bring suit generically to “enforce his rights” under the plan, or to clarify any of his rights to future benefits. Any dispute over the precise terms of the plan is resolved by a court under a de novo review standard, unless the terms of the plan “giv[e] the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 115 (1989).

It follows that if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope, of” ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Metropolitan Life, supra, at 66. In other words, if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).

To determine whether respondents’ causes of action fall “within the scope” of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), we must examine respondents’ complaints, the statute on which their claims are based (the THCLA), and the various plan documents. Davila alleges that Aetna provides health coverage under his employer’s health benefits plan. App. H to Pet. for Cert. in No. 02-1845, p. 67a, ¶ 11. Davila also alleges that after his primary care physician prescribed Vioxx, Aetna refused to pay for it. Id., at 67a, ¶ 12. The only action complained of was Aetna’s refusal to approve payment for Davila’s Vioxx prescription. Further, the only relationship Aetna had with Davila was its partial administration of Davila’s employer’s benefit plan. See App. JA-25, JA-31, JA-39 to JA-40, JA-45 to JA-48, JA-108.

Similarly, Calad alleges that she receives, as her husband’s beneficiary under an ERISA-regulated benefit plan, health coverage from CIGNA. Id., at JA-184, ¶ 17. She alleges that she was informed by CIGNA, upon admittance into a hospital for major surgery, that she would be authorized to stay for only one day. Id., at JA-184, ¶ 18. She also alleges that CIGNA, acting through a discharge nurse, refused to authorize more than a single day despite the advice and recommendation of her treating physician. Id., at JA-185, ¶¶20, 21. Calad contests only CIGNA’s decision to refuse coverage for her hospital stay. Id., at JA-.185, ¶ 20. And, as in Davila’s case, the only connection between Calad and CIGNA is CIGNA’s administration of portions of Calad’s ERISA-regulated benefit plan. Id., at JA-219 to JA-221.

It is clear, then, that respondents complain only about denials of coverage promised under the terms of ERISAregulated employee benefit plans. Upon the denial of benefits, respondents could have paid for the treatment themselves and then sought reimbursement through a § 502(a)(1)(B) action, or sought a preliminary injunction, see Pryzbowski v. U. S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F. 3d 266, 274 (CA3 2001) (giving examples where federal courts have issued such preliminary injunctions).

Respondents contend, however, that the complained-of actions violate legal duties that arise independently of ERISA or the terms of the employee benefit plans at issue in these cases. Both respondents brought suit specifically under the THCLA, alleging that petitioners “controlled, influenced, participated in and made decisions which affected the quality of the diagnosis, care, and treatment provided” in a manner that violated “the duty of ordinary care set forth in §§ 88.001 and 88.002.” App. H to Pet. for Cert. in No. 02-1845, at 69a, ¶ 18; see also App. JA-187, ¶ 28. Respondents contend that this duty of ordinary care is an independent legal duty. They analogize to this Court’s decisions interpreting LMRA § 301, 29 U. S. C. § 185, with particular focus on Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386 (1987) (suit for breach of individual employment contract, even if defendant’s action also constituted a breach of an entirely separate collective-bargaining agreement, not pre-empted by LMRA §301). Because this duty of ordinary care arises independently of any duty imposed by ERISA or the plan terms, the argument goes, any civil action to enforce this duty is not within the scope of the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism.

The duties imposed by the THCLA in the context of these cases, however, do not arise independently of ERISA or the plan terms. The THCLA does impose a duty on managed care entities to “exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions,” and makes them liable for damages proximately caused by failures to abide by that duty. § 88.002(a). However, if a managed care entity correctly concluded that, under the terms of the relevant plan, a particular treatment was not covered, the managed care entity’s denial of coverage would not be a proximate cause of any injuries arising from the denial. Rather, the failure of the plan itself to cover the requested treatment would be the proximate cause. More significantly, the THCLA clearly states that “[t]he standards in Subsections (a) and (b) create no obligation on the part of the health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care entity to provide to an insured or enrollee treatment which is not covered by the health care plan of the entity.” § 88.002(d). Hence, a managed care entity could not be subject to liability under the THCLA if it denied coverage for any treatment not covered by the health care plan that it was administering.

