text:
    No. 75-1064.
    Kremens, Hospital Director, et al. v. Bartley et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 424 U. S. 964.] Motion of Bernard G. Segal, Esquire, on behalf of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for additional time to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. Alternative request for divided argument granted.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 75-1150.
    City of Philadelphia et al. v. New Jersey et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 425 U. S. 910.] Motion of appellants for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted and each side is given 21 days within which to file such a brief. Request for further oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 75-1578.
    Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida v. Sykes.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 883.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that William F. Casler, Esquire, of St. Petersburg Beach, Fla., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 75-1687.
    United States Trust Company of New York, Trustees v. New Jersey et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 427 U. S. 903.] Motion of Securities Industry Assn, for leave to file a reply brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-1693.
    Blackledge, Warden, et al. v. Allison.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 814.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., Esquire, of Marion, N. C., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 76-5433.
    Tecton v. Merhige et al., U. S. District Judges.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 76-180.
    No. 76-183.
    No. 76-5193.
    No. 76-5200.
    Smith, Administrator, New York City Human Resources Administration, et al. v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform et al.; Shapiro, Executive Director, New York State Board of Social Welfare, et al. v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform et al.; Rodriguez et al. v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform et al.; and Gandy et al. v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform et al.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 883.] Motion of appellee foster parents for appointment of independent counsel to represent appellant foster children denied.


text:
    No. 76-235.
    Wright, Director, Department of Transportation of Hawaii v. Stop H-3 Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of the State of Washington for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 76-321.
    Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-447.
    Milliken, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Bradley et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1126.
    No. 75-1385.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison et al.; and International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Hardison et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-439.
    Territory of Guam v. Olsen.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1511.
    Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1741.
    Chrysler Corp. v. Lacy.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6227.
    Allegretti v. Casscles, Correctional Superintendent.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud, Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6737.
    Tubbs v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th^Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6888.
    Walker v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6955.
    Van Curen v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-94.
    No. 76-5004.
    No. 76-5181.
    No. 76-5182.
    Henry, aka Obadele v. United States; Shillingford v. United States; Norman, aka Ana v. United States; and Austin, aka Quaddus, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir., Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-157.
    Intrieri v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-162.
    Robbins et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-166.
    Dixon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-175.
    O’Malley v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-176.
    Alessi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-195.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-202.
    Supinski v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-203.
    No. 76-346.
    King v. United States; and Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-215.
    Drumright v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-216.
    Cordova v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 76-229.
    Alphin et al. v. Henson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-230.
    Giskin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-231.
    Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia, et al. v. Coleman et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-234.
    O’Donnell v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-304.
    Burns v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-317.
    O—J Transport Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-411.
    Tulsa Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local 354 v. Broadway Theatre League of Tulsa, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-426.
    Feldman et al. v. Kunkin.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-428.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers et al. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-433.
    Favrot v. Barnes.
   Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-511.
    Salomon et al. v. Crown Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5041.
    Wong v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5073.
    Papa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5129.
    Lee v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crina. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5135.
    No. 76-5211.
    Perno v. United States; and Capito v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5137.
    Gaither v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5153.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5157.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5185.
    Edmondson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5186.
    Tyczkowski v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5189.
    Chavez-Cortinas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5203.
    Berry v. Arnold, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5210.
    Curtis v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5212.
    Hampton v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5220.
    Nunley v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5221.
    Aebischer v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5226.
    Truax v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5234.
    Dinino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5245.
    Farries v. United States Parole Commission.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5253.
    Hicks v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5254.
    Hicks v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5258.
    No. 76-5259.
    Tucker v. United States; and Clardy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5312.
    Mapp v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5315.
    Angulo-Marron v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5319.
    Stevens v. Warden, Leavenworth Penitentiary.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5327.
    Pokini v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5336.
    Villalobos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5391.
    Tensley v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5401.
    Tecton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5423.
    Kelley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5434.
    Parham v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crina. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5436.
    Liptroth v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crina. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5442.
    Bussey v. Harrison et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5457.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal., Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5466.
    Brown v. Bollinger et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5479.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1105.
    Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-278.
    Jolley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to strike respondent’s brief and certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 76-318.
    Bykofsky et al. v. Borough of Middletown et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari and set case for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance establishing a nonemergency curfew for juveniles in Middle-town, Pa., a rural community with a population of about 10,000. That ordinance makes it unlawful, except in limited circumstances, for minors to be on the streets during specified hours, and for parents knowingly or “by inefficient control” to allow their children to do so.

The freedom to leave one’s house and move about at will is “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937), and hence is protected against state intrusions by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cin cinnati, 402 U. S. 611 (1971) ; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939). To justify a law that significantly intrudes on this freedom, therefore, a State must demonstrate that the law is “narrowly drawn” to further a “compelling state interest.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 155-156 (1973). For this reason, I have little doubt but that, absent a genuine emergency, see, e. g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F. 2d 1277 (CA4 1971), a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive constitutional scrutiny. This is true even though such a general curfew, like the instant ordinance, would protect those subject to it from injury and prevent them from causing “nocturnal mischief.”

The question squarely presented by this case, then, is whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to lesser protection than those of adults. The prior decisions of this Court provide no clear answer. We have recognized that “[cjonstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.” Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511 (1969). But we also have acknowledged that “the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.” Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, supra, at 74; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944). Not surprisingly, therefore, the lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions in addressing the issue raised here. Annot., 59 A. L. R. 3d 321, 339-348 (1974).

Because I believe this case poses a substantial constitutional question — one which is of importance to thousands of towns with similar ordinances — I would grant a writ of certiorari.

       Similar issues currently are pending before the Court in No. 75-1064, Kremens 7. Bartley, probable jurisdiction noted, 424 U. S. 964 (1976).

