text:
    No. 00-997.
    No. 00-1256.
    No. 00-1390.
    No. 00-1547.
    No. 00-1697.
    No. 00-7465.
    No. 00-7781.
    No. 00-8617.
    No. 00-8930.
    No. 00-8964.
    No. 00-8967.
    Schmidt et al. v. United States, Reyes-Hernandez v. United States, Caterina et al. v. Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania et al., Huertas Laboy et al. v. Puerto Rico et al., Williams v. Corporate Express Delivery Systems, Gonzalez v. McDaniel, Richardson v. Albertson’s, Inc., et al., Merced-Nieves v. United States, Sullivan v. Texas, Bayramoglu v. Maddock, Warden, et al., Maggio v. Norm Reeves Honda et al., Sonhouse v. NYNEX Corp. et al., Schexnider v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Sears v. Florida, Ephraim v. Neal, Warden, Loften v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Holleman v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Vessey v. Utah, Fuller v. Spragins et al., Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, Hughes v. Deeds, Warden, Terry v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Lay v. Cain, Warden, Hill v. United States, Cosey v. Louisiana, Winfield v. United States, Boateng et ux. v. Inter American University of Puerto Rico et al., Jones v. Thompson, Warden, Martin v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Foster v. Jones, Warden, Butler v. Craven, Warden, Smith v. United States, Grady v. United States, Myrick v. Hawk Sawyer, Director, Federal bureau of Prisons, et al., Surovik v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Weeks v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Hanks v. California Board for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, Nagy v. United States, In re Harris, Malady v. United States, Padro Burgos v. United States,
   ante, p. 902;

532 U. S. 1065;

532 U. S. 1008;

532 U. S. 1066;

ante, p. 917;

531 U. S. 1164;

531 U. S. 1197;

ante, p. 931;

532 U. S. 1027;

532 U. S. 1028;

532 U. S. 1040;

No. 00-8989.

No. 00-9071.

No. 00-9117.

No. 00-9128.

No. 00-9134.

No. 00-9183.

No. 00-9206.

No. 00-9218.

No. 00-9223.

No. 00-9226.

No. 00-9277.

No. 00-9302.

No. 00-9369.

No. 00-9397.

No. 00-9406.

No. 00-9408.

No. 00-9425.

No. 00-9428.

No. 00-9479.

No. 00-9489.

No. 00-9518.

No. 00-9539.

No. 00-9563.

No. 00-9626.

No. 00-9630.

532 U. S. 1040;

532 U. S. 1042;

532 U. S. 1054;

532 U. S. 1054;

532 U. S. 1055;

532 U. S. 1068;

532 U. S. 1029;

532 U. S. 1029;

ante,

p. 953;

532 U. S. 1042;

532 U. S. 1071;

ante, p. 905;

532 U. S. 1032;

ante, p. 907;

532 U. S. 1044;

ante, p. 918;

532 U. S. 1056;

ante, p. 918;

ante, p. 920;

532 U. S. 1056;

532 U. S. 1057;

532 U. S. 1057;

532 U. S. 1057;

ante, p. 935;

532 U. S. 1072;

No. 00-9717.

No. 00-9739.

No. 00-9819.

No. 00-9862.

No. 00-9863.

ante, p. 921;

532 U. S. 1074;

ante, p. 902;

ante, p. 910; and

ante, p. 910. Petitions for rehearing denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 130,
    Orig.
    New Hampshire v. Maine,
   532 U. S. 742. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 00-1144.
    McPhaul v. Board of Commissioners of Madison County et al.,
   532 U. S. 921. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein informa pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 00-1263.
    Balls v. AT&T Corp.,
   532 U. S. 937. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 00-8347.
    Camarena v. Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, et al.,
   532 U. S. 934. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 7, 2001
    No. 01-5409 (01A80).
    Hill v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.

Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 8, 2001
    No. 00-878.
    Mathias et al. v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 903.] Motion of the United States to intervene granted. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 01-5702 (01A115).
    In re Hill.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    August 13, 2001
    No. 00A1147 (00-10618).
    Beazley v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of execution. Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    August 22, 2001
    No. 01-5243.
    Hudson v. Campbell, Clerk, Lyon County Circuit Court, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    August 23, 2001
    No. 01-5943 (01A155).
    White v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 01-5944 (01A156).
    White v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 01-5960 (01A160).
    White v. Easley, Governor of North Carolina, et al.
   Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Wake County, N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 27, 2001
    No. 01A2.
    Bush v. Powell.
   Application for stay, addressed to Justice O’Connor and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 01A62 (00-10589).
    Dantas v. Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Application for protective order, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 00-1630.
    No. 00-1644.
    No. 00-1659.
    No. 00-1690.
    No. 00-1694.
    No. 00-5961.
    No. 00-7786.
    No. 00-7973.
    No. 00-8444.
    No. 00-8471.
    No. 00-8483.
    No. 00-8602.
    No. 00-8992.
    No. 00-9208.
    No. 00-9212.
    No. 00-9219.
    No. 00-9433.
    No. 00-9444.
    No. 00-9451.
    No. 00-9454.
    No. 00-9523.
    No. 00-9613.
    No. 00-9627.
    No. 00-9638.
    No. 00-9652.
    No. 00-9659.
    No. 00-9669.
    Kanth v. Kanth, Langfeldt et al. v. Genesis Medical Center, Allison et ux. v. United States et al., Sturgeon v. Benton et al., Camoscio v. Massachusetts, Tyler v. Cain, Warden, Saldana v. United States, Rubis v. United States, Fields v. Clark et al., Lanier v. United.States, Saldana v. United States, Laster v. Gearin, Warden, Cadoree v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Underkofler v. Community Health Care Plan, Inc., Farris v. Poppell, Warden, et al., Harris v. United States, Conner v. Head, Warden, Padilla v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Andrade v. California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, Boyer v. United States, Hoss v. Jackson, Warden, Blackwell v. Hohn, aka Haun, Loften v. Texas, Peoples v. Michigan, Kuhn v. Wisconsin, In re Walker, Esposito v. Georgia, Wogoman v. Abramajtys, Warden, Fleming v. Crane, Filipos v. Filipos, Brown v. United States, Green v. Schltgen, Warden, Walsh v. United States, Lynd v. Turpin, Warden, Glee v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., Marrero v. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Barnes v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, McMillan v. Walker, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, McKinney v. United States, Watts v. Arkansas, Dowdy v. United States, Brown v. United States, Adams v. United States,
   ante, p. 929;

ante, p. 930;

ante, p. 916;

ante, p. 951;

ante, p. 656;

ante, p. 952;

532 U. S. 1023;

532 U. S. 977;

ante, p. 904;

ante, p. 952;

532 U. S. 996;

532 U. S. 1040;

532 U. S. 1055;

532 U. S. 1069;

ante, 'p. 953;

ante, p. 932;

532 U. S. 1071;

ante, p. 919;

ante, p. 907;

ante, p. 933;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 954;

ante, p. 954;

ante, p. 948;

ante, p. 935;

No. 00-9691.

No. 00-9703.

No. 00-9710.

No. 00-9778.

No. 00-9821.

No. 00-9854.

No. 00-9872.

No. 00-9897.

No. 00-9938.

No. 00-10018.

No. 00-10023.

No. 00-10027.

No. 00-10066.

No. 00-10103.

No. 00-10213.

No. 00-10241.

ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 921;

ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 908;

ante, p. 956; '

ante, p. 936;

ante, p. 921;

ante, p. 957;

ante, p. 957;

ante, p. 958;

ante, p. 937;

ante, p. 937;

ante, p. 958;

ante, p. 939;

ante, p. 960; and

ante, p. 961. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 00-8634.
    Ramos-Cartagena v. United States,
   532 U. S. 1066. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 30, 2001
    No. 01-6047 (01A177).
    In re Frye.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.


text:
    No. 00-9543.
    Hale v. Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    September 5, 2001
    No. 00-10827 (01A144).
    Tucker v. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    September 7, 2001
    No. 00A1141 (01-286).
    Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-2254.
    In re Disbarment of Stidham.
   Chuck R. Stid-ham, of Cincinnati, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2255.
    In re Disbarment of Evans.
   Francis Birt Evans, Jr., of Canton, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2256.
    In re Disbarment of Griffiths.
   David Grif-fiths, of Bronx, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 99-1786.
    Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. et al. v. Knudson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 531 U. S. 1124.] Motion of Maryland HMD Subrogation Plaintiffs for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-cus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-795.
    Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al. v. Free Speech Coalition et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U. S. 1124.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 00-1293.
    Ashcroft, Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 1037.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 00-1713.
    No. 00-5778.
    No. 00-8388.
    No. 00-8597.
    No. 00-9047.
    No. 00-9343.
    No. 00-9403.
    No. 00-9547.
    No. 00-9631.
    No. 00-9712.
    No. 00-9956.
    No. 00-10305.
    Torres Gonzalez v. United States, Evans v. Galaza, Warden, et al., Scales v. United States, Velez, aka Rosa, aka Rodriguez v. United States, Alexander v. Mosley, Warden, Singleton v. Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the Army, Kirtley v. Baker, Scheib v. Mellon Bank et al., White v. Utah et al., Henderson v. Lockyer, Attorney General of California, et al., Candelario v. United States, Reeves v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al.,
   ante, p. 951;

ante, p. 931;

ante, p. 952;

ante, p. 953;

ante, p. 953;

532 U. S. 1056;

ante, p. 918;

ante, p. 933;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 922; and

ante, p. 962. Petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Chief Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    September 12, 2001
    No. 01A236.
    Bagley, Warden v. Byrd.
   Application to vacate stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Chief Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

John W. Byrd, Jr., was scheduled to be executed by the State of Ohio today, September 12, at 10 a.m. (e.d.t.). Byrd was convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 for the murder of Monte Tewksbury. Byrd's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, and we denied certiorari. Byrd v. Ohio, 484 U. S. 1037 (1988). In 1988, Byrd filed a petition for state postcqnviction relief. The Ohio courts denied the petition. In 1994, Byrd filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the petition, and we again denied certiorari. Byrd v. Collins, 531 U. S. 1082 (2001). Byrd filed another petition for state postcon-viction relief on April 9, 2001. The trial court and Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review. State v. Byrd, No. 01-1515, Aug. 29, 2001. Byrd then sought permission to file a second federal habeas petition. The Court of Appeals denied Byrd’s request on September 10, but stayed the execution until September 18, 2001. On September 11, the Court of Appeals issued an order stating that a member of the court had requested that the en banc court determine whether to vacate the stay issued the day before. The order stated that less than a majority of the court voted in favor of vacating the stay, and “a majority of the active judges have voted to extend the stay of execution until October 8, 2001.” No. 01-3927 (CA6, Sept. 11, 2001). The State has filed in this Court an application to vacate the stay granted by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals has stayed the execution of John Byrd without any explanation of a constitutional defect that would warrant the issuance of a stay by a federal court. The only opinion it has written convincingly concludes that there is no basis for a stay. The only reason the Court of Appeals has provided for granting .the stay is to give “a panel member . . . additional time to consider the matter.” In extending the stay until October 8, 2001, the court provided no additional justification. Byrd surmises that the Court of Appeals extended the stay to October 8 “in order to consider John Byrd’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc.” Response to State’s Application Seeking Lifting of Stay 4. But the Court of Appeals’ order does not offer this as a reason for granting the stay; the order only adds that “the clerk of the court is directed to file and submit to the court any petition offered by a party seeking en banc review of the decision of the panel.” In any event, en banc consideration would not warrant granting a stay until October 8. As Judge Batchelder points out in her opinion, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the panel’s decision denying Byrd’s successive habeas application is not “permitted to be the subject of a petition for rehearing.” No. 01-3927 (CA6, Sept. 10, 2001), p. 26 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (1994 ed., Supp. V)). And even if Byrd could seek en banc review, the Court of Appeals would be able to rule on the petition well before October 8. Indeed, the Court of Appeals issued the stay on September 10, and by the very next day the court had considered and rejected a judge’s request for en banc reconsideration of the stay order. That leaves the rationale that a panel member needed “additional time to consider the matter.” Of course, however, the panel has already issued its opinion. Seeing no justification for the stay, I would grant the State’s application to vacate the stay. See Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U. S. 345 (1996) (per curiam) (“[I]t is ‘particularly egregious’ to enter a stay absent- substantial grounds for relief” (citing Delo v. Blair, 509 U. S. 823 (1993) (per curiam)).


text:
    September 17, 2001
    No. 01-6240 (01A243).
    Bacon v. Lee, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 25, 2001
    No. 00-8727.
    McCarver v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 941.] Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.


text:
    No. 99-1786.
    Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. et al. v. Knudson et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 531 U. S. 1124.] Motion of respondents for leave to participate in oral argument and for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 00-1567.
    Young et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-1595.
    Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-1831.
    United States v. Craft.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-1853.
    Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-1751.
    No. 00-1777.
    No. 00-1779.
    Zelman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Ohio, et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.; Hanna Perkins School et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.; and Taylor et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.
   C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari in Nos. 00-1751 and 00-1777 granted. Cer-tiorari in No. 00-1779 granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Cases are consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 00-1770.
    Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Housing and Development Law Institute et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.


text:
    No. 00-1937.
    Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security v. Walton.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 00-8452.
    Atkins v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    BROWN et al. v. GILMORE, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA, et al.
    No. 01A194 (01-384).
    Decided September 12, 2001
   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

This case is before me on an application for injunctive relief pending writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Applicants seek an order enjoining further implementation of Virginia’s mandatory “minute of silence” statute, Va. Code Ann. §22.1-203 (2000), pending this Court’s disposition of their petition for certiorari which has been filed contemporaneously with this application. The petition for certiorari seeks review of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the constitutionality of §22.1-203. See 258 F. 3d 265 (CA4 2001). For the reasons that follow, I conclude that an injunction should not issue.

Applicants are Virginia public school students and their parents who challenge the constitutionality of a state statute, effective as of July 1, 2000, that requires all of Virginia’s public schools to observe a minute of silence at the start of each schoolday. They challenge the statute on its face, contending that it establishes religion in violation of the First Amendment. For the past year, applicants have repeatedly sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief from both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to enjoin Virginia’s enforcement and implementation of this statute. On August 31, 2000, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held a hearing on applicants’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief in light of the approaching school year. This motion was denied. Applicants then requested that the District Court enter an injunction pending appeal, which was also denied. They then moved in the Court of Appeals for an injunction pending appeal. This motion was denied as well.

Applicants have been no more successful on the merits. On October 26,2000, the District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed applicants’ challenge in its entirety. Applicants then sought expedited review in the Court of Appeals, which was denied. On July 24,2001, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of applicants’ complaint, as well as its earlier denial of applicants’ motion for injunctive relief. This application to me followed.

I note first that applicants are seeking not merely a stay of a lower court judgment, but an injunction against the enforcement of a presumptively valid state statute. The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), is the only source of this Court’s authority to issue such an injunction. It is established, and our own rules require, that injunctive relief under the All Writs Act is to be used “ ‘sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.’” Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (quoting Fishman v. Schaffer, 429 U. S. 1325, 1326 (1976) (Marshall, J., in chambers)). Such an injunction is appropriate only if “the legal rights at issue are ‘indisputably clear.’” 479 U. S., at 1313 (quoting Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 409 U. S. 1235 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)).

Whatever else may be said about the issues and equities in this case, the rights of the applicants are not “indisputably clear.” The pros and cons of the applicants’ claim on the merits are fully set forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals. Applicants contend that this case is virtually a replay of Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985), in which we struck down a similar Alabama statute. But the majority opinion in the Court of Appeals took pains to distinguish the present case from Wallace. It noted our statement that the statute at issue there was “ ‘quite different from [a statute] merely protecting every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the sehoolday.’” Id., at 59, as quoted in 258 F. 3d, at 279. It further found ample evidence that §22.1-203 had a clear secular purpose, namely, to provide a moment for quiet reflection in the wake of high-profile instances of violence in our public schools. Id., at 276-277. This alone may distinguish Wallace, in which Alabama explicitly conceded that the sole purpose of its moment of silence law was to return prayer to the Alabama schools. We in fact emphasized in Wallace that the Alabama statute “had no secular purpose.” 472 U. S., at 56 (emphasis in original). At the very least the lower court’s finding of a clear secular purpose in this case casts some doubt on the question whether §22.1-203 establishes religion in violation of the First Amendment. See, e.g., id., at 66 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] straightforward moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to ‘advance or inhibit religion’ ”); id., at 73 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives”).

