author: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

text:
    Duncan Linton, Charlotte Linton and her Husband, Francis Surgette, Stephen Duncan Guardian of Mary Linton and John Linton Minors, Plaintiffs in error, v. Frederick Stanton.
    Where the highest court of a State decided in favor of a defendant who pleaded his discharge under the bankrupt law of the United States, and the case was brought to this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, this court has no jurisdiction.
    It would have been otherwise if the decision had been adverse to the exemption claimed under the law of Congress.
    Promises alleged to have been made by the bankrupt after his discharge are not th. subject of jurisdiction under the 25th section. The decision of a State court upon their effect cannot be reviewed by this court.
    This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana for the Eastern District, by a writ of error issued under the-25th section of the Judiciary Act.
    The plaintiffs in error, on the 19th June, 1848, filed their petition in the Third District Court of New Orleans, stating them- . selves to be residents of Mississippi, and the only heirs and representatives of John. Linton, deceased, and as such in possession of his property.
    That on, the 13th May, 1839, the defendant, Stanton, owed the estate of John* Linton, then deceased, the sum of $11,446.60, and on that date executed his two promissory notes in favor of Stephen Duncan, (one of the petitioners, and administrator to Linton,) one- -for $5,856.40, due the 1st April, 1841, the other for $5,590.20, payable the 1st April, 1842.
    The petitioners further state, that on the 25th August, 1842, and also on the 25th December, 1843, the defendant promised to pay each of these notes, but has neglected and refused to do so, and that the- debt still -remains due and unpaid.'
    The two notes, they state, were made and fell due in the State of Mississippi, where the legal interest on all debts due and unpaid, is 8 per cent. That the defendant lives in Mississippi, but was then in New Orleans.
    They pray judgment against him for the amounts of the notes, with interest from 13th May, 1839, till paid, and for general relief.

      Stanton filed his exceptions, alleging that the petition did not fully set out and state the nature of the demand, requiring the plaintiffs to state whether the promises charged were verbal or written, and if written, claiming oyer-.
    Plaintiffs filed two letters from Stanton to Duncan, dated, respectively, the 25th day of August, 1842, and the 25th December, 1843, to which in their supplemental petition they refer as the written evidence of the promises alleged in their original petition, and also charge verbal promise^ by Stanton to pay, made both before and after the dates of these letters.
    To this supplemental petition, Stanton filed his exception, alleging that the verbal promises above charged were insufficiently stated, from failure to mention to whom and when they were made.
    The plaintiffs filed an amended petition, stating that these verbal promises were made to Stephen Duncan, the representative of John Linton, on each and every day of the years 1842, 1843, 1844,1845,1846, and 1847.
    Stanton’s answer denies all the allegations of the original and supplemental petitions; and specially pleads, that on the —- day of-, 1842, he applied to the United States District Court, in and for the State of Mississippi, where he then resided, for the benefit of the bankrupt law of the United States; and after due proceeding had, he obtained his discharge and certificate, and that these proceedings and discharge took place after the date of the note sued on.
    Pleads his discharge in bar, and also that the plaintiffs’ demand is barred by prescription.
    His supplemental answers allege that the notes on which plaintiffs sue, and which were made before his bankruptcy, were secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real estate, and that the plaintiffs, or Duncan, for their use,-.purchased it and paid for the same by said notes, thus_ receiving payment and compensation. And further, that by the law of Mississippi, verbal promises to pay a debt discharged by bankruptcy are not binding.
    Amongst the testimony offered on both sides, the defendant produced the proceedings in bankruptcy.
    The District Court of New Orleans decreed in favor of the defendant.
    The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme. Court of Louisiana, which confirmed the decision below, because, —■
    1st. The jurisdiction of the United States District Court in matters of bankruptcy not having been contested, a decree of that court, declaring that all the requisitions of the’bankrupt act had been complied with, was conclusive when drawn collaterally into question.

      - 2d. Because the subsequent promises of the defendant, relied on by the plaintiffs, did not include this debt'.
    The plaintiffs then brought the case up to this court.

      Mr. Johnson moved to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction.
    1st. Because, ovéis the existence and effect of any promises of defendant to pay the debt after his discharge under the bankrupt act, this court has no jurisdiction.
    2d. Because the only statute of the United States involved and drawn into question was that of the ,19th August, 1821 (5 Stat. at Large, 440,) and that was relied upon only by defendant; and the decision of the court below was in favor of, not against, the only title, right, privilege, or exemption claimecf under it. Judiciary Act, 24th Sept. 1789, e. 20, p. 25, (1 Stat. at Large, 85); McKinney v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 67; Crowell v. Randall, 10 Id. 368; Gill v. Oliver, 11 How. 529; Williams v. Oliver, at the present term of this court, MS.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for the Eastern District, and a motion has been made to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs in error, it appears, filed their petition in the Third District Court of New Orleans, against the defendant, to recover certain sums of money which they alleged were due to them on two promissory notes which had been executed by the defendant. ■ .