       See Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 66 (1958).


text:
    No. 76-421.
    California v. Mobbs.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-436.
    Dupont Circle Citizens Assn. v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission et al.
   Ct. App>. D. C. Motion to defer consideration of petition and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-437.
    Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Pennsauken v. Lowenstein et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-5152.
    Stockheimer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970).


text:
    No. 76-441.
    Riegel Textile Corp. v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 75-1555.
    No. 75-1670.
    No. 75-6766.
    No. 75-6797.
    No. 75-6858.
    No. 76-111.
    Conley v. Hampton, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission, et al., Levy et al. v. City of New York et al., Collins v. Arkansas, Neal v. Arkansas, Cox v. Mississippi, Salvucci v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., et al.,
   ante, p. 820;

ante, p. 805;

ante, p. 808;

ante, p. 808;

ante, p. 849; and

ante, p. 860. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 76-5074.
    Burke v. Supreme Court et al.,
   ante, p. 888. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 17, 1976
    No. 76-639.
    American Paper Institute, Inc., et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    November 19, 1976
    No. 75-6992.
    Roldan et al. v. Minter et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Mass, Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    November 24, 1976
    No. A-423.
    Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court in and for Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, et al.
   This is a renewed application for partial stay of a pretrial order of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, pending filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari. The order enjoined law enforcement officials and other public employees, as well as prosecution and defense counsel, “from disclosing any information or making any comment concerning” a delinquency proceeding then pending in that court against a juvenile. The order also restrained all members of the news media from “publishing, broadcasting or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of said minor child in connection with this pending case.” On application for prohibition and mandamus challenging the restraint on the press, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained the order. The application for stay here filed by Oklahoma Publishing Co. also challenges only the injunction against publishing the name and picture of the minor. It does not challenge the restraint on counsel or public employees; nor does it challenge the Oklahoma statute requiring juvenile proceedings to be held in private unless specifically ordered by the judge to be open to the public.

It appearing that the name and picture of the minor involved in this case were made available to the public as a result of a hearing held at the outset of this case which was in fact open to the press, the application for stay of the order enjoining publication of the name or picture of the minor, presented to Me. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, is granted pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari unless earlier terminated by further order of the Court. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 567-568 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 491, 495 (1975).

Me. Justice Beennan, while not subscribing to this order, would also grant the stay.


text:
    November 29, 1976
    No. 76-373.
    Interstate Commerce Commission v. Central of Georgia Railroad Co. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.

Me. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


author: Mr. Justice White,

text:
    No. 76-431.
    Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana v. Arnold et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Me. Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.

Indiana has passed a statute requiring first trimester abortions to be performed by a

“physician in a hospital or a licensed health facility as defined in I. C. 1971, 16-10-2, which offers the basic safeguards as provided by a hospital admission, and has immediate hospital backup . . . Ind. Code § 35-1-58.5-2 (a)(1) (1975).

Without inquiring into the question whether this statute is a reasonable method of protecting the health of the mother, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held the statutory provision unconstitutional. This Court affirms summarily. There is nothing in the United States Constitution which limits the State’s power to require that medical procedures be done safely, and were it not for some language in this Court’s recent decisions in cases touching on abortion, the District Court’s decision should and would be summarily reversed. Because I do not believe that the language in this Court’s recent abortion decisions compels the extraordinary result reached by the District Court, I dissent from the summary affirmance and would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument.

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), this Court held that a pregnant woman has a constitutional right to be free from state prohibition in making her decision to abort a fetus. So far as I can tell, those cases do not elevate the decision to have an abortion to a higher constitutional status than the decision to have lifesaving or health-preserving operations. Clearly, all such operations are subject to reasonable regulation by state legislatures to assure that they are performed safely.

The lower court struck down the statute in this case without inquiring whether it was a reasonable health regulation. In doing so, the court relied on the following language in Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163:

“It follows that, from and after this point \i. e., the first trimester], a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.
“This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.”

Read literally, this language would prevent the State from passing any health or safety regulations applicable to abortions performed in the first trimester no matter what the risk to maternal health. Plainly, the language cannot be read literally, and we have declined to so read it in the past. In Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U. S. 9 (1975), we sustained a statute which proscribed abortion by a nonphysician saying:

“Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict a decision by a woman, with the advice of her physician, to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester because neither its interest in maternal health nor its interest in the potential life of the fetus is sufficiently great at that stage. But the insufficiency of the State’s interest in maternal health is predicated upon the first trimester abortion’s being as safe for the woman as normal childbirth at term, and that predicate holds true only if the abortion is performed by medically competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety for the woman. See 410 U. S., at 149-150, 163; cf. statement of Douglas, J., in Cheaney v. Indiana, 410 U. S. 991 (1973), denying certiorari in 259 Ind. 138, 285 N. E. 2d 265 (1972). Even during the first trimester of pregnancy, therefore, prosecutions for abortions conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interference. . . Id., at 10-11. (Emphasis added.)

Here, the Indiana statute seeks to insure that the “abortion is performed . . . under conditions insuring maximum safety for the woman.” Absent a finding that the statute does not reasonably achieve its purpose, it cannot properly be held unconstitutional.

The court below also relied on this Court's holding in Doe v. Bolton, supra, at 195, invalidating a requirement that abortions be performed only in hospitals accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals, a private organization. The Court there said:

“Appellants and various amici have presented us with a mass of data purporting to demonstrate that some facilities other than hospitals are entirely adequate to perform abortions if they possess these qualifications. The State, on the other hand, has not presented persuasive data to show that only hospitals meet its acknowledged interest in insuring the quality of the operation and the full protection of the patient. We feel compelled to agree with appellants that the State must show more than it has in order to prove that only the full resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other appropriately licensed institution, satisfy these health interests.” (Emphasis added.)

