author: Justice Ginsburg

text:
    PORTER et al. v. NUSSLE
    No. 00-853.
    Argued January 14, 2002
    Decided February 26, 2002

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Gregory T D’Auria, Robert B. Fiske III, Perry Zinn-Rowthorn, Steven R. Strom, and Mark F. Kohler, Assistant Attorneys General.

      John R. Williams argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Norman A. Pattis.

      Irving R. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Barbara L. Herwig, and Peter R. Metier

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, and Caitlin J. Halligan, First Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. leyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F Reilly of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; and for the National Conference of State Legislatives et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the obligation of prisoners who claim denial of their federal rights while incarcerated to exhaust prison grievance procedures before seeking judicial relief. Plaintiff-respondent Ronald Nussle, an inmate in a Connecticut prison, brought directly to court, without filing an inmate grievance, a complaint charging that corrections officers singled him out for a severe beating, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Nussle bypassed the grievance procedure despite a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321-73, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V), that directs: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that §1997e(a) governs only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents, such as corrections officers’ use of excessive force, actions that immediately affect only particular prisoners. Nussle defends the Second Circuit’s judgment, but urges that the relevant distinction is between excessive force claims, which, he says, need not be pursued administratively, and all other claims, which, he recognizes, must proceed first through the prison grievance process. We reject both readings and hold, in line with the text and purpose of the PLRA, our precedent in point, and the weight of lower court authority, that §1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.

I

Respondent Ronald Nussle is an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut. App. 38. According to his complaint, corrections officers at the prison subjected him to “a prolonged and sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation” from the time of his arrival there in May 1996. Id., at 39. Nussle alleged that he was singled out because he was “perceived” to be a friend of the Governor of Connecticut, with whom corrections officers were feuding over labor issues. Ibid.

Concerning the episode in suit, Nussle asserted that, on or about June 15,1996, several officers, including defendant-petitioner Porter, ordered Nussle to leave his cell, “placed him against a wall and struck him with their hands, kneed him in the back, [and] pulled his hair.” Ibid. Nussle alleged that the attack was unprovoked and unjustified, and that the officers told him they would kill him if he reported the beating. Ibid.

Then, as now, the Connecticut Department of Correction provided a grievance system for prisoners. See id., at 5-18. Under that system, grievances must be filed within 30 days of the “occurrence.” Id., at 11. Rules governing the grievance process include provisions on confidentiality and against reprisals. Id., at 17-18.

Without filing a grievance, on June 10, 1999, Nussle commenced an action in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983; he filed suit days before the three-year statute of limitations ran out on the § 1983 claim. Nussle charged, principally, that the corrections officers’ assault violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 38. The District Court, relying on § 1997e(a), dismissed Nussle’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Nussle v. Willette, 3:99CV1091(AHN) (D. Conn., Nov. 22, 1999), App. 43.

Construing § 1997e(a) narrowly because it is an exception “to the general rule of non-exhaustion in § 1983 cases,” the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment; the appeals court held that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for [prisoner] claims of assault or excessive force brought under § 1983.” Nussle v. Willette, 224 F. 3d 95, 106 (2000). Section 1997e(a) requires administrative exhaustion of inmates’ claims “with respect to prison conditions,” but contains no definition of the words “prison conditions.” The appeals court found the term “scarcely free of ambiguity.” Id., at 101. For purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the court concluded, the term was most appropriately read to mean “'circumstances affecting everyone in the area,”’ rather than “ ‘single or momentary matter[s],’ such as beatings . . . directed at particular individuals.” Ibid, (quoting Booth v. Churner, 206 F. 3d 289, 300-301 (CA3 2000) (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U. S. 731 (2001)).

The Court of Appeals found support for its position in the PLRA’s legislative history. Floor statements, “overwhelmingly suggested]” that Congress sought to curtail suits qualifying as “frivolous” because of their “subject matter,” e. g., suits over “insufficient storage locker space,” “a defective haircut,” or “being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety.” 224 F. 3d, at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actions seeking relief from corrections officer brutality, the Second Circuit stressed, are not of that genre. Further, the Court of Appeals referred to pre-PLRA decisions in which this Court had “disaggre-gate[d] the broad category of Eighth Amendment claims so as to distinguish [for proof of injury and mens rea purposes] between ‘excessive force’ claims, on the one hand, and ‘conditions of confinement’ claims, on the other.” Id., at 106 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825 (1994)).

In conflict with the Second Circuit, other Federal Courts of Appeals have determined that prisoners alleging assaults by prison guards must meet § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement before commencing a civil rights action. See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F. 3d 446 (CA7 2001); Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F. 3d 1259 (CA11 2000); Booth v. Churner, 206 F. 3d 289 (CA3 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F. 3d 641 (CA6 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve the intercircuit conflict, 532 U. S. 1065 (2001), and now reverse the Second Circuit’s judgment.

II

Ordinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982). Prisoner suits alleging constitutional deprivations while incarcerated once fell within this general rule. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).

In 1980, however, Congress introduced an exhaustion prescription for suits initiated by state prisoners. See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1994 ed.). This measure authorized district courts to stay a state prisoner’s §1983 action “for a period of not to exceed 180 days” while the prisoner exhausted available “plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies.” § 1997e(a)(l). Exhaustion under the 1980 prescription was in large part discretionary; it could be ordered only if the State’s prison grievance system met specified federal standards, and even then, only if, in the particular case, the court believed the requirement “appropriate and in the interests of justice.” §§ 1997e(a) and (b). We described this provision as a “limited exhaustion requirement” in McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 150-151 (1992), and thought it inapplicable to prisoner suits for damages when monetary relief was unavailable through the prison grievance system.

In 1996, as part of the PLRA, Congress invigorated the exhaustion prescription. The revised exhaustion provision, titled “Suits by prisoners,” states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V).

The current exhaustion provision differs markedly from its predecessor. Onee within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by §1997e(a) is now mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 739 (2001). All “available” remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” See ibid.; see also id., at 740, n. 5. Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. See id., at 741. And unlike the previous provision, which encompassed only § 1983 suits, exhaustion is now required for all “action[s]... brought with respect to prison conditions,” whether under §1983 or “any other Federal law.” Compare 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1994 ed.) with 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Thus federal prisoners suing under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures just as state prisoners must exhaust administrative processes prior to instituting a § 1983 suit.

Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation. Booth, 532 U. S., at 737. In other instances, the internal review might “filter out some frivolous claims.” Ibid. And for eases ultimately brought to court, adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the controversy. See ibid.; see also Madigan, 503 U. S., at 146.

Congress described the cases covered by § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement as “actionfs] . . . brought with respect to prison conditions.” Nussle’s case requires us to determine what the §1997e(a) term “prison conditions” means, given Congress’ failure to define the term in the text of the exhaustion provision. We are guided in this endeavor by the PLRA’s text and context, and by our prior decisions relating to “[s]uits by prisoners,” § 1997e.

As to precedent, the pathmarking opinion is McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136 (1991), which construed 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988 ed.), a Judicial Code provision authorizing district judges to refer to magistrate judges, inter alia, “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.” The petitioning prisoner in McCarthy argued that § 636(b)(1)(B) allowed nonconsensual referrals “only when a prisoner challenges ongoing prison conditions.” 500 U. S., at 138. The complaint in McCarthy targeted no “ongoing prison conditions”; it homed in on “an isolated incident” of excessive force. Ibid. For that reason, according to the McCarthy petitioner, nonconsensual referral of his case was impermissible. Id., at 138-139.

We did not “quarrel with” the prisoner’s assertion in McCarthy that “the most natural reading of the phrase ‘challenging conditions of confinement,’ when viewed in isolation, would not include suits seeking relief from isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct.” Id., at 139. We nonetheless concluded that the petitioner’s argument failed upon reading the phrase “in its proper context.” Ibid. We found no suggestion in § 636(b)(1)(B) that Congress meant to divide prisoner petitions “into subcategories.” Ibid. “On the contrary,” we observed, “when the relevant section is read in its entirety, it suggests that Congress intended to authorize the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner petitions to a magistrate.” Ibid. The Federal Magistrates Act, we noted, covers actions of two kinds: challenges to “conditions of confinement”; and “applications for habeas corpus relief.” Id., at 140. Congress, we concluded, “intended to include in their entirety th[ose] two primary categories of suits brought by prisoners.” Ibid.

“Just three years before [§ 636(b)(1)(B)] was drafted,” we explained.in McCarthy, “our opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), had described [the] two broad categories of prisoner petitions: (1) those challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself; and (2) those challenging the conditions of confinement.” Ibid. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), left no doubt, we further stated in McCarthy, that “the latter category unambiguously embraced the kind of single episode cases that petitioner’s construction would exclude.” 500 U. S., at 141. We found it telling that Congress, in composing the Magistrates Act, chose language “that so clearly paralleled] our Preiser opinion.” Id., at 142. We considered it significant as well that the purpose of the Magistrates Act — to lighten the caseload of overworked district judges — would be thwarted by opening the door to satellite litigation over “the precise contours of [the] suggested exception for single episode cases.” Id., at 143.

As in McCarthy, we here read the term “prison conditions” not in isolation, but “in its proper context.” Id., at 139. The PLRA exhaustion provision is captioned “Suits by prisoners,” see § 1997e; this unqualified heading scarcely aids the argument that Congress meant to bisect the universe of prisoner suits. See ibid.; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This Court generally “presume[s] that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with th[e] Court’s precedents.” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997). That presumption, and the PLRA’s dominant concern to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court, see Booth, 532 U. S., at 737, persuade us that § 1997e(a)’s key words “prison conditions” are properly read through the lens of McCarthy and Preiser. Those decisions tug strongly away from classifying suits about prison guards’ use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything other than actions “with respect to prison conditions.”

Nussle places principal reliance on Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 835-836 (1994), and the Second Circuit found support for its position in those cases as well, 224 F. 3d, at 106. Hudson held that to sustain a claim of excessive force, a prisoner need not show significant injury. 503 U. S., at 9. In so ruling, the Court did indeed distinguish excessive force claims from “conditions of confinement” claims; to sustain a claim of the latter kind “significant injury” must be shown. Id., at 8-9. Hudson also observed that a “conditions of confinement” claim may succeed if a prisoner demonstrates that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference,” id., at 8 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991)), while a prisoner alleging excessive force must demonstrate that the defendant acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” Hudson, 503 U. S., at 7. Farmer similarly distinguished the mental state that must be shown to prevail on an excessive force claim, i. e., “purposeful or knowing conduct,” from the lesser mens rea requirement governing “conditions of confinement” claims, i. e., “deliberate indifference.” 511 U. S., at 835-836. We do not question those decisions and attendant distinctions in the context in which they were made. But the question presented here is of a different order.

Hudson and Farmer trained solely and precisely on proof requirements: what injury must a plaintiff allege and show; what mental state must a plaintiff plead and prove. Proof requirements once a case is in court, however, do not touch or concern the threshold inquiry before us: whether resort to a prison grievance process must precede resort to a court. We have no reason to believe that Congress meant to release the evidentiary distinctions drawn in Hudson and Farmer from their moorings and extend their application to the otherwise invigorated exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a). Such an extension would be highly anomalous given Congress’ elimination of judicial discretion to dispense with exhaustion and its deletion of the former constraint that administrative remedies must be “plain, speedy, and effective” before exhaustion could be required. See supra, at 524; Booth, 532 U. S., at 739; cf. id., at 740-741 (“Congress’s imposition of an obviously broader exhaustion requirement makes it highly implausible that it meant to give prisoners a strong inducement to skip the administrative process simply by limiting prayers for relief to money damages not offered through administrative grievance mechanisms.”).

Nussle contends that Congress added the words “prison conditions” to the text of §1997e(a) specifically to exempt excessive force claims from the now mandatory exhaustion requirement; he sees that requirement as applicable mainly to “ ‘prison conditions’ claims that may be frivolous as to subject matter,” 224 F. 3d, at 106, See Brief for Respondent 2, 26-27. It is at least equally plausible, however, that Congress inserted “prison conditions” into the exhaustion provision simply to make it clear that preincarceration claims fall outside § 1997e(a), for example, a Title VII claim against the prisoner’s preincarceration employer, or, for that matter, a § 1983 claim against his arresting officer.