The defendant pleaded his discharge under the bankrupt law of the United States, and at the trial offered in evidence the record of the proceedings in bankruptcy in the District Court in which he had obtained his certificate. Objections were taken to the regularity and validity of this discharge, but they were overruled by the court, and judgment rendered for the defendant. The' plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment of the court below was affirmed, and this writ of error is brought to reverse that judgment.

The writ must, we presume, have been prosecuted under a misconstruction of the 25th section of the act of 1789, ch. 20.

We have no jurisdiction over the judgment of a State court upon a writ of error, except in the cases specified in-that section. And the jurisdiction of this court is there limited with great care and in plain terms. It gives a writ of error to this court where a party claims a right or exemption under a law of Congress, and the decision is against the right claimed. Undoubtedly the defendant in pleading his discharge under the bankrupt law claimed a right or exemption under a law of Congress. But in order to give jurisdiction something more is necessary; the-judgment of the State court must be against the right claimed. In the case before us the decision was in favor of it, and consequently no writ of error will lie to this court under the provisions of the act of 1789.

And as we have no jurisdiction, we cannot examine into the objections made to the validity of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The judgment of the State court that they were valid, and the defendant thereby discharged from the debt due to the plaintiffs, is conclusive between the parties.

Nor has this court the power to examine into the other question which appears to have arisen as to the legal effect of certain promises which the defendant is alleged to have made after he obtained his certificate in the bankrupt court. The legal obligation of such promises depends upon the laws of the State in which they were made; and in a suit in a State court the decision of that question by the highest tribunal of the State cannot be reviewed in any court of the United States. -

This case must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana for the Eastern District, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is -pow here ordered and. adjudged by this court, that this cause be,, and the same is hereby, dismissed, for the want of jurisdictibn.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The United States, Appellants, Alexis Porche.
    The aqt of Congress passed on 56th, May, 1824, enabling claimants-to land in Missouri arid Arkansas, to try their titles, was revived by the act of 17th Jane, 1844, and extended to Louisiana:
    By the fifth section of the act of 1824, the claimants were required to present' their claims within two years from the passage of the law.
    This section being revived by the act of 1844, claimants were required by the latter act to present their claims before the 17th of June, 1846.
    Acts supplementary to that of 1824 w re- not revived by the act of 1844. Nothing was revived except the original act.
    The District Court of Louisiana had no jurisdiction, therefore, over a case where the petition was not presented until the 8th March, 1848.
    The ninth section of the act of 1824 does not prevent the United States from appealing, where a claim is for less than one thousand acres.
    This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for Louisiana.

      It was a land case .arising under the act of 1824, as revived by the act of 1844.
    On the 8th of March, 1848, Porche filed his petition in the District Court, claiming a confirmation of an order of survey-made by Governor Miro in 1788. It is not necessary to state the title, as the case went off on a question of jurisdiction.
    The District Attorney put in a plea that the two years within which, by the act of 1824, petitions were to be presented, had elapsed at the filing of the petition, and that no suit could be brought against the United States after the 17th of June, 1846.
    The court overruled the plea, and the District Attorney then answered, repeating his plea of limitations, and also denying the allegations of the petition generally.
    After sundry proceedings, which it is not necessary to state, the District Court, on the 6th of June, 1849, passed a decree confirming the claim.
    From this decree the United States appealed to this court.
    It was argued by Mr. Crittenden, (Attorney-General,) for the United States, and by Mr. Henderson for the appellees.

