text:
    No. 01-1697.
    No. 02-1119.
    No. 03-9009.
    Menon v. Frinton, 537 U. S. 817; Young v. United States, 537 U. S. 1234; and J. K. v. Dauphin County Children and Youth Services, 541 U. S. 1012.
   Motions of petitioners for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 03-16.
    Krilich v. United States, 540 U. S. 946 and 1086.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 25, 2004
    No. 04-6001 (04A168).
    Busby v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 26, 2004
    No. 04-262 (04A170).
    Allridge v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    September 3, 2004
    Nó. 03A1020.
    Sugden v. United States.
   Application for certificate of appealability, addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 04A98.
    Green v. Dragovich et al.
   Application for bail, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 03-9379.
    No. 03-9562.
    No. 03-9563.
    No. 03-9643.
    No. 03-9658.
    No. 03-9964.
    No. 03-10119.
    No. 03-10124.
    No. 03-10191.
    No. 03-10226.
    No. 03-10256.
    No. 03-10338.
    No. 03-10390.
    No. 03-10483.
    No. 03-10510.
    Hundley v. United States, 541 U. S. 1001; Gadson v. Florida, 541 U. S. 1075; Ball v. Crosby, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., 541 U. S. 1075; Jones v. Kolb et al. (five judgments), 541 U. S. 1087; Daniels v. McLemore, Warden, 541 U. S. 1088; Bridgeforth v. Mullin, Warden, Fears v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Farmington Correctional Center, Garrison v. Illinois, Fountain v. United States, 541 U. S. 1092; Casey v. Lavan, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al., Carter v. United States et al., Carter v. United States et al., Harrison v. Crosby, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Minor v. United States, and In re Rhett,
   ante, p. 940; ante, p. 925; ante, p. 925; ante, p. 910; ante, p. 911; ante, p. 914; ante, p. 943; ante, p. 929; ante, p. 902. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 03-9966.
    Toliver v. United States, 541 U. S. 1079.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    September 9, 2004
    No. 04A197.
    Reid v. Johnson, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, et al.
   Application for preliminary injunction, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Stevens would grant the application for preliminary injunction.


text:
    September 24, 2004
    No. 02-1028.
    Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., dba Kirby Engineering, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: “Does federal or state substantive law govern the questions presented?” The Acting Solicitor General is invited to file an amicus brief on the same question. Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Monday, October 4, 2004. Twenty copies of the briefs prepared under this Court’s Rule 33.2 may be filed initially in order to meet the October 4 filing date. Forty copies of the briefs prepared under this Court’s Rule 33.1 are to be filed as soon as possible thereafter.


text:
    September 27, 2004
    No. 04-104.
    No. 04-105.
    United States v. Booker. and United States v. Fanfan.
   C. A. 7th Cir.; C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. Each counsel must be prepared to discuss both questions presented. Motion of Ad Hoc Group of Former Judges for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied.


text:
    September 28, 2004
    No. 04A242.
    Kucera et al. v. Bradbury, Secretary of State of Oregon, et al.
   Application to stay order of the Oregon Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari, presented to Justice O’Connor, and by her referred to the Court, denied.

Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay.


text:
    No. 03-636.
    Johnson v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 03-710.
    Devenpeck et al. v. Alford.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 03-923.
    Illinois v. Caballes.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 03-931.
    Florida v. Nixon.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 03-725.
    Pasquantino et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir.

Motion of petitioners for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 03-814.
    Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-cus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of respondent for leave to file a surreply brief denied.


text:
    No. 03-892.
    No. 03-907.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks. and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ba-naitis.
   C. A. 6th Cir.; C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. Motion of respondents for additional time for oral argument denied. Motion of respondent Banks to allow James R. Carty to argue pro hac vice granted. Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to allow David B. Salmons to argue pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 03-1039.
    Brown, Acting Warden v. Payton.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 03-1407.
    Rousey et ux. v. Jacoway.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 03-1423.
    Muehler et al. v. Mena.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Police Officers Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 03-1388.
    Spector et al. v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 03-1488.
    Tory et al. v. Cochran.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 03-1601.
    City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al. v. Abrams.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 03-9627.
    Pace v. DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 03-9685.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 04-37.
    Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al. v. Beaver et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 04-108.
    Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 04-5462.
    Rompilla v. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    September 30, 2004
    No. 04-5978.
    McLaughlin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.


author: Justice Breyer,

text:
    ASSOCIATED PRESS et al. v. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF COLORADO
    No. 04A73.
    Decided July 26, 2004
   Justice Breyer,

Circuit Justice.

This is an application for a stay of orders of the Colorado State District Court for Eagle County and the Supreme Court of Colorado restricting publication of the contents of transcripts of in camera pretrial proceedings held in a criminal prosecution for sexual assault. The applicants are several major newspaper publishers and media outlets that have been covering the prosecution. They filed their application in this Court on July 21, 2004. Due to a change in circumstances following the submission of their application, I deny the application without prejudice to its being filed again in two days’ time (or thereafter), i. e., subsequent to July 28, 2004.

At issue are the transcripts of trial court hearings, held in camera on June 21 and June 22, 2004, to determine the relevance and admissibility of certain evidence pursuant to Colorado’s rape shield statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-407(2) (Lexis 2003). The transcripts were mistakenly e-mailed to the applicants by a court reporter of the trial court. Upon realizing its mistake, the trial court issued an order prohibiting publication of the contents of the transcripts and requiring their deletion from the applicants’ computers. See Order in People v. Bryant, No. 03-CR-204 (Dist. Ct., Eagle Cty., June 24, 2004). The applicants challenged the order before the Colorado Supreme Court, which agreed with them that the order imposed a prior restraint on speech, but concluded that a more narrowly tailored version of the order would pass constitutional muster. See People v. Bryant, 94 P. 3d 624 (2004).

Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court ordered the trial court to:

“(1) make its rape shield rulings as expeditiously as possible and promptly enter its findings of facts and conclusions of law thereon; (2) determine if some or all portions of the June 21 and June 22 transcripts are relevant and material and, therefore, admissible under the rape shield statute at trial; and (3) enter an appropriate order, which may include releasing to the [applicants] and the public a redacted version of the June 21 and June 22 transcripts that contains those portions that are relevant and material in the case, if any, and maintains the ongoing confidentiality of portions that are irrelevant and immaterial, if any.” Id., at 626-627.

