text:
    No. 99-1591.
    Goode, dba Mr. Bones BBQ v. City of Austin et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Americans for the Defense of Constitutional Rights for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 98-9727.
    No. 99-220.
    No. 99-949.
    Bisby v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, DCR, Inc., et al. v. Pierce County, Dahlstrom v. United States, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida et al. v. Tamiami Partners, LTD, By and Through Its General Partner, Tamiami Development Corp., Weldon et ux. v. Farm Credit Services of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA, Mensah v. St. Joseph County Family Independence Agency et al., Howland v. Texas, Rasten v. Department of Labor, Zimbovsky v. Massachusetts, Sirbaugh v. Elo, Warden, Randon v. Hubbard, Warden, Lane v. National Data Corp., Weeks v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, McFadden v. Ford Motor Co. et al., Crosby v. Lambert et al., Robinson v. Luker et al., Alvarado v. McKay et al., Bradley v. United States, In re Davage, McKire v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Marcum v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. et al., Montanya v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Wallace v. Florida, Bostedt v. Wisconsin,
   528 U. S. 849;

ante, p. 1053;

ante, p. 1036;

No. 99-1013.

No. 99-1260.

No. 99-1297.

No. 99-5134.

No. 99-7157.

No. 99-7179.

No. 99-7282.

No. 99-7363.

No. 99-7409.

No. 99-7525.

No. 99-7572.

No. 99-7717.

No. 99-7762.

No. 99-7775.

No. 99-7798.

No. 99-7814.

No. 99-7927.

No. 99-8021.

No. 99-8143.

No. 99-8226.

No. 99-8241.

ante, p. 1018;

ante, p. 1021;

ante, p. 1038;

528 U. S. 887;

528 U. S. 1124;

528 U. S. 1125;

528 U. S. 1165;

528 U. S. 1167;

ante, p. 1023;

528 U. S. 1171;

528 U. S. 1192;

ante, p. 1009;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 1024;

528 U. S. 1193;

528 U. S. 1187;

ante, p. 1040;

ante, p. 1041;

ante, p. 1042;

ante, p. 1030; and

ante, p. 1031. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 99-835.
    No. 99-1213.
    No. 99-5771.
    Stewart v. United States, Williams et al. v. Michigan et al., Hart et ux. v. Elder et al.,
   528 U. S. 1063;

ante, p. 1020; and

528 U. S. 953. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 99-1224.
    Lefkowitz v. United States,
   528 U. S. 1190. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein informa pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 18, 2000
    No. 99-9008.
    Gollehon v. Mahoney, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    May 22, 2000
    No. 99-1227.
    Bryon L. Rosquist, D. C., P. C., et al. v. McCann et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for farther consideration in light of United States v. Morrison, ante, p. 598.


text:
    No. 99-1583.
    Pennsylvania v. D. M.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 (2000).


text:
    No. 99-8696.
    Buchanan v. Doe.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 99-8752.
    Gibson v. Susquehanna Township Commissioners.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. D-2137.
    In re Disbarment of Gereighty.
    [For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1112.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2140.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
    [For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2143.
    In re Disbarment of Spina.
    [For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2146.
    In re Disbarment of Scully.
    [For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2147.
    In re Disbarment of Carlson.
    [For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1151.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2151.
    In re Disbarment of Travis.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1035.]


text:
    No. D-2155.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
   Disbarment entered.

Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg dissent.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1063.]


text:
    No. D-2160.
    In re Disbarment of Tierney.
   James Patrick Tierney, of Malibu, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2161.
    In re Disbarment of Sokolow.
   Lloyd B. Sokolow, of Schenectady, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2162.
    In re Disbarment of Murchison.
   Alton G. Murchison III, of Charlotte, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2163.
    In re Disbarment of Friedler.
   Sydney Friedler, of Hempstead, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2164.
    In re Disbarment of Carlson.
   Robert Bent Carlson, of North Port, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2165.
    In re Disbarment of Tamer.
   David Ferris Tamer, of Winston-Salem, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 99M87.
    Zimbovsky v. Massachusetts.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court’s Rule 14.5 denied.


text:
    No. 99M88.
    No. 99M89.
    Tillis Trucking Co., Inc. v. Moses et al.; and Huertas Barbosa et al. v. Alejandro Buitrago Hospital et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 99-1295.
    Gitlitz et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1097.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 99-8264.
    Delespine v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 1068] denied.


text:
    No. 99-9052.
    Samuel v. Nathan’s Famous Operating Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until June 12, 2000, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 99-9267.
    In re Cavanaugh.
   Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 99-9294.
    In re Galloway.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 99-8724.
    No. 99-8751.
    No. 99-8829.
    In re King; In re Harris; and In re Short.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 99-1257.
    Browner, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, et al. v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 99-1178.
    Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of Pacific Legal Foundation and Randy Peterson, National Association of Home Builders, and American Farm Bureau Federation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 99-1379.
    Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 99-6218.
    Rogers v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 98-1996.
    Pelchat v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 98-9402.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 98-9601.
    Bearden v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1203.
    Theriot et al. v. Parish of Jefferson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1209.
    Novato Fire Protection District v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1283.
    Kumar v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1367.
    Abbott et al. v. Medgar Evers Houses Associates, L. P., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1370.
    New York et al. v. Yonkers Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1439.
    Anderegg v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1526.
    University of Colorado Foundation, Inc., et al. v. American Cyanamid Co.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1537.
    Borden, Inc., et al. v. Morton's Market, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1538.
    Taranto, dba Tundra Taxi v. North Slope Borough.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1545.
    Gonzales et ux., Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Gonzales, Deceased v. City of Kerrville et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1546.
    Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. Professor Vladimir Popov MV in rem.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1561.
    Oliver et vir v. Saha et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1569.
    Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1588.
    Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1599.
    Hopper et al. v. Robinson, Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1610.
    Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1617.
    McMaster v. Michigan National Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1661.
    Rennert v. United States; Miller v. United States; and Jensen v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 255.


text:
    No. 99-1670.
    Webb et ux. v. Mendenhall et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1703.
    Choe v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1712.
    Benavides v. Gerver et ux.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-6879.
    Marlow v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-7908.
    Rodia v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-7918.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-7958.
    Dewberry v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8016.
    Abram v. Laxton et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8244.
    No. 99-8245.
    No. 99-8246.
    No. 99-8247.
    No. 99-8287.
    Richardson v. Richardson; Richardson v. America Online; Richardson v. Sprint PCS; Richardson v. First National Bank of Maryland; and Richardson v. Bell Atlantic Corp.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1327.