Furthermore, the asserted distinction between excessive force claims that need not be exhausted, on the one hand, and exhaustion-mandatory “frivolous” claims on the other, see id., at 2,26-27, is untenable, for “[e]xcessive force claims can be frivolous,” Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 452 (“Inmates can allege they were subject to vicious nudges.”), and exhaustion serves purposes beyond weeding out frivolous allegations, see supra, at 524-525.

Other infirmities inhere in the Second Circuit’s disposition. See McCarthy, 500 U. S., at 143 (“Petitioner’s definition would generate additional work for the district courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions and those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often be difficult to identify.”). As McCarthy emphasized, in the prison environment a specific incident may be symptomatic rather than aberrational. Id., at 143-144. An unwarranted assault by a corrections officer may be reflective of a systemic problem traceable to poor hiring practices, inadequate training, or insufficient supervision. See Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 449. Nussle himself alleged in this very case not only the beating he suffered on June 15, 1996; he also alleged, extending before and after that date, “a prolonged and sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation by corrections officers.” App. 39. Nussle urges that his case could be placed in the isolated episode category, but he might equally urge that his complaint describes a pattern or practice of harassment climaxing in the alleged beating. It seems unlikely that Congress, when it included in the PLRA a firm exhaustion requirement, meant to leave the need to exhaust to the pleader’s option. Cf. Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489-490 (“It would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent to hold that [prisoners] could evade this [exhaustion] requirement by the simple expedient of putting a different label on their pleadings.”).

Under Nussle’s view and that of the Second Circuit, moreover, bifurcation would be normal when a prisoner sues both a corrections officer alleged to have used excessive force and the supervisor who allegedly failed adequately to monitor those in his charge. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. The officer alone could be taken directly to court; the charge against the supervisor would proceed first through the internal grievance process. Similarly split proceedings apparently would be in order, under the Second Circuit’s decision, when the prisoner elects to pursue against the same officers both discrete instance and ongoing conduct charges.

Finally, we emphasize a concern over and above the complexity augured by the Second Circuit’s disposition: Scant sense supports the single occurrence, prevailing circumstance dichotomy. Why should a prisoner have immediate access to court when a guard assaults him on one occasion, but not when beatings are widespread or routine? See Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 450. Nussle’s distinction between excessive force claims and all other prisoner suits, see supra, at 520, presents a similar anomaly. Do prison authorities have an interest in receiving prompt notice of, and opportunity to take action against, guard brutality that is somehow less compelling than their interest in receiving notice and an opportunity to stop other types of staff wrongdoing? See Preiser, 411 U. S., at 492 (“Since [the] internal problems of state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state authority and expertise, the States have an important interest in not being bypassed in the correction of those problems.”).

* * *

For the reasons stated, we hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Cf. Wilson, 501 U. S., at 299, n. 1. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       The Second Circuit has held that §1988 actions in Connecticut are governed by that State’s three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Williams v. Walsh, 558 F. 2d 667, 670 (1977).

       Another provision of the PLRA, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(g)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V), the court observed, does define “prison conditions.” Nussle v. Willette, 224 F. 3d 95, 101 (CA2 2000). That provision, which concerns prospective relief, defines “prison conditions” to mean “the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.” The Second Circuit found the § 3626(g)(2) definition “no less ambiguous” than the bare text of § 1997e(a). Neither of the alternative § 3626(g)(2) formulations, the court said, would be used in “everyday” speech to describe “particular instances of assault or excessive force.” Id., at 102. But see Booth v. Churner, 206 F. 3d 289, 294-295 (CA3 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U. S. 731 (2001) (reading § 3626(g)(2) to cover all prison conditions and corrections officer actions that “make [prisoners’] lives worse”). The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that it would be improper, in any event, automatically to import §3626(g)(2)’s “definition of ‘civil actions brought with respect to prison conditions’ into 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a)” because the two provisions had “distinct statutory purposes.” 224 F. 3d, at 105.

       The parties dispute the meaning of a simultaneously enacted provision, § 3626(g)(2), which concerns prospective relief, and for that purpose, defines the expression “civil action with respect to prison conditions.” See supra, at 522, n. 2 (noting, inter alia, divergent constructions of Second and Third Circuits). We rest our decision on the meaning of “prison conditions” in the context of § 1997e, and express no definitive opinion on the proper reading of § 3626(g)(2).

       In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit referred to its “obligation to construe statutory exceptions narrowly, in order to give full effect to the general rule of non-exhaustion in §1983.” 224 F. 3d, at 106 (citing City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U. S. 725, 731-732 (1995), and Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 508 (1982)). The Second Circuit did not then have available to it our subsequently rendered decision in Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731 (2001). Booth held that § 1997e(a) mandates initial recourse to the prison grievance process even when a prisoner seeks only money damages, a remedy not available in that process. See id., at 741. In so ruling, we observed that “Congress . . . may well have thought we were shortsighted” in failing adequately to recognize the utility of the administrative process to satisfy, reduce, or clarify prisoner grievances. Id., at 737. While the canon on which the Second Circuit relied may be dependable in other contexts, the PLRA establishes a different regime. For litigation within § 1997e(a)’s compass, Congress has replaced the “general rule of non-exhaustion” with a general rule of exhaustion.

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
      “(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
      “a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court,... of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.”

       Other provisions of § 1997e that refer to “prison conditions” would have less scope under the Second Circuit’s construction of the term. Section 1997e(c)(l) provides for dismissal on the court’s own initiative of “any action brought with respect to prison conditions” that is “frivolous [or] malicious.” No specific incident complaint would be subject to that prescription under the view that such suits do not implicate “prison conditions.” Further, § 1997e(f)(l) provides that pretrial proceedings in “any action brought with respect to prison conditions” may be held at the prison via telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications technology so that the prisoner need not be physically transferred to participate. Surely such arrangements would be appropriate in Nussle’s case and others of its genre. But on what authority would these practical procedures rest if cases like Nussle’s do not qualify as actions regarding “prison conditions”?