In evaluating the validity of the prior restraint, the Colorado Supreme Court made clear that the government’s “interest of the highest order” in preventing publication applied only to those portions of “the in camera transcripts that are not relevant and material under the rape shield statute.” Id., at 626. Two days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion, the applicants submitted their application for a stay of the trial court’s and the Colorado Supreme Court’s orders, directing it to me as Circuit Justice.

On July 23, the same day that responses to the application were filed in this Court, the Colorado trial court issued its ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the Colorado rape shield statute. See Order re: Defendant’s Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to C. R. S. § 18-3-407 and People’s Motions in Limine #5 and #7 in People v. Bryant, No. 03-CR-204 (Dist. Ct., Eagle Cty., July 23, 2004). According to this ruling (which affects all of the hearings held in camera pursuant to the rape shield statute, not just those at issue in this application) the trial court

“determines that certain evidence ... is relevant to a material issue(s) in this case . . . and will permit the evidence to be offered at the trial of this matter. The Court determines that certain other evidence ... is not relevant to any material issue in this case, and therefore may not be offered at the trial of this matter, unless circumstances later warrant.” Id., at 5-6.

The ruling goes on to specify the evidence that is relevant and material. To my knowledge, the trial court has not yet made its determination as to whether the transcripts of June 21 and 22, in whole or in part, shall be made public.

My reading of the transcripts leads me to believe that the trial court’s determination as to the relevancy of the rape shield material will significantly change the circumstances that have led to this application. As a result of that determination, the trial court may decide to release the transcripts at issue here in their entirety, or to release some portions while redacting others. Their release, I believe, is imminent. I recognize the importance of the constitutional interests at issue. See, e. g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U. S. 1303, 1304 (1983) (Brennan, J., in chambers); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 423 U. S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, J., in chambers). But a brief delay will permit the state courts to clarify, perhaps avoid, the controversy at issue here. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 423 U. S. 1319, 1325 (1975). (same).

Consequently, the application is denied without prejudice . to the applicants’ filing again in two days’ time. Should they do so, the respondent shall file a response one day subsequent indicating: (1) (if the trial court has acted) why any redacted portions of the transcripts must remain confidential; or (2) (if the trial court has not acted) which portions of the transcripts it believes, in light of the trial cov¿rt’s admissibility determinations, should remain confidential and why. The applicants shall file their reply, if they wish to file one, one further day later.

The application is denied without prejudice.


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
    No. 04A194.
    Decided September 14, 2004
   Chief Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

Applicant Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., has requested I grant an injunction pending appeal barring the enforcement of §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 91, 2 U. S. C. §441b (2000 ed. and Supp. II), which bars corporations from using general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications as defined in BCRA §201. Applicant contends that §203 violates the First Amendment as applied to its political advertisements. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to BCRA § 403(a)(1), denied applicant’s motion for a preliminary injunction and denied applicant’s motion for an injunction pending appeal. I herewith deny the application for an injunction pending appeal.

An injunction pending appeal barring the enforcement of an Act of Congress would be an extraordinary remedy, particularly when this Court recently held BCRA facially constitutional, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 189-210 (2003), and when a unanimous three-judge District Court rejected applicant’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 507 U. S. 1301, 1302-1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), is the only source of this Court’s authority to issue such an injunction. That authority is to be used “‘“sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” ’ ” Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (quoting Fishman v. Schaf-fer, 429 U. S. 1325, 1326 (1976) (Marshall, J., in chambers)). It is only appropriately exercised where (1) “necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdictio[n],” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), and (2) the legal rights at issue are “indisputably clear,” Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2001) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). Applicant has failed to establish that this extraordinary remedy is appropriate. Therefore, I decline to issue an injunction pending appeal in this case.


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist

text:
    LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
    No. 03-583.
    Argued October 12, 2004
    Decided November 9, 2004

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      J. Sedwick Sollers III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Patricia L. Maher and Michael J. Ciatti

      Dan Himmelfarb argued the cause for respondents. With him on.the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitors General Dreeben and Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, and Greg D. Mack.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice et al. by Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr.; for the Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center by Shashank S. Upadhye; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Paul A. Engelmayer, Douglas F. Curtis, Joshua L. Dratel, Lucas Guttentag, Steven R. Shapiro, Robin L. Goldfaden, Lory Diana Rosenberg, Jeanne A. Butterfield, Marianne Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Josué Leocal, a Haitian citizen who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in 2000 of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and causing serious bodily injury, in violation of Florida law. See Fla. Stat. §316.193(3)(c)(2) (2003). Classifying this conviction as a “crime of violence” under 18 U. S. C. § 16, and therefore an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered that petitioner be deported pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, dismissing petitioner’s petition for review. We disagree and hold that petitioner’s DUI conviction is not a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. §16.

Petitioner immigrated to the United States in 1980 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1987. In January 2000, he was charged with two counts of DUI causing serious bodily injury under Fla. Stat. §316.193(3)(c)(2), after he caused an accident resulting in injury to two people. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 2lA years in prison.

In November 2000, while he was serving his sentence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against him pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA. Under that provision, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony... is deportable” and may be removed upon an order of the Attorney General. 66 Stat. 201, 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Section 101(a)(43) of the INA defines “aggravated felony” to include, inter alia, “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (footnote omitted). Title 18 U. S. C. § 16, in turn, defines the term “crime of violence” to mean:

“(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
“(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

Here, the INS claimed that petitioner’s DUI conviction was a “crime of violence” under § 16, and therefore an “aggravated felony” under the INA.

In October 2001, an Immigration Judge found petitioner removable, relying upon the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Le v. United States Attorney General, 196 F. 3d 1352 (1999) (per curiam), which held that a conviction under the Florida DUI statute qualified as a crime of violence. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner completed his sentence and was removed to Haiti in November 2002. In June 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed petitioner’s petition for review, relying on its previous ruling in Le, supra. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-7a. We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1176 (2004), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether state DUI offenses similar to the one in Florida, which either do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence. Compare Le, supra, at 1354; and Omar v. INS, 298 F. 3d 710, 715-718 (CA8 2002), with United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F. 3d 1140, 1145-1146 (CA9 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F. 3d 200, 205-206 (CA2 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609-611 (CA7 2001); and United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F. 3d 921, 926-927 (CA5), amended, 262 F. 3d 479 (CA5 2001) (per curiam); see also Ursu v. INS, 20 Fed. Appx. 702 (CA9 2001) (following Trinidad-Aquino, supra, and ruling that a violation of the Florida DUI statute at issue here and in Le does not count as a “crime of violence”). We now reverse the Eleventh Circuit.

