source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Breyer Justice Thomas,

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text:
    SMALL v. UNITED STATES
    No. 03-750.
    Argued November 3, 2004
    Decided April 26, 2005

      Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 394. Rehnquist, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.

      Paul D. Boas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen P. Halbrook.

      Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and John A. Drennan.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States Criminal Code makes it

“unlawful for any person . .. who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm.” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added).

The question before us focuses upon the words “convicted in any court.” Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.

I

In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757, n. 3 (WD Pa. 2002). After his release, Small returned to the United States, where he bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under the “unlawful gun possession” statute here at issue. 333 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA3 2003). Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being a foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the illegal gun possession statute. The Federal District Court rejected Small’s argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 183 F. Supp. 2d, at 759; 333 F. 3d, at 427, n. 2. Because the Circuits disagree about the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United States v. Atkins, 872 F. 2d 94, 96 (CA4 1989) (“convicted in any court” includes foreign convictions); United States v. Winson, 793 F. 2d 754, 757-759 (CA6 1986) (same), with United States v. Gayle, 342 F. 3d 89, 95 (CA2 2003) (“convicted in any court” does not include foreign convictions); United States v. Concha, 233 F. 3d 1249, 1256 (CA10 2000) (same).

III

A

The question before us is whether the statutory reference “convicted in any court” includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word “any” considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, “I’ll see any film,” may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase “‘any person’” may or may not mean to include ‘“persons’” outside “the jurisdiction of the state.” See, e. g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[GJeneral words,” such as the word “ ‘any,’ ” must “be limited” in their application “to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them”); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (“ ‘any’ ” means “different things depending upon the setting”); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994) (“[RJespondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute”); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase “ ‘any statute’ ” includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) (“‘[A]ny sum,’” while a “catchall” phrase, does not “define what it catches”). Thus, even though the word “any” demands a broad interpretation, see, e. g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find help in the “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). This notion has led the Court to adopt the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949); see also Palmer, supra, at 631 (“The words ‘any person or persons,’ are broad enough to comprehend every human being” but are “limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state”); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 249-251 (1991). That presumption would apply, for example, were we to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad as well as domestically. And, although the presumption against extraterritorial application does not apply directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” here.

For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion of the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter of domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways. Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in economic conduct that our society might encourage. See, e. g., Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, in Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 171 (H. Berman & J. Spindler transís. 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing “Private Entrepreneurial Activity”); Art. 153, id., at 172 (criminalizing “Speculation,” which is defined as “the buying up and reselling of goods or any other articles for the purpose of making a profit”); cf., e. g., Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Cuba, ch. II, Art. 103, p. 68 (Dec. 30, 1987) (forbidding propaganda that incites against the social order, international solidarity, or the Communist state). They would include a conviction from a legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness. See, e. g., U. S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003, Submitted to the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 702-705, 1853, 2023 (Joint Comm. Print 2004) (describing failures of “due process” and citing examples in which “the testimony of one man equals that of two women”). And they would include a conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely. See, e. g., Singapore Vandalism Act, ch. 108, §§ 2, 3, III Statutes of Republic of Singapore, pp. 257-258 (imprisonment for up to three years for an act of vandalism). Thus, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U. S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue.

In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say, of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. Cf. 1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4A1.2(h) (Nov. 2004) (“[Sentences resulting from foreign convictions are not counted” as a “prior sentence” for criminal history purposes).

These considerations, suggesting significant differences between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our ultimate conclusion. Nor do they create a “clear statement” rule, imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity. See post, at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They simply convince us that we should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here — an assumption that helps us determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not consider the matter and where other indi-cia of intent are in approximate balance. Cf. ibid. We consequently assume a congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any court” applies domestically, not extraterri-torially. But, at the same time, we stand ready to revise this assumption should statutory language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary.

B

We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute’s language does not suggest any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention foreign convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, immigration or terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions would seem especially relevant. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies.

For example, the statute creates an exception that allows gun possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime. 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20)(A). In doing so, the exception speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory offenses. Ibid. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no problem. But if “convicted in any court” includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue. An individual convicted of, say, a Canadian antitrust offense could not lawfully possess a gun, Combines Investigation Act, 2 R. S. C. 1985, ch. C-34, §§61(6), (9), but a similar individual convicted of, say, a New York antitrust offense, could lawfully possess a gun.

For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes include “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(9). Again, the language specifies that' these predicate crimes include only crimes that are “misdemean- or[s] under Federal or State law.” § 921(a)(33)(A). If “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. If the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed within the United States and (uncovered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed abroad.

For example, the statute provides an enhanced penalty where unlawful gun possession rests upon three predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense.” § 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. II). Again the statute defines the relevant drug crimes through reference to specific federal crimes and with the words “offense under State law.” §§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2000 éd.). If “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless distinction between drug offenses committed within the United States (potentially producing enhanced punishments) and similar offenses committed abroad (not producing enhanced punishments).

For example, the statute provides that offenses that are punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years, and characterized under state law as misdemeanors, are not predicate crimes. § 921(20). This exception is presumably based on the determination that such state crimes are not sufficiently serious or dangerous so as to preclude an individual from possessing a firearm. If “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language creates another apparently senseless distinction between less serious crimes (misdemeanors punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment) committed within the United States (not predicate crimes) and similar offenses committed abroad (predicate crimes). These illustrative examples taken together suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase “convicted in any court” applies to domestic as well as foreign convictions.

The statute’s lengthy legislative history confirms the fact that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions should or should not serve as a predicate to liability under the provision here at issue. Congress did consider a Senate bill containing language that would have restricted predicate offenses to domestic offenses. See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes in terms of “Federal” crimes “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year” and crimes “determined by the laws of the State to be a felony”). And the Conference Committee ultimately rejected this version in favor of language that speaks of those “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,” § 928(g)(1). See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (1968). But the history does not suggest that this language change reflected a congressional view on the matter before us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may define the term “felony” differently. And as far as the legislative history is concerned, these latter virtues of the new language fully explain the change. Thus, those who use legislative history to help discern congressional intent will see the history here as silent, hence a neutral factor, that simply confirms the obvious, namely; that Congress did not consider the issue. Others will not be tempted to use or to discuss the history at all. But cf. post, at 406 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

The statute’s purpose does offer some support for a reading of the phrase that includes foreign convictions. As the Government points out, Congress sought to “ ‘keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.’” Brief for United States 16 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 112 (1983)); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60-62, 66 (1980); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 824 (1974). And, as the dissent properly notes, post, at 402-403, one convicted of a serious crime abroad may well be as dangerous as one convicted of a similar crime in the United States.

The force of this argument is weakened significantly, however, by the empirical fact that, according to the Government, since 1968, there have probably been no more than “10 to a dozen” instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. This empirical fact reinforces the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid no attention to the matter.

C

In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from inclusion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the potential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign convictions from possessing guns. See supra, at 389. The statute itself and its history offer only congressional silence. Given the reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterritorial coverage from a statute’s total silence and our initial assumption against such coverage, see supra, at 390-391, we conclude that the phrase “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts. Congress, of course, remains free to change this conclusion through statutory amendment.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case.

Justice Thomas,

with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.

Gary Small, having recently emerged from three years in Japanese prison for illegally importing weapons into that country, bought a gun in the United States. This violated 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm in or affecting commerce. Yet the majority decides that Small’s gun possession did not violate the statute, because his prior convictions occurred in a Japanese court rather than an American court. In concluding that “any” means not what it says, but rather “a subset of any,” the Court distorts the plain meaning of the statute and departs from established principles of statutory construction. I respectfully dissent.

I

In December 1992, Small shipped a 19-gallon electric water heater from the United States to Okinawa, Japan, ostensibly as a present for someone in Okinawa. App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 02-2785 (CA3), pp. 507a-510a, 530a-531a, 534a, 598a (hereinafter Appellant’s App.). Small had sent two other water heaters to Japan that same year. Id., at 523a-527a. Thinking it unusual for a person to ship a water tank from overseas as a present, id., at 599a, Japanese customs officials searched the heater and discovered 2 rifles, 8 semiautomatic pistols, and 410 rounds of ammunition, id., at 603a-604a; id., at 262a, 267a, 277a.

The Japanese Government indicted Small on multiple counts of violating Japan’s weapons-control and customs laws. Id., at 261a-262a. Each offense was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 333 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA3 2003). Small was tried before a three-judge court in Naha, Japan, Appellant’s App. 554a, convicted on all counts on April 14, 1994, 333 F. 3d, at 426, and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment with credit for 320 days served, id., at 426, n. 1; Government’s Brief in Support of Detention in Crim. No. 00-160 (WD Pa.), pp. 3-4. He was paroled on November 22, 1996, and his parole terminated on May 26, 1998. 333 F. 3d, at 426, n. 1.

A week after completing parole for his Japanese convictions, on June 2, 1998, Small purchased a 9-millimeter SWD Cobray pistol from a firearms dealer in Pennsylvania. Appellant’s App. 48a, 98a. Some time later, a search of his residence, business premises, and automobile revealed a .380-caliber Browning pistol and more than 300 rounds of ammunition. Id., at 47a-51a, 98a-99a. This prosecution ensued.

II

The plain terms of § 922(g)(1) prohibit Small — a person “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” — from possessing a firearm in the United States. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d)); see also Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 130-131 (2002) (statute making “any” drug-related criminal activity cause for termination of public housing lease precludes requirement that tenant know of the activity); Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398, 400-401 (1998) (statute criminalizing “any” false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency allows no exception for the mere denial of wrongdoing); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 356, 358 (1994) (statute referring to “any” law enforcement officer includes all law enforcement officers — federal, state, or local — capable of arresting for a federal crime). No exceptions appear on the face of the statute; “[n]o modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction,” Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60 (1980), on the scope of the term “court.” See Gonzales, supra, at 5 (statute referring to “ ‘any other term of imprisonment’ ” includes no “language limiting the breadth of that word, and so we must read [the statute] as referring to all ‘term[s] of imprisonment’ ”). The broad phrase “any court” unambiguously includes all judicial bodies with jurisdiction to impose the requisite conviction — a conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than a year. Indisputably, Small was convicted in a Japanese court of crimes punishable by a prison term exceeding one year. The clear terms of the statute prohibit him from possessing a gun in the United States.

Of course, the phrase “any court,” like all other statutory language, must be read in context. E.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993). The context of § 922(g)(1), however, suggests that there is no geographic limit on the scope of “any court.” By contrast to other parts of the firearms-control law that expressly mention only state or federal law, “any court” is not qualified by jurisdiction. See 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20) (excluding certain “Federal or State offenses” from the definition of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”); § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” by reference to “Federal or State law”). Congress’ explicit use of “Federal” and “State” in other provisions shows that it specifies such restrictions when it wants to do so.

Counting foreign convictions, moreover, implicates no special federalism concerns or other clear statement rules that have justified construing “any” narrowly in the past. And it is eminently practical to put foreign convictions to the same use as domestic ones; foreign convictions indicate dangerousness just as reliably as domestic convictions. See Part III-B, infra. The expansive phrase “convicted in any court” straightforwardly encompasses Small’s Japanese convictions.

Ill

Faced with the inescapably broad text, the Court narrows the statute by assuming that the text applies only to domestic convictions, ante, at 388-389; criticizing the accuracy of foreign convictions as a proxy for dangerousness, ante, at 389-390; finding that the broad, natural reading of the statute “creates anomalies,” ante, at 391; and suggesting that Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions counted, ante, at 393. None of these arguments is persuasive.

A

The Court first invents a canon of statutory interpretation — what it terms “an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes,” ante, at 390 — to cabin the statute’s reach. This new “assumption” imposes a clear statement rule on Congress: Absent a clear statement, a statute refers to nothing outside the United States. The Court’s denial that it has created a clear statement rule is implausible. Ibid. After today’s ruling, the only way for Congress to ensure that courts will construe a law to refer to foreign facts or entities is to describe those facts or entities specifically as foreign. If this is not a “special burden of specificity,” ibid., I am not sure what is.

The Court’s innovation is baseless. The Court derives its assumption from the entirely different, and well-recognized, canon against extraterritorial application of federal statutes: “It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the majority rightly concedes that the canon against extraterritoriality itself “does not apply directly to this case.” Ante, at 389. Though foreign as well as domestic convictions trigger § 922(g)(l)’s prohibition, the statute criminalizes gun possession in this country, not abroad. In prosecuting Small, the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal statute to punish domestic criminal conduct. Pasquantino v. United States, ante, at 371-372 (federal wire fraud statute covers a domestic scheme aimed at defrauding a foreign government of tax revenue).

The extraterritoriality cases cited by the Court, ante, at 389, do not support its new assumption. They restrict federal statutes from applying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 203-204 (1993) (Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica); Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 249-251 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not regulate the employment practices of American firms employing American citizens abroad); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285-286 (1949) (federal labor statute does not apply to a contract between the United States and a private contractor for construction work done in a foreign country); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 630-634 (1818) (statute punishing piracy on the high seas does not apply to robbery committed on the high seas by a noncitizen on board a ship belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign state). These straightforward applications of the extraterritoriality canon, restricting federal statutes from reaching conduct beyond U. S. borders, lend no support to the Court’s unprecedented rule restricting a federal statute from reaching conduct within U. S. borders.

We have, it is true, recognized that the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes is rooted in part in the “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith, supra, at 204, n. 5. But my reading of § 922(g)(1) is entirely true to that notion: Gun possession in this country is surely a “domestic concern.” We have also consistently grounded the canon in the risk that extraterritorially applicable U. S. laws could conflict with foreign laws, for example, by subjecting individuals to conflicting obligations. Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 248. That risk is completely absent in applying § 922(g)(1) to Small’s conduct. Quite the opposite, § 922(g)(1) takes foreign law as it finds it. Aside from the extraterritoriality canon, which the Court properly concedes does not apply, I know of no principle of statutory construction justifying the result the Court reaches. Its concession that the canon is inapposite should therefore end this case.

Rather than stopping there, the Court introduces its new “assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes” sua sponte, without briefing or argument on the point, and without providing guidance on what constitutes a “domestically oriented statut[e].” Ante, at 390. The majority suggests that it means all statutes except those dealing with subjects like “immigration or terrorism,” ante, at 391, apparently reversing our previous rule that the extraterritoriality canon “has special force” in statutes “that may involve foreign and military affairs,” Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 188 (1993) (provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act does not apply extraterritorially); cf. Palmer, supra (statute criminalizing piracy on the high seas does not apply to robbery by noncitizen on ship belonging to foreign subjects). The Court’s creation threatens to wreak havoc with the established rules for applying the canon against extraterritoriality.

B

In support of its narrow reading of the statute, the majority opines that the natural reading has inappropriate results. It points to differences between foreign and domestic convictions, primarily attacking the reliability of foreign convictions as a proxy for identifying dangerous individuals. Ante, at 389-390. Citing various foreign laws, the Court observes that, if interpreted to include foreign convictions, § 922(g) would include convictions for business and speech activities “that [United States] laws would permit,” ante, at 389; convictions “from a legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness,” ibid.; and convictions “for conduct that [United States] law punishes far less severely,” ante, at 390. The Court therefore concludes that foreign convictions cannot trigger § 922(g)(l)’s prohibition on firearm possession.

The Court’s claim that foreign convictions punishable by imprisonment for more than a year “somewhat less reliably identify] dangerous individuals” than domestic convictions, ibid., is untenable. In compiling examples of foreign convictions that might trigger § 922(g)(1), ante, at 389-390, the Court constructs a parade of horribles. Citing laws of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Cuba, and Singapore, it cherry-picks a few egregious examples of convictions unlikely to correlate with dangerousness, inconsistent with American intuitions of fairness, or punishable more severely than in this country. Ibid. This ignores countless other foreign convictions punishable by more than a year that serve as excellent proxies for dangerousness and culpability. Surely a “reasonable human being” drafting this language would have considered whether foreign convictions are, on average and as a whole, accurate at gauging dangerousness and culpability, not whether the worst-of-the-worst are. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 854 (1992). The Court also ignores the facts, of this very case: A week after completing his sentence for shipping two rifles, eight semiautomatic pistols, and hundreds of rounds of ammunition into Japan, Small bought a gun in this country. It was eminently reasonable for Congress to use convictions punishable by imprisonment for more than a year — foreign no less than domestic — as a proxy for dangerousness.

Contrary to the majority’s assertion, it makes sense to bar people convicted overseas from possessing guns in the United States. The Court casually dismisses this point with the observation that only “TO to a dozen’” prosecutions under the statute have involved foreign convictions as predicate convictions. Ante, at 394 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 32). The rarity of such prosecutions, however, only refutes the Court’s simultaneous claim, ante, at 389-390, that a parade of horribles will result if foreign convictions count. Moreover, the Court does not claim that any of these few prosecutions has been based on a foreign conviction inconsistent with American law. As far as anyone is aware, the handful of prosecutions thus far rested on foreign convictions perfectly consonant with American law, like Small’s conviction for international gunrunning. The Court has no answer for why including foreign convictions is unwise, let alone irrational.

C

The majority worries that reading § 922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions “creates anomalies” under other firearms-control provisions. Ante, at 391-392. It is true, as the majority notes, that the natural reading of § 922(g)(1) affords domestic offenders more lenient treatment than foreign ones in some respects: A domestic antitrust or business regulatory offender could possess a gun, while a similar foreign offender could not; the perpetrator of a state misdemeanor punishable by two years or less in prison could possess a gun, while an analogous foreign offender could not. Ibid. In other respects, domestic offenders would receive harsher treatment than their foreign counterparts: One who committed a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in the United States could not possess a gun, while a similar foreign offender could; and a domestic drug offender could receive a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for unlawful gun possession, while a foreign drug offender could not. Ibid.

These outcomes cause the Court undue concern. They certainly present no occasion to employ, nor does the Court invoke, the canon against absurdities. We should employ that canon only “where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i. e., where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result . . . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.” Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 470-471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 141 (2004) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (“avoidance of unhappy consequences” is inadequate basis for interpreting a text); cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 203 (1819) (before disregarding the plain meaning of a constitutional provision, the case “must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application”).

Here, the “anomalies” to which the Court points are not absurd. They are, at most, odd; they may even be rational. For example, it is not senseless to bar a Canadian antitrust offender from possessing a gun in this country, while exempting a domestic antitrust offender from the ban. Congress might have decided to proceed incrementally and exempt only antitrust offenses with which it was familiar, namely, domestic ones. In any event, the majority abandons the statute’s plain meaning based on results that are at most incongruous and certainly not absurd. As with the extraterritoriality canon, the Court applies a mutant version of a recognized canon when the recognized canon is itself inappo-site. Whatever the utility of canons as guides to congressional intent, they are useless when modified in ways that Congress could never have imagined in enacting § 922(g)(1).

Even assuming that my reading of the statute generates anomalies, the majority’s reading creates ones even more dangerous. As explained above, the majority’s interpretation permits those convicted overseas of murder, rape, assault, kidnaping, terrorism, and other dangerous crimes to possess firearms freely in the United States. Supra, at 402-403, and n. 7. Meanwhile, a person convicted domestically of tampering with a vehicle identification number, 18 U. S. C. § 511(a)(1), is barred from possessing firearms. The majority’s concern with anomalies provides no principled basis for choosing its interpretation of the statute over mine.

D

The Court hypothesizes “that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase ‘convicted in any court’ applies to domestic as well as foreign convictions,” ante, at 392, and takes that as license to restrict the clear breadth of the text. Whether the Court’s empirical assumption is correct is anyone’s guess. Regardless, we have properly rejected this method of guesswork-as-interpretation. In Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368 (1994), we interpreted other provisions of the. federal firearms laws to mean that a person convicted of a federal crime is not relieved of the firearms disability unless his civil rights have been restored under federal (as opposed to state) law. We acknowledged the possibility “that the phrases on which our reading of the statute turns . . . were accidents of statutory drafting,” id., at 374; and we observed that some legislators might have read the phrases differently from the Court’s reading, “or, more likely, . . . never considered the matter at all,” ibid. We nonetheless adhered to the unambiguous meaning of the statute. Ibid.; cf. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 262 (1994) (“The fact that [the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Here, as in Beecham, “our task is not the hopeless one of ascertaining what the legislators who passed the law would have decided had they reconvened to consider [this] particular cas[e],” 511 U. S., at 374, but the eminently more manageable one of following the ordinary meaning of the text they enacted. That meaning includes foreign convictions.

The Court’s reliance on the absence of any discussion of foreign convictions in the legislative history is equally unconvincing. Ante, at 393. Reliance on explicit statements in the history, if they existed, would be problematic enough. Reliance on silence in the history is a new and even more dangerous phenomenon. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s novel “Canon of Canine Silence”).

I do not even agree, moreover, that the legislative history is silent. As the Court describes, the Senate bill that formed the basis for this legislation was amended in Conference, to change the predicate offenses from “‘Federal’ crimes” punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment and “crimes ‘determined by the laws of a State to be a felony’ ” to conviction “ ‘in any court of, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.’ ” Ante, at 393. The Court seeks to explain this change by saying that “the enacted version is simpler and ... avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may define the term ‘felony’ differently.” Ibid. But that does not explain why all limiting reference to “Federal” and “State” was eliminated. The revised provision would have been just as simple, and would just as well have avoided the potential difficulties, if it read “convicted in any Federal or State court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Surely that would have been the natural change if expansion beyond federal and state convictions were not intended. The elimination of the limiting references suggests that not only federal and state convictions were meant to be covered.

Some, of course, do not believe that any statement or text that has not been approved by both Houses of Congress and the President (if he signed the bill) is an appropriate source of statutory interpretation. But for those who do, this committee change ought to be strong confirmation of the fact that “any” means not “any Federal or State,” but simply “any.”

IV

The Court never convincingly explains its departure from the natural meaning of § 922(g)(1). Instead, it institutes the troubling rule that “any” does not really mean “any,” but may mean “some subset of ‘any,’ ” even if nothing in the context so indicates; it distorts the established canons against extraterritoriality and absurdity; it faults without reason Congress’ use of foreign convictions to gauge dangerousness and culpability; and it employs discredited methods of determining congressional intent. I respectfully dissent.

       See, e. g., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 335 (1966) (defining “court” as “a place where justice is administered,” “a judicial tribunal duly constituted for the hearing and determination of cases,” “a session of a judicial assembly”); The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 282 (5th ed. 1964) (defining “court” as an “[a]ssembly of judges or other persons acting as tribunal”); Webster’s 3d 522 (1961) (defining “court” as “the persons duly assembled under authority of law for the administration of justice,” “an official assembly legally met together for the transaction of judicial business,” “a judge or judges sitting for the hearing or trial of cases”).

       The Court’s observation that “a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’ may or may not mean to include films shown in another city,” ante, at 388, therefore adds nothing to the analysis. The context of that statement implies that such a speaker, despite saying “any,” often means only the subset of films within an accessible distance. Unlike the context of the film remark, the context of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) implies no geographic restriction.

       See also §921(a)(15) (defining a “fugitive from justice,” who is banned from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(2), as “any person who has fled from any State to avoid prosecution for a crime or to avoid giving testimony”); § 924(e)(2) (defining a “serious drug offense,” which can trigger an enhanced sentence, by reference to particular federal laws or “State law”).

        Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125 (2004), considered a federal statute authorizing pre-emption of state and local laws “prohibiting the ability of any entity” to provide telecommunications services. Id., at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the statute did not provide the clear statement required for the Federal Government to limit the States’ ability to restrict delivery of such services by their own political subdivisions. Id., at 140-141; see also id., at 141 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 540-541 (2002) (“any” in federal statute insufficiently clear statement to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 245-246 (1985) (same). No such clear statement rule is at work here.

       Neither party mentions the quasi-extraterritoriality principle that the Court fashions. The briefs barely discuss the extraterritoriality canon itself. The only reference to that canon is a footnote in the Government’s brief pointing out that it is inapposite. Brief for United States 44, n. 31.

       The Court attempts to justify applying its new canon with the claim that “other indicia of intent are in approximate balance.” Ante, at 390. This claim is false. Other indicia of intent are not in balance, so long as text counts as an indicium of intent. As I have explained, Part II, supra, the text of § 922(g)(1) encompasses foreign convictions.

       Brottsbalk (Swedish Criminal Code), SFS 1962:700, ch. 3, § 1 (murder); Criminal Code of Canada, 2 R. S. C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 244(b), as amended (discharging firearm at a person with intent to endanger life); § 102(2) (making an automatic weapon); Laws of the State of Israel, Penal Law § 345(b)(2) (rape by threat of firearm or cutting weapon); Penal Code of Egypt Art. 143 (giving weapons to a detained person in order to help him escape); Federal Penal Code of Mexico Art. 139 (terrorism by explosives, toxic substances, firearms, fire, flooding, or other violent means); Art. 163 (kidnaping); Firearms Offenses Act 1968 (United Kingdom), ch. 27, § 18(1) (carrying firearm with intent to commit an indictable offense or to resist arrest); 7 Laws of the Republic of Zambia Cap. 87, eh. 19, §§ 200-201 (1995) (murder); ch. 24, §248 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm); ch. 25, §§251-262 (kidnaping, abduction, and buying or selling slaves).


author: CHIEF Justice Rehnquist Justice Stevens,

text:
    PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD, et al.
    No. 03-9627.
    Argued February 28, 2005
    Decided April 27, 2005

      Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 419.

      David W. Wycoff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Billy H. Ñolas and Maureen Kear-ney Rowley.

      Ronald Eisenberg argued the. cause for respondents. With him on the brief were- Thomas W. Dolgenos, John W. Goldsborough, Arnold H. Gordon, and Lynne Abraham

        Peter Goldberger, David Richman, Joseph Farber, and David M. Porter filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
      A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Stephanie N. Morman, Deputy Solicitor General, by John W. Suthers, Interim Attorney General of Colorado, and Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jim Petro of Ohio,
        W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Bob McKenna of Washington, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.

   CHIEF Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1). That limitations period is tolled, however, while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). This case requires us to decide whether a state postconviction petition rejected by the state court as untimely nonetheless is “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). We conclude that it is not, and hold that petitioner John Pace’s federal petition is time barred.

In February 1986, petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime in a Pennsylvania state court. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Petitioner did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he did not file a direct appeal. In August 1986, he filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1988) (amended and renamed by Act No. 1988-47, §§ 3, 6,1988 Pa. Laws pp. 337-342). These proceedings concluded in September 1992, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied petitioner’s untimely request for discretionary review.

Over four years later, on November 27, 1996, petitioner filed another state postconviction petition, this time under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1998). The PCRA had replaced the PCHA in 1988 and was amended in 1995 to include, for the first time, a statute of limitations for state postconviction petitions, with three exceptions. Although petitioner’s PCRA petition was filed after the date upon which the new time limits became effective, the petition said nothing about timeliness.

After reviewing petitioner’s PCRA petition, appointed counsel submitted a “no-merit” letter. On July 23,1997, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the petition, without calling for a response from the Commonwealth. The court noted that petitioner’s claims previously had been litigated and were meritless. Petitioner appealed. On May 6, 1998, the Commonwealth filed a brief in response, asserting that petitioner’s PCRA petition was untimely under the PCRA’s time bar, § 9545(b), and citing as support Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A. 2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). On May 28, 1998, petitioner responded by arguing that the time limit was inapplicable to him. The Superior Court dismissed his petition as untimely on December 3, 1998. The Superior Court reasoned that petitioner’s PCRA petition did not come within the statutory note following § 9545(b), see ibid., and that petitioner had “neither alleged nor proven” that he fell within any statutory exception, see §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). App. 316-317. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on July 29, 1999. Id., at 372.

On December 24, 1999, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition under AEDPA’s statute of limitations, § 2244(d)(1), but the District Court rejected that recommendation, App. 447-466 (June 7, 2001, memorandum and order), 503-533 (Mar. 29, 2002, memorandum and order). The District Court recognized that, without tolling, petitioner’s petition was time barred. But it held that petitioner was entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling for the time during which his PCRA petition was pending — November 27, 1996 to July 29, 1999. Beginning with statutory tolling, the District Court held that, even though the state court rejected his PCRA petition as untimely, that did not prevent the petition from being “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). It reasoned that because the PCRA set up judicially reviewable exceptions to the time limit, the PCRA time limit was not a “condition to filing” but a “condition to obtaining relief” as we described those distinct concepts in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4,11 (2000). The District Court alternatively found extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Pace v. Vaughn, 71 Fed. Appx. 127 (2003) (not precedential). With regard to statutory tolling, it relied on a line of Third Circuit cases to conclude that the PCRA time limit constitutes a “condition to filing” and that, when a state court deems a petition untimely, it is not “properly filed.” Id., at 128. With regard to equitable tolling, it held that there were not extraordinary circumstances justifying that remedy. Id., at 129. Because Circuits have divided over whether a state postconviction petition that the state court has rejected as untimely nonetheless may be “properly filed,” we granted certiorari. 542 U. S. 965 (2004). We now affirm.

In Artuz v. Bennett, supra, we held that time limits on postconviction petitions are “condition[s] to filing,” such that an untimely petition would not be deemed “properly filed.” Id., at 8, 11 (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings” including “time limits upon its delivery”). However, we reserved the question we face here: “whether the existence of certain exceptions to a timely filing requirement can prevent a late application from being considered improperly filed.” Id., at 8, n. 2. Having now considered the question, we see no grounds for treating the two differently.

As in Artuz, we are guided by the “common usage” and “commo[n] understanding]” of the phrase “properly filed.” Id., at 8, 9. In common understanding, a petition filed after a time limit, and which does not fit within any exceptions to that limit, is no more “properly filed” than a petition filed after a time limit that permits no exception. The purpose of AEDPA’s statute of limitations confirms this commonsense reading. On petitioner’s theory, a state prisoner could toll the statute of limitations at will simply by filing untimely state postconviction petitions. This would turn § 2244(d)(2) into a de facto extension mechanism, quite contrary to the purpose of AEDPA, and open the door to abusive delay.

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214 (2002), points to the same conclusion. In Saffold, we considered whether § 2244(d)(2) required tolling during the months between the California appellate court’s denial of Saffold’s postconviction petition and his further petition in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence,” which raised the question whether that court had dismissed for lack of merit, for untimeliness, or for both. Id., at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we ultimately remanded, we explained that, “[i]f the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4V&-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’” i. e., untimely, “that would be the end of the matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was ‘entangled’ with the merits.” Id., at 226 (emphasis added); see also id., at 236 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the California court held that all of [Saffold’s] state habeas petitions were years overdue, then they were not ‘properly filed’ at all, and there would be no tolling of the federal limitations period”). What we intimated in Saffold we now hold: When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, “that [is] the end of the matter” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).

Petitioner makes three principal arguments against this reading. First, he asserts that “condition[s] to filing” are merely those conditions necessary to get a clerk to accept the petition, as opposed to conditions that require some judicial consideration. Respondent David DiGuglielmo (hereinafter respondent) characterizes petitioner’s position, which the dissent also appears to embrace, see post, at 426, as a juridical game of “hot potato,” in which a petition will be “properly filed” so long as a petitioner is able to hand it to the clerk without the clerk tossing it back. Brief for Respondent 16. Be that as it may, petitioner’s theory is inconsistent with Artuz, where we explained that jurisdictional matters and fee payments, both of which often necessitate judicial scrutiny, are “condition[s] to filing.” See 531 U. S., at 9. We fail to see how timeliness is any less a “filing” requirement than the mechanical rules that are enforceable by clerks, if such rules exist. For example, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 901 (2005), which is entitled “Initiation of Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings,” lists two mandatory conditions: (A) the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit, and (B) the proceedings “shall be initiated by filing” a verified petition and “3 copies with the clerk of the court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced.” The natural reading is that (A) is every bit as much of a “condition to filing” as (B).

Petitioner also argues that, because § 2244(d)(2) refers to a “properly filed application,” then any condition that must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis, such as Pennsylvania’s time limit, cannot be a “condition to filing.” (Emphasis added.) Section 2244, however, refutes this position. Section 2244(b)(3)(C), for example, states that the court of appeals “may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” (Emphases added.) Yet the “requirements” of the subsection are not applicable to the application as a whole; instead, they require inquiry into specific “claim[s].” See § 2244(b)(2)(A) (“claim” relies on a new rule made retroactive); § 2244(b)(2)(B) (“claim” with new factual predicate). In fact, petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with § 2244(d)(2) itself, which refers not just to a “properly filed application,” but to a “properly filed application . . . with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” (Emphasis added.)

Finally, petitioner challenges the fairness of our interpretation. He claims that a “petitioner trying in good faith to exhaust state remedies may litigate in state court for years only to find out at the end that he was never ‘properly filed,’ ” ánd thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred. Brief for Petitioner 30. A prisoner seeking state postcon-vietion relief might avoid this predicament, however, by filing a “protective” petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted. See Rhines v. Weber, ante, at 278. A petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute “good cause” for him to file in federal court. Ibid. (“[I]f the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics,” then the district court likely “should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition”).

The dissent suggests that our conclusion in Artuz, that state procedural bars “prescribing] a rule of decision for a court” confronted with certain claims previously adjudicated or not properly presented are not “filing” conditions, requires the conclusion that the time limit at issue here also is not a “filing” condition. Post, at 425-426; see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S., at 10-11 (discussing N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994)). The dissent ignores the fact that Artuz itself distinguished between time limits and procedural bars. 531 U. S., at 8-10. For purposes of determining what are “filing” conditions, there is an obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition, and the type of “rule of decision” procedural bars at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief. Far from requiring “verbal gymnastics,” it must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not “properly filed.” Id., at 10.

For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are “filing” conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not “properly filed,” and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).

We now turn to petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time during which his untimely PCRA petition was pending in the state courts. Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 96 (1990). Petitioner argues that he has satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test. He reasons that Third Circuit law at the time he sought relief required him to exhaust his state remedies and thus seek PCRA relief, even if it was unlikely the state court would reach the merits of his claims, and that state law made it appear as though he might gain relief, despite the petition’s untimeliness. Thus, he claims, “state law and Third Circuit exhaustion law created a trap” on which he detrimentally relied as his federal time limit slipped away. Brief for Petitioner 34. Even if we were to accept petitioner’s theory, he would not be entitled to relief because he has not established the requisite diligence.

Petitioner’s PCRA petition set forth three claims: that his sentence was “illegal”; that his plea was invalid because he did not understand his life sentence was without the possibility of parole; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at “all levels of representation.” App. 202, 220. The first two of these claims were available to petitioner as early as 1986. Indeed, petitioner asserted a version of his invalid plea claim in his August 21, 1986, PCHA petition. See id., at 144. The third claim — ineffective assistance of counsel — related only to events occurring in or before 1991. See id., at 191.

Yet petitioner waited years, without any valid justification, to assert these claims in his November 27,1996, PCRA petition. Had petitioner advanced his claims within a reasonable time of their availability, he would not now be facing any time problem, state or federal. And not only did petitioner sit on his rights for years before he filed his PCRA petition, but he also sat on them for five more months after his PCRA proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal court. See id., at 372, 373. Under long-established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 96; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14, 19 (1874) (“Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights”).

Because petitioner filed his federal habeas petition beyond the deadline, and because he was not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for any of that period, his federal petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners in state custody have a 1-year window in which they may file a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides, however, for tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of any “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” § 2244(d)(2). Under the interpretation of that statutory provision adopted by the Court today, a petition for state postconviction relief does not constitute a “properly filed application for . . . collateral review,” even if the application has been accepted, filed, and reviewed in full by the state court. The Court’s chosen rule means that a state application will not be deemed properly filed — no matter how long the state court has held the petition, how carefully it has reviewed the merits of the petition’s claims, or how it has justified its decision — if the court ultimately determines that particular claims contained in the application fail to comply with the applicable state statute of limitations. The Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) is not compelled by the text of that provision and will most assuredly frustrate its purpose.

I

The words “properly filed application for .. . collateral review” are not defined in AEDPA. We did, however, interpret those words in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), by considering their ordinary meaning in the context of the statutory scheme in which they appear. This Court has long understood that a “paper is filed when it is delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed.” United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 76 (1916). In Artuz, we expanded upon that understanding, explaining that an “application is 'filed,’ as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. And an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” 531 U. S., at 8 (citations omitted). Because applications and claims are distinct, we held that a petitioner’s application for postconviction review is “properly filed” even when his legal claims are procedurally barred under state law.

Artuz left open the question presented here — whether a state statute of limitations that allows certain categories of petitioners to file otherwise late applications is comparable to a general precondition to filing (such as the payment of a filing fee) or is instead more akin to a procedural bar that prevents a court from considering particular claims. Id., at 8-9, n. 2. If the state time bar at issue here is more like the former, Pace’s failure to comply with it would make his application improperly filed under AEDPA. If, however, the state time bar is more like the procedural bar in Artuz, Pace’s failure to comply with it would not change the fact that his application was “properly filed.” Before answering that question, it is useful to explain why the state court ultimately found Pace’s application to be untimely.

III

Pace filed the application in question — his second request for state postconviction review — pro se on November 27, 1996, under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1998). Pace’s PCRA petition raised two claims that he alleged had not been presented during his first round of postconviction review: first, that his life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional under state and federal law; and second, that his guilty plea colloquy violated due process. Pace provided new evidence that he had not presented during his first round of postconviction review, see App. 191, 195-201, and explained to the court that his two new claims should not be procedurally barred because they had not been “fully litigated or waived” under state law, id., at 191. Pace’s justifications for raising these two new claims make plain that he was attempting to fit his application within the commonly recognized judicial exceptions to Pennsylvania’s then-applicable state procedural bars.

At the time Pace filed his PCRA petition, no Pennsylvania court had yet applied the PCRA statute of limitations to a petitioner whose conviction had become final prior to the effective date of the Act. Nor had the time in which Pace had a right to file a federal habeas petition expired. Under AEDPA, Pace had until April 24, 1997, to file a federal ha-beas petition. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 217 (2002) (1-year limitations period runs from April 24, 1996, for any prisoner whose conviction became final prior to the effective date of the Act). Pace could not, however, obtain relief in a federal court without first exhausting his state remedies. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Thus, as far as Pace knew on November 27, 1996, there was no state or federal statute of limitations that precluded him from obtaining relief, but he was required (1) by AEDPA to go to state court and (2) by state law to demonstrate that his claim was not procedurally barred. Unless Pace’s PCRA petition tolled the federal statute of limitations, his claims would be time barred in federal court on April 24, 1997.

Pace’s petition was docketed and the court appointed counsel. On July 23, 1997, the state trial court denied relief on the merits. Pace appealed. In May 1998, well after Pace’s time to file a federal habeas petition had expired, the Commonwealth filed a brief in the state appellate court, which argued for the first time that Pace’s petition was untimely under the PCRA’s statute of limitations. On December 3, 1998, the state appellate court agreed, explaining that none of Pace’s several claims fell within the three statutory exceptions to untimeliness contained in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (1998). The state appellate court’s conclusion became final on July 29, 1999. It is that determination that provides the basis for this Court’s ruling that, as a matter of federal law, the pleading that generated protracted litigation in the state courts was never “properly filed” in the first place.

Ill

In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), we held that an •application for state postconviction review may be considered “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) even if the application fails to comply with state-law procedural requirements that preclude relief on the merits of the applicant’s claims. 531 U. S., at 8. To construe “'properly filed application’ to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,’ [would elide] the difference between an ‘application’ and a ‘claim.’ Only individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law . . . .” Id., at 9. Furthermore:

“Ignoring this distinction would require judges to engage in verbal gymnastics when an application contains some claims that are procedurally barred and some that are not. Presumably a court would have to say that the application is ‘properly filed’ as, to the nonbarred claims, and not ‘properly filed’ as to the rest. The statute, however, . . . does not contain the peculiar suggestion that a single application can be both ‘properly filed’ and not ‘properly filed.’ Ordinary English would refer to certain claims as having been properly presented or raised, irrespective of whether the application containing those claims was properly filed.” Id., at 10.

The same reasoning applies with equal force to the PCRA time bar, which in effect operates in the same manner as the procedural bar in Artuz. Under the PCRA, the state court must determine not whether the entire application is time barred, but rather whether individual claims are time barred given the various exceptions enumerated in § 9545(b). See n. 3, supra. Imagine, for example, a Pennsylvania petitioner who states two claims in what is his second state ha-beas petition. The first claim asserts a violation of due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), in which the petitioner demonstrates that his failure to raise the claim during his first round of state postconviction review was “the result of interference by government officials with' the presentation of the claim” under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(l)(i) (1998). The second claim asserts an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the same evidence raised in the petitioner’s first PCRA application. Under the rule announced by the Court today, a federal court would be forced to conclude that the petitioner’s first claim was a “properly filed application for . . . collateral review” for AEDPA purposes, while his second claim was improperly filed. This is precisely the type of incoherent result that Artuz sought to avoid.

Incoherent results will not be limited to petitions filed in Pennsylvania. Many States provide exceptions from their postconviction statutes of limitations that apply to applicants’ individual claims. See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 12.72.020 (Lexis 2004) (exempting from the statute of limitations, inter alia, any claims “based on newly discovered evidence”); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.850 (2005 Supp. Pamphlet) (excepting from the general time bar any claim based on newly discovered evidence, newly recognized rights, or neglect of counsel); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 725, §5/122-1(c) (West Supp. 2004) (allowing for late filings when petitioner can show that delay was not due to negligence and excepting entirely from the limitations period any “claim of actual innocence”); Iowa Code § 822.3 (2003) (exception for any “ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period”); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §§ 1089(D)(4)-(8) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring the reviewing court to examine each claim and permitting late filing if any included claim could not have previously been presented on account of legal or factual unavailability). For all applications originating in such States, federal district courts must now engage in the verv “verbal gymnastics” that Artuz condemned. See 531 U. S., at 10.

The Court’s interpretation of “properly filed” in this context conflicts with the meaning we gave the phrase in Artuz. Indeed, the Court’s rule suggests that the phrase “properly filed” takes on a different meaning when applied to time bars than it does in the context of procedural bars. This Court has generally declined to adopt rules that would give the same statutory provision different meanings in different contexts, see, e. g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 386 (2005), and I would decline to do so here.

It would be much wiser simply to apply Artuz’s rule to state time bars that, like the PCRA, operate like a procedural bar. In this case, the PCRA time bar’s enumerated exceptions, which require state courts to review the claims elucidated in postconviction petitions and to determine whether particular claims trigger the applicability of the exceptions, plainly function like a procedural bar. Thus, I would hold that Pace’s petition was “properly filed” — it was “delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record” and complied with the “applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz, 531 U. S., at 8.

Application of the Artuz rule in this context is clearly consonant with the statutory text. A time bar is nothing more than a species of the larger category of procedural bars that may preclude consideration of the merits of the state petition, and may raise questions that are equally difficult to decide. Indeed, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the contention that a claim is untimely is an affirmative defense that can be waived. Because most state laws respecting untimely filings of postconviction petitions function in a manner identical to the procedural bar at issue in Artuz, there is no justification for giving special treatment to any state rule based on untimeliness.

> I — t

A rule treating statutes of limitations equivalently to procedural bars would accomplish the statutory purposes Congress sought to vindicate in AEDPA. Congress fashioned 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) in order to provide a strong “incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 180 (2001). As we explained in Duncan:

“The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) balances the interests served by the exhaustion requirement and the limitation period. Section 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaustion of state remedies by protecting a state prisoner’s ability later to apply for federal habeas relief while state remedies are being pursued. At the same time, the provision limits the harm to the interest in finality by according tolling effect only to 'properly filed application[s] ....’” Id., at 179-180.

In construing the words “properly filed,” therefore, we must consider not only the “potential for delay in the adjudication of federal law claims,” but also the need to avoid overburdening district courts by encouraging “the very piecemeal litigation that the exhaustion requirement is designed to reduce.” Id., at 180. AEDPA, after all, was designed to “streamline and simplify” the federal habeas system in order to reduce the “interminable delays” and “shameful overloading” that had resulted from “various aspects of this Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 264-265 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court’s rule is unfaithful to these legislative goals.

The Court’s principal justification for its rule is the fear that allowing statutory tolling in this context would allow prisoners to extend the federal statute of limitations indefinitely by repeatedly filing meritless state petitions. See ante, at 413 (“[A] state prisoner could toll the statute of limitations at will simply by filing untimely state postconviction petitions”). That fear is misguided for two reasons. .First, it ignores a basic fact that we have recognized repeatedly— a “prisoner’s principal interest, of course, is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 520 (1982) (plurality opinion). Indeed, it is an understatement to say that the vast majority of federal prisoners “have no incentive to delay adjudication of their claims,” Duncan, 533 U. S., at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Most prisoners have precisely the opposite incentive because delaying the initiation of federal postconviction relief will almost assuredly maximize their periods of incarceration.

Second, the Court’s concern is premised on the incorrect assumption that the phrase “properly filed” has no meaningful content unless all untimely petitions are by definition improper. The reason that assumption is wrong is because any claim that a state application has tolled the limitations period will always depend on the district court’s finding that the petition was “properly filed.” In my view, it would be entirely appropriate, and consistent with the text and purposes of AEDPA, to define “properly filed” as excluding any filings deemed by the district court to be repetitious or abusive. If an application for postconviction review is not filed in good faith — filed, in other words, explicitly to prolong the federal statute of limitations — it would be improper under AEDPA, and statutory tolling would not be appropriate. Federal and state courts have considerable experience identifying and preventing the kind of dilatory pleadings that concern the Court today. See, e. g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 479-489 (1991). There is no reason that courts could not engage in similar analyses to prevent state prisoners from prolonging indefinitely the AEDPA statute of limitations.

Unfortunately, the most likely consequence of the Court’s new rule will be to increase, not reduce, delays in the federal system. The inevitable result of today’s decision will be a flood of protective filings in the federal district courts. As the history of this case demonstrates, litigants, especially those proceeding pro se, cannot predict accurately whether a state court will find their application timely filed. Because a state court’s timeliness ruling cannot be predicted with certainty, prisoners who would otherwise run the risk of having the federal statute of limitations expire while they are exhausting their state remedies will have no choice but to file premature federal petitions accompanied by a request to stay federal proceedings pending the exhaustion of their state remedies. Cf. Rhines v. Weber, ante, at 278. The Court admits that this type of protective filing will result from its holding. See ante, at 416. I fail to see any merit in a rule that knowingly and unnecessarily “add[s] to the burdens on the district courts in a way that simple tolling . . . would not.” Duncan, 533 U. S., at 192 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Beyond increasing the burdens faced by district courts, the Court’s tacit encouragement of countless new protective filings will diminish the “statutory incentives to proceed first in state court” and thereby “increase the risk of the very piecemeal litigation that the exhaustion requirement is designed to reduce.” Id., at 180. Congress enacted § 2244(d)(2), along with § 2254(b), to “encourage litigants first to exhaust all state remedies and then to file their federal habeas petitions as soon as possible.” Id., at 181. The Court’s rule turns that statutory goal on its head — in essence, encouraging all petitioners who have doubts regarding the timeliness of their state petitions to file simultaneously for relief in federal and state court. Artuz appropriately prevented such a result with respect to procedural bars. Because I see no reason to depart from that sound approach, I would hold that Pace’s application was “properly filed” under AEDPA. I respectfully dissent.

       The amended statute states that “[a]ny” posteonviction petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year” from the date the petitioner’s conviction becomes final. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1) (1998). However, three exceptions are provided: if governmental interference prevented filing; if a new constitutional rule is made retroactive; or if new facts arise that could not have been discovered through due diligence. §§ 9545(b)(l)(i) — (iii). A statutory note provides that the 1995 amendments “shall apply to petitions filed after [January 16, 1996]; however, a petitioner whose judgment has become final on or before [January 16, 1996] shall be deemed to have filed a timely petition ... if the petitioner’s first petition is filed within one year of [January 16,1996].” Statutory Note on § 9545(b).

       The District Court noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, “petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of AEDPA’s statute of limitations on April 24,1996 have until one year from the enactment of the habeas statute of limitations to file their petitions.” App. 453, 503. Without tolling, therefore, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed well after the April 1997 deadline.

       Compare, e.g., Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F. 3d 724, 726-728 (CA9 2001), with Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F. 3d 157, 162-168 (CA3 2003).

       With regard to jurisdiction, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Judge, 568 Pa. 877, 387-389, 797 A. 2d 250, 257 (2002) (Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over PCRA petition, despite the fact the petitioner was not in Pennsylvania custody). With regard to filing fees, see, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proe. 904(F) (2005) (“When a defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to pay the costs of the post-conviction collateral proceedings, the judge shall order that the defendant be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis”).

       Perhaps not unintentionally, petitioner fails to provide us any guidance on exactly which Pennsylvania Rules are subject to a clerk’s striking for noncompliance. We doubt there are many such rules, both because few truly mechanical rules exist and because the role of the clerk in refusing petitions in most courts is quite limited. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(e) (“The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices”); 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 3(b) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“The clerk must file the petition and enter it on the docket”); see also Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 3(b), 28 U. S. C., p. 42 (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Rule 3(b) requires the clerk to file a petition, even though it may otherwise fail to comply with Rule 2. This rule ... is not limited to those instances where the petition is defective only in form; the clerk would also be required, for example, to file the petition even though it lacked the requisite filing fee or an informa pauperis form”). Indeed, not even filing in the right court would be a “condition to filing” under petitioner’s limited theory. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(a) (2004) (instructing that, when a petition is filed in the wrong court, it is not to be stricken but transferred to the proper court). Under this theory, “filing” conditions may be an empty set.

       Similarly, § 2244(d)(1) provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Emphasis added.) The subsection then provides one means of calculating the limitation with regard to the “application” as a whole, § 2244(d)(1)(A) (date of final judgment), but three others that require claim-by-elaim consideration, § 2244(d)(1)(B) (governmental interference); § 2244(d)(1)(C) (new right made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D) (new factual predicate).

       Compare, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proe. 901(A) (2005) (titled “Initiation of Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings” and listing compliance with the time limit as one mandatory condition); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (2002) (titled “Jurisdiction and proceedings” and listing the time limit); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 328, 737 A. 2d 214, 222 (1999) (describing the time limit as “jurisdictional”); 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2004-2005) (stating that a court “shall not entertain” a time-barred petition), with 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a) (2002) (titled “Eligibility for relief” and listing procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz)', 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) (2004-2005) (stating that a “petitioner will not be given relief” if certain procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz, axe present).

       We have never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 225 (2004). Because respondent assumes that equitable tolling applies and because petitioner is' not entitled to equitable tolling under any standard, we assume without deciding its application for purposes of this case.

       Petitioner’s PCRA petition did cite allegedly “new” evidence to support his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was invalid because he did not understand his life sentence was without the possibility of parole. However, this new evidence was not new at all: It consisted of affidavits from petitioner’s parents and brother regarding a meeting they attended with petitioner’s counsel and petitioner in 1985 or 1986. App. 195-199.

       As noted previously, the PCRA time limit only came into effect in January 1996, see n. 1, supra, and petitioner’s federal habeas petition was due in April 1997, see n. 2, supra.

       Because I would hold that Pace was entitled to statutory tolling, I need not answer the question whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the District Court’s decision to grant Pace equitable tolling.

       Pace’s conviction became final in 1986, long before the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted the PCRA’s current statute of limitations. Pace’s original petition for postconvietion relief was filed under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9541 et seq. (1988) (amended and renamed by Act No. 1988-47, §§3, 6, 1988 Pa. Laws pp. 337-342), which did not include a statute of limitations. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Pace’s request for review on September 3, 1992. The PCRA time bar did not become effective until January 16, 1996. See Act No. 1995-32, §9579, 1995 Pa. Laws pp. 1125-1126 (Spec. Sess. 1).

       For instance, Pace argued that his failure to raise the claims below should be excused because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See App. 191-194, 220-226. Pace also argued that a failure to consider the new claim would constitute a “miscarriage of justice,” id., at 192, 217-219, and that his new claims challenged the legality of his sentence, id., at 189,192. To support each of these arguments, Pace cited state cases demonstrating the existence of judicial exceptions to procedural default.

       That time bar provides that “[a]ny petition under this subehapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim ...; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (1998) (emphasis added).

       The majority claims that this interpretation of “properly filed” is inconsistent with the text of § 2244(d)(2). See ante, at 416. But the rule I favor relies on the same interpretation, of the same statutory text, that we adopted in Artuz. See 531 U. S., at 10. Unless the Court means implicitly to overrule Artuz, its rule compels the conclusion that the singular phrase “properly filed” takes on different meanings in different contexts. That is the same interpretive exercise we unequivocally rejected in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 386 (2005).

       Such an inquiry is consistent with Artuz, which distinguished between properly filed applications and individual claims contained within those applications. An application filed intentionally to prolong the federal statute of limitations would be improper in its entirety. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one particular claim in an application could be improperly motivated to delay federal proceedings, while another claim was “properly filed” under AEDPA.