text:
    No. 74-300.
    Rosen v. Lawrence.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 74-301.
    Washburn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-310.
    Standard Forge & Axle Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-316.
    Kern v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-321.
    Dunn v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. • Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-325.
    Rovner v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-372.
    Schenker, aka Shenker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-378.
    Gibson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-396.
    Mathis v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-392.
    Orrin v. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-394.
    No. 74-406.
    Paterno et al. v. United States; and Denti v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied: Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1396.


text:
    No. 74-388.
    Casey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-407.
    No. 74-5397.
    Infelice v. United States; and Garelli v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74r-407, 500 F. 2d 1405; No. 74-5397, 500 F. 2d 1406.


text:
    No. 74-414.
    De Veste v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-423.
    No. 74-617.
    Provident Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Reserve Life Insurance Co. et al.; and Reserve Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Provident Life Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 715.


text:
    No. 74-427.
    Williams v. Gagliardi, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-436.
    Medenica v. Callaway, Secretary of the Army.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-442.
    Essex, Administratrix v. Vinal et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-445.
    Haswell v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-461.
    Alexander v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-477.
    Lippman v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-484.
    Prince v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-493.
    Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj, dba Kent Trailer Park.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-494.
    Krause et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-516.
    Stewart v. Kyros et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-539.
    Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-550.
    Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Commission (PAAC) et al. v. Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-554.
    Parrigan v. Paderick, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-555.
    Ishler v. Toledo Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-559.
    Johnson v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-562.
    Mahaley et al. v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-564.
    Vassallo v. LaTorr, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-566.
    Reed v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-568.
    Estep, a minor, by Stanley v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-569.
    Ellis v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-570.
    Dean v. Ford Motor Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-581.
    California Moving & Storage Assn. et al. v. Public Utilities Commission of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-582.
    Picard v. Rhode Island.
   Sup. Ct. R, I. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-585.
    Stanjim Co. et al. v. Board of Revision of Mahoning County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 74-589.
    Brown v. Baylor University Medical Center at Dallas, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-590.
    Kastner, t/a Liberty Bell Discount, et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-598.
    Education/Instruccion, Inc., et al. v. Moore, Chairman, Capitol Regional Planning Agency of Connecticut, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-600.
    LaTurner et al. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-608.
    Carey et al. v. O’Donnell et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-610.
    Northeast Master Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-612.
    Pinnell v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-616.
    Peters et al. v. Clark et al.
   Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 74-625.
    Calvert v. State Administrative Board of Election Laws et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-627.
    Nelson v. South Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-628.
    Liberty National Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Battle, dba Edgar H. Battle Funeral Home, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-629.
    No. 74-638.
    Placid Oil Co. et al. v. Louisiana et al.; and Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300 So. 2d 154.


text:
    No. 74-639.
    Connecticut et al. v. Klarman et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-646.
    Reynolds et al. v. Paster et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-665.
    Ciaccio v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5020.
    Carrington v. Virginia State Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5072.
    Stewart v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5122.
    White v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5144.
    O’Brien v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5146.
    Surles v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5194.
    Chavers v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5201.
    Owens v. Cannon, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5209.
    No. 74-5210.
    Morrow v. Illinois; and Mackins v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Ill. App. 3d 24, 308 N. E. 2d 92.


text:
    No. 74-5218.
    Crump v. Brantley, Warden.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5233.
    Jones v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5250.
    Hudspeth v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5266.
    Lockett v. Alabama.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5283.
    Rodriguez-Preciado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5289.
    Krappatsch, Administrator v. Capps et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5301.
    Ramirez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5310.
    Marshall v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5314.
    Lawrence v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5315.
    Manjarres-Arce v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5320.
    Baker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5321.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5328.
    Hallaway v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. , Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5329.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5334.
    Garvey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5337.
    Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5343.
    Gearin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5366.
    Whitaker et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5371.
    Willis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5378.
    Norton v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5383.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5391.
    Jones et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5400.
    Graham v. DeWinter, United States Marshal.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5409.
    Cowles v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5410.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5412.
    Daniels v. Alabama.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5418.
    Denson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5420.
    Hubbard v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5432.
    Haygood v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5434.
    Villarreal v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5438.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5441.
    Mandujano v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5443.
    Vilkaitis v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5465.
    Laughlin v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5468.
    Magee v. Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5518.
    Pemberton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5495.
    Funches v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5492.
    Snider v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5529.
    McHar v. McHale.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5542.
    Cook v. Administrator, Veterans’ Administration.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5545.
    Stone v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5546.
    Norman v. Clanon, Medical Facility Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5547.
    Carpenter v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5550.
    Moreno v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5555.
    McAlister et al. v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5557.
    Dodson v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5558.
    Myers, dba Romyco Stereo v. Ampex, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5561.
    Carter v. Money Tree Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5569.
    Jones v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5578.
    Magee v. Britt, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5582.
    Carbol v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5590.
    Vester v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5592.
    Cosco v. Meacham, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5596.
    Shine v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th ’App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5601.
    Duarte v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5606.
    Ramirez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-441.
    Meier v. Boldt, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970).