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice O’Connor Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    RAYGOR et al. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA et al.
    No. 00-1514.
    Argued November 26, 2001
    Decided February 27, 2002

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 548. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 549.

      Howard L. Bolter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.

      Mark B. Rotenberg argued the cause for respondent. With’ him on the brief were Lorie S. Gildea and Tracy M. Smith.

      Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for intervenor United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Mc-Collum, Barbara McDowell, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Andrew Baida, Solicitor General, Robert H. Kono, Acting Attorney General of Guam, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Randolph Beales of Virginia; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past the period of limitations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute purports to toll the period of limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. § 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that provision unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-senting state defendants, such as respondent university, and dismissed petitioners’ claims. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the tolling provision does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States.

I

In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that their employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52. After petitioners refused to retire, the university allegedly reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; Brief for Petitioners 3.

The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued a right-to-sue letter on June 6,1996, advising that petitioners could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Brief for United States 5. The MDHR likewise issued right-to-sue letters on July 17,1996, advising petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620 N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46 to A-47.

On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. Each complaint alleged a federal cause of action under the ADEA and a state cause of action under the MHRA. The suits were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130 (Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these complaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including that the suits were “ ‘barred in whole or in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’” Brief for Petitioners 4. The District Court entered a scheduling plan that the parties agreed upon. According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30,1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15,1997. Ibid. The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation. Ibid.

In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion argued that the federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent Regents of the University of Minnesota 5. Petitioners’ response acknowledged respondent’s “ ‘potential Eleventh Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in Federal Court,’” but urged the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5-6. On July 11, 1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39. Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Kimel held that the “ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.” 528 U. S., at 92. Given that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief for Petitioners 6-7.

In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent’s answer asserted that “ ‘plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.’” Brief for Petitioners 7. The state court initially stayed the lawsuit because of the pending federal appeal, but lifted the stay in December 1998 for the purpose of allowing respondent to move for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. §§363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000). Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while they were pending in federal court because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ ADE A claims. Petitioners argued that the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute applied because their state law claims had been dismissed without prejudice. App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3, B-4. The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it, holding that § 1367(d) did “not apply ... because the federal district court never had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the controversy” since “both the state and federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at B-5, B-6.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court first decided that the Federal District Court had original jurisdiction over the case before respondent’s Eleventh Amendment defense was “successfully asserted.” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381 (1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d) applied to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims because that provision “allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under [§1367](c).” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132-133.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that respondent was an arm of the State, and found that the federal tolling provision facially applied to petitioners’ state law claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court concluded, however, “that application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting state defendant first filed in federal court but then dismissed and brought in state court is an impermissible denigration of [respondent’s] Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 687. The court thus concluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims, and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.

H-I l — l

In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), this Court held that federal courts deciding claims within their federal-question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, may decide state law claims not within their subject matter jurisdiction if the federal and state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and comprise “but one constitutional 'case.’ ” Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Jurisdiction over state law claims in such instances was known as “pendent jurisdiction.” This Court later made clear that, absent authorization from Congress, a district court could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims involving parties who were not already parties to a claim independently within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989).

In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that “Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties.” Report of Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that

“[ejxcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”

Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations, such as when a “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.).

Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under § 1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3. Prior to the enactment of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984). In that context, the Eleventh Amendment was found to be an “explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction.” Id., at 118. Consequently, an express grant of jurisdiction over such claims would be an abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it must make its intention to abrogate “‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)).

The most that can be said about subsection (a), however, is that it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more specific to claims against nonconsenting States than the one at issue in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775 (1991). There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C. § 1362 contained a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That grant of jurisdiction provides that

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)

Such a. facially broad grant of jurisdiction over “all civil actions” could be read to include claims by Indian tribes against nonconsenting States, but we held that such language was insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford, supra, at 786. Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims. Thus, consistent with Blatch- ford, we hold that § 1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.

Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting States that are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Subsection (d) of § 1367 provides that

“[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of “any claim asserted under subsection (a).” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim technically “asserted” under subsection (a) as long as it was later dismissed, regardless of the reason for dismissal. But reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity. If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court. This would require a State to defend against a claim in state court that had never been filed in state court until some indeterminate time after the original limitations period had elapsed.

When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have recognized that a limitations period may be “a central condition” of the sovereign’s waiver of immunity. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 843 (1986); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity”)- In suits against the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United States’ immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). From this, the dissent argues that any broadening of a State’s waiver of immunity through tolling under § 1367(d) presumptively does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity. Post, at 552-553, and n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this Court has never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be “a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, supra, at 95.

Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued,” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that “[o]nly the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the absolute character of [its] immunity” from suit in its own courts, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). Thus, although we have not directly addressed whether federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against state defendants, we can say that the notion at least raises a serious constitutional doubt.

Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear statement principle of statutory construction. When “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This principle applies when Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States” or when it legislates in “ ‘traditionally sensitive areas’ ” that “ ‘affec[t] the federal balance.’ ” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle reflects “an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461, 464 (1991).

Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying the clear statement principle helps “ ‘assur[e] that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra, at 349). This is obviously important when the underlying issue raises a serious constitutional doubt or problem. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729-3733 (1994 ed.), did not authorize “an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State” and avoiding whether such a suit would violate the Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious constitutional doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear statement principle to determine that state judges were excluded from the ADEA in order to “avoid a potential constitutional problem” given the constraints on the Court’s “ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”).

The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting States that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Here the lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to the claims the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) to cover any claim “asserted” under subsection (a), but we have previously found similarly general language insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements. For example, we have held that a statute providing civil remedies for violations committed by “ ‘any recipient of Federal assistance’” was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” even when it was undisputed that a state defendant was a recipient of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 245-246 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis in original)). Instead, we held that “[w]hen Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.” 473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States, especially considering that such claims do not fall within the proper scope of § 1367(a) as explained above.

