text:
    No. 78-686.
    Fleming v. Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 78-691.
    Foster et al. v. Maryland Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-695.
    Fowler v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-700.
    McKinney et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-702.
    Zarcone v. Perry et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-704.
    Garcia v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-705.
    P. D. Q., Inc., of Miami v. Nissan Motor Corporation in U. S. A. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-706.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. et al. v. Burns.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-710.
    Klein v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-713.
    United States v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-716.
    National Auto Brokers Corp. et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C.. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-717.
    Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-725.
    Sovereign Construction Co., Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-726.
    Bennett et al. v. Kiggins et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-727.
    Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) v. Kenny.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-729.
    Arrow Food Distributors, Inc. v. Love, Conservator.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-754.
    Unit, Inc., et al. v. Hickman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-758.
    Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Human Rights Appeal Board of New York et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-760.
    Tassop, dba St. Andrew Academy on the Sound v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-767.
    Glasgow et ux. v. Bartleson.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-768.
    Gasper et al. v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-770.
    Curtis v. Frank S. Phillips, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-773.
    United States Lines, Inc. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-804.
    No. 78-805.
    LaRocco v. United States; and Smaldone et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 583 F. 2d 1129.


text:
    No. 78-836.
    Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-851.
    Fayer v. Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee, Tenth Judicial District.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-869.
    Jezarian et al. v. Raichle, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-870.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5232.
    Carter v. Telectron, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5271.
    Mallett v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5279.
    Heflin v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5292.
    Brown v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5294.
    Traylor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5330.
    Gillespie v. Jeffes, Correctional Superintendent.
   C.. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5371.
    Brady et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5386.
    Orduno v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5393.
    Sedgwick v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5416.
    Rivera v. Hefner et al.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5431.
    Gavin et vir v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5433.
    Hollingsworth v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5435.
    Saenz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5457.
    Glover v. Dolan, Sheriff.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5464.
    Duffy v. Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5491.
    Montgomery v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5506.
    Babb et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5510.
    Kirkland v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5515.
    Cox et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5520.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5522.
    Dattalo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5548.
    Vander Linden v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5554.
    Reliford v. Colorado.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5555.
    Akerblom v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5559.
    McMahon v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5562.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5564.
    Cox v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5570.
    Cresta v. Meachum, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5573.
    Carrier v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5583.
    Alvarado-Colon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5599.
    Meadows v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5605.
    Parks v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5613.
    Vanek v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5626.
    Mahdi v. Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5630.
    Grear v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5636.
    Randall v. Fitzmorris.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5644.
    Richardson v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5646.
    Warner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5647.
    McClure v. Balkcom, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5652.
    Wright v. Williams.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5653.
    Magann v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5654.
    Williams v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5656.
    Manning v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5657.
    Spychala v. Gunn, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5663.
    Hunter v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5665.
    Prock v. Derryberry, Attorney General of Oklahoma.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5668.
    Riggs v. Giannetta et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5669.
    Cook v. Crofts, Judge.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5670.
    Davis v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5672.
    Johnson v. Hilton, Prison Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5677.
    Cleveland v. Warden, New Jersey State Prison.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5681.
    Gaines v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5682.
    Revis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5683.
    Olvera v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5687.
    Kaplan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5690.
    Floyd v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5691.
    Stokes v. Fair, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5695.
    Mudd et al. v. Busse.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5699.
    Green v. Wyrick, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5700.
    Patterson v. Thompson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5701.
    Rheuark v. Texas et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5702.
    Fearon v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5703.
    Bates v. Brierton, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5704.
    Van Cranebrock v. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5707.
    Hardwick v. Brooks et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5710.
    Jimenez v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5711.
    Lewis v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5713.
    No. 78-5773.
    Garcia v. United States; and Cowen v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 580 F. 2d 827.


text:
    No. 78-5714.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5716.
    McCrory v. Kirk, Judge.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5719.
    Turner v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5722.
    Kalita v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5729.
    Akerblom v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5731.
    Marconi v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5735.
    Hartwell v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5736.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5738.
    Hines v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5740.
    Ross v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5741.
    Becker v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5743.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5754.
    Diaz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5756.
    Beckwith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5766.
    Acevedo de Campos, Subsecretary of Department of Natural Resources of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Cordeco Development Corp.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5768.
    Armstrong v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5769.
    Malone v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5781.
    Linden v. United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5772.
    Hennemeyer v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5782.
    Perry v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5787.
    Rollins v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5794.
    Greene v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5805.
    Freeman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5807.
    Losing v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5813.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5815.
    Saldana v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-364.
    Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Douglas.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied,

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Powell,

text:
    No. 78-453.
    ACF Industries, Inc., Carter Carburetor Division v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

dissenting.,

The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case appears to be inconsistent with recent decisions of this Court on principles vital to the proper functioning of the federal courts. I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari.

