source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Stewakt Mr. Justice White,

license: Public Domain

text:
    FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 641, et al.
    No. 73-556.
    Argued April 24, 1974
    Decided June 24, 1974

      Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BrenNAN, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and BlacKmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 813.

      Ray C. Muller argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 73-556. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73-795 and for respondent National Labor Relations Board in No. 73-556. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, and Patrick Hardin.

      Laurence J. Cohen argued the cause for respondent unions in both cases. With him on the brief were Robert E. Fitzgerald and Seymour A. Gopman.

      Laurence Gold argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were J. Albert Woll and Thomas E. Harris.

      Together with No. 73-795, National Labor Relations Board v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

        Lawrence T. Zimmerman filed a brief for the Graphic Arts Union Employers of America, a Division of the Printing Industries of America, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Mr. Justice Stewakt

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 8 (b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(B), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” The respondent unions in these consolidated cases called economic strikes against the employer companies. During the strikes, supervisory employees of the companies, some of whom .were members of bargaining units and some of whom were not, but all of whom were union members, crossed the picket lines and performed rank-and-file struck work, i. e., work normally performed by the nonsupervisory employees then on strike. The unions later disciplined these supervisors for so doing. The question to be decided is whether the unions committed unfair labor practices under §8 (b)(1)(B) when they disciplined their supervisor-members for crossing the picket lines and performing rank-and-file struck work during lawful economic strikes against the companies.

I

Since 1909, Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, one of the respondents in No. 73-795, has been recognized by the Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (Illinois Bell) and its predecessors as the exclusive bargaining representative for both rank- and-file and certain supervisory personnel, including general foremen, P. B. X. installation foremen, and building cable foremen. Rather than exercise its right to refuse to hire union members as supervisors, the company agreed to the inclusion of a union security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement which required that these supervisors, like the rank-and-file employees, maintain membership in Local 134. In addition, the bargaining agreement in effect at the time of this dispute contained provisions for the conditions of employment and certain wages of these foremen.

Other higher ranking supervisors, however, were neither represented by the union for collective-bargaining purposes nor covered by the agreement, although they were permitted to maintain their union membership. By virtue of that membership, these supervisors, like those within the bargaining units, received substantial benefits, including participation in the International’s pension and death-benefit plans and in group life insurance and old-age-benefit plans sponsored by Local 134.

Under the International’s constitution, all union members could be penalized for committing any of 23 enumerated offenses, including “[w]orking in the interest of any organization or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to, the I. B. E. W.,” App. 76, and “[w]orking for any individual or company declared in difficulty with a [local union] or the I. B. E. W.” Id., at 77.

Between May 8, 1968, and September 20, 1968, Local 134 engaged in an economic strike against the company. At the inception of the strike, Illinois Bell informed its supervisory personnel that it would like to have them come to work during the stoppage but that the decision whether or not to do so would be left to each individual, and that those who óhose not to work would not be penalized. Local 134, on the other hand, warned its supervisor-members that they would be subject to disciplinary action if they performed rank-and-file work during the strike. Some of the supervisor-members crossed the union picket fines to perform rank-and-file struck work. Local 134 thereupon initiated disciplinary proceedings against these supervisors, and those found guilty were fined $500 each. Charges were then filed with the NLRB by the Bell Supervisors Protective Association, an association formed by five supervisors to obtain counsel for and otherwise protect the supervisors who worked during the strike. The Board, one member dissenting, held that in thus disciplining the supervisory personnel, the union had violated §8 (b)(1)(B) of the Act, in accord with its decision of the same day in Local 2150, IBEW (Wisconsin Electric Power Co.), 192 N. L. R. B. 77 (1971), enforced, 486 F. 2d 602 (CA7 1973), cert. pending No. 73-877, holding:

“The Union's fining of the supervisors who were acting in the Employer’s interest in performing the struck work severely jeopardized the relationship between the Employer and its supervisors.
“The purpose of Section 8 (b)(1)(B) is to assure to the employer that its selected collective-bargaining representatives will be completely faithful to its desires. This cannot be achieved if the union has an effective method, union disciplinary action, by which it can pressure such representatives to deviate from the interests of the employer. . . .” 192 N. L. R. B., at 78.

Accordingly, the Board ordered the unions to rescind the fines, to expunge all records thereof, and to reimburse the supervisors for any portions of the fines paid.

The Florida Power & Light Co. (Florida Power), the petitioner in No. 73-556, has maintained a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Locals 641, 622, 759, 820, and 1263, represented by the System Council U-4, since 1953. That agreement does not require employees to become union members as a condition of employment, but many of its supervisory personnel have in fact joined the union. The company has elected to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of these supervisors, and certain aspects of their wages and conditions of employment are provided for in the agreement. In addition, other higher supervisory personnel not covered by the agreement were allowed to maintain union membership, and, although not represented by the union for collective-bargaining purposes, received substantial benefits as a result of their union membership, including pension, disability, and death benefits under the terms of the International’s constitution.

Since the same International union was involved in both No. 73-556 and No. 73-795, the union members of Florida Power bore the same obligations under the International’s constitution as did the union members of Illinois Bell. See supra, at 793. With respect to union discipline of supervisor members, however, the Florida Power collective-bargaining agreement itself provided:

“It is further agreed that employees in [supervisory] classifications have definite management responsibilities and are the direct representatives of the Company at their level of work. Employees in these classifications and any others in a supervisory capacity are not to be jacked up or disciplined through Union machinery for the acts they may have performed as supervisors in the Company’s interest. The Union and the Company do not expect or intend for Union members to interfere with the proper and legitimate performance of the Foreman’s management responsibilities appropriate to their classification....” App. 47.

From October 22, 1969, through December 28, 1969, the International union and its locals engaged in an economic strike against Florida Power. During the strike, many of the supervisors who were union members crossed the picket lines maintained at nearly all the company’s operation facilities, and performed rank-and-file work normally performed by the striking nonsupervisory employees. Following the strike, the union brought charges against those supervisors covered by the bargaining agreement as well as those not covered, alleging violations of the International union constitution. Those found guilty of crossing the picket fines to perform rank-and-file work, as opposed to their usual supervisory functions, received fines ranging from $100 to $6,000 and most were expelled from the union, thereby terminating their right to pension, disability, and death benefits. Upon charges filed by Florida Power, the Board, in reliance upon its prior decisions in Wisconsin Electric and Illinois Bell, held that the penalties imposed “struck at the loyalty an employer should be able to expect from its representatives for the adjustment of grievances and therefore restrained and coerced employers in their selection of such representatives,” in violation of §8 (b)(1)(B) of the Act. Accordingly, the Board ordered the union to cease and desist, to rescind and refund all fines, to expunge all records of the disciplinary proceedings, and to restore those disciplined to full union membership and benefits.

The Illinois Bell case was first heard by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 487 F. 2d 1113 (1973), and then on rehearing was consolidated with Florida Power and considered en banc. In a 5-4 decision, the court held that “[sjection 8(b)(1)(B) cannot reasonably be read to prohibit discipline of union members — supervisors though they be — for performance of rank-and-file struck work,” 159 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 300, 487 F. 2d 1143, 1171 (1973), and accordingly refused to enforce the Board’s orders. Section 8 (b) (1) (B), the court held, was intended to proscribe only union efforts to discipline supervisors for their actions in representing management in collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. It was the court’s view that when a supervisor forsakes his supervisory role to do work normally performed by nonsupervisory employees, he no longer acts as a managerial representative and hence “no longer merits any immunity from discipline.” Id., at 286, 487 F. 2d, at 1157. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 1156, to consider an important and novel question of federal labor law.

II

Section 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:

“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.”

