text:
    No. 00-9545.
    No. 00-9551.
    No. 00-9554.
    No. 00-9686.
    No. 00-9726.
    No. 00-10271.
    No. 00-10422.
    No. 01-144.
    No. 01-400.
    No. 01-1277.
    No. 01-1299.
    No. 01-1367.
    No. 01-1379.
    No. 01-1391.
    No. 01-1430.
    No. 01-1448.
    No. 01-1526.
    No. 01-1539.
    No. 01-5074.
    No. 01-6035.
    No. 01-7219.
    No. 01-7844.
    No. 01-7926.
    No. 01-8315.
    No. 01-8404.
    No. 01-8431.
    No. 01-8445.
    No. 01-8596.
    Swoyer v. Kercher et al., Swoyer v. Merchants Bank, Swoyer v. Reed, Baez v. Hall et al., Swoyer v. Edgars et al., Jaramillo v. Pinkerton et al., Yon v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Fulton County, Georgia, et al. v. Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. of Georgia, et al., Bell, Warden v. Cone, Krilich v. United States, Watts v. City of Norman, Barnett v. Denver Publishing Co., dba Rocky Mountain News, Inc., Spanagel v. Supportive Care Services, Inc., Smith v. Friedman et al., Sienkiewicz v. Hart et al., Hagenbuch et al. v. Compaq Computer Corp. et al., Brown v. City of Wilmington et al., Sudarsky v. City of New York et al., Hicks v. Snyder, Warden, Tayborn v. Scott, Warden, Mitchell v. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, Moreno v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc., Hedrick v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Manley v. Indiana, ben Yisrayl, aka Cannon v. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Davis v. Davis, Osayande v. United States, Barreiro v. United States, Rowell v. Nevada, Abdullah v. United States, Teague v. Holiday Inn Express et al., Cook v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., Morris v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (two judgments), Banks v. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Metts v. North Carolina Department of Revenue, DuBose v. Kelly et al., Horner v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Menchaca v. Butler, Chief Deputy Warden, et al., Tshiwala v. Maryland, Williams v. United States, Manley v. Monroe County Sheriff’s Department et al., Doerr v. City of Redlands et al., Cole v. Carr et al., Taylor v. Reddish, Warden, Hegwood v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Nabelek v. Texas (two judgments), In re Williams, Vivone v. Kemna, Superintendent, Crossroads Correctional Center, Jones v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, In re Nabelek (three judgments), Chambers v. Turley et al., Trice v. Hall, Warden, McDowell v. Cornell Corrections et al., Moultrie v. United States, Burnett v. Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc., dba Lutheran Medical Center, Carroll v. Pfeffer, Deavault v. United States, Natera-Sosa v. United States, Abdur’Rahman v. Tennessee, McCoy v. Indiana, Nixon v. United States, Mejias Negron v. United States, Nicolaison v. Milczart et al., Marcello et ux. v. Maine Department of Human Services, Ashton v. United States, Armstrong v. City of Greensboro et al., Williams v. United States, Holub v. United States, Nagy v. United States, Blackburn v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., Dix v. United States, Lockett v. United States,
   534 U. S. 831;

534 U. S. 831;

534 U. S. 832;

535 U. S. 904;

534 U. S. 832;

534 U. S. 849;

534 U. S. 857;

ante, p. 904;

535 U. S. 685;

ante, p. 904;

535 U. S. 1055;

535 U. S. 1056;

535 U. S. 1078;

535 U. S. 1057;

535 U. S. 1097;

535 U. S. 1112;

ante, p. 906;

ante, p. 918;

534 U. S. 901;

534 U. S. 965;

535 U. S. 933;

535 U. S. 957;

535 U. S. 959;

535 U. S. 998;

535 U. S. 1001;

535 U. S. 1020;

535 U. S. 962;

535 U. S. 1099;

No. 01-8809.

No. 01-8823.

No. 01-8828.

No. 01-8832.

No. 01-8843.

No. 01-8875.

No. 01-8911.

No. 01-8970.

No. 01-8983.

No. 01-9045.

No. 01-9050.

No. 01-9059.

No. 01-9071.

No. 01-9075.

No. 01-9083.

No. 01-9108.

No. 01-9160.

No. 01-9180.

No. 01-9223.

No. 01-9257.

No. 01-9274.

No. 01-9283.

No. 01-9327.

No. 01-9391.

535 U. S. 1060;

535 U. S. 1004;

535 U. S. 1061;

535 U. S. 1024;

535 U. S. 1061;

535 U. S. 1099;

535 U. S. 1062;

535 U. S. 1064;

535 U. S. 1080;

535 U. S. 1082;

535 U. S. 1065;

535 U. S. 1010;

535 U. S. 1082;

535 U. S. 1083;

535 U. S. 1083;

535 U. S. 1083;

535 U. S. 1100;

535 U. S. 1101;

535 U. S. 1077;

535 U. S. 1086;

535 U. S. 1066;

535 U. S. 1103;

535 U. S. 1114;

535 U. S. 1116;

No. 01-9393.

No. 01-9416.

No. 01-9437.

No. 01-9475.

No. 01-9502.

No. 01-9507.

No. 01-9532.

No. 01-9566.

No. 01-9567.

No. 01-9619.

No. 01-9624.

No. 01-9663.

No. 01-9682.

No. 01-9731.

No. 01-9819.

No. 01-9832.

No. 01-9884.

No. 01-10013.

No. 01-10094.

No. 01-10166.

535 U. S. 1116;

535 U. S. 1067;

535 U. S. 1104;

ante, p. 907;

535 U. S. 1069;

535 U. S. 1069;

535 U. S. 1070;

ante, p. 925;

535 U. S. 1071;

535 U. S. 1086;

ante, p. 910;

ante, p. 920;

535 U. S. 1087;

ante, p. 930;

535 U. S. 1106;

535 U. S. 1090;

535 U. S. 1107;

ante, p. 911;

ante, p. 913; and

ante, p. 915. Petitions for rehearing denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 01-7942.
    No. 01-9316.
    No. 01-9317.
    Porter v. Diecast Corp. et al., Oken v. Maryland, Borchardt v. Maryland,
   535 U. S. 960;

535 U. S. 1074; and

535 U. S. 1104. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    August 7, 2002
    No. 02A95.
    In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for stay, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 02-5698 (02A109).
    Kutzner v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 8, 2002
    No. 01-1390.
    Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    No. 01-1793.
    Duke University et al. v. Milon et ux.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    August 14, 2002
    No. 74, Orig.
    Georgia v. South Carolina.
   Bill of complaint dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1. [For earlier decision herein, see, e. g., 497 U. S. 376.]