Here there was no trial, there were no facts presented to the District Court in any other form, and no finding that the requirement of Indiana law is unreasonable. In any event, Indiana has provided that abortions may be performed in “other appropriately licensed institution[s].” Doe v. Bolton, supra, is thus no support for the lower court’s finding.

Statutes passed by the legislatures of the States may not be so lightly struck down. Normal principles of constitutional adjudication apply even in cases dealing with abortion. I therefore respectfully dissent from affirmance and would note probable jurisdiction and set this case for oral argument.

      The Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), also relied for its holding on the language in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), quoted above, indicating that all health regulations with respect to first trimester abortions are invalid. As already noted, the language is not to be applied literally.


text:
    No. 76-492.
    Exon, Governor of Nebraska, et al. v. McCarthy et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Neb.


text:
    No. 76-401.
    City of Lawrence v. City of Indianapolis et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ind. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. . Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5240.
    Moser v. Oregon.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5514.
    Raitport v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5523.
    Johnson v. Oregon.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-416.
    No. 76-474.
    No. 76-475.
    No. 76-499.
    No. 76-500.
    No. 76-501.
    Delaware State Board of Education et al. v. Evans et al.; Newark School District v. Evans et al.; New Castle-Gunning Bedford School District v. Evans et al.; Mount Pleasant School District et al. v. Evans et al.; Marshallton-McKean School District v. Evans et al.; and Claymont School District et al. v. Evans et al.
   Appeals from D. C. Del. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


text:
    No. 76-469.
    Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School District.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-385.
    General Atomic Co. v. Felter, Judge, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to consider whether judgment is based upon federal or state grounds, or both. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33(1972).


text:
    No. 75-1413.
    Stanton, Administrator, Indiana State Department of Public Welfare, et al. v. Bond et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 905.] Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (Oct. 19, 1976).

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. A-327 (76-5549).
    Skinner v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for bail, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-360.
    Radda v. Acito et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Application for stay, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 75-699.
    Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Goldfarb.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 424 U. S. 906.] Motion of appellee for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 75-1261.
    No. 75-1355.
    Knebel, Secretary of Agriculture v. Hein et al.; and Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Iowa, et al. v. Hein et al.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. Iowa., [Probable jurisdiction noted, 426 U. S. 904.] Motion of appellants for divided argument granted. Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Stephen L. Urbanczyk, Esquire, to argue pro hac vice on behalf of appellant in No. 75-1261 granted.


text:
    No. 75-1631.
    No. 75-1694.
    No. 75-6782.
    Kirkland et al. v. New York State Department of Correctional Services et al., Jones et al. v. New York City Human Resources Administration et al., Douglas v. Florida,
   ante, p. 823;

ante, p. 825; and

ante, p. 871. Counsel for respondents requested to file responses to petitions for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 75-1707.
    Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al. v. Hodory.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 814.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 76-1721.
    United States v. Chadwick et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 814.] Motion of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-6297.
    Fiallo, a minor, by Rodriguez, et al. v. Levi, Attorney General, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 426 U. S. 919.] Motion of John E. Kirklin, Esquire, to permit Janet M. Calvo to argue pro hac vice on behalf of appellants granted.


text:
    No. 75-6527.
    Ingraham et al. v. Wright et al.
   C. A. 5th. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 990.] Motion of American Psychological Association Task Force on the Rights of Children and Youth for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae after argument denied.


text:
    No. 76-358.
    New York v. Brown.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Motion to grant certiorari and set case for oral argument with No. 76-120, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., denied.


text:
    No. 76-672.
    Burlington Northern, Inc., et al. v. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo. Motion of appellee Sterling Colorado Beef Co. to expedite disposition of appeal denied.


text:
    No. 76-5206.
    Roberts v. Louisiana.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari having been granted on November 8, 1976 [ante, p. 938], grant is hereby limited to the following question: “Whether the imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death for the crime of first-degree murder of a police officer under the law of Louisiana violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”


text:
    No. 76-5644.
    Guerrero v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 75-1605.
    Nixon v. Administrator of General Services et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 75-1874.
    Jones, Secretary, Department of Correction of North Carolina, et al. v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-422.
    Dothard, Director, Department of Public Safety of Alabama, et al. v. Rawlinson et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-423.
    Puyallup Tribe, Inc., et al. v. Department of Game of Washington et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari granted. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 75-6968.
    Sweeney v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-18.
    Flores et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-19.
    Henning, aka Warren v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-62.
    Eisenberg v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-105.
    No. 76-141.
    Faith Hospital Assn. v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc., of St. Louis et al.; and St. Louis University v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc., of St. Louis et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-130.
    Pennsylvania et al. v. Kobelinski, Administrator, Small Business Administration, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-136.
    Herrera v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Orange. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-184.
    Lovisi et ux. v. Zahradnick, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-237.
    In re Application of Hay.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-239.
    Bamford et al. v. Garrett et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-246.
    Velasco et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-249.
    Poll v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-267.
    Fletcher v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-268.
    Almendarez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-284.
    Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States et al.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-271.
    No. 76-272.
    Bank of the Commonwealth v. Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd., et al.; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-294.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-296.
    Adcox v. Caddo Parish School Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-302.
    Allen et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-314.
    Wuco v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-320.
    Dover Corp., Norris Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-325.
    Thornton et al., Administrators v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-329.
    Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vasquez et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-330.
    Parker v. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-345.
    Vardy v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-347.
    Patton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-351.
    Boteler, Director, Mississippi State Highway Department v. National Wildlife Federation et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-354.
    Vasquez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-363.
    Amshu Associates, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-380.
    Gino et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-382.
    Carborundum Co. v. United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-400.
    Jones et al. v. Pacific Intermountain Express et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-403.
    Fenlon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-409.
    Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College et al. v. Skehan.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-417.
    Kielwein v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-424.
    Saia Electric, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-425.
    Saia et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-430.
    Estate of Klein et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-472.
    Coon et ux. v. Charles W. Bliven & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-473.
    Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-477.
    McNamara et al. v. TCS-1 et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-479.
    Zachry v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-485.
    Ford v. Harris County Medical Society et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-505.
    Lora et al. v. Board of Education of the City of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-508.
    Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Tights, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-521.
    Smith v. Grimm et ux.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-527.
    Lowe v. City of Jackson.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-582.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-591.
    Borrayo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-606.
    Erb v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5062.
    Marsh v. Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5101.
    Hofmann v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5110.
    Houston v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5119.
    Bankhead v. Cowin et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5130.
    Hernandez-Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5140.
    Burko v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied...