      Mr. Crittenden contended that the decree ought to be reversed, because,
    1. That the court below had no jursdiction, because the petition was not filed within the two years limited by the fifth section of the act of 1824. That section enacts, that any claim within the purview of the act, which shall not be brought by petition before the said courts “ within two years from the passing of this act, or which, after being brought before the said courts, shall, on account of the neglect or delay of the claimant, not be prosecuted to a final decision within three years, shall be forever barred, both at law and equity, and no other action at common law, or proceeding in equity, shall ever thereafter be sustained in any court whatever in relation to these claims.” The act reviving the act of 1824, was passed 17th June, 1844 ; consequently the two years expired on the 17th June, 1846. The petition in this case was not filed until the 8th of March, 1848, nearly two years after the expiration of the time limited.
    In answer to this point it is first said, on the part of the claimant, that the objection was waived by the District Attorney having put in his answer after the plea had been overruled.
    The objection, however, was insisted on in the answer, as well as in the plea; but whether this had been so or not is immaterial, because the objection is one affecting the jurisdiction of the court. , The jurisdiction is confined to claims, the petitions in which are presented within two years, and no consent or waiver can confer any more extended jurisdiction. It is also said that the right to institute proceedings extends to five years; under the act of 1844. This question was settled to the contrary in Boisdore v. United States, 8 How. 120.
    But it is further said, that the time for filing petitions limited in the act of 26th May, 1824, was extended by the second section of the private act, entitled “ An act for the relief of Phineas Underwood, and for other purposes,” of the 22d May, 1826, which enacts, “ that the time for filing petitions under the provisions ” of the act of 1824, “ shall be, and the same is hereby, extended to. the 26th day of May, in the year 1828.” 1 Land Laws, 419.
    There is another act relating to the same subject, not referred to in the brief on behalf of the claimant. It is an act of the 24th May, 1828, entitled “ An act to continue in force for a limited time, and to amend an act entitled,” &e., being the act of 1824. It enacts, in the first section, that the act of 1824 shall be continued in force “ for the purpose of filing petitions in the manner prescribed by that act, to and until the 26th day of May, in the year 1829 ; and for the purpose of enabling claimants to obtain a final decision on the validity of their claims in the courts of Missouri and Arkansas respectively; the said claims liaving been exhibited within the time above specified, the said act shall be continued in force to and until the 26th day of May, 1830, and no longer.” 1 Land Laws, 442.
    By these acts of 1826 and 1828, the time for filing petitions was extended three years, in addition to the two given by the act of 1824. It will be insisted on hereafter, that the act of 1844 revived only and exclusively the act of 1824. But even if it should be held that the acts of 1826 and 1828 were revived, as well as the act of 1824, for other purposes, yet, for the purpose of extending the time for filing petitions, they were not so revived. There would be something in the argument if these acts had extended the time for filing two years, and one year longer; but the language employed “ to the 26th day of May, 1828 ” — “to and until the 26th day of May, 1829,” excludes the idea that these portions of the acts could be revived by the act of 1844. They afforded the relief intended at the time to claimants, but it cannot be extended by analogy to those claiming under the act of 1844.
    But the act of 1844 revived only that of 1824. This question has been twice presented to the court, as arising on the point whether it was necessary for the claimants to make individuals holding any portion of the lands adverse to the claimants parties to th'e petition. The act of 1824 directs them to be. made parties, but the- act of 1828 repeals this direction. This brought up the question. The case in which the point was raised went off on other grounds, and was never decided by this court.
    It was maintained, on behalf of the United States, that the act of 1844' revived only that of 1824, as follows:
    It is said that the act of 1844 revived the act of 1824, as taken in connection with that of 1828. That, however, must depend upon the intention of Congress, to be gathered from the language of the act itself. 1st. It refers to the act of 1824 by its name, reciting both its date and title. . It does not revive the whole of its provisions, but expressly excludes all such portions. of said act as referred to the territory of, Arkansas. Here is a special reference to this act only, in a form of expression as clear and perspicuous as can be employed. Again, it says, “ and the provisions of that part of the aforesaid act hereby revived.” What is still more conclusive and decisive is the following provision, thus — “ as if these States had been enumerated in the original act hereby revived.” The act of 1824 is not only declared to be revived, but reenacted, excluding all such portions of said act as referred to the Territory of Arkansas.
    It is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to revive and reenact the whole of the act of the 24th May, 1828, because no part of the first section could be of any avail. No exceptions are made in regard to this act, and no reference is made to it; while in regard to the act of 1824, the parts rejected are carefully excluded, and the residue only is revived and reenacted. The established rules of construction show, that where a part is named and excluded, the residue is reenacted. Ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius. Co. Lit. 210 A, 1836 ; Bro. Legal Maxims, 183, 187.
    Every'part of the act of 1824,'except what relates to the Territory of Arkansas, is revived and reenacted by express words; the court will readily perceive that this case is distinguishable from one reported in 7 Cranch, 382. In that case the language of the reviving act was general in the reference to the acts which had expired; here it is special and specific, and, by several modes of expression, negatives any such general inference. There is a plain repugnance between the first and eighth sections of the act of 1824, and the second section of the act of 1828. If, therefore, the law of 1824 is revived and reenacted, it is clear that the law of 1828 remains a dead letter.
    Questions bearing a strict analogy have often arisen upon repealing statutes, whether it was the intention of the framers to repeal the whole or only a part of the acts to which such repealing statutes were applied. _No better mode occurs of illustrating the subject, than by refeiring to the stamtard rules of construction which have been adopted by the courts in such cases. The word repeal is not to be taken in an absolute sense, if, from the whole, it appears to be used with a limitation. In every case it is a question of construction, whether it operate as a total, or partial, or temporary repeal. Rex v. Rogers, 10 East, 573.
    Where several acts of Parliament, upon the same subject, had been totally repealed, and others repealed in part, it was held that it must have been the clear intention of the legislature that only the part of an act particularly pointed out should be repealed. Camden v. Anderson, 6 Term R. 723; Dwar. on Stat. 675.
    The general principle undoubtedly is, that the repeal of a repealing statute revives the first act, unless the new law contain words indicative of a contrary intention of the legislature; ip which case no such consequence follows.
    So, it is said, if an act of Parliament be revived, all acts explanatory of that so revived are revived also; which may be true, unless in the latter case, as in the former, the language of the act authorizes a different interpretation. The Bishop’s case, 12 Coke’s Rep. 7; Tattle v. Greenwood, 4 Bing. 496; Dwar. on Stat. 676; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 367.
    And where some parts of a revived statute are omitted in the reviving statute, they are not to be revived by construction, but are to be considered as annulled. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43, 45; Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 97.
    The law does not favor implications in construing a repealing or a reviving statute. Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 342, 348; Haines v. Jenks, 2 Pick. 172, 176; Dwar. on Stat. 675.