text:
    No. 02-5827 (02A138).
    In re Basile.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 02-5752 (02A122).
    Suarez Medina v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 15, 2002
    No. 02-5823 (02A136).
    In re Fugate.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 02-5822 (02A135).
    Fugate v. Georgia Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 16, 2002
    No. 02-5892 (02A147).
    Fugate v. Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles et al.
   Super. Ct. Fulton County, Ga. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 20, 2002
    No. 02-5330 (02A71).
    In re Etheridge.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    August 23, 2002
    No. 02A159.
    Green v. Hodges, Governor of South Carolina, et al.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of

death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 02-5648 (02A103).
    Green v. Maynard, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    August 26, 2002
    No. D-2308.
    In re Disbarment of Edmonds.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 535 U. S. 1092.]


text:
    No. D-2309.
    In re Disbarment of Grayson.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 535 U. S. 1093.]


text:
    No. D-2310.
    In re Disbarment of Lester.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 535 U. S. 1093.]


text:
    No. D-2312.
    In re Disbarment of Riggs.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 535 U. S. 1093.]


text:
    No. D-2313.
    In re Disbarment of Shanahan.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 535 U. S. 1093.]


text:
    No. 01-1067.
    United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 535 U. S. 1016.] Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 01-1118.
    No. 01-1119.
    Scheidler et al. v. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.; and Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, - 535 U. S. 1016.] Motion of Alan Ernest to represent children unborn and born alive denied.


text:
    No. 01-1209.
    No. 01-1382.
    Boeing Co. et al. v. United States; and United States v. Boeing Sales Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 535 U. S. 1094.] Motion of Boeing Co. et al. to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 01-1243.
    Borden Ranch Partnership et al. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 903.] Motion of petitioners Borden Ranch et al. to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 01-1437.
    Branch et al. v. Smith et al.
   D. C. S. D. Miss. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 903.] Motion of Nationalist Movement for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 01-1500.
    Clay v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 957.] Motion of the Solicitor General to amend the order granting petition for -writ of certiorari and stating the question presented granted. Order granting petition for writ of certiorari amended to read as follows: Certiorari granted limited to the following question: “Whether petitioner’s judgment of conviction became ‘Anal’ within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2255, par. 6(1), when the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on direct appeal or when his time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired.”


text:
    No. 00-1852.
    No. 00-9913.
    No. 00-9976.
    No. 01-339.
    No. 01-1177.
    No. 01-1259.
    No. 01-1385.
    No. 01-1457.
    No. 01-1474.
    No. 01-1565.
    No. 01-1597.
    No. 01-1615.
    No. 01-8374.
    No. 01-8494.
    No. 01-8555.
    No. 01-8673.
    No. 01-8674.
    Jett v. Washington County School Board, Ingle v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, King v. Georgia, Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections v. Smith, Caterina et al. v. Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania et al., Goelz v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. et al., Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. v. Banks, Clanton v. Greenwood Trust Co., Bledsoe v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., Haworth v. Office of Personnel Management, Dunn v. Kean, McLachlan, Trustee of the Mary Butschek Living Trust, et al. v. Simon, an Individual and Former Trustee of the Navellier Series Fund, et al., Vargas v. Jorgensen, Hilton v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Livingston v. United States, Oliver v. Kyler, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pellegrino v. Weber, Warden, et al., Jones v. United States, Zarrilli v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation et al., Black v. Stewart, Warden, Rhode v. Georgia, Richardson v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Green v. Newell et al., Smith v. United States, In re Hubbard, Gibbs v. Snyder, Warden, et al., Taylor v. Reynolds et al., Lugo v. Florida, Redic v. Moskowitz et al., Beaton v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Gonzalez Lora v. United States, Miller v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, Castille v. Compliance Solutions, Reed v. Ohio, In re Peterson, Engel v. Pennsylvania et al., Dickerson v. United States, Milano v. North Carolina, Pfeiffer-El v. Jackson, Superintendent, Brown Creek Correctional Institution, Taylor v. Campbell, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction, et al., Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher et al., Price v. Crestar Securities Corp. et al., Carpenter v. North Carolina, Becktel v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District (Morissette, Real Party in Interest), Hamm v. United States, ante, p. 913; and Shingleton v. Ohio,
   ante, p. 921;

534 U. S. 837;

ante, p. 957;

ante, p. 856;

535 U. S. 988;

535 U. S. 1035;

ante, p. 266;

535 U. S. 1112;

ante, p. 904;

535 U. S. 1113;

ante, p. 940;

ante, p. 941;

535 U. S. 1000;

535 U. S. 1021;

535 U. S. 977;

535 U. S. 1038;

535 U. S. 1038;

No. 01-8718.

No. 01-8719.

No. 01-8860.

No. 01-9104.

No. 01-9126.

No. 01-9153.

No. 01-9360.

No. 01-9481.

No. 01-9482.

No. 01-9506.

No. 01-9555.

No. 01-9613.

No. 01-9626.

No. 01-9658.

No. 01-9672.

No. 01-9713.

No. 01-9774.

No. 01-9783.

No. 01-9839.

No. 01-9842.

No. 01-9864.

No. 01-9886.

No. 01-9898.

No. 01-9906.

No. 01-9922.

No. 01-9949.

No. 01-10060.

535 U. S. 979;

535 U. S. 1002;

535 U. S. 1080;

ante, p. 925;

535 U. S. 1084;

ante, p. 942;

ante, p. 964;

535 U. S. 1033;

ante, p. 907;

ante, p. 908;

ante, p. 909;

ante, p. 926;

ante, p. 927;

535 U. S. 1087;

ante, p. 928;

ante, p. 910;

535 U. S. 1089;

ante, p. 938;

ante, p. 946;

535 U. S. 1106;

ante, p. 930;

ante, p. 965;

ante, p. 965;

ante, p. 911;

ante, p. 966;

ante, p. 967;

ante, p. 967;

No. 01-10071.

No. 01-10248.

ante, p. 933. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 01-1566.
    Hawkins, Individually, and as Trustee, Hawkins Family Trust v. Vastar Resources, Inc.,
   ante, p. 934. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author:
Justice Stevens,
      Justice Ginsburg,

text:
    August 28, 2002
    No. 02-6010 (02A164).
    No. 02-6017 (02A165).
    Patterson v. Texas. In re Patterson.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and

Applications for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for a crime he committed when he was 17 years old. In his dissenting opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 382 (1989), Justice Brennan, writing for four Members of the Court, explained why the Eighth Amendment prohibits the taking of the life of a person as punishment for a crime committed when below the age of 18. I joined that opinion and remain convinced that it correctly interpreted the law. Since that opinion was written, the issue has been the subject of further debate and discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations. Given the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international community against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be appropriate for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity. I would therefore grant a stay of this execution to give the Court an opportunity to confront the question at its next scheduled conference in September. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of a stay.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.

This Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, ante, p. 304, made it tenable for a petitioner to urge reconsideration of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), in which the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the execution of a person as punishment for a crime committed while under the age of 18. For the reasons stated by Justice Stevens, I think it appropriate to revisit the issue at this time. I therefore join Justice Stevens in dissenting from the denial of a stay.


text:
    September 6, 2002
    No. 01-800.
    Howsam, Individually and as Trustee for the E. Richard Howsam, Jr., Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust Dated May 14, 1982 v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 534 U. S. 1161.] Motion of Competitive Enterprise Institute for leave to file a brief as ami-cus curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 01-1231.
    Connecticut Department of Public Safety et al. v. Doe, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 535 U. S. 1077.] Motion of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 01-1572.
    Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 956.] Motion of the parties to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.


text:
    No. 02-5543 (02A173).
    Shamburger v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    No. 00-10375.
    No. 01-7992.
    No. 01-8619.
    No. 01-9079.
    No. 01-9091.
    No. 01-9092.
    No. 01-9103.
    No. 01-9430.
    No. 01-9521.
    No. 01-9544.
    No. 01-9703.
    No. 01-9717.
    No. 01-9822.
    No. 01-9836.
    No. 01-9897.
    No. 01-9900.
    No. 01-10016.
    Johnson v. Duncan, Warden, et al., Shaw v. Perry, Governor of Texas, et al., Bowen v. North Carolina, Walker v. United States, Dixon v. City of Minneapolis Water Department, Dixon v. Hardimon, Pound v. Williams, Insurance Commissioner of Delaware, as Receiver of National Heritage Life Insurance Co. in Liquidation, et al., Lee, aka Campbell v. Berge, Warden, Lewis v. Rader, Warden, Miller v. Hall, Warden, Taylor v. Kotecki, Epps v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Weatherspoon v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Tyler v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al., Wright v. Knox County Board of Education, Koch v. Potter, Postmaster General, Bad Wound v. United States, Castro v. Chandler, Warden, In re Warren, In re Callen,
   534 U. S. 854;

535 U. S. 973;

535 U. S. 1023;

535 U. S. 1011;

535 U. S. 1065;

535 U. S. 1083;

535 U. S. 1083;

535 U. S. 1117;

ante, p. 908;

ante, p. 909;

ante, p. 929;

535 U. S. 1073;

ante, p. 945;

ante, p. 945;

ante, p. 965;

ante, p. 911;

ante, p. 911;

No. 01-10102.

No. 01-10331.

No. 01-10358.

ante, p. 914;

ante, p. 938; and

ante, p. 938. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 01-529.
    Hoover et al. v. United States,
   ante, p. 958. Motions of Adrian Bradd and Darrell Branch for leave to proceed farther herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 01-1769.
    Wayne v. United States,
   ante, p. 961. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pau-peris granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 01-9592.
    Boettner v. Kirkwood et al.,
   ante, p. 925. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    September 11, 2002
    No. 01-1839.
    Canal Insurance Co. v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


text:
    September 12, 2002
    No. 02-5047.
    Mays v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 02-5203 (02A195).
    Patrick v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of .execution.


text:
    September 13, 2002
    No. 01-896.
    Ford Motor Co. et al. v. McCauley et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 534 U. S. 1126.] The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following questions: “Is there appellate jurisdiction when petitioners, as the nominally prevailing party in the District Court, appeal the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?” Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Thursday, September 26,2002. Twenty copies of the briefs prepared under this Court’s Rule 33.2 may be filed initially in order to meet the September 26 filing date. Rule 29.2 does not apply. Forty copies of the briefs prepared under Rule 33.1 are to be filed as soon as possible thereafter.


text:
    September 16, 2002
    No. 02A172.
    McClure v. Galvin, Secretary of Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Application for stay and injunctive relief, addressed to Justice Stevens and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    September 17, 2002
    No. 02-6384 (02A244).
    In re Patrick.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.


text:
    No. 02-6377 (02A241).
    Patrick v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kennedy, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and this petition.


text:
    September 18, 2002
    No. 02-6386 (02A246).
    In re Shamburger.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    September 25, 2002
    No. 02-6525 (02A260).
    In re Buell.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 01-10584 (02A250).
    King v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    No. 02-6513 (02A257).
    Buell v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    September 26, 2002
    No. 02-282.
    Hinckley Township Trustees et al. v. Wershing.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.


text:
    October 1, 2002
    No. 01-653.
    No. 01-657.
    Federal Communications Commission v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.; and Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 535 U. S. 904.] Motion of respondents Next-Wave Personal Communications Inc. et al. for leave to file supplemental appendix denied.


text:
    No. 01-1435.
    Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 01-1559.
    Massaro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 01-1766.
    Zapata Industries, Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 01-1862.
    Woodford, Warden v. Garceau.
   C. A. 9th Cir.

Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 02-5735 (02A249).
    Powell v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.


text:
    October 3, 2002
    No. 02-5574.
    Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, dba Camel Rock Gaming Center, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    FORD MOTOR CO. et al. v. McCAULEY et al.
    No. 01-896.
    Argued October 7, 2002
    Decided October 15, 2002

      Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Walter E. Dellinger, John H. Beisner, Brian P. Brooks, Jonathan D. Hanker, Christopher R. Lipsett, and Bruce M. Berman.

      Steve W. Berman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Roger W. Kirby, James G. Lewis, and Russell J. Drake.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Barbara McDowell, Barbara C. Biddle, and Thomas M. Bondy; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Evan M. Tager, David M. Gossett, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Business Roundtable by Bruce E. Clark; for the National Association of Manufacturers by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, Paul J. Zidlicky, Michael S. Lee, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by David Klingsberg, Thomas A. Smart, and Mark S. Popofsky; for the Product Liability Advisory Council by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.; and for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. by Sheila L. Birnbaum, Douglas W. Dunham, and Ellen P. Quackenbos.

      Briefs of amici curias urging affirmance were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Laura C. Thar-ney; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Roger L. Mandel, Marc R. Stanley, Mark A Chavez, Arthur Bryant, and Michael Quirk.

   Per Curiam.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

It is so ordered.


text:
    EARLY, WARDEN, et al. v. PACKER
    No. 01-1765.
    Decided November 4, 2002
   Per Curiam.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief to respondent William Packer after concluding that the state trial judge coerced the jury’s verdict. Packer v. Hill, 291 F. 3d 569 (2002). Because this decision exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.

I

A California jury convicted respondent of one count of second-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, two counts of attempted robbery, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of assault with a firearm. It acquitted him on 10 other counts.