text:
    No. 76-5144.
    Zilka v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5174.
    Toothman v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5176.
    Gray v. Reed, Acting Chairman, U. S. Parole Commission, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5179.
    Kaufman v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5188.
    Brockett v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5228.
    Rudolph v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5249.
    Effler v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5250.
    Wilson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5251.
    Cole v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5255.
    Thomas et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5260.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5263.
    Taylor v. Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5268.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5269.
    Estell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5273.
    Kenyon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5275.
    Mapp v. Warden, New York State Correctional Institution for Women.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5276.
    Ferranto v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5277.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5282.
    Rivera v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5287.
    Logan v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5291.
    Joyner v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5292.
    Ingram v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5295.
    Silverstein v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5305.
    Kesner v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5307.
    Mathis v. Secretary of Defense.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5309.
    Brooks et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5310.
    Ortiz-Aguayo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5320.
    Kessler v. Wise, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5321.
    Pless v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5322.
    Daniel v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5328.
    Coleman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5329.
    Castro-Ayon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5330.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5334.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5338.
    DeVaughn v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5339.
    Terrell v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5347.
    Larry v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5362.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5378.
    Homcy v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5389.
    Tilghman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5390.
    Rushlow v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5439.
    Coulter v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5472.
    Fabricant v. California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5486.
    Pehler v. Schoen, Corrections Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5487.
    Buzynski v. Oliver et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5488.
    Barbosa v. Curry.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5504.
    Locke v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5515.
    Wright v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5519.
    Walsh v. Board of Trustees, Police Pension Fund, Article I.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5525.
    Strano et al. v. Croy, Secretary, New Mexico Department of Hospitals and Institutions.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5529.
    Greenwood v. Superior Court of Calirornia, County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5538.
    Sanders et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5541.
    Higgins v. Metter et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 76-5545.
    Pederson v. Stewart-Warner Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5618.
    Hancock v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5623.
    Florence v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5626.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5627.
    Mancinas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5628.
    Savage v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5630.
    Felder et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5636.
    Cluck v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-312.
    Alcan Sales, Division of Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-432.
    White et al. v. Arthur Murray, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-448.
    Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., et al. v. Jenkins.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-5231.
    No. 76-5404.
    No. 76-5455.
    No. 76-5530.
    Gibson v. Georgia; Isaacs v. Georgia; Dungee v. Georgia; and Stephens v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct, Ga. Certiorari denied. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; id., at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and vacate judgments insofar as they leave undisturbed the sentences of death.


text:
    No. 76-463.
    Sterns, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Princeton Bank & Trust Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-509.
    Singer Co. v. Perma Research & Development Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of SCM Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1450.
    No. 75-1451.
    No. 75-1487.
    No. 75-1505.
    No. 75-1506.
    No. 75-1581.
    No. 75-1598.
    No. 75-1621.
    No. 75-1667.
    No. 75-1743.
    No. 75-1815.
    No. 75-1825.
    Department of Social Services of Iowa et al. v. West Height Manor, Inc.; and Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Iowa, et al. v. Hutchison Nursing Home, Inc., et al., Smith v. United States, Evans et al. v. United States, A. W. Thompson, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Hondo Drilling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, Leemon v. Illinois, Global Marine Development of California, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., Slovak v. Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, United States v. Pomponio et al., Doyle et al. v. Sheehan, Gabriel v. United States et al., Littrell v. United States,
   ante, p. 884;

ante, p. 817;

ante, p. 818;

ante, p. 818;

ante, p. 818;

ante, p. 804;

ante, p. 821;

ante, p. 868;

ante, p. 10;

ante, p. 870;

ante, p. 877; and

ante, p. 831. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 75-1845.
    No. 75-1857.
    No. 75-1860.
    No. 75-6790.
    No. 75-6861.
    No. 75-6906.
    No. 75-6938.
    No. 75-6952.
    No. 75-6984.
    No. 76-117.
    No. 76-197.
    No. 76-5026.
    Stryker et al. v. Village of Oak Park et al., Gabriel et al. v. Levin et al., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, U. S. Marshal, Munoz v. Civil Service Commission of Illinois, Lunz v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent, Smith v. California, Blackford v. National Labor Relations Board, Reale v. United States, Krancberg v. Revlon Corp., Mitchell et al. v. Ingram, Commissioner of Education of Tennessee, et al., Mohasco Industries, Inc., et al. v. Spound et al., Wilson v. United States,
   ante, p. 832;

ante, p. 833;

ante, p. 833;

ante, p. 845;

ante, p. 849;

ante, p. 851;

ante, p. 853;

ante, p. 854;

ante, p. 856;

ante, p. 861;

ante, p. 886; and

ante, p. 897. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 75-492.
    Rosner v. United States,
   427 U. S. 911. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall would grant petition for rehearing, vacate order denying certiorari, grant certiorari, vacate judgment, and remand case for further consideration in light of United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976).


