author: Justice Scalia Justice Souter, Justice Stevens,

text:
    BARNES, in her official capacity as MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY MISSOURI, et al. v. GORMAN
    No. 01-682.
    Argued April 23, 2002
    Decided June 17, 2002

      Scaxja, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Sou-ter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 190. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 191.

      Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Roy T. Englert, Jr., Alan E. Untereiner, Arnon D. Siegel, and Dale H. Close.

      Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorneys General Boyd and McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Gregory B. Friel.

      Scott L. Nelson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Brian Wolfman, John M. Simpson, and Connie Knight Sieracki

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Hawaii et al. by Earl I. Anzai, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Dorothy D. Sellers and Adina L. K. Cunningham, Deputy Attorneys General, joined by Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Steve Carter of Indiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, David Samson of New Jersey, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming; for the California Municipalities et al. by Samuel L. Jackson, Pamela Albers, Michael G. Colantuono, Ronald R. Ball, Michael F. Dean, John L. Cook, Charles E. Dickerson III,

        Joel D. Kuperberg, Philip D. Kohn, John Sanford Todd, Robert E. Shannon, Joseph A. Soldani, William B. Conners, Gregory P. Friamos, Had-den Roth, James F. Penman, George Rios, Brien J. Farrell, Valerie J. Armenio, Debra E. Corbett, J. Wallace Wortham, Jr., A Scott Chinn, Karl F. Dean, Michael Cardozo, Nelson A. Diaz, Jeffrey L. Rogers, John C. Wolfe, and Harry Morrison, Jr.; and for the International City/County Management Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James 1. Crowley.

        Jeffrey Robert White filed a brief for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide whether punitive damages may be awarded in a private cause of action brought under § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 337,42 U. S. C. § 12132 (1994 ed.), and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. § 794(a).

I

Respondent Jeffrey Gorman, a paraplegic, is confined to a wheelchair and lacks voluntary control over his lower torso, including his bladder, forcing him to wear a catheter attached to a urine bag around his waist. In May 1992, he was arrested for trespass after fighting with a bouncer at a Kansas City, Missouri, nightclub. While waiting for a police van to transport him to the station, he was denied permission to use a restroom to empty his urine bag. When the van arrived, it was not equipped to receive respondent’s wheelchair. Over respondent’s objection, the officers removed him from his wheelchair and used a seatbelt and his own belt to strap him to a narrow bench in the rear of the van. During the ride to the police station, respondent released his seatbelt, fearing it placed excessive pressure on his urine bag. Eventually, the other belt came loose and respondent fell to the floor, rupturing his urine bag and injuring his shoulder and back. The driver, the only officer in the van, finding it impossible to lift respondent, fastened him to a support for the remainder of the trip. Upon arriving at the station, respondent was booked, processed, and released; later he was convicted of misdemeanor trespass. After these events, respondent suffered serious medical problems — including a bladder infection, serious lower back pain, and uncontrollable spasms in his paralyzed areas — that left him unable to work full time.

Respondent brought suit against petitioners — members of the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, the chief of police, and the officer who drove the van — in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The suit claimed petitioners had discriminated against respondent on the basis of his disability, in violation of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries.

A jury found petitioners liable and awarded over $1 million in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages. The District Court vacated the punitive damages award, holding that punitive damages are unavailable in suits under § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, relying on this Court’s decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 70-71 (1992), which stated the “general rule” that “absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Punitive damages are appropriate relief, the Eighth Circuit held, because they are “an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial arsenal,” 257 F. 3d 738, 745 (2001), and Congress did nothing to disturb this tradition in enacting or amending the relevant statutes, id., at 747. We granted certiorari. 534 U. S. 1103 (2002).

II

Section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by public entities; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funding, including private organizations, 29 U. S. C.

§ 794(b)(3). Both provisions are enforceable through private causes of action. Section 203 of the ADA declares that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides” for violations of § 202. 42 U. S. C. § 12133. Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, declares that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... shall be available” for violations of § 504, as added, 92 Stat. 2983, 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2). Thus, the remedies for violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq., which prohibits racial discrimination in federally funded programs and activities.

Although Title VI does not mention a private right of action, our prior decisions have found an implied, right of action, e. g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 703 (1979), and Congress has acknowledged this right in amendments to the statute, leaving it “beyond dispute that private individuals may sue to enforce” Title VI, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 280 (2001). It is less clear what remedies are available in such a suit. In Franklin, supra, at 73, we recognized “the traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right,” and held that since this presumption applies to suits under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681-1688, monetary damages were available. (Emphasis added.) And the Court has interpreted Title IX consistently with Title VI, see Cannon, supra, at 694-698. Franklin, however, did not describe the scope of “appropriate relief.” We take up this question'today.