The path to the jury’s guilty verdicts on the murder and attempted-murder charges was not an easy one. After 28 hours of deliberation, and after the jury had returned sealed verdict forms on all the other charges, juror Eve Radcliff sent a note to the judge requesting to be dismissed from the jury due to “‘health problems.’” 291 F. 3d, at 573. The judge then met alone with Radcliff, who explained that “ ‘because of the seriousness of the charges, I can’t make snap decisions. ... I was beginning to feel a little burned out.’ ” Ibid. The judge asked Radcliff if she could “ ‘hold out just a little bit longer,’ ” and when Radcliff agreed the judge replied: “ T really appreciate it. Otherwise, they have to start deliberations all over again with another person.’” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

The next day, the foreman sent the judge a note stating that “‘we can no longer deliberate,’” that “‘Eve Radcliff, does not appear to be able to understand the rules as given by you,’ ” that “ ‘nearly all my fellow jurors questio[n] her ability to understand the rules and her ability to reason,’ ” and that continuing will result in a “ ‘hung jury . . . based on ... one person’s inability to reason or desire to be unreasonable.’” Ibid. The judge called the jury into the courtroom, and, in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant, read the note aloud. The judge asked the foreman whether the jury was deliberating. The foreman replied that the jurors were “'just having the same conversation over the same issue time and time again.’” Id., at 574. The judge made the following statement to the jury:

“ ‘The juror has a right to do that, as you all know. They have a right to disagree with everybody else. But they do not have a right to not deliberate. They must deliberate and follow the rules and laws as I state it to them.’” Ibid.

The judge then asked the foreman what the latest vote count was, but told him not to reveal which side had which number of votes. The foreman indicated that the last vote count had been 11 to 1. After the foreman indicated that further deliberations would be helpful, the judge gave the following instruction to the jury:

“ 'What you do is — like I think what the instructions were — you apply the facts to the law and you arrive at a decision. The law is right there, and I think elements of the law was [sic] given to you in those instructions. They do this or not do this? Was it proven beyond a reasonable doubt? This element, this element, this element? If they did and you find unanimously they did that, you must follow the law and find them either guilty or not guilty of that charge.’ ” Ibid, (emphasis deleted).

At this point, defense counsel objected on the ground that the judge was improperly “ 'instructing the jury ... as to their manner of deliberation.’ ” Id., at 574-575. The judge overruled the objection and continued his instruction as follows:

“ ‘Ladies and Gentlemen, the only thing I’m going to tell you right now is; once again, I told you, you’ll look up in the instructions paraphrasing it, I think I’m using the correct words: you’re the sole judges of the facts. You determine the facts. You then apply the law to those facts as I state it to you, and you must accept and follow the law. You can’t make up your own law. You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you.’ ” Id., at 575.

The judge then excused the jury for the day.

After a day off, deliberations resumed on a Friday. Once again, Radcliff sent the judge a note asking to be dismissed from the jury. This time she complained about “ ‘feeling[s] of distrust and disrespect from the other jurors,’ ” and said that “ T have reached a point of anger, and I don’t believe I can be objective.’” Ibid. The judge again met with Rad-cliff in his chambers, outside the presence of attorneys, and asked her if she was continuing to deliberate. Radcliff responded that she was “trying,” but not to the satisfaction of the others. Id., at 576. The judge thanked her and returned her to the jury room. Then the judge met briefly with the foreman, who assured him that Radcliff was indeed continuing to deliberate. The jury then resumed its deliberations. The following Tuesday, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the attempted-murder count, and the next morning a guilty verdict on the second-degree murder charge.

Respondent appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Second Appellate District, arguing that the comments to Radcliff and to the jury were coercive and denied him his due process right to a fair and impartial jury. California law, unlike federal law, prohibits the giving of a so-called Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896), charge to a deadlocked jury — that is, a charge that specifically urges the minority jurors to give weight to the majority’s views. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 852, 566 P. 2d 997, 1006 (1977), held that no instruction may be given which either “(1) encourages jurors to consider the numerical division or preponderance of opinion of the jury in forming or reexamining their views on the issues before them; or (2) states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will necessarily be retried.”

The state appellate court, applying Gainer, rejected respondent’s claim. “[T]here is nothing improper,” it said, “in urging the jury to consider the matter farther with the view to reaching an agreement[,] as long as the language used does not coerce a particular type of verdict. Accordingly, the comments made and not made by the court to the jury did not coerce a particular verdict or deny Packer any constitutional rights.” App. to Pet. for Cert. H-15 to H-16 (citations omitted). The court rejected respondent’s remaining challenges to his conviction, and the State Supreme Court declined review.

Respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court dismissed the petition, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question whether the state trial judge violated respondent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by coercing the jury into rendering a verdict on the attempted-murder and second-degree murder counts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on that ground, and instructed the District Court to grant the writ on the murder convictions. California’s Attorney General has petitioned for certiorari.

II

When a habeas petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) forecloses relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The jury-coercion claim in respondent’s habeas petition is the same claim rejected on the merits in his direct appeal to the state appellate court, and the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that § 2254(d) was therefore applicable. It held that respondent had established that the decision of the Court of Appeal was contrary to established federal law for two, and possibly three, reasons. We think none of them correct.

First, the Ninth Circuit observed that the state court “failed to cite . . . any federal law, much less the controlling Supreme Court precedents.” 291 F. 3d, at 578. If this meant to suggest that such citation was required, it was in error. A state-court decision is “contrary to” our clearly established precedents if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 405-406 (2000). Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation of our cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them. The Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of the Court of Appeal’s failure to cite this Court’s cases is especially puzzling since the state court cited instead decisions from the California Supreme Court that impose even greater restrictions for the avoidance of potentially coercive jury instructions. Compare People v. Gainer, supra, at 852, 566 P. 2d, at 1006, with Allen v. United States, supra, at 501.

Second, the Ninth Circuit charged that the Court of Appeal “failed to apply the totality of the circumstances test as required, by Lowenfield [v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231 (1988)].” That was so, the Ninth Circuit concluded, because it “simply mentioned three particular incidents in its analysis,” “failed to consider” other “critical facts,” and “failed to consider the cumulative impact” of all the significant facts, one of which it “[did] not even mention in its analysis.” 291 F. 3d, at 578-579, and n. 10. With regard to the last point: The significant fact the Ninth Circuit said was not mentioned — that the judge sent the jury back to its deliberations after learning that it was split 11 to 1 — was in fact succinctly described. See id., at 579, n. 10. The Court of Appeal focused its analysis upon “three particular incidents” for the entirely acceptable reason that (as the court said) those incidents constituted “[t]he essence of Packer’s complaints” regarding juror coercion. App. to Pet. for Cert. H-15. The opinion set forth many facts and circumstances beyond those three incidents, including the two “critical facts” that the Ninth Circuit said it “failed to consider,” 291 F. 3d, at 579, n. 10 — the judge’s knowledge that'Radcliff was the sole dissenting juror prior to his instructing the jury to keep deliberating, App. to Pet. for Cert. H-14, and the fact that the foreman’s note, which mentioned Radcliff by name, was read in court, ibid. The contention that the California court “failed to consider” facts and circumstances that it had taken the trouble to recite strains credulity. The Ninth Circuit may be of the view that the Court of Appeal did not give certain facts and circumstances adequate weight (and hence adequate discussion); but to say that it did not consider them is an exaggeration. There is, moreover, nothing to support the Ninth Circuit’s claim that the Court of Appeal did not consider the “cumulative impact” of all the recorded events. Compliance with Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231 (1988), does not demand a formulary statement that the trial court’s actions and inactions were noncoercive “individually and cumulatively.” It suffices that that was the fair import of the Court of Appeal’s opinion.