Thus, interpretation of the terms of respondents’ benefit plans forms an essential part of their THCLA claim, and THCLA liability would exist here only because of petitioners’ administration of ERISA-regulated benefit plans. Petitioners’ potential liability under the THCLA in these cases, then, derives entirely from the particular rights and obligations established by the benefit plans. So, unlike the state-law claims in Caterpillar, supra, respondents’ THCLA causes of action are not entirely independent of the federally regulated contract itself. Cf. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, 217 (1985) (state-law tort of bad-faith handling of insurance claim pre-empted by LMRA §301, since the “duties imposed and rights established through the state tort... derive[d] from the rights and obligations established by the contract”); Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U. S. 362, 371 (1990) (state-law tort action brought due to alleged negligence in the inspection of a mine was pre-empted, as the duty to inspect the mine arose solely out of the collective-bargaining agreement).

Hence, respondents bring suit only to rectify a wrongful denial of benefits promised under ERISA-regulated plans, and do not attempt to remedy any violation of a legal duty independent of ERISA. We hold that respondents’ state causes of action fall “within the scope of” ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), Metropolitan Life, 481 U. S., at 66, and are therefore completely pre-empted by ERISA §502 and removable to federal district court.

B

The Court of Appeals came to a contrary conclusion for several reasons, all of them erroneous. First, the Court of Appeals found significant that respondents “assert a tort claim for tort damages” rather than “a contract claim for contract damages,” and that respondents “are not seeking reimbursement for benefits denied them.” 307 F. 3d, at 309. But, distinguishing between pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on the particular label affixed to them would “elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade” the pre-emptive scope of ERISA simply “by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.” Allis-Chalmers, supra, at 211. Nor can the mere fact that the state cause of action attempts to authorize remedies beyond those authorized by ERISA § 502(a) put the cause of action outside the scope of the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism. In Pilot Life, Metropolitan Life, and Ingersoll-Rand, the plaintiffs all brought state claims that were labeled either tort or tort-like. See Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 43 (suit for, inter alia, “ ‘Tortious Breach of Contract’ ”); Metropolitan Life, supra, at 61-62 (suit requesting damages for “mental anguish caused by breach of [the] contract”); Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U. S., at 136 (suit brought under various tort and contract theories). And, the plaintiffs in these three cases all sought remedies beyond those authorized under ERISA. See Pilot Life, supra, at 43 (compensatory and punitive damages); Metropolitan Life, supra, at 61 (mental anguish); Ingersoll-Rand, supra, at 136 (punitive damages, mental anguish). And, in all these cases, the plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted. The limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the “careful balancing” between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans. Pilot Life, supra, at 55.

Second, the Court of Appeals believed that “the wording of [respondents’] plans is immaterial” to their claims, as “they invoke an external, statutorily imposed duty of ‘ordinary care.’ ” 307 F. 3d, at 309. But as we have already discussed, the wording of the plans is certainly material to their state causes of action, and the duty of “ordinary care” that the THCLA creates is not external to their rights under their respective plans.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rested its decision on one line from Rush Prudential. There, we described our holding in Ingersoll-Rand as follows: “[W]hile state law duplicated the elements of a claim available under ERISA, it converted the remedy from an equitable one under § 1132(a)(3) (available exclusively in federal district courts) into a legal one for money damages (available in a state tribunal).” 536 U. S., at 379. The point of this sentence was to describe why the state cause of action in Ingersoll-Rand was pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a): It was pre-empted because it attempted to convert an equitable remedy into a legal remedy. Nowhere in Rush Prudential did we suggest that the preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is limited to the situation in which a state cause of action precisely duplicates a cause of action under ERISA § 502(a).

