author: Justice Scaiia Justice Ginsburg,

text:
    NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP. v. GARRIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF GARRIS, DECEASED
    No. 00-346.
    Argued April 18, 2001
    Decided June 4, 2001

      James T. Ferrini argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kimbley A. Kearney, Melinda S. Kollross, Robert M. Tata, and Carl D. Gray.

      Patrick H. O’Donnell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John R. Grumpier, Jr.

   Justice Scaiia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this ease is whether the negligent breach of a general maritime duty of care is actionable when it causes death, as it is when it causes injury.

I

According to the complaint that respondent filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, her son, Christopher Garris, sustained injuries on April 8, 1997, that caused hid death one day later. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53. The injuries were suffered while Garris was performing sandblasting work aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless in the employ of Tidewater Temps, Inc., a subcontractor for Mid-Atlantic Coatings, Inc., which was in turn a subcontractor for petitioner Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. And the injuries were caused, the complaint continued, by the negligence of petitioner and one of its other subcontractors, since dismissed from this case. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States when Garris was injured, respondent invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2, cl. 1; 28 U. S. C. §1333, and prayed for damages under general maritime law. She also asserted claims under the Virginia wrongful-death statute, Va. Code Ann. §§8.01-50 to 8.01-56 (2000).

The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim, for the categorical reason that “no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death of a nonseaman in state territorial waters resulting from negligence.” 1999 A. M. C. 769 (1998). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings, explaining that although this Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the principles contained in our decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), made such an action appropriate. 210 F. 3d 209, 211 (2000). Judge Hall concurred in the judgment because, in her view, Moragne had itself recognized the action. 210 F. 3d, at 222-227. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s suggestion for rehearing en banc, with two judges dissenting. 215 F. 3d 420 (2000). We granted certiorari. 531 U.S. 1050 (2000).

H-Í H-4

Three of four issues of general maritime law are settled, and the fourth is before us. It is settled that the general maritime law imposes duties to avoid unseaworthiness and negligence, see, e. g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 589, 549-550 (1960) (unseaworthiness); Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 680 (1882) (negligence), that nonfatal injuries caused by the breach of either duty are com-pensable, see, e. g., Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 102-103 (1944) (unseaworthiness); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 457 (1925) (negligence), and that death caused by breach of the duty of seaworthiness is also compensable, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., supra, at 409. Before us is the question whether death caused by negligence should, or must under direction of a federal statute, be treated differently.

A

For more than 80 years, from 1886 until 1970, all four issues were considered resolved, though the third not in the manner we have just described. The governing rule then was the rule of The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886): Although the general maritime law provides relief for injuries caused by the breach of maritime duties, it does not provide relief for wrongful death. The Harrisburg said that rule was compelled by the existence of the same rule at common law, id., at 213-214 — although it acknowledged, id., at 205-212, that admiralty courts had held that damages for wrongful death were recoverable under maritime law, see also Moragne, supra, at 387-388 (listing eases).

In 1969, however, we granted certiorari in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., supra, for the express purpose of considering “whether The Harrisburg . . . should any longer be regarded as acceptable law.” 398 U.S., at 375-376. We inquired whether the rule of The Harrisburg was defensible under either the general maritime law or the policy displayed in the maritime statutes Congress had since enacted, 398 U.S., at 379-393, whether those statutes preempted judicial action overruling The Harrisburg, 398 U.S., at 393-403, whether stare decisis required adherence to The Harrisburg, 398 U. S., at 403-405, and whether insuperable practical difficulties would accompany The Harrisburg’s overruling, 398 U.S., at 405-408. Answering every question no, we overruled the case and declared a new rule of maritime law: “We . . . hold that an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties.” Id., at 409.

As we have noted in an earlier opinion, the wrongful-death rule of Moragne was not limited to any particular maritime duty, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, 214, n. 11 (1996) (dictum), but Moragne’s facts were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and so the issue of wrongful death for negligence has remained technically open. We are able to find no rational basis, however, for distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness. It is no less a distinctively maritime duty than seaworthiness: The common-law duties of care have not been adopted and retained unmodified by admiralty, but have been adjusted to fit their maritime context, see, e. g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-632 (1959), and a century ago the maritime law exchanged the common law’s rule of contributory negligence for one of comparative negligence, see, e. g., The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-409 (1953), Consequently the “tensions and discrepancies” in our precedent arising “from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts” — which ultimately drove this Court in Moragne to abandon The Harrisburg, see 398 U.S., at 401 — were no less pronounced with maritime negligence than with unseaworthiness. In fact, both cases cited by Moragne to exemplify those discrepancies involved maritime negligence, see ibid, (citing Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960) (per curiam)), see also Nelson v. United States, 639 F. 2d 469, 473 (CA9 1980) (opinion by then-Judge Kennedy) (concluding that uniformity concerns required Moraine’s application to negligence). It is true, as petitioner observes, that we have held admiralty accommodation of state remedial statutes to be constitutionally permissible, see, e. g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 594 (1959), but that does not resolve the issue here: whether requiring such an accommodation by refusing to recognize a federal remedy is preferable as a matter of maritime policy. We think it is not.

The choice-of-law anomaly occasioned by providing a federal remedy for injury but not death is no less strange when the duty breached is negligence than when it is seaworthiness. Of two victims injured at the same instant in the same location by the same negligence, only one would be covered by federal law, provided only that the other died of his injuries. See, e. g., Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue Ferry Co., 125 F. Supp. 573, 578 (ED La. 1954) (in case involving single car accident on ferry, applying state negligence law to claim for deceased husband’s wrongful death but federal maritime negligence law to claim for surviving wife’s injuries), aff’d, 227 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1955) (per curiam). And cutting off the law’s remedy at the death of the injured person is no less “a striking departure from the result dictated by elementary principles in the law of remedies,” Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 898 U.S., at 381, when the duty breached is negligence than when it is seaworthiness. “Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonaetionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death.” Ibid. Finally, the maritime policy favoring recovery for wrongful death that Moragm found implicit in federal statutory law cannot be limited to unseaworthiness, for both of the federal Acts on which Moragne relied permit recovery for negligence, see Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a); Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 et seq.; see also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1926) (Jones Act). In sum, a negligent breach of a maritime duty of care being assumed by the posture of this case, no rational basis -within the maritime law exists for denying respondent the recovery recognized by Moragne for the death of her son.

B

Weightier arguments against recognizing a wrongful-death action for negligence may be found not within general maritime law but without, in the federal statutes that provide remedies for injuries and death suffered in admiralty. As we explained in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990), “[w]e no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury and death; Congress ... [has] legislated extensively in these areas.” And, even in admiralty, “we have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 626 (1978). Hence, when a statute resolves a particular issue, we have held that the general maritime law must comply with that resolution. See, e.g., Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U. S. 116, 123-124 (1998). We must therefore make careful study of the three statutes relevant here.

1

The Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a), establishes a cause of action for negligence for injuries or death suffered in the course of employment, but only for seamen. See generally Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995) (describing test for seaman status). Respondent’s son, who was not a seaman, was not covered by the Jones Act, and we have held that the Jones Act bears no implication for actions brought by nonseamen. See, e. g., American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 282-283 (1980). Moreover, even as to seamen, we have held that general maritime law may provide wrongful-death actions predicated on duties beyond those that the Jones Act imposes. See, e. g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., supra, at 28-30 (seaworthiness). The Jones Act does not preclude respondent’s negligence action.

DOHSA creates wrongful-death actions for negligence and unseaworthiness, see Moragne, supra, at 395, but only by the personal representatives of people killed “beyond a marine league from the shore of any State,” 46 U. S. C. App. §761. Respondent’s son was killed in state territorial waters, where DOHSA expressly provides that its provisions "shall... [not] apply,” §767. In Moragne, after discussing the anomalies that would result if DOHSA were interpreted to preclude federal maritime causes of action even where its terms do not apply, 398 U. S., at 395-396, we held that DOHSA “was not intended to preclude the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not covered by the Act,” id., at 402. Or, “[t]o put it another way, ... no intention appears that the Act have the effect of foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law.” Id., at 400. DOHSA therefore does not pre-empt respondent’s negligence action.