Without expressing any view of my own, or attempting to predict the views of my colleagues as to the ultimate merit of applicants’ First Amendment claim, I can say with some confidence that their position is less than indisputable.

Applicants point out that Justice Powell stayed the order of the District Court dissolving a preliminary injunction in Wallace. See Jaffree v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., 459 U. S. 1314 (1983) (opinion in chambers). But there the plaintiffs alleged that “teachers had ‘on a daily basis’ led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison.” Wallace, supra, at 42. Here, by contrast, after more than a year of operation, the Virginia statute providing for a minute of silence seems to have meant just that. There is no allegation that Virginia schoolteachers have used the minute of silence, or any other occasion, to lead students in collective prayer. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals noted that between 1976 and 2000 at least 20 local school divisions in Virginia established a minute of silence in their classrooms, yet there is no evidence of the practice having ever been used as a government prayer exercise.

I also note that applicants could have made an immediate application to a Justice of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) in September 2000, after the Court of Appeals denied their request for an injunction pending appeal. That they did not do so is somewhat inconsistent with the urgency they now assert.

For these reasons, I decline to issue an injunction pending certiorari in this case.


author: Justice O’Connor Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg,

text:
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE v. GREGORY
    No. 00-758.
    Argued October 9, 2001
    Decided November 13, 2001

      O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 11. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 14.

      Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, former Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, David B. Stinson, Mary Anne Gibbons, Lori J. Dym, and Stephan J. Boardman.

      Henk Brands argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Mark D. Roth and Charles A Hobbie; for the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, by Keith E. Secular; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Edward H. Passman and Paula A Brantner; and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O’Duden, Barbara A. Atkin, and Kerry L. Adams.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 allows eligible employees to appeal termination and other serious disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U. S. C. §§7512-7513. The Federal Circuit ruled that, when assessing the reasonableness of these actions, the Board may not consider prior disciplinary actions that are pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings. 212 F. 3d 1296, 1298 (2000). Because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit’s rule, we now vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I

Respondent Maria Gregory worked for petitioner United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes, and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-15. On April 7,1997, respondent left work early to take her daughter to the doctor, ignoring her supervisor’s instructions to sort the mail for her route before leaving. She received a letter of warning for insubordination. App. 47-48. Respondent filed a grievance under the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement between her union and her employer, see generally 1998-2001 Agreement Between National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO and U. S. Postal Service, Art. 15. App. 43.

Later that same month respondent was cited for delaying the mail, after mail from another route was found in her truck at the end of the day. Id., at 45-46. The Postal Service suspended her for seven days, and respondent filed a second grievance. Id., at 41-42. In August 1997, respondent was again disciplined for various violations, including failing to deliver certified mail and attempting to receive unauthorized or unnecessary overtime. Id., at 38-40. She received a 14-day suspension, and again filed a grievance.

While these three disciplinary actions were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, respondent was disciplined one final time. On September 13, 1997, respondent filed a form requesting assistance in completing her route or, alternatively, SVfe hours of overtime. Considering this request excessive, respondent’s supervisor accompanied her on her route and determined that she had overestimated the necessary overtime by more than an hour. Id., at 31-33. In light of this violation and respondent’s previous violations, her supervisor recommended that she be removed from her employment at the Postal Service. Ibid. On November 17, 1997, the Postal Service ordered respondent’s termination effective nine days later. Id., at 24-29.

Because respondent previously served in the Army, she falls into the category of “preference eligible” Postal Service employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). 5 U. S. C. §7511(a)(l)(B)(ii). The CSRA provides covered employees the opportunity to appeal removals and other serious disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). §§7512-7513. Under the CSRA, respondent could appeal her termination to the Board or seek relief , through the negotiated grievance procedure, but could not do both. § 7121(e)(1). Respondent chose to appeal to the Board.

When an employing agency’s disciplinary action is challenged before the Board, the agency bears the burden of proving its charge by a preponderance of the evidence. § 7701(c)(1)(B). Under the Board’s settled procedures, this requires proving not only that the misconduct actually occurred, but also that the penalty assessed was reasonable in relation to it. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M. S. P. B. 313, 333-334 (1981).

Following these guidelines, a Board Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld respondent’s termination, concluding that the Postal Service had shown that respondent overestimated her overtime beyond permissible limits on September 13, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-29, and that her termination was reasonable in light of this violation and her prior violations. Id., at A-36 to A-40. Although the three prior disciplinary actions were the subject of pending grievances, the ALJ analyzed them independently, following the approach set forth in Bolling v. Department of Air Force, 8 M. S. P. B. 658 (1981). Bolling provides for de novo review of prior disciplinary actions unless: “(1) [the employee] was informed of the action in writing; (2) the action is a matter of record; and (3) [the employee] was given the opportunity to dispute the charges to a higher level than the authority that imposed the discipline.” Id., at 660-661. If these conditions are met, Board review of prior disciplinary action is limited to determining whether the action is clearly erroneous. Id., at 660. After finding that respondent’s three prior disciplinary actions met Bolling’s three conditions, the ALJ concluded that there was no clear evidence of error. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-37.

Respondent petitioned the Board for review of the ALJ’s decision. While this appeal was pending, an arbitrator resolved respondent’s first grievance (relating to the April 7 incident) in her favor, and ordered that the letter of warning be expunged. App. 3-16. Respondent did not advise the Board of that ruling. The Board then denied her request for' review of the ALJ’s determination. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-9 to A-10.

Respondent petitioned for review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U. S. C. § 7703(a). That court affirmed the Board’s decision to uphold the ALJ’s factual findings with respect to the September 13 incident. 212 F. 3d, at 1299. Taking judicial notice of the fact that one of the three disciplinary actions underlying respondent’s termination had been overturned in arbitration, and noting that respondent’s two remaining grievances were still pending, it reversed the Board’s determination that the penalty was reasonable. Ibid. While recognizing that disciplinary history is an “important factor” in assessing any penalty, id., at 1300, the Federal Circuit held that “prior disciplinary actions that are subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support” a penalty’s reasonableness, id., at 1298. It therefore vacated the Board’s decision in part and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 1300. We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1143 (2001).

II

The Federal Circuit’s statutory review of the substance of Board decisions is limited to determining whether they are unsupported by substantial evidence or are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7703(c). Like its counterpart in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2), the arbitrary and capricious standard is extremely narrow, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971), and allows the Board wide latitude in fulfilling its obligation to review agency disciplinary actions. It is not for the Federal Circuit to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). The role of judicial review is only to ascertain if the Board has met the minimum standards set forth in the statute. We conclude that the Board need not adopt the Federal Circuit’s rule in order to meet these standards.

The Postal Service argues that the Board’s independent review of prior disciplinary actions is sufficient to meet its statutory obligations. The adequacy of the Board’s particular review mechanism — Bolling review, see Bolling v. Department of Air Force, supra—is not before us. The Federal Circuit said nothing about Bolling, instead adopting a sweeping rule that the Board may never rely on prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing grievance procedures, regardless of the sort of independent review the Board provides. Respondent likewise asks this Court only to uphold the Federal Circuit’s rule forbidding independent Board review. She does not seek a ruling requiring a different Board review mechanism, nor did she do so before the Federal Circuit. Her brief in that court mentioned neither Bolling nor its standard, arguing only that the Board should hold off its review altogether pending the outcome of collectively bargained grievance proceedings. Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-3123 (CA Fed.), p. 2. Moreover, even if the adequacy of Bolling review were before us, we lack sufficient briefing on its specific functioning in this case. We thus consider only whether the Board may permissibly review prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing grievance procedures independently, not whether the particular way in which it does so meets the statutory standard.

There is certainly nothing arbitrary about the Board’s decision to independently review prior disciplinary violations. Neither the Federal Circuit nor respondent has suggested that the Board has applied this policy inconsistently — indeed, the Board has taken this same approach for 19 years. See Carr v. Department of Air Force, 9 M. S. P. B. 714 (1982). Nor have they argued that the Board lacks reasons for its approach. Following the Federal Circuit’s rule would require the Board either to wait until challenges to disciplinary actions pending in grievance proceedings are completed before rendering its decision, or to ignore altogether the violations being challenged in grievance in determining the reasonableness of the penalty. The former may cause undue delay. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 6-7. The latter would, in many cases, effectively preclude agencies from relying on an employee’s disciplinary history, which the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged to be an “important factor” in any disciplinary decision. 212 F. 3d, at 1300.