      Mr. Henderson, for the appellee.
    We first submit to the consideration of the court with the argument at hearing, a motion to dismiss this suit, for reasons—
    1. Because the claim being for less than 1000 acres of land, is not appealable. We believe this was the intention of Congress. See 9th sect, act 26th May, 1324.
    2. Because the record on which the appeal was taken to December term, 1849, was not filed in this court till 28th February, 1850..
    Should this motion be overruled, we further submit that as the merits of the case upon the facts obviously sustain the decree, therefore, we think, the only point deserving note, is the plea in bar interposed, that the suit was not instituted till after two years from the date of the act of 17th June, 1844.

      To this objection in this court our answer is twofold. 1st. That as the United States answered to the merits, after their plea had been overruled, the objection was waived, and cannot now be reviewed in this court. To have made that objection available here, the United States should have suffered judgment final upon the plea, and appealed from that judgment. United States v. Boyd, 5 How. 51; 16 Pet. 93, 94.
    Our second answer is, that the judgment on the plea was right, because the right of action given by the act 17th June, 1845, “to’ institute proceedings to try, &c., extends -to five years; or if not, and the time given to institute the suit is the same as was given to Missouri, then the limitation is four years from 17th June, 1844, to 17th June, 1848. Because the fifth section of the act of 1824 was by the act of 22d May, 1826, extended by amendment to 26th May, 1828; hence the 5th section of the act of 1824 was by said amendment a limitation of four years, and only expired as so amended.” And this act, thus liberally-construed, avoids this plea as to time. .

      Mr. Crittenden, in reply.
    Two objections are taken to the appeal:
    1st. It is said that no appeal lies, the claim being for less than one thousand acres.
    By the latter part of the second, section of the act of 1824, it is” provided as follows: “ And in all cases, the party against whom the judgment or decree of the said District Court may be finally given, shall be entitled to an appeal within one year from the time of its rendition to the Supreme Court of the United States.” That is the language of the law.
    It is supposed, however, that the ninth section restricts the United States in the right of appeal thus given to both parties. This section declares that it shall be the duty of the District Attorney, where the claim exceeds one thousand acres, and the decision is against the government, to report the facts of the case to the Attorney* General, and the decision of the court; and if he shall be of opinion that the decision is erroneous, it shall be his duty to direct an appeal to the Supreme Court, and to appear and prosecute the said appeal. This section, it is very clear, however, is merely directory to the officers named in it; and it was so decided by the court in Curry and Garland v. United States, 6 How. 111. Its intention is obvious, to provide for greater care being taken in cases of large grants; and it in no way abridged the right of appeal given to both parties in all cases by the second section.
    2d. It is said that the appeal should be dismissed, because the record was not filed till 28th February, 1850.

      The decree in the case was delivered on the 8th June, 1849'; and on the same day an appeal was prayed and allowed, and citation issued, returnable to December term, 1849. The record was filed on the 28th February, 1850, during that term, which did not end until May. The point must have been made by the other side under some misapprehension.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is evident that the District Court .had no jurisdiction in this case, and the petition ought to have been dismissed.

The act of June 17th, 1844, under which the petition was filed, extended to Louisiana the act of 1824, and revived such parts of it as had expired. Under this provision, the fifth section of the act of 1824 was revived, and became a part of the law of 1844. And by this section,- the time for filing a petition by a claimant under a French or Spanish grant, is in express terms limited to two years from the passage of the law. The time limited, therefore, for filing a petition in Louisiana, .expired on the 17th of June, 1846, and this petition was not filed until March 8th, 1848, long after the time fixed by the law. 8 How. 119.

The acts of 1826 and 1828, referred to in the argument, can have no bearing on the question. They are not mentioned, nor in any manner referred to, by the act of-1844. They were special laws enlarging the timé given by the act. of 1824 to claimants in Missouri and Arkansas to file their petitions. But they are not extended to Louisiana by the act of 1844. Nothing but the act of 1824 is extended. As to the supposed waiver by the District Attorney of his objection as to the time of filing the petition, by answering after- his plea was overruled, it must be made, we suppose, upon a mistake as to the fact. For in his answer he insists upon the same defence. • And he had a right to avail himself of it by way of answer as well as by- plea. But if he had, in express terms, waived it, and entered his waiver on the record, it would not have given jurisdiction to the court, when the act of Congress had not conferred it.