Finally, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., provides nonseaman maritime workers such as respondent’s son, see §902(3) (defining covered employees), with no-fault workers’ compensation claims (against their employer, § 904(b)) and negligence claims (against the vessel, § 905(b)) for injury and death. As to those two defendants, the LHWCA expressly pre-empts all other claims, §§ 905(a), (b); but cf. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 723-726 (1980) (holding some state workers’ compensation claims against employer not pre-empted), but it expressly preserves all claims against third parties, §§ 933(a), (i). And petitioner is a third party: It neither employed respondent’s son nor owned the vessel on which he was killed.

Petitioner argues,, however, that §933’s preservation-of-other-elaims provisions express Congress’s intent to reserve all other wrongful-death actions to the States. That argument cannot withstand our precedent, since we have consistently interpreted §933 to preserve federal maritime claims as well as state claims, see, e. g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 100-102 (1946); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 113 (1974), including maritime negligence claims, see,- e. g., Pope (6 Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S., at 411-413 (upholding recovery for negligence under maritime law by longshoreman covered by the LHWCA). Petitioner’s further contention — that the policy implicit in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA bars a maritime action for wrongful death though the text of those amendments (which left §933 unchanged) permits it — cannot succeed. We do not find, as petitioner does, an anti-maritime-wrongful-death policy implicit in the amendment to § 905(b), see 86 Stat. 1263, which eliminated covered workers’ unseaworthiness claims against a vessel, see, e. g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (“Congress abolished the unseaworthiness remedy for longshoremen, recognized in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)”). That amendment was directed not at wrongful death in particular, but at unseaworthiness generally, see Edmonds v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 (1979) (“Congress acted in 1972, among other things, to eliminate the shipowner’s liability to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness... — in other words, to Overrule Sieracki”). To the extent the amendment to § 905(b) reflects any policy relevant here, it is in expressly ratifying longshore and harbor workers’ claims against the vessel for negligence, see id., at 259-260. The LHWCA therefore does not preclude this negligence action for wrongful death.

2

Even beyond the express pre-emptive reach of federal maritime statutes, however, we have acknowledged that they contain a further prudential effect. “While there is an established and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field.” American Dredging Co, v. Miller, 510 U.S. 448, 455 (1994). Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 382-383 (1999) (equitable lawmaking power of bankruptcy courts limited by statute). Because of Congress’s extensive involvement in legislating causes of action for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that assert new claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further development to Congress. The cause of action we recognize today, however, is new only in the most technical sense. The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since Moragne that breaches of a maritime duly are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury. Congress’s occupation of this field is not yet so extensive as to preclude us from recognizing what is already logically compelled by our precedents.

* * *

The maritime cause of action that Moragne established for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join,

concurring in part.

I join all but Part II-B-2 of the Court’s opinion.

Following the reasoning in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court today holds that the maritime cause of action Moragne established for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence. I agree with the Court’s clear opinion with one reservation. In Part II-B-2, the Court counsels: “Because of Congress’s extensive involvement in legislating causes of action, for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many eases that assert new claims beyond what those statutes ... allow, to leave further development to Congress.” Ante, at 820. Moragne itself, however, tugs in the opposite direction. Inspecting the relevant legislation, the Court in Moragne found no measures counseling against the judicial elaboration of general maritime law there advanced. See 398 U.S., at 399-402, 409; see also id., at 393 (“Where death is caused by the breach of a duty imposed by federal maritime law, Congress has established a policy favoring recovery in the absence of a legislative direction to exeept a particular class of eases.”). In accord with Moragne, I see development of the law in admiralty as a shared venture in which “federal common lawmaking” does not stand still, but “harmonize[s] with the enactments of Congress in the field.” Ante, at 820 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 455 (1994)). I therefore do not join the Court’s dictum.

       The issue addressed in Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), whether state remedies may in some instances supplement a federal maritime remedy, is not presented by this case, where respondent is no longer pursuing state remedies. After the District Court dismissed her state-law claim on jurisdictional grounds, respondent re-filed it in state court, where it was resolved against her. See Brief for Respondent 2, n. I.

       The District Court dismissed the case for the threshold reason that, regardless of a negligent breach, there could be no recovery. See supra, at 813. Petitioner therefore will be free to present its arguments regarding duty and breach on remand to the extent they have been preserved.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Souter Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED DOMINION INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED STATES
    No. 00-157.
    Argued March 26, 2001
    Decided June 4, 2001

      Eric R. Fox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alan J. J. Swirski

      Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Fallon, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farber, and Edward T. Perelmuter.

        Richard E. Zuckerman and Raymond M. Kethledge filed a brief for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Souter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under § 172(b)(l)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry bach its “product liability loss” up to 10 years in order to offset prior years’ income. The issue here is the method for calculating the product liability loss of an affiliated group of corporations electing to file a consolidated federal income tax return. We hold that the group’s product liability loss must be figured on a consolidated basis in the first instance, and not by aggregating product liability losses separately determined company by company.

I

A “net operating loss” results from deductions in excess of gross income for a given year. 26 U. S. C. § 172(e). Under § 172(b)(1)(A), a taxpayer may carry its net operating loss either backward to past tax years or forward to Mure tax years in order to “set off its lean years against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income computed over a period longer than one year,” Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957).

Although the normal carryback period was at the time three years, in 1978, Congress authorized a special 10-year carryback for “product liability loss[es],” 26 U. S. C. § 172(b)(l)(I), since, it understood, losses of this sort tend to be particularly “large and sporadic.” Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978,95th Cong., 232 (Comm. Print 1979). The Code defines “product liability loss,” for a given tax year, as the lesser of (1) the taxpayer’s “net operating loss for such year” and (2) its allowable deductions attributable to product liability “expenses.” 26 U. S. C. § 172(j)(l). In other words, a taxpayer’s product liability loss (PLL) is the total of its product liability expenses (PLEs), limited to the amount of its net operating loss (NOL). By definition, then, a taxpayer with positive annual income, and thus no NOL, may have PLEs but can have no PLL.

Instead of requiring each member company of “[a]n affiliated group of corporations” to file a separate tax return, the Code permits the group to file a single consolidated return, 26 U. S. C. § 1501, and leaves it to the Secretary of the Treasury to work out the details by promulgating regulations governing such returns, § 1502. Under Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a) and 1.1502 — 21(f), an affiliated group’s “consolidated taxable income” (CTI), or, alternatively, its “consolidated net operating loss” (CNOL), is determined by “taking into account” several items. The first is the “separate taxable income” (STI) of each group member. A member’s STI (whether positive or negative) is computed as though the member were a separate corporation (i e., by netting income and expenses), but subject to several important “modifications.” Treas. Reg. §1.1502-12. These modifications require a group member calculating its STI to disregard, among other items, its capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, and dividends-reeeived deductions. Ibid. These excluded items are accounted for on a consolidated basis, that is, they are combined at the level of the group filing the single return, where deductions otherwise attributable to one member (say, for a charitable contribution) can offset income received by another (from a capital gain, for example). Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a)(3) to (8); 1.1502-21(f)(2) to (6). A consolidated group’s CTI or CNOL, therefore, is the sum of each member’s STI, plus or minus a handful of items considered on a consolidated basis.