text:
    December 3, 1976
    No. A-453.
    Gilmore v. Utah.
   State of Utah is requested to file prior to 5 p.m., e.s.t., Tuesday, December 7, 1976, a response to application for stay of execution filed December 2, 1976, particularly with respect to the allegations of said application bearing upon the validity of Gary Mark Gilmore’s waiver of his right to appeal, and to file with said response, unless impossible or wholly impractical, a transcript of the hearing held on November 1, 1976, on the motion for a new trial, a transcript of the proceedings of November 10, 1976, before the Utah Supreme Court, a transcript of the proceedings before the Board of Pardons on November 30, 1976, and a transcript of the proceedings of December 1, 1976, before the sentencing judgment at which a date for execution of the sentence was set. The State’s response may be filed separately from and prior to the filing of the transcripts should the State care to do so. Application for stay of execution granted pending filing of said response and further action of the Court on the application for stay.

The Chief (Jtjstice, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and Mr. Justice Stevens would deny the stay.


text:
    December 6, 1976
    No. 76-504.
    Nader et al. v. Schaffer, Secretary of State of Connecticut, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Conn.


text:
    No. 76-487.
    Bell v. Hopper, Warden.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for -writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-460.
    No. 76-467.
    Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York; and Ramsgate Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of New York.
   Appeals from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as petitions for certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1875.
    Pacific Legal Foundation v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for consideration. of question of mootness.


text:
    No. 75-5831.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Moody v. Daggett, ante, p. 78.


text:
    No. 76-72.
    Solimine v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for consideration of petitioner’s claim that his convictions and concurrent sentences for theft and receiving the same property must be dealt with as were the similar convictions and sentences of codefendant Sclafani.


author: Mr. Justice Powell,

text:
    No. 76-200.
    Austin Independent School District v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976).

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall dissent because they are persuaded that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted and applied the relevant decisions of this Court.

Mr. Justice Powell,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

concurring.

I concur in the action of the Court, and agree that there would be no need to address the issue of remedy if the Court of Appeals upon reconsideration of its opinion in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), should conclude that there was no constitutional violation. I would nonetheless include the issue of remedy in the remand order because of what appears to be a misapplication of a core principle of desegregation cases. In such cases, this Court has repeatedly emphasized:

“[T]he task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, ‘the condition that offends the Constitution.’ A federal remedial power may be exercised ‘only on the basis of a constitutional violation’ and, ‘[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.’ ” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 738 (1974), quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).

As suggested by this Court’s remand premised upon Washington v. Davis, supra, the Court of Appeals may have erred by a readiness to impute to school officials a segregative intent far more pervasive than the evidence justified. That court also seems to have erred in ordering a desegregation plan far exceeding in scope any identifiable violations of constitutional rights.

As is true in most of our larger cities with substantial minority populations, Austin has residential areas in which certain racial and ethnic groups predominate in the population. Residential segregation creates significant problems for school officials who seek to achieve a nonsegregated school district. In Austin those problems are perhaps accentuated by the geography of the city. Acknowledging these difficulties, the Court of Appeals noted:

“ ‘Countless efforts by school officials, consultants, and visiting teams have found it impossible to produce significant desegregation by boundary line changes, contiguous pairing of schools, magnet schools, or other effective means short of massive crosstown busing incident to noncontiguous pairing of . . . schools. . . .’ ” United States v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F. 2d 380, 394 (CA5 1976).

The Court of Appeals then concluded that nothing short of extensive cross-town transportation would suffice.

Designed to achieve a degree of racial balance in every school in Austin, the desegregation plan endorsed by the Court of Appeals is remarkably sweeping. For kindergarten through eighth grade, the plan requires crosstown busing of all students in schools that are over 50% minority or 90% “Anglo.” For kindergarten through fourth grade, the students in East Austin attending the relevant schools will be bused through the congested center of the city to West Austin. For fifth through eighth grade, the flow will be reversed. The high schools will be integrated by a system of “feeder” schools. This plan requiring transportation of from 18,600 to 25,000 students, consisting of from 32% to 42% of the entire school population, was ordered despite the District Court’s conclusion that such a plan would involve a “ 'risk to health and probable impingement of the educational process’ ... for students younger than the sixth grade . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53.

Whether the Austin school authorities intentionally discriminated against minorities or simply failed to fulfill affirmative obligations to eliminate segregation, see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the remedy ordered appears to exceed that necessary to eliminate the effect of any official acts or omissions. The Court of Appeals did not find and there is no evidence in the record available to us to suggest that, absent those constitutional violations, the Austin school system would have been integrated to the extent contemplated by the plan. If the Court of Appeals believed that this remedy was coextensive with the constitutional violations, it adopted a view of the constitutional obligations of a school board far exceeding anything required by this Court.

The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across the country — -North and South — is the imbalance in residential patterns. Such residential patterns are typically beyond the control of school authorities. For example, discrimination in housing — whether public or private — cannot be attributed to school authorities. Economic pressures and voluntary preferences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.

I do not suggest that transportation of pupils is never a permissible means of implementing desegregation. I merely emphasize the limitation repeatedly expressed by this Court that the extent of an equitable remedy is determined by and may not properly exceed the effect of the constitutional violation. Thus, large-scale busing is permissible only where the evidence supports a finding that the extent of integration sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school authorities fulfilled their constitutional obligations in the past. Such a standard is remedial rather than punitive, and would rarely result in the widespread busing of elementary-age children. A remedy simply is not equitable if it is disproportionate to the wrong.