text:
    No. 99-8271.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8639.
    Duncan v. Barreras, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8641.
    Jackson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8643.
    McDowell v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8646.
    Mahon v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8648.
    Jones v. Commissioner of Labor of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8664.
    Coffee v. Doth, Commissioner of Human Services of Minnesota.
   Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8669.
    Taylor v. Dees, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8670.
    Welch v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8671.
    Walker v. Akers et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8673.
    Stemley v. Foti, Sheriff of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8679.
    Jeffers v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8680.
    Manthei v. Bogan, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8686.
    Aldridge v. Zulpo-Dane et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8687.
    Angleton v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8689.
    Clay v. Sanders, Judge, Circuit Court of Mississippi, Wilkinson County.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8690.
    Ayers v. City of Memphis et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8693.
    Dominguez v. Kuhlmann, Superintendent, Sullivan Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8698.
    Pruitt v. Irvin, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8709.
    Stewart v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8719.
    Williams v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8722.
    Muhammad v. Florida Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8723.
    Morse v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8726.
    Richardson v. Broad Lane, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8728.
    Baptist v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8729.
    Kinchloe v. Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8730.
    Lassan v. City of Gulf Shores.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8731.
    Lee v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8735.
    Cittadino v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8736.
    Butler v. Pitzer, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8738.
    Alford v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8739.
    Duke v. Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8744.
    Hairston v. Idaho.
   Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8756.
    Penns v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8760.
    McLean v. Members of Virginia Board of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8761.
    Marsh v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8762.
    Murdock v. Washington et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8763.
    Atkins v. Tessmer, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8764.
    Coronado v. Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8773.
    Hill v. Brigano, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8784.
    Coutee v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8834.
    Kikuyama v. Maddock, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8845.
    Chappell v. Deeds, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8857.
    Farmer v. Trent, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8885.
    Sledge v. North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-8960.
    Atamian v. Gorkin.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9010.
    Garcia v. Henry.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9012.
    Fletcher v. North Carolina Department of Revenue et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9046.
    Paul v. Department of the Navy.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9059.
    Shayesteh v. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9066.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9082.
    McNeil v. Corcoran, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9093.
    Perez-De Angel v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9094.
    Romero-Cruz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9106.
    Anciso v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9109.
    Bollman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9125.
    Norfleet v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9129.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9132.
    Brocamonte v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9137.
    Griffin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9138.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9142.
    Forrest v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9145.
    Green v. Connecticut.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9147.
    Hakopian v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9148.
    George v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9149.
    Giovannangeli v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9150.
    Gedman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9152.
    Graham v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9153.
    Damerville v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9155.
    Holmes v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9156.
    Enigwe v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9157.
    Fairly v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9159.
    Dyson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9161.
    Rashid v. Reno, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9163.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9167.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9169.
    Betemit v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9173.
    Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9184.
    Patterson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9189.
    Buckley v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9192.
    Upshaw v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9197.
    Pena v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9200.
    Turner v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9203.
    Majors v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9204.
    Marino v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9211.
    Stone v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9215.
    Calderon-Espinoza v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9219.
    Mansilla-Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9226.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9239.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9240.
    Leslie v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9241.
    Stevenson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9242.
    Godwin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9243.
    Dehaney v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9246.
    Geers v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9254.
    Fuller v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9261.
    Coleman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9262.
    Alexander v. Flowers, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-9270.
    McSwain v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


author: Justice Thomas,

text:
    No. 99-781.
    Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., et al. v. Aguilar et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Justice Thomas,

dissenting.

“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963). The presumption is by no means rebutted here. For one, the unprecedented injunction entered by the courts below, which bars petitioner John Lawrence from uttering in the workplace any of a judicially drawn list of words deemed offensive to Latino employees, very likely suppresses fully protected speech. But even if some types of harassing speech in the workplace do not enjoy First Amendment protection, there has been no showing that a prior restraint, rather than the less severe remedy of money damages for any future violations, is necessary to regulate Lawrence’s speech. Further, the injunction here is not narrowly tailored, as it applies even to isolated remarks and to remarks outside the hearing of respondents or any Latino employee. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari.

I

Respondents, who are Latinos, were employed as drivers at petitioner Avis Rent A Car System, Ine.’s San Francisco airport facility. According to the complaint, Lawrence, another employee of the facility, routinely harassed only the Latino drivers, calling them derogatory names and demeaning them on the basis of their race, national origin, and lack of English language skills. Lawrence also appears to have engaged in uninvited touching of the Latino drivers. Respondents filed suit against Lawrence and Avis in California court under that State’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer ... or any other person, because of race ... [or] national origin ... to harass an employee or applicant.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12940(h) (West 1992). A jury returned special, verdicts in favor of respondents, finding that Lawrence had engaged in harassment and that Avis knew or should have known of Lawrence’s conduct. Respondents were each awarded $25,000 in damages, except for one who was found by the jury not to have suffered emotional distress.

The trial court then considered respondents’ request for in-junctive relief. Over the objection of petitioners that there was no evidence of ongoing harm such as would justify an injunction (Lawrence had not harassed anyone at work for two years), the trial court granted the requested injunction. Specifically, it ordered:

“1. Defendant John Lawrence shall cease and desist from using any derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanie/Latino employees of Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., and shall further refrain from any uninvited intentional touching of said Hispanic/Latino employees, as long as he is employed by Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. in California.
“2. Defendant Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. shall cease and desist from allowing defendant John Lawrence to commit any of the acts described in paragraph 1 above, under circumstances in which it knew or should have known of such acts . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. C2.

Lawrence and Avis appealed from the injunction portion of the judgment, claiming it is impermissibly overbroad and vague. The Court of Appeal agreed to an extent, holding that the injunction must be restricted to Lawrence’s speech in the workplace and articulated in the form of an exemplary list of forbidden words, but upheld the injunction in all other respects.

A divided California Supreme Court affirmed. 21 Cal. 4th 121 (1999). The plurality opinion, at the outset, declined to entertain petitioners’ contention that the First Amendment prohibits application of employment discrimination laws to the sort of harassing speech that creates a “hostile environment,” deeming the argument waived by petitioners’ decision not to challenge the jury findings of liability and damages for their past conduct. Id., at 131, n. 3, 136-137, n. 5. The plurality then turned to the propriety of the injunctive remedy, accepting at face value the trial court’s finding of a “ ‘substantial likelihood’ ” that Lawrence would harass again unless restrained. Id., at 132. The plurality rejected petitioners’ First Amendment objection, holding that the injunction is not an invalid prior restraint “because the order was issued only after the jury determined that defendants had engaged in employment discrimination, and the order simply precluded defendants from continuing their unlawful activity.” Id., at 138. A concurring opinion addressed the threshold question deemed waived by the plurality, concluding that, while FEHA’s restrictions are content based when applied to pure speech, the First Amendment does not prohibit such application of FEHA. Id., at 164,166 (opinion of Werdegar, J.). Justices Mosk, Kennard, and Brown each filed dissenting opinions. See id., at 169 (opinion of Mosk, J.); id., at 176 (opinion of Kennard, J.); id., at 189 (opinion of Brown, J.).

II

I would grant certiorari to address the troubling First Amendment issues raised by this injunction. Attaching liability to the utterance of words in the workplace is likely invalid for the simple reason that this speech is fully protected speech. No one claims that the words on the “exemplary list” (to be drafted by the trial court on remand) qualify as fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942), obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), or some other category of speech currently recognized as outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Even if these words do constitute so-called “low-value speech,” the content-based nature of FEHA’s restriction — which bars speech based upon “race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation,” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12940(h)(1) (West Supp. 2000) but not because of political affiliation, union membership, or numerous other traits — renders it invalid under our current jurisprudence. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 391 (1992).

To uphold the application of a content-based antidiscrimination law such as FEHA to pure speech in the workplace, then, we would have to substantially modify our First Amendment jurisprudence. This is not to say that there are no doctrinal bases for such a modification. As the concurring opinion below pointed out, for example, we have held that public employers retain some leeway to regulate their employees’ speech in the workplace, see 21 Cal. 4th, at 156 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983)), and have occasionally stated that speech may be more readily restricted when the audience is- “captive” and cannot avoid the objectionable speech, see 21 Cal. 4th, at 159 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988)). On the other hand, these analogies may not quite translate to the instant problem. See, e.g., 21 Cal. 4th, at 184-185 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (discussing captive audience doctrine); Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1821 (1992) (arguing that this Court’s cases on speech in the workplace do not support a “workplace speech exception” broad enough to justify harassment law). In light of the difficulty of these issues, it is not surprising that even those commentators who conclude the First Amendment generally permits application of harassment laws to workplace speech recognize exceptions where First Amendment interests are especially strong. See, e. g., Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 41, 47 (exception for speech that is reasonably designed or intended to contribute to reasoned debate on issues of public concern).