II

Petitioner United Dominion’s predecessor in interest, AMGA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group of corporations that properly elected to file consolidated tax returns for the years 1983 through 1986. In each of these years, AMCA reported CNOL (the lowest being $85 million and the highest, $140 million) that exceeded the aggregate of its 26 individual members’ PLEs ($3.5 million to $6.5 million). This case focuses on the PLEs of five of AMCA’s member companies, which, together, generated roughly $205,000 in PLEs in 1983, $1.6 million in 1984, $1.3 million in 1985, and $250,000 in 1986. No one disputes these amounts or their characterization as PLEs. See 208 F. 3d 452,453 (CA4 2000) (“The parties agree” with respect to the amount of “the product liability expenses incurred by the five group members in the relevant years”). Rather, the sole question here is whether the AMCA affiliated group may include these amounts on its consolidated return, in determining its PLL for 10-year carryback. The question arises because of the further undisputed fact that in each of the relevant tax years, each of the five companies in question (with minor exceptions not relevant here), reported a positive STI.

AMCA answered this question by following what commentators have called a “single-entity” approach to calculating its “consolidated” PLL. For each tax year, AMCA (1) calculated its CNOL pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a), and (2) aggregated its individual members’ PLEs. Because, as noted above, for each tax year AMCA’s CNOL was greater than the sum of its members’ PLEs, AMCA treated the full amount of the PLEs as consolidated PLL eligible for 10-year carryback. In AMCA’s view, the fact that several member companies throwing off large PLEs also, when considered separately, generated positive taxable income was of no significance.

From the Government’s perspective, however, the fact that the several affiliated members with PLEs also generated positive separate taxable income is of critical significance. According to the Government’s methodology, which we will call the “separate-member” approach, PLEs incurred by an affiliate with positive separate taxable income cannot contribute to a PLL eligible for 10-year carryback. Whereas AMCA compares the group’s total income (or loss) and total PLEs in an effort to determine the group’s total PLL, the Government compares each affiliate’s STI and PLEs in order to determine whether each affiliate suffers a PLL, and only then combines any PLLs of the individual affiliates to determine a consolidated PLL amount.

In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for refunds of taxes based on its PLL calculations. The IRS first ruled in AMCA’s favor but was reversed by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the United States Congress, which controls refunds exceeding a certain threshold, 26 U. S. C. § 6405(a). AMCA then filed this refund action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The District Court agreed with AMCA that an affiliated group’s PLL is determined on a single-entity basis, and held that, so long as the group’s consolidated return reflects CNOL in excess of the group’s aggregate PLEs, the total of those expenses (including those incurred by members with positive separate taxable income) is a PLL that “may be carried back the full ten years.” No. 8:9S-CV-341-MU (June 19, 1998), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and held that “determining ‘product liability loss’ separately for each group member is correct and consistent with [Treasury] regulations.” 208 F. 3d, at 458.

Because the Fourth Circuit’s separate-member approach to calculating PLL conflicted with the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the single-entity approach in Intermet Corf. v. Com missioner, 209 F. 3d 901 (2000), we granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1009 (2000). We now reverse.

III

The ease for the single-entity approach to calculating an affiliated group’s PLL is straightforward. Section 172(j)(l) defines a taxpayer’s “product liability loss” for a given tax year as the lesser of its “net operating loss for such year” and its product liability “expenses.” In order to apply this definition, the taxpayer first determines whether it has taxable income or NOL, and in making that calculation it subtracts PLEs. If the result is NOL, the taxpayer then makes a simple comparison between the NOL figure and the total PLEs. The PLE total becomes the PLL to the extent it does not exceed NOL. That is, until NOL has been determined, there is no PLL.

The first step in applying the definition and methodology of PLL to a taxpayer filing a consolidated return thus requires the calculation of NOL. As United Dominion correctly points out, the Code and regulations governing affiliated groups of corporations filing consolidated returns provide only one definition of NOL: “consolidated” NOL, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(f). There is no definition of separate NOL for a member of an affiliated group. Indeed, the fact that Treasury Regulations do provide a measure of separate NOL in a different context, for an affiliated corporation as to any year in which it filed a separate return, infra, at 832-834, underscores the absence of such a measure for an affiliated corporation filing as a group member. Given this apparently exclusive definition of NOL as CNOL in the instance of affiliated entities with a consolidated return (and for reasons developed below, infra, at 884-838) we think it is fair to say, as United Dominion says, that the concept of separate NOL “simply does not exist.” Brief for Petitioner 15. The exclusiveness of NOL at the consolidated level as CNOL is important here for the following reasons. The Code’s authorization of consolidated group treatment contains no indication that for a consolidated group the essential relationship between NOL and PLL will differ from their relationship for a conventional corporate taxpayer. Nor does any Treasury Regulation purport to change the relationship in the cpnsolidated context. If, then, the relationship is to remain essentially the same, the key to understanding it lies in the regulations’ definition of net operating loss exclusively at the consolidated level. Working back from that, PLEs should be considered first in calculating CNOL, and they are: because any PLE of an affiliate affects the calculation of its STI, that same PLE necessarily affects the CTI or CNOL in exactly the same way, dollar for dollar. And because, by definition, there is no NOL measure for a consolidated return group or any affiliate except CNOL, PLEs cannot be compared with any NOL to produce PLL until CNOL has been calculated. Then, and only then in the case of the consolidated filer, can total PLEs be compared •with a net operating loss. In sum, comparable treatment of PLL in the instances of the usual corporate taxpayer and group filing a consolidated return can be achieved only if the comparison of PLEs with a limiting loss amount occurs at the consolidated level after CNOL has been determined. This approach resting on comparable treatment has a further virtue entitled to some weight in case of doubt: it is (relatively) easy to understand and to apply.

The case for the separate-member approach, advanced (in one variant) by the Government and adopted (on a different rationale) by the Court of Appeals, is not so easily made. In the analysis of comparable treatment just set out, of course, there is no NOL below the consolidated level and hence nothing for comparison with PLEs to produce PLL at any stage before the CNOL calculation. At the least, then, a proponent of the separate-member approach must identify some figure in the consolidated return scheme that could have a plausible analogy to NOL at the level of the affiliated corporations. See A. Dubroff, J. Blanchard, J. Broadbent, & K Duvall, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations Filing Consolidated Returns §41.04[06], p. 41-75 (2d ed. 2000) (hereinafter Dubroff) (“Even if separate entity treatment was appropriate, it is unclear how a member with [PLEs] would compute its separate NOL”). The Government and the Court of Appeals have suggested different substitute measures. Neither one works.

The Government has argued that an individual group member’s STI, as determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12, is analogous to a “separate” NOL, so that an affiliate’s STI may be compared with its PLEs in order to determine any separate PLL. An individual member’s PLL would be the amount of its separate PLEs up to the amount of its negative STI; a member having positive STI could have no PLL.

The Government claims that an STI-based comparison places the group member closest to the position it would have occupied if it had filed a separate return. But that is simply not so. We have seen already that the calculation of a group member's STI by definition excludes several items that an individual taxpayer would normally account for in computing income or loss, but which an affiliated group may tally only at the consolidated level, such as capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, and dividends-received deductions. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-12(j) to (n). Owing to these exclusions, an affiliate’s STI will tend to be inflated by eliminating deductions it would have taken if it had filed separately, or deflated by eliminating an income item like capital gain.

When pushed, the Government concedes that STI is “not necessarily equivalent to the income or [NOL] figure that the corporation would have computed if it had filed a separate return.” Brief for United States 21, n. 14. But, the Government claims, “[t]here has never been a taxpayer with [PLEs] who had a positive [STI] but a negative separate [NOL].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. In other words, the Government says that the deductions excluded from STI have never once made a difference and, therefore, that STI is, in fact, a decent enough proxy for a group member’s “separate” NOL. But whether or not the excluded items have made a difference in the past, or make a difference here, they certainly could make a difference and, given the potential importance of some of the deductions involved (a large charitable contribution, for example), it is not hard to see how the difference could favor the Government.