With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling regardless of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “inconsistent” with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”). In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. See Gregory, supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissals of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their claims because Congress enacted it to prevent due process violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-splitting laws. Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-12. In other words, petitioners contend that Congress enacted the tolling provision to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against perceived state violations. We have previously addressed the argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to Congress’ §5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism concerns “might carry less weight.” Gregory, 501 U. S., at 468. We concluded, however, that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism,” id., at 469, and held that insofar as statutory intent was ambiguous, we would “not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 470. That same rule applies here. As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against non-consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to § 5.

Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute does not resolve their case because respondent consented to suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. We have stated that “[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived” and have “held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883)). Petitioners claim that respondent consented to suit by not moving to dismiss petitioners’ state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal lawsuits were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity by including that defense in its answers that were filed in September 1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent “unequivocally expressed” a consent to be sued in federal court. Pennhurst, supra, at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974)). The fact that respondent filed its motion in July 1997 is as consistent with adherence to the pretrial schedule as it is with anything else.

Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable from the limited situations where this Court has found a State consented to suit, such as when a State voluntarily invoked federal court jurisdiction or otherwise “ma[de] a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 676 (1999). And even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that consent could be inferred “from the failure to raise the objection at the outset of the proceedings,” Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) — a standard this Court has not adopted — consent would still not be found here since respondent raised the issue in its answer. Thus, we find no merit to petitioners’ argument that respondent was a consenting state defendant during the federal court proceedings. We express no view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d) when a State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a State.

l — l t — 1 I — (

We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners’ claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissing those claims.

It is so ordered.

Justice Ginsburg,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court’s judgment and its opinion in principal part. I agree with the decision’s twin rulings. First, prevailing precedent supports the view that, in the absence of a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a)’s extension of federal jurisdiction does not reach claims against nonconsenting state defendants. See ante, at 540-542. Second, absent “affirmative indicatiofn]” by Congress, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000), § 1367(d)’s tolling provision does not reach claims “asserted,” but not maintainable, under § 1367(a) against nonconsenting state defendants. See ante, at 542-545.

The pathmarking decision, it appears to me, is Vermont Agency. There, the Court declined to read the word “person,” for purposes of qui tarn liability, to include a non-consenting State. Bolstering the Court’s conclusion in Vermont Agency were the two reinforcements pivotal here: first, ‘“the ordinary rule of statutory construction’ that ‘if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,”’ 529 U. S., at 787 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989)); and second, “the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions,” 529 U. S., at 787. I would not venture further into the mist surrounding § 1367 to inquire, generally, whether § 1367(d) “applies] to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute,” ante, at 545.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The federal interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice is both legitimate and important. To vindicate that interest federal rulemakers and judges have occasionally imposed burdens on the States and their judiciaries. Thus, for example, Congress may provide for the adjudication of federal claims in state courts, Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), and may direct that state litigation be stayed during 'the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, 11 U. S. C. § 362(a). In appropriate cases federal judges may enjoin the prosecution of state judicial proceedings. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of. the Constitution, in all such cases the federal rules prevail “and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

The “supplemental jurisdiction” provisions of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), impose a lesser burden on the States than each of these examples, and do so only in a relatively narrow category of cases— those in which both federal- and state-law claims are so related “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Adopting a recommendation of the Federal Courts Committee, Congress in § 1367(a) overruled our misguided decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989), and expressly authorized federal courts to entertain such cases even when the state-law claim is against a party over whom there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Subsection (d) of § 1367 responds to the risk that the plaintiff’s state-law claim, even though timely when filed as a part of the federal lawsuit, may be dismissed after the state period of limitations has expired. To avoid the necessity of duplicate filings, it provides that the state statute shall be tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days thereafter. The impact of this provision on the defendant is minimal, because the timely filing in federal court provides it with the same notice as if a duplicate complaint had also been filed in state court.

The tolling of statutes of limitations is, of course, an ancient and widespread practice. Some federal tolling statutes apply only to federal limitations periods, but others apply to state statutes as well. All of these statutes are broadly worded, and none of them excludes any special category of defendants. The plain text of all these statutes, in-eluding § 1367, applies to cases in which a State, or an arm of a State, is named as a defendant. Thus, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals correctly held, “the plain language of subsection (d) allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under subsection (c).”

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, because it considered this Court's holding in Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706 (1999), to compel the view that § 1367(d) was an invalid attempt by Congress to make the State of Minnesota subject to suit in state court without its consent. Unlike the State in Alden, however, Minnesota has given its consent to be sued in its own courts for alleged violations of the MHRA within 45 days of receipt of a notice letter from the State Department of Human Rights. The question whether that timeliness condition may be tolled during the pendency of an action filed in federal court within the 45-day period is quite different from the question whether Congress can entirely abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity defense. For the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence concerns the question whether an unconsenting sovereign may be sued, rather than when a consenting sovereign may be sued.

The Court recognized this crucial distinction in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case in which the application of equitable tolling to a waiver of federal sovereign immunity was at issue. Although the Court required the Government’s assent as to whether it may be sued to be “unequivocally expressed,” it presumed the rule of equitable tolling applied once assent was established because tolling would “amoun[t] to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.” Id., at 95. The Court reached this holding despite the inclusion in the waiver provision of a limitations period shorter than the one for suits against private parties.

The waiver at issue in this case is more unequivocally expressed than the one in Irwin. Minnesota has consented to suit under the MHRA by agreeing to be treated in the same manner as a private employer. The 45-day limitations period is thus applicable to any suit under the MHRA, not only those against state entities. In light of such a clear consent to suit, unencumbered by any special limitations period, it is evident that tolling under § 1367(d) similarly “amounts to little, if any, broadening of the [legislature’s] waiver.” Ibid. Given the fact that the timely filing in Federal Court served the purposes of the 45-day period, it seems to me quite clear that the application of the tolling rule does not raise a serious constitutional issue.