Title VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to place conditions on the grant of federal funds. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 640 (1999) (Title IX). We have repeatedly characterized this statute and other Spending Clause legislation as “much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Davis, supra, at 640; Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 286 (1998); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582, 599 (1983) (opinion of White, J.); id., at 632-633 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, 568-569 (1974). Just as a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of its terms, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’.. . Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst, supra, at 17; see also Davis, supra, at 640; Gebser, supra, at 287; Franklin, 503 U. S., at 74. Although we have been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation, see, e. g., Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985) (Title I), we have regularly applied the contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable for money damages. Thus, a recipient may be held liable to third-party beneficiaries for intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the relevant statute, Davis, supra, at 642, but not for its failure to comply with vague language describing the objectives of the statute, Pennhurst, supra, at 24-25; and, if the statute implies that only violations brought to the attention of an official with power to correct them are actionable, not for conduct unknown to any such official, see Gebser, supra, at 290. We have also applied the contract-law analogy in finding a damages remedy available in private suits under Spending Clause legislation. Franklin, supra, at 74-75.

The same analogy applies, we think, in determining the scope of damages remedies. We said as much in Gebser: “Title IX’s contractual nature has implications for our construction of the scope of available remedies.” 524 U. S., at 287. One of these implications, we believe, is that a remedy is “appropriate relief,” Franklin, 503 U. S., at 73, only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature. A funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. Thus we have held that under Title IX, which contains no express remedies, a recipient of federal funds is nevertheless subject to suit for compensatory damages, id., at 76, and injunction, Cannon, supra, at 711-712, forms of relief traditionally available in suits for breach of contract. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 (1981); 3 S. Williston, Law of Contracts §§ 1445-1450 (1920); J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts 1-5 (1879). Like Title IX, Title VI mentions no remedies — indeed, it fails to mention even a private right of action (hence this Court’s decision finding an implied right of action in Cannon). But punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract, see 3 E. Farnsworth, Contracts §12.8, pp. 192-201 (2d ed. 1998); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §355; 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages §370 (8th ed. 1891).

Nor (if such an interpretive technique were available) could an implied, punitive damages provision reasonably be found in Title VI. Some authorities say that reasonably implied contractual terms are those that the parties would have agreed to if they had adverted to the matters in question. See 2 Farnsworth, supra, § 7.16, at 335, and authorities cited. More recent commentary suggests that reasonably implied contractual terms are simply those that “compor[t] with community standards of fairness,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 204, Comment d; see also 2 Farnsworth, supra, §7.16, at 334-336. Neither approach would support the implication here of a remedy that is not normally available for contract actions and that is of indeterminate magnitude. We have acknowledged that compensatory damages alone “might well exceed a recipient’s level of federal funding,” Gebser, supra, at 290; punitive damages on top of that could well be disastrous. Not only is it doubtful that funding recipients would have agreed to exposure to such unorthodox and indeterminate liability; it is doubtful whether they would even have accepted the funding if punitive damages liability was a required condition. “Without doubt, the scope of potential damages liability is one of the most significant factors a school would consider in deciding whether to receive federal funds.” Davis, supra, at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And for the same reason of unusual and disproportionate exposure, it can hardly be said that community standards of fairness support such an implication. In sum, it must be concluded that Title VI funding recipients have not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consented to liability for punitive damages.

Our conclusion is consistent with the “well settled” rule that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946); see also Franklin, supra, at 66. When a federal-funds recipient violates conditions of Spending Clause legislation, the wrong done is the failure to provide what the contractual obligation requires; and that wrong is “made good” when the recipient compensates the Federal Government or a third-party beneficiary (as in this case) for the loss caused by that failure. See Guardians, 463 U. S., at 633 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“When a court concludes that a recipient has breached its contract, it should enforce the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the recipient would not discriminate. ... The obvious way to do this is to put private parties in as good a position as they would have been had the contract been performed”). Punitive damages are not compensatory, and are therefore not embraced within the rule described in Bell.