But even assuming that some pure speech in the workplace may be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment when it violates a workplace harassment law, special First Amendment problems are presented when, as here, the proscription takes the form of a prior restraint. We have, since Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), evaluated injunctions against speech as prior restraints, which entails the strictest scrutiny known to our First Amendment jurisprudence. As we have explained:

“The presumption against prior restraints is heavier — and the degree of protection broader — than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 558-559 (1975).

The instant injunction is insufficiently tailored in at least three respects, raising serious doubts concerning whether “the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994).

First, the injunction prohibits even a single utterance of a prohibited word. Yet a hostile environment for purposes of FEHA only arises “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with diserimina-tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 21 Cal. 4th, at 130 (plurality opinion) (“California courts have adopted the [Harris] standard in evaluating claims under the FEHA”). It simply cannot be known in advance whether a particular utterance will create (or recreate) a hostile environment under this standard, and speculation simply does not suffice to rebut the heavy presumption against a prior restraint. See Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 561; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 725-726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result”). The alternative remedy of a money damages judgment for future violations would solve the problem. Second, there has been no showing that the prospect of a money damages judgment for future violations would fall short of deterring petitioners from recreating a hostile environment, especially when a second money damages judgment might include hefty punitive damages and attorney’s fees. See 21 Cal. 4th, at 194 (Brown, J., dissenting). Indeed, it appears from the transcript of the injunction hearing held in 1994 that Lawrence had not engaged in any harassing speech or conduct since 1992. See App. to Brief in Opposition A9. Third, the prohibition applies without regard to whether the utterance is directed at, or within earshot of, respondents (or, for that matter, any Latino employee), and contains no exception for speech that might contribute to reasoned debate.

My colleagues are perhaps dissuaded from granting certiorari by the paucity of lower court decisions addressing the First Amendment implications of workplace harassment law, and by the incomplete factual record in this case. Neither is a persuasive reason to deny certiorari. First, we must remember that we deal here with a claim at the core of the First Amendment — that the State is suppressing speech that it dislikes. For the same reason that we evaluate prior restraints under a heavy presumption against their validity (the harm from delay), we should decide the issue now. And the thorough treatment of the issues by the several opinions below makes it especially unnecessary to await a split in the lower courts. Second, while it is true that the record does not reveal the past speech and conduct upon which the jury based its money damages award and the trial court based its grant of injunctive relief, the record does plainly indicate the scope of the injunction and the conclusory nature of the trial court’s findings as to the need for an injunction. Though the record may disable us from resolving here and now every detail of the interaction between the First Amendment and workplace harassment law, an incremental approach to this area would seem wise in any event. I respectfully dissent.

       Like the concurring and dissenting justices below, I do not consider this argument waived by virtue of petitioners’ decision not to appeal the money damages portion of the judgment. A First Amendment objection is, as a matter of logic, available against the money damages portion, the injunction portion, or both. Petitioners may well have thought their First Amendment claim weaker with respect to the money damages portion because Lawrence’s past conduct consisted of speech and conduct (whereas the injunction prohibits pure speech independent of any conduct), cf. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 478 (1941), and because prior restraints are especially suspect under the First Amendment, see, e. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 558-559 (1975).

       Although a content-neutral injunction is not treated as a prior restraint, see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U.S. 357, 372 (1997); Madsen, 512 U. S., at 763-764, n. 2, the instant injunction is indisputably content based. See 21 Cal. 4th 121, 164 (1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring); id., at 172 (Mosk, J., dissenting). I apply the Madsen standard here because, if the injunction fails the Madsen standard for content-neutral injunctions, a fortiori it fails whatever standard applies to content-based injunctions.


text:
    No. 99-1277.
    Philip Morris Inc. et al. v. Engle et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1533.
    M. C. Products et al. v. AT&T Corp.; and Audio Entertainment Network, Inc., et al. v. AT&T Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1351 (first judgment) and 1350 (second judgment).


text:
    No. 99-1534.
    Ray et al. v. Iwanski, Personal Administrator of the Estate of Iwanski, Deceased.
   C. A. 10th Cir.

Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1565.
    American Airlines, Inc. v. Cruz, for Herself and as Representative of Cruz and Rodriguez, Minors, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Air Transport Association of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1275.
    No. 99-1276.
    No. 99-1309.
    No. 99-6512.
    No. 99-6808.
    No. 99-6913.
    Scheidly v. Travelers Insurance Co., Greene v. Douglas et al., Chandler v. Chandler et al., James v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Genco v. United States et al., Genco v. United States District Court for the District of Oregon (two judgments), Mitchell v. United States, Ward v. Trent, Warden, Tsu et ux. v. Tracy Federal Bank et al., Watts v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Lindsey v. Catoe, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al., Solis Sosa v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Klumpp v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Lingar v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Taylor v. California, Ifabiyi, aka DeBrown, aka Bell, aka Bello v. United States, Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County, California, et al., Arrington v. Broward Community College, South Campus, Mendoza et al. v. Pennington et al., Madden v. United States,
   ante, p. 1054;

ante, p. 1038;

ante, p. 1054;

528 U. S. 1027;

528 U. S. 1065;

528 U. S. 1090;

No. 99-6978.

No. 99-7177.

No. 99-7178.

No. 99-7322.

No. 99-7676.

No. 99-7825.

No. 99-7860.

No. 99-7872.

No. 99-7982.

No. 99-8013.

No. 99-8029.

No. 99-8048.

No. 99-8072.

No. 99-8644.

528 U. S. 1056;

ante, p. 1055;

ante, p. 1023;

528 U. S. 1166;

ante, p. 1008;

ante, p. 1056;

ante, p. 1039;

ante, p. 1039;

ante, p. 1056;

ante, p. 1010;

ante, p. 1057;

ante, p. 1058;

ante, p. 1042; and

ante, p. 1079. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 23, 2000
    No. 99-9269.
    Richardson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    May 24, 2000
    No. 99-9577 (99A950).
    In re Foster.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Breyer, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    May 25, 2000
    No. 99-8297 (99A956).
    Clayton v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
   ante, p. 1059. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing out of time denied. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


author: Mr. Justice DANIEL

text:
    The President, Directors, and Company of the Miners’ Bank of Dubuque, Plaintiffs in Error, v. The State of Iowa, on the Relation of the District Prosecuting Attorney.
    Where a bank was chartered and its charter repealed by the legislature of a Territory, the question of the validity of the repealing act cannot be brought before this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
    The power of review is confined by that section to certain laws passed by States, and does not extend to those passed by territorial Legislatures.
    This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial District of the State of Iowa. Proceedings were commenced when Iowa was a Territory, but in the progress of the cause she was admitted as a State. The pleadings set forth the facts of the case.
    At the November term, 1845, of the District Court of Dubuque county, in the Territory of Iowa, the District Attorney of the United States filed the following information:
    James Grant, district prosecutor of the third Judicial District, who prosecutes for the United States, on leave granted, comes into said District Court of Dubuque county, at the court-house in Dubuque county, on the first Monday in November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, and for said United States gives the court to be informed and understand, that John Wharton, Patrick Quigley, Robert Waller, John Thompson, Peter Waples, Jesse P. Farley, and Timothy Davis, for the space of two months last past, and since, have had and still use, without any legal authority, the liabilities and franchises of President, Directors, and Company of the Miners’ Bank of Dubuque, and discount bills, loan money, buy and sell bills of exchange, and do all such other acts and things as bodies corporate for banking usually do.
    All which privileges, liabilities, and franchises, the said defendants have usurped, and still do usurp, upon said United States, to the great damage and prejudice thereof.
    Whereupon the said attorney prays the aid. of this court in the premises, and due process of law against said defendants, to answer to said United States by what warrants they claim to have and enjoy the liabilities, privileges, and franchises aforesaid.
    James Grant, Dist. Pros.