The basic import of this provision was explained in the Senate Report as follows:

“[A] union or its responsible agents could not, without violating the law, coerce an employer into joining or resigning from an employer association which negotiates labor contracts on behalf of its members; also, this subsection would not permit a union to dictate who shall represent an employer in the settlement of employee grievances, or to compel the removal of a personnel director or supervisor who has been delegated the function of settling grievances.”

For more than 20 years after §8 (b)(1)(B) was enacted in 1947, the Board confined its application to situations clearly falling within the metes and bounds of the statutory language. Thus, in Los Angeles Cloak Joint Board ILGWU (Helen Rose Co.), 127 N. L. R. B. 1543 (1960), the Board held that §8 (b)(1)(B) barred a union from picketing a company in an attempt to force the employer to dismiss an industrial relations consultant thought to be hostile to the union. See also Local 986, Miscellaneous Warehousemen, Drivers & Helpers (Tak-Trak, Inc.), 145 N. L. R. B. 1511 (1964); Southern California Pipe Trades District Council No. 16 (Paddock Pools of California, Inc.), 120 N. L. R. B. 249 (1958). Similarly, the Board held that §8 (b)(1)(B) was violated by union attempts to force employers to join or resign from multi-employer bargaining associations, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Local 86 (Roofing Contractors Assn. of Southern California), 172 N. L. R. B. 2248 (1968); Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48 (Painting & Decorating Contractors of America, Inc.), 152 N. L. R. B. 1136 (1965) ; General Teamsters Local Union No. 324 (Cascade Employers Assn., Inc.), 127 N. L. R. B. 488 (1960), as well as by attempts to compel employers to select foremen from the ranks of union members, International Typographical Union & Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12 (Graphic Arts League), 87 N. L. R. B. 1215 (1949); International Typographical Union (American Newspaper Publishers Assn.), 86 N. L. R. B. 951 (1949), enforced, 193 F. 2d 782 (CA7 1951); International Typographical Union (Haverhill Gazette Co.), 123 N. L. R. B. 806 (1959), enforced, 278 F. 2d 6 (CA1 1960), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 365 U. S. 705 (1961).

In 1968, however, the Board significantly expanded the reach of § 8 (b)(1)(B), with its decision in San Fran cisco-Oakland Mailers’ Union No. 18 (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N. L. R. B. 2173. In that case, three union-member foremen were expelled from the union for allegedly assigning bargaining unit work in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Despite the absence of union pressure or coercion aimed at securing the replacement of the foremen, the Board held that the union had violated §8 (b)(1)(B) by seeking to influence the manner in which the foremen interpreted the contract:

“That Respondent may have sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and may have exerted its pressures upon the Charging Party by indirect rather than direct means, cannot alter the ultimate fact that pressure was exerted here for the purpose of interfering with the Charging Party’s control over its representatives. Realistically, the Employer would have to replace its foremen or face de facto nonrepresentation by them.” 172 N. L. R. B. 2173.

Subsequent Board decisions extended §8 (b)(1)(B) to proscribe union discipline of management representatives both for the manner in which they performed their collective-bargaining and grievance-adjusting functions, and for the manner in which they performed other supervisory functions if those representatives also in fact possessed authority to bargain collectively or to adjust grievances. See Detroit Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s Union 13, 192 N. L. R. B. 106 (1971); Meat Cutters Union Local 81, 185 N. L. R. B. 884 (1970), enforced, 147 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 458 F. 2d 794 (1972); Houston Typographical Union 87, 182 N. L. R. B. 592 (1970); Dallas Mailers Union Local 143 (Dow Jones Co., Inc.), 181 N. L. R. B. 286 (1970), enforced, 144 U. S. App. D. C. 254, 445 F. 2d 730 (1971); Sheet Metal Workers’ Internar tional Assn., Local Union 49 (General Metal Products, Inc.), 178 N. L. R. B. 139 (1969), enforced, 430 F. 2d 1348 (CA10 1970); New Mexico District Council of Carpenters & Joiners of America (A. S. Horner, Inc.), 176 N. L. R. B. 797 and 177 N. L. R. B. 600 (1969), both enforced, 454 F. 2d 1116 (CA10 1972); Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers & Photoengravers International (Toledo Blade Co., Inc.), 175 N. L. R. B. 1072 (1969), enforced, 437 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1971).

These decisions reflected a further evolution of the Oakland Mailers doctrine. In Oakland Mailers, the union had disciplined its supervisor-members for an alleged misinterpretation or misapplication of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the Board had reasoned that the natural and foreseeable effect of such discipline was that in interpreting the agreement in the future, the supervisor would be reluctant to take a position adverse to that of the union. In the subsequent cases, however, the Board held that the same coercive effect was likely to arise from the disciplining of a supervisor whenever he was engaged in management or supervisory activities, even though his collective-bargaining- or grievance-adjustment duties were not involved. Through the course of these decisions, §8 (b)(1)(B) thus began to evolve in the view of the Board and the courts “as a general prohibition of a union’s disciplining supervisor-members for their conduct in the course of representing the interests of their employers.” Toledo Locals Nos. 15—P & 272, Lithographers & Photoengravers International, 175 N. L. R. B., at 1080, or for acts “performed in the course of [their] management duties,” Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 147 U. S. App. D. C., at 377, 458 F. 2d, at 796.

In the present cases, the Board has extended that doctrine to hold that § 8 (b)(1)(B) forbids union discipline of supervisors for performance of rank-and-file work on the theory that the performance of such work during a strike is an activity furthering management’s interests. We agree with the Court of Appeals that § 8 (b)(1)(B) cannot be so broadly read. Both the language and the legislative history of §8 (b)(1)(B) reflect a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities, namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. By its terms, the statute proscribes only union restraint or coercion of an employer “in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances,” and the legislative history makes clear that in enacting the provision Congress was exclusively concerned with union attempts to dictate to employers who would represent them in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment.

The specific concern of Congress was to prevent unions from trying to force employers into or out of multi-em-ployer bargaining units. As Senator Taft, cosponsor of the legislation, explained:

“Under this provision it would be impossible for a union to say to a company, 'We will not bargain with you unless you appoint your national employers’ association as your agent so that we can bergain nationally.’ Under the bill the employer has a right to say, 'No, I will not join in national bargaining. Here is my representative, and this is the man you have to deal with.’ I believe the provision is a necessary one, and one which will accomplish substantially wise purposes.” 93 Cong. Rec. 3837.

That the legislative creation of this unfair labor practice was in no sense intended to cut the broad swath attributed to it by the Board in the present cases is pointed up by the further observation of Senator Taft:

“This unfair labor practice referred to is not perhaps of tremendous importance, but employees cannot say to their employer, ‘we do not like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y.’ That has been done. It would prevent their saying to the employer, ‘You have to fire Foreman Jones. We do not like Foreman Jones, and therefore you will have to fire him, or we will not go to work.’ ” 93 Cong. Rec. 3837.

Nowhere in the legislative history is there to be found any implication that Congress sought to extend protection to the employer from union restraint or coercion when engaged in any activity other than the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining and grievance __adj ustment. The conclusion is thus inescapable that a union’s discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of §8 (b)(1)(B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor’s conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer.

We may assume without deciding that the Board’s Oakland Mailers decision fell within the outer limits of this test, but its decisions in the present cases clearly do not. For it is certain that these supervisors were not engaged in collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, or in any activities related thereto, when they crossed union picket lines during an economic strike to engage in rank-and-file struck work.

