source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice O’Connor

license: Public Domain

text:
    FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
    No. 02-6320.
    Argued December 10, 2003
    Decided January 26, 2004

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Seth P Waxman, by appointment of the Court, 538 U. S. 997, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Paul R. Q. Wolfson.

      Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Wray, John P. Elwood, and Joel M. Gershowitz.

        Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

        Alfred P. Carlton and Thomas C. Goldstein filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

After a grand jury indicted petitioner John J. Fellers, police officers arrested him at his home. During the course of the arrest, petitioner made several inculpatory statements. He argued that the officers deliberately elicited these statements from him outside the presence of counsel, and that the admission at trial of the fruits of those statements therefore violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner contends that in rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit improperly held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was “not applicable” because “the officers did not interrogate [petitioner] at his home.” 285 F. 3d 721, 724 (2002). We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 538 U. S. 905 (2003), and now reverse.

I

On February 24, 2000, after a grand jury indicted petitioner for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, Lincoln Police Sergeant Michael Garnett and Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff Jeff Bliemeister went to petitioner’s home in Lincoln, Nebraska, to arrest him. App. 111. The officers knocked on petitioner’s door and, when petitioner answered, identified themselves and asked if they could come in. Ibid. Petitioner invited the officers into his living room. Ibid.

The officers advised petitioner they had come to discuss his involvement in methamphetamine distribution. Id., at 112. They informed petitioner that they had a federal warrant for his arrest and that a grand jury had indicted him for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Ibid. The officers told petitioner that the indictment referred to his involvement with certain individuals, four of whom they named. Ibid. Petitioner then told the officers that he knew the four people and had used methamphetamine during his association with them. Ibid.

After spending about 15 minutes in petitioner’s home, the officers transported petitioner to the Lancaster County jail. Ibid. There, the officers advised petitioner for the first time of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285 (1988). App. 112. Petitioner and the two officers signed a Miranda waiver form, and petitioner then reiterated the inculpatory statements he had made earlier, admitted to having associated with other individuals implicated in the charged conspiracy, App. 29-39, and admitted to having loaned money to one of them even though he suspected that she was involved in drug transactions, id., at 34..

Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made at his home and at the county jail. A Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing and recommended that the statements petitioner made at his home be suppressed because the officers had not informed petitioner of his Miranda rights. App. 110-111. The Magistrate Judge found that petitioner made the statements in response to the officers’ “implicit] questions,” noting that the officers had told petitioner that the purpose of their visit was to discuss his use and distribution of methamphetamine. Id., at 110. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that portions of petitioner’s jailhouse statement be suppressed as fruits of the prior failure to provide Miranda warnings. App. 110-111.

The District Court suppressed the “unwarned” statements petitioner made at his house but admitted petitioner’s jailhouse statements pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), concluding petitioner had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making the statements. App. 112-115.

Following a jury trial at which petitioner’s jailhouse statements were admitted into evidence, petitioner was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his jailhouse statements should have been suppressed as fruits of the statements obtained at his home in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 285 F. 3d 721 (CA8 2002). With respect to petitioner’s argument that the officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings at his home violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Patterson, supra, the Court of Appeals stated: “Patterson is not applicable here ... for the officers did not interrogate [petitioner] at his home.” 285 P. 3d, at 724. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the statements from the jail were properly admitted under the rule of Elstad, supra. 285 F. 3d, at 724 (“‘Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made’ ” (quoting Elstad, supra, at 309)).

Judge Riley filed a concurring opinion. He concluded that during their conversation at petitioner’s home, officers “deliberately elicited incriminating information” from petitioner. 285 F. 3d, at 726-727. That “post-indictment conduct outside the presence of counsel,” Judge Riley reasoned, violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id., at 727. Judge Riley nevertheless concurred in the judgment, concluding that the jailhouse statements were admissible under the rationale of Elstad in light of petitioner’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. 285 F. 3d, at 727.

II

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”’ Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972)). We have held that an accused is denied “the basic protections” of the Sixth Amendment “when there [is] used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents . . . deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206 (1964); cf. Patterson, supra (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not bar postindictment questioning in the absence of counsel if a defendant waives the right to counsel).