Title 18 U. S. C. § 16 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which broadly reformed the federal criminal code in such areas as sentencing, bail, and drug enforcement, and which added a variety of new violent and nonviolent offenses. § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136. Congress employed the term “crime of violence” in numerous places in the Act, such as for defining the elements of particular offenses, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1959 (prohibiting threats to commit crimes of violence in aid of racketeering activity), or for directing when a hearing is required before a charged individual can be released on bail, see § 3142(f) (requiring a pretrial detention hearing for those alleged to have committed a crime of violence). Congress therefore provided in §16 a general definition of the term “crime of violence” to be used throughout the Act. See § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136. Section 16 has since been incorporated into a variety of statutory provisions, both criminal and noneriminal.

Here, pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA, the Court of Appeals applied §16 to find that petitioner’s DUI conviction rendered him deportable. In determining whether petitioner’s conviction falls within the ambit of § 16, the statute directs our focus to the “offense” of conviction. See § 16(a) (defining a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person or property of another” (emphasis added)); § 16(b) (defining the term as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense” (emphasis added)). This language requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime.

Florida Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) makes it a third-degree felony for a person to operate a vehicle while under the influence and, “by reason of such operation, eaus[e]. . . [s]erious bodily injury to another.” The Florida statute, while it requires proof of causation of injury, does not require proof of any particular mental state. See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 562-564 (Fla. 1999) (holding, in the context of a DUI manslaughter conviction under § 316.193, that the statute does not contain a mens rea requirement). Many States have enacted similar statutes, criminalizing DUI causing serious bodily injury or death without requiring proof of any mental state, or, in some States, appearing to require only proof that the person acted negligently in operating the vehicle. The question here is whether § 16 can be interpreted to include such offenses.

Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144 (1995). The plain text of § 16(a) states that an offense, to qualify as a crime of violence, must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” We do not deal here with an at tempted, or threatened use of force. Petitioner contends that his conviction did not require the “use” of force against another person because the most common employment of the word “use” connotes the intentional availment of force, which is not required under the Florida DU I statute. The Government counters that the “use” of force does not incorporate any mens rea component, and that petitioner’s DUI conviction necessarily includes the use of force. To support its position, the Government dissects the meaning of the word “use,” employing dictionaries, legislation, and our own case law in contending that a use of force may be negligent or even inadvertent.

Whether or not the word “use” alone supplies a mens rea element, the parties’ primary focus on that word is too narrow. Particularly when interpreting a statute that features as elastic a word as “use,” we construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. See Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 229 (1993); Bailey, supra, at 143. The critical aspect of § 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one involving the “use ... of physical force against the person or property of another.” (Emphasis added.) As we said in a similar context in Bailey, “use” requires active employment. 516 U. S., at 145. While one may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident. Thus, a person would “use . . . physical force against” another when pushing him; however, we would not ordinarily say a person “use[s] . . . physical force against” another by stumbling and falling into him. When interpreting a statute, we must give words their “ordinary or natural” meaning. Smith, supra, at 228. The key phrase in § 16(a) — the “use . ... of physical force against the person or property of another” — most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F. 3d, at 1145; Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d, at 609. Petitioner’s DUI offense therefore is not a crime of violence under § 16(a).

Neither is petitioner’s DUI conviction a crime of violence under § 16(b). Section 16(b) sweeps more broadly than § 16(a), defining a crime of violence as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” But § 16(b) does not thereby encompass all negligent misconduct, such as the negligent operation of a vehicle. It simply covers offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense. The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime. The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under § 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime.

Thus, while § 16(b) is broader than § 16(a) in the sense that physical force need not actually be applied, it contains the same formulation we found to be determinative in § 16(a): the use of physical force against the person or property of another. Accordingly, we must give the language in § 16(b) an identical construction, requiring a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense. This is particularly true in light of § 16(b)’s requirement that the “substantial risk” be a risk of using physical force against another person “in the course of committing the offense.” In no “ordinary or natural” sense can it be said that a person risks having to “use” physical force against another person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury.

In construing both parts of § 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term “crime of violence.” The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses. Cf. United States v. Doe, 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C. J.) (observing that the term “violent felony” in 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence”). Interpreting §16 to encompass accidental or negligent conduct would blur the distinction between the “violent” crimes Congress sought to distinguish for heightened punishment and other crimes. See United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205-1206 (CA10 2003).

Section 16 therefore cannot be read to include petitioner’s conviction for DUI causing serious bodily injury under Florida law. This construction is reinforced by Congress’ use of the term “crime of violence” in § 101(h) of the INA, which was enacted in 1990. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, § 131, 104 Stat. 31 (hereinafter FRAA). Section 212(a)(2)(E) of the INA renders inadmissible any alien who has previously exercised diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction in the United States after committing a “serious criminal offense.” 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(2)(E). Section 101(h) defines the term “serious criminal offense” to mean:

“(1) any felony;
“(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of title 18; or
“(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or of prohibited substances if such crime involves personal injury to another.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(h) (emphasis added).

Congress’ separate listing of the DUI-causing-injury offense from the definition of “crime of violence” in § 16 is revealing. Interpreting §16 to include DUI offenses, as the Government urges, would leave § 101(h)(3) practically devoid of significance. As we must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001), the distinct provision for these offenses under § 101(h) bolsters our conclusion that § 16 does not itself encompass DUI offenses.

This case does not present us with the question whether a state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless use of force against the person or property of another qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. DUI statutes such as Florida’s do not require any mental state with respect to the use of force against another person, thus reaching individuals who were negligent or less. Drunk driving is a nationwide problem, as evidenced by the efforts of legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose appropriate penalties. But this fact does not warrant our shoehorning it into statutory sections where it does not fit. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Congress first made commission of an aggravated felony grounds for an alien’s removal in 1988, and it defined the term to include offenses such as murder, drug trafficking crimes, and firearm trafficking offenses. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4469, 4470. Since then; Congress has frequently amended the definition of aggravated felony, broadening the scope of offenses which render an alien deportable. See, e. g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1277 (adding a number of offenses to § 101(a)(43) of the INA); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), §321,110 Stat. 3009-627 (same). The inclusion of any “crime of violence” as an aggravated felony came in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. 5048.