    Whereupon the attorney for the Bank filed the following plea, viz.:
    And the said John Wharton, Patrick Quigley, Robert Waller, John Thompson, Peter Waples, Jesse P. Farley, and Timothy Davis, President, Directors, and Co. &c.
    As to the said liabilities, franchises, and privileges, of the said President, Directors, and Company, of the Miners’ Bank of Dubuque, say that, by an act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, approved on the thirtieth day of November, in .the year of pur Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, which act, with alterations, was approved by Congress on the third'day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, said President, Directors, and Company were duly incor.porated as a company or body politic and corporate, with the privileges, liabilities, and franchises aforesaid; that by an act of Congress in session on the 12th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, the Territory of Wisconsin was divided, and the Territory of Iowa formed therefrom; and by this warrant the said defendants have, and during the time in said information mentioned, and still use the liabilities, privileges, and franchises, as they well might, and still may; without this, that said defendants have usurped, or do now usurp, said liabilities, franchises, and privileges, in manner and form as by said information is supposed; all which the said defendants are ready to verify; and wherefore they pray judgment, and that said liberties, franchises, and. privileges, above by them claimed, may be allowed and adjudged them, and that they may be herein dismissed, &c.
    Davis, Alty for Bank.

    The replication of the plaintiff was as follows:—
    And the said plaintiffs, for replication to said plea of said defendants; say, that the act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, by which said defendants claim the liberties, franchises, and privileges aforesaid, by an act of the Legislature of Iowa Territory, within whose jurisdiction the said corporate body existed, after the division of the Territory of Wisconsin, in force the tweutydirst day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty five, the said liabilities, privileges, and franchises, was repealed, disallowed, and declared for naught; and this he is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment, &c.
    James Grant, Dist. Pros. -

    The defendants rejoined, but afterwards had leave to file the following amended rejoinder:—
    The said defendants, as to the said replication of the said plaintiffs to the plea of defendants, say, that they ought not to be barred of the franchises, liberties, and privileges, secured to them by their aforesaid charter, because they say that the act of the said Legislature of Iowa aforesaid,- whereby it is supposed the said charter was repealed, was passed without the said corporation (defendants) having first failed to go into operation, and without having abused or misused its privileges; and this they are ready to verify.
    Davis & Smith, Atfys for Defendants.

    To this rejoinder the plaintiff demurred, and the. defendants joined in demurrer.
    At December term,1847-, the District Court gave the following judgment: —
    Thereupon, the demurrer is sustained by the court, with leave to the said defendants to answer over, but said defendants elect to abide by their aforesaid' amended rejoinder; and it being adjudged by the court now here, that the information filed in this case, and the matters and things therein charged are true, it is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said defendants, and all others acting by, through, or under them, be ousted, and altogether and forever excluded from .all such corporate rights, privileges, and franchises, of the President, Directors, and Company of the Miners’ Bank of Dubuque; that the corporation of said President, Directors, and Company be dissolved, and that the plaintiffs have and recover of and from the said defendants their costs about their suit in this behalf expended, and that they have execution therefor.
    The Bank appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court; and a writ of error brought the case up to this court.
    It was argued by Mr. Lawrence, for the plaintiff in error,
    who said that the principal question in the case was whether the legislature could repeal the charter of the Bank without evidence of misuse or abuse of its corporate privileges. His argument on this point need not be stated,-as the case went off upon a question of jurisdiction.
   Mr. Justice DANIEL

delivered the opinion of the court.

By a statute approved on the 20th of April, 1836. Congress, within the boundaries designated by that statute, established the territorial government of Wisconsin, (vid. 5 Stat. at Large, 10 to 16); and by a subsequent law, approved June the 12th, 1838, Congress divided the Territory of Wisconsin, and established over what had formed a portion of that territory, the territorial government of Iowa, (vid. 5 Stat. at Large, 235 to 241.) On the 3d of March, 1845, the Territory of Iowa was admitted into the Union, as one of the States of this confederacy, (vid. 5 Stat. at Large, 742,) and on the 3d day of March, 1847, the like admission was extended to the Territory of Wisconsin. Yid. 9 Stat. at Large, 178. By what may be termed the organic laws creating the governments' of both the territories above-mentioned, it will be seen, that those governments.were vested with general legislative power; and were subjected to no enumerated or specific limitations of that general power, save in certain exceptions applicable to the lands or other property of the United States, and to the right on the part of those governments, in exercising the power of taxation, to discriminate between the property of residents and non-residents. The language of the provisions, here referred to is identical in the laws establishing each of these territories, and is in the following words: That the legislative power, of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil, no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States, nor shall the lands or other property of non-residents be taxed higher than the lands of residents.” Each of those provisions contains the- following declaration: “ All laws of the governor and legislative assembly shall be submitted to, and if disapproved by the Congress of the United States, the same shall be null and of no effect.” Vid. 5 Stat. at Large, p. 13, and ib. p. 237, sec. 6.

By a law of the territorial Legislature of Wisconsin, approved on the 30th of November, 1836, the plaintiffs in error were created a corporation by the style of the Miners’ Bank of Dubuque, to continue until the 1st day of May 1851. Vid. acts. of Legislature of. Wisconsin of 1836, p.. 18; No. 7. By an act of Congress, approved on the 3d of March, 1837, (5. Stat. at Large, 198,) the charter granted by the Legislature of Wisconsin was disapproved and annulled in certain particulars; but allowed and left in force as to the provisionslnot thus vacated, and contained, amongst other provisions, (section 23,) the following: “ That this act be and the same is hereby declared to be a public act, and that the sainé be for the time before limited, construed in all courts and places benignly, and favorably, for every beneficial purpose therein mentioned.. Provided, that if such corporation shall fail to go into operation, or shall abuse or misuse their privileges under this charter, it shall be in the power of the legislative assembly of this Territory at any time to annul, vacate, and. make void this charter.” " After the separation of Iowa from. Wisconsin, the Legislature of the former Territory, (the Bank of Dubuque being situated within the government thereof,) by an act of the 21st of May, 1845, repealed the act of incorporation of the Miners’ Bank; directed, under the supervision of the court of the District, the settlement by trustees of the affairs of that corporation, and the distribution of its assets amongst the creditors and stockholders thereof. Vid. Laws of Iowa Ter. c. 31. In pursuance of this law, the prosecuting attorney for the Territory, on the 10th of August, 1845, filed an information in the nature of a writ of quo war rapto against the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of Dubuque, as usurpers, upon the authority of the United States, of the privileges and franchises of a banking corporation. To this information the plaintiffs pleaded the act of incorporation by the Legislature of Wisconsin, as altered by the act of Congress, and the division of the Territory of Wisconsin, and the creation of the government of Iowa, in justification of their corporate rights. To this plea, it is replied for the United States, that the Act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, by which the defendants were incorporated, had, after the separation of the territories, been repealed by an act of the Legislature of Iowa, within whose jurisdiction the corporation existed. The plaintiffs in error (the defendants below) rejoined, that the repealing act of the Legislature of Iowa had been passed without the said, corporation having failed to go into operation, and without having misused or abused its privileges. On behalf of the United States there was a demurrer to this rejoinder, and in the mean time the Territory of Iowa having become a State, this case was tried before the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial District of the State, by which tribunal the demurrer was sustained, and judgtnent of ouster pronounced against the Bank.