text:
    No. 74-551.
    Lee et al. v. Arrowood, Co-executor, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 74-586.
    Wainwright, Corrections Director, et al. v. Means.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1823.
    No. 73-1824.
    Van Gundy et al. v. United States, New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., et al. v. United States,
   ante, p. 1004; and

ante, p. 1007. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 73-6847.
    No. 74-187.
    No. 74-419.
    No. 74-5032.
    No. 74-5161.
    No. 74-5168.
    No. 74-5240.
    No. 74-5254.
    No. 74—5269.
    Cousino v. Cousino, First American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Ellwein, State Examiner and Commissioner, Department of Banking and Financial Institutions, et al., Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts & Garage Employees, Local Union 926, et al. v. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc., Montgomery et al. v. California, Gaskins v. Titeflex Employees Collective Bargaining Assn., Williams v. Dana Corp., Bryan v. United States, Whitlow v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, Qadir v. County of Santa Clara et al.,
   ante, p. 1019;

ante, p. 1026;

ante, p. 1049;

ante, p. 1057;

ante, p. 1035;

ante, p. 1024;

ante, p. 1079;

ante, p. 1036; and

ante, p. 1037. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    January 20, 1975

    No. 74-5433.
    Kovach v. Schubert, Hospital Superintendent.

      Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of cases in which orders hereinafter reported were announced on this date, with the exception of No. 74-335, Pryba v. United States, infra, p. 1127.

   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 74-5710.
    Smith v. California.
   Appeal from App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Kern, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 74-5617.
    Nickens v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. D-33.
    In re Disbarment of McDonald.
   It is ordered that Ronald F. McDonald, Jr., of Rockville, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-34.
    In re Disbarment of Kerr.
   It is ordered the Elaine Worley Kerr, of Bailey’s Crossroads, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-35.
    In re Disbarment of Raimondi.
   It is ordered that Thomas Paul Raimondi, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-36.
    In re Disbarment of Bomstein.
   It is ordered that Stanley J. Bomstein, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-37.
    In re Disbarment of Hankinson.
   It is ordered that Christopher Ker Hankinson, of Vienna, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 73-1933.
    United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 893.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Appellees also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 74-8.
    O’Connor v. Donaldson.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 894.] Motion of Texas et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 74-5574.
    Williams v. United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 74-337.
    Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 74-362.
    Intercounty Construction Corp. et al. v. Walter, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-653.
    Michigan v. Mosley.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-157.
    No. 74-647.
    United Housing Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Forman et al.; and New York et al. v. Forman et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1246.


text:
    No. 74-634.
    United States v. Nobles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-2006.
    Colorado Magnetics, Inc., dba Sound Values, Inc., et al. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-81.
    No. 74-522.
    Cochran v. United States; and Hornsby v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1072.


text:
    No. 74-250.
    Cole v. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-261.
    C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-283.
    No. 74-322.
    No. 74-323.
    Emprise Corp. v. United States; Polizzi et al. v. United States; and Giordano v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 856.


text:
    No. 74-365.
    Whitted v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-446.
    Local 300, Laborers’ International Union of North America, et al. v. Magallanes et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-491.
    No. 74-5608.
    Schneider v. United States; and Dace v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 897.


text:
    No. 74-526.
    Stollings v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-530.
    Lawhon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-560.
    Rendon et al. v. District of Columbia Board of Elections.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-565.
    Breier et al. v. Bence et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-618.
    Morse v. Wilson, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-624.
    Fenner v. Strickland.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-626.
    Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago v. O’Brien et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-631.
    Eddie Dassin, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-644.
    Association of Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc., et al. v. Knopf et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-636.
    Pellicci v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-640.
    No. 74-642.
    Economic Research Analysts, Inc., et al. v. O'Connell; and Economic Research Analysts, Inc., et al. v. Hudak.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74-640, 499 F. 2d 994; No. 74-642,499 F. 2d 996.