Ill

It is strenuously asserted, however, that to permit a union to discipline supervisor-members for performing rank-and-file work during an economic strike will deprive the employer of the full loyalty of those supervisors. Indeed, it is precisely that concern that is reflected in these and other recent decisions of the Board holding that the statutory language “restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances” is not confined to situations in which the union’s object is to force a change in the identity of the employer’s representatives, but may properly be read to encompass any situation in which the union’s actions are likely to deprive the employer of the undivided loyalty of his supervisory employees. As the Board stated in Wisconsin Electric:

“During the strike of the Union, the Employer clearly considered its supervisors among those it could depend on during this period. The Union’s fining of the supervisors who were acting in the Employer’s interest in performing the struck work severely jeopardized the relationship between the Employer and its supervisors. Thus, the fines, if found to be lawful, would now permit the Union to drive a wedge between a supervisor and the Employer, thus interfering with the performance of the duties the Employer had a right to expect the supervisor to perform. The Employer could no longer count on the complete and undivided loyalty of those it had selected to act as its collective-bargaining agents or to act for it in adjusting grievances. Moreover, such fines clearly interfere with the Employer’s control over its own representatives.
“The purpose of Section 8 (b)(1)(B) is to assure to the employer that its selected collective-bargaining representatives will be completely faithful to its desires. This cannot be achieved if the union has an effective method, union disciplinary action, by which it can pressure such representatives to deviate from the interests of the employer.” 192 N. L. R. B., at 78.

The Board in the present cases echoes this view in arguing that “where a supervisor is disciplined by the union for performing other supervisory or management functions, the likely effect of such discipline is to make him subservient to the union’s wishes when he performs those functions in the future. Thus, even if the effect of this discipline did not carry over to the performance of the supervisor’s grievance adjustment or collective bargaining functions, the result would be to deprive the employer of the full allegiance of, and control over, a representative he has selected for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining purposes.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 73-795, p. 34.

The concern expressed in this argument is a very real one, but the problem is one that Congress addressed, not through § 8(b)(1)(B), but through a completely different legislative route. Specifically, Congress in 1947 amended the definition of “employee” in §2(3), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3), to exclude those denominated supervisors under §2 (11), 29 U. S. C. §152(11), thereby excluding them from the coverage of the Act. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974). Further, Congress enacted § 14 (a), 29 U. S. C. § 164 (a), explicitly providing:

“Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.”

Thus, while supervisors are permitted to become union members, Congress sought to assure the employer of the loyalty of his supervisors by reserving in him the right to refuse to hire union members as supervisors, see Carpenters District Council v. NLRB, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 55, 274 F. 2d 564 (1959); A. H. Bull S. S. Co. v. National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Assn., 250 F. 2d 332 (CA2 1957), the right to discharge such supervisors because of their involvement in union activities or union membership, see Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U. S. 653 (1974); see also Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F. 2d 466 (CA5 1966); NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F. 2d 545 (CA9 1960); NLRB v. Griggs Equipment, Inc., 307 F. 2d 275 (CA5 1962) ; NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F. 2d 571 (CA6 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 908 (1949), and the right to refuse to engage in collective bargaining with them, see L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 163 F. 2d 905 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 837 (1948).

The legislative history of §§ 2 (3) and 14 (a) of the Act clearly indicates that those provisions were enacted in response to the decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947), in which this Court upheld the Board’s finding that the statutory definition of “employee” included foremen, and that they were therefore entitled to the coverage of the Act in the absence of a decision by Congress to exclude them. In recommending passage of this legislation, the Senate Report noted:

“It is natural to expect that unless this Congress takes action, management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen. There is ail inherent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever they conflict with those of the rank and file.” Senate Report 5. (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar concern with this conflict-of-loyalties problem was reflected in the House Report:

“The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with . . . our policy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in the plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in a union that claims to be 'independent’ of the union of the rank and file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and file bosses them.
“The bill does not forbid anyone to organize. It does not forbid any employer to recognize a union of foremen. Employers who, in the past, have bargained collectively with supervisors may continue to do so. What the bill does is to say what the law always has said until the Labor Board, in the exercise of what it modestly calls its 'expertness’, changed the law: That no one, whether employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is obligated to those on the other side, or one whom, for any rear- son, he does not trust.” House Report 14^17. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that the conflict-of-loyalties problem that the Board has sought to reach under § 8 (b)(1)(B) was intended by Congress to be dealt with in a very different manner. As we concluded in Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U. S., at 661-662:

“This history compels the conclusion that Congress' dominant purpose in amending §§2(3) and 2 (11), and enacting § 14 (a) was to redress a perceived imbalance in labor-management relationships that was found to arise from putting supervisors in the position of serving two masters with opposed interests.”

While we recognize that the legislative accommodation adopted in 1947 is fraught with difficulties of its own, “[i]t is not necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute.” Col gate-Palmolive Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U. S. 355, 363 (1949).

Congress’ solution was essentially one of providing the employer with an option. On the one hand, he is at liberty to demand absolute loyalty from his supervisory personnel by insisting, on pain of discharge, that they neither participate in, nor retain membership in, a labor union, see Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., supra. Alternatively, an employer who wishes to do so can permit his supervisors to join or retain their membership in labor unions, resolving such conflicts as arise through the traditional procedures of collective bargaining. But it is quite apparent, given the statutory language and the particular concerns that the legislative history shows were what motivated Congress to enact § 8(b) (1) (B), that it did not intend to make that provision any part of the solution to the generalized problem of supervisor-member conflict of loyalties.

For these reasons, we hold that the respondent unions did not violate § 8 (b) (1) (B) of the Act when they disciplined their supervisor-members for performing rank-and-file struck work. Accordingly, the judgment is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

Believing that the majority has improperly substituted its judgment for a fair and reasonable interpretation by the Board of § 8 (b) (1) (B) in light of the statutory language and legislative history of that provision and other provisions dealing with supervisors, I must dissent substantially for the reasons expressed by the dissent below.

While it might be unreasonable for the Board to interpret § 8 (b)(1) (B) to permit an employer to require absolute loyalty from a supervisor-member in all circumstances, it is certainly apparent that during an economic strike, the supervisor’s performance of rank-and-file struck work, which represents a classic “use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute ...[,] is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U. S. 477, 495 (1960). “As management representatives, supervisory personnel may be requested by management to enhance the bargaining position of their employer during a dispute between it and the particular union involved.” 159 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 304, 487 F. 2d 1143, 1175 (1973) (en banc) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). Moreover, these union sanctions would unavoidably decrease a supervisor’s loyalty to his employer and thereby materially interfere with the performance of those responsibilities which the employer quite properly demands of him. Local Union No. 2150, IBEW (Wisconsin Electric Power Co.), 192 N. L. R. B. 77, 78 (1971), enforced, 486 F. 2d 602 (CA7 1973). Nothing in the language or legislative history of the statute contradicts the conclusion that

“ [w]hen a union disciplines a supervisor for crossing a picket line to perform rank-and-file work at the request of his employer, that discipline equally interferes with the employer’s control over his representative and equally deprives him of the undivided loyalty of that supervisor as in the case where the discipline was imposed because of the way the supervisor interpreted the collective bargaining agreement or performed his 'normal’ supervisory duties.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 305, 487 F. 2d, at 1176 (dissenting opinion).

In a steady progression of decisions leading up to the instant cases, the Board concluded that §8 (b)(1)(B) interdicted not only direct union pressure on an employer to replace a supervisor with collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment functions, but also indirect coercion of an employer by means of attempting, through the application of union discipline apparatus against supervisor-members, to dictate the manner in which they would exercise their supervisory responsibilities. Far from seeing the present cases as a radical extension of this principle, I view the Board’s decisions as a reasoned and realistic application of § 8 (b)(1)(B). For my part, the Board’s findings are based upon substantial record evidence and enjoy “a reasonable basis in law.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944). It may be true that special concerns prompted §8 (b)(1)(B), but the provision, as is often the case, was written more broadly. Nor do I see anything in the legislative history foreclosing the Board from applying the section to prevent unions from imposing sanctions on supervisors in the circumstances present here. This Court is not a super-Board authorized to overrule an agency’s choice between reasonable constructions of the controlling statute. We should not impose our views on the Board as long as it stays within the outer boundaries of the statute it is charged with administering. Respectfully, I dissent.