By the plaintiffs in error it is insisted, that the averments in their rejoinder being admitted by the demurrer, it follows ex consequenti, that the repealing law of the Territory of Iowa was unconstitutional, as a law arbitrarily abrogating.the charter of the Bank, and therefore a law impairing the obligation of a con* tract. In reviewing this case thus made, this court do not consider themselves called upon to test either the power of the government of Iowa for the enactment ■ of the statute complained of, the coincidence or incompatibility of that statute with the 10th section of the first article of the Constitution, or regularity of the proceedings in the court below. At the threshold of their examination of this case, they are met by an inquiry far more important and controlling than either of these, viz., an inquiry into their own authority to effect, under any aspect under which this case is presented to them, the result which is sought at their hands? Whatever authority there exists in this court to reexamine and reverse the judgments or decrees of the courts, not those regularly appertaining to the organized judicial system of the United States, such authority must be traced to the 25th section of the law establishing the “ Judicial Courts of the United States,” by which section alone the power of this court for the purposes above stated was created and is clearly defined. By recurrence to that section it will be perceived, in order to give the corrective power to this tribunal, that, by the decision of the State court, there must have been “ drawn in question, the validity of a statute or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision be against their-validity ;” or it must be “where is drawn in question the validity or statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed under such clause of the Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission.” By a comparison of the record before us with the section of the Judiciary Act above quoted, we think it nowhere apparent, that there has been, by the decision of the Court of Iowa, 'drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United State much less that there has been a decision against the validity of either; or that, there has been drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of any treaty or statute of or commission held under the United States, and a decision adverse to the validity of the latter. And it may be observed^ that every, requisite to form a ground of jurisdiction enumerated in each of thé predicaments comprised in the statute, must combine in order to give to this' court the power invoked by the plaintiffs m error. The alleged wrong which the court are cabed on to redress, is not an act of State power at all; it is an act of the territorial government of Iowa, by which was repealed an act of the preceding territorial govern¿nent of Wisconsin; consequently the decision of the court below asserted no State act or power in opposition to the Constitution,treaties, or laws, or to a commission or atithority of, or under the United States, and presents therefore no ground of jurisdiction here, either as derived from the language of the statute, or from any construction heretofore given of it. If the question whether a writ of error would lie from this court to review the acts of the territorial governments could'ever have been regarded as in any sense equivocal upon the language of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, such a question could not now be considered as open, under the express adjudications previously ruled by this court.. Thus in the case of Scott v. Jones, 5 Howard, p. 343, it was expressly declared, — “ That an objection to the validity of a statute on the ground that the legislature which passed it were not competent or duly’organized, under, the acts of Congress and the Constitution, so as to pass valid statutes, is not within the cases, enumerated in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, and therefore this court has no jurisdiction over the subject. That in order to give this court jurisdiction, the statute, the validity of which is drawn in question,- must be passed by a State a member of the Union, and a public body owing obedience and conformity to its Constitution and laws. That if public bodies, not duly admitted into the Union, undertake as States, to pass laws which might encroach on the Union or its granted powers, such conduct would have to be reached either by the power of the Union to put down insurrection, or by the ordinary penal laws of the States or Territories within which these bodies axe situated and acting: but their measure's are not examinable by this court upon a writ of error. They are not States, and cannot pass statutes within the meaning of the Judiciary acts.” Other eases cited by the court, in the opinion just quoted, might be adduced to show the difference ever taken by the court in reference to its relation to the States as States, and as contradistinguished from the Territories of the United States. It seems to us, that the control of these territorial governments properly appertains to that branch of-the government which creates' and can change or modify them to meet its views of public policy,' viz.-: the Congress of the United States. That control certainly has not been vested in this court, either in mode or in substance, by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.

It has been argued in this case, that as Congress, in creating the territorial governments of Wisconsin and Iowa, reserved to themselves the power of disapproving and thereby annulling the acts of those governments, and had, in,the exercise of that power, stricken out several of the provisions of the charter of-the Bank of Dubuque, enacted by the Legislature of Wisconsin, assenting to the residue ; that therefore the charter of this Bank should be regarded as an act of Congress, rather than of the territorial government; and consequently the decision of the State court, in favor of the repealing law of Iowa, must be held to be one in which was drawn in question and overruled the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under the United States, and as a decision also .against á right, title, or privilege set up under a statute of the United States. The fallacy of this argument is easily detected. Congress, in creating the territorial governments, and in conferring upon them .power's of general legislation, did not, from obvious principles of policy and necessity, ordain a suspension of all acts proceeding from those powers, until expressly sanctioned by themselves, whilst for considerations equally strong they reserved the power of disapproving or annulling such acts of territorial legislation as might be deemed detrimental. A different system of procedure would have been fatal to all practical improvement in those territories, however urgently called for ; nay, might have disarmed them of the very power of self-preservation. An invasion, or insurrection, or any other crisis demanding the most strenuous action, would have had to remain without preventive or remedy, till Congress', if not in session, could be convened, or when in session, must have awaited its possibly procrastinated aid.

The argument would render also the acts of the territorial governments, even the most wholesome and necessary, and though indispensably carried to the extreme of authority, obnoxious to the Charge of usurpation or criminality. The reverse of this argument, whilstitis accordant with the investiture of general' legislative power .in the territorial governments, places them in the position of usefulness and advantage towards those they were bound to foster, and subjects them at the same time to-proper restraints from their superior. The charter of the Bank of Dubuque enacted in all its details and powers ever possessed by it, (and according to which it >vas in fact organized,) by the Legislature of Wisconsin, must be looked upon as the creature of that legislature. To regard it, as we are urged to do by the argument for the plaintiff in error, would constitute it rather a Bank of the United States, situated without the United States, and operating within the Territory of Wisconsin, now the State of Iowa, independently- of the power or local policy of that State, and beyond the reach of its faculties or obligations to be exerted for its own citizens. We think that the positions, urged for the plaintiff in error, leave the objections to the jurisdiction as above stated, in their full force. We regard both the charter granted by Wisconsin, and the repeal of that charter by Iowa, alike as acts of the territorial authorities, and not as the acts of any State of this Union; and that as such, this court has no power, by writ of error, to take cognizance of them in virtue of, and for the objects designated by, the 25th .section of the. Judiciary’ Act.

We therefore adjudge that the writ of error in this case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial District of the State of Iowa, and was argued by counsel — ■ on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.


text:
    William Binns and C. Stockton Halstead, Plaintiffs, v. Cornelius W. Lawrence.
    The Tariff Act, passed in 1846, (9 Stat. at Large, p. 44,) enacted duties on glass, as follows, viz.
    “ Schedule B. Forty per centum ad valorem, Glass cut.
    “ Schedule C. Thirty per centum ad valorem, Glass tumblers, plain, moulded, or “ pressed; not cut or punted.”
    The following classes of tumblers fall within Schedule B, and are chargeable with a duty of forty per centum, viz.
    1. Glass tumblers, the entire surface of the bottom of which had been smoothed by the . glasscutter or grinder, previous to .their importation into the United States.
    2. Glass tumblers, on the sides of which ornamental figures had been engraved by the glasscutter or engraver, previous to their importation into the United States.
    This cause was brought up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, on a certificate of division' in opinion between the judges thereof.
    It was an action brought up by the plaintiffs against the Collector of New York for the return of certain duties, paid under-protest, and charged to have been illegally exacted upon the importation of glass tumblers.
    The tariff of 3d August, 1846, (9 Stat. at Large, pp. 44 45, chap. 74,) enacted duties on glass, as follows, viz.:
    “ Schedule B. Forty per centum ad valorem.
    “ Glass cue
    “ Schedule C. Thirty per centum ad valorem.