The Court of Appeals was therefore right to reject the Government’s reliance on STI as a functional surrogate for an affiliate’s “separate” NOL. 208 F. 3d, at 459-460. But what the Court of Appeals used in place of STI fares no better. The court relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-79, which contains a definition of “separate net operating loss” that the court believed to be “analogous to an individual’s ‘net operating loss’ on a separate return.” 208 F. 3d, at 460. Section 1.1502-79(a)(3) provides that, “[f]or purposes of this subparagraph,” the “separate net operating loss of a member of the group shall be determined under §1.1502-12 . . . , adjusted for the . . . items taken into account in the computation of” the CNOL. As the Court of Appeals said, the directive of § 1.1502-79(a)(3) (unlike the definition of STI) “takes into account, for example, [a] member’s charitable contributions” and other consolidated deductions. 208 P. 3d, at 460-461.

But this sounds too good. It is true that, insofar as § 1.1502-79(a)(3) accounts for gains and losses that STI does not, it gets closer to a commonsense notion of a group member’s “separate” NOL than STI does. But the fact that § 1.1502-79(a)(3) improves on STI simply by undoing what §1.1502-12 requires in defining STI is suspicious, and the suspicion turns out to be justified. Section 1.1502-79(a)(3) unbakes the cake for only one reason, and that reason has no application here. The definition on which the Court of Appeals relied applies, by its terms, only “for purposes of” § 1.1502-79(a)(3), and context makes clear that the purpose is to provide a way to allocate CNOL to an affiliate member that seeks to carry back a loss to a “separate return year,” that is, to a year in which the member was not part of the consolidated group. See Treas. Reg. §1.1502-79 (titled “Separate return years”); § 1.1502-79(a) (titled “Carryover and carryback of [CNOL] to separate return years”); § 1.1502-79(a)(l) (“[i]f a [CNOL] can be carried... to a separate return year . . .”). No separate return years are at issue before us; all NOL carrybacks relevant here apply to years in which the five corporations were affiliated in the group. The Court of Appeals thus applied concepts addressing separate return years to a determination for a consolidated return year, without any statutory or regulatory basis for doing so. Cf. 49 Fed. Reg.. 30530 (1984) (“[AJlthough the consolidated net operating loss is apportioned to individual members for purposes of carry backs to separate return years [under § 1.1502-79(a)], the apportioned amounts are not separate NOLs of each member”). Hence, while § 1.1502-79 might not distort an affiliate’s separate NOL in the same way that STI does, the facial inapplicability of that regulation only underscores the exclusive concern of § 1.1502-ll(a) with consolidated NOL.

In sum, neither method for computing PLL on a separate-member basis squares with the notion of comparability as applied to consolidated return regulations. On the contrary, by expressly and exclusively defining NOL as CNOL, the regulations support the position that group members’ PLEs should be aggregated and the affiliated group’s PLL determined on a consolidated, single-entity basis.

IV

Several objections have been raised to a single-entity approach to calculating PLL that we have not considered yet. First, the Government insists that a single-entity rule allows affiliated groups a “double deduction.” . The Government argues that because PLEs are not included among the specific items (charitable-contribution deductions, etc.) for which consolidated, single-entity treatment is required under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12, PLEs are “consumed” or “used up” in computing members’ STIs, which, pursuant to Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1502-ll(a) and 1.15Q2-21(f), are then used to calculate the group’s CTI or CNOL. According to the Government, to permit the use of PLEs first to reduce an individual member’s STI and then to contribute to an aggregate PLL for carryback purposes would be tantamount to a double deduction.

The double-deduction argument may have superficial appeal, but any appeal it has rests on a fundamental misconception of the function of STI in computing an affiliated group’s tax liability. Calculation of a group member’s STI is not in and of itself the basis for any tax event, and there is no separate tax saving when STI is calculated; that occurs only when deductions on the consolidated return equal income and (if they exceed income and produce a CNOL) are carried back against prior income. STI is merely an accounting construct devised as an interim step in computing a group’s CTI or CNOL; it “has no other purpose.” Inter-met, 209 F. 3d, at 906 (“A member’s STI is simply a step along the way to calculating the group’s taxable income or CNOL”). The fact that a group member’s PLEs reduce its STI, which in turn either reduces the group’s CTI or contributes to its CNOL “dollar for dollar,” ibid., is of no other moment. If there were anything wrong in what United Dominion proposes to do, it would be wrong in relation to CNOL and its use for any carryback. Yet, as noted above, no one here disputes that the group members had PLEs in the total amount claimed or that the AMCA group is entitled to carry back the full amount of its CNOL to offset income in prior years. The only question is what portion, if any, of AMCA’s CNOL is PLL and, as such, eligible for 10-year, as opposed to 3-year, carryback treatment. There is no more of a double deduction with a 10-year carryback than one for three years.

A second objection was the reason that the Court of Appeals rejected the single-entity approach. That court attached dispositive significance to the fact that, while the Treasury Regulation we have discussed, § 1.1502-12, specifically provides that several items (capital gains and losses, charitable-contribution deductions, etc.) shall be accounted for on a consolidated basis, it does not similarly provide for accounting for PLEs on a consolidated basis: “The regulations provide for blending the group members’ [NOLs], and they explicitly define [CNOL] without an accompanying reference to consolidated [PLEs]. This omission ... makes clear that blending those expenses is not permitted . . . 208 P. 3d, at 458.

We think the omission of PLEs from the series of items that §1.1502-12 requires to be tallied at the consolidated level has no such elear lesson, however. The logic that invests the omission with significance is familiar: the mention of some implies the exclusion of others not mentioned. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 168, 168 (1993) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). But here, as always, the soundness of that premise is a function of timing: if there was a good reason to consider the treatment of consolidated PLL at the time the regulation was drawn, then omitting PLL from the list of items for consolidated treatment may well have meant something. But if there was no reason to consider PLL then, its omission would mean nothing at all. And in fact there was no reason. When the consolidated return regulations were first promulgated in 1966, there was no carryback provision pegged to PLEs or PLLs; those notions did not become separate carryback items until 1978, when the 10-year rule was devised. See Revenue Act of 1978, §371, 92 Stat. 2859; see also Leatherman, Current Developments 393, n. 5. Omission of PLEs or PLLs from the series set out for consolidated treatment in the 1966 regulation therefore meant absolutely nothing in 1966. The issue, then, is the significance, not of omission, but of failure to include later: has the significance of the earlier regulation changed solely because the Treasury has never amended it, even though PLL is now a separate carryback? We think that is unlikely. The Treasury’s relaxed approach to amending its regulations to track Code changes is well documented. See e. g., Dubroff 41-72, n. 193; Axelrod & Blank 1391; Leath-erman, Separate Liability Losses 708-709. The absence of any amendment to § 1.1502-12 that might have added PLEs or PLLs to the list of items for mandatory single-entity treatment therefore is more likely a reflection of the Treasury’s inattention than any affirmative intention on its part to say anything at all.

Last, the Government warns that “[t]he rule that petitioner advocates would permit significant tax avoidance abuses.” Brief for United States 40. Specifically:

"Under petitioner’s approach, a corporation that is currently unprofitable but that had substantial income in prior years could (i) acquire a profitable corporation with product liability expense deductions in the year of acquisition, (ii) file a consolidated return and (iii) thereby create an otherwise nonexistent 'product liability loss’ for the new affiliated group that would allow the acquiring corporation to claim refunds of the tax it paid in prior years.” Ibid.

The Government suggests, for example, that “a manufacturing company (with prior profits and current losses) that has no product liability exposure could purchase a tobacco company (with both prior and current profits) that has significant product liability expenses” and that “[t]he combined entity could... assert a ten-year carryback of 'product liability losses’ even though the tobacco company has always made a profit and never incurred a 'loss’ of any type.” Id., at 40-41, n. 27.