       Under a Letter of Understanding signed by Illinois Bell and Local 134 in 1954 and reaffirmed in 1971, it was provided:
      “As District Installation Superintendents and District Construction Supervisors their wages and conditions of employment will not be a matter of union-management negotiations but they will not be required to discontinue their membership in the union as it is recognized that they have accumulated a vested interest in pension and insurance benefits as a result of their membership in the union. However, any allegiance they owe to the union shall not affect their judgment in the disposition of their supervisory duties. Since they will have under their supervision employees who are members of unions other than Local 134 and perhaps some with no union affiliations whatever, the company will expect the same impartial judgment that it demands from all Supervisory personnel.” App. 113.

       Local 134 also imposed fines of $1,000 upon each of the five supervisors who had formed the Bell Supervisors Protective Association.

         International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and Local 134, 192 N, L. R. B. 85 (1971) (hereinafter Illinois Bell).

       System Council U-4 was named as a respondent in the complaint, but the Board dismissed all charges against it and entered an order only against the local Unions.

       Supervisory employees thus included are district supervisors, assistant district supervisors, assistant supervisors, plant superintendents, plant supervisors, assistant plant superintendents, distribution assistants, results assistants, assistant plant engineers, and subsection supervisors.

       In both Illinois Bell and this case, some of the supervisors involved, though union members, did not actively participate in union affairs and paid no dues. This was because they held “honorary” withdrawal cards, permitting them to return to active membership without paying normal initiation fees in the event they returned to rank-and-file work. These cards also permitted their holders to continue participation in the International's death-benefit fund. Other supervisors held “participating” withdrawal cards under which they continued to pay a fee equal to the monthly dues and remained eligible for pension, death, and disability benefits. The holders of these cards were also not permitted to participate in other union affairs.

        International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers System Council U-4, 193 N. L. R. B. 30, 31 (1971) (hereinafter Florida Power).

       159 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 487 F. 2d 1143 (1973).

         S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter Senate Report), pt. 1, p. 21 (1947).

       The Haverhill Gazette case was typical. There the union had demanded the inclusion of a “foreman clause” providing that the composing room foreman, who had the power to hire, fire, and process grievances, must be a member of the union, although he would be exempted from union discipline in certain circumstances for activities on behalf of management. As the Court of Appeals pointed out: “Not only would the clause . . . limit the employers’ choice of foremen to union members, but it would also give the unions power to force the discharge or demotion of a foreman by expelling him from the union.” 278 F. 2d, at 12.

       In Toledo Blade, two supervisors were disciplined by the union for working in a crew smaller than the contractually prescribed minimum and for doing production work in excess of the contractually permitted maximum. These activities occurred during an economic strike. The Trial Examiner, in a holding which foreshadowed the cases now before us, noted that such discipline is an unwarranted interference with the employer's control over its own representatives and
      “deprives the employer of the undivided loyalty of the supervisor to which it is entitled. If, therefore, the supervisor has actually been designated as the employer’s bargaining or grievance representative . . . the Union’s discipline of the supervisor is unquestionably a restraint upon, and coercion of the employer’s continuing its selection of, and reliance upon, the supervisor as its bargaining and grievance representative.” 175 N. L. R. B., at 1080-1081.
      In enforcing the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals noted: “This conduct of the union would further operate to make the employees reluctant in the future to take a position adverse to the union, and their usefulness to their employer would thereby be impaired.” 437 F. 2d, at 57.

       Indeed, in its original panel decision in the instant Illinois Bell case, the Court of Appeals spoke of §8 (b)(1)(B) as prohibiting union discipline of supervisory employees "for actions performed by them within the general scope of their supervisory or managerial responsibilities.” 159 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 248, 487 F. 2d 1113, 1119.

       As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned in enforcing the Board’s order in Wisconsin Electric:

      “What a supervisor’s proper functions are when the full complement of employees is at work under the regime of a collective bargaining agreement then in force is not determinative of supervisory responsibility during a strike. Otherwise, with no employees to supervise, many supervisors would simply have no managerial responsibilities during a strike. . . . Insofar as the supervisors work to give the employer added economic leverage, they are acting as members of the management team are expected to act when the employer and union are at loggerheads in their most fundamental of disputes.” 486 F. 2d 602, 608 (1973).

       Section 8 (b)(1)(B) was in fact a more restrained solution to the problem of multi-employer bargaining than originally proposed. Proposed § 9 (f) (i) of the House bill, H. R. 3020, would have prohibited multi-employer bargaining altogether, see H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter House Report), 8-9, 56 (1947).

       In a similar vein, Senator Ellender observed:
      “The bill prevents a union from dictating to an employer on the question of bargaining with union representatives through an employer association. The bill, in subsection 8 (b) (1) on page 14, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to coerce an employer either in the selection of his bargaining representative or in the selection of a personnel director or foreman, or other supervisory official. Senators who heard me discuss the issue early in the afternoon will recall that quite a few unions forced employers to change foremen. They have been taking it upon themselves to say that management should not appoint any representative who is too strict with the membership of the union. This amendment seeks to prescribe a remedy in order to prevent such interferences.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4143.

       To hold that union discipline of supervisor-members for performing rank-and-file struck work is not proscribed by § 8 (b) (1) (B) of the Act is not to hold that such discipline is expressly permitted by § 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, as construed in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 (1967). The decision in that case is inapposite where the union seeks to fine not employee-members but supervisor-members, who are explicitly excluded from the definition of “employee” by §2 (3), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3), and hence from the coverage of § 8 (b) (1) (A). See Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U. S. 653 (1974). The Act, therefore, neither protects nor prohibits union discipline of supervisor-members for engaging in rank-and-file struck work. In light of the fact that “Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions,” NLRB v. Drivers Local Union No. 639, 362 U. S. 274, 282-283 (1960), the admonition against regulation of the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining absent a particularized statutory mandate is particularly apt in this context. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 490 (1960). See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483 (1950); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327 (1958); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819 (1960).

       Title 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3) provides in pertinent part:
      “The term 'employee’ shall include any employee, . . . but shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor . . . .”
      Title 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11) provides:
      “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.”

       It has been held that this right is limited to the extent that an employer cannot discharge supervisory personnel for participation in the union where the discharge is found to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their protected rights, see NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F. 2d 209 (CA5 1954), or where it is prompted by the supervisors’ refusal to engage in unlawful activity, see NLRB v. Lowe, 406 F. 2d 1033 (CA6 1969).

       Prior to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, foremen and rank-and-file workers were often members of the same bargaining unit, and such conflict-of-interest problems as arose were dealt with through the collective-bargaining process. After first holding that supervisors could organize in independent or affiliated unions in Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N. L. R. B. 961 (1942) and Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 874 (1942), the Board, concerned by the conflict of interests created thereby, reversed its position in Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943), and held that except where foremen had been organized in 1935 when the Act was passed, supervisory units were not appropriate collective-bargaining units under the Wagner Act. The Board then reversed its position again in Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4, enforced, 157 F. 2d 80 (CA6), aff’d, 330 U. S. 485 (1947), holding that supervisory employees as a class were entitled to the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 277 (1974); Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U. S., at 658 n. 4. See also House Report 13-14. In discussing the proposed legislation dealing with supervisory personnel, the Senate Report stated:
      “It should be noted that all that the bill does is to leave foremen in the same position in which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had originally taken in 1943 in the Maryland Drydock case (49 N. L. R. B. 733). In other words, the bill does not prevent anyone from organizing nor does it prohibit any employer from recognizing a union of foremen. It merely relieves employers who are subject to the national act free from any compulsion by this National Board or any local agency to accord to the front line of management the anomalous status of employees.” Senate Report 5.