text:
    No. 74-651.
    Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-654.
    O’Dell et al. v. City of Chattanooga et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-668.
    Selikoff v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-672.
    City of Los Angeles v. Aaron et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-686.
    Loeser v. Loeser.
   Ct. App. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-695.
    Deskins v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-697.
    Mahoney et al. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5005.
    Alexander et al. v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5103.
    Baker v. Atkins, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5245.
    Porter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5274.
    Hurst et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5297.
    Woods v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5350.
    Varfis v. Richey, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5379.
    Milne, aka Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5384.
    Crook v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5394.
    Scales v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5395.
    Howes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5398.
    Stypmann v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5401.
    Corum v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5402.
    Cooley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5408.
    Raven v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5411.
    Malone v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5430.
    Banks v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5448.
    Beamon v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5450.
    Teran v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5452.
    Kochel v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5461.
    Kemper v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5470.
    Cochran v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5485.
    Mayfield v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5490.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5501.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5503.
    Tubbs v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5508.
    Lincoln v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5521.
    Romero v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5528.
    Rodovich v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5533.
    Talley v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 74-5537.
    Tasby v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5541.
    DeMontijo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5605.
    Martin v. Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5610.
    Pillis v. Russo, Judge, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5614.
    Harsany v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5618.
    Cherry v. Indiana.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5622.
    English v. Davis, Corrections Director.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-5626.
    Besser v. Dunn, Judge, et al.
   C. A-6th -Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5630.
    Williams v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5631.
    Henderson v. Atkins, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5640.
    Adkins v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5649.
    Catanzarite v. Mazurkiewicz et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5650.
    Bredy v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5652.
    Tallent, aka Osterhout, et al. v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 74-29.
    No. 74-30.
    Sykes v. Maryland; and Fornaro v. Maryland.
   Crim. Ct. Baltimore City. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted in Baltimore City District Court of showing unlicensed films in violation of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66A, §§ 1-26 (1970 and Supp. 1974), which requires that films be licensed before exhibition and forbids the licensing of obscene films. Pursuant to § 6 (b) of the statute a film is “obscene” if, “when considered as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to outweigh whatever other merits the film may possess.” The Criminal Court of Baltimore City affirmed both convictions, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari.

It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, as it defines “obscene” in § 6 (b), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), and because the judgments below were rendered after Miller, I would therefore reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).


text:
    No. 74-222.
    Allred et al. v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan, Me. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 74-335.
    Pryba v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of transporting obscene films in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462 and of possessing such films with intent to distribute in violation of D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 163 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 502 F. 2d 391 (1974). Title 18 U. S. C. § 1462 provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce—
“(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; or
“Whoever knowingly takes from such express company or other common carrier any matter or thing the carriage of which is herein made unlawful—
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.”

District of Columbia Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973) provides in pertinent part:

“(a)(1) It shall be unlawful in the District of Columbia for a person knowingly—
“(A) to sell, deliver, distribute, or provide, or offer or agree to sell, deliver, distribute, or provide any obscene, indecent, or filthy writing, picture, sound recording, or other article or representation;
“(E) to create, buy, procure, or possess any matter described in the preceding subparagraphs of this paragraph with intent to disseminate such matter in violation of this subsection.
“(e) A person convicted of violating subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall for the first offense be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. A person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 or imprisoned not less than six months or more than three years, or both.”

It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene* contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, 18 U. S. C. § 1462 and D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973) are constitutionally overbroad and therefore' facially invalid. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was rendered after- Miller, reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.

Me. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

It is occasionally suggested that the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), has a more restricted meaning than when applied to the Federal Government. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 500-503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in Alberts v. California, 354 U. S. 476 (1957)). That view has never prevailed and is not at issue in this case as the prohibition of the First Amendment against abridgment of speech and press precisely fits this federal prosecution and, in my view, should bar it. That is the view I expressed in Roth, supra, at 508-514 (dissenting), a position from which I have not retreated.

       Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion dp not insist that the case be decided on the merits.


text:
    No. 74-353.
    Schubert, Hospital Superintendent v. Kovach.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-384.
    Sprinkle, Acting Warden, et al. v. Mason.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-536.
    No. 74-537.
    Ballew v. Alabama; and Pierce v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74-536, 292 Ala. 1460, 296 So. 2d 206; No. 74-537, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted of distributing or exhibiting allegedly obscene publications in violation of Ala. Code, Tit. 14, §374 (4)(1) (Supp. 1973), which provides as follows:

“Every person who, with knowledge of its contents, . . . sells, exhibits or commercially distributes, . . . any obscene printed or written matter or material, other than mailable matter . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor...

As used in § 374 (4), “obscene” means:

“lewd, lascivious, filthy and pornographic and that to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, its dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” §374(3).

On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari in both cases and affirmed.

It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 374 (4), as it incorporates the definition of “obscene” of §374 (3), is constitutionally over-broad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgments of the Supreme Court of Alabama were rendered after Miller, reverse the convictions. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Further, it does not appear from the petition or response in No. 74-536 that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner Ballew must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate this judgment and remand for a determination whether petitioner Ballew should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.


text:
    No. 74-645.
    National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc., et al. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to defer consideration and certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1902.
    No. 73-6856.
    No. 73-6991.
    No. 74-426.
    No. 74-5132.
    No. 74-5527.
    National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, Robinson v. Jefferson County Board of Education et al., Williams v. California, Joiner et al. v. City of Dallas et al., Young v. United States, Bridges v. Tennessee,
   ante, p. 955;

ante, p. 862 ;

ante, p. 1046;

ante, p. 1042;

ante, p. 1002; and

ante, p. 1097. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 74-44.
    Fahrig et al. v. Ledford, Executor,
   ante, p. 967. Motion for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


author: Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

text:
    TIMES-PICAYUNE PUBLISHING CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP
    No. A-1305.
    Decided July 29, 1974
   Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

This is an application for stay of an order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans restricting media coverage of the trials of two defendants accused of committing a highly publicized rape and murder in the city of New Orleans. The applicant, a Louisiana corporation that owns and publishes two of the city’s daily newspapers, has asked that I stay that order pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of cer-tiorari in this Court. Respondent, the Honorable Oliver P. Schulingkamp, has at my request filed a memorandum in opposition to the application. The record before me indicates a substantial possibility that the state court’s order is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions governing prior restraint of the news media and that continuance of the order pending consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari would inflict irreparable harm. I therefore have granted the requested stay.

In April 1973, a young white nursing student was raped and murdered following her visit to an elderly patient living in one of the city’s public housing projects. Shortly thereafter, two Negro suspects were arrested and charged with the crime. The case immediately became the focal point in the media for a number of more generalized concerns. The state university program that prompted the student’s unescorted visit to the housing project was called into sharp question, as was the sufficiency of law enforcement efforts in high-crime areas of New Orleans. The case also occasioned criticism of the criminal and juvenile justice systems.

Much of the initial publicity was directed toward one defendant, a 17-year-old with an apparently extensive history of juvenile offenses. Newspaper stories recounted in some detail the circumstances leading to his arrest and his subsequent alleged disclosure of the location where the victim’s body was recovered. Additionally, stories dwelt on his prior juvenile offenses. Almost all of the many newspaper references characterized him as a youth with a history of 43 juvenile arrests, the accuracy of which has since been disputed. Some newspaper accounts referred to his previous arrest on charges of murder and armed robbery without simultaneously revealing that those charges had been dropped for insufficient evidence. Others reported a psychiatric diagnosis of this defendant made several years earlier and apparently contained in the records of the juvenile probation officer.

Within a few days reports concerning the crime, the accused, and other related concerns ceased to be of banner importance. Stories became shorter and began to move from the first page to less prominent positions in the papers. Newspaper coverage appears to have ceased within some 10 days of the arrest and the papers apparently published no stories about the defendants from the latter part of April until late January of the following year, when one subdued story announced the anticipated initiation of pretrial motions in the case.

Some of the newspaper reporting that occurred in April can hardly be characterized as responsible journalism. Like many States, Louisiana maintains the confidentiality of the records of juvenile offenders. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1586.3 (Supp. 1974). The record does not indicate how reporters came into possession of some of their information. Additionally, there appear to be inaccuracies or partial truths in matters that are of obvious importance.

In March 1974, some 11 months after the crime and attendant extensive publicity, counsel for the defendant who had received the most journalistic attention moved that the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans impose restrictions on reporting of the case. The court granted the motion on June 17, 1974. The court’s order imposes a total ban on reporting of testimony given in hearings on pretrial motions until after the selection of a jury and also places other selective restrictions on reporting before and during trial.

At the time the order was issued, the court apparently contemplated only one trial. By its terms the order was to remain in effect until termination of the trial. The court later severed the defendants’ cases and ordered separate trials of the rape and murder charges against each. It made no modification of its media coverage order to reflect this changed circumstance. The applicant has represented that the court stated that the order would remain in effect until the termination of the last trial. Respondent has not contradicted this representation, and I assume it to be correct.

The applicant sought relief from both the lower federal courts and the state court system prior to addressing this application to me. After failing to obtain immediate injunctive relief from the federal courts, the applicant asked the state court to vacate its order. That request was denied, as was a request that the court stay its order pending submission of application for supervisory and remedial writs in the Louisiana Supreme Court. On July 9, 1974, the applicant sought writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, and mandamus, and a stay of the state trial court’s order in the Louisiana Supreme Court. That same day the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief by a vote of four to three, stating that the “[sjhowing made does not justify the relief demanded.” Following one more unsuccessful attempt to obtain an injunction in the United States District Court, the applicant has requested that I, as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, stay the state court’s order pending this Court’s consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari.

I have previously expressed my reluctance, in considering in-chambers stay applications, to substitute my view for that of other courts that are closer to the relevant factual considerations that so often are critical to the proper resolution of these questions. Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972). In my in-chambers opinion in that case, I articulated the general standards governing the grant of' a stay application: there must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not. stayed. Ibid.

The question of the possibility of irreparable harm is particularly troublesome in this case. It presents a fundamental confrontation between the competing values of free press and fair trial, with significant public and private interests balanced on both sides. If the order is not stayed, the press is subjected to substantial prior restraint with respect to a case of widespread concern in the community. If, on the other hand, the order is stayed and the press fails to act with scrupulous responsibility, the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial may be seriously endangered.

The challenged portions of the order of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans impose a total prohibition on publication of testimony adduced in pretrial hearings until after selection of a jury. Noting that extensive testimony would be required in considering the many pretrial motions, including motions to suppress an alleged confession and other evidence, the court specifically ordered “that the reporting of such testimony be deferred until after the jury has been selected in order to preclude the possibility of such testimony influencing, in any way, prospective jurors, yet to be selected, and rendering more difficult the task of selecting said jurors.” In addition, the state court order imposes other selective restrictions on what may be published both before and during trial. These restrictions are aimed at the content of news reporting. The order requires that the media avoid publication of interviews with subpoenaed witnesses. It also prohibits publication of any of the defendants’ criminal records or discreditable acts or of any possible confessions or inculpatory statements unless made part of the evidence in the court record. The order forbids publication of any testimony stricken by the .court unless identified as having been stricken and bars publication of any leaks, statements, or conclusions of guilt or innocénce that might be expressed or implied by statements of the police, prosecuting attorneys, or defense counsel. Finally, the order prohibits any editorial comment preceding or during trial “which tends to influence the Court, jury, or witnesses.” By its terms, the order remains in effect “until the conclusion of the trial.” The court’s decision to continue the order during pendency of all of the trials ensures that it will extend over an indefinite and possibly lengthy period of time.

The court’s order imposes significant prior restraints on media publication. As such, it would come to this Court “ “bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ ” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Decisions of this Court repeatedly have recognized that trials are public events. See, e. g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349-350 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 374 (1947). And “reporters . . . are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open- court through their respective media.” Estes v. Texas, supra, at 541-542.

This Court also has shown a special solicitude for preserving fairness in a criminal trial. “Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.” Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 271 (1941). See also Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961). The task of reconciling First Amendment rights with the defendant’s right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is not an easy one. This Court has observed in dictum that newsmen might be prohibited from publishing information about trials if such restrictions were necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 685 (1972). There was no indication in that opinion, however, that the standards for determining the propriety of resort to such action would materially differ from those applied in other decisions involving prior restraints of speech and publication.

I need only consider this question in the limited context of an application for a stay. On the record before me, and certainly in the absence of any showing of an imminent threat to fair trial, I cannot say that the order of the state court would withstand the limitations that this Court has applied in determining the propriety of prior restraints on publication. Cf. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1972). The state court was properly concerned that the type of news coverage described above might be resumed and might threaten the defendants’ rights to a fair trial. But the restraints it has imposed are both pervasive and of uncertain duration. They include limitations on the timing as well as the content of media publication, cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974). Moreover, the court has available alternative means for protecting the defendants’ rights to a fair trial.

The issues underlying this case are important and difficult. Without anticipating my views on the merits, 1 have concluded that this application satisfies the standards for the grant of a stay. Accordingly, I have decided to stay that portion of the order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court that imposes direct limitations on media reporting pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.

       Stories from the applicant’s newspapers were included in the defendant’s motion to restrict media coverage and have been made part of this application. They reveal that the crime obtained immediate first-page banner coverage. On April 10, 1973, stories appeared that reported discovery of the victim’s body and the arrest of a juvenile in connection with the crime. By the next day, this defendant had been identified and front-page stories began to portray his history of juvenile arrests. The arrest of the second defendant received banner coverage on April 12, as did a report that allegedly linked property stolen from the victim to- the possession of the first defendant. The following day first-page banner stories appeared purportedly detailing the first defendant’s juvenile record and his psychiatric diagnosis. One newspaper also ran a picture of him being escorted to arraignment with his hands cuffed behind his back. During that same period other stories dealt with more general topics, and many mentioned this defendant and. his juvenile record.
      Publicity began to subside around April 15 and ended a few days thereafter. The record does not disclose any subsequent newspaper accounts mentioning the defendants until the appearance on January 12, 1974, of a story reporting the expected initiation of routine pretrial motions in the case.
      The record does not specifically reveal the nature and extent of radio and television reporting. I assume that its timing and intensity more or less paralleled that of the newspaper reporting.

       The United States District Court conducted a hearing at which it heard argument of counsel and the testimony of the respondent herein. Thereafter, the court determined that it should abstain from interfering with the state proceedings at that stage. The applicant noted an appeal from that decision and requested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, stay the state court order pending appeal. A panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the request for a stay. Neither of these decisions is before me today.

       The court has already invoked several of these procedures. For example, portions of the court’s order prohibit members of the bar and other persons under the court’s supervision and control from making extrajudicial statements prior to the termination of trial. These prohibitions are not challenged here. Additionally, respondent has indicated his intention to sequester the juries. This will protect against many of the hazards that the selective restrictions on reporting during trial are designed to prevent.
      Some other options may yet be used to protect the defendants’ rights. The defendant who sought the order apparently did not request that the pretrial hearings be closed to the public and press, and the court does not seem to have contemplated that possibility. As an initial matter, the court’s power to take such action is a question governed by state law. Unlike some States, Louisiana does not appear to have a specific provision authorizing such action. Cf. Cal. Penal Code §868 (1970); Iowa Code §761.13 (1973); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 95-1202 (c) (1969). This Court has not been called upon to determine whether these provisions are constitutional, and I express no view on that question. Of course, the court must conduct voir dire of the prospective jurors in these cases with particular care. Finally, the court retains the power to hold persons, including members of the media, in contempt in particular limited circumstances. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946)Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).

       The applicant has not questioned the portions of the court’s order that relate to the conduct of other persons, and this stay order does not affect them. My order is limited to the portion of the respondent’s order directed specifically to the news media. It does not, however, stay the portion of the court’s order prohibiting the use of electronic or mechanical equipment within the' court during the trial or related proceedings.
      The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the Vieux Carre Courier Publishing Co., as amici curiae, have requested additionally that I enjoin any court proceeding about which the press is prohibited from reporting pending final disposition of this case on the merits. I find that action to be unwarranted and unwise.


text:
    EHRLICHMAN v. SIRICA et al.
    No. A-93.
    Decided August 28, 1974
   Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Circuit Justice.

This application comes before me as Circuit Justice for a stay of the District Judge’s order setting trial for September 30, 1974, of United States v. Mitchell, D. C. Crim. No. 74-110. Defendant Ehrlichman seeks this stay alleging that past and continuing prejudicial publicity has made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial in this venue at the time now set, and that he will not have sufficient time to prepare his defense.

The trial had been set for September 9, 1974. When both the prosecution and defense asked for more time to prepare for trial the District Court denied the requests, and applicant, inter alia, petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to delay the trial. That court, sitting en banc, did not rule directly on the petition, but instead remanded and recommended that the District Judge consider delaying the trial three or four weeks so all parties would have more time to prepare; one judge based his concurrence on prejudicial publicity as well. The District Judge then ordered the trial to be deferred for three weeks from September 9,1974.

The present application is presented to me, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, to delay the start of the trial until January 1975. The application puts forth the same reasons as were before the Court of Appeals. The United States has filed a response opposing any further delay.

The function of a Circuit Justice in these circumstances is limited. It does not ordinarily encompass overseeing pretrial- orders in pending criminal prosecutions. Such matters are essentially within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge who must be presumed to be intimately aware of the case at hand and other factors which bear upon the relief sought. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919); Goldsby v. United States, 160 U. S. 70 (1895); Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487 (1895).

The limited power of a court of appeals, whether by way of mandamus or in its supervisory function over trial courts, must be looked to as the primary source of relief since such courts are in closer touch with the facts and factors presented in the workings of the régular activities of the district courts within a circuit.

Here the Court of Appeals has denied mandamus relief, but exercised something in the nature of a de facto supervisory function by remanding the issue to the District Court with intimations that some delay would be appropriate. It is only a coincidence that the location of this trial is in the same city as the seat of this Court, giving Members of this Court essentially the same exposure as that of the trial judge and the Court of Appeals to the pretrial publicity which forms a partial basis for the relief requested. Except for cases coming from the District of Columbia Circuit, a Justice of this Court is ordinarily far removed from the setting of the trial. General principles about the function of a Circuit Justice in a situation of this kind are not to be formed from such a unique setting. An individual Circuit Justice does not possess the supervisory powers of a court of appeals concerning the activities of the district courts within its circuit.

One course open in this setting and in light of the gravity of the claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity would be to refer this application to the full Court for action at the opening of the October 1974 Term on October 7. However, this in itself would defer starting of the trial to at least sometime in the latter half of October since neither party would be expected to go to trial immediately following this Court’s action. To follow this course would have the operative effect of an additional stay of three or four weeks, assuming denial of the relief requested.

The responsibility for passing on a claim for change of venue or delay in a trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity calls for the exercise of the highest order of sound judicial discretion by the District Court. Doubts about the correctness of a district court decision fixing a trial date in these circumstances, particularly after the Court of Appeals has reviewed the matter and denied an application for mandamus, are not sufficient to form a basis for contrary action by an individual Circuit Justice. The District Court bears responsibility commensurate with its authority in such matters, and only in the most extraordinary circumstances should an individual Circuit Justice intervene.

The application for a stay is therefore denied, but this action is not to be taken as intimating any view whatever on the issues presented by the order of the District Court or the action of the Court of Appeals. The resolution of these issues should they arise after verdict must await the normal appellate processes. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 362 (1966).

Application denied.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice.

text:
    SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
    No. A-534.
    Decided December 27, 1974
   Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice.

This case is before me on an application to stay an order entered by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, vacating in part an order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court had granted a preliminary injunction against the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others, barring Government agents and informants from attending or otherwise monitoring the national convention of the Yonng Socialist Alliance (YSA), to be held in St. Louis, Mo., between December 28, 1974, and January 1, 1975. Applicants also seek to have the injunction of the District Court reinstated in full.

Applicants, the Socialist Workers Party, the YSA — the party’s youth organization — and several individuals, originally brought this action against various Government officials, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for alleged governmental interference in the political activities of the two organizations. In the course of preparing for trial on the merits, the applicants apparently learned that the FBI planned to monitor the YSA national convention and to use confidential informants to gain information about convention activities. They sought to enjoin the FBI, its agents, and its informants from “attending, surveilling [sic], listening to, watching, or otherwise monitoring,” the convention. After several hearings, the District Court granted the injunction in the form requested by the plaintiffs. On an expedited appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s injunction in all respects except one: it barred the FBI from transmitting the names of persons attending the convention to the Civil Service Commission pending final determination of the action. For the reasons stated below, I have concluded that on the facts of this case, the extraordinary relief of a stay is not warranted.

I

The applicants argue that a stay is necessary to protect the First Amendment speech and association rights of those planning to attend the YSA convention. Surveillance and other forms of monitoring, they claim, will chill free participation and debate, and may even discourage some from attending the convention altogether. Beyond this, the applicants allege that the FBI has admitted that its agents or informants “intend to participate in the convention debate posing as bona fide YSA members.” This “double agent” activity, the applicants claim, will result in “corruption of the democratic process” and consequent irreparable harm to the applicants and others who would participate in the convention.

The applicants further assert that granting the relief requested here will not result in injury to the FBI. The fact that the FBI has a duty to keep itself informed concerning the possible commission of crimes, applicants say, does not justify its permitting informants and agents to participate in the convention, since the YSA has not been shown to have engaged in illegal activities. They further claim that the risk that FBI informants will become identifiable by their nonattendance at the convention is not sufficient to support the Court of Appeals’ order. While the applicants’ allegations evoke an unsavory picture of deceit and political sabotage, the facts as characterized by the Court of Appeals suggest a less sinister view of the Government’s planned activities at the convention. The court noted that the convention would be open to anyone under the age of 29; that anyone could register; that even the “delegated” sessions would be open to anyone registered at the convention; that the Government planned no electronic surveillance or disruptive activity; and that the only investigative method would be the use of informants who would attend the meetings just as any member of the public would be permitted to do.

The Court of Appeals held that on the facts of this case, the chilling effect on attendance and participation at the convention was not sufficient to outweigh the serious prejudice to the Government of permanently compromising some or all of its informants. The 11th-hour grant or denial of injunctive relief would not be likely to have a significant effect on attendance at the convention, the court stated, and since the convention is to be open to the public and the press, the use of informants to gather, information would not appear to increase appreciably the “chill” on free debate at the convention. In weighing the nature of the planned investigative activity, the justification for that activity, and the claimed First Amendment infringement in this case, the Court of Appeals determined that the balance of the equities tipped in favor of the Government and that a preliminary injunction was therefore improper.

II

This case presents a difficult threshold question— whether the applicants have raised a justiciable controversy under this Court’s decision in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972). In Laird, the plaintiffs protested surveillance activities by the Army that were in many ways similar to those planned by the FBI in this case. The Court held, however, that the plaintiffs’ claim that the Army’s surveillance activities had a general chilling effect on them was not sufficient to establish a case or controversy under Art. Ill of the Constitution.

The Government has contended that under Laird, a “chilling effect” will not give rise to a justiciable controversy unless the challenged exercise of governmental power is “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,” and the complainant is either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he is challenging. Id., at 11. In my view, the Government reads Laird too broadly. In the passage relied upon by the Government, the Court was merely distinguishing earlier cases, not setting out a. rule for determining whether an action is justiciable or not. More apposite is the Court’s observation in Laird that the respondents’ claim was

“that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs and that the very existence of the Army’s data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights.” Id., at 13.

Because the “chilling effect” alleged by respondents in Laird arose from their distaste for the Army’s assumption of a role in civilian affairs or from their apprehension that the Army might at some future date “misuse the information in some way that would cause direct harm to [them],” ibid., the Court held the “chilling effect” allegations insufficient to establish a case or controversy.

In this case, the allegations are much more specific: the applicants have complained that the challenged investigative activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of employment for those who are identified as being in attendance. Whether the claimed “chill” is substantial or not is still subject to question, but that is a matter to be reached on the merits, not as a threshold jurisdictional question. The specificity of the injury claimed by the applicants is sufficient, under Laird, to satisfy the requirements of Art. III.

Ill

Although the applicants have established jurisdiction, they have not, in my view, made out a compelling case on the merits. I cannot agree that the Government’s proposed conduct in this case calls for a stay, which, given the short life remaining to this controversy, would amount to an outright reversal of the Court of Appeals.

It is true that governmental surveillance and infiltration cannot in any context be taken lightly. The dangers inherent in undercover investigation are even more pronounced when the investigative activity threatens to dampen the exercise of First Amendment rights. See DeGregory v. New Hamp. Atty. Gen., 383 U. S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). But our abhorrence for abuses of governmental investigative authority cannot be permitted to lead to an indiscriminate willingness to enjoin undercover investigation, of any nature, whenever a countervailing First Amendment claim is raised.

In this case, the Court of Appeals has analyzed the competing interests at some length, and its analysis seems to me to compel denial of relief. As the court pointed out, the nature of the proposed monitoring is limited, the conduct is entirely legal, and if relief were granted, the potential injury to the FBI’s continuing investigative efforts would be apparent. Moreover, as to the threat of disclosure of names to the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals has already granted interim relief. On these facts, I am reluctant to upset the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As noted above, the Government has stated that it has not authorized any disruptive activity at the convention. In addition, the Government has represented that it has no intention of transmitting any information obtained at the convention to nongovernmental entities such as schools or employers. I shall hold the Government to both representations as a condition of this order. Accordingly, the application to stay the order of the Court of Appeals and to reinstate the injunction entered by the District Court is

Denied.

       Applicants object to the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the case as an appeal, after initially setting it as a motion for a stay. When the time is as short as it was in this case, of course, the difference between the two is very slight. The court’s determination that the District Court abused its discretion in ordering the injunction would appear to meet the standard of review for either a stay or the reversal of a preliminary injunction.

       Applicants argue that this admission, made after the District Court’s decision, significantly alters the balance of the equities in this case. However, the Government has represented that no FBI agents will attend the convention and that the informants who are members of the YSA will participate in the convention only in a manner consistent with their previous roles in the organization. The Government assured both the Court of Appeals and me that the FBI has authorized no disruptive activity at the YSA convention. To require informants who may be active members of the organization to remain silent throughout the convention would render them as readily identifiable in some cases as an order excluding them.

       This is especially true where, as here, the matter before me involves a preliminary injunction granted without a full hearing on the merit's. Much of the information before me is in dispute. The denial of the stay in this case in no way affects the outcome of the ease on the merits, which was filed in 1973 and is still pending in the District Court.


text:
    NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES et al. v. BRENNAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR
    No. A-553.
    Decided December 31, 1974
    See: 406 F. Supp. 826.
   Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Circuit Justice.

This matter came to me as an individual Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the close of regular business hours of this Court on Tuesday, December 31, 1974, on a motion of the above-named applicants, States and municipalities, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors’ Conference. The application of said parties requests a stay of those parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seg., which go into effect January 1, 1975, a stay of the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, 29 CFR Part 553, 39 Fed. Reg. 44142, Employees of Public Agencies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement Activities, including security personnel in correctional institutions of said States and municipalities, and an injunction against enforcement by the Secretary of Labor, or by any other person in any federal court, to enforce parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the above-described Act, which went into effect May 1,1974.

The above-entitled case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on December 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was convened and on Monday, December 30, 1974, heard arguments on plaintiffs’ and plaintiff intervenors’ (all of whom, except for plaintiff intervenor State of California, are applicants on this application) application for a preliminary injunction. Earlier today an order was entered, denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled action.

The three-judge District Court in denying the relief on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view that the complaint raised “a difficult and substantial question of law” but concluded that it was bound by this Court’s holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968).

In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the District Court on every state and municipal government in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions presented, the expressed concern of the District Court as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court and to me as Circuit Justice, and the extent and nature of the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take final action as an individual Justice.

Against this background, and balancing the injury to the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they are ultimately successful, and sharing the doubts and concerns articulated by the District Court, I am not prepared — less than five hours before the regulations of the Secretary become effective — to do more than enter an interim order granting the relief prayed for until the application can be presented to the full Court at the earliest convenient date. At that time the entire matter can be considered with the benefit of a response from the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary.

Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, granting the relief prayed for until further order of the Court and referring the application to the full Court.

The Solicitor General has been directed to file any response he desires to make on or before Wednesday, January 8, 1975.