      Glass tumblers, plain, moulded, or pressed; not cut ■ or punted.” *
    The demand of the plaintiffs, Binns & Halstead, for alleged Overcharge of duties paid to the collector, was founded on the importations of glass tumblers of two kinds:
    1. Glass tumblers, the entire surface of the bottom of which had been smoothed by the glasscutter, or grinder, previous to their importation into the United States.
    2. Glass tumblers, on the sides of ,which ornamental figures had been engraved by the glasscutter, or engraver, previous to theix importation into the United States.
    Upon these tumblers the collector charged a duty of forty per cent, classing them uixder schedule B. In ten importations this duty of forty per cent, arnounted to $6,695.70, whereas the plaintiffs alleged that it was '$730.20 too much, averring that the tumblers properly belonged to Schedule C, and to recover this excess the present action was brought.
    Upon the trial the jury found a verdict for the defendant. But upon the trial the counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to the charge Of the court, which exception wás reserved for argument.
    Upon which said argument it occurred as a question whether, according to the true construction of the act of Congress of 30th July, 1846, entitled, “ Ah act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes,” glass tumblers, the, bottoms Of which have been smoothed or flattened by the process of cutting or grinding, and glass tumblers which have been engraved on the sides by a similar proeéss, should be charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, under Schedule B of said act, as glass cut,” or with the duty of 30 per centum ad valorem, under Schedule C of said act, as “glass tumblers, plain, moulded or pressed, not cut or punted.”
    On which question the opinions of the judges of the court were opposed.
    Whereupon, on motion of the said plaintiffs, by their counsel, that the point upon which the disagreement hath happened may, during the term, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of this court to the Supreme Court to be finally decided: .
    It is ordered, that the following statement of facts, which is made under the direction of the judges, be certified according to the request of the said plaintiffs, and the statute in such case made and provided.

      (Statement of Facts.

    That the tumblers in question consisted of two kinds, as follows :

      1. Glass tumblers, the entire surface' of the bottoms of which had been smoothed by the glasscutter, or grinder, previous to their importation by the plaintiffs.
    2. Glass tumblers, on the sides of which ornamental figures had been engraved by the glasscutter or engraver, previous to such importation,
    That the tumblers in question, of the first class, are only known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as “ plain tumblers,” or ás “ plain smooth-bottomed tumblers,” or as “ plain tumblers with flattened-bottoms.”
    That the tumblers in question of the second class are only known in trade and commerce in said city as “ engraved tumblers.”
    That the tumblers in question (of both classes) aré not known in trade and commerce in said city as “ cut glass.”
    That all the material witnesses for the plaintiffs were merchants, importing and dealing in glassware.
    That all the material witnesses for the defendant were manufacturers of glassware, or glasscutters and grinders.
    That the designation “ cut glass,” as used in trade' and commerce in said city, applies only to tumblers, the sides of which have been cut or ground, and that the importers of glassware and dealers in glassware, in said city, do not consider tumblers of the description in question in this suit as coming within the designation, and if they received an order from a customer for “ cut glass tumblers,” would not regard it as including either smooth-bottomed or engraved tumblers..
    That by the testimony of the manufacturers and operatives, glass tumblers are manufactured entirely by the glassblower, or in part by the glassblower and in part by the glasscutter or grinder, and that glass-blowing and glass-cutting are distinct and separate trades, and processes of manufacture.
    By the same witnesses. That the bottoms of glass tumblers, manufactured entirely by the glassblower are rough, particularly in the centre, being there broken off from the punt or stick on which made ; and that when sold in this condition such, tumblers are known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as “ plain ” or “ plain rough-bottomed tumblers.”
    By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter, or grinder, by whom the centre of the bottoms of tumblers is cut or smoothed, for the purpose of removing the particular roughness of that part of the tumbler, and that the process of thus putting or smoothing the centre of the bottoms of such tumblers is colled punting ; and that tumblers manufactured by the .glassblower, but the centre part- of the bottoms of which have been somut or smoothed by the glass-cutter, are known in trade and commerce as “ punted ” tumblers.
    By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter or grinder, by whom the entire surface of the bottoms of such tumblers is cut or smoothed, and that tumblers manufactured by the glassblower, but the entire bottoms of which have been cut or smoothed by the glasscutter or grinder,, are known in trade and commerce as “ plain tumblers,” or as “ plain smoothed-bottomed tumblers,” or as “ plain tumblers with flattened bottoms,” and are similar to the tumblers iñ question of the first class.
    By the same witnesses. That tumblers known in trade and commerce, and amongst manufacturers, as “ moulded tumblers,” or “ pressed tumblers,” are also made entirely by the glassblower, and are also rough-bottomed until subjected to the process of punting, or smoothing and cutting above described.
    By the same witnesses. That all cutting of glass is done by means of grinding upon wheels, and that there is no such thing as the cutting of glass in the manufacture of “ cut glass” in any other way.
    By the same witnesses. That the cutting or smoothing of the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is •done by the glasscutter, and that the process of cutting and smoothing is identical with that of punting, except that it extends to the entire surface'of the bottom of the tumblers, whereas the “ punting ” is limited, as above stated, to the centre of the bottom merely.
    By the same witnesses. ' That the process of “ punting,” and the process of “ cutting or smoothing” the bottoms of the tumblers in question, are identical in their operation with that of cutting the sides of tumblers, known in trade and commerce as “cut-glass.”
    It is proved that the time required to cut. or smoothe the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is four or five times as long as that required for “ punting ” the bottoms of punted tumblers; and that tumblers with the bottoms cut or smoothed cost from 18 to 22 cents per dozen more than punted tumblers.
    It was proved that the “ punted ” tumblers are charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem Under the Tariff Act of 1846.
    It . was proved by the manufacturers and operatives that the process of engraving the tumblers of the second class is similar to that of cutting the tumblers of the first class, but is a finer species of work, requiring more- experienced and skilful workmen, and the use of copper wheels instead of wood and stone wheels, and oil and emery, instead of sand.

      All which we have caused by these presents to be exemplified, and the seal of the said Circuit Court to be hereunto affixed.
    Witness the Hon. Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the city of New York, this first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, and of the independence, of the United States the seventy-fourth.
    Alexander Gardiner, Clerk.

    I, Samuel R. Betts, one of the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York, in the second circuit, do hereby -certify, that the foregoing exemplification is in due form of law.
    Samuel R. Betts.
    It was argued by Mr. Patten for the plaintiff, and Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General,) for the defendant.
    The points for the plaintiffs were as follows:—
    1. That the tariff laws are to be construed according to the commercial sense of the terms used in them. Lee v. Lincoln, 1 Story, 610; U. S. v. 112 Casks Sugar, 8 Pet. 277; Bacon v. Bancroft, 1 Story, 341; U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Henry W. Sill et al. v. Cornelius W. Lawrence, Collector, MS., before Justice Nelson, U. S. C., New York.
    ' 2. That statutes laying restrictions upon trade, or which lay .an excise or tax upon it, are to be construed strictly. Sewall v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412; and that the court cannot, therefore, look for the intent of the framers beyond the ordinary and natural import of the language used.
    3. That the words “ plain tumblers,” in the second clause upon this subject, in schedule C, are to be taken as used in commerce. Tariff Laws of July, 1846, p. 42; schedule B, “ glass cut,” p. 44; schedule C, p. 45, Boston edition; Tariff, 1842, p. 552, sec. 5.
    4. That in commerce the tumblers in question are known as “ plain tumblers.”
    5. That no other tumblers, either in commerce or manufacture, are known simply as plain tumblers. U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369.