         Instructive as well is the fact that §§ 2 (3) and 14 (a) were both slightly modified versions of §§ 9 (a) and (c) of the Case bill, H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), which was passed by Congress in 1946 but vetoed by President Truman. See Senate Report 5. That earlier bill, however, contained no provision bearing any resemblance to §8 (b)(1)(B), which first appeared in S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).

       Further support for the proposition that § 8 (b) (1) (B) was addressed to a separate and far more limited problem than that of conflict of loyalties dealt with in §§2(3), 2(11), and 14(a) is found in the differing scope of the provisions themselves. Section 8 (b) (1) (B) purports to cover only those selected as the employer’s representative “for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances,” whereas the class of supervisors excluded from the definition of employees in § 2 (3) is defined by §2 (11) to include individuals engaged in a substantially broader range of activities. See supra, n. 17; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra. The two groups coincide only with respect to the function of grievance adjustment.

       There can be no denying that the supervisors involved in the present cases found themselves in something of a dilemma, and were pulled by conflicting loyalties. But inherent in the option afforded the employer by Congress, must be the recognition that supervisors permitted by their employers to maintain union membership will necessarily incur obligations to the union. See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors’ Assn., Inc., 118 N. L. R. B. 174, 182 (1957). See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951). And, while both the employer and the union may have conflicting but nonetheless legitimate expectations of loyalty from supervisor-members during a strike, the fact that the supervisor will in some measure be the beneficiary of any advantages secured by the union through the strike makes it inherently inequitable that he be allowed to function as a strikebreaker without incurring union sanctions.
      The supervisor-member is, of course, not bound to retain his union membership absent a union security clause, and if, for whatever reason, he chooses to resign from the union, thereby relinquishing his union benefits, he could no longer be disciplined by the union for working during a strike. NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge 405 v. NLRB, 412 U. S. 84 (1973).
      In these cases, the supervisors’ dilemma has been somewhat exaggerated by the petitioners. In Illinois Bell, the company did not command its supervisors to work during the strike and expressly left the decision to each individual. Those who chose not to work were not penalized, and some were in fact promoted by their employer after the strike had ended. Those who did work during the strike but performed only their regular duties were not disciplined by the union. In Florida Power, the record does not disclose whether the supervisors crossed the picket lines at the company’s request or not, but in any event, the union did not discipline those who did so only to perform their normal supervisory functions.

       Thus, while a union violates §8 (b)(1)(B) by striking to force an employer to agree to hire only union members as foremen, International Typographical Union Local 38 v. NLRB, 278 F. 2d 6 (CA1 1960), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 365 U. S. 705 (1961), see n. 7, supra, it can propose that supervisors be covered by the collective-bargaining agreement, Sakrete of Northern California, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F. 2d 902 (CA9 1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 961 (1965). Similarly, it is clear that an employer may request that supervisors be excluded from the bargaining unit, Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F. 2d 631 (CA6 1968); NLRB v. Corral Sportswear Co., 383 F. 2d 961 (CA10 1967).
      The parties in Florida Power in fact agreed to the inclusion in the collective-bargaining agreement of provisions governing the disciplining by the union of supervisory personnel, basically providing that such matters were to be dealt with through the grievance adjustment and arbitration provisions of the agreement. See supra, at 796.

       The court below acknowledged the practical realities of the use of supervisors during a strike: “in the highly automated public utility industries involved in these cases a small work force composed of strikebreakers and non-union management personnel can evidently provide sufficient manpower to continue vital services in a strike, thereby cutting into the strike’s effectiveness.” 159 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 290 n. 21, 487 F. 2d 1143, 1161 n. 21 (1973) (en banc).

       I do not read the Court to say that § 8 (b)(1) (B) would allow a union to discipline supervisor-members for performing supervisory or management functions, as opposed to customary rank-and-file work, during a labor dispute.


author: Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    PELL et al. v. PROCUNIER, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, et al.
    No. 73-918.
    Argued April 16-17, 1974
    Decided June 24, 1974

      StewaRT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and RehNQuist, JJ., joined and in Part I of which Powell, J., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 835. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 836.

      Herman Schwartz argued the cause for appellants in No. 73-918. With him on the briefs were Alvin J. Bron-stein and Melvin L. Wulf.

      John T. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees in No. 73-918 and for appellants in No. 73-754. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and Jean M. Bordon, Deputy Attorney General. Stanley A. Bass argued the cause for appellees in No. 73-754. With him on the brief were Jack Greenberg and Charles Stephen Ralston.

      Together with No. 73-754, Procunier, Corrections Director v. Hillery et al., also on appeal from the same court.

      Briefs of amici curiae in No. 73-918 were filed by Joseph A. Cali-jano, Jr., Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Richard M. Cooper, Daniel P. S. Paul, James W. Rodgers, and Robert C. Lobdell for the Washington Post Co. et al., and by Glen E. Clover and Robert J. King for the Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. Don H. Reuben and Lawrence Gunnels filed a brief for the Chicago Tribune Co. as amicus curiae in both cases.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases are here on cross-appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in the District Court were four California prison inmates — Booker T. Hillery, Jr., John Larry Spain, Bobby Bly, and Michael Shane Guile — and three professional journalists — Eve Pell, Betty Segal, and Paul Jacobs. The defendants were Raymond K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections, and several subordinate officers in that department. The plaintiffs brought the suit to challenge the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of § 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual, which provides that “[p]ress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted.” They sought both injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Section 415.071 was promulgated by defendant Procunier under authority vested in him by § 5058 of the California Penal Code and is applied uniformly throughout the State’s penal system to prohibit face-to-face interviews between press representatives and individual inmates whom they specifically name and request to interview. In accordance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, a three-judge court was convened to hear the case.

The facts are undisputed. Pell, Segal, and Jacobs each requested permission from the appropriate corrections officials to interview inmates Spain, Bly, and Guile, respectively. In addition, the editors of a certain periodical requested permission to visit inmate Hillery to discuss the possibility of their publishing certain of his writings and to interview him concerning conditions at the prison. Pursuant to § 415.071, these requests were all denied. The plaintiffs thereupon sued to enjoin the continued enforcement of this regulation. The inmate plaintiffs contended that § 415.071 violates their rights of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Similarly, the media plaintiffs asserted that the limitation that this regulation places on their newsgathering activity unconstitutionally infringes the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The District Court granted the inmate plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that § 415.071, insofar as it prohibited inmates from having face-to-face communication with journalists, unconstitutionally infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms. With respect to the claims of the media plaintiffs, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court noted that “[e]ven under § 415.071 as it stood before today’s ruling [that inmates’ constitutional rights were violated by § 415.071] the press was given the freedom to enter the California institutions and interview at random,” and concluded “that the even broader access afforded prisoners by today’s ruling sufficiently protects whatever rights the press may have with respect to interviews with inmates.” 364 F. Supp. 196, 200.

In No. 73-754, Corrections Director Procunier and the other defendants appeal from the judgment of the District Court that § 415.071 infringes the inmate plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In No. 73-918, the media plaintiffs appeal the court’s rejection of their claims. We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated the cases for oral argument. 414 U. ¡3. 1127, 1155.