It is true, of course, that the federal tolling provision, like any other federal statute that pre-empts state law, “affects the federal balance” even though it does not “constitute] an abrogation of state sovereign immunity.” Ante, at 544. But that consequence is surely not sufficient to exclude state parties from the coverage of statutes of general applicability like the Bankruptcy Code, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, or any other federal statute whose general language creates a conflict with a pre-existing rule of state law. In my judgment, the specific holding in Alden v. Maine represented a serious distortion of the federal balance intended by the Framers of our Constitution. If that case is now to provide the basis for a rule of construction that will exempt state parties from the coverage of federal statutes of general applicability, whether or not abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is at stake, it will foster unintended and unjust consequences and impose serious burdens on an already-overworked Congress. Indeed, that risk provides an additional reason for reexamining that misguided decision at the earliest opportunity.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       This Court’s majority, in contrast to the Minnesota Supreme Court, does not invoke Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706 (1999), in support of today’s decision. I joined the dissent in Alden and, in a suitable case, would join a call to reexamine that decision. Cf. post, at 554-555 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

       The supplemental jurisdiction statute, well-reasoned commentary indicates, “is clearly flawed and needs repair.” Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U. C. D. L. Rev. 855, 936 (1998); see generally id., at 936-945 (canvassing problems with 28 U. S. C. § 1367). For a proposed repair of § 1367, see ALI, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 14,1998).

       The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (1994 ed.), provides:
      “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a) provides:
      “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the join-der or intervention of additional parties.”

       Section 1367(d) provides:
      “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a)... shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

       When an equity bill was dismissed to permit the commencement of an action at law, it was the practice of the English courts to consider the statute of limitations tolled during the pendency of the suit in equity. See, e. g., Anonimous, 1 Vern. 73, 73-74, 23 Eng. Rep. 320, 320-321 (Ch. 1682) (“[I]f a man sued in Chancery, and pending the suit here, the statute of limitations attached on his demand, and his bill was afterwards dismissed, as being a matter properly determinable at common law: in such case . . . [the court] would not suffer the statute to be pleaded in bar to his demand”); see also Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 610, 615, 26 Eng. Rep. 765, 767 (Ch. 1743); MacKenzie v. Marquis of Powis, 7 Brown 282, 288, 3 Eng. Rep. 183, 187 (H. L. 1737).

       Equitable tolling is a background rule that informs our construction of federal statutes of limitations, Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946), including those statutes conditioning the Federal Government’s waiver of immunity to suit, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (“[T]he same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States”). The rule also is generally applied by state courts, such as the Minnesota courts adjudicating claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See, e. g., Ochs v. Streater, Inc., 568 N. W. 2d 858, 860 (Minn. App. 1997).

       See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iv) (tolling an alien’s period of unlawful presence in the United States during certain immigration proceedings); 28 U. S. C. § 2263(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (tolling the statute of limitations on filing for habeas corpus relief); 29 U. S. C. § 1854(f) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (tolling the statute of limitations on actions for bodily injury or death to a migrant farmworker).

       See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 108 (tolling during bankruptcy); 50 U. S. C. App. §525 (1994 ed.) (Soldiers' and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940) (tolling during military service); 15 U. S. C. § 6606(e)(4) (Y2K Act) (tolling during notice and remediation period for Year 2000 related claims); cf. 42 U. S. C. §9658 (1994 ed.) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) (setting uniform limitations-period commencement date in suits under state law for damages due to hazardous release exposure).

       604 N. W. 2d 128, 132-133 (2000).

       See 620 N. W. 2d 680, 686 (2001) (“[W]e read Alden to require that the University’s waiver of immunity be limited to the [45-day limitations period]”).

       See Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subds. 17 and 28 (2000) (defining “employer” to include private entities and “the state and its departments, agencies, and political subdivisions”).

       It is true enough that we “ha[ve] never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules,” ante, at 543. Of course, we have never held to the contrary, either. But surely our federal sovereign immunity cases shed great light on the question, given our similarly strict analyses of waivers in federal and state sovereign immunity cases. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 682 (1999) (“[I]n the context oí federal sovereign immunity — obviously the closest analogy to the present case— it is well established that waivers are not implied. . . . We see no reason why the rule should be different with respect to state sovereign immunity” (citation omitted)).
      As the Court observes, ante, at 542-543, our federal sovereign immunity cases recognize that a limitations period may serve as a central condition of waiver. The teaching of Irwin, however, is that even when a limitations period is a “condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed,” 498 U. S., at 94, application of tolling to that period is presumptively permissible. I can “see no reason why the rule should be different with respect to state sovereign immunity.” College Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 682.

       The university received notice of the claim and was able to take part fully in the prosecution of the litigation by engaging in extensive discovery and participating in mediation.

       Indeed, as an alternative basis for its decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate. See 604 N. W. 2d, at 133-134. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion that equitable tolling was permissible, but rather found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal of such tolling. See 620 N. W. 2d, at 687.

       See, e. g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000) (finding pre-emption of common-law tort action by National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833 (1997) (finding pre-emption of state community property laws by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).

       It may also impose serious burdens on already-overworked state courts. Claims brought under state antidiscrimination statutes such as the MHRA, for example, will often be bound up with claims -under similar federal statutes, such as 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over these federal statutes. Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 139 (1988) (§ 1983); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U. S. 820 (1990) (Title VII); 29 U.S. C. §626(c)(1) (ADEA). As a result of the Court’s reading of § 1367(d), many litigants with such mixed claims against state entities may decide to file their entire suits in state court. By doing so, they avoid the cost and confusion of duplicate filings. They also eliminate the risk that a time bar will attach to a claim dismissed from federal court on Eleventh Amendment grounds, which might occur even when, as in this case, Eleventh Amendment immunity was not evident at the time the suit was filed. Thus, in attempting to preserve the “balance between the States and the Federal Government,” ante, at 543, the Court risks upending that balance by removing from the state courts the assistance of the federal courts in adjudicating many claims.


text:
    October 1, 2001
    No. 00-1649.
    County of Humboldt et al. v. Headwaters Forest Defense et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001).


text:
    No. 00-1875.
    Time Warner Entertainment Co. et al. v. Six Flags Over Georgia et al.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424 (2001).


text:
    No. 00-9044.
    Jackson v. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the Acting Commissioner of Social Security filed June 20, 2001.