Nor is independent review by the Board contrary to any law. The Federal Circuit cited no provision of the CSRA or any other statute to justify its new rule. Id., at 1299-1300. At oral argument in this Court, respondent’s counsel pointed to the Federal Circuit’s statement that, if pending grievances were later overturned in arbitration, “the foundation of the Board’s Douglas analysis would be compromised.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; 212 F. 3d, at 1300 (citing Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M. S. P. B. 313 (1981)). The Board’s Douglas decision set out a general framework for reviewing agency disciplinary actions. Because Douglas at one point specifically discussed 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B), the CSRA provision placing the burden of proof on the employing agency to justify its disciplinary action, counsel claimed, the Federal Circuit must have thought the Board’s policy violates that section. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. We do not read the Federal Circuit’s citation of Douglas as an implicit reference to § 7701(c)(1)(B), particularly given that the Federal Circuit’s opinion nowhere mentions that section’s standard. Rather, we interpret the Federal Circuit’s reference to Douglas as a way of describing the entire process of Board review of disciplinary actions.

More importantly, any suggestion that the Board’s decision to independently review prior disciplinary actions violates § 7701(c)(l)(B)’s preponderance of the evidence standard would be incorrect. To the extent that that standard places the burden upon employing agencies to justify all of the violations — including those dealt with in prior disciplinary actions — that are the'basis for the penalty, the Board has its own mechanism for allowing agencies to meet that burden. Insofar as Bolling review is adequate to meet this burden of proof, an employing agency may meet its statutory burden to justify prior actions by prevailing either in grievance or before the Board.

Amicus National Treasury' Employees Union (NTEU) argues that independent Board review of prior disciplinary actions pending in grievance violates the CSRA’s general statutory scheme. Brief for National Treasury Employees Union as Amicus Curiae 8-12. Employees covered by the CSRA may elect Board review only for disciplinary actions of a certain seriousness, such as termination, suspension for more than 14 days, or a reduction in grade or pay. 5 U. S. C. §§7512-7513. For more minor actions, workers may only seek review through negotiated grievance procedures, if they exist. §7121. According to NTEU, this scheme deprives the Board of the statutory authority to review minor disciplinary actions like the three that were pending in this case. It is true that the CSRA contemplates that at least some eligible employees (those represented by unions) will have two different forums for challenging disciplinary actions, depending in part on their seriousness. If the Board had attempted to review respondent’s first disciplinary action before she was terminated, it would have exceeded its statutory authority. In this case, however, the Board was asked to review respondent’s termination, something it clearly has authority to do. §§7512-7513. Because this termination was based on a series of disciplinary actions, some of which are minor, the Board’s authority to review the termination must also include the authority to review each of the prior disciplinary actions to establish the reasonableness of the penalty as a whole.

Independent Board review of disciplinary actions pending in grievance proceedings may at times result in the Board reaching a different conclusion than the arbitrator. It may also result in a terminated employee never reaching a resolution of her grievance at all, because some collective bargaining agreements require unions to withdraw grievances when an employee’s termination becomes final before the Board. Brief for Respondent 10-11, 37; Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. Rather than being inconsistent with the statutory scheme, however, these possibilities are the result of the parallel structures of review set forth in the CSRA.

Such results are not necessarily unfair. Any employee who appeals a disciplinary action to the Board receives independent Board review. If the Board’s mechanism for reviewing prior disciplinary actions is itself adequate, the review such an employee receives is fair. Although the fairness of the Board’s oWn procedure is not before us, we note that a presumption of regularity attaches to the actions of Government agencies, United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14—15 (1926), and that some deference to agency disciplinary actions is appropriate.

II

Although the Board independently reviews prior disciplinary actions pending in grievance, it also has a policy of not relying upon disciplinary actions that have already been overturned in grievance proceedings at the time of Board review. See Jones v. Department of Air Force, 24 MSPR 429, 431 (1984). As one of respondent’s disciplinary actions was overturned in arbitration before the Board rendered its decision, the Postal Service concedes that a remand to the Federal Circuit is necessary to determine the effect of this reversal on respondent’s termination. Reply Brief for Petitioner 15-16.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

While I join the Court’s opinion as far as it goes, it does not go far enough. The Court concludes that the adequacy of the mechanism the Merit Systems Protection Board used to review prior disciplinary actions pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings (the so-called Bolling framework) is a question “not before us.” Ante, at 7. I think it is.

The Federal Circuit below held that the Board, in assessing the reasonableness of petitioner’s decision to terminate respondent, abused its discretion by relying upon prior disciplinary actions that were pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings. 212 F. 3d 1296, 1300 (2000).

Petitioner now contests the Federal Circuit’s holding by arguing that the Board’s consideration of prior disciplinary actions subject to pending grievances does not constitute an abuse of discretion because the Board’s use of the Bolling framework, see Bolling v. Department of Air Force, 8 M. S. P. B. 658 (1981), provides employees with more than adequate procedural safeguards. Brief for Petitioner 27-28. Respondent, by contrast, counters that the Bolling framework not only is insufficient to prevent the “unfairness” inherent in the Board’s consideration of prior disciplinary actions subject to pending grievances, but also is inconsistent with the agency’s statutory burden to show that its decision is supported by a “preponderance of the evidence.” See Brief for Respondent 34-37. Properly disposing of this case requires that we address these arguments.

This is not a difficult task because the Bolling framework provides federal employees with more than adequate procedural safeguards. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7503(b), for instance, sets forth the basic procedural protections to which employees receiving minor discipline are entitled pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). Conspicuously absent from the statutory provision is any opportunity to appeal a minor disciplinary action to the Board. Thus, as petitioner points out, “it can hardly be said that the Bolling framework for collateral review of prior discipline conflicts with the CSRA, when Congress chose not to provide for any [Board] review of minor disciplinary actions.” See Reply Brief for Petitioner 12-13 (emphasis in original).

Respondent’s argument that the Bolling framework conflicts with the “preponderance of the evidence” standard set forth in 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) is also unavailing. The logical consequence of respondent’s position is that the Board would be required to review de novo all facts supporting all prior disciplinary actions relied upon by an agency to justify the reasonableness of a penalty, whether or not the prior actions were ever grieved. Nothing in the CSRA supports this rather remarkable proposition. At most, the statute requires an agency to prove the existence of prior disciplinary actions; it does not place the burden on the agency to prove the facts underlying those actions.

The central flaw in the Federal Circuit’s decision is that it. relies on the mistaken assumption that the Board’s review process and collectively bargained grievance proceedings are somehow linked. 212 F. 3d, at 1300. This assumption is not supported by the CSRA. Under the statute, the Board’s review process and collectively bargained grievance procedures constitute entirely separate structures. As a result, the Board need not wait for an employee’s pending grievances to be resolved before taking account of prior disciplinary actions in its assessment of the reasonableness of a penalty given in a subsequent disciplinary action.

For these reasons, I agree with the Court’s decision to vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remand for further proceedings.

Justice Ginsburg,

concurring in the judgment.

Although I join the Court’s judgment, I do so ón grounds not stated in the Court’s opinion. I note first that under Bolling v. Department of Air Force, the Board’s review of prior disciplinary actions pending in negotiated grievance proceedings requires, in eases like this one, only that the Board determine whether an agency action was “clearly erroneous.” 8 M. S. P. B. 658, 660 (1981). This summary and highly deferential standard is arguably inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the Board sustain a decision of an agency “only if . . . [it] is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B). The Court maintains that the adequacy of Bolling review to meet § 7701(c)(l)(B)’s preponderance of the evidence standard is a question “not before us.” Ante, at 7, 10. In light of the unsettled issue, however, I would place no reliance upon the Board’s “independent review” of prior discipline, see ante, at 7, 8, in this case. Nevertheless, I do not resist the Court’s remand order for the reasons set out below.