I

In No. 73-754, the inmate plaintiffs claim that § 415.071, by prohibiting their participation in face-to-face communication with newsmen and other members of the general public, violates their right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the constitutional right of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require a journalist or any other citizen to listen to a person's views, let alone a right to require a publisher to publish those views in his newspaper, see Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F. 2d 151 (CA3 1967); Chicago Joint Board, Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F. 2d 470 (CA7 1970); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F. 2d 133 (CA9 1971), we proceed upon the hypothesis that under some circumstances the right of free- speech includes a right to communicate a person’s views to any willing listener, including a willing representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a willing publisher.

We start with the familiar proposition that “[1] awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972). In the First Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law.

An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence of crime. The premise is that by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people presumably find undesirable, they and others will be deterred from committing additional criminal offenses. This isolation, of course, also serves a protective function by-quarantining criminal offenders for a given period of time while, it is hoped, the rehabilitative processes of the corrections system work to correct the offender’s demonstrated criminal proclivity. Thus, since most offenders will eventually return to society, another paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody. Finally, central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves. It is in the light of these legitimate penal objectives that a court must assess challenges to prison regulations based on asserted constitutional rights of prisoners.

The regulation challenged here clearly restricts one manner of communication between prison inmates and members of the general public beyond the prison walls. But this is merely to state the problem, not to resolve it. For the same could be said of a refusal by corrections authorities to permit an inmate temporarily to leave the prison in order to communicate with persons outside. Yet no one could sensibly contend that the Constitution requires the authorities to give even individualized consideration to such requests. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). In order properly to evaluate the constitutionality of § 415.071, we think that the regulation cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the light of the alternative means of communication permitted under the regulations with persons outside the prison. We recognize that there “may be particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning,” and “that [the] existence of other alternatives [does not] extinguis[h] altogether any constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of access.” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765 (1972). But we regard the available “alternative means of [communication as] a relevant factor” in a case such as this where “we [are] called upon to balance First Amendment rights against [legitimate] governmental . . . interests.” Ibid.

One such alternative available to California prison inmates is communication by mail. Although prison regulations, until recently, called for the censorship of s+atements, inter alia, that “unduly complain” or “magnify grievances,” that express “inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views,” or that were deemed “defamatory” or “otherwise inappropriate,” we recently held that “the Department’s regulations authorized censorship of prisoner mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands,” and accordingly affirmed a district court judgment invalidating the regulations. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 416 (1974). In addition, we held that “[t]he interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a 'liberty’ interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.” Accordingly, we concluded that any “decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimal procedural safeguards.” Id., at 418, 417. Thus, it is clear that the medium of written correspondence affords inmates an open and substantially unimpeded channel for communication with persons outside the prison, including representatives of the news media.

Moreover, the visitation policy of the California Corrections Department does not seal the inmate off from personal contact with those outside the prison. Inmates are permitted to receive limited visits from members of their families, the clergy, their attorneys, and friends of prior acquaintance. The selection of these categories of visitors is based on the Director’s professional judgment that such visits will aid in the rehabilitation of the inmate while not compromising the other legitimate objectives of the corrections system. This is not a case in which the selection is based on the anticipated content of the communication between the inmate and the prospective visitor. If a member of the press fell within any of these categories, there is no suggestion that he would not be permitted to visit with the inmate. More importantly, however, inmates have an unrestricted opportunity to communicate with the press or any other member of the public through their families, friends, clergy, or attorneys who are permitted to visit them at the prison. Thus, this provides another alternative avenue of communication between prison inmates and persons outside the prison.

We would find the availability of such alternatives unimpressive if they were submitted as justification for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public. We have recognized, however, that “[t]he relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen,” and that the “internal problems of state prisons involve issues . . . peculiarly within state authority and expertise.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 492 (1973).

In Procunier v. Martinez, supra, we could find no legitimate governmental interest to justify the substantial restrictions that had there been imposed on written communication by inmates. When, however, the question involves the entry of people into the prisons for fáce-to-face communication with inmates, it is obvious that institutional considerations, such as security and related administrative problems, as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the corrections system itself, require that some limitation be placed on such visitations. So long as reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no discrimination in terms of content is involved, we believe that, in drawing such lines, “prison officials must be accorded latitude.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 321.

In a number of contexts, we have held “that reasonable 'time, place and manner’ regulations [of communicative activity] may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 398 (1953); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 46-48 (1966). “The nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.” Grayned, supra, at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “normal activity” to which a prison is committed — the involuntary confinement and isolation of large numbers of people, some of whom have demonstrated a capacity for violence — necessarily requires that considerable attention be devoted to the maintenance of security. Although they would not permit prison officials to prohibit all expression or communication by prison inmates, security considerations are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison to justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates.

In this case the restriction takes the form of limiting visitations to individuals who have either a personal or professional relationship to the inmate — family, friends of prior acquaintance, legal counsel, and clergy. In the judgment of the state corrections officials, this visitation policy will permit inmates to have personal contact with those persons who will aid in their rehabilitation, while keeping visitations at a manageable level that will not compromise institutional security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties. But when the issue involves a regulation limiting one of several means of communication by an inmate, the institutional objectives furthered by that regulation and the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials in their attempt to serve those interests are relevant in gauging the validity of the regulation.

Accordingly, in light of the alternative channels of communication that are open to prison inmates, we cannot say on the record in this case that this restriction on one manner in which prisoners can communicate with persons outside of prison is unconstitutional. So long as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression, it falls within the “appropriate rules and regulations” to which “prisoners necessarily are subject,” Cruz v. Beto, supra, at 321, and does not abridge any First Amendment freedoms retained by prison inmates.

II

In No. 73-918, the media plaintiffs ask us to hold that the limitation on press interviews imposed by § 415.071 violates the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They contend that, irrespective of what First Amendment liberties may or may not be retained by prison inmates, members of the press have a constitutional right to interview any inmate who is willing to speak with them, in the absence of an individualized determination that the particular interview might create a clear and present danger to prison security or to some other substantial interest served by the corrections system. In this regard, the media plaintiffs do not claim any impairment of their freedom to publish, for California imposes no restrictions on what may be published about its prisons, the prison inmates, or the officers who administer the prisons. Instead, they rely on their right to gather news without governmental interference, which the media plaintiffs assert includes a right of access to the sources of what is regarded as newsworthy information.

We note at the outset that this regulation is not part of an attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press’ investigation and reporting of those conditions. Indeed, the record demonstrates that, under current corrections policy, both the press and the general public are accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions. The Department of Corrections regularly conducts public tours through the prisons for the benefit of interested citizens. In addition, newsmen are permitted to visit both the maximum security and minimum security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any subject to any inmates whom they might encounter. If security considerations permit, corrections personnel will step aside to permit such interviews to be confidential. Apart from general access to all parts of the institutions, newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons to interview inmates selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if a newsman wishes to write a story on a particular prison program, he is permitted to sit in on group meetings and to interview the inmate participants. In short, members of the press enjoy access to California prisons that is not available to other members of the public.

The sole limitation on newsgathering in California prisons is the prohibition in § 415.071 of interviews with individual inmates specifically designated by representatives of the press. This restriction is of recent vintage, having been imposed in 1971 in response to a violent episode that the Department of Corrections felt was at least partially attributable to the former policy with respect to face-to-face prisoner-press interviews. Prior to the promulgation of § 415.071, every journalist had virtually free access to interview any individual inmate whom he might wish. Only members of the préss were accorded this privilege; other members of the general public did not have the benefit of such an unrestricted visitation policy. Thus, the promulgation of § 415.071 did not impose a discrimination against press access, but merely eliminated a special privilege formerly given to representatives of the press vis-á-vis members of the public generally.