Third and last, the Ninth Circuit faulted the state appellate court for stating that “ ‘there is nothing improper in urging the jury to consider [the matter] further with the view to reaching an agreement as long as the language used does not coerce a particular type of verdict.’ ” 291 F. 3d, at 579. The Ninth Circuit found this statement to be “contrary to” both Jenkins v. United States, 380 U. S. 445 (1965) (per curiam), and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978), which it construed to prohibit pressing the jurors to arrive at some verdict, not just “ ‘a particular type of verdict.’ ” 291 F. 3d, at 579. Neither Jenkins nor Gypsum Co. is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) determination, since neither case sets forth a rule applicable to state-court proceedings. Jenkins and Gypsum Co. reversed convictions based on jury instructions given in federal prosecutions, and neither opinion purported to interpret any provision of the Constitution. That alone would be enough to defeat a claim that their application to state-court proceedings is “clearly established.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra, at 239, n. 2 (citation omitted), however, removed any lingering doubt regarding these cases’ application to state convictions when it stated: “[O]ur ruling in Jenkins v. United States was based on our supervisory power over the federal courts, and not on constitutional grounds. The Jenkins Court cited no provision of the Constitution, but rather relied upon other cases involving the exercise of supervisory powers.” (The same was true of Gypsum Co.) Jenkins and Gypsum Co. are off the table as far as § 2254(d) is concerned, and the Ninth Circuit erred by relying on those nonconstitutional decisions.

Having determined that the Court of Appeal “failed to apply” clearly established Supreme Court law, 291 F. 3d, at 579 (a phrase which the opinion repeatedly and erroneously substitutes for the more demanding requirement of § 2254(d)(1): that the decision be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law), the Ninth Circuit then proceeded to address the question “whether [the Court of Appeal’s] decision constituted error and if so whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict.” Ibid. But that inquiry would have been proper only if the Ninth Circuit had first found (pursuant to the correct standard) that the California court’s decision was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law — which it did not and could not. By mistakenly making the “contrary to” determination and then proceeding to a simple “error” inquiry, the Ninth Circuit evaded § 2254(d)’s requirement that decisions which are not “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law can be subjected to habeas relief only if they are not merely erroneous, but “an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, or based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts” (emphasis added). Even if we agreed with the Ninth Circuit majority (Judge Silverman dissented) that there was jury coercion here, it is at least reasonable to conclude that there was not, which means that the state court’s determination to that effect must stand.

* * *

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.


text:
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ORLANDO VENTURA
    No. 02-29.
    Decided November 4, 2002
   Per Curiam.

Federal statutes authorize the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who demonstrates “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . [a] political opinion,” and they require the Attorney General to withhold deportation where the alien’s “life or freedom would be threatened” for that reason. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(a), 243(h), 66 Stat. 166, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§1101(a)(42), 1158(a), 1253(h)(1) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that respondent Fredy Orlando Ventura failed to qualify for this statutory protection because any persecution that he faced when he left Guatemala in 1993 was not “on account of” a “political opinion” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA’s holding. 264 F. 3d 1150 (2001) (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals then went on to consider an alternative argument that the Government had made before the Immigration Judge, namely, that Orlando Ventura failed to qualify for protection regardless of past persecution because conditions in Guatemala had improved to the point where no realistic threat of persecution currently existed. Both sides pointed out to the Ninth Circuit that the Immigration Judge had held that conditions had indeed changed to that point but that the BIA itself had not considered this alternative claim. And both sides asked that the Ninth Circuit remand the case to the BIA so that it might do so. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-71004 (CA9), pp. 5, 6, 24; Brief for Respondent in No. 99-71004 (CA9), pp. 8, 9, 23.

The Court of Appeals, however, did not remand the case. Instead, it evaluated the Government’s claim itself. And it decided the matter in Orlando Ventura’s favor, holding that the evidence in the record failed to show sufficient change. 264 F. 3d, at 1157-1158. The Government, seeking certiorari here, argues that the Court of Appeals exceeded its legal authority when it decided the “changed circumstances” matter on its own. We agree with the Government that the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the BIA. And we summarily reverse its decision not to do so.

I

We shall describe the basic proceedings so far. In 1993 Orlando Ventura, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally. In 1995 the Attorney General began deportation proceedings. And in 1998 an Immigration Judge considered Orlando Ventura’s application for asylum and withholding of deportation, an application based upon a fear and threat of persecution “on account of” a “political opinion.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1253(h) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Orlando Ventura testified that he had received threats of death or harm unless he joined the guerrilla army, that his family members had close ties to the Guatemalan military, and that, in his view, the guerrillas consequently believed he held inimical political opinions.

The Immigration Judge denied relief. She recognized that Orlando Ventura subjectively believed that the guerrillas’ interest in him was politically based. And she credited testimony showing (a) that Orlando Ventura’s family had many connections to the military, (b) that he was very close to one cousin, an army lieutenant who had served for almost 12 years, (c) that in 1987 his uncle, a local military commissioner responsible for recruiting, was attacked by people with machetes, and (d) that in 1988 his cousin (a soldier) and the cousin’s brother (a civilian) were both shot at and the soldier-cousin killed. Nonetheless, Orlando Ventura had failed objectively “to demonstrate that the guerillas’ interest” in him was “on account of his political opinion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. The Immigration Judge added that "conditions” in Guatemala had changed significantly. Even “if the guerillas” once had had a politically based “interest” in Orlando Ventura, the evidence failed to show that the guerrillas would “continue to have motivation and inclination to persecute him in the future.” Ibid.

The BIA, considering the matter de novo, “agree[dj” with the Immigration Judge that Orlando Ventura “did not meet his burden of establishing that he faces persecution ‘on account of’ a qualifying ground . . . .” Id., at 15a. The BIA added that it “need not address” the question of “changed country conditions.” Ibid.

The Court of Appeals, reviewing the BIA’s decision, decided that this evidence “compel[led] ” it to reject the BIA’s conclusion. 264 F. 3d, at 1154 (emphasis added); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S. 478, 481, n. 1 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it . . .” (emphasis in original)). It recognized that the BIA had not decided the “changed circumstances” question and that “generally” a court should remand to permit that consideration. 264 F. 3d, at 1157. Cf. Castillo v. INS, 951 F. 2d 1117, 1120-1121 (CA9 1991) (specifying that the Court of Appeals must review the decision of the BIA, not the underlying decision of the immigration judge). But the Court of Appeals added that it need “not remand .. . when it is clear that we would be compelled to reverse the BIA’s decision if the BIA decided the matter against the applicant.” 264 F. 3d, at 1157. And it held that the record evidence, namely, a 1997 State Department report about Guatemala, “clearly demonstrates that the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution was not rebutted.” Ibid. Hence, it concluded, “remand ... is inappropriate.” Ibid.