We have consistently applied the deliberate-elicitation standard in subsequent Sixth Amendment cases, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 270 (1980) (“The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent ‘deliberately elicited’ incriminating statements ... within the meaning of Massiah”); Brewer, supra, at 399 (finding a Sixth Amendment violation where a detective “deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from [the suspect]”), and we have expressly distinguished this standard from the Fifth Amendment custodial-interrogation standard, see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 632, n. 5 (1986) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel... even when there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicability”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 300, n. 4 (1980) (“The definitions of ‘interrogation’ under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term ‘interrogation’ is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable”); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (holding that the Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel at a postindictment lineup even though the Fifth Amendment is not implicated).

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the absence of an “interrogation” foreclosed petitioner’s claim that the jailhouse statements should have been suppressed as fruits of the statements taken from petitioner at his home. First, there is no question that the officers in this case “deliberately elicited” information from petitioner. Indeed, the officers, upon arriving at petitioner’s house, informed him that their purpose in coming was to discuss his involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine and his association with certain charged co-conspirators. 285 F. 3d, at 723; App. 112. Because the ensuing discussion took place after petitioner had been indicted, outside the presence of counsel, and in the absence of any waiver of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Sixth Amendment standards established in Massiah, supra, and its progeny. ■

Second, because of its erroneous determination that petitioner was not questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment standards, the Court of Appeals improperly conducted its “fruits” analysis under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, it applied Elstad to hold that the admissibility of the jailhouse statements turns solely on whether the statements were “ ‘knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ” 285 F. 3d, at 724 (quoting Elstad, 470 U. S., at 309). The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the Sixth Amendment requires suppression of petitioner’s jailhouse statements on the ground that they were the fruits of previous questioning conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation standard. We have not had occasion to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards. We therefore remand to the Court of Appeals to address this issue in the first instance.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Justice Kennedy Justice Stevens,

text:
    LAMIE v. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
    No. 02-693.
    Argued November 10, 2003
    Decided January 26, 2004

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except for Part III. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 542.

      Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John M. Lamie, pro se, Amy Howe, G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., John A. E. Pottow, and Craig Goldblatt.

      Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her. on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, and Deputy Solicitor General Hungar.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)(1), regulates court awards of professional fees, including fees for services rendered by attorneys in connection with bankruptcy proceedings. Petitioner, a bankruptcy attorney, sought compensation under the section for legal services he provided to a bankrupt debtor after the proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. His application for fees was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Each court held that in a Chapter 7 proceeding § 330(a)(1) does not authorize payment of attorney’s fees unless the attorney has been appointed under §327 of the Code. See 11 U. S. C. §§327 and 701 et seq. Petitioner was not so appointed, and his fee request was denied. Having granted the petition for certiorari to review this holding, we now affirm.

I

In 1994 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (Act), 108 Stat. 4106. The subject of professional fees was addressed and comprehensive changes were made. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], pp. 330-75 to 330-76 (rev. 15th ed. 2003). Most of the changes served to clarify the standards for the award of professional fees; but various courts disagree over the proper interpretation of the portion of the statute relevant to this dispute, concerning attorney’s fees.

The Act replaced the predecessor section to the one in issue here. Compare 108 Stat. 4130-4131 (§ 224(b) of the Act amending 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)) with 11 U. S. C. § 330(a) (1988 ed.). Before the 1994 Act, § 330(a) had read as follows:

“(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to. an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor’s attorney—
“(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney . . . and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional person, or attorney .. . ; and
“(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary Ibid, (emphasis added to highlight text later deleted).

Pursuant to the 1994 Act, 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)(1) now reads as follows:

“(a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326,328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103—
“(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
“(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”

As can be noted, the 1994 enactment’s principal, substantive alteration was its deletion of the five words at the end of what was § 330(a) and is now § 330(a)(1): “or to the debtor’s attorney.”

The deletion created an apparent It left current § 330(a)(1) with a missing “or” that infects its grammar (i. e., “an examiner, [or] a professional person ...”). Furthermore, the Act’s inclusion of the word “attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) defeats the neat parallelism that otherwise marks the relationship between §§ 330(a)(1) and 330(a)(1)(A) (i. e., in § 330(a)(1): “trustee, . . . examiner, [or] professional person”; in § 330(a)(1)(A): “trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney”) and so casts some doubt on the proper presence of “attorney.” That the pre-1994 text had no grammatical error and was parallel in its structure strengthens the sense that error exists in the new text.