In practice, it was found that the policy in effect prior to the promulgation of § 415.071 had resulted in press attention being concentrated on a relatively small number of inmates who, as a result, became virtual “public figures” within the prison society and gained a disproportionate degree of notoriety and influence among their fellow inmates. Because of this notoriety and influence, these inmates often became the source of severe disciplinary problems. For example, extensive press attention to an inmate who espoused a practice of noncooperation with prison regulations encouraged other inmates to follow suit, thus eroding the institutions’ ability to deal effectively with the inmates generally. Finally, in the words of the District Court, on August 21, 1971, “[d]uring an escape attempt at San Quentin three staff members and two inmates were killed. This was viewed by the officials as the climax of mounting disciplinary problems caused, in part, by its liberal posture with regard to press interviews, and on August 23 § 415.071 was adopted to mitigate the problem.” 364 F. Supp., at 198. It is against this background that we consider the media plaintiffs’ claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The constitutional guarantee of a free press “assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society,” Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 389 (1967), and secures “the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 77 (1964). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). By the same token, “'[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ ” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Correlatively, the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to receive such information and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S., at 762-763; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969).

In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972), the Court went further and acknowledged that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections/’ id., at 707, for “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,” id., at 681. In Branzburg the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were not abridged by requiring reporters to disclose the identity of their confidential sources to a grand jury when that information was needed in the course of a good-faith criminal investigation. The Court there could “perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings [was] insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial,” id., at 690-691.

In this case, the media plaintiffs contend that § 415.071 constitutes governmental interference with their news-gathering activities that is neither consequential nor uncertain, and that no substantial governmental interest can be shown to justify the denial of press access to specifically designated prison inmates. More particularly, the media plaintiffs assert that, despite the substantial access to California prisons and their inmates accorded representatives of the press — access broader than is accorded members of the public generally — face-to-face interviews with specifically designated inmates is such an effective and superior method of newsgathering that its curtailment amounts to unconstitutional state interference with a free press. We do not agree.

“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. . . . Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.” Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 684-685. Similarly, newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.

The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfering in any way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally. It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not available to members of the general public, that he is entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such sources, cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, and that government cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from such sources. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, supra. It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally. That proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court. Accordingly, since § 415.071 does not deny the press access to sources of information available to members of the general public, we hold that it does not abridge the protections that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the District Court’s judgment that § 415.071 infringes the freedom of speéeh of the prison inmates and affirm its judgment that that regulation does not abridge the constitutional right of a free press. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the cases are remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Powell,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

These cross-appeals concern the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a regulation of the California Department of Corrections that prohibits all personal interviews of prison inmates by representatives of the news media. This regulation is substantially identical to the United States Bureau of Prisons policy statement whose validity is at issue in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., post, p. 843. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in that case, post, p. 850, I would hold that California’s absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews impermissibly restrains the ability of the press to perform its constitutionally established function of informing the people on the conduct of their government. Accordingly, I dissent from the judgment of the Court.

The California cross-appeals differ from the Washington Post case in one significant respect. Here the constitutionality of the interview ban is challenged by prisoners as well as newsmen. Thus these appeals, unlike Washington Post, raise the question whether, inmates as individuals have a personal constitutional right to demand interviews with willing reporters. Because I agree with the majority that they do not, I join Part I of the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

These cases involve the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of prison regulations limiting communication between state and federal prisoners and the press. Nos. 73-754 and 73-918 are cross-appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California. 364 F. Supp. 196. Suit was brought in that court by four California state prisoners and three professional journalists challenging the constitutionality of California Department of Corrections Manual § 415.071 which imposes an absolute ban on media interviews with individually designated inmates.

The court upheld the prisoners’ claim that this regulation is violative of their right of free speech, and, in No. 73-754, the Director of the California Department of Corrections appeals from the court’s injunction against further enforcement of the regulation. As to the journalists’ claim, the court noted: “The media plaintiffs herein and amicus curiae argue that § 415.071 is violative of not only the prisoners’ First Amendment rights, but also the press’. The court disagrees.” 364 F. Supp., at 199. In No. 73-918, the journalists appeal this rejection of their claim.

No. 73-1265 involves a media challenge to Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A, †[ 4 (b)(6), which prohibits press interviews with any particular federal prisoner in any medium security or maximum security facility. The District Court held the total ban vio-lative of the First Amendment’s free press guarantee and enjoined its enforcement. 357 F. Supp. 770. The Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 161 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 494 F. 2d 994. As the majority notes, “[t]he policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding visitations to prison inmates do not differ significantly from the California policies” here under review.

I

In analyzing the prisoner challenge to California’s absolute ban on media interviews with individual inmates, I start with the proposition that “foremost among the Bill of Rights of prisoners in this country, whether under state or federal detention, is the First Amendment. Prisoners are still ‘persons’ entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due process. . . . Free speech and press within the meaning of the First Amendment are, in my judgment, among the pre-eminent privileges and immunities of all citizens.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 428-429 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment). With that premise, I cannot agree with the Court that California’s grossly overbroad restrictions on prisoner speech are constitutionally permissible. I agree that prison discipline, inmate safety, and rehabilitation must be considered in evaluating First Amendment rights in the prison context. First Amendment principles must always be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment.” Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506; Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180. But the prisoners here do not contend that prison officials are powerless to impose reasonable limitations on visits by the media which are necessary in particularized circumstances, to maintain security, discipline, and good order.

All that the prisoners contend, and all that the courts below found, is that these penal interests cannot be used as a justification for an absolute ban on media interviews because “[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. . . . Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438. And see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311.

It is true that the prisoners are left with other means of expression such as visits by relatives and communication by mail. But the State can hardly defend an overly broad restriction on expression by demonstrating that it has not eliminated expression completely.

As Mr. Justice Black has said:
' “I cannot accept my Brother Harlan’s view [in dissent] that the abridgment of speech and press here does not violate the First Amendment because other methods of communication are left open. This reason for abridgment strikes me as being on a par with holding that governmental suppression of a newspaper in a city would not violate the First Amendment because there continue to be radio and television stations. First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by one fell swoop.” NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 79-80 (concurring opinion).

A State might decide that criticism of its affairs could be reduced by prohibiting all its employees from discussing governmental operations in interviews with the media, leaving criticism of the State to those with the time, energy, ability, and inclination to communicate through the mails. The prohibition here is no less offensive to First Amendment principles; it flatly prohibits interview communication with the media on the government’s penal operations by the only citizens with the best knowledge and real incentive to discuss them.

I agree with the court below that the State’s interest in order and prison discipline cannot justify its total ban on all media interviews with any individually designated inmate on any matter whatsoever. Such a coarse attempt at regulation is patently unconstitutional in an area where “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone.” NAACP v. Button, supra, at 438; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 18. I would affirm the District Court’s judgment in this regard.

II

In Nos. 73-918 and 73-1265, the media claim that the state and federal prison regulations here, by flatly prohibiting interviews with inmates selected by the press, impinge upon the First Amendment’s free press guarantee, directly protected against federal infringement and protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the claim, the Court notes that the ban on access to prisoners applies as well to the general public, and it holds that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” Ante, at 834.

In dealing with the free press guarantee, it is important to note that the interest it protects is not possessed by the media themselves. In enjoining enforcement of the federal regulation in No. 73-1265, Judge Gesell did not vindicate any right of the Washington Post, but rather the right of the people, the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an informed manner. “The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know. The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) .

Prisons, like all other public institutions, are ultimately the responsibility of the populace. Crime, like the economy, health, education, defense, and the like, is a matter of grave concern in our society and people have the right and the necessity to know not only of the incidence of crime but of the effectiveness of the system designed to control it. “On any given day, approximately 1,500,000 people are under the authority of [federal, state and local prison] systems. The cost to taxpayers is over one billion dollars annually. Of those individuals sentenced to prison, 98% will return to society.” The public’s interest in being informed about prisons is thus paramount.