I

In 1970, a civil rights organization and several individuals filed a charge against petitioner with respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It was claimed that in discharging an employee and in failing to promote another, petitioner had discriminated on the basis of race. In 1972, an additional complaint was lodged on behalf of a female employee who asserted that petitioner’s pregnancy-leave policies discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Upon the unsuccessful conclusion of conciliation efforts concerning these charges, the EEOC commenced this action against petitioner in the District Court. The complaint alleged broadly that petitioner had discriminated on the basis of race in its hiring, promotion, apprenticeship, and other practices, and on the basis of sex with respect to its maternity-leave and disability benefits.

Each party served interrogatories on the other. The dispute leading to this petition arose from the EEOC’s refusal adequately to answer interrogatories seeking the names of the individuals, other than those named in the initial administrative charges, against whom the EEOC believed petitioner had discriminated. Rather than supply this information, the EEOC moved the District Court to stay the filing of its answers while it completed its discovery against petitioner. This motion was denied. The EEOC thereafter submitted the following answer to the interrogatories: “The Commission is unable at this time to identify other individuals until it has completed its discovery.”

Petitioner moved for sanctions against the EEOC under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37. At a hearing on this motion, the District Judge reserved decision and directed the parties to confer. He stated that if they could not agree on the matter, he would consider the motion for sanctions. Further negotiations failed to produce an agreement.

The District Court then granted, in part, petitioner’s motion for sanctions. It concluded that the answers filed by the EEOC were merely an attempt to postpone an adequate response until after the EEOC’s own discovery was completed. It further found that “the EEOC has not in fact answered the interrogatories and has wilfully ignored the Court’s order . . . denying the requested stay.” 76 F. R. D. 143, 144 (1977). The court thought it obvious that the EEOC had made “broad-based allegations, without any basis for a belief in those allegations, and then . . . invade[d] the defendant’s records in an attempt to determine whether or not a cause of action exists.” Ibid. Rather than dismissing the complaint outright, as requested by petitioner, the court ordered (1) that at the trial on the merits it should be taken as established that petitioner had not discriminated against anyone, with the possible exception of the individuals named in the administrative charges before the EEOC; (2) that the EEOC would not be permitted to introduce evidence of discrimination against anyone other than those named individuals; and (3) that the EEOC should pay attorney’s fees of $500. Sanctions of this kind are expressly authorized by Rule 37 (d).

The EEOC filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s order. It argued to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that the sanctions order was appealable either as a collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), or as a denial of an injunction under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1). Petitioner responded that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because the sanctions order was not appealable before final judgment.

The Court of Appeals declined to decide the jurisdictional issue as presented by the parties. Instead, it stated, “we find this an appropriate case for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.” 577 F. 2d 43, 45 (1978). The court offered little by way of justification for its issuance of the writ, a remedy not requested by the EEOC. It merely noted its belief that petitioner, as well as the EEOC, had “displayed dilatory tactics during the discovery period,” id., at 48, and that the procedures leading to the sanctions had been irregular. It also disagreed with the District Court’s finding that the EEOC’s conduct amounted to willful disobedience.

II

The opinion of the Court of Appeals appears to be seriously at odds with the decisions of this Court in two respects, both of which are important to federal judicial policy.

A

The court below seems to have committed the compound error of using the mandamus power to mask a questionable jurisdictional decision. Our cases have emphasized the practical importance of the final-judgment rule of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which goes to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. As recently as last Term we unanimously agreed that “ ‘[restricting appellate review to “final decisions” prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy.’ ” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 471 (1978), quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 170 (1974). Whether the District Court’s sanctions order comes within either of the exceptions to the final-judgment rule suggested by the EEOC appears to be highly questionable. Rather than dealing with the merits of this important and dispositive issue, the Court of Appeals simply sidestepped it by treating the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. This action is difficult to square with the well-established rule that mandamus “is not to be used as a substitute for appeal.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104, 110 (1964).