* * *

Because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This makes it unnecessary to reach petitioners’ alternative argument — neither raised nor passed on below — invoking the traditional presumption against imposition of punitive damages on government entities. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 784-785 (2000); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 262-263 (1981). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice O’Connor joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that analogy to the common law of contract is appropriate in this instance, with the conclusion that punitive damages are not available under the statute. Punitive damages, as the Court points out, may range in orders of “indeterminate magnitude,” ante, at 188, untethered to compensable harm, and would thus pose a concern that recipients of federal funding could not reasonably have anticipated. I realize, however, and read the Court’s opinion as acknowledging, that the contract-law analogy may fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other questions that may be raised by actions for private recovery under Spending Clause legislation, such as the proper measure of compensatory damages.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals might be reversed on any of three different theories: (1) as the Court held in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981), absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, municipalities are not subject to punitive damages; (2) an analysis of the text and legislative history of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize a punitive damages remedy for violations of either statute; or (3) applying reasoning akin to that used in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), that the remedies for violations of federal statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power should be defined by the common law of contracts, third-party beneficiaries are not allowed to recover punitive damages.

Petitioners did not rely on either the first or the third of those theories in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, because it presents the narrowest basis for resolving the case, I am convinced that it is an appropriate exercise of judicial restraint to decide the ease on the theory that petitioners are immune from punitive damages under Newport There is, however, no justification for the Court’s decision to reach out and decide the case on a broader ground that was not argued below. The Court’s reliance on, and extension of, Pennhurst — a case that was not even cited in petitioners’ briefs in the Court of Appeals— is particularly inappropriate.

In Pennhurst we were faced with the question whether the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §6010, had imposed affirmative obligations on participating States. Relying in part on the important distinction between statutory provisions that “simply prohibited certain kinds of state conduct” and those that “impose affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain services,” 451 U. S., at 16-17, we first held that § 6010 was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. We then concluded that the “affirmative obligations” that the Court of Appeals had found in § 6010 could “hardly be considered a ‘condition’ of the grant of federal funds.” Id., at 23. “When Congress does impose affirmative obligations on the States, it usually makes a far more substantial contribution to defray costs.... It defies common sense, in short, to suppose that Congress implicitly imposed this massive obligation on participating States.” Id., at 24.

The case before us today involves a municipality’s breach of a condition that simply prohibits certain discriminatory conduct. The prohibition is set forth in two statutes, one of which, Title II of the ADA, was not enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. Our opinion in Pennhurst says nothing about the remedy that might be appropriate for such a breach. Nor do I believe that the rules of contract law on which the Court relies are necessarily relevant to the tortious conduct described in this record. Moreover, the Court's novel reliance on what has been, at most, a useful analogy to contract law has potentially far-reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues briefed and argued in this case. In light of the fact that the petitioners — in addition to most defendants sued for violations of Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 — are clearly not subject to punitive damages pursuant to our holding in Newport, I see no reason to decide the case on the expansive basis asserted by the Court.

Accordingly, I do not join the Court’s opinion, although I do concur in its judgment in this case.

       Justice Stevens believes that our reliance on Pennhurst is “inappropriate” because that case addressed legislation imposing affirmative obligations on recipients whereas Title VI “simply prohibit^] certain discriminatory conduct.” Post, at 192 (opinion concurring in judgment). He does not explain why he thinks this distinction — which played no role in the Court’s application of contract-law principles in Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 24-25 — ought to make a difference. Whatever his reason, we have regularly applied Pennhurst’s contract analogy to legislation that “simply prohibit^] certain discriminatory conduct.” See, e. g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 640 (1999) (Title IX); Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 287 (1998) (same).

       We cannot understand Justice Stevens’ Chicken-Little statement that today’s decision “has potentially far-reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues briefed and argued in this case.” Post, at 192-193. Our decision merely applies a principle expressed and applied many times before: that the “contractual nature” of Spending Clause legislation “has implications for our construction of the scope of available remedies.” Gebser, 524 U. S., at 287 (emphasis added). We do not imply, for example, that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise. Since Justice Stevens is unable to identify any “far-reaching consequenc[e]” that might reasonably follow from our decision today, and since we are merely occupying ground that the Court has long held, we surely do not deserve his praise that we are “fearless crusaders,” post, at 193, n. 2.

       Justice Stevens believes that our analysis of Title VI does not carry over to the ADA because the latter is not Spending Clause legislation, and identifies “tortious conduct.” Post, at 192, 193, n. 2. Perhaps he thinks that it should not carry over, but that is a question for Congress, and Congress has unequivocally said otherwise. The ADA could not be clearer that the “remedies, procedures, and rights . . . this subchapter provides” for violations of §202 are the same as the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in” § 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, which is Spending Clause legislation. 42 U. S. C. § 12133. Section 505(a)(2), in turn, explains that the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI... shall be available” for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2). These explicit provisions make discussion of the ADA’s status as a “non Spending Clause” tort statute quite irrelevant.