The Government challenges the decision not to remand. And it says the matter is important. The “error,” it says, is a “recurring error [that] puts the Ninth Circuit in conflict with other courts of appeals, which generally respect the BIA’s role as fact-finder by remanding to the BIA in similar situations.” Pet. for Cert. 11. See also Pet. for Cert. in INS v. Chen, O. T. 2002, No. 25, p. 23 (referring to eight other recent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which, in the Government’s view, demonstrate this trend). After examining the record, we find that well-established principles of administrative law did require the Court of Appeals to remand the “changed circumstances” question to the BIA.

II

No one disputes the basic legal principles that govern remand. Within broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision here in question. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994 ed.); Elias-Zacarias, supra, at 481; INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415 (1999). See also 8 CFR §3.1 (2002). In such circumstances a “judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943). Nor can an “appellate court... intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.” Ibid. A court of appeals “is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744 (1985). Rather, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Ibid. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947) (describing the reasons for remand).

Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands. This principle has obvious importance in the immigration context. The BIA has not yet considered the “changed circumstances” issue. And every consideration that classically supports the law’s ordinary remand requirement does so here. The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.

These basic considerations indicate that the Court of Appeals committed clear error here. It seriously disregarded the agency’s legally mandated role. Instead, it independently created potentially far-reaching legal precedent about the significance of political change in Guatemala, a highly complex and sensitive matter. And it did so without giving the BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise.

The Court of Appeals rested its conclusion upon its belief that the basic record evidence on the matter — the 1997 State Department report about Guatemala — compelled a finding of insufficiently changed circumstances. But that foundation is legally inadequate for two reasons. First, the State Department report is, at most, ambiguous about the matter. The bulk of the report makes clear that considerable change has occurred. The report says, for example, that in December 1996 the Guatemalan Government and the guerrillas signed a peace agreement, that in March 1996 there was a cease fire, that the guerrillas then disbanded as a fighting force, that “the guerrillas renounced the use of force to achieve political goals,” and that “there was [a] marked improvement in the overall human rights situation.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U. S. Dept. of State, Guatemala-Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions 2-4 (June 1997).

As the Court of Appeals stressed, two parts of the report can be read to the contrary. They say that (1) even “after the March cease-fire, guerrillas continued to employ death threats” and (2) “the level of crime and violence now seems to be higher than in the recent past.” Id., at 3-4. Yet the report itself qualifies these statements. As to the second, the report (as the Court of Appeals noted) says: “Although the level of crime and violence now seems to be higher than in the recent past, the underlying motivation in most asylum cases now appears to stem from common crime and/or personal vengeance,” i. e., not politics. Id., at 4 (emphasis added). And the report (in sections to which the Court of Appeals did not refer) adds that in the context of claims based on political opinion, in “our experience, only party leaders or high-profile activists generally would be vulnerable to such harassment and usually only in their home communities.” Id., at 8. This latter phrase “only in their home communities” is particularly important in light of the fact that an individual who can relocate safely within his home country ordinarily cannot qualify for asylum here. See 8 CFR §208.13(b)(1)(i) (2002).

Second, remand could lead to the presentation of further evidence of current circumstances in Guatemala — evidence that may well prove enlightening given the five years that have elapsed since the report was written. See §§3.1, 3.2 (permitting the BIA to reopen the record and to remand to the Immigration Judge as appropriate).

III

We conclude that the Court of Appeals should have applied the ordinary “remand” rule. We grant the Government’s petition for certiorari. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit insofar as it denies remand to the agency. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.


text:
    WOODFORD, WARDEN v. VISCIOTTI
    No. 02-137.
    Decided November 4, 2002
   Per Curiam.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief to respondent John Visci-otti after concluding that he had been prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 288 F. 3d 1097 (2002). Because this decision exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we reverse.

I

Respondent and a co-worker, Brian Hefner, devised a plan to rob two fellow employees, Timothy Dykstra and Michael Wolbert, on November 8, 1982, their payday. They invited the pair to join them at a party. As the four were driving to that supposed destination in Wolbert’s car, respondent asked Wolbert to stop in a remote area so that he could relieve himself. When all four men had left the car, respondent pulled a gun, demanded the victims’ wallets (which turned out to be almost empty), and got Wolbert to tell him where in the car the cash was hidden. After Hefner had retrieved the cash, respondent walked over to the seated Dykstra and killed him with a shot in the chest from a distance of three or four feet. Respondent then raised the gun in both hands and shot Wolbert three times, in the torso and left shoulder, and finally, from a distance of about two feet, in the left eye. Respondent and Hefner fled the scene in Wolbert’s car. Wolbert miraculously survived to testify against them.

Respondent was convicted by a California jury of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery, with a special-circumstance finding that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery. The same jury determined that respondent should suffer death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 825 P. 2d 388 (1992).

Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. That court appointed a referee to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact — after which, and after briefing on the merits, it denied the petition in a lengthy opinion. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th 325, 926 P. 2d 987 (1996). The California Supreme Court assumed that respondent’s trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation during the penalty phase, but concluded that this did not prejudice the jury’s sentencing decision. Id., at 353, 356-357, 926 P. 2d, at 1004, 1006.

Respondent filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court determined that respondent had been denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, and granted the habeas petition as to his sentence. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that a federal habeas application can only be granted if it meets the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), which provides:

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The Court of Appeals found that the California Supreme Court decision ran afoul of both the “contrary to” and the “unreasonable application” conditions of § 2254(d)(1), and affirmed the District Court’s grant of relief. See 288 F. 3d, at 1118-1119. The State of California petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we now grant along with respondent’s motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.

II

A

We consider first the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the California Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary to” our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Strickland held that to prove prejudice the defendant must establish a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id., at 694 (emphasis added); it specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered, id., at 693. The Court of Appeals read the State Supreme Court opinion in this case as applying the latter test— as requiring respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the result of the sentencing proceedings would have been different. See 288 F. 3d, at 1108-1109. That is, in our view, a mischaracterization of the state-court opinion, which expressed and applied the proper standard for evaluating prejudice.