It also seems evident that this was not an appropriate case for mandamus. “ '[0]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial “usurpation of power” will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.’ ” Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U. S. 394, 402 (1976), quoting Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 95 (1967). The petitioning party must show, among other things, that his right to the issuance of the writ is “ ‘clear and indisputable.’ ” Kerr v. United States District Court, supra, at 403, quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U. S. 379, 384 (1953). A litigant does not have a clear and indisputable right to a particular result in matters committed to the discretion of the District Court. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U. S. 655, 665-666 (1978) (plurality opinion). As the decision to impose sanctions under Rule 37 is discretionary with the District Judge, see National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U. S. 639, 642 (1976), and the sanctions ordered in this case are among those expressly authorized by Rule 37, the Court of Appeals’ resort to mandamus to review what appears to have been an otherwise unappealable order is highly suspect.

B

The decision below is difficult to reconcile with our recent decision in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., supra. In that case an antitrust action was dismissed under Rule 37 because of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery orders. The Court of Appeals reversed, apparently finding this sanction too harsh. We summarily reversed the Court of Appeals. We stressed that “the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions . . . must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.” 427 U. S., at 643. The sanctions order in this case is less severe than that approved in National Hockey League, and it was imposed for a virtually identical reason: a willful failure to answer interrogatories. Although the Court of Appeals rejected the District Cburt’s finding that the EEOC had willfully disregarded the court’s order, “[t]he question ... is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have [imposed the sanctions]; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.” Id., at 642. Neither the EEOC nor the Court of Appeals has convincingly demonstrated that an abuse of discretion occurred here.

Ill

The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case not only appears to be inconsistent with our recent decisions, but also could discourage efforts to curb the widespread abuse of discovery that is a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. The extent of this abuse has been of increasing concern. It was the subject of close attention at the Pound Conference held in St. Paul, Minn., in April 1976, and it was scrutinized further by the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force. The Task Force, chaired by then Judge Griffin B. Bell, recommended that the appropriate organizations of the bench and bar should “accord a high priority to the problem of abuses in the use of pretrial procedures . . . with a view to appropriate action by state and federal courts.” Following the studies that ensued, the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association submitted recommendations for substantial changes in the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure respecting pretrial discovery. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, after considering these and other recommendations, has circulated for comment a number of proposed amendments to the Rules. In a letter to the Committee, Attorney General Bell stated:

“It has been my experience as a judge, practicing lawyer and now as Attorney General that the scope of discovery is far too broad and that excessive discovery has significantly contributed to the delays, complexity and high cost of civil litigation in the federal courts.”

I have referred briefly to the concern that exists with respect to abuse of discovery to emphasize that, at least until rule changes can be made, there is a pressing need for judicial supervision in this area. The district court before which a case is being litigated is in a far better position than a court of appeals to supervise and control discovery and to impose sanctions for its abuse. Here, the District Court found that the EEOC had “in fact [failed to] answe[r] . . . interrogatories” and also had “willfully ignored the Court's order.” 76 F. R. D., at 144. It is a serious matter for a court of appeals to undercut a district court's authority on questions of this kind, which are peculiarly within its discretion and competency.

IV

Accordingly, because it appears that the decision below misapplied the relevant decisions of this Court with respect to interlocutory appeals and the use of mandamus, and also because its decision may deter district courts from imposing appropriate sanctions promptly where abuses of discovery occur, I would grant the petition.

       The Court of Appeals thought the procedures had been irregular because, in its opinion, the EEOC had not been given a sufficient opportunity to present its side of the story before sanctions were imposed. The District Court’s action, however, was premised on the conclusion that the EEOC had simply persisted in doing what it had been forbidden to do when the motion to stay was denied. Thus, even if the Court of Appeals were correct that the adversary proceedings that preceded the sanctions order may have been unduly truncated, a district court should not be required to prolong argument over a matter within its discretion and already decided.

       See Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F. R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976).

        Id., at 192. See also Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-first Century, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice, 76 F. R. D. 320, 328 (1978).

       See ABA Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation (1977). Comments on these proposals were offered by the Justice Department's Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, see United States Department of Justice, The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States 1977, pp. 13-15 (1978), and by the Board of Regents of the American College of Trial Lawyers.

       See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1978).

       Letter to Hon. Roszel C. Thomsen, Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, June 27, 1978, from Hon. Griffin B. Bell.