       Although in an earlier stage in this case other findings were made which evidenced segregative intent, see, e. g., United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 864-869 (CA5 1972) (actions by school authorities contributing to segregation of Mexican-American students), the opinion below apparently gave controlling effect to the use of neighborhood schools:
      “At least in the Texas schools, where we have held that Mexiean-American students are entitled to the same benefits of Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954),] as are blacks, school authorities may not constitutionally use a neighborhood assignment policy that creates segregated schools in a district with ethnically segregated residential patterns. A segregated school system is the foreseeable and inevitable result of such an assignment policy. When this policy is used, we may infer that the school authorities have acted with segregative intent.” 532 F. 2d 380, 392 (CA5 1976).

       Apparently misconceiving the import of language in Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 442 (1968), to the effect that there should be no “Negro” school or “white” school, the Court of Appeals seems to believe every school must be racially balanced to some degree. Green involved a rural, sparsely populated county with only two schools. Much of its language is irrelevant to a large urban school system. Moreover, the effect of applying the language of Green to such a system may be to stigmatize — without justification — schools that can be identified as having a racial or ethnic majority. The Solicitor General, speaking for the United States in this case, commented that “there is nothing inherently inferior about all-black schools, any more than all-white schools are inferior, when the separation is not caused by state action.” Brief for United States 8 n. 5.

       This “triggering” condition of the plan requires further comment. Describing it, the Court of Appeals stated as follows:
      “Elementary and junior high schools that are between 50 and 90 percent Anglo are defined as 'naturally desegregated’ and would remain unchanged. When changing demographic patterns came any of these schools to fall outside of the ‘naturally desegregated’ range, the schools would be brought within the Finger Plan 4-4-4 system.” 532 F. 2d, at 395 (emphasis added).
      This aspect of the plan clearly reveals that the plan is designed to achieve some predetermined racial and ethnic balance in the schools rather than to remedy the constitutional violations committed by the school authorities. As described by the Court of Appeals, the plan is impermissible under our holding in Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976).

       In defending the high percentage of children proposed to be bused in Austin, the Court of Appeals relied on superficially comparable percentages of children that were to be transported under the plan approved in Swann. The school district before the Court in Swann included Mecklenburg County as well as the city of Charlotte. As the Court said:
      “The area is large — 550 square miles — spanning roughly 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south.” 402 U. S., at 6. Although it included a metropolitan area, much of the district was rural, requiring the trailsportation of pupils quite apart from desegregative efforts. Because of this situation in Swann, it is unduly simplistic to compare the percentages of children bused. The situation in Austin is simply not comparable.

       See Keyes, 413 U. S., at 22A-253 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The tendency of citizens of common national or ethnic origins to form homogeneous residential patterns in our cities is a familiar demographic characteristic of this country.

       See id., at 242-252.

       A related equitable principle, also applicable in fashioning a desegregation remedy, is that a court has the duty to “balanc[e] . . . the individual and collective interests.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 738. The individual interests at issue here are as personal and important as any in our society. They relate to the family, and to the concern of parents for the welfare and education of their children — especially those of tender age. Families share these interests wholly without regard to race, ethnic origin, or economic status. It also is to be remembered, in granting equitable relief, that a desegregation decree is unique in that its burden falls not upon the officials or private interests responsible for the offending action but, rather, upon innocent children and parents.


text:
    No. 76-355.
    Reed, Acting Chairman, U. S. Parole Commission, et al. v. Byrd et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Moody v. Daggett, ante, p. 78.


text:
    No. 76-5537.
    Street v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Davis v. Georgia, ante, p. 122.


text:
    No. A-384.
    Moreau et al. v. Tonry et al.
   Second application to vacate stay orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, entered on November 3 and 4, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-404.
    Bowler et ux. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for preliminary injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-446.
    White v. Texas.
   Application for stay of execution of sentence of death imposed by the District Court of Collin County, Tex., presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending timely filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should petition for writ of certiorari be timely filed, then this stay is to remain in effect pending disposition of case in this Court.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist would deny the stay.


text:
    No. 72, Orig.
    South Dakota v. Nebraska.
   It is ordered that the Honorable Oren Harris, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, be, and he is hereby, appointed Special Master in this case. The Special Master shall have authority to fix the time and conditions for filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses, the allowances to him, the compensation paid ‘to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his reports, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master becomes vacant during the recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court herein.

The motion of Robert J. Foley et al. for leave to intervene is referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 810.]


text:
    No. 75-6933.
    Brown v. Ohio.
   Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 893.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Robert Plautz, Esquire, of Cleveland, Ohio, is appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 75-1583.
    Morris et al. v. Gressette, President Pro Tem, South Carolina Senate, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-60.
    Briscoe, Governor of Texas, et al. v. Levi, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-413.
    United States et al. v. Larionoff et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-143.
    Splawn v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 76-444.
    No. 76-454.
    Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc., et al. v. Caputo et al.; and International Terminal Operating Co., Inc. v. Blundo et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certierari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-545.
    United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 75-1796.
    James, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1798.
    No. 75-1810.
    No. 75-6911.
    Bernstein et al. v. United States; Behar v. United States; and Cardona v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1864.
    Garmise v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-5215.
    Gaddy v. Michael et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-5594.
    Orr v. Levi, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6603.
    McDaniels v. California Adult Authority.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6621.
    Dorman v. United States Parole Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6703.
    Reese v. United States Parole Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6872.
    Gonzales v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-73.
    Young et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-100.
    Southern Railway Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-152.
    In re Connors.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-164.
    Campos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-179.
    Markert v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-206.
    Conley v. Sawyer.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-235.
    Wright, Director, Department of Transportation of Hawaii v. Stop H-3 Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-292.
    Ashley et al. v. San Antonio Telephone Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-306.
    Mitchell v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-310.
    Pacific Gas Transmission Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-335.
    Williams v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-337.
    No. 76-356.
    Davis v. United States; and Charnay v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-376.
    No. 76-5237.
    Mackey v. United States; and Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-381.
    Conley v. Hampton, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-388.
    Niedermeyer et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-394.
    Timmons v. Lawton et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-402.
    Albergo v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-420.
    Russo v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-427.
    Groves et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-429.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-434.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-510.
    Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel et al.
   Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 3d denied.