The objection to the regularity with which the appeal was brought up must also, we presume, have arisen from some oversight in the counsel. The récord shows that it has been brought up regularly according to, the provisions of the act of Congress. The objection-that an appeal will not lie on behalf of the United States, where the claim is less than one thousand acres, is too clearly untenable to require discussion.

And as the petition was not filed within the time limited by law, it is not necessary to examine into the merits or want of merits of the claim. The decree of the District Court must be reversed, and a mandate issued directing the petition to be dismissed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is'now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimant.


author: Mr. Justice GRIER

text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Edward Simon.
    In 1791 Miro granted an order of survey for some land in Louisiana.
    During the ten years that the provinee4remained in the hands of Spain, the grantee neither had a survey, nor took possession, nor did any other act showing an intention of fulfilling the conditions upon which the grant was made.
    The regulations of Morales required parties so situated to have their titles made out. In case of neglect the Spanish government was under no obligation to grant the land, and therefore the claim is not good against the United States.
    This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
    The case arose under the acts of 1824 -and 1844, and was decided by the District Court in favor of the petitioner. The circumstances are stated in the opinion of the court.
    It was argued by Mr. Crittenden, (Attorney-General,) for the United States. No counsel appeared for the appellee.
   Mr. Justice GRIER

delivered the opinion of the court.

Edward Simon, the plaintiff below, filed his petition in the District Court of Louisiana, praying the confirmation of his title to a tract of land on the bayou Sans Fagon or Huffpower, containing six thousand four hundred arpens. He claimed by various mesne conveyances through Stephen Flores, who on the 11th of November, 1791, petitioned Governor Miro for a grant of eighty arpens front on each side of said bayou; the petitioner being “ desirous,” as he states, “ of establishing himself in the post of Opelousas.” On the 20th of November, 1791, Governor Miro issued an order to Don Carlos Trudeau to establish the petitioner on the land for' which he prays, in the usual form.

■The pleadings in this case do not allege, nor is there any evidence to prove, that Stephen Flores ever “ established himself at the post of Opelousas,” or took possession of the land which he desired to have, or obtained a survey thereof,, or did any other act showing an intention of fulfilling the known conditions by which such gratuitous concessions could be converted from an inchoate into a complete title. In March, 1820, more than thirty years after its date, the order of survey is transferred by a person calling himself Stephen Flores to John Thompson. In 1825 John Thompson filed his claim with the register; but no action was taken on it, as its genuineness was doubted. In 1836 it was again submitted by the present petitioner to the register and receiver of Opelousas, under' the act of 1835, and afterwards reported against by the Solicitor of the General Land-Office, because of “ no inhabitation, no cultivation, no possession.”

The land supposed to be described in this order of survey has been all, long since, surveyed and' sold by the United States. During the twelve or thirteen years that the Province of Louisiana was in possession of Spain and France," Flores showed no desire of complying with the conditions of, his grant, in any way, or of obtaining a title for the land offered to him by this order, of survey. For twenty years after the land passed to the. United States, and after officers were appointed to receive and report claims for confirmation, no act is done to show that this mere equitable inchoate claim was not wholly abandoned. . After a neglect of ten years and more to obtain a survey, to settle or improve the land or take possession of it, the Spanish government was under no obligation, equitable or moral, to grant this land to Flores. As was said by this court in the case of United States v. Boisdore, (11 How. 96) “ The policy of Spain was to make gratuitous grants for the purposes of settlement and inhabitation, and not for those of mere speculation. The grantee might have his land surveyed or might decline; he.might establish himself on the land or decline; these acts rested wholly in his discretion. But if he failed to take possession and establish himself he had no claim to a title; his concession or first decree in such casé had no operation.”

The regulations of Morales of 1799, sections 18,19, 20,21, and 22, warn those “ who have merely asked for land,” or “ obtained the first decree, by which the surveyor is ordered to measure it and put them in possession,” from indulging, the notion that they have any title to it, and peremptorily require that they should come forward and have their titles made out within six months. But, although we may believe that these conditions were not rigidly exacted, there is no reason to suppose that persons who have neglected to take possession, improve or survey the lands, which they have requested to be given them, for ten, twenty, or thirty years, can have any just claim on the government for such lands, or to receive others in place of them. Such laches is conclusive evidence of abandonment, if not of their total want, of genuineness. But certainly no court of equity can be required to enforce the specific execution of inchoate grants or contracts made without consideration, which have béen buried for half a century, and are now exhumed merely for purposes of speculation.