Nor would it be consistent with our precedent to conclude that only strictly duplicative state causes of action are preempted. Frequently, in order to receive exemplary damages on a state claim, a plaintiff must prove facts beyond the bare minimum necessary to establish entitlement to an award. Cf. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U. S., at 217 (bad-faith refusal to honor a claim needed to be proved in order to recover exemplary damages). In order to recover for'mental anguish, for instance, the plaintiffs in Ingersoll-Rand and Metropolitan Life would presumably have had to prove the existence of mental anguish; there is no such element in an ordinary suit brought under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). See Ingersoll-Rand, supra, at 136; Metropolitan Life, supra, at 61. This did not save these state causes of action from pre-emption. Congress’ intent to make the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism exclusive would be undermined if state causes of action that supplement the ERISA § 502(a) remedies were permitted, even if the elements of the state cause of action did not precisely duplicate the elements of an ERISA claim.

C

Respondents also argue — for the first time in their brief to this Court — that the THCLA is a law that regulates insurance, and hence that ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) saves their causes of action from pre-emption (and thereby from complete preemption). This argument is unavailing. The existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme can demonstrate an “overpowering federal policy” that determines the interpretation of a statutory provision designed to save state law from being pre-empted. Rush Prudential, 536 U. S., at 375. ERISA’s civil enforcement provision is one such example. See ibid.

As this Court stated in Pilot Life, “our understanding of [§ 514(b)(2)(A)] must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a).” 481 U. S., at 52. The Court concluded that “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id., at 54. The Court then held, based on

“the common-sense understanding of the saving clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the business of insurance, and, most importantly, the clear expression of congressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme be exclusive,.. . that [the plaintiff’s] state law suit asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is not saved by § 514(b)(2)(A).” Id., at 57 (emphasis added).

Pilot Life’s reasoning applies here with full force. Allowing respondents to proceed with their state-law suits would “pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id., at 52. As this Court has recognized in both Rush Prudential and Pilot Life, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a). Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as “regulating insurance” will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.

IV

Respondents, their amici, and some Courts of Appeals have relied heavily upon Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U. S. 211 (2000), in arguing that ERISA does not pre-empt or completely pre-empt state suits such as respondents’. They, contend that Pegram makes it clear that causes of action such as respondents’ do not “relate to [an] employee benefit plan,” ERISA § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), and hence are not pre-empted. See Brief for Respondents 35-38; Cicio v. Does, 321 F. 3d 83, 100-104 (CA2 2003), cert. pending sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, No. 03-69 [Reporter’s Note: See post, p. 933]; see also Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 339 F. 3d 1286, 1292-1294 (CA11 2003).

Pegram cannot be read so broadly. In Pegram, the plaintiff sued her physician-owned-and-operated HMO (which provided medical coverage through plaintiff’s employer pursuant to an ERISA-regulated benefit plan) and her treating physician, both for medical malpractice and for a breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty. See 530 U. S., at 215-216. The plaintiff’s treating physician was also the person charged with administering plaintiff’s benefits; it was she who decided whether certain treatments were covered. See id., at 228. We reasoned that the physician’s “eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably mixed.” Id., at 229. We concluded that “Congress did not intend [the defendant HMO] or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians.” Id., at 231.

A benefit determination under ERISA, though, is generally a fiduciary act. See Bruch, 489 U. S., at 111-113. “At common law, fiduciary duties characteristically attach to decisions about managing assets and distributing property to beneficiaries.” Pegram, supra, at 231; cf. 2A A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts §§ 182, 183 (4th ed. 1987); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts & Trustees § 541 (rev. 2d ed. 1993). Hence, a benefit determination is part and parcel of the ordinary fiduciary responsibilities connected to the administration of a plan. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489, 512 (1996) (relevant plan fiduciaries owe a “fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of claims”). The fact that a benefits determination is infused with medical judgments does not alter this result.

Pegram itself recognized this principle. Pegram, in highlighting its conclusion that “mixed eligibility decisions” were not fiduciary in nature, contrasted the operation of “[traditional trustees administering] a medical trust” and “physicians through whom HMOs act.” 530 U. S., at 231-232. A traditional medical trust is administered by “paying out money to buy medical care, whereas physicians making mixed eligibility decisions consume the money as well.” Ibid. And, significantly, the Court stated that “[p]rivate trustees do not make treatment judgments.” Id., at 232. But a trustee managing a medical trust undoubtedly must make administrative decisions that require the exercise of medical judgment. Petitioners are not the employers of respondents’ treating physicians and are therefore in a somewhat analogous position to that of a trustee for a traditional medical trust.