text:
    No. 00-9762.
    Peterson v. Gulf Correctional Institute.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-9763.
    Peterson v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau- peris denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-9901.
    Fordjour v. Cohen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10565.
    Hamilton v. Garcia, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10716.
    McReynolds v. Broderick et al.
   App. Biv., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10747.
    Church v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10885.
    Harvey v. Hahn, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10891.
    Fordjour v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5073.
    Camarena v. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5136.
    Peterson v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5163.
    Thomas v. King, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5164.
    Thomas v. Wetherington, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5244.
    Fordjour v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 01-5404.
    Hemmerle v. Lauderdale Reporting Service.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-9894.
    Vargas v. Georgia.
   Super. Ct. Gwinnett County, Ga. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 00-9927.
    Higgason v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (two judgments).
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 00-10308.
    Head v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule. 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 00-10627.
    Southerland v. Sanna et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 00-10755.
    Kukes v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. D-2238.
    In re Disbarment of Zdravkovich.
    [For earlier order herein, see 531 U. S. 1138.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. D-2257.
    In re Discipline of Hanna.
   Hanna Zaki Hanna, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2258.
    In re Discipline of Aron.
   Ruthann Aron, of Potomac, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2259.
    In re Discipline of Wisehart.
   Arthur McKee Wisehart, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2260.
    In re Discipline of Mercer.
   S. Hal Mercer IV, of Brooklyn, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2261.
    In re Discipline of McPhee.
   William Craig McPhee, of Holbrook, Mass., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2262.
    In re Discipline of Estrine.
   Andrew B. Es-triñe, of Boca Raton, Fla., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2263.
    In re Discipline of Lallo.
   John Francis Lallo, of Westerly, R. I., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2264.
    In re Discipline of Goldstein.
   Jerrold D. Goldstein, of North Plainfield, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2265.
    In re Discipline of Don.
   Berek Paul Don, of Englewood Cliffs, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2266.
    In re Discipline of Gutierrez.
   Maria Cristina Gutierrez, of Towson, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2267.
    In re Discipline of Clarke.
   Patrick Emmett Clarke, of San Antonio, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2268.
    In re Discipline of Kaszynski.
   William Paul Kaszynski, of St. Paul, Minn., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2269.
    In re Discipline of Haller.
   William Bernard Haller, of St. Louis, Mo., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2270.
    In re Discipline of Clinton.
   Bill Clinton, of New York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2271.
    In re Discipline of Noble.
   Ford Lee Noble, of Cleveland, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2272.
    In re Discipline of Pees.
   Randall W. Pees, of Columbus, Ohio, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2273.
    In re Discipline of Grand.
   Thomas L. Grand, Jr., of New Orleans, La., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-2274.
    In re Discipline of Legg.
   Wayne E. Legg, of Scottsdale, Ariz., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 01M1.
    Mahaffey v. Illinois.
   Motion for leave to proceed informa -pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 01M2.
    No. 01M3.
    No. 01M4.
    No. 01M5.
    No. 01M7.
    No. 01M8.
    No. 01M9.
    No. 01M10.
    No. 01M11.
    No. 01M13.
    No. 01M14.
    Magwinoff v. Vizcaya; Coley v. North Carolina Industrial Commission et al.; Fletcher v. Pennsylvania State University et al.; Poole v. General Accounting Office; Lazor v. California; Phillips v. Johnson, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution; Calhoun v. Spelling Television, Inc., et al.; Johnson v. Adams, Warden; Quintero v. United States; Reese v. Bayview Electric Co. et al.; and Kashelkar v. MacCartney et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 01M6.
    Darne v. Juntunen et al.
   Motion to dispense with printing the petition for writ of certiorari in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33.1 denied.


text:
    No. 01M12.
    Doe v. University of Cincinnati College of Medicine et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari under a pseudonym denied.


text:
    No. 01M15.
    Anderson v. Calderon, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record granted.


text:
    No. 129,
    Orig.
    Virginia v. Maryland.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 532 U. S. 969.]
   Motion of the Special Master for fees and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the Special Master is awarded a total of $181,228.28 for the period October 10, 2000, through July 31, 2001, to be paid equally by the parties.


text:
    No. 00-1072.
    Edelman v. Lynchburg College.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 533 U. S. 928.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-1089.
    Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 970.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-1187.
    McKune, Warden, et al. v. Lile.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 1018.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-1214.
    Alabama v. Shelton.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 1018.] Motion of Texas et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-1249.
    Thomas et al. v. Chicago Park District.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U. S. 1051.] Motion of International City-County Management Association et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-1307.
    Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Halter v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 532 U. S. 993.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument and to allow United, Mine Workers of America Combined Fund leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 00-1531.
    No. 00-1711.
    Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland et al.; and United States v. Public Service Commission of Maryland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 533 U. S. 928.] Motion of Verizon Maryland Inc. to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.

Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 00-1842.
    No. 00-1860.
    No. 00-1926.
    Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v. o. f. et al. Memorial Hospitals Assn. v. Humphrey. American Insurance Assn. et al. v. Low, Commissioner of Insurance of California.
   C. A. 5th Cir.;

C. A. 9th Cir.; and

C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 00-8452.
    Atkins v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. [Certiorari granted, 533 U. S. 976.] Order entered September 25, 2001, is amended as follows: Motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Certiorari granted limited to the following question: “Whether the execution of mentally retarded individuals convicted of capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment?”


text:
    No. 00-9054.
    Corey v. Mendel et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [532 U. S. 1036] denied.


text:
    No. 00-9491.
    Johnson v. Wyoming.
   Dist. Ct. Wyo., Laramie County. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [532 U. S. 1036] denied.


text:
    No. 00-10065.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [533 U. S. 926] denied.


text:
    No. 00-9280.
    Kelly v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. [Certiorari granted, 533 U. S. 928.] Motion of appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that David I. Bruck, Esq., of Columbia, S. C., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 00-9285.
    Mickens v. Taylor, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 532 U.S. 970.] Motion of Legal Ethicists et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 00-9939.
    No. 00-10003.
    Matthews v. Spalding, Director, Idaho Department of Corrections. Zhang v. Arizona State University et al. Christen v. Alabama. Thomas Shakir v. Schlein et al. Germano et ux. v. First National Bank of Bethany et al. Matima v. Ayerst Laboratories, Inc. Dryden v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Doe v. Noe et al. (two judgments). Olufemi v. DeKalb County Department of Family and Children Services. Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board (two judgments). Shea v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund. Ridley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir.;

C. A. 9th Cir.;

No. 00-10139.