       When petitioner first appealed, the BIA’s position was that a violation of DUI statutes similar to Florida’s counted as a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. See, e. g., Matter of Puente-Salazar, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1006, 1012-1013 (BIA 1999) (en banc). Before petitioner received a decision from his appeal (due to a clerical error not relevant here), the BIA in another case reversed its position from Puente-Salazar and held that DUI offenses that do not have a mens rea of at least recklessness are not crimes of violence within the meaning of § 16. See Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 346 (BIA 2002) (en banc). However, because the BIA held in Ramos that it would “follow the law of the circuit in those circuits that have addressed the question whether driving under the influence is a crime of violence,” id., at 346-347, and because it found the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Le controlling, it affirmed the Immigration Judge’s removal order. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-4a.

       Pursuant to the IIRIRA, the Eleventh Circuit was without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s removal order in this case if petitioner was “removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses, including those covered as an “aggravated felony.” See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Because the Eleventh Circuit held that petitioner’s conviction was such an offense, it concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider the removal order.

       For instance, a number of statutes criminalize conduct that has as an element the commission of a crime of violence under § 16. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §842(p) (prohibiting the distribution of information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction in relation to a crime of violence). Other statutory provisions make classification of an offense as a crime of violence consequential for purposes of, inter alia, extradition and restitution. See §§3181(b), 3663A(c). And the term “crime of violence” under §16 has been incorporated into a number of noncriminal enactments. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (rendering an alien deportable for committing a crime of violence, as petitioner is charged here).

       See, e. g., Ala. Code § 18A-6-20(a)(5) (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3— 205(1)(b)(I) (Lexis 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-60d(a) (2008); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-394 (Lexis 2004); Idaho Code § 18-8006(1) (Lexis 2004); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 625, § 5/11—501(d)(1)(C) (West 2002); Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4 (1993); Iowa Code §707.6A(4) (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 189A.010(1) and (11)(c) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29-A, § 2411(1-A)(D)(1) (West Supp. 2003); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §257.625(5) (West Supp. 2004); Neb. Rev. Stat. §60-6,198(1) (2002 Cum. Supp.); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 265:82-a(I)(b) and (II)(b) (West 2004); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:12-l(c) (West Supp. 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-101(B) and (C) (2004); N. D. Cent. Code §39-09-01.1 (Lexis 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.08(A)(1)(a) (Lexis 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47, §11-904(B)(1) (West 2001); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3804(b) (Supp. 2003); R. I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.6(a) (Lexis 2002); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07(a)(1) (West 2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 1210(f) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.522(1)(b) (1994); Wis. Stat. §940.25(1) (1999-2000); Wyo. Stat. §31-5-233(h) (Lexis 2003).

       See, e. g., Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23153 (West 2000); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§628(2), 629 (Lexis 1995); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:39.1(A), 14:39.2(A) (West 1997 and Supp. 2004); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§3-211(c) and (d) (Lexis 2004); Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-30(5) (Lexis 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. §565.060.1(4) (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §45-5-205(1) (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. §484.3795(1) (2003); S. C. Code Ann. §56-5-2945(A)(1) (2003); S. D. Codified Laws §22-16-42 (West Supp. 2003); Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (3)(b) (Lexis Supp. 2004); W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(c) (Lexis 2004).

       Thus, § 16(b) plainly does not encompass all offenses which create a “substantial risk” that injury will result from a person’s conduct. The “substantial risk” in § 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible effect of a person’s conduct. Compare § 16(b) (requiring a “substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used”) with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2003) (in the context of a career-offender sentencing enhancement, defining “crime of violence” as meaning, inter alia, “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). The risk that an accident may occur when an individual drives while intoxicated is simply not the same thing as the risk that the individual may “use” physical force against another in committing the DUI offense. See, e. g., United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205-1207 (CA10 2003); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609-610 (CA7 2001).

       Even if §16 lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor. Although here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies. Cf. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517-518 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting, because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be interpreted consistently with its criminal applications).

       This point carries significant weight in the particular context of this case. Congress incorporated § 16 as an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. 5048 (Nov. 29, 1990). Congress enacted § 101(h), with its incorporation of § 16 and a separate provision covering DUI-causing-injury offenses, just nine months earlier. See FRAA, §131, 104 Stat. 31 (Feb. 16, 1990). That Congress distinguished between a crime of violence and DUI-causing-injury offenses (and included both) in § 101(h), but did not do so shortly thereafter in making only a crime of violence an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(F), strongly supports our construction of § 16.


author: Justice O’Connor

text:
    NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. JAMES N. KIRBY, PTY LTD., dba KIRBY ENGINEERING, et al.
    No. 02-1028.
    Argued October 6, 2004
    Decided November 9, 2004

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Stephen B. Kinnaird, Amanda L. Tyler, Hyman HiUenbrand, Richard K. Hines V, and Taylor Tapley Daly.

      Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Malcolm L. Stewart, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, Peter S. Smith, Robert B. Ostrom, Amy Larson, Phillip Christopher Hughey, Ellen D. Hanson, and Alice C. Saylor.

      ' David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael F. Sturley, J. S. Scott Busby, and Charles Robert Sharp

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Air Transport Association of America, Inc., by Robert K. Spotswood; for the American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc., et al. by David J. Bederman; for the Association of American Railroads by Daniel Saphire; for the National Association of Waterfront Employers by Thomas D. Wilcox; for the Transportation Loss Prevention and Security Association by James Attridge; and for the World Shipping Council by Jeffrey F. Lawrence and John W. Butler.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. by Joseph G. Grnsso and Robert Hermann; for International Cargo Loss Prevention, Inc., by Stanley Mc-Dermott 111; for the National Industrial Transportation League et al. by Nicholas J. DiMichael and Karyn A. Booth; for the Transportation Intermediaries Association by Richard D. Gluck; for Francesco Berlingieri et al. by John Paul Jones; and for Martin Davies by Susan M. Vance.

      Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Public Citizen, Inc., by Brian Wolf-man; and for Jan Ramberg by Christopher E. Carey, John B. Gooch, Jr., and Michael W. Lodwick.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a maritime case about a train wreck. A shipment of machinery from Australia was destined for Huntsville, Alabama. The intercontinental journey was uneventful, and the machinery reached the United States unharmed. But the train carrying the machinery on its final, inland leg derailed, causing extensive damage. The machinery’s owner sued the railroad. The railroad seeks shelter in two liability limitations contained in contracts that upstream carriers negotiated for the machinery’s delivery.