The decree of the District Court is thereiore reversed and record remitted, with directions to dismiss the bill or petition of the plaintiff below.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the-opinion of this court that th¿ grant is null and void. Whereupon, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, -that the decred of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimant.


text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Constance LeBlanc, Modeste LeBlanc, Louis LeBlanc, Aspasia LeBlanc, Joseph Leon and Raphael Broissard, legal Representatives and Heirs at law of Pierre LeBlanc, deceased.
    A paper, offered as a grant from the Spanish authorities for some land in Louisiana, decided to he incomplete and nothing more than the preamble to Spanish grants. Moreover, there is no evidence that the claimants are the heirs of the grantee, nor that any one claiming under him ever took possession or exercised any act of ownership from 1777 to 1846.
    This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States .for the Eastern District of Louisiana, being a land case arising under the acts of 1824 and 1844.
    The claimants presented in the District Court a paper, of which the following is a translation :
    “ Don Bernardo de Galvez, Colonel, &e. Having seen the foregoing proceedings, performed by the commandant of Attacapas, Don Alexander Declobet, respecting the possession which he had given to Peter LeBlanc, of ten arpens of front on the great prairie, with the depth of forty-two, bounded on one side by the lands of Louis Roque; and on the other by vacant lands, and recognizing these proceedings as regular, and that the concession of these lands can be made without injury to others, not having been claimed, but the proceedings acquiesced in on the part of those assisting in them; approving as we do approve, and using, &c. New Orleans, 5th of January, 1777. Don Bernardo de Galvez, by order of his Lordship, Don Joseph Foucher.”
    “ Register's Office, New Orleans, La.
    I, Louis St. Martin, Register of the Land-Office at New Orleans, Louisiana, do. hereby certify the foregoing document to be a true copy, taken from one of the records of my office, entitled ‘ Libro 1 of French and Spanish Concessions.’
    In faith whereof I hereunto subscribe my name, this 18th day of May, 1849.
    (Signed) L. St. Martin, Register.”
    Upon this document, the District Court confirmed the claim, and the United States appealed.
    It was argued by Mr. Crittenden, (Attorney-General,) for the United States, and by Messrs. Jain and Taylor for the appellees.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This claim appears to be a groundless one. The paper produced is á copy, certified by the Register of the Land-Office at New Orleans, to have been taken from one of the records of his office entitled “ Libro 1 of French and Spanish Concessions.” The paper as certified is nothing more than the preamble usually inserted in Spanish grants where a perfect and absolute title is intended to be given as contradistinguished from the order of survey or first concession. And at the end of this preamble is an &c., without any words of concession or grant, and this &c. is followed by the date, New Orleans, 5th of January, 1777, and the names of Don Bernardo de Galvez, by order of his Lordship, Don Joseph Foucher.

It is not suggested that there has been any mutilation of the record, and the paper certified manifestly contains all of the instrument that was ever,written in the record-book, and upon the face of it, from the manner in which it terminates with an &c. .at the place where the granting clause usually begins; and from the -unusual manner, also, in which the names of Galvez and Foucher are arranged in the certified copy, it looks much more-like a formula written in a record-book for the direction of clerks in making out for signature an absolute and perfect grant, than like a paper intended to convey the title to land. And moreover there is no evidence that the petitioners are the heirs of Pierre LeBlanc named in the paper which is claimed to have been a grant to him; no evidence that he or those claiming under him ever took possession or exercised any act of ownership over it; and no evidence that any right or title was ever claimed to it, by Pierre LeBlanc or any one claiming under him, from the year 1777, when the paper bears date, down to June 16,1846, when this petition was filed, being a period of sixty-nine years.

The decree of the District - Court must be reversed, and a mandate issued directing the petition to be dismissed.

Order.

This -cause came on to be. heard on the transcript of the record, from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimants.


author: Mr. Justice DANIEL

text:
    The United States, Appellants, v. Jeannette Caroline Castant, Widow in community of Jacob Brandegee, deceased, and natural tutrix of her minor children, viz.: Odile Madeline, Camillus John, Stephaine, Marie Henrietta Brandegee, and of Caroline Clotilde Brandegee, Wife of Henry Lloyd, beneficiary Heirs and legal Representatives of said Jacob Brandegee, deceased.
    This court again decides, as in 9 How. 127, and 10 How. 809, that by the act of 1824, a claimant of land in Louisiana must aver and prove his residence in that Province at the-date of the grant, or on or before the 10th of March, 1804.
    Also, that the act was not intended to provide for perfect grants. Over such, the District Court has no jurisdiction.
    A decree of the court was erroneous, authorizing the claimants to enter public land, upon the ground that the United States had sold what was covered by the claim, when there waS no evidence that the United States had made any such sales.
    This was a land case arising under the acts of 1824 and 1844, which came up by appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
    , The. circumstances of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
    It was argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney!General,) for the United States, and Mr. Soulé for the appellees.
   Mr. Justice DANIEL

delivered the opinion of the court.

The claim of the appellees in this case was preferred in virtue of the provisions of the act of Congress of May 26th, 1824, entitled “ An act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the State of Missouri, and the Territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claimsvid. 4 Stat. at Large, 52, which provisions were revived by an act of Congress of the 17th of June, 1844, and extended to the States of Louisiana and Arkansas, and to so much of the States of Mississippi and Alabama as is included in the district of country south of the 31st degree of north latitude, and between the Mississippi and Perdido rivers. 5 Stat. at Large, 676.