       One need not disagree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner also was at fault in the apparently acrimonious discovery disputes in this case. The District Court supervising the trial concluded that the EEOC's abuse was flagrant enough to warrant sanctions. That petitioner’s hands may not have been entirely clean would not seem to justify the drastic action of overturning this decision by mandamus.


text:
    No. 78-528.
    No. 78-529.
    No. 78-530.
    No. 78-531.
    Pierce v. Georgia; Callahan v. Georgia; Wickman v. Georgia; and Ritchie v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certio-rari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and reverse the convictions.

Reported below: 145 Ga. App. 680, 244 S. E. 2d 589.


text:
    No. 78-549.
    Henderson, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Majors et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y.. Motion of respondent Majors for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-557.
    Sworob et al. v. Harris, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent Nellie Reynolds for leave, to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-666.
    Nationwide Life Insurance Co. v. Collister.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-696.
    Lewis et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-751.
    Young v. Ethyl Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-701.
    Meltzer et al. v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-703.
    Ackerman-Chillingworth, Division of Marsh & McLennan, Inc., et al. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-720.
    Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Motion of Aircraft Finance Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-734.
    Kansas City Area Transportation Authority v. Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of American Public Transit Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-755.
    Hogan, Corrections Commissioner, et al. v. Dunkerley.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-761.
    American Telephone & Telegraph Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-764.
    Northern California Supermarkets, Inc. v. Central California Lettuce Producers Cooperative et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-807.
    Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Peoria, Illinois, et al. v. Kurek et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-5333.
    Shannon v. Associates Financial Services Company, Western, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-5359.
    Jones v. Morris, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-5381.
    Tennon v. Ricketts, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-5482.
    Wiggins v. Murphy et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 78-5531.
    Carmona et al. v. Ward, Correctional Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins,

dissenting.

In 1973, New York enacted a comprehensive drug law which prescribes mandatory maximum life sentences and varying minimum terms of imprisonment for all class A narcotics felonies. N. Y. Penal Law §§ 70.00 (2) (a), 70.00 (3) (a) (McKinney 1975). The Court today declines to consider whether two mandatory life sentences imposed under this statute, one for possession of an ounce of a substance containing cocaine, and the other for sale of 0.00455 of an ounce of a substance containing cocaine, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

I

In 1975, petitioner Martha Carmona pleaded guilty to possession of an ounce of a substance containing cocaine in violation of N. Y. Penal Law §220.18 (McKinney Supp. 1978). The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Car-mona, 40 N. Y. 2d 1081, 360 N. E. 2d 965 (1976). She is currently serving a sentence of six years to life, the minimum possible for a § 220.18 violation under the 1973 statute. N. Y. Penal Law §§ 70.00 (2)(a), (3)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975). Prior to a series of events giving rise to the instant charges, petitioner Carmona had no criminal record except for one non-drug-related arrest 19 years earlier.

Petitioner Roberta Fowler was convicted in February 1974, of selling 0.00455 of an ounce of a substance containing cocaine to an undercover agent for $20, in violation of N. Y. Penal Law § 220.39 (McKinney Supp. 1978). The state trial court sentenced her to four years to life under §§ 70.00 (2) (a) and 70.00 (3) (a) (iii), and the New York Court of Appeals sustained that penalty over her Eighth Amendment challenge, sub nom. People v. Broadie, 37 N. Y. 2d 100, 332 N. E. 2d 338, cert. denied, 423 U. S. 950 (1975). At the time of sentencing, Eowler, then age 20, had no prior record of possession or sale of narcotics, or of any violent criminal conduct, although she previously had been convicted of possession and use of drug paraphernalia, prostitution, and petit larceny.

In 1975, Carmona petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, on the ground that the sentencing provision of the 1973 statute was unconstitutional as applied. A month later, Fowler intervened as a petitioner. After a hearing, the District Court held that petitioners’ mandatory maximum life sentences were so “grossly out of proportion to the severity of [their] crime [s]” as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (1977). Accordingly, the court ordered petitioners discharged at the end of their minimum terms unless the State imposed constitutionally appropriate maximum sentences within 90 days. Id., at 1175.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Although agreeing in principle with the District Court that a sanction grossly disproportionate to the gravity of an offense would violate the Eighth Amendment, the majority concluded that petitioners’ sentences were constitutional. 576 F. 2d 405' (1978).