No. 00-10391.

No. 00-10445.

No. 00-10458.

No. 00-10710.

No. 01-5359.

No. 01-5413.

No. 01-5533.

No. 01-5756.

No. 01-5999.

Ct. Civ. App. Ala.;

Ct. App. D. G;

C. A. 5th Cir.;

C. A. 2d Cir.;

C. A. 6th Cir.;

App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.;

C. A. 11th Cir.;

C. A. Fed. Cir.;

Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.; and

C. A. 11th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 22, 2001, wilhin which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 00-10769.
    Mann v. Thalacker, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent to strike petition for writ of certiorari and to seal petitioner’s appendix granted without prejudice to counsel for petitioner submitting a redacted petition for writ of certiorari, with the appendix under seal, on or before October 22, 2001.


text:
    No. 01-163.
    In re Rettig.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 01-5349.
    In re Young.
   D. C. W. D. Ky. Petition for writ of common-law certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-10558.
    No. 00-10730.
    No. 00-10829.
    No. 00-10849.
    No. 00-10860.
    No. 00-10863.
    No. 00-10869.
    In re Broades; In re Cole; In re McSheffrey; In re Asberry; In re Castellanos; In re Hetherington; In re Cothrum; In re Bauder; In re Garcia; In re Feldman; In re Alonso Londono; In re Cana-Ruiz; In re Porter; In re Neufville; In re Hedges et al.; In re Martin; In re Montgomery; In re Woods; In re Giura; In re Gonzalez; In re Draper; In re Taylor; In re Goodwin; In re Yapp; In re Murray; In re Brown; In re Adio-Mowo; In re Wiggins; In re Monreal; In re DeVaughn; In re Walden; and In re Graves.
    No. 00-10884.
    No. 01-56.
    No. 01-88.
    No. 01-5005.
    No. 01-5021.
    No. 01-5029.
    No. 01-5055.
    No. 01-5083.
    No. 01-5090.
    No. 01-5137.
    No. 01-5149.
    No. 01-5155.
    No. 01-5315.
    No. 01-5360.
    No. 01-5428.
    No. 01-5523.
    No. 01-5550.
    No. 01-5554.
    No. 01-5558.
    No. 01-5653.
    No. 01-5700.
    No. 01-5741.
    No. 01-5755.
    No. 01-5928.
    No. 01-6033.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 00-10748.
    In re Church.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10761.
    In re Church.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court’s rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 00-10105.
    No. 00-10292.
    No. 00-10336.
    No. 00-10390.
    No. 00-10485.
    No. 00-10487.
    No. 00-10513.
    No. 00-10532.
    In re Robinson; In re Berry; In re Vann; In re Robinson; In re Abdelmessih; In re Rodriguez-Padron; In re Dunnington; In re Young; In re Dore; In re Ainsworth; In re Gunnell; In re Gaines; In re Schreiber; In re Correa; In re Jackson; In re Purchess; In re Bowen; In re Young; and In re Tootle.
    No. 00-10591.
    No. 00-10592.
    No. 00-10650.
    No. 00-10652.
    No. 00-10701.
    No. 00-10722.
    No. 00-10851.
    No. 01-5012.
    No. 01-5348.
    No. 01-5429.
    No. 01-5544.
   Petitions for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 00-1788.
    In re Polyak.
   Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of mandamus denied. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 01-129.
    In re Fernandes.
   Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of mandamus denied. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 01-148.
    In re Polyak.
   Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of mandamus denied. Petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 00-1878.
    No. 00-9895.
    No. 00-10178.
    No. 00-10479.
    No. 00-10694.
    No. 00-10795.
    No. 01-5148.
    In re Rose; In re Newsome; In re Abbey; In re Chambers; In re Mehdipour; In re Cummings; and In re Woods.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 00-10810.
    In re Braun.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents. See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 01-173.
    In re Davis.
   Petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 00-1781.
    Oakland Housing Authority et al. v. Rucker et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, case consolidated with No. 00-1770, Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker et al. [certiorari granted, 533 U. S. 976], and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition and this order.


text:
    No. 00-1393.
    Co-Steel Raritan v. New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1506.
    Cash America International, Inc., et al. v. Sparks.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1526.
    No. 00-9419.
    Garcia Cisneros v. United States; and Marek v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 238 F. 3d 310.


text:
    No. 00-1534.
    Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1545.
    Bielfeldt et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1556.
    Fejes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1558.
    Seldowitz v. Office of Inspector General, Department of State.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1561.
    Godon v. North Carolina Crime Control and Public Safety et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1571.
    Walker v. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1588.
    Oman v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1597.
    Ecoban Finance Ltd. v. Grupo Acerero del Norte, S. A. de C. V., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1598.
    Covey v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1605.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1656.
    Shaltry, Bankruptcy Trustee, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1666.
    Ginther v. Ginther Trusts et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1669.
    Fleetwood Homes of Florida et al. v. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1674.
    Dow AgroSciences LLC et al. v. Sleath et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1680.
    Pacific Bell Telephone Co. et al. v. Wayne et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1682.
    Trigalet et al., Personal Representatives of the Estate of Trigalet, et al. v. City of Tulsa.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1683.
    Church of Scientology International v. Time Warner, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1685.
    Oklahoma ex rel. Tal et al. v. City of Oklahoma City et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1687.
    Allnutt, aka Sovereign Equipment Co. et al. v. Friedman, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estates of Allnutt.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1688.
    Steppenwolf Productions, Inc., et al. v. Kassbaum, aka St. Nicholas.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1691.
    Picciotto et al. v. Zabin et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1692.
    Wetlands Action Network et al. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1695.
    Scott v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Grim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 00-1700.
    U-Haul International, Inc., et al. v. Romano.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.