MSPB regulations allow the Board to reopen an appeal and reconsider its decision “at any time.” 5 CPR § 1201.118 (2001) (“The Board may reopen an appeal and reconsider a decision of [an administrative judge] on its own motion at any time, regardless of any other provisions of this part.”). There is every reason to believe that the Board would reopen to reconsider a decision that credited a prior disciplinary action later overturned in arbitration. See Jones v. Department of Air Force, 24 MSPR 429, 431 (1984) (suspension “reversed by grievance . . . was effectively cancelled and thus should not be considered in determining a reasonable penalty for the current charge”). Notably, the Postal Service agrees that the Board may invoke its provision for reopening “in the event that the employee’s prior disciplinary record has been revised as the result of a successful grievance.” Brief for Petitioner 28; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 (counsel for the Postal Service confirmed Service’s recognition that “the [Bjoard’s regulations permit the [B]oard to reopen any case at any time to reconsider it in light of a grievance which may have proved successful”).

Indeed, it might well be “arbitrary and capricious” in such a situation for the Board to disregard the employee’s revised record and refuse to reopen. Cf. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4433, p. 311 (1981) (a “judgment based upon the preclusive effects of [a prior] judgment should not stand if the [prior] judgment is reversed”); id., at 312-315; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16 and Comment c (1982) (nullification of an earlier judgment on which a subsequent judgment relied “may be made the ground for appropriate proceedings for relief from the later judgment with any suitable provision for restitution of benefits that may have been obtained under that judgment”); id., § 84 (generally, “a valid and final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court”).

Gregory did not bring to the Board’s attention her successful grievance of the Postal Service’s first disciplinary action, i. e., a letter of warning dated May 13, 1997, based on the April 7,1997, incident, see ante, at 4; App. 43,47-48. Under the MSPB’s regulations, she may even now ask the Board to reopen based on the expungement of that action, or the Board may reopen “on its own motion.” 5 CFR § 1201.118 (2001); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 26 (counsel for the Postal Service acknowledged that successful grievance of first disciplinary action “could have been brought to the attention of the [Bjoard and still could be today”). Gregory may also bring to the Board’s attention any revision resulting from successful grievances of the Postal Service’s second and third disciplinary actions, i. e., the seven-day suspension ordered on June 7, 1997, see ante, at 4; App. 41-42, 45-46, and the fourteen-day suspension ordered on August 7,1997, see ante, at 4; App. 38-40.

Gregory asserts that the Postal Service resists arbitration of her second and third grievances on the ground that under the collective-bargaining agreement between the Postal Service and her union, predischarge grievances do not survive a discharge which has been made final. Brief for Respondent 10-12, and n. 5,26-27. She does not suggest, however, that the union is disarmed from bargaining for postdischarge continuation of grievances through to completion of arbitration.

Gregory, moreover, elected to resort to the MSPB “[a]t the advice of her then-counsel.” Id., at 9. She could have asked her union to challenge her dismissal before an arbitrator. Had she and her union opted for arbitration rather than MSPB review of the dismissal, she might have fared better; it appears that a labor arbitrator, in determining the reasonableness of a penalty, would have accorded no weight to prior discipline grieved but not yet resolved by a completed arbitration. See Arbitration Between National Assn. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, and USPS, Case No. E94 N-4E-D 96075418, pp. 16-18 (Apr. 19, 1999) (Snow, Arb.), Lodging of Respondent 57-59 (referring to parties’ “past practice of giving unresolved grievances no standing in removal hearings,” arbitrator granted a continuance “pending resolution of an underlying disciplinary grievance”); Arbitration Between USPS and National Assn. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, Case No. D90 N-4D-D 95076768, pp. 19-21 (Mar. 20, 1996) (Sickles, Arb.), Lodging of Respondent 27-29 (although employing agency need not await resolution of prior grievances before ordering an employee’s removal, an arbitrator may not take account of prior discipline until the appeals process has yielded a final resolution); Arbitration Between USPS and National Post Office Mail Handlers, Case No. MC-S-0874-D, p. 7 (June 18, 1977) (Fasser, Arb.), Lodging of Respondent 7 (“Until th[e] appeal [of a prior disciplinary action] is finally adjudicated, it has no standing in this proceeding.” (emphasis added)). Gregory, having at her own option forgone arbitration proceedings, in which prior discipline could not weigh against her while grievances were underway, is not comfortably situated to complain that the procedure she elected employed a different rule.

Given (1) the Board’s reopening regulation, (2) the alternative arbitration forum Gregory might have pursued, (3) the Court’s explicit reservation of the question of “the adequacy of Bolling review,” ante, at 7,10, and (4) the apparent, incorrect view of the Federal Circuit that the Postal Service itself could not take account of prior disciplinary action that is the subject of a pending grievance proceeding, see 212 F. 3d 1296, 1299, 1300 (2000), I agree that a remand is in order.

       petitioner’s argument is certainly quite relevant here as the Board Administrative Law Judge below considered prior disciplinary actions in respondent’s case pursuant to the Bolling framework. See ante, at 5-6; App. to Pet. for Cert. A-36 to A-37.

       The Court accurately notes that respondent’s brief in the Federal Circuit merely argued that the Board erred by relying upon prior disciplinary actions and nowhere mentioned the Bolling framework. See ante, at 7. Petitioner, however, has put the Bolling framework squarely into play by relying upon it to support its contention that the Board’s practice of considering prior disciplinary actions is not an abuse of discretion. Given that petitioner, in defending the Board's practice, raises the Bolling framework for the first time in this Court, respondent surely has not waived her right to argue that the protections provided by the Bolling framework are inadequate to save the practice invalidated by the Federal Circuit.

       This statutory provision applies to suspensions for 14 days or less. 5 U. S. C. § 7503(a). Respondent’s prior disciplinary actions pending in grievance proceedings fall into this category.

       Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion to the contrary, see post, at 16, n. 2 (opinion concurring in judgment), rests on the assumption that the Board’s review process and collectively bargained grievance proceedings are somehow linked. As explained infra this page, such an assumption is erroneous. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) either requires an agency to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all facts supporting all prior disciplinary actions relied upon by an agency or it does not. Whether an employee has chosen to access collectively bargained grievance proceedings with respect to a prior disciplinary action is irrelevant to answering this question. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning still suggests that the Board must review de novo all facts supporting all prior minor disciplinary actions relied upon by agencies in cases where employees are not represented by a union as such employees have no ability to access collectively bargained grievance proceedings. Such a requirement, however, is nowhere to be found in the CSRA.

       Neither would it be, as Justice Ginsburg intimates, “arbitrary and capricious” for the Board to disregard an arbitrator’s reversal of a prior disciplinary action. Post, at 15 (opinion concurring in judgment). Such an argument, like the Federal Circuit’s holding below, rests on the erroneous premise that the CSRA inextricably ties together the Board’s review process and collectively bargained grievance proceedings. To be sure, the Board has chosen to link its review to collectively bargained grievance proceedings — at least to some extent — by adopting a policy of not relying upon disciplinary actions that have been reversed through grievance proceedings. Cf. Jones v. Department of Air Force, 24 MSPR 429, 430-431 (1984). But the Board is not required to do so. Neither Justice Ginsburg nor the Federal Circuit cites any statutory provision mandating that the Board must take this step. The CSRA simply establishes no link between the Board’s review process, which is designed to protect an employee’s statutory rights, and grievance proceedings, which adjudicate rights secured through collective-bargaining agreements. As the Court points out: “Independent Board review of disciplinary actions . .. may at times result in the Board reaching a different conclusion than the arbitrator.” Ante, at 10.

       Given the Board’s stated policy of not relying upon disciplinary actions that have already been overturned in grievance proceedings at the time of Board review, see n. 5, supra, I agree that a remand is necessary for the Federal Circuit to consider the relevance of the fact that one of respondent’s prior disciplinary actions had already been reversed when the Board finalized its review of her case.

       The Board thus comprehends the two schemes — its own review, and arbitration under the bargained-for grievance procedure — as harmonious and not, as Justice Thomas does, ante, at 13 (concurring opinion), as entirely unrelated to each other.