         Justice Stevens suggests that our decision likewise rests on a theory neither presented nor passed on below. Post, at 191-192. But the parties raised, and the courts below passed on, the applicability of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), to the question presented. That case addressed Spending Clause legislation (Title IX) and cited the contract-analogy discussion in Pennhurst as the basis for its acknowledgment of a notice requirement. See 503 U. S., at 74-75. Respondent did argue (quite correctly) that petitioners had failed to rely on the Newport ground that Justice Stevens uses, Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 262-263 (1981), see Brief for Respondent 41-43, but not that they had failed to rely on the contract analogy initiated in Pennhurst, Brief for Respondent 35-41.

       This was the theory that was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F. 3d 782, 788-792 (1996). It was also the only theory discussed and rejected by the Court of Appeals below.

       Although rejected by the Sixth Circuit, see Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F. 3d 852 (2002), one District Court applied the Pennhurst contract analogy in order to support its conclusion that Spending Clause legislation is not the “supreme law of the land.” Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561 (ED Mich. 2001). The Court fortunately does cabin the potential reach of today’s decision by stating that “[w]e do not imply, for example, that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise,” ante, at 189, n. 2, but whenever the Court reaches out to adopt a broad theory that was not discussed in the early stages of the litigation, and that implicates statutes that are not at issue, its opinion is sure to have unforeseen consequences. When it does so unnecessarily, it tends to assume a legislative, rather than a judicial, role. Reliance on a narrower theory that was not argued below does not create that risk. I am not persuaded that “Chicken-Little,” ante, at 188, n. 2, is an appropriate characterization of judicial restraint; it is, however, a rhetorical device appropriately used by fearless crusaders.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Kennedy Justice Souter,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON et al.
    No. 01-631.
    Argued April 16, 2002
    Decided June 17, 2002

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 208.

      Larry D. Thompson argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Jeffrey A. Lamken, and Kathleen A. Felton.

      Gwendolyn Spivey, by appointment of the Court, 535 U. S. 903, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Randolph P. Murrell, Steven L. Seliger, by appointment of the Court, 535 U. S. 903, Jeffrey T. Green, and Jacqueline G. Cooper

         Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Leon Friedman and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

        James P, Manak, Wayne W Schmidt, Richard Weintraub, Bernard J. Farber, and Carl Milazzo filed a brief for Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991). This case requires us to determine whether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate.

I

On February 4, 1999, respondents Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr., were traveling on a Greyhound bus en route from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Detroit, Michigan. The bus made a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida. The passengers were required to disembark so the bus could be refueled and cleaned. As the passengers reboarded, the driver checked their tickets and then left to complete paperwork inside the terminal. As he left, the driver allowed three members of the Tallahassee Police Department to board the bus as part of a routine drug and weapons interdiction effort. The officers were dressed in plain clothes and carried concealed weapons and visible badges.

Once onboard Officer Hoover knelt on the driver’s seat and faced the rear of the bus. He could observe the passengers and ensure the safety of the two other officers without blocking the aisle or otherwise obstructing the bus exit. Officers Lang and Blackburn went to the rear of the bus. Blackburn remained stationed there, facing forward. Lang worked his way toward the front of the bus, speaking with individual passengers as he went. He asked the passengers about their travel plans and sought to match passengers with luggage in the overhead racks. To avoid blocking the aisle, Lang stood next to or just behind each passenger with whom he spoke.

According to Lang’s testimony, passengers who declined to cooperate with him or who chose to exit the bus at any time would have been allowed to do so without argument. In Lang’s experience, however, most people are willing to cooperate. Some passengers go so far as to commend the police for their efforts to ensure the safety of their travel. Lang could recall five to six instances in the previous year in which passengers had declined to have their luggage searched. It also was common for passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were on board. Lang sometimes informed passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. On the day in question, however, he did not.

Respondents were seated next to each other on the bus. Drayton was in the aisle seat, Brown in the seat next to the window. Lang approached respondents from the rear and leaned over Drayton’s shoulder. He held up his badge long enough for respondents to identify him as a police officer. With his face 12-to-18 inches away from Drayton’s, Lang spoke in a voice just loud enough for respondents to hear:

“I’m Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police Department. We’re conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being transported on the bus. Do you have any bags on the bus?” App. 55.

Both respondents pointed to a single green bag in the overhead luggage rack. Lang asked, “Do you mind if I check it?,” and Brown responded, “Go ahead.” Id., at 56. Lang handed the bag to Officer Blackburn to check. The bag contained no contraband.