ERISA itself and its implementing regulations confirm this interpretation. ERISA defines a fiduciary as any person “to the extent ... he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [an employee benefit] plan.” § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). When administering employee benefit plans, HMOs must make discretionary decisions regarding eligibility for plan benefits, and, in this regard, must be treated as plan fiduciaries. See Varity Corp., supra, at 511 (plan administrator “engages in a fiduciary act when making a discretionary determination about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the terms of the plan documents”). Also, ERISA §503, which specifies minimum requirements for a plan’s claim procedure, requires plans to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” 29 U. S. C. §1133(2). This strongly suggests that the ultimate decisionmaker in a plan regarding an award of benefits must be a fiduciary and must be acting as a fiduciary when determining a participant’s or beneficiary’s claim. The relevant regulations also establish extensive requirements to ensure full and fair review of benefit denials. See 29 CFR § 2560.503-1 (2003). These regulations, on their face, apply equally to health benefit plans and other plans, and do not draw distinctions between medical and nonmedical benefits determinations. Indeed, the- regulations strongly imply that benefits determinations involving medical judgments are, just as much as any other benefits determinations, actions by plan fiduciaries. See, e. g., § 2560.503 — 1(h)(3)(iii). Classifying any entity with discretionary authority over benefits determinations as anything but a plan fiduciary would thus conflict with ERISA’s statutory and regulatory scheme.

Since administrators making benefits determinations, even determinations based extensively on medical judgments, are ordinarily acting as plan fiduciaries, it was essential to Pe- gram’s conclusion that the decisions challenged there were truly “mixed eligibility and treatment decisions,” 530 U. S., at 229, i. e., medical necessity decisions made by the plaintiff’s treating physician qua treating physician and qua benefits administrator. Put another way, the reasoning of Pe-gram “only make[s] sense where the underlying negligence also plausibly constitutes medical maltreatment by a party who can be deemed to be a treating physician or such a physician’s employer.” Cicio, 321 F. 3d, at 109 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part). Here, however, petitioners are neither respondents’ treating physicians nor the employers of respondents’ treating physicians. Petitioners’ coverage decisions, then, are pure eligibility decisions, and Pegram is not implicated.

V

We hold that respondents’ causes of action, brought to remedy only the denial of benefits under ERISA-regulated benefit plans, fall within the scope of, and are completely pre-empted by, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and thus removable to federal district court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring.

The Court today holds that the claims respondents asserted under Texas law are totally preempted by § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a). That decision is consistent with our governing case law on ERISA’s preemptive scope. I therefore join the Court’s opinion.. But, with greater enthusiasm, as indicated by my dissenting opinion in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. .Co. v. Knudson, 534 U. S. 204 (2002), I also join “the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.” DiFelice v. AETNA U. S. Healthcare, 346 F. 3d 442, 453 (CA3 2003) (Becker, J., concurring).

Because the Court has coupled an encompassing interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force with a cramped construction of the “equitable relief” allowable under § 502(a)(3), a “regulatory vacuum” exists: “[Virtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes are provided.” Id., at 456, 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A series of the Court’s decisions has yielded a host of situations in which persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain make-whole relief. First, in Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134 (1985), the Court stated, in dicta: “[T]here is a stark absence — in [ERISA] itself and in its legislative history — of any reference to an intention to authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages” for consequential injuries. Id., at 148. Then, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248 (1993), the Court held that § 502(a)(3)’s term “ ‘equitable relief’ .. . refer[s] to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).” Id., at 256 (emphasis in original). Most recently, in Great-West, the Court ruled that, as “§ 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for equitable relief,” the provision excludes “the imposition of personal liability ... for a contractual obligation to pay money.” 534 U. S., at 221 (emphasis in original).