I

This controversy arises from two bills of lading (essentially, contracts) for the transportation of goods from Australia to Alabama. A bill of lading records that a carrier has received goods from the party that wishes to ship them, states the terms of carriage, and serves as evidence of the contract for carriage. See 2 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 58-60 (3d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Schoenbaum); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 49 Stat. 1208, 46 U. S. C. App. § 1303. Respondent James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. (Kirby), an Australian manufacturing company, sold 10 containers of machinery to the General Motors plant located outside Huntsville, Alabama. Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC), an Australian freight forwarding company, to arrange for delivery by “through” (i e., end-to-end) transportation. (A freight forwarding company arranges for, coordinates, and facilitates cargo transport, but does not itself transport cargo.) To formalize their contract for carriage, ICC issued a bill of lading to Kirby (ICC bill). The bill designates Sydney, Australia, as the port of loading, Savannah, Georgia, as the port of discharge, and Huntsville as the ultimate destination for delivery.

In negotiating the ICC bill, Kirby had the opportunity to declare the full value of the machinery and to have ICC assume liability for that value. Cf. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U. S. 128, 135 (1953) (a carrier must provide a shipper with a fair opportunity to declare value). Instead, and as is common in the industry, see Sturley, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 241, 244 (2000), Kirby accepted a contractual liability limitation for ICC below the machinery’s true value, resulting, presumably, in lower shipping rates. The ICC bill sets various liability limitations for the journey from Sydney to Huntsville. For the sea leg, the ICC bill invokes the default liability rule set forth in the COGSA. The COGSA “package limitation” provides:

“Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States . . . unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.” 46 U. S. C. App. § 1304(5).

For the land leg, in turn, the bill limits the carrier’s liability to a higher amount. So that other downstream parties expected to take part in the contract’s execution could benefit from the liability limitations, the bill also contains a so-called “Himalaya Clause.” It provides:

“These conditions [for limitations on liability] apply whenever claims relating to the performance of the contract evidenced by this [bill of lading] are made against any servant, agent or other person (including any independent contractor) whose services have been used in order to perform the contract.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, cl. 10.1.

Meanwhile, Kirby separately insured the cargo for its true value with its co-respondent in this case, Allianz Australia Insurance' Ltd. (formerly MMI General Insurance, Ltd.).

Having been hired by Kirby, and because it does not itself actually transport cargo, ICC then hired Hamburg Südamer-ikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft Eggert & Amsinck (Hamburg Süd), a German ocean shipping company, to transport the containers. To formalize their contract for carriage, Hamburg Süd issued its own bill of lading to ICC (Hamburg Süd bill). That bill designates Sydney as the port of loading, Savannah as the port of discharge, and Huntsville as the ultimate destination for delivery. It adopts COGSA’s default rule in limiting the liability of Hamburg Süd, the bill’s designated carrier, to $500 per package. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 1304(5). It also contains a clause extending that liability limitation beyond the “tackles” — that is, to potential damage on land as well as on sea. Finally, it too contains a Himalaya Clause extending the benefit of its liability limitation to “all agents . . . (including inland) carriers . . . and all independent contractors whatsoever.” App. 63, cl. 5(b).

Acting through a subsidiary, Hamburg Süd hired petitioner Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk) to transport the machinery from the Savannah port to Huntsville. The Norfolk train carrying the machinery derailed en route, causing an alleged $1.5 million in damages. Kirby’s insurance company reimbursed Kirby for the loss. Kirby and its insurer then sued Norfolk in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting diversity jurisdiction and alleging tort and contract claims. In its answer, Norfolk argued, among other things, that Kirby’s potential recovery could not exceed the amounts set forth in the liability limitations contained in the bills of lading for the machinery’s carriage.

The District Court granted Norfolk’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Norfolk’s liability was limited to $500 per container. Upon a joint motion from Norfolk and Kirby, the District Court certified its decision for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b).

A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that Norfolk could not claim protection under the Himalaya Clause in the first contract, the ICC bill. It construed the language of the clause to exclude parties, like Norfolk, that had not been in privity with ICC when ICC issued the bill. 300 F. 3d 1300, 1308-1309 (2002). The majority also suggested that “a special degree of linguistic specificity is required to extend the benefits of a Himalaya clause to an inland carrier.” Id., at 1310. As for the Hamburg Siid bill, the court held that Kirby could be bound by the bill’s liability limitation “only if ICC was acting as Kirby’s agent when it received Hamburg Süd’s bill.” Id., at 1305. And, applying basic agency law principles, the Court of Appeals concluded that ICC had not been acting as Kirby’s agent when it received the bill. Ibid. Based on its opinion that Norfolk was not entitled to benefit from the liability limitation in either bill of lading, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the railroad. We granted certiorari to decide whether Norfolk could take shelter in the liability limitations of either bill, 540 U. S. 1099 (2004), and now reverse.

II

The courts below appear to have decided this case on an assumption, shared by the parties, that federal rather than state law governs the interpretation of the two bills of lading. Respondents now object. They emphasize that, at bottom, this is a diversity case involving tort and contract claims arising out of a rail accident somewhere between Savannah and Huntsville. We think, however, borrowing from Justice Harlan, that “the situation presented here has a more genuinely salty flavor than that.” Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 742 (1961). When a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not inherently local, federal law controls the contract interpretation. Id., at 735.

Our authority to make decisional law for the interpretation of maritime contracts stems from the Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction to. federal courts. See Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the federal judicial power shall extend to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”). See 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction”); R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 733-738 (5th ed. 2003). This suit was properly brought in diversity, but it could also be sustained under the admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of thé maritime contracts involved. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 411 (1953) (“[Substantial rights ... are not to be determined differently whether [a] ease is labelled ‘law side’ or ‘admiralty side’ oh a district court’s docket”). Indeed, for federal common law to apply in these circumstances, this suit must also be sustainable under the admiralty jurisdiction. See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U. S. 22, 28 (1988). Because the grant of admiralty jurisdiction and the power to make admiralty law are mutually dependent, the two are often intertwined in our cases.

Applying the two-step analysis from Kossick, we find that federal law governs this contract dispute. Our cases do not draw clean lines between maritime and nonmaritime contracts. We have recognized that “[t]he boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts — as opposed to torts or crimes — being conceptual rather than spatial, have always been difficult to draw.” 365 U. S., at 735. To ascertain whether a contract is a maritime one, we cannot look to whether a ship or other vessel was involved in the dispute, as we would in a putative maritime tort case. Cf. Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 740 (“The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury . . . caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land”); 1 R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 1:15 (5th ed. 2003). Nor can we simply look to the place of the contract’s formation or performance. Instead, the answer “depends upon . . . the nature and character of the contract,” and the true criterion is whether it has “reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.” North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Brothers Marine Railway & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U. S. 119, 125 (1919) (citing Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 26 (1871)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U. S. 603, 611 (1991) (“[T]he trend in modern admiralty case law ... is to focus the jurisdictional inquiry upon whether the nature of the transaction was maritime”).