■ The original petition, presented in the name of Jacob Brandegee, sets forth that in pursuance of an order of Don Manuel Gayoso de Lemo's, Governor-General of Louisiana and West •Florida, Don Carlos Laveau Trudeau the royal Surveyor, did on the 15th of November, 1798, deliver to Donna Maria Manetta' Laveau Trudeau, a tract of land, containing five hundred superficial arpens, situated and bounded as in the petition described, and as contained in a survey or figurative plan accompanying the petition, and as said to have been set forth in a survey alleged to have been previously made by Pintado, Deputy-Surveyor of Louisiana.and West Florida. That afterwards, on or about the 12th day of November, 1798, the Governor-General Gayoso ‘ de Lemos, made a regular concession or grant of this land to Donna 'Maria Manetta Laveau Trudeau; that on the 31st of ''Abgust, 1821, the said Donna Maria conjointly with her husband,Musiah E. Kerr, sold and conveyed the land granted as aforesaid to Brandegee, and the deed to him is made an exhibit in this case. The petition further states, (referring to the metes and bounds of the grant, as described in the survey and evidences of title) .that the claim had been presented to the Board of Land Commissioners, whose decision-had been adverse thereto-; that the whole of said tract of land, or the greater part thereof, had either been sold by the United States, or confirmed to actual settlers. The petition then concludes with the prayer, that the title of the petitioner may be held good, and that he may be entitled to enter an equal quantity of land in lieu of that which had been sold or confirmed to others. The petitioner, Jacob Brandegee, having departed this life after the institution of these proceedings, they were revived in the name of his widow in community, and of his children and heirs.

There is not exhibited with the petition or in any part of the proceedings, an original order from De Lemos to Trudeau, dir recting the latter to deliver to Donna Maria Manetta Trudeau, the land mentioned, but there is a certificate signed by Carlos Laveau Trudeau, as Royal Surveyor, stating that he had delivered possession to Donna Maria Manetta Laveau Trudeau, of the tract of land of five hundred superficial arpens, corresponding with the figurative plan or survey, in which the boundaries are described with great precision. This certificate is followed by an instrument adopting and confirming it, signed by Gayoso De Lemos, styling himself Brigadier of the Royal Armies, Governor-General and Royal Vice-Patron of the Provinces of Louisiana and "West Florida; and this instrument, after reciting the boundaries as contained in the certificate, concludes in the following terms: “ And recognizing the same; approving them as we do hereby approve them, availing ourselves of the faculty which the King has given us, we grant in his royal name, to the aforesaid Donna Maria Manetta Laveau Trudeau, the aforesaid five hundred superficial acres of land; that she may use and dispose of-them as her own property, in conformity with the aforesaid aets.”

Upon the aforegoing petition, and the documents above referred to, constituting all the evidence in this cause, the District Court, on the 8th of June, 1849, ordered and decreed, that the grant made by the Spanish government to Donna Maria Manetta Laveau Trudeau wás a perfect one; "that therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief granted by the act of Congress, approved on the 17th’of June, 1844, and the act of 1824, to' which it refers; and that it is therefore ordered and decreed, that the grant is valid against the United States, and that the land described in the said grant arid survey thereof, as part of the exhibits, containing five hundred superficial arpens, according to the metes and bounds as described in the said grant and survey, belongs to the petitioners holding under the original grantee.” The same court then proceeds to declare; “ that whereas it is ascertained that a great part of the land is now held by titles emanating from the United States, it is further" ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that for all the land within the limits so held, which has-been sold or otherwise disposed of by the United States, the petitioners shall be, and they are hereby authorized to enter in any land-office of the United States in the State of Louisiana, a like quantity of public land elsewhere, in; conformity with the provision of the 11th section of the act of- Congress, approved on the 26th of May, 1824.”