II

Few legal principles are more firmly rooted in the Bill of Rights and its common-law antecedents than the requirement of proportionality between a crime and its punishment. The precept that sanctions should be commensurate with the seriousness of a crime found expression in both the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights. And this Court has long recognized that the Eighth Amendment embodies a similar prohibition against disproportionate punishment.

In Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), the Court struck down as cruel and unusual punishment a sentence under the Philippine Code for falsification of a Government document. Although the sentence was excessive not merely in its length but in its conditions — 15 years of hard labor in chains, with lifetime surveillance after release — the duration of the imprisonment and subsequent supervision plainly contributed to the Courtis conclusion that “[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those who . . . believe that . . . punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” Id., at 366-367. In so ruling, the Court quoted with approval the Massachusetts Supreme Courtis observation that imprisonment “for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offence as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.” Id., at 368, quoting McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 328 (1899).

Applying the analysis set forth in Weems, this Court has invalidated punishments that were disproportionate to the nature of the offense charged, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for the status of drug addiction), and to the penalties imposed in other jurisdictions, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (denationalization for wartime desertion). Thus, while recognizing that the power to prescribe punishments rests in the first instance with the legislature, we have not abdicated our constitutional function to draw a meaning from the Eighth Amendment consonant with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id., at 101.

Most recently, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), the Court refined the test for assessing Eighth Amendment challenges, concluding that

“a punishment is 'excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Id., at 592.

In holding the Georgia death penalty for rape invalid on the latter ground, the Court followed the approach of Weems, focusing on the character of the crime, the punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions, and the penalty for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals here purported to apply the principles enunciated in Coker and Weems. Whether it did so in fact is, in my judgment, open to serious question.

Ill

Under Coker, the threshold inquiry concerns the character of the offense. In assessing the severity of petitioners’ crimes, the Court of Appeals made the following observations:

“The crime [drug abuse] spawns is well recognized. Addicts turn to prostitution, larceny, robbery, burglary and assault to support their habits. . . .
“The entire system depends upon ultimate disposition by sellers such as [petitioners] here who . . . are, 'the crucial link’ in the pernicious cycle spawning the addiction which creates other sellers. We conclude that the legislature could only properly judge the severity of the crime involved by considering the well understood and undisputed operating procedures of the dirty business involved and its disastrous consequences.” 576 F. 2d., at 412 (footnote and citation omitted).

This analysis is problematic for several reasons. Petitioners were convicted of selling a single dose of cocaine and of possessing one ounce of a substance containing cocaine. They were not, as the dissent pointed out, “wholesalers, importers, dealers or distributors of that drug or of heroin.” Id., at 423 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Yet New York’s 1973 statute precluded the judges who sentenced Carmona and Fowler from taking into account any gradations of culpability when imposing the maximum punishment.

To rationalize petitioners’ sentences by invoking all evils attendant on or attributable to widespread drug trafficking is simply not compatible with a fundamental premise of the criminal justice system, that individuals are accountable only for their own criminal acts. Nor is it consistent with the proportionality principle implicit in the Eighth Amendment. As Coker suggests, a crime that is sometimes accompanied by collateral offenses cannot constitutionally be punished as if it were always so linked. That the rape in Coker occurred while the defendant was committing armed robbery did not alter the plurality’s analysis for, “[ajlthough [rape] may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of, or even the serious injury to another person.” 433 U. S., at 598.

Moreover, none of the collateral crimes to which the Court of Appeals adverted carry as severe a punishment as those currently at issue. In New York, the maximum prison term for first-degree robbery and burglary is 25 years, for first-degree assault it is 4% to 15 years, and for prostitution, 3 months. To justify a stringent penalty for an act on the assumption that the act may engender other crimes makes little sense when those other crimes carry less severe sanctions than the act itself. See 576 F. 2d, at 423 (Oakes, J., dissenting). In sum, by focusing on the corrosive social impact of drug trafficking in general, rather than on petitioners’ actual — and clearly marginal — involvement in that enterprise, the Court of Appeals substantially overstated the gravity of the instant charges.

IV

When comparing petitioners’ sentences with those prescribed for other crimes by New York, and for the same crime in other States, it is first necessary to clarify the precise nature of the penalty imposed. Although the Court of Appeals professed to acknowledge that the “major question on appeal is whether the mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed on [petitioners] is unconstitutional,” 576 F. 2d, at 408, it declined to analyze the sentences in terms of their maximum potential. Rather, the court discounted petitioners’ penalties by the “probability of parole,” id., at 413, and considered the constitutionality of those lesser undefined sentences. This approach is analytically unsatisfying and inconsistent with the position taken by other courts that have considered the constitutionality of maximum life sentences.