text:
    No. 76-514.
    Bell, dba Crescendo Publishing Co. v. Combined Registry Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-516.
    Salvucci v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-524.
    Arms et ux. v. Watson, Trustee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-532.
    MacLaren et al. v. B-I-W Group, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-536.
    Pattison v. Spratlan.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 12th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-538.
    Leitch v. Oregon Department of Revenue et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-540.
    City of Chicago et al. v. Dixie Dairy Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-543.
    Record Club of America, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-547.
    Simmons v. Council Bluffs Savings Bank, Executor.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-574.
    Carolina Power & Light Co. et al. v. Moore.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-578.
    Brannon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-588.
    Ruiz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-611.
    Fairbanks v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-631.
    Davis v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5082.
    Potts v. Bruce, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5236.
    Morgan v. Massey, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5241.
    Neal v. Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5278.
    Hufford et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5280.
    Harris v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5281.
    Hammers v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5299.
    Chandler v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5351.
    Grigsby v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5355.
    Hayes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5359.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5419.
    Haff v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5448.
    Woodring v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5468.
    Littlefield v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assn.
   Sup.Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5547.
    Adams v. Power.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5548.
    Edmonds v. Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5551.
    Spencer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5552.
    Jackson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5558.
    Manriquez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5566.
    Griffin v. Kansas.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5568.
    Coleman v. Stone, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5572.
    Spates v. Connecticut.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5633.
    Wallace v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5647.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5651.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5673.
    Shoemaker v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5674.
    Ramirez-Rodriquez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-198.
    Louisiana v. Mora.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-254.
    Verit Industries et al. v. Ohashi.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-531.
    Arkansas Department of Labor v. Fairfield Communities Land Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-488.
    Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner, the unsuccessful defendant in respondent’s patent infringement suit, challenges the validity of respondent’s patent on the ground that the invention was obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. The patented device is a headset used for the transmission and reception of voice communications by telephone operators, aircraft pilots, air traffic controllers, and others. The District Court found, and the record clearly demonstrates, that all of the individual elements of the patented headset were used in the prior art, although no single item of the prior art used the complete combination. 403 F. Supp. 138, 142 (SDNY 1975). The court nevertheless held that the invention was not obvious on the basis of evidence showing a long unfulfilled need, prior failures in satisfying that need, and immediate acceptance and substantial commercial success. Id., at 148.

This Court long ago established that the sine qua non of patentability is “invention” and that the protection of the patent law does not extend to an “improvement [that] is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267 (1851). In 1952, Congress codified this judicial standard by requiring that the improvement sought to be patented “would [not] .have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U. S. C. § 103. Whether referred to as “invention” or “nonobviousness” the requirement is based on the constitutional command that patents be used to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1966). Patents may not be issued to remove existing knowledge from the public domain or to limit access to materials already available.

Where, as here, the patent claim is for a combination of existing elements, “[c]ourts should scrutinize [such] claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements.” Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152 (1950). When a device consists of a mere aggregation, of segments of the prior art, there is an increased danger that a patent will withdraw into its monopoly what is already known and add nothing to the sum of useful knowledge. Thus, to be patentable, a combination of elements, must produce something more than the sum of the pre-existing elements; there must be a synergistic result that is itself nonobvious. Ibid. Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U. S. 57, 61 (1969); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U. S. 273, 282 (1976).

The District Court here made no finding that the combination produced a synergistic or any other nonobvious result. This failure is not surprising. Each element in the combination had previously been used to perform the same function it now performs in respondent’s device. Although no one had used the full combination of all elements, each element had been combined with one or more of the others in a variety of different headsets. Some of the elements in respondent’s invention appeared as long ago as 1878 in a British patent (Pritchett). More recently, two patented inventions used every part of respondent’s combination in the same manner the parts were used by respondent. A headset patented in 1949 (Olney) employed a headband holding both a receiver and microphone, and an acoustic tube carrying the sound from the user’s mouth to the microphone. Received messages, however, were heard through a flat earpiece resting on the external ear. The 1961 Guttner patent of a hearing aid perfected the concept of miniature, electronic equipment mounted so as to minimize wearer discomfort. Guttner used a post-auricular housing fitting behind the external ear; the housing contained a miniature microphone and receiver connected to each other by an amplifier. A flexible acoustic tube extended from the receiver and terminated with a plug in the ear canal. Although'other devices also made use of miniature electronic equipment, acoustic tubes, and ear plugs, the District Court expressly found that these two examples of the prior art contained all the necessary elements and required only slight modification to produce respondent’s device:

“Adding Olney’s voice tube to Guttner’s device, and modifying Guttner’s electrical circuit, as also taught by Olney, so that the microphone and the receiver, instead of being connected to one another through an amplifier, are connected to separate external transmitting and receiving circuits, would produce the complete combination . . . .” 403 F. Supp., at 143.

Rather than ending its inquiry with this total lack of any nonobvious improvement over the prior art, the District Court went on to consider the need for respondent’s device, prior failures in “discovering” it despite intensive efforts, and respondent’s commercial success. Based solely on its historical review of various efforts to improve on previously-existing devices, the court concluded:

“Indeed, as simple as the invention now appears, it would seem presumptuous to the point of arrogance to conclude that it was 'obvious’ to persons of ordinary skill in the art, notwithstanding their lengthy and unsuccessful struggle to achieve such results.” Id., at 148.