As the array of lower court cases and opinions documents, see, e. g., DiFelice; Cicio v. Does, 321 F. 3d 83 (CA2 2003), cert. pending sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, No. 03-69 [Reporter’s Note: See post, p. 933], fresh consideration of the availability of consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order. See 321 F. 3d, at 106, 107 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (“gaping wound” caused .by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, will not be healed until the Court “start[s] over” or Congress “wipe[s] the slate clean”); DiFelice, 346 F. 3d, at 467 (“The vital thing ... is that either Congress or the Court act quickly, because the current situation is plainly untenable.”); Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1365 (2003) (hereinafter Langbein) (“The Supreme Court needs to ... realign ERISA remedy law with the trust remedial tradition that Congress intended [when it provided in § 502(a)(3) for] ‘appropriate equitable relief.’ ”).

The Government notes a potential amelioration. Recognizing that “this Court has construed Section 502(a)(3) not to authorize an award of money damages against a non-fiduciary,” the Government suggests that the Act, as currently written and interpreted, may “allo[w] at least some forms of ‘make-whole’ relief against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in equity at the time of the divided bench.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28, n. 13 (emphases added); cf. ante, at 220 (“entity with discretionary authority over benefits determinations” is a “plan fiduciary”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 13 (“Aetna is [a fiduciary] — and CIGNA is for purposes of claims processing.”). As the Court points out, respondents here de-dined the opportunity to amend their complaints to state claims for relief under § 502(a); the District Court, therefore, properly dismissed their suits with prejudice. See ante, at 221, n. 7. But the Government’s suggestion may indicate an effective remedy others similarly circumstanced might fruitfully pursue.

“Congress ... intended ERISA to replicate the core principles of trust remedy law, including the make-whole standard of relief.” Langbein 1319. I anticipate that Congress, or this Court, will one day so confirm.

       In this Court, petitioners do not claim or argue that respondents’ causes of action fall under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Because petitioners do not argue this point, and since we can resolve these cases entirely by reference to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), we do not address ERISA § 502(a)(2).

       Respondents also argue that the benefit due under their ERISAregulated employee benefit plans is simply the membership in the respective HMOs, not coverage for the particular medical treatments that are delineated in the plan documents. See Brief for Respondents 28-30. Respondents did not identify this possible argument in their brief in opposition to the petitions for certiorari, and we deem it waived. See this Court’s Rule 15.2.

       To take a clear example, if the terms of the health care plan specifically exclude from coverage the cost of an appendectomy, then any injuries caused by the refusal to cover the appendectomy are properly attributed to the terms of the plan itself, not the managed care entity that applied those terms.

       Respondents also argue that ERISA § 502(a) completely pre-empts a state cause of action only if the cause of action would be pre-empted under ERISA § 514(a); respondents then argue that their causes of action do not fall under the terms of § 514(a). But a state cause of action that provides an alternative remedy to those provided by the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism conflicts with Congress’ clear intent to make the ERISA mechanism exclusive. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S.133, 142 (1990) (holding that “[ejven if there were no express pre-emption [under ERISA § 514(a)]” of the cause of action in that case, it “would be preempted because it conflicted] directly with an ERISA cause of action”).

       ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), reads, as relevant: “[NJothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”

       Both Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life support this understanding. The plaintiffs in Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life challenged disability determinations made by the insurers of their ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 48 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins,. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U. S. 58, 61 (1987). A disability determination often involves medical judgments. See, e. g., ibid, (plaintiff determined not to be disabled only after a medical examination undertaken by one of his employer’s physicians). Yet, in both Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life, the-Court held that the causes of action were preempted. Cf. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U. S. 822 (2003) (discussing “treating physician” rule in the context of disability determinations made by ERISA-regulated disability plans).

       The United States, as amicus, suggests that some individuals in respondents’ positions could possibly receive some form of “make-whole” relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27, n. 13. However, after their respective District Courts denied their motions for remand, respondents had the opportunity to amend their complaints to bring expressly a claim under ERISA § 502(a). Respondents declined to do so; the District Courts therefore dismissed their complaints with prejudice. See App. JA-147 to JA-148; id., at JA-298; App. B to Pet. for Cert. in No. 02-1845, pp. 34a-35a; App. B to Pet. for Cert. in No. 03-83, p. 40a. Respondents have thus chosen not to pursue any ERISA claim, including any claim arising under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The scope of this provision, then, is not before us, and we do not address it.