Officer Lang noticed that both respondents were wearing heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather. In Lang’s experience drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to conceal weapons or narcotics. The officer thus asked Brown if he had any weapons or drugs in his possession. And he asked Brown: “Do you mind if I check your person?” Brown answered, “Sure,” and cooperated by leaning up in his seat, pulling a cell phone out of his pocket, and opening up his jacket. Id., at 61. Lang reached across Drayton and patted down Brown’s jacket and pockets, including his waist area, sides, and upper thighs. In both thigh areas, Lang detected hard objects similar to drug packages detected on other occasions. Lang arrested and handcuffed Brown. Officer Hoover escorted Brown from the bus.

Lang then asked Drayton, “Mind if I check you?” Id., at 65. Drayton responded by lifting his hands about eight inches from his legs. Lang conducted a patdown of Dray-ton’s thighs and detected hard objects similar to those found on Brown. He arrested Drayton and escorted him from the bus. A further search revealed that respondents had duct-taped plastic bundles of powder cocaine between several pairs of their boxer shorts. Brown possessed three bundles containing 488 grams of cocaine. Drayton possessed two bundles containing 295 grams of cocaine.

Respondents were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of § 841(a)(1). They moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the consent to the patdown search was invalid. Following a hearing at which only Officer Lang testified, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied their motions to suppress. The District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and respondents’ consent to the search was voluntary. The District Court pointed to the fact that the officers were dressed in plain clothes, did not brandish their badges in an authoritative manner, did not make a general announcement to the entire bus, and did not address anyone in a menacing tone of voice. It noted that the officers did not block the aisle or the exit, and stated that it was “obvious that [respondents] can get up and leave, as can the people ahead of them.” App. 132. The District Court concluded: “[Everything that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton and Mr. Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was nothing coercive, there was nothing confrontational about it.” Ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant respondents’ motions to suppress. 231 F. 3d 787 (2000). The court held that this disposition was compelled by its previous decisions in United States v. Washington, 151 F. 3d 1354 (1998), and United States v. Guapi, 144 F. 3d 1393 (1998). Those cases had held that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard police officers’ requests to search absent “some positive indication that consent could have been refused.” Washington, supra, at 1357.

We granted certiorari. 534 U. S. 1074 (2002). The respondents, we conclude, were not seized and their consent to the search was voluntary; and we reverse.

II

Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen. See, e. g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); see id., at 523, n. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that such interactions in airports are “the sort of consensual encounters] that implicate] no Fourth Amendment interest”). Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage — provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 434-435 (citations omitted). If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.

The Court has addressed on a previous occasion the specific question of drug interdiction efforts on buses. In Bos-tick, two police officers requested a bus passenger’s consent to a search of his luggage. The passenger agreed, and the resulting search revealed cocaine in his suitcase. The Florida Supreme Court suppressed the cocaine. In doing so it adopted a per se rule that due to the cramped confines on-board a bus the act of questioning would deprive a person of his or her freedom of movement and so constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

This Court reversed. Bostick first made it clear that for the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. The proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.” Id., at 439. The Court noted next that the traditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so long as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and go about his business,” California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 628 (1991), is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of a bus encounter. A passenger may not want to get off a bus if there is a risk it will depart before the opportunity to reboard. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 434-436. A bus rider’s movements are confined in this sense, but this is the natural result of choosing to take the bus; it says nothing about whether the police conduct is coercive. Id., at 436. The proper inquiry “is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Ibid. Finally, the Court rejected Bostick’s argument that he must have been seized because no reasonable person would consent to a search of luggage containing drugs. The reasonable person test, the Court explained, is objective and “presupposes an innocent person.” Id., at 437-438.

In light of the limited record, Bostick refrained from deciding whether a seizure occurred. Id., at 437. The Court, however, identified two factors “particularly worth noting” on remand. Id., at 432. First, although it was obvious that an officer was armed, he did not remove the gun from its pouch or use it in a threatening way. Second, the officer advised the passenger that he could refuse consent to the search. Ibid.

Relying upon this latter factor, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted what is in effect a per se rule that evidence obtained during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses must be suppressed unless the officers have advised passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to a search. In United States v. Guapi, supra, the Court of Appeals described “[t]he most glaring difference” between the encounters in Guapi and in Bostick as “the complete lack of any notification to the passengers that they were in fact free to decline the search request.... Providing [this] simple notification ... is perhaps the most efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the Constitution.” 144 F. 3d, at 1395. The Court of Appeals then listed other factors that contributed to the coerciveness of the encounter: (1) the officer conducted the interdiction before the passengers disembarked from the bus at a scheduled stop; (2) the officer explained his presence in the form of a general announcement to the entire bus; (3) the officer wore a police uniform; and (4) the officer questioned passengers as he moved from the front to the rear of the bus, thus obstructing the path to the exit. Id., at 1396.