       Justice Thomas suggests, ante, at 12-13 (concurring opinion), that Gregory’s argument would logically require the Board to review de novo any prior disciplinary action upon which the employer relied in removing an employee, “whether or not the prior actions were ever grieved.” Failure to pursue an available grievance procedure or other avenue of appeal, however, would end the matter. It is well settled that one who fails timely to appeal an adverse decision is bound by that decision in later proceedings. See, e. g., New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392, 481 (1970) (holding that a party who “took no appeal” from an adverse order is “foreclosed by res judicata” from later seeking relief inconsistent with that order); see also 18 Wright, Miller, & Cooper, § 4433, at 305 (“preclusion cannot be defeated by electing to fo[r]go an available opportunity to appeal”); id,-at 305-308; Restatement (Second) of Judgments §83 and Comment a, §84 and Comment e (in general, administrative adjudications and arbitration awards have the same preclusive effects as court judgments).

       At oral argument counsel for the Postal Service sought to “make clear” that “if this Court reverses the decision [of the Federal Circuit],” the Service “would not object to the continuance of'[a] grievance.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 55.

       Grievances “may be appealed to ... arbitration” only “by the certified representative of the Union.” 1998-2001 Agreement Between National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO and U. S. Postal Service, Art. 15, § 4(A)(2).

       The petition for certiorari and the brief for petitioner state the question presented as follows: “Whether a federal agency, when disciplining or removing an employee for misconduct pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., may take account of prior disciplinary actions that are the subject of pending grievance proceedings.” Pet. for Cert. (I); Brief for Petitioner (I) (emphasis added).


author: Justice Ginsburg Justice Scalia,

text:
    TRW INC. v. ANDREWS
    No. 00-1045.
    Argued October 9, 2001
    Decided November 13, 2001

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 35.

      Glen D. Nauger argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Daniel H. Bromberg.

      Andrew Ryan Henderson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., and Gerald L. Sauer.

      Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edward C. DuMont, John D. Graubert, John F. Daly, and Lawrence DeMille-Wagman.

        Richard J. Rubin, Joanne S. Faulkner, Willard P. Ogbum, Deborah M. Zuckerman, Stacy J. Canan, and Michael R. Schuster filed a brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the running of the two-year statute of limitations governing suits based on the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA or Act), as added, 84 Stat. 1127, and amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The time prescription appears in §1681p, which sets out a general rule and an exception. Generally, an action to enforce any liability created by the Act may be brought “within two years from the date on which the liability arises.” The exception covers willful misrepresentation of “any information required under [the Act] to be disclosed to [the plaintiff]”: When such a representation is material to a claim under the Act, suit may be brought “within two years after [the plaintiff’s] discovery ... of the misrepresentation.”

Section 1681p’s exception is not involved in this case; the complaint does not allege misrepresentation of information that the FCRA “required] ... to be disclosed to [the plaintiff].” Plaintiff-respondent Adelaide Andrews nevertheless contends, and the Ninth Circuit held, that §1681p’s generally applicable two-year limitation commenced to run on Andrews’ claims only upon her discovery of defendant-petitioner TRW Inc.’s alleged violations of the Act.

We hold that a discovery rule does not govern §1681p. That section explicitly delineates the exceptional case in which discovery triggers the two-year limitation. We are not at liberty to make Congress’ explicit exception the general rule as well.

I

A

Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to promote efficiency -in the Nation’s banking system and to protect consumer privacy. See 15 U. S. C. § 1681(a) (1994 ed.). As relevant here, the Act seeks to accomplish those goals by requiring credit reporting agencies to maintain “reasonable procedures” designed “to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” contained in credit reports, § 1681e(b), and to “limit the furnishing of [such reports] to” certain statutorily enumerated purposes, § 1681e(a); 15 U. S. C. § 1681b (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The Act creates a private right of action allowing injured consumers to recover “any actual damages” caused by negligent violations and both actual and punitive damages for willful noncompliance. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 1681n, 168 lo (1994 ed.).

B

The facts of this case are for the most part undisputed. On June 17, 1993, Adelaide Andrews visited a radiologist’s office in Santa Monica, California. She filled out a new patient form listing certain basic information, including her name, birth date, and Social Security number. Andrews handed the form to the office receptionist, one Andrea Andrews (the Impostor), who copied the information and thereafter moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Once there, the Impostor attempted on numerous occasions to open credit accounts using Andrews’ Social Security number and her own last name and address.

On four of those occasions, the company from which the Impostor sought credit requested a report from TRW. Each time, TRW’s computers registered a match between Andrews’ Social Security number, last name, and first initial and therefore responded by furnishing her file. TRW thus disclosed Andrews’ credit history at the Impostor’s request to. a bank on July 25, 1994; to a cable television company on September 27, 1994; to a department store on «October 28, 1994; and to another credit provider on January 3,1995. All recipients but the cable company rejected the Impostor’s applications for credit.

Andrews did not learn of these disclosures until May 31, 1995, when she sought to refinance her home mortgage and in the process received a copy of her credit report reflecting the Impostor’s activity. Andrews concedes that TRW promptly corrected her file upon learning of its mistake. She alleges, however, that the blemishes on her report not only caused her inconvenience and emotional distress, they also forced her to abandon her refinancing efforts and settle for an alternative line of credit on less favorable terms.

On October 21, 1996, almost 17 months after she discovered the Impostor’s fraudulent conduct and more than two years after TRW’s first two disclosures, Andrews filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Her complaint stated two categories of FCRA claims against TRW, only the first of which is relevant here. See App. 15-17. Those claims alleged that TRW’s four disclosures of her information in response to the Impostor’s credit applications were improper because TRW failed to verify, predisclosure, that Adelaide Andrews of Santa Monica initiated the requests or was otherwise involved in the underlying transactions. Andrews asserted that by processing requests that matched her profile on Social Security number, last name, and first initial but did not correspond on other key identifiers, notably birth date, address, and first name, TRW had facilitated the Impostor’s identity theft. According to Andrews, TRW’s verification failure constituted a willful violation of §1681e(a), which requires credit reporting agencies to maintain “reasonable procedures” to avoid improper disclosures. She sought injunctive relief, punitive damages, and compensation for the “expenditure of time and money, commercial impairment, inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress” that TRW had allegedly inflicted upon her. App. 15-16.

TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the FCRA’s- statute of limitations had expired on Andrews’ claims based on the July 25 and September 27, 1994, disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Andrews countered that her claims as to all four disclosures were timely because the limitations period did not commence until May 31, 1995, the date she learned of TRW’s alleged wrongdoing. The District Court, agreeing with TRW that § 1681p does not incorporate a general discovery rule, held that relief stemming from the July and September 1994 disclosures was time barred. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1066-1067 (CD Cal. 1998).

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this ruling, applying what it considered to be the “general federal rule . . . that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured.” 225 F. 3d 1063, 1066 (2000). The court rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the text of § 168 lp, and in particular the limited exception set forth in that section, precluded judicial attribution of such a rule to the FCRA. “[TJQnless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise,” the Ninth Circuit declared, “the equitable doctrine of discovery is read into every federal statute of limitations.” Id., at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finding no such express directive, the Court of Appeals held that “none of [Andrews’] injuries were stale when suit was brought.” Id., at 1066. Accordingly, the court reinstated Andrews’ improper disclosure claims and remanded them for trial.

In holding that § 1681p incorporates a general discovery rule, the Ninth Circuit parted company with four other Circuits; those courts have concluded that a discovery exception other than the one Congress expressed may not be read into the Act. See Clark v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 54 F. 3d 669 (CA10 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F. 2d 1175 (CA7 1989); Houghton v. Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, 795 F. 2d 322 (CA3 1986); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F. 2d 952 (CA11 1985). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 532 U. S. 902 (2001), and now reverse.

II

The Court of Appeals rested its decision on the premise that all federal statutes of limitations, regardless of context, incorporate a general discovery rule “unless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise.” 225 F. 3d, at 1067. To the extent such a presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide, the Ninth Circuit conspicuously overstated its scope and force.

The Appeals Court principally relied on our decision in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946). See 225 F. 3d, at 1067. In that case, we instructed with particularity that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.” Holmberg, 327 U. S., at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). Holmberg thus stands for the proposition that equity tolls the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment; it does not establish a general presumption applicable across all contexts. The only other cases in which we have recognized a prevailing discovery rule, moreover, were decided in two contexts, latent disease and medical malpractice, “where the cry for [such a] rule is loudest,” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000). See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111 (1979); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949).