The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, when asked to interpret current § 380(a)(1), concluded that its language was plain irrespective of these quirks and history. Under the statutory language as written, those courts held, fees may be awarded to attorneys for services rendered only to the extent they are payments to “a professional person employed under section 327,” see, e. g., § 327(a) (authorizing an appointed trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action to “employ one or more attorneys ... to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this title”); § 327(e) (authorizing an appointed trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action to “employ, for a specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor,.. .”). See In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F. 3d. 414 (CA5 1998); In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F. 3d 1354 (CA11 1999). The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, in contrast, concluded that the text’s apparent errors rendered the section ambiguous, requiring consideration of the provision’s legislative history. That history, those courts held, shows Congress intended § 330(a)(1) to continue to allow compensation of Chapter 7 debtors’ attorneys, irrespective of qualification under §327. In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 76 F. 3d 66 (CA2 1996); In re Top Grade. Sausage, Inc., 227 F. 3d 123 (CA3 2000); In re Century Cleaning Services, Inc., 195 F. 3d 1053 (CA9 1999). See also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶330.LH[5], at 330-75 to 330-76.

This interpretive divide became relevant to petitioner in his representation of Equipment Services, Inc. (ESI). ESI retained petitioner to prepare, file, and prosecute a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding on its behalf. He did so, all the while representing ESI with the approval of the court under §327. See In re Equipment Services, Inc., 290 F. 3d 739, 742 (CA4 2002) (case below). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (authorizing debtor-in-possession to exercise the statutory rights and powers of an estate trustee, including to retain counsel under §327). Three months into the Chapter 11 reorganization, the United States Trustee (Government) filed a motion to convert the action into a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. The court granted the Government’s motion and appointed an estate trustee pursuant to §701, 11 U. S. C. § 701(a). This terminated ESI’s status as debtor-in-possession and so terminated petitioner’s service under § 327 as an attorney for the debtor-in-possession. Yet petitioner continued to provide legal services to ESI, the debtor, even though he did not have the trustee’s authorization to do so. He prepared reports detailing debts incurred and property acquired since the initial filing; he amended asset schedules; and he appeared at a hearing on an adversary complaint.

In due course petitioner filed an application seeking fees under § 330(a)(1) for the time he spent on ESI’s behalf after the Chapter 7 conversion. The Government objected to the application. It argued that § 330(a)(1) makes no provision for the estate to compensate an attorney not authorized under §327. The court agreed and denied the fees. In re Equipment Services, Inc., 253 B. R. 724 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Va. 2000). (Petitioner was paid fees for the services he provided to ESI before conversion of the proceeding to Chapter 7 and when ESI was the debtor-in-possession. The parties do not contest those fees.) •

Petitioner unsuccessfully sought reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s determination, first from the District Court, see In re Equipment Services, Inc., 260 B. R. 273 (WD Va. 2001), then from the Court of Appeals, see 290 F. 3d 739 (CA4 2002). Both courts concluded the plain language of § 330(a)(1) controlled and that attorneys who provide services to debtors in Chapter 7 proceedings must be hired by the trustee under § 327 to be eligible for compensation. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its holding deepened the divide among the various Circuits, but held fast to the statute’s plain language, “particularly because application of that plain language supports a reasonable interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code,” id., at 745. We granted the petition for certiorari, 538 U. S. 905 (2003), and now resolve the issue.

II

Petitioner argues that the existing statutory text is ambiguous and so requires us to consult legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to allow fees for services rendered by a debtor’s attorney in a Chapter 7 proceeding, where that attorney is not authorized under § 327. He makes the case for ambiguity, for the most part, by comparing the present statute with its predecessor. Thus, he says the statute is ambiguous because subsection (A)’s “attorney” is “facially irreconcilable” with the section’s first part since

“[e]ither Congress inadvertently omitted the ‘debtor’s attorney’ from the ‘payees’ list, on which the court of appeals relied, or it inadvertently retained the reference to the attorney in the latter, ‘payees’ list.” Brief for Petitioner 17.

Similarly, with respect to the missing conjunction “or” he says,

“[tjhere is no apparent reason, other than a drafting error, that Congress would have rewritten the statute to produce a grammatically incorrect provision.” Ibid.

This is the analysis followed by the Courts of Appeals that hold the statute is ambiguous. See In re Top Grade Sausage, supra, at 129 (noting in its search for ambiguity that “[p]rior to amendment, it was undisputed that the repetition of officers in § 330(a)(1)(A) was meant to parallel the officers previously listed in § 330(a)(1)”); see also In re Century Cleaning Services, 195 F. 3d, at 1057-1058 (engaging in same resort to previous enactment to inquire as to the current text’s ambiguity). One determines ambiguity, under this contention, by relying on the grammatical soundness of the prior statute. That contention is wrong.

The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 438 (1999), and not the predecessor statutes. It is well established that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989), in turn quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)). So we begin with the present statute.

A

The statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue. In its first part, the statute authorizes an award of compensation to one of three types of persons: trustees, examiners, and § 327 professional persons. A debtor’s attorney not engaged as provided by § 327 is simply not included within the class of persons eligible for compensation. In subsection (A) the statute further defines what type of compensation may be awarded: compensation that is reasonable; and for actual, necessary services; and rendered by four types of persons (the same three plus attorneys). Unless the applicant for compensation is in one of the named classes of persons in the first part, the kind of service rendered is irrelevant.

The missing conjunction “or” does not change our conclusion. The Government points to numerous federal statutes that inadvertently lack a conjunction. They are read, nonetheless, for their plain meaning. See Brief for Respondent 17, n. 4. Here, the missing conjunction neither alters the text’s substance nor obscures its meaning. This is not a case where a “not” is missing or where an “or” inadvertently substitutes for an “and.” The sentence may be awkward; yet it is straightforward.

Subsection (A)’s nonparalleled fourth category of persons who can render compensable services does not cloud the statute’s meaning. Petitioner reasons that since the section is a single sentence, and since it appears to strive for parallelism between those authorized to receive fees and those whose services are compensable, there is an ambiguity as to what “attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) refers to in § 330(a)(1). He also points to neighboring §331, which provides for both debtors’ attorneys and §327 professional persons to receive interim compensation after an order for relief is entered but before an application for §330 fees is filed. He argues that since §331 contemplates debtors’ attorneys’ receiving interim compensation there is reason to conclude that “attorney” in § 330(a)(1)(A) refers to debtors’ attorneys in § 330(a)(1), though they go unmentioned in that clause.

Subsection (A)’s “attorney,” however, can be read in a straightforward fashion to refer to those attorneys whose fees are authorized by § 330(a)(1): attorneys qualified as § 327 professional persons, that is, in a Chapter 7 context, those employed by the trustee and approved by the court. See § 327(a) (appointed trustee may “employ one or more attorneys ... to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this title); § 327(e) (appointed trustee may “employ, for a specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, . . .”). Likewise, § 331’s reference to interim compensation for debtors’ attorneys most straightforwardly refers to debtors’ attorneys authorized under § 327.

It must be acknowledged that, under our reading of the text, the word “attorney” in subsection (A) may well be sur-plusage. Subsection (A)’s reference to §327 professional persons undoubtedly includes attorneys, as much as does §330(a)(l)’s reference to professional persons. That is not controlling, however. Surplusage does not always produce ambiguity and our preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001) (the preference “is sometimes offset by the canon that permits a court to reject words ‘as surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute’”). Where there are two ways to read the text — either attorney is surplusage, in which case the text is plain; or attorney is nonsurplusage (i. e., it refers to an ambiguous component in § 330(a)(1)), in which case the text is ambiguous — applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other indications, inappropriate. We should prefer the plain meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress. In this manner we avoid the pitfalls that plague too quick a turn to the more controversial realm of legislative history.

B

The plain meaning that § 330(a)(1) sets forth does not lead to absurd results requiring us to treat the text as if it were ambiguous. See supra, at 534 (citing Hartford Underwriters). Petitioner disagrees and argues that our interpretation will “entail an inexplicable, wholesale departure from ... the guiding principle of the ‘prompt and effectual administration’ of federal bankruptcy law.” Brief for Petitioner 30. He says that our reading “attributed] to Congress an illogical, penny-wise and pound-foolish determination to eliminate entirely — as a purportedly asset-preserving measure — compensation that is essential to debtors’ receipt of legal services.” Id., at 35.

These arguments overstate the effect of § 330(a)(1). Under the text’s instruction compensation remains available to debtors’ attorneys through various permitted means. First, while § 330(a)(1) requires proper authorization for payment to attorneys from estate ftmds in Chapter 7 filings, it does not extend throughout all bankruptcy law. Compensation for debtors’ attorneys in Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies, for example, is not much disturbed by §330 as a whole. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (“In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney”).

Compensation for debtors’ .attorneys working on Chapter 7 bankruptcies, moreover, is not altogether prohibited. Sections 327 and 330, taken together, allow Chapter 7 trustees to engage attorneys, including debtors’ counsel, and allow courts to award them fees. See §§ 327(a) and (e). Section 327’s limitation on debtors’ incurring debts for professional services without the Chapter 7 trustee’s approval is not absurd. In the context of a Chapter 7 liquidation it advances the trustee’s responsibility for preserving the estate.

If we add to all this the apparent sound functioning of the bankruptcy system under the plain meaning approach, petitioner’s arguments become unconvincing. Seeming order has attended the rule’s application for five years in the Fifth Circuit and for four years in the Eleventh Circuit. See In re American Steel Product, Inc., 197 F. 3d 1354 (CA11 1999); In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F. 3d 414 (CA5 1998). It appears to be routine for debtors to pay reasonable fees for legal services before filing for bankruptcy to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. See generally Collier Compensation, Employment and Appointment of Trustees.and Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases ¶3.02[1], p. 3-2 (2002) (“In the majority of cases, the debtor’s counsel will accept an individual or a joint consumer chapter 7 case only after being paid a retainer that covers the ‘standard fee’ and the cost of filing the petition”). So our interpretation accords with common practice. Section 330(a)(1) does not prevent a debtor from engaging counsel before a Chapter 7 conversion and paying reasonable compensation in advance to ensure that the filing is in order. Indeed, the Code anticipates these arrangements. See, e. g., § 329 (debtors’ attorneys must disclose fees they receive from a debtor in the year prior to its bankruptcy filing and courts may order excessive payments returned to the estate).

C

Petitioner’s argument stumbles on still harder ground in the face of another canon of interpretation. His interpretation of the Act — reading the word “attorney” in § 330(a) (1)(A) to refer to “debtors’ attorneys” in § 330(a)(1) — would have us read an absent word into the statute. That is, his argument would result “not [in] a construction of [the] statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926). With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in view, we need not proceed in this way. “There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.” Mobil Oil Corn. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978).

Our unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding. It results from “deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as' well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill.” United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 95 (1985) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)).

Adhering to conventional doctrines of statutory interpretation, we hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court.

Ill

Though we find it unnecessary to rely on the legislative history behind.the 1994 enactment of §330(a)(1), we find it instructive that the history creates more confusion than clarity about the congressional intent. History and policy considerations lend support both to petitioner’s interpretation and to the holding we reach based on the plain language of the statute.

Petitioner, for instance, cites evidence supporting the conclusion that a scrivener’s error obscures what was Congress’ real intent. For over 100 years debtors’ attorneys have been considered by Congress and the courts to be an integral part of the bankruptcy process. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 59(d) and 64(b), 30 Stat. 561, 563. See also In re Kross, 96 F. 816 (SDNY 1899). It is fair to doubt that Congress would so rework their longstanding role without announcing the change in the congressional record. Cf. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998) (“We . . . will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The legislative processes behind the change also lend some support to petitioner’s claim. In 1994 the original proposed draft of new § 330(a)(1) featured two changes: stylistic changes throughout the section and the addition of a new provision giving the Government a right to object to fee applications. See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 103-168 (1993). The right to object provision was added at §330(a)(l)’s end. Thus it came immediately after the critical text “or to the debtor’s attorney,” which the draft edited to read “or the debtors [sic] attorney.” Ibid.. Before voting the Act into law, however, Congress amended the proposed draft. See 140 Cong. Rec. 8383 (1994) (setting out amendment 1645 to S. 540). Amendment 1645 made only two changes to § 330(a)(1): It deleted the Government’s right to object provision and the critical words (“or the debtors [sic] attorney”). The rest of the original proposed draft remained intact. Legislative history explains the first deletion, for the provision was installed elsewhere, as new § 330(a)(2). Nothing, however, explains the second. That the Government’s right to object was deleted and reinstated (i. e., reorganized), while the words at issue, which had preceded the moved provision, were deleted with no notation in the legislative history suggests the scrivener just reached too far in his deletion. These factors combined to convince a leading treatise on bankruptcy law, Collier, that the deletion was a scrivener’s error and ought not have any effect. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], at 330-75 to 330-76.

There are other aspects of the legislative record, however, that undermine this interpretation. These considerations suggest Congress may have intended the change the scrivener worked. For example, amendment 1645 was part of a reform Act designed to curtail abuses in fee awards, according to statements by the amendment’s sponsor. See 140 Cong. Rec., at 28753 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). These abuses were not ghosts seen only by Congress. Some bankruptcy courts had reached the same conclusion. See, e. g., In re NRG Resources, Inc., 64 B. R. 643 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD La. 1986). The deletion at issue furthered this reform by ensuring that Chapter 7 debtors’ attorneys would receive no estate compensation absent the trustee’s authorization of their work. This objective is not inconsistent with the interest of involving debtors’ attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings. As noted, the Act still allows debtors’ attorneys to be compensated in different ways. See supra, at 536-539.

Amendment 1645, viewed in its entirety, gives further reason to think Congress may have intended the change. The amendment added a new section that authorizes fee awards to debtors’ attorneys in Chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcies. 140 Cong. Rec., at 8383 (setting out new 11 U. S. C. § 330(a) (4)(B)). Since the amendment’s deletion of “or the debtors [sic] attorney” from the original proposed draft affected Chapter 12 and 13 debtors’ attorneys as much as Chapter 7 debtors’ attorneys, § 330(a)(4)(B) shows a special intent to authorize the formers’ fee awards in the face of the new, broad exclusion.

If Congress’ action does not prove the point, the House of Representatives’ inaction may. The House passed the Act after having the deletion, as well as its impact, called to its attention. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 551 (1994). The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA), which represents those lawyers most likely to be affected by § 330(a)(l)’s change, declined to object to the deletion. Ibid, (noting the deletion but stating that the NACBA did “not oppose” amendment 1645’s passage). This alert, followed by the Legislature’s nonresponse, should support a presumption of legislative awareness and intention. The Act may now contain surplusage, along with grammatical error; but that may have been the result of trying to make the substantive change with the fewest possible textual alterations or of an error by the scrivener in carrying out the change.

These competing interpretations of the legislative history make it difficult to say with assurance whether petitioner or the Government lays better historical claim to the congressional intent. The alert to the change in policy was given, to be sure, before the House passed the final version, but that particular circumstance cannot bear too much weight. The alert was not the subject of testimony from any witness at the congressional hearing. It consisted of but two sentences contained within 472 pages of written statements delivered to the legislative subcommittee for its August 17, 1994, hearing day. Those 472 pages were added to 236 pages of prepared statements and testimony transcribed from the day’s testifying witnesses. Within the NACBA’s filing, the two relevant sentences appear on the 18th page of the 27-page report. Nothing in the legislative history confirms that this particular point bore on the congressional deliberations or was given specific consideration.

These uncertainties illustrate the difficulty of relying on legislative history here and the advantage of our determination to rest our holding on the statutory text.

* * *

If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. “It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think ... is the preferred result.” United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 68 (1994) (concurring opinion). This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and respective, constitutional roles. In the meantime, we must determine intent from the statute before us. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, concurring.

As the majority recognizes, ante, at 539-540, a leading bankruptcy law treatise concluded that the 1994 amendments to § 330(a)(1) contained an unintended error. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[5], pp. 330-75 to 330-76 (rev. 15th ed. 2003). Whenever there is such a plausible basis for believing that a significant change in statutory law resulted from a scrivener’s error, I believe we have a duty to examine legislative history. In this case, that history reveals that the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA) not only called the assumed drafting error to Congress’ attention in a timely fashion, but also deemed the error unworthy of objection. This evidence convinces me that the Court’s reading of the text, which surely is more natural than petitioner’s, is correct. I therefore concur in the judgment.

      Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its entirety. Justice Scalia joins this opinion except for Part III.

       As Chief Justice Marshall stated, “Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . .” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).

       See ante, at 541. Specifically, three months after the Senate passed the relevant amendment, the NACBA submitted written comments to the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, which was considering the change. Those comments first noted that the amended version of § 330(a)(1) “appears to have some minor drafting errors,, including the apparently inadvertent removal of debtors’ attorneys from the list of professionals whose compensation awards are covered.” Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 551 (1994). With no proviso that these alleged errors be corrected, the NACBA then expressly did “not oppose” passage of the amendment. Ibid, (emphasis added).


author: Per Curiam. Justice Stevens,

text:
    ILLINOIS v. FISHER
    No. 03-374.
    Decided February 23, 2004
   Per Curiam.

The Appellate Court of Illinois held here that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the dismissal of criminal charges because the police, acting in good faith and according to normal police procedures, destroyed evidence that respondent had requested more than 10 years earlier in a discovery motion. Petitioner, the State of Illinois, contends that such a result is foreclosed by our decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988). There we held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id., at 58. We agree with petitioner, grant the petition for certiorari and respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

In September 1988, Chicago police arrested respondent in the course of a traffic stop during which police observed him furtively attempting to conceal a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. Four tests conducted by the Chicago Police Crime Lab and the Illinois State Police Crime Lab confirmed that the bag seized from respondent contained cocaine.

Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine in the Circuit Court of Cook County in October 1988. He filed a motion for discovery eight days later requesting all physical evidence the State intended to use at trial. The State responded that all evidence would be made available at a reasonable time and date upon request. Respondent was released on bond pending trial. In July 1989, however, he failed to appear in court, and the court issued an arrest warrant to secure his presence. Respondent remained a fugitive for over 10 years, apparently settling in Tennessee. The outstanding arrest warrant was finally executed in November 1999, after respondent was detained on an unrelated matter. The State then reinstated the 1988 cocaine-possession charge.

Before trial, the State informed respondent that in September 1999, the police, acting in accord with established procedures, had destroyed the substance seized from him during his arrest. Respondent thereupon formally requested production of the substance and filed a motion to dismiss the cocaine-possession charge based on the State’s destruction of evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and the ease proceeded to a jury trial. The State introduced evidence tending to prove the facts recounted above. Respondent’s case in chief consisted solely of his own testimony, in which he denied that he ever possessed cocaine and insinuated that the police had “framed” him for the crime. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and respondent was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Due Process Clause required dismissal of the charge. Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 652 N. E. 2d 288 (1995), the Appellate Court reasoned:

“ ‘Where evidence is requested by the defense in a discovery motion, the State is on notice that the evidence must be preserved, and the defense is not required to make an independent showing that the evidence has exculpatory value in order to establish a due process violation. If the State proceeds to destroy the evidence, appropriate sanctions may be imposed even if the destruction is inadvertent. No showing of bad faith is necessary.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12 (quoting Newberry, supra, at 317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 292) (citation omitted in original).

The Appellate Court observed that Newberry distinguished our decision in Youngblood on the ground that the police in Youngblood did not destroy evidence subsequent to a discovery motion by the defendant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13. While acknowledging that “there is nothing in the record to indicate that the alleged cocaine was destroyed in bad faith,” id., at 15, the court further determined that Newberry dictated dismissal because, unlike in Youngblood, the destroyed evidence provided respondent’s “only hope for exoneration,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15, and was “ ‘essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case,”’ App. to Pet. for Cert. 16 (quoting Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291). Consequently, the court concluded that respondent “was denied due process when he was tried subsequent to the destruction of the alleged cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.

We have held that when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is withheld. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976). In Youngblood, by contrast, we recognized that the Due Process Clause “requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” 488 U. S., at 57. We concluded that the failure to preserve this “potentially useful evidence" does not violate due process “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” Id., at 58 (emphasis added).

The substance of “potentially useful evidence” referred to in Youngblood, not the material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady and Agurs. At most, respondent could hope that, had the evidence been preserved, a fifth test conducted on the substance would have exonerated him. See Youngblood, 488 U. S., at 57. But respondent did not allege, nor did the Appellate Court find, that the Chicago police acted in bad faith when they destroyed the substance. Quite the contrary, police testing indicated that the chemical makeup of the substance inculpated, not exculpated, respondent, see id., at 57, n., and it is undisputed that police acted in “good faith and in accord with their normal practice,” id., at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 488 (1984), in turn quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231, 242 (1961)). Under Youngblood, then, respondent has failed to establish a due process violation.

We have never held or suggested a pending discovery request eliminates the necessity of showing bad faith on the part of police. Indeed, the result reached in this case demonstrates why such a per se rule would negate the very reason we adopted the bad-faith requirement in the first place: to “limi[t] the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable grounds and confin[e] it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it.” 488 U. S., at 58.

We also disagree that Youngblood ever the contested evidence provides a defendant’s “only hope for exoneration” and is “ ‘essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (citing Newberry, supra, at 315, 652 N. E. 2d, at 291). In Youngblood, the Arizona Court of Appeals said that the destroyed evidence “could [have] eliminate^] the defendant as the perpetrator.” 488 U. S., at 54 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly here, an additional test might have provided the defendant with an opportunity to show that the police tests were mistaken. It is thus difficult to distinguish the two cases on this basis. But in any event, the applicability of the bad-faith' requirement in Youngblood depended not on the centrality of the contested evidence to the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s defense, but on the distinction between “material exculpatory” evidence and “potentially useful” evidence. 488 U. S., at 57-58. As we have held, supra, at 548, the substance destroyed here was, at best, “potentially useful” evidence, and therefore Young-blood's bad-faith requirement applies.

The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

While I did not join the three Justices who dissented in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U. S. 51 (1988), I also declined to join the majority opinion because I was convinced then, and remain convinced today, that “there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Id., at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). This, like Youngblood, is not such a case.

Neither is it a case that merited review in this Court, however. The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court has limited precedential value, and may well be reinstated on remand because the result is supported by the state-law holding in People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 652 N. E. 2d 288 (1995). See ante, at 547, n. In my judgment the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari should have been denied.

       Respondent suggests that we lack jurisdiction because the Appellate Court relied on Newberry, which in turn relied on an adequate and independent state ground. See, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1042 (1983). Respondent is correct that Newberry relied on both the Due Process Clause, and in the alternative, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(g)(i) (1990). 166 Ill. 2d, at 314-317, 652 N. E. 2d, at 290-292. The Appellate Court, however, relied only on the portion of Newberry that addressed due process, and the Appellate Court based its decision solely on the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review that decision. See, e. g., Long, supra, at 1038, n. 4 (“We may review a state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly have relied” (citing Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967) (per curiam))).

      Youngblood’s focus on the subjective motivation of the police represents a break with our usual understanding that the presence or absence of constitutional error in suppression of evidence cases depends on the character of the evidence, not the character of the person who withholds it. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 110 (1976). Since Youngblood was decided, a number of state courts have held as a matter of state constitutional law that the loss or destruction of evidence critical to the defense does violate due process, even in the absence of bad faith. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, “[f]airness dictates that when a person’s liberty is at stake, the sole fact of whether the police or another state official acted in good or bad faith in failing to preserve evidence cannot be determinative of whether the criminal defendant received due process of law.” State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 723, 657 A. 2d 585, 593 (1995) (footnote omitted). See also State v. Ferguson, 2 S. W. 3d 912, 916-917 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Osakalumi, 194 W. Va. 758, 765-767, 461 S. E. 2d 504, 511-512 (1995); State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 309, 648 A. 2d 632, 642 (1994); Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 411 Mass. 309, 310-311, 582 N. E. 2d 496, 497 (1991); State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 186-187, 787 P. 2d 671, 673 (1990); Hammond v. State, 569 A. 2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989); Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P. 2d 1326, 1330, n. 9 (Alaska 1989).