There are several answers. First, on the score of tax avoidance, the separate-member approach is no better (and is perhaps worse) than the single-entity treatment; both entail some risk of tax-motivated behavior. See Leatherman, Separate Liability Losses 681 (Under the separate-member approach, "[djespite sound non-tax business reasons, a group may be disinclined to form a new member or transfer assets between members, because it may worry that it would lose the benefit of a ten-year carryback,” and "may be encouraged to transfer assets between members to increase its consolidated [PLL], even when those transfers would otherwise he ill-advised”)- Second, the Government may, as always, address tax-motivated behavior under Internal Revenue Code §269, which gives the Secretary ample authority to ‘‘disallow [any] deduction, credit, or other allowance” that results from a transaction “the principal purpose [of] which... is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax.” 26 U. S. C. § 269(a). And finally, if the Government were to conclude that §269 provided too little protection and that it simply could not live with the single-entity approach, the Treasury could exercise the authority provided by the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1502, and amend the consolidated return regulations.

* * *

Thus, it is true, as the Government has argued, that “[t]he Internal Revenue Code vests ample authority in the Treasury to adopt consolidated return regulations to effect a binding resolution of the question presented in this case.” Brief for United States 19-20. To the extent that the Government has exercised that authority, its actions point to the single-entity approach as the better answer. To the extent the Government disagrees, it may amend its regulations to provide for a different one.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that the Internal Revenue Code provision and the corresponding Treasury Regulations that control consolidated filings are best interpreted as requiring a single-entity approach in calculating product liability loss. I write separately, however, because I respectfully disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that, when a provision of the Code and the corresponding regulations are ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Government’s interpretation. See post this page (opinion of Stevens, J.). At a bare minimum, in cases such as this one, in which the complex statutory and regulatory scheme lends itself to any number of interpretations, we should be inclined to rely on the traditional canon that construes revenue-raising laws against their drafter. See Leavell v. Blades, 237 Mo. 695, 700-701, 141 S.W. 893, 894 (1911) (“When the tax gatherer puts his finger on the citizen, he must also put his finger on the law permitting it”); United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923) (“If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer”); Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350 (1927) (“The provision is part of a taxing statute; and such laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers”). Accord, American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 (1891); Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55 (1904).

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

This is a close and difficult case, in which neither the statute nor the regulations offer a definitive answer to the crucial textual question. Absent a clear textual anchor, I would credit the Secretary of the Treasury’s concerns about the potential for abuse created by the petitioner’s reading of the statutory scheme and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that basis.

As the majority accurately reports, during the time relevant to this case, § 172(b)(l)(I) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allowed any ’taxpayer” who “ha[d] a product liability loss” to carry back its excess product liability losses for 10 years. The resolution of this case turns on whether, when a group of affiliated corporations files a consolidated tax return, the entire group should be considered the “taxpayer” for the purposes of implementing this provision or whether each individual corporation should be seen as a “taxpayer.”

There is no obvious answer to this question. On the one hand, it is generally accepted that the rationale behind the consolidated return regulations is to allow affiliated corporations that are run as a single entity to elect to be treated for tax purposes as a single entity. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 17-19 (collecting sources in which the Internal Revenue Service so stated). On the other hand, it is quite clear that each corporation in such a group remains in both a legal and a literal sense a “taxpayer,” a status that has important consequences. See Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 328 (1932) (“The fact is not to be ignored that each of two or more corporations joining ... in a consolidated return is none the less a taxpayer”); 26 U. S. C. §7701(a)(14) (defining a “taxpayer” as “any person subject to any internal revenue tax,” where a related provision defines “person” to include corporations). As both the group and the individual corporations are considered “taxpayers” in different contexts, the statute presents a genuine ambiguity.

When a provision of the Internal Revenue Code presents a patent ambiguity, Congress, the courts, and the IRS share a preference for resolving the ambiguity via executive action. See, e. g., National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). This is best achieved by the issuing of a Treasury Regulation resolving the ambiguity Ibid. In this instance, however, the Secretary of the Treasury issued no such regulation. In the absence of such a regulation, the majority has scoured tangentially related regulations, looking for clues to what the Secretary might intend. For want of a more precise basis for resolving this case, that approach is sound.

It is at this point, however, that I part company with the majority’s analysis. The fact that the regulations forward a particular method for calculating a consolidated “net operating loss” (NOL) for a group of affiliated companies, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(f), tells us how the Secretary wants the NOL to be calculated whenever it is necessary to determine a consolidated NOL, but it does not tell us what provisions of the Code require the calculation of a consolidated NOL. That is a separate and prior question. Even if we were to draw some mild significance from the presence of such a regulation (and the absence, at the time these returns were filed, of a similar regulation for the calculation of corporation-specific NOL’s), the power of that inference is counterbalanced by the fact that the regulations listing deductions that must be reported at the consolidated level makes no mention of product liability expenses. See Treas. Reg. §1.1502-12; see also H. Enter-prises Int% Inc. v. Com-misioner, 105 T. C. 71, 85 (1995) (construing Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(a) to provide “[wjhere the consolidated return regulations do not require that corporations filing such returns be treated differently from the way separate entities would be treated, those corporations shall be treated as separate entities when applying provisions of the Code”). In addition, the subsequent promulgation of a method for calculating a corporation-specific NOL (albeit for a different purpose), see § 1.1502-79(a)(3) (defining “separate net operating loss”), demonstrates that there are no inherent problems implicit in undertaking such a calculation.

In short, I find no answer to this case in the text of the statute or in any Treasury Regulation. However, the Government does forward a valid policy concern that militates against petitioner’s construction of the statute: the fear of tax abuse. See Brief for United States 40-42. Put simply, the Government fears that currently unprofitable but previously profitable corporations might receive a substantial windfall simply by acquiring a corporation with significant product liability expenses but no product liability losses. See id., at 40. On a subjective level, I find these concerns troubling. Cf. Woolford Realty Co., 286 U.S., at 330 (rejecting “the notion that Congress in permitting a consolidated return was willing to foster an opportunity for juggling so facile and so obvious”). More importantly, however, I credit the Secretary of the Treasury’s concerns about the potential scope of abuse. Perhaps the Court is correct in suggesting that these concerns can be alleviated through applications of other anti-abuse provisions of the Tax Code, see ante, at 838, but I am not persuaded of my own ability to make that judgment. When we deal “with a subject that is highly specialized and so complex as to be the despair of judges,” Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943), an ounce of deference is appropriate.

I respectfully dissent.

       Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), as in effect between 1983 and 1986, the tax years here in question.

       If, for example, a company had $100 in taxable income, $50 in deductible PLEs, and $75 in additional deductions, its NOL would be $25 (i e., $100 — $50—$75= —$25); it could count only $25 of its $50 in PLEs as PLL. If the company had $100 in income] $50 in PLEs, and $125 in additional deductions, its NOL would he $75, and it could count its entire $50 in PLEs as PLL. And, finally, if the company had $100 in income, $50 in PLEs, and $40 in additional deductions, it would have positive income and, thus, no NOL and no PLL. ¡.

       Unless otherwise noted, Treasury Regulation references are to the regulations in effect between 1983 and 1986, 26 CFR § 1.1502-11 et seq. (1982-1986).

       Axelrod & Blank, The Supreme Court, Consolidated Returns, and 10-Year Carrybacks, 90 Tax Notes, No. 10, p. 1383 (Mar. 5,2001) (hereinafter Axelrod & Blank).

        Ibid.

         Intermet involved “specified liability losses” (SLLs), not PLLs. The difference, however, does not matter. The PLL was a statutory predecessor to the SLL, and PLLs were folded into the SLL provision in § 11811(b)(1) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1388-532. Thus, “[i]n all relevant respects, the provisions on [PLLs] and SLLs are the same.” Leatherman, Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 486 PLI/Tax 389,393, n. 5 (2000) (hereinafter Leatherman, Current Developments).

       In addition to Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-79(a)(3), discussed infra, at 832-834, two other provisions, 26 U. S.C. § 1508(f)(2) and the current version (though not the version applicable between 1983 and 1986) of Treas. Reg. § 1502-21(b) (2000), refer to separate group members’ NOLs. The parties here have not emphasized those provisions, and with good reason. Not only are they inapplicable to the question before us (either substantively, temporally, or both), but, as one commentator has observed, their references to separate NOLs “ste[m] more from careless drafting than meaningful design.” Leatherman, Are Separate Liability Losses Separate for Consolidated Groups?, 52 Tax. Law. 663, 705 (1999) (hereinafter Leather-man, Separate Liability Losses).

       It makes no difference whatsoever whether the affiliate’s PLEs are (1) first netted against each member's income and then aggregated or (2) first aggregated and then netted against the group’s combined income: under either method, AMCA’s CNOL is the same. See Axelrod & Blank 1394 (noting that this conclusion follows from "the associative principle of arithmetic (which holds that the groupings of items in the case of addition and subtraction have no effect on the result)”).

       Justice Thomas accurately points to a tradition of cases construing “revenue-raising laws” against their drafter. See ante this page (Thomas, J., concurring). However, when the ambiguous provision in question is not one that imposes tax liability but rather one that crafts an exception from a general revenue duty for the benefit of some taxpayers, a countervailing tradition suggests that the ambiguity should be resolved in the government’s favor. See, e. g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner,
        319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy, Administratrix v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440 (1934); Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U. S. 319, 326 (1932).

       I am also in full agreement with the Court’s rejection of the Government’s double-deduction argument. See ante, at 834-835.

       Because I agree with the majority that the calculation contemplated by Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-79(a)(3) better approximates the NOL that each company would have had reported if filing individually than the alternative forwarded by the Government, see ante, at 833, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision to adopt that measure and would affirm the decision below in its entirety.


author: Justice Thomas

text:
    POLLARD v. E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.
    No. 00-763.
    Argued April 23, 2001
    Decided June 4, 2001

      Kathleen L. Caldwell argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.

      Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Yeomans, Austin C. Schlick, Dennis J. Dimsey, Jennifer Levin, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Phillip B. Sklover, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Caren I. Friedman.

      Raymond Michael Ripple argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Donna L. Goodman.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers’ Committee for avil Rights Under Law et al. by Richard M. Wymr, Matthew M. Hoffman, Charles T. Lester, Jr., John Payton, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Steven R. Shapiro, Lenora M. Lapidus, Sara L. Mandelbaum, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, Martha F. Davis, Karen K Narasaki, Vincent A Eng, Mark D. Roth, and Laurie A McCann; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Woodley B. Osborne, H. Candace Gorman, and Paula A Brantner.

      Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Robert E. Williams, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Society for Human Resource Management by Paul Salvatore.

       We note that the federal courts consistently have construed § 706(g) as authorizing front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement. See, e. g., Blum v. Witco Ch&m. Cwp., supra, at 383 (“A front pay... award is the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement”); Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., supra, at 952 (stating that “front pay is the functional equivalent of reinstatement”).

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a front pay award is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We eonelude that it is not.

I

Petitioner Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. 1 du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 253,42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. After a trial, the District Court found that Pollard was subjected to coworker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The District Court further found that the harassment resulted in a medical leave of absence from her job for psychological assistance and her eventual dismissal for refusing to return to the same hostile work environment. The court awarded Pollard $107,364 in backpay and benefits, $252,997 in attorney’s fees, and, as relevant here, $300,000 in compensatory damages — the maximum permitted under the statutory cap for such damages in 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record demonstrated that DuPont employees engaged in flagrant discrimination based on sex and that DuPont managers and supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it. 213 F. 3d 933 (CA6 2000).

The issue presented for review here is whether front pay constitutes an element of "compensatory damages” under 42 U. S. C. § 1981a and thus is subject to the statutory damages cap imposed by that section. Although courts have defined "front pay” in numerous ways, front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available without displacing an incumbent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening of such a position and have ordered front pay to be paid until reinstatement occurs. See, e. g., Walsdorf v. Board of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1053-1054 (CA5 1988); King v. Staley, 849 F. 2d. 1143, 1145 (CA8 1988). In cases in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement. See, e. g., Gotthardt v. National B. B. Passenger Corp., 191 F. 3d 1148, 1156 (CA9 1999); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945, 957 (CA101980). For the purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary for us to explain when front pay is an appropriate remedy. The question before us is only whether front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus subject to the Act’s statutory cap on such damages.

Here, the District Court observed that "the $300,000.00 award is, in fact, insufficient to compensate plaintiff,” 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924, n. 19 (WD Tenn. 1998), but it stated that it was bound by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson v. Reno, 130 F. 3d 1193 (1997), which held that front pay was subject to the cap. On appeal, Pollard argued that Hudson was wrongly decided because front pay is not an element of compensatory damages, but rather a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. She also argued that § 1981a, by its very terms, explicitly excludes from the statutory cap remedies that traditionally were available under Title VII, which she argued included front pay. The Court of Appeals agreed with Pollard’s arguments but considered itself bound by Hudson. The Sixth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson was one of the first appellate opinions to decide whether front pay is an element of compensatory damages subject to the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s resolution of this question, the other Courts of Appeals to address it have concluded that front pay is a remedy that is not subject to the limitations of § 1981a(b)(3). See, e. g., Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F. 3d 495, 499-500 (CA7 2000); Kramer v. Logan County School Dist. No. R-1, 157 F. 3d 620,625-626 (CA8 1998); Gotthardt, supra, at 1153-1154; Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F. 3d 545, 556 (CA10 1999); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F. 3d 600, 619, n. 10 (CA11 2000); Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn., 178 F. 3d 1336, 1348-1349 (CADC 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 531 U. S. 1069 (2001).

II

Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of sex traditionally have been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, lost benefits, and attorney’s fees under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. S. C. § 2000 5(g)(1). In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expanded the remedies available to these plaintiffs by permitting, for the first time, the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U. S. C. §1981a(a)(l) (“[T]he complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”). The amount of compensatory damages awarded under § 1981a for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpeeu-niary losses,” and the amount of punitive damages awarded under § 1981a, however, may not exceed the statutory cap set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). The statutory cap is based on the number of people employed by the respondent. In this case, the cap is $300,000 because DuPont has more than 500 employees.

The Sixth Circuit has concluded that front pay constitutes compensatory damages awarded for future pecuniary losses and thus is subject to the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3). 213 F. 3d, at 945; Hudson, swpra, at 1203. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages within the meaning of § 1981a, and, therefore, we hold that the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3) is inapplicable to front pay.

A

Under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as originally enacted, when a court found that an employer had intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the court was authorized to “enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g)(1). This provision closely tracked the language of § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 454, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), which similarly authorized orders requiring employers to take appropriate, remedial “affirmative action.” § 160(c) (authorizing the National Labor Relations Board to issue an order “requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subehapter”). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419, n. 11 (1975). The meaning of this provision of the NLRA prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, therefore, gives us guidance as to the proper meaning of the same language in § 706(g) of Title VII. In applying § 10(e) of the NLRA, the Board consistently had made awards of what it called “backpay” up to the date the employee was reinstated or returned to the position he should have been in had the violation of the NLRA not occurred, even if such event occurred after judgment. See, e. g., Natkanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1952); NLRB v. Reeves Broadcasting & Development Corp., 336 F. 2d 590, 593-594 (CA4 1964); NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 266 F. 2d 883, 887 (CA5 1959); Berger Polishing, Inc., 147 N. L. R. B. 21, 40 (1964); Lock Joint Pipe Co., 141 N. L. R. B. 943, 948 (1963). Consistent with the Board’s interpretation of this provision of the NLRA, courts finding unlawful intentional discrimination in Title VII actions awarded this same type of backpay under § 706(g). See, e. g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 442 F. 2d 1078, 1080 (CA5 1971); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 FEP Cases 767, 790 (ND Ga. 1971). In the Title VII context, this form of “backpay” occurring after the date of judgment is known today as “front pay.”

In 1972, Congress expanded § 706(g) to specify that a court could, in addition to awarding those remedies previously listed in the provision, award “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” After this amendment to § 706(g), courts endorsed a broad view of front pay. See, e. g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976) (stating that where reinstatement is not immediately feasible, backpay “should be supplemented by an award equal to the estimated present value of lost earnings that are reasonably likely to occur between the date of judgment and the time when the employee can assume his new position”); EEOC v. Enterprise Assn. Steamfitters, 542 F. 2d 579, 590 (CA2 1976) (stating that backpay award would terminate on the date of actual remedying of discrimination); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (ED Tex. 1974) (ordering backpay from the date the employee would have been entitled to fill a vacancy but for racial discrimination to the date the employee would in all reasonable probability reach his rightful place). Courts recognized that reinstatement was not always a viable option, and that an award of front pay as a substitute for reinstatement in such cases was a necessary part of the “make whole” relief mandated by Congress and by this Court in Albemarle. See, e. g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1158-1159 (CA6 1985) (“Front pay is . . . simply compensation for the post-judgment effects of past discrimination.” It is awarded “to effectuate fully the ‘make whole’ purposes of Title VII”); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F. 2d 1061, 1066 (CA8 1988) (stating that front pay was appropriate given substantial animosity between parties where “the parties’ relationship was not likely to improve, and the nature of the business required a high degree of mutual trust and confidence”); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d, at 957 (upholding award of front pay where continuing hostility existed between the parties); Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F. 2d 1338, 1347 (CA9 1987) (same). By 1991, virtually all of the courts of appeals had recognized that “front pay” was a remedy authorized under § 706(g). In fact, no court of appeals appears to have ever held to the contrary.

In 1991, without amending § 706(g), Congress further expanded the remedies available in cases of intentional employment discrimiñation to include compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(l). At that time, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, permitted the recovery of unlimited compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race and ethnic discrimination, but no similar remedy existed in cases of intentional sex, religious, or disability discrimination. Thus, § 1981a brought all forms of intentional employment discrimination into alignment, at least with respect to the forms of relief available to successful plaintiffs. However, compensatory and punitive damages awarded under § 1981a may not exceed the statutory limitations set forth in § 1981a(b)(3), while such damages awarded under § 1981 are not limited by statute.

B

In the abstract, front pay could be considered compensation for "future pecuniary losses,” in which case it would be subject to the statutoiy cap. § 1981a(b)(3). The term “compensatory damages ... for future pecuniary losses” is not defined in the statute, and, out of context, its ordinary meaning could include all payments for monetary losses after the date of judgment. However, we must not analyze one term of § 1981a in isolation. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992) C“[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law* ”). When § 1981a is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that front pay is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in § 1981a(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the statutory cap.

In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress determined that victims of employment discrimination were entitled to additional remedies. Congress expressly found that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace,” without giving any indication that it wished to curtail previously available remedies. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, §2. Congress therefore made clear through the plain language of the statute that the remedies newly authorized under § 1981a were in addition to the relief authorized by § 706(g). Section 1981a(a)(l) provides that, in intentional discrimination cases brought under Title VII, “the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subjection (b) of [§ 1981a], in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.” (Emphasis added.) And §1981a(b)(2) states that “[c]ompensatory damages awarded under [§ 1981a] shall not include back-pay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (Emphasis added.) According to these statutory provisions, if front pay was a type of relief authorized under § 706(g), it is excluded from the meaning of compensatory damages under § 1981a.

As discussed above, the original language of § 706(g) authorizing backpay awards was modeled after the same language in the NLRA. This provision in the NLRA had been construed to allow awards of backpay up to the date of reinstatement, even if reinstatement occurred after judgment. Accordingly, backpay awards made for the period between the date of judgment and the date of reinstatement, which today are called front pay awards under Title VII, were authorized under § 706(g).

As to front pay awards that are made in lieu of reinstatement, we construe § 706(g) as authorizing these awards as well. We see no logical difference between front pay awards made when there eventually is reinstatement and those made when there is not. Moreover, to distinguish between the two eases would lead to the strange result that employees could receive front pay when reinstatement eventually is available but not when reinstatement is not an option — whether because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries that the discrimination has caused the plaintiff. Thus, the most egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions. Had Congress drawn such a line in the statute and foreclosed front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement, we certainly would honor that line. But, as written, the text of the statute does not lend itself to such a distinction, and we will not create one. The statute authorizes courts to “ordo such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. § 200Ge-5(g)(1). We conclude that front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement fit within this statutory term.

Because front pay is a remedy authorized under § 706(g), Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in § 1981a. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay.

* * *

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.

       See, e. g., Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F. 2d 139,146-147 (CA21990); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F. 2d 367, 383 (CA3 1987); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976); Walsdorfv. Board of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1054 (CA5 1988); Share v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1159-1160 (CA6 1985); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA8 1984); Thome v. El Segundo, 802 F. 2d 1181,1137 (CA9 1986); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945,957 (CA101980); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F. 2d 1462,1473-1474 (CA111985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 2d 257, 292 (CADC1982). See also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F. 2d 104, 116-117 (GA7 1990) (reserving question of availability of front pay under Title VII); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771F. 2d 605,615-616 (CA1 1985) (holding that front pay is available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, but relying on Title VTI case law).

       The only two Courts of Appeals not to have addressed this issue prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have since joined the other Circuits in holding that front pay is a remedy available under § 706(g). See Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. 3d 9, 12-13 (CAI 1997); Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F. 3d 944, 951-952 (CA7 1998).


text:
    March 5, 2001
    No. 99-1263.
    No. 99-1265.
    Massachusetts et al. v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al.; and American Lung Assn. v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment below in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Therefore, certiorari granted, and cases remanded for further proceedings. Reported below: 175 F. 3d 1027 and 195 F. 3d 4.


text:
    No. 00-6808.
    Valensia v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).


text:
    No. 00-7796.
    Atraqchi et ux. v. Darui.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-7963.
    Stone v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1

(1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 00M70.
    Cook v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 00M71.
    Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States.
   Motion to direct the Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 105,
    Orig.
    Kansas v. Colorado.
   Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument granted. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 531 U.S. 1122.]


text:
    No. 128,
    Orig.
    Alaska v. United States.
   Amended complaint and answer referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 531 U.S. 1066.]


text:
    No. 00-454.
    Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 531 U.S. 1009.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-720.
    Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines.
   C. A. 2d Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 00-1073.
    Owasso Independent School District No. I-011, aka Owasso Public Schools, et al. v. Falvo, Parent and Next Friend of Her Minor Children, Pletan et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 00-7728.
    No. 00-8475.
    In re Nevius; and In re Johnson.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 00-799.
    City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-1045.
    TRW Inc. v. Andrews.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-860.
    Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-878.
    Mathias et al. v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the following questions:

“1. Whether a state commission’s action relating to the enforcement of a previously approved §252 interconnection agreement is a ‘determination under [§252]’ and thus is reviewable in federal court under 47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6)?
"2. Whether a state commission’s acceptance of Congress’ invitation to participate in implementing a federal regulatory scheme that provides that state commission determinations are reviewable in federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity?
“3. Whether an official capacity action seeking prospective relief against state public utility commissioners for alleged ongoing violations of federal law in performing federal regulatory functions under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 can be maintained under the Ex parte Young doctrine?”

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 99-604.
    Velazquez et al. v. Legal Services Corporation et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 99-1431.
    No. 99-1442.
    Appalachian Power Co. et al. v. Whitman, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, et al.; and Citizens for Balanced Transportation et al. v. Whitman, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   G. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 F. 3d 1027 and 195 F. 3d 4.


text:
    No. 00-289.
    Yarnell, Chief Engineer, Missouri Department of Transportation, et al. v. Cuffley et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-445.
    Appalachian Power Co. et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.; Michigan et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.; and Ohio et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.
    No. 00-632.
    No. 00-633.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 F. 3d 663.


text:
    No. 00-504.
    Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing, Inc., et al. v. Leblanc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-675.
    Jones, Secretary of State of California, et al. v. Schaefer.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-704.
    Cris Realms, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-854.
    Advanced Display Systems, Inc., et al. v. Kent Display Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-895.
    Wedderburn v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-907.
    Foster v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-910.
    No. 00-1077.
    Humanitarian Law Project et al. v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.; and Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1130.


text:
    No. 00-929.
    Transatlantic Schiffahrtskontor GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-946.
    S. S., By and Through Her Next Friend and Guardian ad Litem, Jervis v. McMullen et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1003.
    Belhumeur et al. v. Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1049.
    Cass et al. v. County of Suffolk et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1052.
    Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida v. Tampa Electric Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1059.
    Rodrigue et al. v. Hidalgo Rodrigue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1062.
    Yei-Hwei Tong v. Gutierrez et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1068.
    Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Home Place Batture Leasing, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1069.
    Efron v. Embassy Suites (Puerto Rico), Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1074.
    Niemeyer et al. v. Oroville Union High School District et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1078.
    Springer, dba Bondage Breaker Ministries v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1081.
    Sudduth v. Stegall, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1082.
    Bradt v. Lilly et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1091.
    Illinois v. Carlson.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1092.
    Bartlett, Executive Director, Board of Elections of North Carolina, et al. v. Perry et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1099.
    Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop et al. v. McAlpin et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1100.
    Miller v. General Bank Nederland, N. V., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1106.
    Murphy v. Binion et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1111.
    McKay v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1117.
    Livingstone et vir v. North Belle Vernon Borough et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1124.
    Boykin v. Entergy Operations, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1132.
    Morice v. EG&G Florida, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1148.
    South Carolina v. Holmes.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1152.
    Garner v. Department of Labor.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1156.
    Levi Strauss & Co. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1161.
    McKinney et al. v. Chao, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1162.
    Bester v. Louisiana Committee on Bar Admissions.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1171.
    Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1175.
    Reese v. Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1209.
    Solomon v. Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1247.
    Lejeune v. Texas.
   Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1267.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1269.
    Allen v. United States.
   C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6368.
    Dillard v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6561.
    Davenport v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6732.
    Martin v. Taylor, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-6980.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7133.
    Melson v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7167.
    Baker v. Jones, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7255.
    Whitehead v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7270.
    Manning v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7297.
    Keen v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7311.
    Hyde v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7312.
    Hammonds v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7391.
    Damper v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7423.
    Kraft v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7476.
    Moore v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7522.
    Mines v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7688.
    Guidry v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7706.
    Neloms v. McLemore, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7710.
    Beasley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7711.
    Poteete v. Capital Engineering, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7714.
    Medrano Ayala v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7718.
    Jones v. Conroy et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7729.
    Beaubrum v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7733.
    Jackson v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7734.
    Johnson v. Larkins et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7739.
    Williams Lewis v. Entergy Electric Co.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7743.
    Newgent v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7745.
    Torres Arboleda v. Newland, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7752.
    Wesley v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7753.
    Wicks v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7759.
    McClure v. Hargett, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7761.
    Roberts v. Sabine State Bank & Trust Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7763.
    Frank v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7768.
    Hansen v. Crosby et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7769.
    High v. Head, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7777.
    Green v. Cain, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7779.
    Swendra v. Soares, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari, denied.


text:
    No. 00-7782.
    Raiolo v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7783.
    Reynolds v. Cain, Warden.
   G. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7785.
    Sanabria v. Varner, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7787.
    Williams v. Williams, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7789.
    Shough v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7794.
    Tom v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7801.
    Ortiz v. Rodriguez et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7802.
    Morgan v. Muro et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7820.
    Cooper v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7826.
    Utley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7844.
    Reese v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7850.
    Coleman v. Childs, Superintendent, Central Mississippi Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7852.
    Dorsey v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7901.
    Butler v. Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7956.
    Allison v. Cordova, District Director, Internal Revenue Service, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-7958.
    Brown v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8002.
    Stangel v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8009.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8014.
    Bailey v. Carter, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8070.
    Drain v. Snyder, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8087.
    Thompson v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8209.
    Dunmon v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8226.
    Gaston v. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8227.
    Hunnell v. Lee, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8233.
    Gray v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8235.
    Glass v. Battles, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8236.
    Ford v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8249.
    Ashway v. Hatcher, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8258.
    Greene v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8262.
    Melendez v. Greiner, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8266.
    Fain v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8275.
    Pinnavaia v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8284.
    Hollingsworth v. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8304.
    Hannaford v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8333.
    Morales Cervantes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8343.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8352.
    Garrett v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8355.
    Rinaldi v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8356.
    Salcedo-Villanueva v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8362.
    Rojas-Mendoza v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8364.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8365.
    Thompson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8366.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8370.
    Fulton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8372.
    Hall, aka Reed v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8376.
    Nicholson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8380.
    Arechiga-Gil v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8384.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8386.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8387.
    Andrews v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8394.
    Card v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8395.
    Quinn v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8403.
    Richardson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8405.
    Boggs v. Collins, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8406.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8433.
    Narvaez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8437.
    Mendoza-De La Parra v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8438.
    Joseph v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8441.
    Dunbar v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8445.
    Ricks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8453.
    Dicks v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8458.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8467.
    Simmons v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8478.
    Fernandez v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-906.
    Erie County, Pennsylvania v. Erie County Retirees Assn. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund, American Association of Health Plans, Inc., et al., and ERISA Industry Committee for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-948.
    United Airlines, Inc. v. Frank et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Council for Employment Law Equity and Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file briefs as amid curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1102.
    Bawazir v. Mahfouz.
   Ct. App. Wash. Motion of petitioner for leave to lodge documents under seal granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-8525.
    Fisher v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-900.
    No. 00-913.
    No. 00-6411.
    No. 00-6716.
    No. 00-6754.
    No. 00-6809.
    No. 00-6810.
    No. 00-6881.
    No. 00-6942.
    No. 00-6984.
    No. 00-7118.
    No. 00-7361.
    Fultz v. ABB Power T & D, Inc., et al., Kersey v. Crane et al., Dawley v. Mangel, Miller v. Gober, Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs, In re Gregory, Trainer v. Stills, Vaughn v. Jackson, Warden, Jones v. Powell et al., Shivaee v. Cube, In re Cothrum, Watley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Purdle v. Groesch, Warden,
   531 U.S. 1080;

531 U.S. 1127;

531 U.S. 1021;

531 U.S. 1026;

531 U.S. 1009;

531 U.S. 1087;

531 U.S. 1087;

531 U.S. 1089;

531 U.S. 1091;

531 U.S. 1111;

531 U.S. 1116; and

531 U.S. 1130. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 99-2041.
    Vallone v. United States,
   531 U. S. 825. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 6, 2001
    No. 00A767 (00-8810).
    Richardson v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certio-rari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the issuance of the mandate of this Court.


text:
    No. 00A773.
    Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Richardson.
   Application to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on March 6, 2001, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, granted.

Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would deny the application to vacate the stay of execution.


text:
    No. 00-8505 (00A702).
    Dowthitt v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    March 7, 2001
    No. 00-8824 (00A775).
    Dowthitt v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scaua, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.