As with the prisoners’ free speech claim, no one asserts that the free press right is such that the authorities are powerless to impose reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of interviews to effectuate prison discipline and order. The only issue here is whether the complete ban on interviews with inmates selected by the press goes beyond what is necessary for the protection of these interests and infringes upon our cherished right of a free press. As the Court of Appeals noted in No. 73-1265: “[WJhile we do not question that the concerns voiced by the Bureau [of Prisons] are legitimate interests that merit protection, we must agree with the District Court that they do not, individually or in total, justify the sweeping absolute ban that the Bureau has chosen to impose.” 161 U. S. App. D. C., at 86, 494 F. 2d, at 1005.

It is thus not enough to note that the press — the institution which “[t]he Constitution specifically selected ... to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs” — -is denied no more access to the prisons than is denied the public generally. The prohibition of visits by the public has no practical effect upon their right to know beyond that achieved by the exclusion of the press. The average citizen is most unlikely to inform himself about the operation of the prison system by requesting an interview with a particular inmate with whom he has no prior relationship. He is likely instead, in a society which values a free press, to rely upon the media for information.

It is indeed ironic for the Court to justify the exclusion of the press by noting that the government has gone beyond the press and expanded the exclusion to include the public. Could the government deny the press access to all public institutions and prohibit interviews with all governmental employees? Could it find constitutional footing by expanding the ban to deny such access to everyone?

1 agree with the courts below in No. 73-1265 that the absolute ban on press interviews with specifically designated federal inmates is far broader than is necessary to protect any legitimate governmental interests and is an unconstitutional infringement on the public’s right to know protected by the free press guarantee of the First Amendment. I would affirm the judgment in this regard. Since this basic right is guaranteed against state infringement by the application of the First Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth, California’s absolute ban can fare no better. I would reverse the District Court’s rejection of this claim in No. 73-918.

       This litigation was first initiated before a single judge and proceeded for nearly a year with the court’s attention focused on the interview practice at San. Quentin State Penitentiary, where all the inmate plaintiffs are confined, where the interviews sought by the media plaintiffs were to occur, and where all the defendants, except Mr. Procunier, are employed. After the matter was briefed and argued, the single judge preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of § 415.071. Only then did the defendants bring to the court’s attention that § 415.071 was a regulation of statewide application. Thereafter a three-judge court was convened to pass on the constitutional validity of the regulation.

       The periodical has since ceased publication and its editors did not join the media plaintiffs in this litigation.

       There is some question as to whether the interview between Hil-lery and the magazine editors was denied under the authority of §415.071. Department of Corrections interview policy permits, on a case-by-case basis, meetings between inmate authors and their publishers. The defendants contend that the interview was denied here because the officials made an individualized determination that the meeting was not in fact necessary to effectuate the publication of Hillery’s works. Hillery, on the other hand, notes that the editors had indicated to the prison officials that they also wished to discuss with him the conditions in the prison in order to publish an article on that subject. Thus, it appears that the denial was in all likelihood based at least in part on § 415.071.

       This policy does not appear to be codified or otherwise expressly articulated in any generally applicable rule or regulation. The statement of visiting privileges for San Quentin State Penitentiary indicates that all visitors must be approved by the corrections officials and must be either “members of the family or friends of long standing.” It also permits visits by attorneys to their clients. Although nothing is said in this statement about visits by members of the clergy, there is no dispute among the parties that the practice of the Department of Corrections is to permit such visits. There is also no disagreement among the parties that this visitation policy is generally applied by the Department throughout the state corrections system.

       It is suggested by the inmate appellees that the use of the mails as an alternative means of communication may not be effective in
        the case of prisoners who are inarticulate or even illiterate. There is no indication, however, that any of the four inmates before the Court suffer from either of these disabilities. Indeed, the record affirmatively shows that two of the inmates are published writers. Although the complaint was filed as a class action, the plaintiffs never moved the District Court to certify the case as a class action as required by Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(3) and (c). Thus, the short answer to the inmates’ contention is that there is neither a finding by the District Court nor support in the record for a finding that the alternative channels of communication are not an effective means for the inmate appellees to express themselves to persons outside the prison.
      Even with respect to inmates who may not be literate or articulate, however, there is no suggestion that the corrections officials would not permit such inmates to seek the aid of fellow inmates or of family and friends who visit them to commit their thoughts to writing for communication to individuals in the general public. Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969). Merely because such inmates may need assistance to utilize one of the alternative channels does not make it an ineffective alternative, unless, of course, the State prohibits the inmate from receiving such assistance.

       The inmates argue that restricting their access to press representatives unconstitutionally burdens their First and Fourteenth Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. Communication with the press, the inmates contend, provides them with their only effective opportunity to communicate their grievances, through the channel of public opinion, to the legislative and executive branches of the government. We think, however, that the alternative means of communication with the press that are available to prisoners, together with the substantial access to prisons that California accords the press and other members of the public, see infra, at 830-831, satisfies whatever right the inmates may have to petition the goverment through the press.
      We also note that California accords prison inmates substantial opportunities to petition the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government directly. Section 2600 of the California Penal Code permits an inmate to correspond confidentially with any public officeholder. And various rules promulgated by the Department of Corrections explicitly permit an inmate to correspond with the Governor, any other elected state or federal official, and any appointed head of a state or federal agency. Similarly, California has acted to assure prisoners the right to petition for judicial relief. See, e. g., In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 500 P. 2d 873 (1972); In re Van Geldern, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 489 P. 2d 578 (1971); In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P. 2d 640 (1970). Section 845.4 of the California Government Code also makes prison officials liable for intentional interference with the right of a prisoner to obtain judicial relief from his confinement.

       This policy reflects a recognition that the conditions in this Nation’s prisons are a matter that is both newsworthy and of great public importance. As The Chief Justice has commented, we cannot “continue ... to brush under the rug the problems of those who are found guilty and subject to criminal sentence. ... It is a melancholy truth that it has taken the tragic prison outbreaks of the past three years to focus widespread public attention on this problem.” Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18 Vill. L. Rev. 165, 167 (1972). Along the same lines, The Chief Justice has correctly observed that “[i]f we want prisoners to change, public attitudes toward prisoners and ex-prisoners must change. ... A visit to most prisons will make you a zealot for prison reform.” W. Burger, For Whom the Bell Tolls, reprinted at 25 Record of N. Y. C. B. A. (Supp.) 14, 20, 21 (1970).

       It cannot be contended that because California permits family, friends, attorneys, and clergy to visit inmates, it cannot limit visitations by the press. No member of the general public who does not have a personal or professional relationship to the inmate is permitted to enter the prison and name an inmate with whom he would like to engage in face-to-face discourse. Thus, the press is granted the same access in this respect to prison inmates as is accorded any member of the general public. Indeed, as is noted in the text, the aggregate access that the press has to California prisons and their inmates is substantially greater than that of the general public.

       As Mr. Chief Justice Warren put the matter in writing for the Court in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965), “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”

      [This opinion applies also to No. 73-1265, Saxbe et al. v. Washington Post Co. et al., post, p. 843.]

       Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Inspection of Federal Facilities at Leavenworth Penitentiary and the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners 2 (Comm. Print 1974).

        Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219.

       “While Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, stated that the First Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it has become customary to rest on the broader foundation of the entire Fourteenth Amendment. Free speech and press within the meaning of the First Amendment is, in my judgment, one of the pre-eminent privileges and immunities of all citizens.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 428-429 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment).