text:
    BRAY v. UNITED STATES
    No. 75-5182.
    Decided December 1, 1975
   Per Curiam.

On June 25, 1973, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served a subpoena on the petitioner, Karl J. Bray, directing him to produce business records for examination and to appear for questioning in connection with an inquiry into possible violations of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 85 Stat. 743, note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. III). When he failed to comply, the IRS filed a petition for enforcement of the subpoena in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Following a hearing, the District Court ordered him to comply with the subpoena. Upon his refusal to testify or produce the records, the court directed him to show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt. He was subsequently convicted of criminal contempt under 18 U. S. C. § 401 and sentenced to imprisonment for 60 days. He appealed the judgment of conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but that court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the appeal came within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) by § 211 (b)(2) of the Economic Stabilization Act. This petition for certiorari asks us to review the propriety of the dismissal of Bray’s appeal.

As part of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Congress created the TECA and vested it with “exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from the district courts of the United States in cases and controversies arising under this title or under regulations or orders issued thereunder.” §211 (b)(2), 86 Stat. 749. This judicial-review provision was designed to provide speedy resolution of cases brought under the Act and “to funnel into one court all the appeals arising out of the District Courts and thus gain in consistency of decision.” S. Rep. No. 92-507, p. 10 (1971). The provision thus carved out a limited exception to the broad jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291.

The Tenth Circuit held that, “notwithstanding Bray’s prosecution under 18 U. S. C. [§] 401,” the contempt charge did not “change the substantive nature of the original enforcement proceedings” and therefore remained “a 'case or controversy’ arising under the [Economic Stabilization] Act.” This was, we think, a misreading of both the language and the purpose of the stabilization statute. The Act does not contain any provision prohibiting the violation of a district court’s enforcement order or establishing penalties for such a violation. Thus, rather than “arising under” any provision of the Act, the contempt prosecution was commenced under 18 U. S. C. § 401, the provision of the Criminal Code that empowers federal courts to punish certain contempts of their authority. Nothing in the Act or in its legislative history indicates that Congress intended “to include existing offenses, already covered under Title 18, under the umbrella of the Stabilization Act.” United States v. Cooper, 482 F. 2d 1393, 1398 (TECA 1973). Review in the TECA of criminal contempt convictions relating to compliance investigations or enforcement efforts is not necessary to assure uniform interpretation of the substantive provisions of the stabilization scheme. Indeed, a requirement of such review would only serve to undermine the prompt resolution of Stabilization Act questions by burdening the TECA with additional appeals.

The charge brought against the petitioner based on his refusal to obey a lawful order of the District Court initiated “a separate and independent proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to vindicate the authority of the court” and was “not a part of the original cause.” Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 445, 451. Although the contempt charge related to an order entered in connection with an investigation of Stabilization Act violations, it was not dependent on the existence of such violations or even the continuation of the investigation. As the Court noted in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294: “Violations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal, Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14 (1887), or though the basic action has become moot, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).” Here the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner for criminal contempt constituted a final decision of the District Court that was then appealable to the appropriate court of appeals. We therefore grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      The District Court stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal.

       In Cooper, the TECA held that a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for willfully and knowingly making false representations to an IRS agent in connection with a Stabilization Act investigation was not “a controversy 'arising under’ any title of the Stabilization Act or under regulations or orders issued thereunder.” 482 F. 2d, at 1307.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. MOORE et al.
    No. 74-687.
    Argued October 15, 1975
    Decided December 2, 1975
    Bueger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Gerald P. Norton, Robert E. Kopp, and Larry R. O’Neal.

      Thomas Osa Harris argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
   Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether obligations of an insolvent debtor arising from default in the performance of Government contracts, occurring before an assignment for the benefit of creditors, are entitled to the statutory priority for “debts due to the United States” when the amount of the obligation was not fixed at the time of the assignment. We hold that the obligations, even though unliquidated in amount when the insolvent debtor made the assignment, are entitled to the statutory priority accorded debts due the United States under Rev. Stat. § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191, and we reverse.

(1)

The facts are not in dispute. In June 1966 respondent Emsco Screen and Pipe Company of Texas, Inc., contracted with the United States in three separate contracts to supply to the Navy, the Army, and the Defense Supply Agency certain fabricated items at an aggregate agreed price of $310,296. Emsco subsequently advised the Navy that it could not perform the contracts without an advance of money not yet due under the terms of the contracts; the Government was unwilling to make the advance. The Navy treated its contract as terminated on August 31, 1966. Emsco repudiated the Army contract, .and the Army notified Emsco of its intent to treat the contract as terminated during the same month, although formal termination was not made until December 6, 1966. The Defense Supply Agency terminated its contract with Emsco on October 19, 1966, for failure to deliver.

Respondent Emsco made a voluntary assignment of all its assets, totaling $55,707.28, on October 20, 1966, to respondent Thomas W. Moore, Jr., as assignee for the benefit of creditors. The company at that time owed the city of Houston approximately $6,000, and it owed more than $68,000 to the private creditors who consented to the assignment. Thus the claims of the private creditors alone exceeded all known corporate assets of the debtor.

The United States did not consent to the assignment, but filed proof of claims with the respondent Moore. The amount of the Government's claim, after reprocurement of the contract goods and negotiations with respondent Moore, was eventually set at $51,680, exclusive of interest. Respondent Moore refused to accord these claims priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191, which provides:

“Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.”

The United States then sued respondents Moore and Emsco in District Court. That court found the amount owed under the three defaulted contracts to be in excess of $67,000, including interest, and held that § 3466 afforded priority status to them as “debts due to the United States.”

The Court of Appeals reversed, with one judge dissenting, holding that the claims of the United States were not, at the time of the assignment for creditors, amounts certain and then payable and hence not “debts due” entitled to statutory priority. 497 F. 2d 976 (CA5 1974). To define this term, the court looked to the limits of a common-law action for debt, which permitted recovery of only liquidated obligations — “sums certain or which could be made certain by mathematical computation.” Id., at 978. One judge concurred separately, concluding that to have priority the claim of the United States must be one ascertained in amount prior to assignment, by a tribunal having jurisdiction to bind the contracting parties. Judge Thornberry dissented; he relied on King v. United States, 379 U. S. 329 (1964), and other holdings to the effect that Congress intended to give special status and protection to claims of the Government and the statute was to be construed to accomplish that objective. Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U. S. 446 (1960); United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423 (1941); Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 269 U. S. 483 (1926). The dissent viewed the existence of an obligation as determinative, even though the extent of the obligation was unliquidated at the time of the assignment.

(2)

The statute at issue is almost as old as the Constitution, and its roots reach back even further into the English common law; the Crown exercised a sovereign prerogative to require that debts owed it be paid before the debts owed other creditors. 3 R. Clark, Law of Receivers § 669, p. 1223 (3d ed. 1959). Many of the States claim the same prerogative, as an inherent incident of sovereignty. Pauley v. California, 75 F. 2d 120, 133 (CA9 1934); People v. Farmers’ State Bank, 335 Ill. 617, 167 N. E. 804 (1929); In re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912); State v. Bank of Maryland, 6 Gill & Johns. 205, 26 Am. Dec. 561 (Md. 1834). The Federal Government’s claim to priority, however, rests as a matter of settled law only on statute. Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 499-500 (1926); United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (1832).

The earliest priority statute was enacted in the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, which dealt with bonds posted by importers in lieu of payment of duties for release of imported goods. It provided that the “debt due to the United States” for such duties shall be discharged first “in all cases of insolvency, or where any estate in the hands of executors or administrators shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased ....” § 21, 1 Stat. 42. A 1792 enactment broadened the Act’s coverage by providing that the language “cases of insolvency” should be taken to include cases in which a debtor makes a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, and the other situations that § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191, now covers. 1 Stat. 263.

In 1797 Congress applied the priority to any “person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise . . . .” 1 Stat. 515. Then in 1799, Congress gave the priority teeth by making the administrator of any insolvent or decedent’s estate personally liable for any amount not paid the United States because he gave another creditor preference. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 627, 676. The-1797 and 1799 Acts have survived to this day essentially unchanged, as 31 U. S. C. §§ 191 and 192 (Rev. Stat. §§ 3466 and 3467).

The priority statute serves the same public policy as the Crown’s common-law prerogative. As Mr. Justice Story -wrote for the Court in 1832, the priority proceeds from “motives of public policy, in order to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burthens and discharge the public debts. . . . [A]s that policy has mainly a reference to the public good, there is no reason for giving to [the statute] a strict and narrow interpretation.” United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, supra, at 35. For nearly two centuries this Court has applied the statute with this policy in mind. In State Bank itself, 6 Pet., at 38, the Court rejected the bank’s argument that bonds payable only in the future were not “debts due to the United States” because they were not presently payable, using language apt for today’s case as well:

“No reason can be perceived, why, in cases of a deficiency of assets of deceased persons, the legislature should make a distinction between bonds which should be payable at the time of their decease, and bonds which should become payable afterwards. The same public policy which would secure a priority of payment to the United States in one case, applies with equal force to the other; and an omission to provide for such priority in regard to bonds payable in futuro, would amount to an abandonment of all claims, except for a pro rata dividend. In cases of general assignments by debtors, there would be a still stronger reason against making a distinction between bonds then payable and bonds payable in futuro; for the debtor might, at his option, give any preferences to other creditors, and postpone the debts of the United States of the latter description, and even exclude them altogether.”

For similar reasons, and using similar language, the courts have applied the priority statute to Government claims of all types. See 3A J. Moore & R. Oglebay, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 64,502 (14th ed. 1975); see also Plumb, The Federal Priority In Insolvency: Proposals for Reform, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 3, 10-12 (1971). Indeed, under the decisions of this Court, “[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of § 3466.” United States v. Emory, 314 U. S., at 433.

(3)

Respondent Moore argues that in this case we should read the statute narrowly, to accord priority only to those claims that are liquidated and certain in amount at the time an assignment for the benefit of creditors is made. Three factors lead us to a different result.

First, nothing on the face of the statute, and no potential difficulty in administering it, require that a distinction be drawn for this purpose between liquidated and unliquidated debts. The statute’s express command is that “debts due the United States shall be first satisfied”; its language looks to the time of payment rather than the moment at which the assignment of obligations is made. Respondent Moore concedes here, as he has throughout this litigation, that the debt owed the United States is a valid claim against the debtor’s assets; he argues only that the United States should be paid pro rata, as a general creditor. While the concession does not dispose of the case, it does dispose of any argument that giving priority to debts unliquidated at the time of assignment would unduly delay distribution of the debtor’s estate, since payment pro rata would occasion a like delay. Moreover, if the claim can be paid on a pro rata basis. Congress could, as we hold it did in this statute, provide for priority payment.

Second, respondent Moore urges and the Court of Appeals held that the words “debts due to the United States” must be read to mean only those obligations that would on the date of the assignment have given rise to a common-law action for debt. But we see no persuasive reason why the technical requirements of a common-law pleading should be read into the statute. We look instead to the provisions of the several Bankruptcy Acts that Congress has enacted, as the Court has for the definition of other phrases used in the statute here at issue. See, e. g., United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253 (1923); United States v. Emory, supra, at 426. The Bankruptcy Acts focus more precisely on the problems of insolvency and are more apt an analogy to a statute giving the United States priority in payments to be made from insolvents’ estates.

The first Bankruptcy Act, passed in 1800, was a near contemporary of the priority statute. It permitted creditors to prove not only debts liquidated at the time of bankruptcy, but some other debts that became certain during the proceedings. The debtor would receive a discharge of these debts “as if such money had been due and payable before the time of his or her becoming bankrupt.” § 39, 2 Stat. 32. The Acts of 1841 and 1867 contained similar provisions. The current Bankruptcy Act permits proof of unliquidated claims, which will be allowed if they are liquidated or can reasonably be estimated soon enough that the distribution of the estate will not unduly be delayed. 11 U. S. C. §§ 103 (a)(8), (9), 93 (d). The priority statute “is not to be defeated by unnecessarily restricting the application of the word ‘debts’ within a narrow or technical meaning,” Price v. United States, 269 U. S., at 500, and to give “debts” a meaning more restrictive than the bankruptcy statutes have given it over 175 years would do just that.

Finally, the parties agree that this Court and other federal courts have regularly applied the priority statute to debts that in fact were unliquidated, although without discussing the precise issue before us in this case. See, e. g., King v. United States, 379 U. S. 329 (1964); United States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73 (1920); United States v. Brunner, 282 F. 2d 535 (CA10 1960); United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705 (CCSDNY 1887). Respondent Moore relies on dicta in Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, 627 (1948), to the effect that “obligations wholly contingent for ultimate maturity and obligation upon the happening of events after insolvency” are not “debts due.” But the obligation here, and in the cases cited, was fixed and independent of “events after insolvency”; only the precise amount of that obligation awaited future events. Given the consistent application of the priority statute to fixed but unliquidated obligations, Mr. Justice Story's remarks in State Bank, 6 Pet., at 39-40, are particularly appropriate:

“It is not unimportant to state, that the construction which we have given to the terms of the act, is that which is understood to have been practically acted upon by the government, as well as by individuals, ever since its enactment. Many estates, as well of deceased persons, as of persons insolvent who have made general assignments, have been settled upon the footing of its correctness. A practice so long and so general, would, of itself, furnish strong grounds for a liberal construction; and could not now be disturbed without introducing a train of serious mischiefs. We think the practice was founded in the true exposition of the terms and intent of the act: but if it were susceptible of some doubt, so long an acquiescence in it would justify us in yielding to it as a safe and reasonable exposition.’’

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Respondent Moore relies upon some language in United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 39 (1832): “Wherever the common law would hold a debt to be debitum in presentí, solvendum in futuro, the statute embraces it just as much as if it were presently payable.” But the Court relied upon this common-law phrase to hold that at least such debts were within the reach of the priority statute; it certainly did not hold that any debts but these were excluded from the statute. And the Court rested its decision upon more than just this phrase. See supra, at 82, and infra, at 86.

       The Act of 1800, § 39, 2 Stat. 19, 32, provided that the “obligee of any bottomry or respondentia bond, and the assured in any policy of insurance, shall be admitted to claim, and after the contingency or loss, to prove the debt thereon.”

       The Act of 1841, § 5, 5 Stat. 440, 445, provided that contingent or uncertain claims might be proved and paid when they became absolute; debts payable in the future might also be proved, and paid with an appropriate discount. The Act of 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517, allowed in § 19 proof of debts due and payable as of bankruptcy, debts payable in the future, and unliquidated contract damages claims: “[T]he court may cause such damages to be assessed in such mode as it may deem best, and the sum so assessed may be proved against the estate. No debts other than those above specified shall be proved or allowed . . . .”

       Title 11 U. S. G. § 1 (14) defines a debt as “any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy.”

       In Massachusetts, the Court held that insolvency cut off ,a debtor’s right to elect to pay the State rather than the Federal Government an unemployment compensation tax. Permitting post-insolvency election would mean that the priority statute applied to contingent obligations, the Court reasoned, and that result would be anomalous. The “contingency” in Massachusetts, of course, was the debtor’s election to pay someone other than the United States, and so defeat the obligation entirely. The present case is, as we note, quite different: liability vel non will be determined on the' facts as they exist at the time of the assignment for the benefit of creditors; subsequent events cannot defeat the obligation.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist Mr. Justice Stewart,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. POWELL
    No. 74-884.
    Argued October 6, 1975
    Decided December 2, 1975
    Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 94.

      Frank H. Easterbrook argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solid-

      tor General Bork and Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney.

      Jerry J. Moberg, by appointment of the Court, 421 U. S. 974, argued the cause pro hac vice and filed briefs for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion for the Court.

The Court of Appeals in a brief per curiam opinion held that portion of an Act of Congress prohibiting the mailing of firearms “capable of being concealed on the person,” 18 U. S. C. § 1715, to be unconstitutionally vague, and we granted certiorari to review this determination. 420 U. S. 971 (1975). Respondent was found guilty of having violated the statute by a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, and was sentenced by that court to a term of two years' imprisonment. The testimony adduced at trial showed that a Mrs. Theresa Bailey received by mail an unsolicited package from Spokane, Wash., addressed to her at her home in Tacoma, Wash. The package contained two shotguns, shotgun shells, and 20 or 30 hacksaw blades.

While the source of this package was unknown to Mrs. Bailey, its receipt by her not unnaturally turned her thoughts to her husband George, an inmate at nearby McNeil Island Federal Penitentiary. Her husband, however, disclaimed any knowledge of the package or its contents. Mrs. Bailey turned the package over to federal officials, and subsequent investigation disclosed that both of the shotguns had been purchased on the same date. One had been purchased by respondent, and another by an unidentified woman.

Ten days after having received the first package, Mrs. Bailey received a telephone call from an unknown woman who advised her that a second package was coming but that “it was a mistake.” The caller advised her to give the package to “Sally.” When Mrs. Bailey replied that she “did not have the address or any way of giving it to Sally,” the caller said she would call back.

Several days later, the second package arrived, and Mrs. Bailey gave it unopened to the investigating agents. The return address was that of respondent, and it was later determined that the package bore respondent’s handwriting. This package contained a sawed-off shotgun with a barrel length of 10 inches and an overall length of 22% inches, together with two boxes of shotgun shells.

Respondent was indicted on a single count of mailing a firearm capable of being concealed on the person (the sawed-off shotgun contained in the second package), in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1715. At trial there was evidence that the weapon could be concealed on an average person. Respondent was convicted by a jury which was instructed that in order to return a guilty verdict it must find that she “knowingly caused to be delivered by mail a firearm capable of being concealed on the person.”

She appealed her judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals, and that court held that the portion of § 1715 proscribing the mailing of "other firearms capable of being concealed on the person” was so vague that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 501 F. 2d 1136 (1974). Citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939), the court held that, although it was clear that a pistol could be concealed on the person, “the statutory prohibition as it might relate to sawed-off shotguns is not so readily recognizable to persons of common experience and intelligence.” 501 F. 2d, at 1137.

While the Court of Appeals considered only the constitutional claim, respondent in this Court makes a statutory argument which may fairly be described as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment of that court. She contends that as a matter of statutory construction, particularly in light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the language “other firearms capable of being concealed on the person” simply does not extend to sawed-off shotguns. We must decide this threshold question of statutory interpretation first, since if we find the statute inapplicable to respondent, it will be unnecessary to reach the constitutional question, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476 (1970).

The thrust of respondent’s argument is that the more general language of the statute (“firearms”) should be limited by the more specific language (“pistols and revolvers”) so that the phrase “other firearms capable of being concealed on the person” would be limited to “concealable weapons, such as pistols and revolvers.”

We reject this contention. The statute by its terms bans the mailing of “firearms capable of being concealed on the person,” and we would be justified in narrowing the statute only if such a narrow reading was supported by evidence of congressional intent over and above the language of the statute.

In Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936), the Court said:

“The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty. Ordinarily, it limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified; but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation. And, while penal statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require rejection of that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view.”

The legislative history of this particular provision is sparse, but the House report indicates that the purpose of the bill upon which § 1716 is based was to avoid having the Post Office serve as an instrumentality for the violation of local laws which prohibited the purchase and possession of weapons. H. R. Rep. No. 610, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). It would seem that sawed-off shotguns would be even more likely to be prohibited by local laws than would pistols and revolvers. A statement by the author of the bill, Representative Miller of Washington, on the floor of the House indicates that the purpose of the bill was to make it more difficult for criminals to obtain concealable weapons. 66 Cong. Rec. 726 (1924). To narrow the meaning of the language Congress used so as to limit it to only those weapons which could be concealed as readily as pistols or revolvers would not comport with that purpose. Cf. United States v. Alpers, 338 U. S. 680, 682 (1950).

We therefore hold that a properly instructed jury could have found the 22-inch sawed-off shotgun mailed by respondent to have been a “firearm capable of being concealed on the person” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1715. Having done so, we turn to the Court of Appeals’ holding that this portion of the statute was unconstitutionally vague.

We said last Term that “[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 550 (1975). The Court of Appeals dealt with the statute generally, rather than as applied to respondent in this case. It must necessarily have concluded, therefore, that the prohibition against mailing “firearms capable of being concealed on the person” proscribed no comprehensible course of conduct at all. It is well settled, of course, that such a statute may not constitutionally be applied to any set of facts. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S., at 453; Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926).

An example of such a vague statute is found in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89 (1921). The statute there prohibited any person from “willfully ... mak[ing] any unjusr or unreasonable rate or charge in . . . dealing in or with any necessaries. . . .” So worded it “forbids no specific or definite act” and “leaves open . . . the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.” Ibid.

On the other hand, a statute which provides that certain oversized or heavy loads must be transported by the “shortest practicable route” is not unconstitutionally vague. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393 (1932). The carrier has been given clear notice that a reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct is mandated; it is for him to insure that his actions do not fall outside the legal limits. The sugar dealer in Cohen, to the contrary, could have had no idea in advance what an “unreasonable rate” would be because that would have been determined by the vagaries of supply and demand, factors over which he had no control. Engaged in a lawful business which Congress had in no way sought to proscribe, he could not have charged any price with the confidence that it would not be later found unreasonable.

But the challenged language of 18 U. S. C. § 1715 is quite different from that of the statute involved in Cohen. It intelligibly forbids a definite course of conduct: the mailing of concealable firearms. While doubts as to the applicability of the language in marginal fact situations may be conceived, we think that the statute gave respondent adequate warning that her mailing of a 22-inch-long sawed-off shotgun was a criminal offense. Even as to more doubtful cases than that of respondent, we have said that “the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.” Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913).

The Court of Appeals questioned whether the “person” referred to in the statute to measure capability of concealment was to be “the person mailing the firearm, the person receiving the firearm, or, perhaps, an average person, male or female, wearing whatever garb might be reasonably appropriate, wherever the place and whatever the season.” 501 F. 2d, at 1137. But we think it fair to attribute to Congress the commonsense meaning that such a person would be an average person garbed in a manner to aid, rather than hinder, concealment of the weapons. Such straining to inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by the normal reader is not required by the “void for vagueness” doctrine, and we will not indulge in it.

The Court of Appeals also observed that “[t]o require Congress to delimit the size of the firearms (other than pistols and revolvers) that it intends to declare unmailable is certainly to impose no insurmountable burden upon it . . . .” Ibid. Had Congress chosen to delimit the size of the firearms intended to be declared unmailable, it would have written a different statute and in some respects a narrower one than it actually wrote. To the extent that it was intended to proscribe the mailing of all weapons capable of being concealed on the person, a statute so limited would have been less inclusive than the one Congress actually wrote.

But the more important disagreement we have with this observation of the Court of Appeals is that it seriously misconceives the “void for vagueness” doctrine. The fact that Congress might, without difficulty, have chosen “[c]learer and more precise language” equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the Court that the statutory provision before us is not unconstitutionally vague, because I think the provision has an objectively measurable meaning under established principles of statutory construction. Specifically, I think the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable here, and that 18 U. S. C. § 1715 must thus be read specifically to make criminal the mailing of a pistol or revolver, or of any firearm as “capable of being concealed on the person” as a pistol or revolver.

The rule of ejusdem generis is applicable in a setting such as this unless its application would defeat the intention of Congress or render the general statutory language meaningless. See United States v. Alpers, 338 U. S. 680, 682; United States v. Salen, 235 U. S. 237, 249-251; United States v. Stever, 222 U. S. 167, 174-175. Application of the rule in the present situation entails neither of those results. Instead of draining meaning from the general language of the statute, an ejusdem generis construction gives to that language an ascertainable and intelligible content. And, instead of defeating the intention of Congress, an ejusdem generis construction coincides with the legislative intent.

The legislative history of the bill on which § 1715 was based contains persuasive indications that it was not intended to apply to firearms larger than the largest pistols or revolvers. Representative Miller, the bill’s author, made it clear that the legislative concern was not with the “shotgun, the rifle, or any firearm used in hunting or by the sportsman.” 66 Cong. Rec. 727. As a supporter of the legislation stated: “The purpose ... is to prevent the shipment of pistols and revolvers through the mails.” 67 Cong. Rec. 12041. The only reference to sawed-off shotguns came in a question posed by Representative McKeown: “Is there anything in this bill that will prevent the citizens of Oklahoma from buying sawed-off shotguns to defend themselves against these bank-robbing bandits?” Representative Blanton, an opponent of the bill, responded: “That may come next. Sometimes a revolver is more necessary than a sawed-off shotgun.” 66 Cong. Rec. 729. In the absence of more concrete indicia of legislative intent, the pregnant silence that followed Representative Blanton’s response can surely be taken as an indication that Congress intended the law to reach only weapons of the same general size as pistols and revolvers.

I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with these views.

       Respondent’s husband, Travis Powell, also was an inmate at McNeil Island.

       Mrs. Bailey testified at trial that she did not know “Sally.”

       Title 18 U. S. C. § 1715 provides in pertinent part:
      “Pistols, revolvers, and other firearms capable of being concealed on the person are nonmailable ....
      “Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . any pistol, revolver, or firearm declared nonmailable by this section, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”


author: Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    MICHIGAN v. MOSLEY
    No. 74-653.
    Argued October 6, 1975
    Decided December 9, 1975
    Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 107. BreNNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 111.

      Thomas M. Khalil argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were William L. Cabalan, Dominick R. Carnovale, and Robert A. Reuther.

      Carl Ziemba argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

        Frank Carrington, Fred E. Inbau, William K. Lambie, and
        Wayne W. Schmidt filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent, Richard Bert Mosley, was arrested in Detroit, Mich., in the early afternoon of April 8, 1971, in connection with robberies that had recently occurred at the Blue Goose Bar and the White Tower Restaurant on that city’s lower east side. The arresting officer, Detective James Cowie of the Armed Robbery Section of the Detroit Police Department, was acting on a tip implicating Mosley and three other men in the robberies. After effecting the arrest, Detective Cowie brought Mosley to the Robbery, Breaking and Entering Bureau of the Police Department, located on the fourth floor of the departmental headquarters building. The officer advised Mosley of his rights under this Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and had him read and sign the department’s constitutional rights notification certificate. After filling out the necessary arrest papers, Cowie began questioning Mosley about the robbery of the White Tower Restaurant. When Mosley said he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies, Cowie promptly ceased the interrogation. The completion of the arrest papers and the questioning of Mosley together took approximately 20 minutes. At no time during the questioning did Mosley indicate a desire to consult with a lawyer, and there is no claim that the procedures followed to this point did not fully comply with the strictures of the Miranda opinion. Mosley was then taken to a ninth-floor cell block.

Shortly after 6 p. m., Detective Hill of the Detroit Police Department Homicide Bureau brought Mosley from the cell block to the fifth-floor office of the Homicide Bureau for questioning about the fatal shooting of a man named Leroy Williams. Williams had been killed on January 9, 1971, during a holdup attempt outside the 101 Ranch Bar in Detroit. Mosley had not been arrested on this charge or interrogated about it by Detective Cowie. Before questioning Mosley about this homicide, Detective Hill carefully advised him of his “Miranda rights.” Mosley read the notification form both silently and aloud, and Detective Hill then read and explained the warnings to him and had him sign the form. Mosley at first denied any involvement in the Williams murder, but after the officer told him that Anthony Smith had confessed to participating in the slaying and had named him as the “shooter,” Mosley made a statement impheating himself in the homicide. The interrogation by Detective Hill lasted approximately 15 minutes, and at no time during its course did Mosley ask to consult with a lawyer or indicate that he did not want to discuss the homicide. In short, there is no claim that the procedures followed during Detective Hill’s interrogation of Mosley, standing alone, did not fully comply with the strictures of the Miranda opinion.

Mosley was subsequently charged in a one-count information with first-degree murder. Before the trial he moved to suppress his incriminating statement on a number of grounds, among them the claim that under the doctrine of the Miranda case it was constitutionally impermissible for Detective Hill to question him about the Williams murder after he had told Detective Cowie that he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies. The trial court denied the motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing, and the incriminating statement was subsequently introduced in evidence against Mosley at his trial. The jury convicted Mosley of first-degree murder, and the court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Mosley renewed his previous objections to the use of his incriminating statement in evidence. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that Detective Hill’s interrogation of Mosley had been a per se violation of the Miranda doctrine. Accordingly, without reaching Mosley’s other contentions, the Court remanded the case for a new trial with instructions that Mosley’s statement be suppressed as evidence. 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N. W. 2d 564. After further appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court, 392 Mich. 764, the State filed a petition for certiorari here. We granted the writ because of the important constitutional question presented. 419 U. S. 1119.

In the Miranda case this Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. In sum, the Court held in that case that unless law enforcement officers give certain specified warnings before questioning a person in custody, and follow certain specified procedures during the course of any subsequent interrogation, any statement made by the person in custody cannot over his objection be admitted in evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 443.

Neither party in the present case challenges the continuing validity of the Miranda decision, or of any of the so-called guidelines it established to protect what the Court there said was a person’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The issue in this case, rather, is whether the conduct of the Detroit police that led to Mosley’s incriminating statement did in fact violate the Miranda “guidelines,” so as to render the statement inadmissible in evidence against Mosley at his trial. Resolution of the question turns almost entirely on the interpretation of a single passage in the Miranda opinion, upon which the Michigan appellate court relied in finding a per se violation of Miranda:

“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” 384 U. S., at 473-474.

This passage states that “the interrogation must cease” when the person in custody indicates that “he wishes to remain silent.” It does not state under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible. The passage could be literally read to mean that a person who has invoked his “right to silence” can never again be subjected to custodial interrogation by any police officer at any time or place on any subject. Another possible construction of the passage would characterize “any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege” as “the product of compulsion” and would therefore mandate its exclusion from evidence, even if it were volunteered by the person in custody without any further interrogation whatever. Or the passage could be interpreted to require only the immediate cessation of questioning, and to permit a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite.

It is evident that any of these possible literal interpretations would lead to absurd and unintended results. To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned. At the other extreme, a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests. Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent.

A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to adopt “fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored . . . 384 U. S., at 479. The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person’s “right to cut off questioning.” Id., at 474. Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his “right to cut off questioning” was “scrupulously honored.”

A review of the circumstances leading to Mosley’s confession reveals that his “right to cut off questioning” was fully respected in this case. Before his initial interrogation, Mosley was carefully advised that he was under no obligation to answer any questions and could remain silent if he wished. He orally acknowledged that he understood the Miranda warnings and then signed a printed notification-of-rights form. When Mosley stated that he did not want to discuss the robberies, Detective Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation and did not try either to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position. After an interval of more than two hours, Mosley was questioned by another police officer at another location about an unrelated holdup murder. He was given full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation. He was thus reminded again that he could remain silent and could consult with a lawyer, and was carefully given a full and fair opportunity to exercise these options. The subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosley’s previous decision not to answer Detective Cowie’s inquiries. Detective Hill did not resume the interrogation about the White Tower Restaurant robbery or inquire about the Blue Goose Bar robbery, but instead focused exclusively on the Leroy Williams homicide, a crime different in nature and in time and place of occurrence from the robberies for which Mosley had been arrested and interrogated by Detective Cowie. Although it is not clear from the record how much Detective Hill knew about the earlier interrogation, his questioning of Mosley about an unrelated homicide was quite consistent with a reasonable interpretation of Mosley’s earlier refusal to answer any questions about the robberies.

This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.

The Michigan Court of Appeals viewed this case as factually similar to Westover v. United States, 384 U. S. 436, a companion case to Miranda. But the controlling facts of the two cases are strikingly different.

In Westover, the petitioner was arrested by the Kansas City police at 9:45 p. m. and taken to the police station. Without giving any advisory warnings of any kind to Westover, the police questioned him that night and throughout the next morning about various local robberies. At noon, three FBI agents took over, gave advisory warnings to Westover, and proceeded to question him about two California bank robberies. After two hours of questioning, the petitioner confessed to the California crimes. The Court held that the confession obtained by the FBI was inadmissible because the interrogation leading to the petitioner’s statement followed on the heels of prolonged questioning that was commenced and continued by the Kansas City police without preliminary warnings to Westover of any kind. The Court found that “the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation” and that the belated warnings given by the federal officers were “not sufficient to protect” West-over because from his point of view “the warnings came at the end of the interrogation process.” Id., at 497, 496.

Here, by contrast, the police gave full “Miranda warnings” to Mosley at the very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning, and suspended questioning entirely for a significant period before beginning the interrogation that led to his incriminating statement. The cardinal fact of West-over — the failure of the police officers to give any warnings whatever to the person in their custody before embarking on an intense and prolonged interrogation of him — was simply not present in this case. The Michigan Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in believing that Detective Hill’s questioning of Mosley was “not permitted” by the Westover decision. 51 Mich. App., at 108, 214 N. W. 2d, at 566.

For these reasons, we conclude that the admission in evidence of Mosley’s incriminating statement did not violate the principles of Miranda v. Arizona. Accordingly, the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result and in much of the majority’s reasoning. However, it appears to me that, in an effort to make only a limited holding in this case, the majority has implied that some custodial confessions will be suppressed even though they follow an informed and voluntary waiver of the defendant’s rights. The majority seems to say that a statement obtained within some unspecified time after an assertion by an individual of his “right to silence” is always inadmissible, even if it was the result of an informed and voluntary decision — following, for example, a disclosure to such an individual of a piece of information bearing on his waiver decision which the police had failed to give him prior to his assertion of the privilege but which they gave him immediately thereafter. Indeed, ante, at 102, the majority characterizes as “absurd” any contrary rule. I disagree. I do not think the majority’s conclusion is compelled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and I suspect that in the final analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to silence by a properly informed defendant. I think the Court should say so now.

Miranda holds that custody creates an inherent compulsion on an individual to incriminate himself in response to questions, and that statements obtained under such circumstances are therefore obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination unless the privilege is “knowingly and intelligently waived.” Id., at 471, 475. It also holds that an individual will not be deemed to have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his “right to silence” unless the authorities have first informed him, inter alia, of that right — “the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.” Id., at 468. I am no more convinced that Miranda was required by the United States Constitution than I was when it was decided. However, there is at least some support in the law both before and after Miranda for the proposition that some rights will never be deemed waived unless the defendant is first expressly advised of their existence. E. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969); Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 11, 32 (a)(2). There is little support in the law or in common sense for the proposition that an informed waiver of a right may be ineffective even where voluntarily made. Indeed, the law is exactly to the contrary, e. g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790 (1970). Unless an individual is incompetent, we have in the past rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case. Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). To do so would be to "imprison a man in his privileges,” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 280 (1942), and to disregard “ 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law,’ ” Faretta v. California, supra, at 834. I am very reluctant to conclude that Miranda stands for such a proposition.

The language of Miranda no more compels such a result than does its basic rationale. As the majority points out, the statement in Miranda, 384 U. S., at 474, requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the “right to silence” tells us nothing because it does not indicate how soon this interrogation may resume. The Court showed in the very next paragraph, moreover, that when it wanted to create a per se rule against further interrogation after assertion of a right, it knew how to do so. The Court there said “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Ibid. However, when the individual indicates that he will decide unaided by counsel whether or not to assert his “right to silence” the situation is different. In such a situation, the Court in Miranda simply said: “If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” Id., at 475. Apparently, although placing a heavy burden on the government, Miranda intended waiver of the “right to silence” to be tested by the normal standards. In any event, insofar as the Miranda decision might be read to require interrogation to cease for some magical and unspecified period of time following an assertion of the “right to silence,” and to reject voluntariness as the standard by which to judge informed waivers of that right, it should be disapproved as inconsistent with otherwise uniformly applied legal principles.

In justifying the implication that questioning must inevitably cease for some unspecified period of time following an exercise of the “right to silence,” the majority says only that such a requirement would be necessary to avoid •'‘undermining” “the will of the person being questioned.” Yet surely a waiver of the “right to silence” obtained by “undermining the will” of the person being questioned would be considered an involuntary waiver. Thus, in order to achieve the majority’s only stated purpose, it is sufficient to exclude all confessions which are the result of involuntary waivers. To exclude any others is to deprive the factfinding process of highly probative information for no reason at all. The “repeated rounds” of questioning following an assertion of the privilege, which the majority is worried about, would, of course, count heavily against the State in any determination of voluntariness — particularly if no reason (such as new facts communicated to the accused or a new incident being inquired about) appeared for repeated questioning. There is no reason, however, to rob the accused of the choice to answer questions voluntarily for some unspecified period of time following his own previous contrary decision. The Court should now so state.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.

The Court focuses on the correct passage from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 473-474 (1966) (footnote omitted):

“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.”

But the process of eroding Miranda rights, begun with Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), continues with today’s holding that police may renew the questioning of a suspect who has once exercised his right to remain silent, provided the suspect’s right to cut off questioning has been “scrupulously honored.” Today’s distortion of Miranda’s constitutional principles can be viewed only as yet another step in the erosion and, I suppose, ultimate overruling of Miranda’s enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination.

The Miranda guidelines were necessitated by the inherently coercive nature of in-custody questioning. As in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), “we sought a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation.” 384 U. S., at 465. We “concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Id., at 467. To assure safeguards that promised to dispel the “inherently compelling pressures” of in-custody interrogation, a prophylactic rule was fashioned to supplement the traditional determination of voluntariness on the facts of each case. Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence. Id., at 468-469, 479. Satisfaction of this prophylactic rule, therefore, was necessary, though not sufficient, for the admission of a confession. Certiorari was expressly granted in Miranda “to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,” id., at 441-442, that is, clear, objective standards that might be applied to avoid the vagaries of the traditional voluntariness test.

The task that confronts the Court in this case is to satisfy the Miranda approach by establishing “concrete constitutional guidelines” governing the resumption of questioning a suspect who, while in custody, has once clearly and unequivocally “indicate [d] . . . that he wishes to remain silent . . . .” As the Court today continues to recognize, under Miranda, the cost of assuring voluntariness by procedural tests, independent of any actual inquiry into voluntariness, is that some voluntary statements will be excluded. Ante, at 99-100. Thus the consideration in the task confronting the Court is not whether voluntary statements will be excluded, but whether the procedures approved will be sufficient to assure with reasonable certainty that a confession is not obtained under the influence of the compulsion inherent, in interrogation and detention. The procedures approved by the Court today fail to provide that assurance.

We observed in Miranda: “Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.” 384 U. S., at 476. And, as that portion of Miranda which the majority finds controlling observed, “the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” Id., at 474. Thus, as to statements which are the product of renewed questioning, Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion, see id., at 474 n. 44, and that presumption stands strongest where, as in this case, a suspect, having initially determined to remain silent, is subsequently brought to confess his crime. Only by adequate procedural safeguards could the presumption be rebutted.

In formulating its procedural safeguard, the Court skirts the problem of compulsion and thereby fails to join issue with the dictates of Miranda. The language which the Court finds controlling in this ease teaches that renewed questioning itself is part of the process which invariably operates to overcome the will of a suspect. That teaching is embodied in the form of a proscription on any further questioning once the suspect has exercised his right to remain silent. Today’s decision uncritically abandons that teaching. The Court assumes, contrary to the controlling language, that “scrupulously honoring” an initial exercise of the right to remain silent preserves the efficaciousness of initial and future warnings despite the fact that the suspect has once been subjected to interrogation and then has been detained for a lengthy period of time.

Observing that the suspect can control the circumstances of interrogation “[tjhrough the exercise of his option to terminate questioning,” the Court concludes “that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends ... on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ” Ante, at 103, 104. But scrupulously honoring exercises of the right to cut off questioning is only meaningful insofar as the suspect’s will to exercise that right remains wholly unfettered. The Court’s formulation thus assumes the very matter at issue here: whether renewed questioning following a lengthy period of detention acts to overbear the suspect’s will, irrespective of giving the Miranda warnings a second time (and scrupulously honoring them), thereby rendering inconsequential any failure to exercise the right to remain silent. For the Court it is enough conclusorily to assert that “[t]he subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosley’s previous decision not to answer Detective Cowie’s inquiries.” Ante, at 105. Under Miranda, however, Mosley’s failure to exercise the right upon renewed questioning is presumptively the consequence of an overbearing in which detention and that subsequent questioning played central roles.

I agree that Miranda is not to be read, on the one hand, to impose an absolute ban on resumption of questioning “at any time or place on any subject,” ante, at 102, or on the other hand, “to permit a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite,” ibid. But this surely cannot justify adoption of a vague and ineffective procedural standard that falls somewhere between those absurd extremes, for Miranda in flat and unambiguous terms requires that questioning “cease” when a suspect exercises the right to remain silent. Miranda’s terms, however, are not so uncompromising as to preclude the fashioning of guidelines to govern this case. Those guidelines must, of course, necessarily be sensitive to the reality that “[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.” 384 U. S., at 461 (footnote omitted).

The fashioning of guidelines for this case is an easy task. Adequate procedures are readily available. Michigan law requires that the suspect be arraigned before a judicial officer “without unnecessary delay,” certainly not a burdensome requirement. Alternatively, a requirement that resumption of questioning should await appointment and arrival of counsel for the suspect would be an acceptable and readily satisfied precondition to resumption. Miranda expressly held that “[t]he presence of counsel . . . would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Id., at 466. The Court expediently bypasses this alternative in its search for circumstances where renewed questioning would be permissible.

Indeed, language in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative. In categorical language we held in Miranda: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id., at 473-474. We then immediately observed:

“If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent but has an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements.” Id., at 474 n. 44 (emphasis added).

This was the only circumstance in which we at all suggested that questioning could be resumed, and even then, further questioning was not permissible in all such circumstances, for compulsion was still the presumption not easily dissipated.

These procedures would be wholly consistent with the Court’s rejection of a “per se proscription of indefinite duration,” ante, at 102, a rejection to which I fully subscribe. Today’s decision, however, virtually empties Miranda of principle, for plainly the decision encourages police asked to cease interrogation to continue the suspect’s detention until the police station’s coercive atmosphere does its work and the suspect responds to resumed questioning. Today’s rejection of that reality of life contrasts sharply with the Court’s acceptance only two years ago that “[i]n Miranda the Court found that the techniques of police questioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce an inherently coercive situation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 247 (1973). I can only conclude that today’s decision signals rejection of Miranda’s basic premise.

My concern with the Court’s opinion does not end with its treatment of Miranda, but extends to its treatment of the facts in this case. The Court’s effort to have the Williams homicide appear as “an unrelated holdup murder,” ante, at 104, is patently unsuccessful. The anonymous tip received by Detective Cowie, conceded by the Court to be the sole basis for Mosley’s arrest, ante, at 97 n. 1, embraced both the robberies covered in Cowie’s interrogation and the robbery-murder of Williams, ante, at 98 n. 2, about which Detective Hill questioned Mosley. Thus, when Mosley was apprehended, Cowie suspected him of being involved in the Williams robbery-murder in addition to the robberies about which he tried to examine Mosley. On another matter, the Court treats the second interrogation as being “at another location,” ante, at 104. Yet the fact is that it was merely a different floor of the same building, ante, at 97-98.

I also find troubling the Court’s finding that Mosley never indicated that he did not want to discuss the robbery-murder, see ante, at 104-106. I cannot read Cowie’s testimony as the Court does. Cowie testified that Mosley declined to answer “ ‘[a'Jnything about the robberies/” ante, at 105 n. 11. That can be read only against the background of the anonymous tip that implicated Mosley in the Williams incident. Read in that light, it may reasonably be inferred that Cowie understood “[ajnything” to include the Williams episode, since the anonymous tip embraced that episode. More than this, the Court’s reading of Cowie’s testimony is not even faithful to the standard it articulates here today. “Anything about the robberies” may more than reasonably be interpreted as comprehending the Williams murder which occurred during a robbery. To interpret Mosley’s alleged statement to the contrary, therefore, hardly honors “scrupulously” the suspect’s rights.

In light of today’s erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher standards under state law. Each State has power to impose higher standards governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 62 (1967). A decision particularly bearing upon the question of the adoption of Miranda as state law is Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A. 2d 700 (1971). There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted an aspect of Miranda as state law. This Court on March 20, 1972, granted the Commonwealth’s petition for certiorari to review that decision. 405 U. S. 987. A month later, however, the error of the grant having been made apparent, the Court vacated the order of March 20, “it appearing that the judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground.” 406 U. S. 910. Understandably, state courts and legislatures are, as matters of state law, increasingly according protections once provided as federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this Court. See, e. g., State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P. 2d 657 (1971) (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N. W. 2d 511 (1975), cert. denied, post, p. 878 (rejecting United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971)); State v. Johnson, 68 N. J. 349, 346 A. 2d 66 (1975) (rejecting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973)); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A. 2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U. S. 969 (1974) (adopting “same transaction or occurrence” view of Double Jeopardy Clause). I note that Michigan’s Constitution has its own counterpart to the privilege against self-incrimination. Mich. Const., Art. 1, § 17; see State v. Johnson, supra.

       The officer testified that information supplied by an anonymous caller was the sole basis for his arrest of Mosley.

       The original tip to Detective Cowie had, however, implicated Mosley in the Williams murder.

       During cross-examination by Mosley’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing, Detective Hill conceded that Smith in fact had not confessed but had “denied a physical participation in the robbery.”

       But see n. 5, injra.

       In addition to the claim that Detective Hill’s questioning violated Miranda, Mosley contended that the statement was the product of an illegal arrest, that the statement was inadmissible because he had not been taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay, and that it had been obtained through trickery and promises of leniency. He argued that these circumstances, either independently or in combination, required the suppression of his incriminating statement.

       The warnings must inform the person in custody “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U. S., at 444.

       The present case does not involve the procedures to be followed if the person in custody asks to consult with a lawyer, since Mosley made no such request at any time. Those procedures are detailed in the Miranda opinion as follows:
      “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
      “This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a 'station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that .time.” Id., at 474.

       The Court did state in a footnote:
      “If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements.” Id., at 474 n. 44.
      This footnote in the Miranda opinion is not relevant to the present case, since Mosley did not have an attorney present at the time he declined to answer Detective Cowie’s questions, and the officer did not continue to question Mosley but instead ceased the interrogation in compliance with Miranda’s dictates.

       It is instructive to note that the vast majority of federal and state courts presented with the issue have concluded that the Miranda opinion does not create a per se proscription of any further interrogation once the person being questioned has indicated a desire to remain silent. See Hill v. Whealon, 490 F. 2d 629, 630, 635 (CA6 1974); United States v. Collins, 462 F. 2d 792, 802 (CA2 1972) (en banc); Jennings v. United States, 391 F. 2d 512, 515-516 (CA5 1968); United States v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 466-467 (ED Pa. 1975); McIntyre v. New York, 329 F. Supp. 9, 13-14 (EDNY 1971); People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, 277-278, 509 P. 2d 1235, 1237 (1973); People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d 39, 54-56, 302 N. E. 2d 7, 16-17 (1973); State v. McClelland, 164 N. W. 2d 189, 192-196 (Iowa 1969); State v. Law, 214 Kan. 643, 647-649, 522 P. 2d 320, 324-325 (1974); Conway v. State, 7 Md. App. 400, 405-411, 256 A. 2d 178, 181-184 (1969); State v. O’Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 70-71, 216 N. W. 2d 822, 829 (1974); State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 454-457, 155 N. W. 2d 438, 440-442 (1968); People v. Gary, 31 N. Y. 2d 68, 69-70, 286 N. E. 2d 263, 264 (1972); State v. Bishop, 272 N. C. 283, 296-297, 158 S. E. 2d 511, 520 (1968); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 233-234, 296 A. 2d 730, 731 (1972); State v. Robinson, 87 S. D. 375, 378, 209 N. W. 2d 374, 375-377 (1973); Hill v. State, 429 S. W. 2d 481, 486-487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 486-488, 217 N. W. 2d 359, 365-366 (1974). See also People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 717-720, 441 P. 2d 625, 626-628 (1968) (permitting the suspect but not the police to initiate further questioning).
      Citation of the above cases does not imply a view of the merits of any particular decision.

       The dissenting opinion asserts that Miranda established a requirement that once a person has indicated a desire to remain silent, questioning may be resumed only when counsel is present. Post, at 116-117. But clearly the Court in Miranda imposed no such requirement, for it distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and directed that “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present” only “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney.” 384 U. S., at 474.

       Detective Cowie gave the only testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the scope of Mosley’s earlier refusal to answer his questions:
      “A. I think at that time he declined to answer whether he had been involved.
      “Q. He declined to answer?
      “A. Yes. Anything about the robberies.”
      At the suppression hearing, Mosley did not in any way dispute Cowie’s testimony. Not until trial, after the judge had denied the motion to suppress the incriminating statement, did Mosley offer a somewhat different version of his earlier refusal to answer Detective Cowie’s questions. The briefs submitted by Mosley’s counsel to the Michigan Court of Appeals and to this Court accepted Detective Cowie’s account of the interrogation as correct, and the Michigan Court of Appeals decided the case on that factual premise. At oral argument before this Court, both counsel discussed the case solely in terms of Cowie’s description of the events.

      The majority’s rule may cause an accused injury. Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know immediately — if it were true — that his ability to explain a particular incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would result in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know — if it were true — that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that (2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced charge. Certainly the individual’s lawyer, if he had one, would be interested in such information, even if communication of such information followed closely on an assertion of the “right to silence.” Where the individual has not requested counsel and has chosen instead to make his own decisions regarding his conversations with the authorities, he should not be deprived even temporarily of any information relevant to the decision.

       The question of the proper procedure following expression by an individual of his desire to consult counsel is not presented in this case. It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the lines of communication between the authorities and the accused open when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with respect thereto. The authorities may then communicate with him through an attorney. More to the point, the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities’ insistence to make a statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.

         The Court said further:
      “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” 384 U. S., at 458.

       Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 764.13, 764.26 (1970); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.871 (1), 28.885 (1972). Detective Cowie’s testimony indicated that a judge was available across the street from the police station in which Mosley was held from 2:15 p. m. until 4 p. m. or 4:30 p. m. App. 13. The actual interrogation of Mosley, however, covered only 15 or 20 minutes of this time. Id., at 14. The failure to comply with a simple state-law requirement in these circumstances is totally at odds with the holding that the police “scrupulously honored” Mosley’s rights.

       In addition, a break in custody for a substantial period of time would permit — indeed it would require — law enforcement officers to give Miranda warnings a second time.

      I do not mean to imply that counsel may be forced on a suspect who does not request an attorney. I suggest only that either arraignment or counsel must be provided before resumption of questioning to eliminate the coercive atmosphere of in-custody interrogation. The Court itself apparently proscribes resuming questioning until counsel is present if an accused has exercised the right to have an attorney present at questioning. Ante, at 101 n. 7.

       The Court asserts that this language is not relevant to the present case, for “Mosley did not have an attorney present at the time he declined to answer Detective Cowie’s questions.” Ante, at 102 n. 8. The language, however, does not compel a reading that it is applicable only if counsel is present when the suspect initially exercises his right to remain silent. Even if it did, this would only indicate that Miranda placed even stiffer limits on the circumstances when questioning may be resumed than I suggest here. Moreover, since the concern in Miranda was with assuring the absence of compulsion upon renewed questioning, it makes little difference whether counsel is initially present. Thus, even if the language does not specifically address the situation where counsel is not initially present, it certainly contemplates that situation.
      The Court also asserts that Miranda “directed that ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present’ only ‘[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney.’ ” Ante, at 104 n. 10 (quoting 384 U. S., at 474). This is patently inaccurate. The language from the quoted portion of Miranda actually reads: “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”

      I do not suggest that the Court’s opinion is to be read as permitting unreasonably lengthy detention without arraignment so long as any exercise of rights by a suspect is “scrupulously honored.” The question of whether there is some constitutional limitation on the length of time police may detain a suspect without arraignment, cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), is an open one and is not now before the Court.

       See Westover v. United States, 384 U. S. 436, 494 (1966), where Westover confessed after being turned over to the FBI following questioning by local police. We said:
      “Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning....
      “We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station — in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from Westover the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.” Id., at 496-497.
      It is no answer to say that the questioning was resumed by a second police officer. Surely Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262 (1971), requires that the case be decided as if it involved two interrogation sessions by a single law enforcement officer.

       Although my Brother Marshall correctly argued in Hass, 420 U. S., at 728 (dissenting), that we should have remanded for the state court to clarify whether it was relying on state or federal law, such a disposition is not required here. In Hass the state court cited both federal and state authority; in this case Mosley’s counsel has conceded that the self-incrimination argument in the state court was based solely on the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44.