      Mr. Crittenden, for the defendant, contended—
    1. • That whether the tumblers in question were • or were not of “ glass cut,” was a question of fact. Upon that question the evidence is clear in favor of the verdict.
    That tumblers of glass punted are “ glass cut ” is undeniable upon the evidence of the manufacturers; and upon the same evidence it is equally clear that tumblers of glass with ornamental^figures engraved on them are “ glass cut,” and so both descriptions of the tumblers, about which the suit was brought, are within schedule B, and subject to a duty of forty per cent, ad valorem.
    The descriptions, in schedule' B, of “ glass cut,” and in schedule C, of “ glass tumblers, plain, moulded, or pressed, not cut or punted,” do not leave ropm for argument.
    Both classes of the imported tumblers in question had been cut, pimted, smoothed, and, ground by the glasscutter; none of them were plain and uncut, as they were from the hands of the glassblower, añd therefore cannot be brought to the lower duty of thirty per cent, ad valorem according to schedule C.-
    The maxim, “ Cuique in sua arte credendum est,” applies to the evidence of the manufacturers of glass introduced by the collector.

      2. Upon the. statements appearing upon the record, there is no ground for a new trial.
    It is not possible to mistify and make intricate the matters of fact. That the tumblers- of glass in question were “ glass cut,” tumblers of glass punted, tumblers with ornamental figures cut upon them, and not “ glass tumblers,’ plain, moulded, or pressed, not cut or punted,” cannot be made more lucid by argument than -by the testimony given. Importing merchants- cannot demolish facts, change the qualities and substance of things, alter the descriptions and meaning of schedules B and C, in the tariff of 1846, nor evade their effect by arbitrary names, which they may think fit to give to things imported by them.
   Mr. Justice DANIEL

delivered the opinion of -the court.

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, importers of glassware, against the defendant as collector of - the port of New York, to recover a certain • amount of money-paid under protest to the defendant as collector, for duties exacted by him upon glass tumblers imported by the plaintiffs at. the period Set forth in an exhibit filed in the cause, by which are also shown, the duties charged by and paid to the defendant, and the amount claimed by the plaintiffs, as having been improperly exacted; this last amount, consisting in each instance of the. difference between the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, charged under schedule B of the Tariff Act of July 30th, 1846, as on importations of “ glass cut,” and the duty of 30 per centum ad valorem, at which rate the plaintiffs, claimed to enter their importations of glass above-mentioned, under schedule C of the same act of Congress, as “ glass ttimbler3 plain, moulded, . or pressed, not cut or pimted,

The question of law upon the construction of the Statute Of 1846 upon which the judges differed in opinion, and the facts of the case, out of which that question has grown, cannot he stated with greater clearness .or with more succinctness of form, than they have been in the certificate from the Circuit Court.

This cause having been tried before his honor Justice Nelson, on the 3d of November, 1848, the jury impanelled returned a verdict for the defendant. The counsel for the plaintiff having excepted to the charge of the presiding judge on the trial, the cause was heard upon the exception reserved for the plaintiff, involving the question whether, according to the true construction of the Act of Congress of 30th of July, 1846, entitled “ An net reducing the duty on imports and for other purposes,” glass tumblers, the bottoms of which have, been smoothed or flattened by the process of cutting or grinding, and glass tumblers which have been engraved on the si .es by a similar process, should be charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, under schedule B of said act, as “ glass cut,” or with the duty of 30 per centum- ad valorem, under schedule C of said act, as “glass tumblers plain, moulded, or pressed, not cut or punted.”

On which question the opinion of the judges of the court were opposed.

Whereupon, on motion of the said plaintiffs by their counsel, that the point upon which the disagreement hath happened may, during the term, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of this court to the Supreme Court to be finally decided.

It is ordered, that the following statement of facts, which is made under the direction of the judges, .be certified according to the request of the said plaintiffs, and the statute in such case made and provided.

Statement of Facts.

That the tumblers in question consisted of two kinds, as follows:

1. Glass tumblers, the entire surface of the bottoms of which had been smoothed by the glasscutter or grinder, previous to their importation by the plaintiffs.

2. ' Glass tumblers, on the «sides of which ornamental figures had been engraved by the glasscutter or engraver, previous to such importation.

That the tumblers in question of the first class, are only known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as “ plain tumblers,” or as plain smooth-bottomed tumblers,” or as “ plain tumblers with flattened bottoms.”

That the tumblers in question of the second class, are only known in trade and commerce in said city as “ engraved turn-biers?’

That the' tumblers in question (of both classes) are not known in trade and commerce in said city as “ cut glass.”

That all the material witnesses' for the plaintiffs were merchants, importing and dealing in glassware.

That all the material witnesses for the defendant were manufacturers of glassware, or glasscutters and grinders.

That the designation “ cut glass,” as used in 'trade and commerce in said city, applies only to tumblers the sides of which have been cut or ground, and that 'the importers of glassware and dealers in glassware in said city, do not consider tumblers of the description in 'question in this suit, as coming within the designation, and if they received an order from a customer for “ cut glass tumblers,” would not regard it as including either smooth-bottomed or engraved tumblers.

That by the testimony of the manufacturers and operatives, glass tumblers are manufactured entirely by the glassblower, or in part by the glassblower and in part by the glass-cutter or grinder, and that glass-blowing and glass-cutting are distinct and separate trades, and processes of manufacture.

By the same witnesses. That the bottoms of glass tumblers manufactured entirely by the glassblower, are rough, particularly in the centre5 being theie broken off from the punt or stick on which made; and that when sold in this condition, such tumblers are known in trade and commerce in the city of New York as “plain” or “plain rough-bottomed tumblers.”

By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter, or grinder, by whom the centre of the bottoms of such tumblers is cut or smoothed, for the purpose of removing the particular roughness of that part of the tumbler, and that the process- of thus cutting or smoothing the centre of the bottoms of such tumblers is called punting; and that tumblers manufactured by the glassblower, but the centre part of the .bottoms of which have- been so cut or smoothed by the glasscutter, are known in trade and commerce as “ punted ” tumblers.

By the same witnesses. That, after their completion by the glassblower, such rough-bottomed tumblers frequently pass into the hands of the glasscutter or grinder, by whom the entire surface of the 'bottoms of such tumblers is cut or smoothed, and that tumblers manufactured by the glassblower, but the entire bottoms of which have been cut or smoothed by the glasscutter or grinder, are known in trade and commerce as “ plain tumblers,” or.as “plain smoothed-bottomed tumblers,” or as “plain tumblers with flattened bottoms,” and are similar to the tumblers in question of the first class.

By the same witnesses. That tumblers known in trade and commerce, and amongst manufacturers as “ moulded tumblers,” or “ pressed tumblers,” are also made entirely by the glassblower; and are also rough-bottomed until subjected to the process of punting, or smoothing and cutting above described.

By the same witnesses. That all cutting of glass is done by means of grinding upon wheels, and that there is no such thing as the cutting of glass in the manufacture of “cut glass ” in any other way.

By the same witnesses. That the cutting or smoothing of the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is done by the glasscutter, and that the process of cutting and smoothing is identical with that of punting, except that it extends to the entire surface of the bottom of the tumblers, whereas the “ punting ” is limited, as above stated, to the centre of the bottom merely.