We have also observed that lower federal courts “generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a statute is silent on the issue.” Rotella, 528 U. S., at 555; see also Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 191 (1997) (citing Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F. 2d 336, 342 (CADC 1991), for the proposition that “federal courts generally apply [a] discovery accrual rule when [the] statute does not call for a different rule”). But we have not adopted that position as our own. And, beyond doubt, we have never endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by explicit command, rather than by implication from the structure or text of the particular statute.

The Ninth Circuit thus erred in holding that a generally applied discovery rule controls this case. The PCRA does not govern an area of the law that cries out for application of a discovery rule, nor is the statute “silent on the issue” of when the statute of limitations begins to run. Section 1681p addresses that precise question; the provision reads:

“An action to enforce any liability created under [the Act] may be brought... within two years from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under [the Act] to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the defendant’s liability to that individual under [the Act], the action may be brought at any time within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.” .

We conclude that the text and structure of §1681p evince Congress’ intent to preclude judicial implication of a discovery rule.

“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616-617 (1980). Congress provided in the FCRA that the two-year statute of limitations runs from “the date on which the liability arises,” subject to a single exception for cases involving a defendant’s willful misrepresentation of material information. § 1681p. The most natural reading of § 1681p is that Congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”). We would distort §1681p’s text by converting the exception into the rule. Cf. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352 (1997) (“explicit listing of exceptions” to running of limitations period considered indicative of Congress’ intent to preclude “courts [from] reading] other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute”).

At least equally telling, incorporating a general discovery rule into § 1681p would not merely supplement the explicit exception contrary to Congress’ apparent intent; it would in. practical effect render that exception entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances. A consumer will generally not discover the tortious conduct alleged here— the improper disclosure of her credit history to a potential user — until she requests her file from a credit reporting agency. If the agency responds by concealing the offending disclosure, both a generally applicable discovery rule and the misrepresentation exception would operate to toll the statute of limitations until the concealment is revealed. Once triggered, the statute of limitations would run under either for two years from the discovery date. In this paradigmatic setting, then, the misrepresentation exception would have no work to do.

Both Andrews and the Government, appearing as amicus in her support, attempt to generate some role for the express exception independent of that filled by a general discovery rule. They conceive of the exception as a codification of the judge-made doctrine of équitable estoppel, which, they argue, operates only after the discovery rule has triggered the limitations period, preventing a defendant from benefiting from its misrepresentation by tolling that period until the concealment is uncovered.

To illustrate this supposed separate application, Andrews and the Government frame the following scenario: A credit reporting agency injures a consumer by disclosing her file for an improper purpose. The consumer has no reason to suspect the violation until a year later, when she applies for and is denied credit as a result of the agency’s wrongdoing. At that point, the Government asserts, “the consumer would presumably be put on inquiry notice of the violation, and the discovery rule would start the running of the normal limitation period.” Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 22 (emphasis deleted); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36 (argument in accord by Andrews’ counsel). Some days or months later, the consumer follows up on her suspicions by requesting a copy of her credit report, to which the agency responds by concealing the initial improper disclosure. According to Andrews and the Government, the misrepresentation exception would then operate to toll the already-commenced limitations period until the agency reveals its wrongdoing.

We reject this argument for several reasons. As an initial matter, we are not persuaded by this effort to distinguish the practical function of a discovery rule and the express exception, because we doubt that the supporting scenario is likely to occur outside the realm of theory. The fatal weakness in the narrative is its assumption that a consumer would be charged with constructive notice of an improper disclosure upon denial of a credit application. If the consumer habitually paid her bills on time, the denial might well lead her to suspect a prior credit agency error. But the credit denial would place her on “inquiry notice,” and the discovery rule would trigger the limitations period at that point, only if a reasonable person in her position would have learned of the injury in the exercise of due diligence. See Stone v. Williams, 970 F. 2d 1043, 1049 (CA2 1992) (“The duty of inquiry having arisen, plaintiff is charged with whatever knowledge an inquiry would have revealed.”); 2 C. Gorman,' Limitation of Actions §11.1.6, p. 164 (1991) (“It is obviously unreasonable to charge the plaintiff with failure to search for the missing element of the cause of action if such element would not have been revealed by such search.”).

In the usual circumstance, the plaintiff will gain knowledge of her injury from the credit reporting agency. The scenario put forth by Andrews and the Government, however, requires the assumption that, even if the consumer exercised reasonable diligence by requesting her credit report without delay, she would not in fact learn of the disclosure because the credit reporting agency would conceal it. The uncovering of that concealment would remain the triggering event for both the discovery rule and the express exception. In this scenario, as in the paradigmatic one, the misrepresentation exception would be superfluous.

In any event, both Andrews and the Government concede that the independent function one could attribute to the express exception would arise only in “rare and egregious easefs].” Brief for Respondent 32-33; see Brief for United States , et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (implied discovery rule would apply in “vast majority” of cases). The result is that a rule nowhere contained in the text of § 1681p would do the bulk of that provision’s work, while a proviso accounting for more than half of that text would lie dormant in all but the most unlikely situations.

It is “a cardinal principle of statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883))). “[W]ere we to adopt [Andrews’] construction of the statute,” the express exception would be rendered “insignificant, if not wholly superfluous.” Duncan, 533 U. S., at 174. We are “reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting,” ibid, (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted), and we decline to do so here.

Andrews advances two additional arguments in defense of the decision below, neither of which we find convincing. She contends, first, that the words “date on which the liability arises” — the phrase Congress used to frame the general rule in § 1681p — “literally expres[s]” a discovery rule because liability does not “arise” until it “presentís] itself” or comes to the attention of the potential plaintiff. Brief for Respondent 13. The dictionary definition of the word “arise” does not compel such a reading; to the contrary, it can be used to support either party’s position. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 117 (1966) (arise defined as “to come into being”; “to come about”; or “to become apparent in such a way as to demand attention”); Black’s Law Dictionary 138 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“to come into being or notice”). And TRW offers a strong argument that we have in fact construed that word to imply the result Andrews seeks to avoid. See Brief for Petitioner 16-20 (citing, inter alia, McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25 (1951) (statute .of limitations triggered on date “cause of action arises” incorporates injury-occurrence rule)). On balance, we conclude, the phrase “liability arises” is not particularly instructive, much less dispositive of this case.

Similarly unhelpful, in our view, is Andrews’ reliance on the legislative history of § 1681p. She observes that early versions of that provision, introduced in both the House and Senate, keyed the start of the limitations period to “the date of the occurrence of the violation.” S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §618 (1969); H. R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §27 (1970); H. R. 14765,91st Cong., 1st Sess., §617 (1969). From the disappearance of that language in the final version of § 1681p, Andrews infers a congressional intent to reject the rule that the deleted words would have plainly established.

As TRW notes, however, Congress also heard testimony urging it to enact a statute of limitations that runs from “the date on which the violation is discovered” but declined to do so. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 188 (1970). In addition, the very change to § 1681p’s language on which Andrews relies could be read to refute her position. The misrepresentation exception was added at the same time Congress changed the language “date of the occurrence of the violation” to “liability arises.” Compare S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §618 (1969); H. R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §27 (1970); H. R. 14765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §617 (1969), with H. R. Rep. No. 91-1587, p. 22 (1970). We doubt that Congress, when it inserted a carefully worded exception to the main rule, intended simultaneously to create a general discovery rule that would render that exception superfluous. In sum, the evidence of the early incarnations of § 1681p, like the “liability arises” language on which Congress ultimately settled, fails to convince us that Congress intended sub silentio to adopt a general discovery rule in addition to the limited one it expressly provided.

Ill

In this Court, Andrews for the first time presents an alternative argument based on the “liability arises” language of §1681p. Brief for Respondent 22-25. She contends that even if § 1681p does not incorporate a discovery rule, “liability” under the FCRA does not necessarily “arise” when a violation of the Act occurs. Noting that the FCRA’s substantive provisions tie “liability” to the presence of “actual damages,” §§1681n, 1681o, and that “arise” means at least “to come into existence,” Andrews concludes that “liability arises” only when actual damages materialize. Not until then, she maintains, will all the essential elements of a claim coalesce: “duty, breach, causation, and injury.” Brief for Respondent 23; see Hyde v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 861 F. 2d 446, 449 (CA5 1988) (“The requirement that a consumer sustain some injury in order to establish a cause of action suggests that the statute should be triggered when the agency issues an erroneous report to an institution with which the consumer is dealing.”).

Accordingly, Andrews asserts, her claims are timely: The disputed “liability” for actual damages did not “arise” until May 1995, when she suffered the emotional distress, missed opportunities, and inconvenience cataloged in her complaint; prior to that time, “she had no FCRA claim to bring,” Brief for Respondent 24 (emphasis deleted). Cf. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 200-201 (1997) (rejecting construction of statute under which limitations period would begin running before cause of action existed in favor of “standard rule” that the period does not commence earlier than the date “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief”).

We do not reach this issue because it was not raised or briefed below. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 18-19. We note, however, that the Ninth Circuit has not embraced Andrews’ alternative argument, see 225 F. 3d, at 1066 (“Liability under the [Act] arises when a consumer reporting agency fails to comply with § 168le.”), and the Government does not join her in advancing it here.

Further, we doubt that the argument, even if valid, would aid Andrews in this case. Her claims alleged willful violations of § 1681e(a) and are thus governed by § 1681n. At the time of the events in question, that provision stated: “Any consumer reporting agency... which willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under [the Act] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damages” and “such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow.” 15 U. S. C. § 1681n (1994 ed.). Punitive damages, which Andrews sought in this case, could presumably be awarded at the moment of TRW’s alleged wrongdoing, even if “actual damages” did not accrue at that time. On Andrews’ theory, then, at least some of the liability she sought to enforce arose when the violations occurred, and the limitations period therefore began to run at that point.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.

As the Court notes, ante, at 26, 27, the Court of Appeals based its decision on what it called the “general federal rule . . . that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured,” 225 F. 3d 1063, 1066 (CA9 2000). the Court declines to say whether that expression of the governing general rule is correct. See ante, at 27 (“To the extent such a presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide ..There is in my view little doubt that it is not, and our reluctance to say so today is inexplicable, given that we held, a mere four years ago, that a statute of limitations which says the period, runs from “the date on which the cause of action arose,” 29 U. S. C. § 1451(f)(1) (1994 ed.), “incorporates the standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).

Bay Area Laundry quoted approvingly our statement in Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875), that “[a]U statutes of limitation begin to run when the right of action is complete ...This is unquestionably the traditional rule: Absent other indication, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff “has the right to apply to the court for relief . . . 1 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions § 122a, p. 684 (4th ed. 1916). “That a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not postpone the period of limitation.” 2 id., §276c(l), at 1411.

The injury-discovery rule applied by the Court of Appeals is bad wine of recent vintage. Other than our recognition of the historical exception for suits based on fraud, e. g., Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 347-350 (1875), we have deviated from the traditional rule and imputed an injury-discovery rule to Congress on only one occasion. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 169-171 (1949). We did so there because we could not imagine that legislation as “humane” as the Fed-éral Employers’ Liability Act would bar recovery for latent medical injuries. Id., at 170. We repeated this sentiment in Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000), saying that the “cry for a discovery rule is loudest” in the context of medical-malpractice suits; and we repeat it again today with the assertion that the present case does not involve “an area of the law that cries out for application of a discovery rule,” ante, at 28. These cries, however, are properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide how “humane” legislation should be — or (to put the point less tendentiously) to strike the balance between remediation of all injuries and a policy of repose. See Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U. S. 320, 323-324 (1889) (“[T]he cases in which [the statute of limitations may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself] are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering, it”).

Congress has been operating against the background rule recognized in Bay Area Laundry for a very long time. When it has wanted us to apply a different rule, such as the injury-discovery rule, it has said so. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1030(g) (1994 ed., Supp. V). See also, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §77m (1994 ed., Supp. V); 42 U. S. C. § 9612(d)(2) (1994 ed.). To apply a new background rule to previously enacted legislation would reverse prior congressional judgments; and to display uncertainty regarding the current background rule makes all unspecifying new legislation a roll of the dice. Today’s opinion, in clarifying the meaning of 15 U. S. C. § 1681p, casts the meaning of innumerable other limitation periods in doubt.

Because there, is nothing in this statute to contradict the rule that a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action is complete, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

       Congress has revised the FCRA extensively since the events at issue, but has not altered the provisions material to this case.

       Under 1996 amendments to § 1681n, a plaintiff may also recover statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 for willful violations. See 15 U. S. C. § 1681n(a)(l)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).

       The second alleged that TRW had collected information about the Impostor’s activities and inaccurately attributed that activity to Andrews, in violation of its obligation under § 1681e(b) to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom [a] report relates.” A jury resolved this claim in favor of TRW.
      The complaint also stated FCRA claims against Trans Union Corporation, another credit reporting agency involved in the Impostor’s conduct. In addition, Andrews brought a state-law claim against each defendant. The resolution of these claims is not at issue here.

       The District Court also granted summary judgment to TRW on the two remaining improper disclosure claims, reasoning that TRW maintained adequate procedures and that the disputed disclosures had been made for a permissible purpose as defined by § 1681b. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d, at 1068-1071. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. 225 F. 3d 1063, 1067-1068 (2000). Such questions, the Appeals Court held, “needed determination by a jury not a judge.” Id., at 1068.

       Similarly, even if we agreed that the discovery and equitable estoppel doctrines could comfortably coexist in this setting, we would reject-the contention that we are therefore free to incorporate both into the FCRA. As we have explained, see supra, at 28-29, we read Congress’ codification of one judge-made doctrine not as a license to imply others, but rather as an intentional rejection of those it did not codify.

       The opinion concurring in the judgment rips Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997), from its berth, see post, at 36, 38; we here set the record straight. The question presented in Bay Area Laundry was whether a statute of limitations could commence to run on one day while the right to sue ripened on a later day. We answered that question, and only that question, “no,” unless the statute indicates otherwise. See 522 U. S., at 200-201. Continuing on beyond the place where the concurrence in the judgment leaves off, we clarified:
      “Unless Congress has told us otherwise in the legislation at issue, a cause of action does not become ‘complete and present’ for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 267 (1993) (“While it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the statute.”).” Id., at 201.

       This analysis does not, as the Court asserts, ante, at 34, n. 6, “ri[p] Bay Area Laundry . . . from its berth.” The question presented on which certiorari was granted in the case was not, as the Court now recharacter-izes it, the generalized inquiry “whether a statute of limitations could commence to run on one day while the right to sue ripened on a later day,” ibid., but rather (as set forth in somewhat abbreviated form in petitioner Bay Area Laundry’s merits brief) the much more precise question, “When does the statute of limitations begin to run on an action under the Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq., to collect overdue employer withdrawal liability payments?” Brief for Petitioner, O. T. 1997, No. 96-370, p. i. (Framing of the question in respondent Ferbar Corporation’s merits brief was virtually identical.) The Court’s Bay Area Laundry opinion introduced its discussion of the merits as follows:
      “[T]he Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with an earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit [which] held that the statute of limitations ... runs from the date the employer misses a scheduled payment, not from the date of complete withdrawal.... The Third and Seventh Circuits have also held that the statute of limitations runs from the failure to make a payment- We granted certiorari... to resolve these conflicts.” 522 U. S., at 200.
      The Court’s assertion that we did not answer the question presented, and did not resolve the conflicts — held only that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to say that the limitations period commenced before there was a right of action, and not that the other Circuits were right to say that the period commenced upon the failure to make a payment — is as erroneous as it is implausible. Bay Area Laundry held that the cause of action arose when “the employer violated an obligation owed the plan,” id., at 202, because “the standard rule” is that the period begins to run when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” id,., at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       As the Court accurately notes, ante, at 27, in one other case we simply observed (without endorsement) that several Courts of Appeals had substituted injury-discovery for the traditional rule in medical-malpractice actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 120, and n. 7 (1979), and in two other cases observed (without endorsement) that lower federal courts “generally apply” an injury-discovery rule, see Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000); Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 191 (1997).

       “No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.”

       “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 771(a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 771(a)(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based.”

       “No claim may be presented under this section ... unless the claim is presented within 3 years after . . . [t]he date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release in question.”