Under New York law, the determination to grant parole and absolute discharge from parole is committed to the discretion of the Parole Board. Unless the parolee receives an absolute discharge, he remains in the legal custody of the State for the maximum term of his sentence and may be reincarcerated for violating any of the conditions which normally attach to the grant of parole. N. Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978). Since the standard governing absolute discharge from parole, whether such termination would serve the “best interests of society,” § 259 — j, affords nearly limitless discretion to the Parole Board, petitioners could not claim any realistic expectation of release from legal custody prior to the termination of their maximum sentences. On similar reasoning, the New York Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court have both evaluated Eighth Amendment claims by reference to the maximum terms the defendants might serve, notwithstanding the possibility of parole. People v. Broadie, 37 N. Y. 2d, at 110, 332 N. E. 2d, at 341; In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 415-418, 503 P. 2d 921, 924-926 (1972) (en banc).

Had the Court of Appeals evaluated petitioners’ sentences in terms of their maximum potential, it might well have reached a different result. In New York, the only other crimes with mandatory life sentences are first- and second-degree murder, first-degree arson (intentional damage to an inhabited building by explosion) and first-degree kidnaping (abduction if the victim dies or the purpose is extortion). Among those crimes carrying a substantially lighter maximum penalty than the $20 sale and possession of an ounce of cocaine involved here are:

(1) first-degree rape (sexual intercourse by force or with a female physically helpless or less than 11 years old) (6-25 years);
(2) first-degree manslaughter (homicide with intent to cause serious physical injury) (6-25 years) ;
(3) second-degree kidnaping (abduction) (6-25 years);
(4) second-degree arson (intentional damage to an inhabited building) (6-25 years) ;
(5) first-degree robbery or burglary (armed) (6-25 years); and
(6) first-degree assault (injury with intent to cause disfigurement or serious physical injury) (4%-15 years).

Just as the plurality in Coker found it “difficult to accept the notion . . . that the rapist . . . should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer,” 433 IT. S., at 600, so, too, I find it difficult to accept the concept that the sale or possession of a small amount of cocaine should be penalized more severely than manslaughter or forcible rape.

Compared with the punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions, New York’s drug law is unique in its severity. As both the District Court and the dissent in the Court of Appeals painstakingly demonstrated, no other State prescribes life sentences for the crimes involved here:

“Indeed, only six states have statutes permitting a court to consider imposition of a life sentence on a first felony offender. The most common maximum permitted is between ten and twenty years and not- one of the thirty-four states in this range requires imposition of the maximum term. Neither Fowler nor Carmona would have faced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under the law of any other state. As for Carmona, in thirty-one states the maximum penalty provided by law is less than the minimum sentence which she is serving.” 576 F. 2d, at 424 (footnotes omitted).

Under federal drug laws, Carmona, if charged as a first offender with simple possession, could have received no more than one year of imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine, 21 U. S. C. § 844 (a). Fowler’s sale of narcotics, as a first offense, would have been punishable by probation or incarceration for up to 15 years and/or a fine of up to $25,000, coupled with a mandatory special parole term of at least 3 years. 21 U. S. C. §841 (b)(1)(A).

Although acknowledging that the penalties under the 1973 New York law are harsher than those in any other jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals justified the disparity on the ground that New York City “houses more than half of all the addicts in the entire United States.” 576 F. 2d, at 415. There was no finding to that effect by the District Court. Rather, the majority relied on People v. Broadie, 37 N. Y. 2d, at 116, 332 N. E. 2d, at 345, which in turn drew upon an estimate in E. Brecher and the Editors of Consumer Reports, Licit and Illicit Drugs 72 (1972). Current evidence, however, indicates that New York City has no more “epidemic” a drug problem than a number of other major metropolitan areas. A study by the National Institute on Drug Abuse reveals that in 1973, the year the statute was passed, Los Angeles, Miami, Detroit, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Francisco all had more heroin addicts per capita than New York City. Person, Retka, & Woodward, A Method for Estimating Heroin Use Prevalence, NIDA Technical Paper 8 (1977).