This decision of the district judge is palpably inconsistent with the repeated adjudications of this court, upon the language and objects of the act of Congress of 1824, and of the reviving act of 1844; and is indééd contradictory and inconsistent with itself, in the different grounds, it assumes for its support. Before proceeding to a more particular examination of the decisión of the District Court, it seems proper to advert to the true position • of the petitioner, or rather of the grantee, from whom his title is deduced, as described in the petition, and to inquire whether that position, as there described, -apart from the question of the completeness or incompleteness of the grant, be. one on which the jurisdiction of the District Court could attach. Thus it must be remembered, that in the enumeration in the act of 1824, of the qualifications requisite for claiming the benefit of that act, is the residence of the grantee within the province of Louisiana, at the date of the grant, or • on or before the 10th day of March, 1804. This requisite of residence at one of the/periods prescribed, can in nowise be received as a matter of form. It is of- the essence of 'the right to invoke the aid of the act of Congress, which, was designed to confer a benefit on actual occupants or settlers. Such being its character, it should, therefore, in every -instance in which that act is appealed to, be both averred and proved-.... In the case before us the petition is wholly silent as to this qualification, and no proof is adduced as to its .existence. For this omission alone, then, to aver a material, nay, the most material ingredient in the right to invoke the aid of the act of 1824, the petition presented no case upon which • the jurisdiction of the District Court could attach. This point has -been ruled in the cases of the United States v. Reynes, in 9th Howard, 127, and of the United States v. D’Auterive, in 10th Howard, 609, and in other cases decided during the present term of this,court. But let us view this case in other aspects of it, as exhibited upon the face of the petition and documents adduced to sustain it; and as it is characterized in the' decree of the District Court, in order to determine whether it be one within either the mischiefs or the remedies described or provided by the act of Congress of May 26th, 1824. By recurrence to the certificate of- Trudeau, and to the figurative plan accompanying it, dated November 15th, 1798, the quantity of the land and the boundaries thereof will be seen to have been fixed and described with the utmost precision, so as to leave no room for mistake or uncertainty. Turning next to the grant ór concession by Gayoso, on the 12th of December, 1798, it will be seen that the certificate of survey by Trudeau, and .the figurative plan, are directly referred to, and all the lines and boundaries, the quantity of land, and, indeed, every indicium by which it. had been described, are adopted by the grantor, in the very language of the certificate; and after such reference and adoption, the grant concludes in the following terms: “Approving them as we do hereby approve them, availing ourselves of the faculty which the King has given us, we grant in his royal name, to the aforesaid Donna Maria Manetta Laveau Trudeau, the aforesaid five hundred superficial acres of land, that she may use and dispose of them as her own property, in conforinity with the aforesaid act's.” The effect of these proceedings on the part of the Spanish governor was to vest in the grantee a perfect legal estate, in the subject granted the titulo in forma. The District Court, upon the strength of these proceedings, declares what was unquestionably true, viz:, that the title vested in the grantee by the Spanish authorities was a perfect one; but the court goes on to deduce from this truth a consequence which it did not warranty but which it entirely excluded, viz., that “ therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief granted by the act of Congress, entitled, &c.” The legitimate deduction from the facts above ascertained and admitted by the court, Would' havé been to this effect, and therefore the District Court could have no jurisdiction of the plaintiffs’ petition, and that the same be accordingly dismissed. It is in this'respect that the inconsistency of the decree of the District Court, with the facts on which it professes to be founded, and with the acts of 1824 and 1844, and with itself, is made manifest. It first assérts the completeness of the title of the petitioner, and then declares it to be dependent on aids provided by statute; provided for the purpose of perfecting titles avowedly incomplete, which must continue forever incomplete, except for the means so provided for perfecting them. That interpretation of the acts Of Congress of 1824 and 1844, which declares them to be inapplicable to perfect legal titles, can no longer be questioned.'

It has been expressly ruled in the cases already cited of the United States v. Reynes, in 9th Howard, 127, and in the United States v. D’Auterive, in 10th Howard, 609; and upon the same interpretation of the statutes above-mentioned, have numerous eases been decided during the present term. The decree of the District'.Court in this case is marked by other peculiarities which must deprive it of any validity whatsoever. The decree first decides that the title of Donna Maris to .the land in question is good and complete as against the United States, and that, therefore, the íand belongs to the petitioners, as deducing title from her. The decree then proceeds to declare and order, “that whereas it is ascertained that a great part of the said land is now held by titles emanating from the United States, it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that for all the land within the limits so held, which has been sold or otherwise disposed of by the United States, the petitioners shall be, and they are hereby authorized, to enter in any land-office of the United States in the State of Louisiana, a like quantity of public land elsewhere, in conformity with the provisions of the eleventh section of the act of Congress, approved on the 26th of May, 1824.”

Now, it is to be observed in the first place, that there is, in this case, on the part of the United States, a general denial of every fact contained in the petition; nothing is admitted directly or by implication. In the'next place, there is not in this record to be found even an attempt to show a grant or confirmation of any portion of this land by the United States to any person whomsoever; nor the possession of it, nor of any portion of it, by any person at anytime; not even by the'petitioners or those from whom their title is deduced. Indeed, none but the government of the United States is' made a party defendant in this case. Upon what proof, or on what surmise even, the District Court could conclude, that the lands had been granted or confirmed by the United States, this court cannot conjecture. Even if the opinion of the court could import intrinsically any proof upon this point, the inquiries would remain, as to what portion of the lands had been granted; by whom, and to whom. Without information upon these heads, it seems difficult to imagine, if the.fact-of grants having been made were to be conceded, What should be the extent of the equivalent to be substituted for. them. The mere assertion of the one or the other can invest no right, and impose no duty. It is too vague and indefinite to be comprehended, much less to be enforced with due regard to the rights of the parties to the cause.

It is, therefore, for the several reasons before assigned, the opinion,of this court, that the decree of the District Court be reversed, and the petition dismissed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by' counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, ffiat the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed ana anpulieu, and that-this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded'to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimants.