author: Mr. Justice Stevens

text:
    ALEXANDER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY v. FIOTO
    No. 75-1704.
    Argued March 1, 1977
    Decided April 4, 1977
    Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except Rehnquist, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Stephen L. Urbanczyk argued the cause for appellant pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and William Kanter.

      David Goldfarb argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kalman Finkel, Helaine Barnett, Joan Mangones, and John E. Kirklin.

        Penrose Lucas Albright filed a brief for the United States Merchant Marine Academy Alumni Assn. as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

After World War II Congress authorized retirement pay for nonregular military personnel with at least 20 years of service in the Reserves or National Guard. However, under 10 U. S. C. § 1331 (c), those who had been in the Reserves before World War II are not eligible for benefits unless they performed active duty during wartime. Appellee had no such active duty. He contends that he may not be denied benefits for which he is otherwise eligible simply because he had prewar service in the Guard. In the District Court he argued that the statute violates the equal protection principle inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In this Court he also argues that the statute should be construed as merely providing that his years of prewar service must be ignored for the purpose of determining his eligibility. We reject both arguments.

The case is here on direct appeal from a summary judgment entered by a three-judge District Court sitting in the Eastern District of New York. That court ordered the Secretary of the Army to pay retirement benefits to appellee and to place the members of the class he represents on the retirement rolls. 409 F. Supp. 831 (1976). Because the three-judge court was properly convened, we have jurisdiction even though the decision of the District Court can be read as resting on its interpretation of the statute rather than squarely on constitutional grounds.

Section 1331 (c) plainly discriminates between persons who were in the Reserves before August 16, 1945, and those who performed their first service after that date. The statute says that the members of the former group are not “eligible for retired pay” unless they performed active duty during specified dates when the country was engaged in hostilities.

Appellee acknowledges that the statute creates two distinct classes of reservists. He contends, however, that the members of his class are not ineligible for benefits, but merely are prevented from counting pre-World War II service as part of the 20 years of “satisfactory service” needed to qualify. The argument is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute. Moreover, the legislative history reveals a congressional purpose inconsistent with appellee’s interpretation.

Section 1331 (c) is a description of persons who are not eligible for retirement pay. It does not describe periods of service which may or may not be counted toward eligibility. Its text plainly disqualifies the persons it describes. Furthermore, § 1331 (a), which defines the conditions of eligibility for retirement pay, states that a person meeting these conditions is entitled to retirement pay “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” It is difficult to believe that language this clear could be the product of a drafting error. We are persuaded that Congress meant what it so plainly said.

An explanation for excluding certain persons from benefits—as opposed to excluding part of their service—was given by the chairman, of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the hearings on the bill. He pointed out that the provision would “make certain that no one who drops out of the Reserves to avoid service in the war is qualified under the bill. This is concurred in by the services and the Reserves.” The Senate Committee had been advised by the Army Chief of Staff that: “The purpose of reservists was to fight in the war. If he did not fight in the wars we did have, we feel he should not qualify.”

These comments describe a purpose to disqualify certain persons rather than merely a purpose to treat a part of their service as unsatisfactory.

In 1958 Congress amended § 1331 (c) to remove the disqualification for persons who served in the Korean conflict. The history of this amendment reflects an intent to make retirement pay available for otherwise “ineligible persons” rather than a desire to classify periods of service as satisfactory. The statutory language and its legislative history convincingly demonstrate that Congress made a deliberate decision to deny retirement pay to members of appellee’s class.

Appellee argues that the Constitution requires equal treatment for all reservists with 20 years of satisfactory service and that it is totally irrational to disqualify some of them simply because they had additional years of service before August 16, 1945. We disagree.

The retirement pay program was intended to provide an inducement to qualified personnel to remain active in the Reserves in order to maintain a cadre of trained soldiers for use in active duty if the need should arise. Such an inducement would be unlikely to achieve its intended purpose if offered to persons who had dropped out of the Reserves to avoid service during the war. Moreover, the decision not to offer the inducement to reservists whose failure to serve was involuntary, reflects a predictive judgment that a past obstacle to active service may have a continuing effect on future availability.

When Congress enacted the statute in 1948, it did not penalize the members of appellee’s class; it merely made a judgment that they were somewhat less desirable prospects for future active duty than others, and therefore decided not to offer them a special inducement to remain in the Reserves. The statutory exclusion is unquestionably the product of a deliberate and rational choice which Congress had the constitutional power to make.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       The Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, 10 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq., authorizes retirement pay for reservists and guardsmen who have accumulated 20 years of eligible service, are 60 years of age, and are not disqualified by § 1331 (c).

       Section 1331 (c) provides:
      “No person who, before August 16, 1945, was a Reserve of an armed force, or a member of the Army without component or other category covered by section 1332 (a) (1) of this title except a regular component, is eligible for retired pay under this chapter, unless he performed active duty after April 5, 1917, and before November 12, 1918, or after September 8, 1940, and before January 1, 1947, or unless he performed active duty (other than for training) after June 26, 1950, and before July 28, 1953.”

       Appellee served in the National Guard from 1933 to 1940 and again from 1947 to 1967. The record does not reveal the reason for appellee’s failure to serve during World War II. Although he was in the Guard between June 26, 1950 and July 28, 1953, he performed no active duty (other than for training) during that time; again, the record does not reveal why he did not perform active duty during the Korean hostilities. At oral argument in the District Court appellee’s counsel represented that appellee had been unable to serve in World War II because of injuries received in an automobile accident, but there is no support in the record for this assertion. For purposes of this appeal, however, we assume that his failure to serve in World War II was involuntary.

       Federal jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1361.

       The class as certified by the District Court, App. 38, includes all
      “persons at least 60 years of age who have performed 20 years of service computed under 10 USC § 1332 since August 16, 1945 and otherwise are entitled to Retired Pay for Non-Regular Military Service, except that before August 16, 1945 they were a Reserve of an armed force or a member of the Army without component and did not perform active duty after April 5, 1917 but before November 12, 1918, or after September 8, 1940 and before January 1, 1947, or after June 26, 1950 and before July 28, 1953, and therefore were disqualified from Retired Pay Benefits by virtue of 10 USC §1331 (c).” Id., at 6.
      The District Court stayed its judgment as to all members of the class other than appellee.

       The only basis for injunctive relief set forth in the complaint was the alleged unconstitutionality of § 1331 (c); a three-judge court was therefore required to hear the application for injunctive relief. See 28 U. S. C. § 2282.

         Title 28 U. S. C. § 1253 provides:
      “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
      See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 712-713, n. 8.

       The same bill that contained § 1331 (c) also created a point system for determining whether sufficient service was performed in a given year to count toward the 20-year requirement. 10 U. S. C. § 1332. Years served before the point system are automatically considered “satisfactory service.” § 1332 (a). Appellee contends that Congress generally excluded such years of prior service because the point system had not been in effect, and therefore there was no way to determine whether substantial service had been rendered in those years. Then, appellee argues, Congress made an exception for those men who served in World War II as a reward for their wartime service.

       Section 1331 (c) is quoted in full in n. 2, supra.

       Hearings on H. R. 2744 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 77 (1948).

         Id., at 29.

       In the interim, there was a slight change in the language of the provision. As originally enacted, it provided that such persons would not be eligible for “retirement benefits.” § 302 (a), 62 Stat. 1087. When Title 10 was enacted into positive law, the language was changed to "retired pay.” 70A Stat. 102. Appellee argues that the original language was ambiguous, because the phrase the “right to accrue retirement benefits” was used elsewhere in the same Act to refer to the accrual of credit for years of satisfactory service. See § 304, 62 Stat. 1089. But we see no reason to assume that the same meaning was intended, for one section refers to “accrual” of additional benefits, while the other refers to “eligibility” for any benefits.

       For instance, the Senate Report described the amendment as a bill “to make retired pay for nonregular service available to certain persons . . . .” S. Rep. No. 2188, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1958). The same understanding was expressed during the House hearings by the representative of the Defense Department. He stated that “[t]he Department of Defense favors the extension of such retirement benefits to a small group of Reserve personnel who would be eligible for this benefit but for the fact that they do not meet the requirement of having performed active service during World Wars I or II.” Hearings on Consideration of S. 2630, H. R. 4381, H. R. 8775 and H. R. 781 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on Armed Services, No. 88, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 7897 (1957). A later colloquy is to the same effect:
      “Mr. Winstead. And there would be no differential in the pay for retirement with those years counted if this passed as to what they would get if we did not pass this?
      “Mr. Ducander. They won’t be able to retire at all.
      “Mr. Winstead. They should be covered.” Id., at 7905.

       The Senate Report states that the primary purpose of the Act was “to provide an inducement to members of Reserve components to remain active in the Reserves over a long period of time, thereby providing a better trained and more ready Reserve to meet the needs of our national-defense structure.” S. Rep. No. 1543, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1948). See also Hearings on H. R. 2744, n. 10, supra, at 13 (testimony of Gen. Dahlquist), 22-24 (testimony of Col. Maas).

       See the excerpt from the legislative history quoted, supra, at 638. Although the statutory exclusion is broader than necessary to accomplish that purpose, it cannot be doubted that it would apply to the persons that Congress wanted to be certain to disqualify.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. ANTELOPE et al.
    No. 75-661.
    Argued January 18, 1977
    Decided April 19, 1977
    Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh, Harry R. Sachse, and Jerome M. Feit.

      Allen V. Bowles, by appointment of the Court, 429 U. S. 892, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Antelope. John W. Walker, by appointment of the Court, ibid., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Davison et al.
   Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by our grant of certiorari is whether, under the circumstances of this case, federal criminal statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by subjecting individuals to federal prosecution by virtue of their status as Indians.

(1)

On the night of February 18, 1974, respondents, enrolled Coeur d'Alene Indians, broke into the home of Emma Johnson, an 81-year-old non-Indian, in Worley, Idaho; they robbed and killed Mrs. Johnson. Because the crimes were committed by enrolled Indians within the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation, respondents were subject to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153. They were, accordingly, indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of burglary, robbery, and murder. Respondent William Davison was convicted of second-degree murder only. Respondents Gabriel Francis Antelope and Leonard Davison were found guilty of all three crimes as charged, including first-degree murder under the felony-murder provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 1111, as made applicable to enrolled Indians by 18 U. S. C. § 1153.

(2)

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondents contended that their felony-murder convictions were unlawful as products of invidious racial discrimination. They argued that a non-Indian charged with precisely the same offense, namely the murder of another non-Indian within Indian country, would have been subject to prosecution only under Idaho law, which in contrast to the federal murder statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1111, does not contain a felony-murder provision. To establish the crime of first-degree murder in state court, therefore, Idaho would have had to prove premeditation and deliberation. No such elements were required under the felony-murder component of 18 U. S. C. § 1111.

Because of the difference between Idaho and federal law, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents were “put at a serious racially-based disadvantage,” 523 F. 2d 400, 406 (1975), since the Federal Government was not required to establish premeditation and deliberation in respondents’ federal prosecution. This disparity, so the Court of Appeals concluded, violated equal protection requirements implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We granted the United States’ petition for certiorari, 424 U. S. 907 (1976), and we reverse.

(3)

The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, classifications expressly singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly provided for in the Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal Government’s relations with Indians.

“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); they are 'a separate people’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . .’ ” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975).

Legislation with respect to these “unique aggregations” has repeatedly been sustained by this Court against claims of unlawful racial discrimination. In upholding a limited employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, we said in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 552 (1974):

“Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single [s] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws . . . were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U. S. C.) would be effectively erased . . . .”

In light of that result, the Court unanimously concluded in Mancari:

“The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasisovereign tribal entities . . . .” Id., at 554.

Last Term, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976), we held that members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe could be denied access to Montana State courts in connection with an adoption proceeding arising on their reservation. Unlike Mancari, the Indian plaintiffs in Fisher were being denied a benefit or privilege available to non-Indians; nevertheless, a unanimous Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination:

“[W]e reject the argument that denying [the Indian plaintiffs] access to the Montana courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimination. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.” 424 U. S., at 390.

Both Mancari and Fisher involved preferences or disabilities directly promoting Indian interests in self-government, whereas in the present case we are dealing, not with matters of tribal self-regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal conduct within Indian country implicating Indian interests. But the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as “a separate people” with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a “ 'racial' group consisting of ‘Indians’ . . . .” Morton v. Mancari, supra, at 553 n. 24. Indeed, respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. We therefore conclude that the federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole nor in part upon impermissible racial classifications.

(4)

The challenged statutes do not otherwise violate equal protection. We have previously observed that Indians indicted under the Major Crimes Act enjoy the same procedural benefits and privileges as all other persons within federal jurisdiction. Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 212 (1973). See 18 U. S. C. § 3242. Respondents were, therefore, subjected to the same body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave. They do not, and could not, contend otherwise.

There remains, then, only the disparity between federal and Idaho law as the basis for respondents' equal protection claim. Since Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in Indian country, United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886), it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code otherwise applicable within the boundaries of the State of Idaho. Under our federal system, the National Government does not violate equal protection when its own body of law is evenhanded, regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject matter.

The Federal Government treated respondents in the same manner as all other persons within federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory scheme that did not erect impermissible racial classifications; hence, no violation of the Due Process Clause infected respondents’ convictions.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

       Title 18 U. S. C. § 1153 at the time in question provided in pertinent part:
      “Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”
      The background leading up to enactment of the Major Crimes Act is discussed in Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 209-212 (1973). As noted in that case, the Government has characterized the Major Crimes Act as “a carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.” Id., at 209.

       Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts. 18 U. S. C. § 1152. Not all crimes committed within Indian country are subject to federal or tribal jurisdiction, however. Under United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621 (1882), a non-Indian charged with committing crimes against other non-Indians in Indian country is subject to prosecution under state law.

       Title 18 U. S. C. § 1111 is the federal murder statute. It provides in pertinent part:
      “(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
      “Any: other murder is murder in the second degree.”
      It should be emphasized that respondent William Davison was convicted only of second-degree murder, not felony murder, under 18 U. S. C. § 1111.

       See n. 2, supra. Federal law ostensibly extends federal jurisdiction to all crimes occurring in Indian country, except offenses subject to tribal jurisdiction. 18 U. S. C. § 1152. However, under United States v. McBratney, supra, and cases that followed, this Court construed § 1152 and its predecessors as not applying to crimes by non-Indians against other non-Indians. Thus, respondents correctly argued that, had the perpetrators of the crimes been non-Indians, the courts of Idaho would have had jurisdiction over these charges.

       Idaho statutes contain the following definition of first-degree murder:
      “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree. Any murder of any peace officer of this state or of any municipal corporation or political subdivision thereof, when the officer is acting in line of duty, . . . shall be murder in the first degree. ... All other kinds of murder are of the second degree.” Idaho Code § 18-4003 (Supp. 1976).

       Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”

       As was true in Mancari, federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act does not apply to “many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ ” 417 U. S., at 553 n. 24. Thus, the prosecution in this case offered proof that respondents are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and thus not emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of tribes whose official status has been terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. United States v. Heath, 509 E. 2d 16, 19 (CA9 1974) (“While anthropologically a Klamath Indian even after the Termination Act obviously remains an Indian, his unique status vis-á-vis the Federal Government no longer exists”). In addition, as enrolled tribal members, respondents were subjected to federal jurisdiction only because their crimes were committed within the confines of Indian country, as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1151. Crimes occurring elsewhere would not be subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U. S. 392, 397 n. 11 (1968).
      It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the reservation and “maintained tribal relations with the Indians thereon.” Ex parte Pero, 99 F. 2d 28, 30 (CA7 1938). See also United States v. Ives, 504 F. 2d 935, 953 (CA9 1974) (dicta). Since respondents are enrolled tribal members, we are not called on to decide whether nonenrolled Indians are subject to 18 U. S. C. § 1153, and we therefore intimate no views on the matter.