Moreover, even granting that New York has a greater concentration of drug abuse than other States, this does not of itself justify the punishments at issue here. Due to a variety of geographic, demographic, and socio-economic factors, New York has more than its fair share of motor vehicle theft and larceny, but this misfortune could not insulate Draconian penalties for such offenses from constitutional challenge. However serious its narcotics problem, New York cannot constitutionally treat those with peripheral involvement in drug trafficking as if they were responsible for the problem in its entirety.

Throughout its opinion, the Court of Appeals emphasized the need for broad deference to the legislature’s judgment of how best to deal with a social phenomenon alarming in its current proportions. I do not disagree. It is axiomatic that this Court should approach Eighth Amendment challenges with caution, lest it become “under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility . . . throughout the country.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion). But neither should the Court abdicate the function conferred by the Eighth Amendment, to determine whether application of a given legislative judgment results in punishment grossly out of proportion to specific offenses. I decline to join the Court in its abdication here.

Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for argument.

       Section 70.00 (2) (a) provides in part: “For a class A felony the [maximum] term shall be life imprisonment.” The minimum terms that a court may impose vary depending on whether the felony is specified as A-I, A-II, or A-III. Section 70.00 (3) (a) provides:
      “(i) For a class A-I felony, such minimum period shall not be less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years.
      “(ii) For a class A-II felony, such minimum period shall not be less than six years nor more than eight years four months.
      “(iii) For a class A-III felony such minimum period shall not be less than one year nor more than eight years four months.”

       Section 220.18 provides in part:

        “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses:
      "1. one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of one ounce or more containing a narcotic drug . . . .” Cocaine is classified as a narcotic drug. § 220.00 (7). N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 3306, Schedule II (a) (4) (McKinney Supp. 1978).

       Section 220.18 classifies criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree as an A-II felony. See n. 1, supra.

       Several months before her indictment in state court for the instant offense, Carmona was arrested on federal charges of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and on state charges of selling heroin. In satisfaction of the federal charges, she pleaded guilty to one substantive count of possession and received a sentence of imprisonment for one year and special parole for three years, both to run concurrently with the state sentence. The other state charges were dismissed in return for Carmona's guilty plea to one count of possession of cocaine.

       Section 220.39 provides in part:

        “A person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells:
      “1. a narcotic drug

       Section 220.39 specifies criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree as a class A-III felony. See n. 1, supra.

       Fowler’s criminal record is set out in full in the District Court’s opinion, 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 n. 13 (SDNY 1977).

       Chapter 20, renumbered Chapter 14, of the Magna Carta states: “A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood . . . .” J. Holt, Magna Carta 323 (1965). For a discussion of the evolution of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the English Bill of Rights, see Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev, 839, 855-860 (1969).

       The Court of Appeals suggested that petitioners were “not aided by the fact that their convictions were based on cocaine and not heroin. Cocaine is a dangerous drug that causes damaging psychological and physiological effects in its users.” 576 F. 2d, at 412 n. 11. In support of that proposition, the court cited no findings by the District Court. Rather, the Court of Appeals relied on a law review article which notes that cocaine use “does not produce tolerance or physical dependence,” McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 537, 553 (1973), and on an opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court which acknowledges that, “[w]hile cocaine has been anecdotally related to aggressive,or criminal conduct, adequate evidence to assess its possible impact in these areas is absent.” State v. Erickson, 574 P. 2d 1, 9 (1978) i

       Here there was no evidence causally linking petitioners’ drug offenses to any violent collateral crimes. And it is questionable whether such linkage can be presumed. Even if the Court of Appeals could appropriately rely on a New Yorker Magazine article to establish that a substantial percentage of New York’s prison inmates use drugs and that many of them turn to robbery or burglary to support their habits, see 576 F. 2d., at 412 n. 12, it cannot be presumed either that: (1) but for drugs, those defendants would not have committed crimes; or (2) cocaine sales have a significant causal relationship to robbery or burglary. See n. 9, supra. Indeed, one of the Court of Appeals’ own sources noted that there is “no rehable scientific evidence finking cocaine usage to criminal conduct . . . .” State v. Erickson, swpra, at 9.

       N. Y. Penal Law §§ 160.15, 70.00 (2) (b) (McKinney 1975); §§ 140.30, 70.00 (2)(b) (McKinney 1975); §§230.00 (McKinney Supp. 1978), 70.15 (2) (McKinney 1975).