After its decision in Guapi the Court of Appeals decided United States v. Washington and the instant case. The court suppressed evidence obtained during similar drug interdiction efforts despite the following facts: (1) the officers in both cases conducted the interdiction after the passengers had reboarded the bus; (2) the officer in the present ease did not make a general announcement to the entire bus but instead spoke with individual passengers; (3) the officers in both cases were not in uniform; and (4) the officers in both cases questioned passengers as they moved from the rear to the front of the bus and were careffil not to obstruct passengers’ means of egress from the bus.

Although the Court of Appeals has disavowed a per se requirement, the lack of an explicit warning to passengers is the only element common to all its cases. See Washington, 151 F. 3d, at 1357 (“It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure that their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say so. Without such notice in this case, we do not feel a reasonable person would have felt able to decline the agents’ requests”); 231 F. 3d, at 790 (noting that “[t]his case is controlled by” Guapi and Washington, and dismissing any factual differences between the three cases as irrelevant). Under these cases, it appears that the Court of Appeals would suppress any evidence obtained during suspicion-less drug interdiction efforts aboard buses in the absence of a warning that passengers may refuse to cooperate. The Court of Appeals erred in adopting this approach.

Applying the Bostick framework to the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the police did not seize respondents when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers’ questions. When Officer Lang approached respondents, he did not brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter.

There were ample grounds for the District Court to conclude that “everything that took place between Officer Lang and [respondents] suggests that it was cooperative” and that there “was nothing coercive [or] confrontational” about the encounter. App. 132. There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. It is beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be constitutional. The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure. See Bostick, 501 U. S., at 439-440. Indeed, because many fellow passengers are present to witness officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other circumstances.

Respondents make much of the fact that Officer Lang displayed his badge. In Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S., at 5-6, however, the Court rejected the claim that the defendant was seized when an officer approached him in an airport, showed him his badge, and asked him to answer some questions. Likewise, in INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212-213 (1984), the Court held that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents’ wearing badges and questioning workers in a factory did not constitute a seizure. And while neither Lang nor his colleagues were in uniform or visibly armed, those factors should have little weight in the analysis. Officers are often required to wear uniforms and in many circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort. Much the same can be said for wearing sidearms. That most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.

Officer Hoover’s position at the front of the bus also does not tip the scale in respondents’ favor. Hoover did nothing to intimidate passengers, and he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit and indeed he left the aisle clear. In Delgado, the Court determined there was no seizure even though several uniformed INS officers were stationed near the exits of the factory. Id., at 219. The Court noted: “The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of detention to these workers,. . . the mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or detained in any meaningful way.” Ibid.

Finally, the fact that in Officer Lang’s experience only a few passengers have refused to cooperate does not suggest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the bus encounter. In Lang’s experience it was common for passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were questioning passengers. App. 70, 81. And of more importance, bus passengers answer officers’ questions and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them. “While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Delgado, supra, at 216.

Drayton contends that even if Brown’s cooperation with the officers was consensual, Drayton was seized because no reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with the officers after Brown had been arrested. The Court of Appeals did not address this claim; and in any event the argument fails. The arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by police. If anything, Brown’s arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers’ questions. Even after arresting Brown, Lang addressed Drayton in a polite manner and provided him with no indication that he was required to answer Lang’s questions.

We turn now from the question whether respondents were seized to whether they were subjected to an unreasonable search, i. e., whether their consent to the suspicionless search was involuntary. In circumstances such as these, where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very similar facts. And, as the facts above suggest, respondents’ consent to the search of their luggage and their persons was voluntary. Nothing Officer Lang said indicated a command to consent to the search. Rather, when respondents informed Lang that they had a bag on the bus, he asked for their permission to check it. And when Lang requested to search Brown and Drayton’s persons, he asked first if they objected, thus indicating to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse. Even after arresting Brown, Lang provided Drayton with no indication that he was required to consent to a search. To the contrary, Lang asked for Drayton’s permission to search him (“Mind if I check you?”), and Dray-ton agreed.

The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search. See, e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227 (1973). “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” Ibid. Nor do this Court’s decisions suggest that even though there are no per se rules, a presumption of invalidity attaches if a citizen consented without explicit notification that he or she was free to refuse to cooperate. Instead, the Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning. See, e. g., Sckneckloth, supra; Robinette, supra, at 39-40. Although Officer Lang did not inform respondents of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary, so the searches were reasonable.