The ICC and Hamburg Süd bills are maritime contracts because their primary objective is to accomplish the transportation of goods by sea from Australia to the eastern coast of the United States. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 31 (2d ed. 1975) (“Ideally, the [admiralty] jurisdiction [over contracts ought] to include those and only those things principally connected with maritime transportation” (emphasis deleted)). To be sure, the two bills call for some performance on land; the final leg of the machinery’s journey to Huntsville was by rail. But under a conceptual rather than spatial approach, this fact does not alter the essentially maritime nature of the contracts.

In Kossick, for example, we held that a shipowner’s promise to assume responsibility for any improper treatment his seaman might receive at a New York hospital was a maritime contract. The seaman had asked the shipowner to pay for treatment by a private physician, but the shipowner, preferring the cheaper public hospital, offered to cover the costs of any complications that might arise from treatment there. We characterized his promise as a “fringe benefit” to a shipowner’s duty in maritime law to provide “ ‘maintenance and cure.’ ” 365 U. S., at 736-737. Because the promise was in furtherance of a “peculiarly maritime concer[n],” id., at 738, it folded into federal maritime law. It did not matter that the site of the inadequate treatment — which gave rise to the contract dispute — was in a hospital on land. Likewise, Norfolk’s rail journey from Savannah to Huntsville was a “fringe” portion of the intercontinental journey promised in the ICC and Hamburg Süd bills.

We have reiterated that the “ ‘fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is “thé protection of maritime commerce”’”’ Exxon, supra, at 608 (emphasis added) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 367 (1990), in turn quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668, 674 (1982)). The conceptual approach vindicates that interest by focusing our inquiry on whether the principal objective of a contract is maritime commerce. While it may once have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying commercial obligations between .the “tackles” (i. e., from port to port) have maritime objectives, the shore is now an artificial place to draw a line. Maritime commerce has evolved along with the nature of transportation and is often inseparable from some land-based obligations. The international transportation industry “clearly has moved into a new era — the age of multimodalism, door-to-door transport based on efficient use of all available modes of transportation by air, water, and land.” 1 Schoenbaum 589 (4th ed. 2004). The cause is technological change: Because goods can now be packaged in standardized containers, cargo can move easily from one mode of transport to another. Ibid. See also NLRB v. Longshoremen, 447 U. S. 490, 494 (1980) (“ ‘[C]on-tainerization may be said to constitute the single most important innovation in ocean transport since the steamship displaced the schooner’”); G. Muller, Intermodal Freight Transportation 15-24 (3d ed. 1995).

Contracts reflect the new technology, hence the popularity of “through” bills of lading, in which cargo owners can contract for transportation across oceans and to inland destinations in a single transaction. See 1 Schoenbaum 595. Put simply, it is to Kirby’s advantage to arrange for transport from Sydney to Huntsville in one bill of lading, rather than to negotiate a separate contract — and to find an American railroad itself — for the land leg. The popularity of that efficient choice, to assimilate land legs into international ocean bills of lading, should not render bills for ocean carriage non-maritime contracts.

Some lower federal courts appear to have taken a spatial approach when deciding whether intermodal transportation contracts for intercontinental shipping are maritime in nature. They have held that admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to contracts which require maritime and nonmaritime transportation, unless the nonmaritime transportation is merely incidental — and that long-distance land travel is not incidental. See, e. g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F. 3d 549, 555-556 (CA2 2000) (“Transport by land "under a bill of lading is not ‘incidental’ to transport by sea if the land segment involves great and substantial distances,” and land transport of over 850 miles across four countries is more than incidental); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Danzig, 211 F. 3d 1373, 1378 (CA Fed. 2000) (holding that intermodal transport contracts were not maritime contracts because they called for “substantial transportation between inland locations and ports both in this country and in the Middle East” that was not incidental to the transportation by sea); Kuehne & Nagel (AG & Co.) v. Geosource, Inc., 874 F. 2d 283, 290 (CA5 1989) (holding that a through bill of lading calling for land transportation up to 1,000 miles was not a traditional maritime contract because such “extensive land-based operations cannot be viewed as merely incidental to the maritime operations”). As a preliminary matter, it seems to us imprecise to describe the land carriage required by an intermodal transportation contract as “incidental”; realistically, each leg of the journey is essential to accomplishing the contract’s purpose. In this case, for example, the bills of lading required delivery to Huntsville; the Savannah port would not do.

Furthermore, to the extent that these lower court decisions fashion a rule for identifying maritime contracts that depends solely on geography, they are inconsistent with the conceptual approach our precedent requires. See Kossick, supra, at 735. Conceptually, so long as a bill of lading requires substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce — and thus it is a maritime contract. Its character as a maritime contract is not defeated simply because it also provides for some land carriage. Geography, then, is useful in a conceptual inquiry only in a limited sense: If a bill’s sea components are insubstantial, then the bill is not a maritime contract.

Having established that the ICC and Hamburg Slid bills are maritime contracts, then, we must clear a second hurdle before applying federal law in their interpretation. Is this case inherently local? For. not “every term in every maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule.” Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 313 (1955) (applying state law to maritime contract for marine insurance because of state regulatory power over insurance industry). A maritime contract’s interpretation may so implicate local interests as to beckon interpretation by state law. See Kossick, 365 U. S., at 735. Respondents have not articulated any specific Australian or state interest at stake, though some are surely implicated. But when state interests cannot be accommodated without defeating a federal interest, as is the case here, then federal substantive law should govern. See id., at 739 (the process of deciding whether federal law applies “is surely ... one of accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws situation where two sov-ereignties assert divergent interests in a transaction”); 2 Schoenbaum 61 (“ ‘Bills of lading issued outside the United States are governed by the general maritime law, considering relevant choice of law rules’ ”).

Here, our touchstone is a concern for the uniform meaning of maritime contracts like the ICC and Hamburg Süd bills. We have explained that Article Ill’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction “ ‘must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states.’ ” American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 451 (1994) (quoting The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875)). See also Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, 210 (1996) (“[I]n several contexts, we have recognized that vindication of maritime policies demanded uniform adherence to a federal rule of decision” (citing Kossick, supra, at 742; Pope & Talbot, 346 U. S., at 409; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 248-249 (1942))); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373 (1959) (“[Sjtate law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope”).

Applying state law to cases like this one would undermine the uniformity of general maritime law. The same liability limitation in a single bill of lading for international inter-modal transportation often applies both to sea and to land, as is true of the Hamburg Süd bill. Such liability clauses are regularly executed around the world. See 1 Schoenbaum 595; Wood, Multimodal Transportation: An American Perspective on Carrier Liability and Bill of Lading Issues, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 403, 407 (Supp. 1998). See also 46 U. S. C. App. § 1307 (permitting parties to extend the COGSA default liability limit to damage done “prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship”). Likewise, a single Himalaya Clause can cover both sea and land carriers downstream, as is true of the ICC bill. See Part III-A, infra. Confusion and inefficiency will inevitably result if more than one body of law governs a given contract’s meaning. As we said in Kossick, when “a [maritime] contract . . . may well have been made anywhere in the world,” it “should be judged by one law wherever it was made.” 365 U. S., at 741. Here, that one law is federal.

In protecting the uniformity of federal maritime law, we also reinforce the liability regime Congress established in COGSA. By its terms, COGSA governs bills of lading for the carriage of goods “from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship.” 46 U. S. C. App. § 1301(e). For that period, COGSA’s “package limitation” operates as a default rule. §1304(5). But COGSA also gives the option of extending its rule by contract. See §1307 (“Nothing contained in this chapter shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any agreement, stipulation, condition, reservation, or exemption as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in connection with the custody and care and handling of goods prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which the goods are carried by sea”). As COGSA permits, Hamburg Süd in its bill of lading chose to extend the default rule to the entire period in which the machinery would be under its responsibility, including the period of the inland transport. Hamburg Süd would not enjoy the efficiencies of the default rule if the liability limitation it chose did not apply equally to all legs of the journey for which it undertook responsibility. And the apparent purpose of COGSA, to facilitate efficient contracting in contracts for carriage by sea, would be defeated.

III

A

Turning to the merits, we begin with the ICC bill of lading, the first of the contracts at issue. Kirby and ICC made a contract for the carriage of machinery from Sydney to Huntsville, and agreed to limit the liability of ICC and other parties who would participate in transporting the machinery. The bill’s Himalaya Clause states:

“These conditions [for limitations on liability] apply whenever claims relating to the performance of the contract evidenced by this [bill of lading] are made against any servant, agent or other person (including any inde-' pendent contractor) whose services have been used in order to perform the contract.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, cl. 10.1 (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether the liability limitation in Kirby’s and ICC’s contract extends to Norfolk, which is ICC’s sub-subcontractor. The Circuits have split in answering this question. Compare, e. g., Akiyama Corp. of America v. M. V. Hanjin Marseilles, 162 F. 3d 571, 574 (CA9 1998) (privity of contract is not required in order to benefit from a Himalaya Clause), with Mikinberg v. Baltic S. S. Co., 988 F. 2d 327, 332 (CA2 1993) (a contractual relationship is required).

This is a simple question of contract interpretation. It turns only on whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly applied this Court’s decision in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U. S. 297 (1959). We conclude that it did not. In Herd, the bill of lading between a cargo owner and carrier said that, consistent with COGSA, “ ‘the Carrier’s liability, if any, shall be determined on the basis of $500 per package.’” Id., at 302. The carrier then hired a stevedor-ing company to load the cargo onto the ship, and the steve-doring company damaged the goods. The Court held that the stevedoring company was not a beneficiary of the bill’s liability limitation. Because it found no evidence in COGSA or its legislative history that Congress meant COGSA’s liability limitation to extend automatically to a carrier’s agents, like stevedores, the Court looked to the language of the bill of lading itself. It reasoned that a clause limiting “ ‘the Carrier’s liability’” did not “indicate that the contracting parties intended to limit the liability of stevedores or other agents. ... If such had been a purpose of the contracting parties it must be presumed that they would in some way have expressed it in the contract.” Ibid. The Court added that liability limitations must be “strictly construed and limited to intended beneficiaries.” Id., at 305.

The Eleventh Circuit, like respondents, made much of the Herd decision. Deriving a principle of narrow construction from Herd, the Court of Appeals concluded that the language of the ICC bill’s Himalaya Clause is too vague to clearly include Norfolk. 300 F. 3d, at 1308. Moreover, the lower court interpreted Herd to require privity between the carrier and the party seeking shelter under a Himalaya Clause. 300 F. 3d, at 1308. But nothing in Herd requires the linguistic specificity or privity rules that the Eleventh Circuit attributes to it. The decision simply says that contracts for carriage of goods by sea must be construed like any other contracts: by their terms and consistent with the intent of the parties. If anything, Herd stands for the proposition that there is no special rule for Himalaya Clauses.

The Court of Appeals’ ruling is not true to the contract language or to the intent of the parties. The plain language of the Himalaya Clause indicates an intent to extend the liability limitation broadly — to “any servant, agent or other person (including any independent contractor)” whose services contribute to performing the contract. App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a, cl. 10.1 (emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). There is no reason to contravene the clause’s obvious meaning. See Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 89-90 (1828) (“[W]here the words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded”). The expansive contract language corresponds to the fact that various modes of transportation would be involved in performing the contract. Kirby and ICC contracted for the transportation of machinery from Australia to Huntsville, Alabama, and, as the crow flies, Huntsville is some 366 miles inland from the port of discharge. See G. Fitzpatrick & M. Modlin, Direct-Line Distances 168 (1986). Thus, the parties must have anticipated that a land carrier’s services would be necessary for the contract’s performance. It is clear to us that a railroad like Norfolk was an intended beneficiary of the ICC bill’s broadly written Himalaya Clause. Accordingly, Norfolk’s liability is limited by the terms of that clause.

B

The question arising from the Hamburg Süd bill of lading is more difficult. It requires us to set an efficient default rule for certain shipping contracts, a task that has been a challenge for courts for centuries. See, e. g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). ICC and Hamburg Süd agreed that Hamburg Süd would transport the machinery from Sydney to Huntsville, and agreed to the COGSA “package limitation” on the liability of Hamburg Süd, its agents, and its independent contractors. The second question presented is whether that liability limitation, which ICC negotiated, prevents Kirby from suing Norfolk (Hamburg Süd’s independent contractor) for more. As we have explained, the liability limitation in the ICC bill, the first contract, sets liability for a land accident higher than this bill does. See n. 1, supra. Because Norfolk’s liability will be lower if it is protected by the Hamburg Süd bill too, we must reach this second question in order to give Norfolk the full relief for which it petitioned.