The District Judge gave no indication as to what aspect of respondent’s device could be considered nonobvious to the assiduous researchers in the field. Rather, he found that the requirement of nonobviousness was satisfied simply because no one had created the successful combination before respondent secured his patent. In so doing, the court departed from the clear teachings of this Court’s prior cases.

Although the Court has held that need, prior failure, and commercial success may, “in a close case, tip the scales in favor of patentability,” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U. S. 275, 279 (1944), it has consistently and repeatedly rejected the claim that the standard of invention or nonobviousness can be satisfied solely by these “objective” criteria. Anderson’s-Black Rock, supra, at 61; Great A. & P. Tea Co., 340 U. S., at 153; Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U. S. 560, 567 (1949). In Graham v. John Deere Co., supra, we reaffirmed and refined the basic test of patentability and firmly established the role of “secondary” factors in the procedure for determining when the standard of nonobviousness is met:

“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.” 383 U. S., at 17-18.

Applying this test in Graham, we expressly rejected a claim that the secondary considerations could fill the void left by “exceedingly small and quite nontechnical mechanical differences in a device which was old in the art.” Id., at 35-36. The court below should also have rejected that same claim here.

As a general proposition, I agree that our crowded docket does not permit review of every case where error has been committed; but this case seems to me to involve such a significant departure from longstanding principles of patent law that the petition for certiorari should be granted.

       Respondent’s headset consists of a miniature microphone and miniature receiver mounted in a small capsule supported near the wearer’s ear; a self-supporting, bendable, acoustic tube extending from the microphone to a point adjacent to the wearer’s mouth; and a similar tube extending from the receiver and having at its outer end a plug inserted in the wearer’s ear canal. The device is supported by clipping the capsule to a pair of eyeglasses or a headband or by a post-auricular housing hooking over the ear.

       The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in a short, uncritical, per curiam opinion. 535 E. 2d 1397 (1976).

       Section 103 provides in full:

        “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”

       After relating an admittedly impressive account of prior failures, the court summarized as follows:
      “The record establishes that there was a long-recognized need for a lighter, more comfortable headset to eliminate the fatigue and pain, rather extravagantly termed 'ear torture,’ involved in the wearing of all previously known headsets over extended periods. A number of organizations with access to the best minds in the field, including the airlines, the U. S. Air Force and FAA, as well as the industry suppliers whom they con-suited, had been actively searching over a number of years for an answer to the problem, but had found none, despite the availability of all the components ultimately employed by [respondent] Larkin. When Larkin’s headset was publicly disclosed, it received almost immediate recognition as an elegant and ingenious solution. It enjoyed impressive commercial success. It revolutionized thinking in the headset industry, overcoming ingrained prejudices, and its concepts have been widely copied by competitors, one of whom aptly termed it the progenitor of a 'new generation of headsets/ ” 403 F. Supp., at 148.

       Again, the District Court’s silence on this key issue is explained by the record and by the court’s own findings. The court found that the Guttner device required (1) modification of its electrical circuit and (2) the addition of the Olney voice tube to produce respondent’s invention. As found by the District Court, the first change was taught by Olney itself, indicating that it was neither novel nor nonobvious. The second change involved the use of an element that had served its function in numerous headsets since the Pritchett patent of 1878. It hardly requires an inventor to perceive that a hollow, voice-conducting tube on one headset can be used as a hollow voice-conducting tube on another.


text:
    No. 76-541.
    Grenader et al. v. Spitz et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-550.
    Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ayres.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 75-6975.
    No. 76-165.
    No. 76-186.
    No. 76-5114.
    No. 76-5376.
    Schremp v. Hall et al., Restaurant Industries Corp. et al. v. Bylicki et al., Restaurant Industries Corp. et al. v. Bylicki et al., In re K, a Minor, by Atchley, Alers v. Toledo et al.,
   ante, p. 855;

ante, p. 891;

ante, p. 896;

ante, p. 907; and

ante, p. 928. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    December 8, 1976
    No. 76-777.
    Connor et al. v. Finch, Governor of Mississippi, et al.
   D. C. S. D. Miss. Requests of Peggy J. Connor et al. and of the United States to treat application [A-421] as an expedited appeal from judgment denying injunctive relief entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on November 18, 1976, granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.

Parties may file and exchange such motions under Rule 16 as they desire, and they shall file and exchange briefs on the merits on or before the close of business Monday, February 7, 1977. Responsive briefs, if any, shall be filed and exchanged on or before the close of business Monday, February 21, 1977. Oral argument set for Monday, February 28, 1977.

It is further ordered that any and all other appeals from the above judgment be taken by filing notices of appeal and perfected pursuant to the Rules of the Court by filing statements as to jurisdiction on or before the close of business Wednesday, January 5, 1977.

In all other respects, the application presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and. by him referred to the Court, is denied. Reported below: See 419 F. Supp. 1072 and 1089 ; 422 F. Supp. 1014.


text:
    December 13, 1976
    No. 76-491.
    Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., et al. v. Burke, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 76-405.
    No. 76-443.
    Gabriel v. United States et al.; and Wesson et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. J.


text:
    No. 76-81.
    Winters v. Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services, et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-573.
    First American Bank & Trust Co. v. George.
   Appeal from C. A. 8th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers. whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-579.
    Spencer et al., dba Ted Spencer & Sons Auto Service Center v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Nanticoke.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it appearing that there is no final judgment of the highest court of a state wherein judgment could be had as required by 28 U. S. C. § 1257.


text:
    No. 76-407.
    Winters v. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.


text:
    No. 76-190.
    Estelle, Corrections Director v. Cole.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976).


text:
    No. A-400 (76-5635).
    Hannah v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Application for bail, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    Nos. A-403 and A-437 (76-5690).
    McDonald v. Tennessee et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Applications for stay and other relief, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.