In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.

We need not ask the alternative question whether, after the arrest of Brown, there were grounds for a Terry stop and frisk of Drayton, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), though this may have been the case. It was evident that Drayton and Brown were traveling together — Officer Lang observed the pair reboarding the bus together; they were each dressed in heavy, baggy clothes that were ill-suited for the day’s warm temperatures; they were seated together on the bus; and they each claimed responsibility for the single piece of green carry-on luggage. Once Lang had identified Brown as carrying what he believed to be narcotics, he may have had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and frisk on Drayton as well. That question, however, has not been presented to us. The fact the officers may have had reasonable suspicion does not prevent them from relying on a citizen’s consent to the search. It would be a paradox, and one most puzzling to law enforcement officials and courts alike, were we to say, after holding that Brown’s consent was, voluntary, that Drayton’s consent was ineffectual simply because the police at that point had more compelling grounds to detain him. After taking Brown into custody, the officers were entitled to continue to proceed on the basis of consent and to ask for Drayton’s cooperation.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter,

with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

Anyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It is universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks that, nowadays, even small children understand. The commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground transportation, however, and no such conditions have been placed on passengers getting on trains or buses. There is therefore an air of unreality about the Court’s explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to “enhanc[e] their own safety and the safety of those around them.” Ante, at 205. Nor are the other factual assessments underlying the Court’s conclusion in favor of the Government more convincing.

The issue we took to review is whether the police’s examination of the bus passengers, including respondents, amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If it did, any consent to search was plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 507-508 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he consent was tainted by the illegality and ... ineffective to justify the search”); id., at 509 (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), established the framework for determining whether the bus passengers were seized in the constitutional sense. In that case, we rejected the position that police questioning of bus passengers was a per se seizure, and held instead that the issue of seizure was to be resolved under an objective test considering all circumstances: whether a reasonable passenger would have felt “free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,” id., at 436. We thus applied to a bus passenger the more general criterion, whether the person questioned was free “to ignore the police presence and go about his business,” id., at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567, 569 (1988)).

Before applying the standard in this ease, it may be worth getting some perspective from different sets of facts. A perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable claim of seizure is the act of an officer who simply goes up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question. See Royer, 460 U. S., at 497; see id., at 523, n. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A pair of officers questioning a pedestrian, without more, would presumably support the same conclusion. Now consider three officers, one of whom stands behind the pedestrian, another at his side toward the open sidewalk, with the third addressing questions to the pedestrian a foot or two from his face. Finally, consider the same scene in a narrow alley. On such barebones facts, one may not be able to say a seizure occurred, even in the last case, but one can say without qualification that the atmosphere of the encounters differed significantly from the first to the last examples. In the final instance there is every reason to believe that the pedestrian would have understood, to his considerable discomfort, what Justice Stewart described as the “threatening presence of several officers,” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). The police not only carry legitimate authority but also exercise power free from immediate check, and when the attention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian the imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable. We all understand this, as well as we understand that a display of power rising to Justice Stewart’s “threatening” level may overbear a normal person’s ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit commands or the formalities of detention. As common as this understanding is, however, there is little sign of it in the Court’s opinion. My own understanding of the relevant facts and their significance follows.

When the bus in question made its scheduled stop in Tallahassee, the passengers were required to disembark while the vehicle was cleaned and refueled. App. 104. When the passengers returned, they gave their tickets to the driver, who kept them and then left himself, after giving three police officers permission to board the bus in his absence. Id., at 77-78. Although they were not in uniform, the officers displayed badges and identified themselves as police. One stationed himself in the driver’s seat by the door at the front, facing back to observe the passengers. The two others went to the rear, from which they worked their way forward, with one of them speaking to passengers, the other backing him up. Id., at 47-48. They necessarily addressed the passengers at very close range; the aisle was only 15 inches wide, and each seat only 18. The quarters were cramped further by the overhead rack, 19 inches above the top of the passenger seats. The passenger by the window could not have stood up straight, id., at 55, and the face of the nearest officer was only a foot or 18 inches from the face of the nearest passenger being addressed, id., at 57. During the exchanges, the officers looked down, and the passengers, had to look up if they were to face the police. The officer asking the questions spoke quietly. He prefaced his requests for permission to search luggage and do a body pat-down by identifying himself by name as a police investigator “conducting bus interdiction” and saying, “‘We would like for your cooperation. Do you have any luggage on the bus?’ ” Id., at 82.

Thus, for reasons unexplained, the driver with the tickets entitling the passengers to travel had yielded his custody of the bus and its seated travelers to three police officers, whose authority apparently superseded the driver’s own. The officers took control of the entire passenger compartment, one stationed at the door keeping surveillance of all the occupants, the others working forward from the back. With one officer right behind him and the other one forward, a third officer accosted each passenger at quarters extremely close and so cramped that as many as half the passengers could not even have stood to face the speaker. None was asked whether he was willing to converse with the police or to take part in the enquiry. Instead the officer said the police were “conducting bus interdiction,” in the course of which they “would like . . . cooperation.” Ibid. The reasonable inference was that the “interdiction” was not a consensual exercise, but one the police would carry o.ut whatever the circumstances; that they would prefer “cooperation” but would not let the lack of it stand in their way. There was no contrary indication that day, since no passenger had refused the cooperation requested, and there was no reason for any passenger to believe that the driver would return and the trip resume until the police were satisfied. The scene was set and an atmosphere of obligatory participation was established by this introduction. Later requests to search prefaced with “Do you mind ...” would naturally have been understood in the terms with which the encounter began.

It is very hard to imagine that either Brown or Drayton would have believed that he stood to lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to ignore the police altogether. No reasonable passenger could have believed that, only an uncomprehending one. It is neither here nor there that the interdiction was conducted by three officers, not one, as a safety precaution. See id., at 47. The fact was that there were three, and when Brown and Drayton were called upon to respond, each one was presumably conscious of an officer in front watching, one at his side questioning him, and one behind for cover, in case he became unruly, perhaps, or “cooperation” was not forthcoming. The situation is much like the one in the alley, with civilians in close quarters, unable to move effectively, being told their cooperation is expected. While I am not prepared to say that no bus interrogation and. search can pass the Bostick test without a warning that passengers are free to say no, the facts here surely required more from the officers than a quiet tone of voice. A police officer who is certain to get his way has no need to shout.

It is true of course that the police testified that a bus passenger sometimes says no, App. 81, but that evidence does nothing to cast the facts here in a different light. We have no way of knowing the circumstances in which a passenger elsewhere refused a request; maybe that has happened only when the police have told passengers they had a right to refuse (as the officers sometimes advised them), id., at 81-82. Nor is it fairly possible to see the facts of this case differently by recalling INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984), as precedent. In that case, a majority of this Court found no seizure when a factory force was questioned by immigration officers, with an officer posted at every door leading from the workplace. Id., at 219. Whether that opinion was well reasoned or not, the facts as the Court viewed them differed from the case here. Delgado considered an order granting summary judgment in favor of respondents, with the consequence that the Court was required to construe the record and all issues of fact favorably to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See id., at 214; id., at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court therefore emphasized that even after “th[e] surveys were initiated, the employees were about their ordinary business, operating machinery and performing other job assignments.” Id., at 218. In this case, however, Brown and Drayton were seemingly pinned-in by the officers and the customary course of events was stopped flat. The bus was going nowhere, and with one officer in the driver’s seat, it was reasonable to suppose no passenger would tend to his own business until the officers were ready to let him.

In any event, I am less concerned to parse this case against Delgado than to apply Bostick’s totality of circumstances test, and to ask whether a passenger would reasonably have felt free to end his encounter with the three officers by saying no and ignoring them thereafter. In my view the answer is clear. The Court’s contrary conclusion tells me that the majority cannot see what Justice Stewart saw, and I respectfully dissent.

       The Court proceeds to resolve the voluntariness issue on the heels of its seizure enquiry, but the voluntariness of respondents’ consent was not within the question the Court accepted for review. Accord, Reply Brief for United States 20, n. 7 (stating that the consent issue “is not presented by this case; the question here is whether there was an illegal seizure in the first place”). While it is true that the Eleventh Circuit purported to address the question “whether the consent given by each defendant for the search was ‘uncoerced and legally voluntary,”’ 231 F. 3d 787, 788 (2000), elsewhere the court made it clear that it was applying the test in Florida, v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), which is relevant to the issue of seizure, 231 F. 3d, at 791, n. 6. There is thus no occasion here to reach any issue of consent untainted by seizure. If there were, the consent would have to satisfy the voluntariness test of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), which focuses on “the nature of a person’s subjective understanding,” id., at 230, and requires consideration of “the characteristics of the accused [in addition to] the details of the interrogation,” id., at 226.

       The figures are from a Lodging filed by respondents (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The Government does not dispute their accuracy.