The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the prejudice inquiry by setting forth the “reasonable probability” criterion, with a citation of the relevant passage in Strickland; and it proceeded to state that “[t]he question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors and omissions, the sentencing authority would have found that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant imposition of the death penalty,” again with a citation of Strickland. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th, at 352, 926 P. 2d, at 1003 (citing Strickland, supra, at 696). Twice, the court framed its inquiry as turning on whether there was a “reasonable probability” that the sentencing jury would have reached a more favorable penalty-phase verdict. 14 Cal. 4th, at 352, 353, 926 P. 2d, at 1003, 1004. The following passage, moreover, was central to the California Supreme Court’s analysis:

“In In re Fields,... we addressed the process by which the court assesses prejudice at the penalty phase of a capital trial at which counsel was, allegedly, incompetent in failing to present mitigating evidence: ‘What kind of evidentiary showing will undermine confidence in the outcome of a penalty trial that has resulted in a death verdict? Strickland . . . and the cases it cites offer some guidance. United States v. Agurs ... , the first case cited by Strickland, spoke of evidence which raised a reasonable doubt, although not necessarily of such character as to create a substantial likelihood of acquittal. . . . United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. . . , the second case cited by Strickland, referred to evidence which is “material and favorable ... in ways not merely cumulative. . . Id., at 353-354, 926 P. 2d, at 1004.

“Undermin[ing] confidence in the outcome” is exactly Strickland’s description of what is meant by the “reasonable probability” standard. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, supra, at 694.

Despite all these citations of, and quotations from, Strickland, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the California Supreme Court had held respondent to a standard of proof higher than what that case prescribes for one reason: in three places (there was in fact a fourth) the opinion used the term “probable” without the modifier “reasonably.” 288 F. 3d, at 1108-1109, and n. 11. This was error. The California Supreme Court’s opinion painstakingly describes the Strickland standard. Its occasional shorthand reference to that standard by use of the term “probable” without the modifier may perhaps be imprecise, but if so it can no more be considered a repudiation of the standard than can this Court’s own occasional indulgence in the same imprecision. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 166 (2002) (“probable effect upon the outcome”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 393 (2000) (“probably affected the outcome”).

The Court of Appeals made no effort to reconcile the state court’s use of the term “probable” with its use, elsewhere, of Strickland’s term “reasonably probable,” nor did it even acknowledge, much less discuss, the California Supreme Court’s proper framing of the question as whether the evidence “undermines confidence” in the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. This readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. See, e. g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U. S. 308, 314-316 (1991); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002); LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U. S. 690, 694-695 (1973) (per curiam). It is also incompatible with §2254(d)’s “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997), which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.

B

The Court of Appeals also held that, regardless of whether the California Supreme Court applied the proper standard for determining prejudice under Strickland, its decision involved an unreasonable application of our clearly established precedents. 288 F. 3d, at 1118. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the determination that VIsciotti suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficiencies was “objectively unreasonable.” Ibid. Under §2254(d)’s “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 698-699 (2002); Williams, supra, at 411. Rather, it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An “unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, supra, at 410; see Bell, supra, at 694. The Ninth Circuit did not observe this distinction, but ultimately substituted its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).

The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion of “objective unreasonableness” upon its perception (1) that the California Supreme Court failed to “take into account” the totality of the available mitigating evidence, and “to consider” the prejudicial impact of certain of counsel's actions, and (2) that the “aggravating factors were not overwhelming.” 288 F. 3d, at 1118. There is no support for the first of these contentions. All of the mitigating evidence, and all of counsel’s prejudicial actions, that the Ninth Circuit specifically referred to as having been left out of account or consideration were in fact described in the California Supreme Court’s lengthy and careful opinion. The Court of Appeals asserted that the California Supreme Court “completely ignored the mitigating effect of Visciotti’s brain damage,” and failed to consider the prejudicial effect of counsel’s “multiple concessions during closing argument.” Ibid. However, the California Supreme Court specifically considered the fact that an expert “had testified at the guilt phase that [Visciotti] had a minimal brain injury of a type associated with impulse disorder and learning disorder.” In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th, at 354, 926 P. 2d, at 1004. And it noted that under the trial court’s instructions, this and other evidence that had been introduced “might have been considered mitigating at the penalty phase,” despite trial counsel’s concessions during closing argument. Ibid.

The California Supreme Court then focused on counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence about respondent’s background, including expert testimony that could have been presented about his “growing up in a dysfunctional family in which he suffered continual psychological abuse.” Id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005. This discussion referred back to a lengthy, detailed discussion about the undiscovered mitigating evidence that trial counsel might have presented during the penalty phase. See id., at 341-345, 926 P. 2d, at 996-998. The California Supreme Court concluded that despite the failure to present evidence of respondent’s “troubled family background,” id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005, which included his being “berated,” being “markedly lacking in self-esteem and depressed,” having been “born with club feet,” having “feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, inferiority,” and the like, moving “20 times” while he was growing up, and possibly suffering a “seizure disorder,” id., at 341-343, 926 P. 2d, at 996-998, the aggravating factors were overwhelming. In the state court’s judgment, the circumstances of the crime (a cold-blooded execution-style killing of one victim and attempted execution-style killing of another, both during the course of a preplanned armed robbery) coupled with the aggravating evidence of prior offenses (the knifing of one man, and the stabbing of a pregnant woman as she lay in bed trying to protect her unborn baby) was devastating. See id., at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005; see also People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th, at 33-34, 825 P. 2d, at 402. The California Supreme Court found these aggravating factors to be so severe that it concluded respondent suffered no prejudice from trial counsel’s (assumed) inadequacy. In re Visciotti, supra, at 355, 926 P. 2d, at 1005.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with this assessment, suggesting that the fact that the jury deliberated for a full day and requested additional guidance on the meaning of “moral justification” and “extreme duress” meant that the “aggravating factors were not overwhelming.” 288 F. 3d, at 1118. Perhaps so. However, “under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly.” Bell, 535 U. S., at 699. The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts for these judgments, and authorizes federal-court intervention only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable. It is not that here. Whether or not we would reach the same conclusion as the California Supreme Court, “we think at the very least that the state court’s contrary assessment was not ‘unreasonable.’ ” Id., at 701. Habeas relief is therefore not permissible under § 2254(d).

* * *

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

Reversed.


author:
      Chief Justice Rehnquist
      Justice Stevens,

text:
    SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC., et al. v. HENSON
    No. 01-757.
    Argued October 15, 2002
    Decided November 5, 2002

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 35.

      Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Mark C. Surprenant, Robert N. Markle, and Alan B. Nadel.

      David J. Bederman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

        Robert N. Weiner and Jonathan Harrison filed a brief for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Texas by John Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas, Lonny S. Hoffman, and Gregory S. Coleman; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Adam Samaha, Roberta B. Walbum, Martha K Wivell, and Arthur H. Bryant.