To interpret the Hamburg Slid bill, we turn to a rule drawn from our precedent about common carriage: When an intermediary contracts with a carrier to transport goods, the cargo owner’s recovery against the carrier is limited by the liability limitation to which the intermediary and carrier agreed. The intermediary is certainly not automatically empowered to be the cargo owner’s agent in every sense. That would be unsustainable. But when it comes to liability limitations for negligence resulting in damage, an intermediary can negotiate reliable and enforceable agreements with the carriers it engages.

We derive this rule from our decision about common carriage in Great Northern R. Co. v. O’Connor, 232 U. S. 508 (1914). In Great Northern, an owner hired a transfer company to arrange for the shipment of her goods. Without the owner’s express authority, the transfer company arranged for rail transport at a tariff rate that limited the railroad’s liability to less than the true value of the goods. The goods were lost en route, and the owner sued the railroad. The Court held that the railroad must be able to rely on the liability limitation in its tariff agreement with the transfer company. The railroad “had the right to assume that the Transfer Company could agree upon the terms of the shipment”; it could not be expected to know if the transfer company had any outstanding, conflicting obligation to another party. Id., at 514. The owner’s remedy,- if necessary, was against the transfer company. Id., at 515.

Respondents object to our reading of Great Northern, and argue that this Court should fashion the federal rule of decision from general agency law principles. Like the Eleventh Circuit, respondents reason that Kirby cannot be bound by the bill of lading that ICC negotiated with Hamburg Slid unless ICC was then acting as Kirby’s agent. Other Courts of Appeals have also applied agency law to cases similar to this one. See, e. g., Kukje Hwajae Ins. Co. v. The M/V Hyundai Liberty, 294 F. 3d 1171, 1175-1177 (CA9 2002) (an intermediary acted as a cargo owner’s agent when negotiating a bill of lading with a downstream carrier).

We think reliance on agency law is misplaced here. It is undeniable that the traditional indicia of agency, a fiduciary relationship and effective control by the principal, did not exist between Kirby and ICC. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1957). But that is of no moment. The principle derived from Great Northern does not require treating ICC as Kirby’s agent in the classic sense. It only requires treating ICC as Kirby’s agent for a single, limited purpose: when ICC contracts with subsequent carriers for limitation on liability. In holding that an intermediary binds a cargo owner to the liability limitations it negotiates with downstream carriers, we do not infringe on traditional agency principles. We merely ensure the reliability of downstream contracts for liability limitations. In Great Northern, because the intermediary had been “entrusted with goods to be shipped by railway, and, nothing to the contrary appearing, the carrier had the right to assume that [the intermediary] could agree upon the terms of the shipment.” 232 U. S., at 514. Likewise, here we hold that intermediaries, entrusted with goods, are “agents” only in their ability to contract for liability limitations with carriers downstream.

Respondents also contend that any decision binding Kirby to the Hamburg Slid bill’s liability limitation will be disastrous for the international shipping industry. Various participants in the industry have weighed in as amici on both sides in this case, and we must make a close call. It would be idle to pretend that the industry can easily be characterized, or that efficient default rules can easily be discerned. In the final balance, however, we disagree with respondents for three reasons.

First, we believe that a limited agency rule tracks industry practices. In intercontinental ocean shipping, carriers may not know if they are dealing with an intermediary, rather than with a cargo owner. Even if knowingly dealing with an intermediary, they may not know how many other intermediaries came before, or what obligations may be outstanding among them. If the Eleventh Circuit’s rule were the law, carriers would have to seek out more information before contracting, so as to assure themselves that their contractual liability limitations provide true protection. That task of information gathering might be very costly or even impossible, given that goods often change hands many times in the course of intermodal transportation. See 1 Schoenbaum 589; Wood, 46 Am. J. Comp. L., at 404.

Second, if liability limitations negotiated with cargo owners were reliable while limitations negotiated with intermediaries were not, carriers would likely want to charge the latter higher rates. A rule prompting downstream carriers to distinguish between cargo owners and intermediary shippers might interfere with statutory and decisional law promoting nondiscrimination in common carriage. Cf. ICC v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 251-256 (1911) (common carrier cannot “sit in judgment on the title of the prospective shipper”); Shipping Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 1709 (nondiscrimination rules). It would also, as we have intimated, undermine COGSA’s liability regime.

Finally, as in Great Northern, our decision produces an equitable result. See 232 U. S., at 515. Kirby retains the option to sue ICC, the carrier, for any loss that exceeds the liability limitation to which they agreed. And indeed, Kirby has sued ICC in an Australian court for damages arising from the Norfolk derailment. It seems logical that ICC— the only party that definitely knew about and was party to both of the bills of lading at issue here — should bear responsibility for any gap between the liability limitations in the bills. Meanwhile, Norfolk enjoys the benefit of the Hamburg Slid bill’s liability limitation.

IV

We hold that Norfolk is entitled to the protection of the liability limitations in the two bills of lading. Having undertaken this analysis, we recognize that our decision does no more than provide a legal backdrop against which future bills of lading will be negotiated. It is not, of course, this Court’s task to structure the international shipping industry. Future parties remain free to adapt their contracts to the rules set forth here, only now with the benefit of greater predictability concerning the rules for. which their contracts might compensate.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded ■for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       The bill provides that “the Freight Forwarder shall in no event be or become liable for any loss of or damage to the goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of 666.67 SDR per package or unit or 2 SDR per kilo-gramme of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher, unless the nature and value of the goods shall have been declared by the Consignor.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, cl. 8.3. An SDR, or Special Drawing Right, is a unit of account created by the International Monetary Fund and calculated daily on the basis of a basket of currencies. Liability computed per package for the 10 containers, for example, was approximately $17,373 when the bill of lading issued in June 1997, $17,231 when the goods were damaged on October 9, 1997, and $9,763 when the case was argued. See International Monetary Fund Exchange Rate Archives, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/rates/param_rms_mth.cfm (as visited Nov. 5, 2004, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Respondents claim that liability computed by weight is higher. The machinery’s weight is not in the record. In any case, because we conclude that Norfolk is also protected by the $500 per package limit in the second bill of lading at issue here, see Part III — B, infra, and thus cannot be liable for more than $5,000 for the 10 containers, each holding one machine, the precise liability under the ICC bill of lading does not matter.

       Clauses extending liability limitations take their name from an English case involving a steamship called Himalaya. See Adler v. Dickson, [1955] 1 Q. B. 158 (C. A.).