       Other than their argument that the federal statutes create an invidious racial classification, respondents do not seriously contend that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so irrational as to deny equal protection. See n. 11, infra. They do point, however, to Congress’ relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction over Indians in six States pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 1162. But § 1162 is simply one manifestation of Congress’ continuing concern with the welfare of Indian tribes under federal guardianship. Indeed, in adopting § 1162, Congress singled out certain reservations to remain subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. Congress’ selective approach in § 1162 reinforces, rather than undermines, the conclusion that legislation directed toward Indian tribes is a necessary and appropriate consequence of federal guardianship under the Constitution.

       Federal jurisdiction would extend to crimes, regardless of the race of the perpetrator or victim, committed on federal enclaves, such as military installations, or on vessels of the United States on the high seas.
      Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction over the crime of murder on a reservation, much as on other federal enclaves, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1111, 1153. But as our opinions have recognized that Indian reservations differ in certain respects from other federal enclaves, the statute has been construed as not encompassing crimes on the reservation by non-Indians against non-Indians. United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621 (1882); see Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651 (1930); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-220 (1959); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 171 (1973). Federal statutes do not single out Indians as such; non-Indian defendants are also covered if the victim was a member of the tribe.

       Respondents base their equal protection claim on the assumption that they have been disadvantaged by being prosecuted under federal law. In their view, their murder convictions were made more likely by the fact that federal prosecutors were not required to prove premeditation. However, they do not seriously question that the evidence adduced at their federal trial might well have supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation, since respondents were found to have beaten and kicked Mrs. Johnson to death during the course of a planned robbery.

       It should be noted, however, that this Court has consistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal Indians, as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction. See, e. g., United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 417-418 (1866); Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482 (1914). See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, ante, at 613-615, n. 47. Indeed, the Constitution itself provides support for legislation directed specifically at the Indian tribes. See n. 6, supra. As the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, the Constitution therefore “singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation.” 417 U. S., at 552.
      In this regard, we are not concerned with instances in which Indians tried in federal court are subjected to differing penalties and burdens of proof from those applicable to non-Indians charged with the same offense. Compare United States v. Big Crow, 523 F. 2d 955 (CA8 1975), cert, denied. 424 U. S. 920 (1976), and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d 1067 (CA9 1974), with United States v. Analla, 490 F. 2d 1204 (CA10), vacated and remanded, 419 U. S. 813 (1974). See 18 U. S. C. §1153 (1976 ed.) (which provides for uniform penalties for both Indians and non-Indians charged with assault resulting in serious bodily injury). That issue is not before us, and we intimate no views on it.

       Indeed, had respondents been prosecuted under state law, they may well have argued, under this Court’s holding in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), that the state conviction was void for want of jurisdiction. In Seymour, an enrolled member of the Colville Indian Tribe was convicted in state court of attempted burglary within Indian country. In reversing the state conviction, this Court held:
      “Since the burglary with which petitioner was charged occurred on property . . . within the . . . [Indian] reservation, the courts of Washington had no jurisdiction to try him for that offense.” Id., at 359.
      If state courts would have had no jurisdiction over respondents’ case, then state law does not constitute a meaningful point of reference for establishing a claim of equal protection.

       If we accepted respondents’ contentions, persons charged with crimes on federal military bases or other federal enclaves could demand that their federal prosecutions be governed by state law to the extent that state law was more “lenient” than federal law. The Constitution does not authorize this kind of gamesmanship. Indeed, any such rule, even assuming its workability, is flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2.