By the same witnesses. That the process of “ punting,” and the process of “ cutting or smoothing ”■ the bottoms of the tumblers in question, are identical in their operation with that of cutting the sides of tumblers, known in trade and commerce as “ cut glass.”

It was proved that the time required to cut or smoothe the bottoms of the tumblers in question, (of the first class,) is four or five times as long as that required for “ punting ” the bottoms of punted tumblers ; .and that tumblers with the bottoms cut or-smoothed cost from 18 to 22 cents per dozen more than punted tumblers.

It was proved that the “ punted ’’.tumblers are charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem under the Tariff Act of 1846.

It was proved by the manufacturers and operatives, that the process of engraving the tumblers of the second class is similar to that of cutting the tumblers of the first class, but is a finer species of work, requiring more experienced and skilful workmen, and the use of copper wheels instead of wood and stone wheels, and oil and emery instead of sand.

The question referred to this court by the aforegoing certificate, and the solution of that questimi, are supposed to lie within a comparatively narrow compass. In the construction of the Act of Congress of July 30th, 1846, as in that of every other statute, one cardinal rule must govern, and it is this; that wherever the will or intention of the lawmaking power is declared in plain and unequivocal terms, that will or intention must be followed — absolutely followed. It would not be admissible under such circumstances, to attempt a control or modification of that will, by speculations df policy or by facts or opinions derived aliunde, as' such a proceeding would in effect operate a repeal of the positive law, or the abrogation of a superior power, by what were the just and regular subjects of its operation. Where a statute maybe ambiguous in its language, or may have reference to facts or conclusions dependent on usage, the influence of opinion or the proof of established usage may be proper or even indispensable, in fixing the just interpretation of the law, but it is only in instances like these last mentioned, that such a rule of interpretation can be tolerated.

The question presentéd upon the certificate from the Circuit Court will be considered, 1st, with'reference to the language of the Tariff Act of July 30th, 1846; and-next upon the import of the facts proved in the case, upon the hypothesis that those facts could at all affect the rule of interpretation.

In schedule B, part of the act above-mentioned, laying an impost of 40 per centum on all articles embraced within it, the only description of glass mentioned, is that designated as “glass cut” Its distinguishing characteristic, that brings the article Within the j urview of that schedule is, that it be cut; the figure, or the extent in which the process of cutting should have been applied, was nowhere defined by the statute; and it must be obvious, that any attempt to define or describe that which may, and must indeed be as diverse as the sldll, the taste, or the prospect of profit on the part of the manufacturer, would have been utterly nugatory. But it could be easily, understood, both by the law-maker and by others, that the oeauty, the quality, and the price of glass are heightened by the process of cutting, and it was equally notorious or susceptible of proof, that the process of cutting is accomplished by but one species of operation, viz.: the operation of grinding. It would appear plain then, that all glass subjected to this one known process, as being enhanced in value, was designed to fall within the description in the statute of “glass cut”

The articles of glassware enumerated in schedule C, as being subject to an impost of 30 per centum, are thus described, viz.: glass tumblers plain, moulded, or' pressed, “not cut or punted.” Upon the language of the description just quoted it would seem too clear for cavil, that cut or punted tumblers, cannot be placed in the same class with those .that are enumerated as “plain, moulded, or pressed,” but are carefully contradistinguished from these last denominations. Out or punted tumblers, therefore, even if these two terms could be understood as having different significations and were not applicable merely to different degrees of cutting or grinding, do not fall under the lower rate of duty but all cut tumblers, no matter in what part, in what figures, or to what extent they are cut, and all punted tumblers, were by the act of Congress of July 30th, 1846, subject to a duty of 40 'per cent, upon the proper construction of the language of the statute. An effort has been made to control this language, by introducing the opinions of certain dealers in glass, and of other persons in the city of New York, to show, that tumblers, the' entire bottom of which are ground or smoothed by the glass-cutter, and tumblers the sides of which are wrought and ornamented by the same means, are not considered as cut, but are held to be the first plain, and the second engraved tumblers. The sum of the argument thus attempted, when tested by common sense, amounts to this: That the process of grinding or cutting, when applied to the entire surface of the bottom of tumblers, or to the ornamenting of their sides, although it be the identical process and the only one by which cut glass is manufactured, is not cutting, but something less; and that the manufacturing -of cut glass, means something else or beyond the only process by which cut glass is ever made. The integrity or indeed the intelligibility of this argument, this court are unable to perceive. It cannot be sustained in opposition to the language of the statute, in violation of consistency, and against the weight of the testimony in the cause, upon mere arbitrary and unfounded assumption, or upon opinion entertained within a limited theatre, and this by persons whose interests are involved in and would be advanced by that assumption. The weakness of this assumption is further exposed by recurrence to facts stated by manufacturers and found in the record, in strict conformity with Which, the distinction made in the statute appears to have been taken.

Thus it is proved, that tumblers are manufactured either entirely by the glassblower, or in part by the glassblower, and in part by the cutter or grinder; and that glass-blowing and glass-cutting are distinct and separate trades and processes of manufacture. It is further shown, in proof, that the bottoms of tumblers manufactured entirely by the glassblower, are rough in the centre, being there broken off from the putit or stick in which they are made; that after their completion as far as can be by the glassblower, they pass into the hands of the cutter or grinder, by whom the centre of the bottom is cut or smoothed, and that the process of thus cutting or smoothing the centre of the bottoms of these tumblers, is called punting. Again it is in proof, that the tumblers, as made by the glassblower, are frequently passed to the cutter or grinder, by whom the entire surface of the bottom is cut or smoothed; and it is the tumbler, thus cut and finished by the glasscutter, that is said to be known in the trade in New York as “ the plain tumbler,” or as the “ plain, smoothed-bottomed tumbler.” It is also proved, that the cutting and smoothing the bottom of the tumbler is effected by the identical process which is applied in punting, the only difference consisting in the fact, that in the former operation it extends to the entire surface, instead. of being limited to the point at which the tumbler was separated from the punt or stick. “ Cut or punted tumblers are expressly distinguished in the statute from glass tumblers, plain, moulded, or pressed.” Punted tumblers, it is clearly shown by the facts certified, are made by the operation of cutting or grinding the centre of the bottom; the smoothing of the entire bottoms of tumblers, is merely the application of the same process, to a greater extent; how this extended application can cause those tumblers subjected to it to be considered less as cut glass, than if they were merely punted, or cut at a small point of the bottom, presents a problem not easy of solution. Could these tumblers, with the entire bottom or sides cut or ground, be, with any propriety of language, denominated “plain tumblers,” or “plain, smoothed-bottomed tumblers,” they still are not the less “ plain tumblers,” or “ plain, smoothed-bottomed tumblers,” or- “ plain tumblers with flattened bottoms,” or “ engraved tumblers ” so constituted by the operation of cutting or grinding. In this view of the question certified, it is the opinion of this court, that glass tumblers, having the entire surface or bottom smoothed or polished, or their sides figured or ornamented by cutting or grinding, come regularly within the operation of schedule B of the Tariff Act of July 30th, 1846, and are, within the intent and meaning of that schedule, subject to a duty of 40 per centum.act valorem, as glass cut; and we order it to be so certified to the- Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of Nevy York.

Order.

This causé came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the .United States for the Southern District of New York, and on the point or question on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion, of this court, that, according to the trué construction of the act of Congress of 30th July, 1846, entitled “ An Act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes,” glass tumblers, the bottoms of which have been smoothed or flattened by the process of cutting or grinding, and glass tumblers which have been engraved on the sides by a similar process, should be charged with the duty of 40 per centum ad valorem, under schedule B of said act, as cut glass. Whereupon, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.