   Chief Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Hurley Henson filed suit in state court in Iberville Parish, Louisiana, against petitioner Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. (then known as Ciba-Geigy Corp.) asserting various tort claims related to petitioners’ manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. A similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., was already underway in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. The Louisiana court stayed respondent’s action when respondent successfully intervened in the Price suit and participated in the ensuing settlement. That settlement included a stipulation that the Henson action, “including any and all claims . . . against [petitioners], shall be dismissed, with prejudice,” as of the approval date. App. 38a; see also id., at 36a.

Following the approval of the settlement, the Louisiana state court conducted a hearing to determine whether the Henson action should be dismissed. Counsel for respondent told the court that the Price settlement required dismissal of only some of the claims raised in Henson. Although this representation appeared to be contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement, the Louisiana court relied upon it and invited respondent to amend the complaint and proceed with the action.

Counsel for petitioners did not attend the hearing. Upon learning of the state court’s action, however, petitioners promptly removed the action to the Middle District of Louisiana, relying on 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). The notice of removal asserted federal jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, § 1651, and under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, §1367. The Middle District of Louisiana granted a transfer to the Southern District of Alabama pursuant to § 1404(a), and the Alabama court then dismissed Henson as barred by the Price settlement and sanctioned respondent’s counsel for his misrepresentation to the Louisiana state court.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sanctions but vacated the District Court’s order dismissing the Henson action. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F. 3d 1065 (2001). The court reasoned that §1441 by its terms authorizes removal only of actions over which the district courts have original jurisdiction. But the All Writs Act authorizes writs “in aid of [the courts’] respective jurisdictions” without providing any federal subject-matter jurisdiction in its own right, see, e. g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U. S. 529, 534-535 (1999). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, the All Writs Act could not support removal of the Henson action from state to federal court.

In so holding, the Court of Appeals recognized that several Circuits have held that the All Writs Act gives a federal court the authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued. See, e. g., Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F. 3d 424, 426 (CA8 1999); Bylinski v. Allen Park, 169 F. 3d 1001, 1003 (CA6 1999); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 996 F. 2d 1425, 1431 (CA2 1993). It noted, however, that other Circuits have agreed with its conclusion that the All Writs Act does not furnish removal jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hillman v. Webley, 115 F. 3d 1461, 1469 (CA10 1997). We granted certiorari to resolve this controversy, 534 U. S. 1126 (2001), and now affirm.

The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Petitioners advance two arguments in support of their claim that removal of the Henson action was proper under the All Writs Act: (1) The All Writs Act authorized removal of the Henson action, and (2) the All Writs Act in conjunction with the doctrine of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction authorized the removal. We address these contentions in turn.

First, petitioners, like the courts that have endorsed “All Writs removal,” rely upon our statement in United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 172 (1977), that the Act authorizes a federal court “to issue such commands . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” Petitioners also cite Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 41 (1985), for the proposition that the All Writs Act “fill[s] the interstices of federal judicial power when those gaps threate[n] to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’ jurisdiction.” They argue that the Act comes into play here because maintenance of the Henson action in state court in Louisiana frustrated the express terms of the Price settlement, which required that “any and all claims” in Henson be dismissed.

But Pennsylvania Bureau made clear that “[w]here a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.” 474 U. S., at 43. The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and “a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Great Northern R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U. S. 276, 280 (1918) (citing Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 (1878)). These statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed. See, e. g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U. S. 100, 108-109 (1941) (noting that policy underlying removal statutes “is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation”); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 270 (1934) (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments ... requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined”); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233-234 (1922). Petitioners may not, by resorting to the All Writs Act, avoid complying with the statutory requirements for removal. See Pennsylvania Bureau, supra, at 43 (All Writs Act “does not authorize [federal courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate”).

Petitioners’ question presented to this Court suggests a variation on this first argument, asking whether the All Writs Act “vests federal district courts with authority to exercise removal jurisdiction under 28 U S. C. §1441” Pet. for Cert. i (emphasis added). The general removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1441, provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending,” unless,Congress specifically provides otherwise. § 1441(a). Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove the Henson action pursuant to that provision, petitioners must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts. They concede that the All Writs Act “does not, by its specific terms, provide federal courts with an independent grant of jurisdiction.” Brief for Petitioners 9; see also Clinton, supra, at 534-535 (express terms of the All Writs Act confine a court “to issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutory jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge that jurisdiction”). Because the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it cannot confer the original jurisdiction required to support removal pursuant to § 1441.

Second, petitioners contend that some combination of the All Writs Act and the doctrine of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction support the removal of the Henson action. As we explained in Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U. S. 349, 355 (1996), “[ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on ‘the primary lawsuit.’ ” Petitioners emphasize that the Southern District of Alabama retained jurisdiction over the Price settlement, thus distinguishing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375 (1994), in which we found ancillary jurisdiction lacking. They argue that respondent’s maintenance of the Henson action undermined the Price settlement and that, in light of the Alabama court’s retained jurisdiction, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction was necessary and appropriate. But they fail to explain how the Alabama District Court’s retention of jurisdiction over the Price settlement authorized removal of the Henson action. Removal is governed by statute, and invocation of ancillary jurisdiction, like invocation of the All Writs Act, does not dispense with the need for compliance with statutory requirements.

Read in light of the question presented in the petition for certiorari, perhaps petitioners’ argument is that ancillary jurisdiction authorizes removal under 28 U. S. C. § 1441. As we explained in Peacock, however, a “court must have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction over ancillary claims.” 516 U. S., at 355. Ancillary jurisdiction, therefore, cannot provide the original jurisdiction that petitioners must show in order to qualify for removal under § 1441.

Section 1441 requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Stevens,

concurring.

As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 82, the decisions of the Courts of Appeals that we disapprove today have relied in large part on our decision in United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159 (1977). For the reasons stated in Part II of my dissenting opinion in that case — reasons that are echoed in the Court’s opinion today — I believe that it clearly misconstrued the All Writs Act. Id., at 186-190 (opinion dissenting in part). See also id., at 178 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the overly expansive interpretation given to the All Writs Act in New York Telephone may produce further mischief, I would expressly overrule that misguided decision.

With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.

      Petitioners’ assertion that removal was “necessary” is unpersuasive on its own bottom. One in petitioners’ position may apply to the court that approved a settlement for an injunction requiring dismissal of a rival action. Petitioners could also have sought a determination from the Louisiana state court that respondent’s action was barred by the judgment of the Alabama District Court.

      See, e. g., In re VMS Securities Litigation, 103 F. 3d 1317, 1323 (CA7 1996); Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F. 3d 171, 175 (CA6 1996); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 996 F. 2d 1425, 1431 (CA2 1993). See also Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 417 (1999) (noting that nearly all courts that have approved removal pursuant to the All Writs Act have relied on New York Telephone).

      Indeed, the court below observed that the most powerful argument in favor of petitioners’ position is provided by the “broad view of the All Writs Act’s purpose” articulated in New York Telephone. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F. 3d 1065, 1070 (CA11 2001).