       In In re Lynch, the California Supreme Court held that an indeterminate sentence must be evaluated as a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and that, as such, it was cruel and unusual punishment for a second offense of indecent exposure.
      The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a contrary approach in Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F. 2d 651 (1978) (en banc). At issue there was the constitutionality of a sentence imposed under the Texas Habitual Criminal Statute, which mandates life imprisonment upon a third felony conviction. Relying in part on the analysis of the Court of Appeals in this case, the en banc majority upheld the sentence, after taking into consideration the possibility of parole. Id., at 659. The dissent, in which six judges joined, refused to discount the defendant’s sentence by “a statistical possibility of clemency, an unenforceable hope that he may someday benefit from the grace of a parole board.” Id., at 668. (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). That another Circuit has narrowly divided over a question of critical significance for this case is, in my judgment, further reason for granting review.

       N. Y. Penal Law §§ 125.27, 125.25, 150.20, 135.25 (McKinney 1975).

       The crimes are defined in N. Y. Penal Law §§ 130.35, 125.20, 135.20, 150.15, 160.15, 140.30, 120.10 (McKinney 1975). The penalties are set forth in §§ 70.02 (3) (a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1978).

       If convicted of possession as a second offender, Carmona would have been subject to no more than two years'1 imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. §844 (a). Had she been convicted of possession with intent to sell, the maximum penalty for a first offense would have been 15 years’ imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, and a special parole term of at least 3 years; for a second offense, it would have been 30 years, $50,000, and at least 6 years’ special parole. 21 U. S. C. §841 (b)(1)(A). Only if she were found guilty of engaging in a “continuing criminal enterprise” in concert with at least five others could she have received a life sentence. 21 U. S. C. § 848.

       The report’s latest annual figures, those for 1975, reflect that San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, and San Antonio have a higher heroin addict per capita ranking than New York City. Person, Retka, & Woodward, at 8.

       See U. S. Dept. of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States 1977, Table 4 (1978).


text:
    No. 78-5533.
    No. 78-5763.
    Jackson v. Florida. Westbrook v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Fla.; and

Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 78-5533, 359 So. 2d 1190; No. 78-5763, 242 Ga. 151, 249 S. E. 2d 524.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


author: Mr. Justice White,

text:
    No. 78-5619.
    Rezin v. Wolff, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction after rejecting his claim that a plea bargain had been breached in violation of Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971). Rezin v. State, 93 Nev. 55, 559 P. 2d 822 (1977). Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus, the District Court denying his petition on the grounds that he had failed to raise the Santobello claim until his appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. Affirming, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s failure to object in the state trial court was not within the “cause and prejudice” exception of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). Affirmance order, 580 F. 2d 1053 (CA9 1978).

Wainwright v. Sykes, however, did not impose its own contemporaneous-objection rule independent of state rules governing the time for raising objections in state criminal proceedings. The only issue addressed in Sykes was: “In what instances will an adequate and independent state ground bar consideration of otherwise cognizable federal issues on federal habeas review?” 433 U. S., at 78-79, 81. In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court reached and decided the Santobello issue, and there would have been no adequate and independent state ground of decision barring review by this Court on a petition for certiorari from the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 154-157 (1974). If Nevada has a rule requiring the Santobello issues to be presented to the trial court, the Nevada Supreme Court did not enforce the rule in this case. Wainwright v. Sykes is therefore beside the point, and I would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-134.
    No. 78-315.
    No. 78-347.
    No. 78-381.
    No. 78-501.
    No. 78-5342.
    No. 78-5382.
    No. 78-5417.
    No. 78-5448.
    No. 78-5458.
    No. 78-5602.
    No. 78-5603.
    No. 78-5634.
    Sexton v. United States, Neaveill v. Andolsek et al., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp. et al., Holding v. BVA Credit Corp., Koros et ux. v. Credit Bureau, Inc., of Georgia et al., Jenkins v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., et al., Yates v. United States Civil Service Commission, Collins v. United States, Restrepo-Granda v. United States, Wayland v. Town of Topsfield, Key v. Georgia, Bloch et ux. v. Suffolk County Federal Savings & Loan Assn., Mahler v. United States,
   ante, p. 911;

ante, p. 965;

ante, p. 946;

ante, p. 949;

ante, p. 966;

ante, p. 921;

ante, p. 987;

ante, p. 988;

ante, p. 935;

ante, p. 961;

ante, p. 990;

ante, p. 990; and

ante, p. 991. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 75-1219.
    Sexton v. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.,
   425 U. S. 973, and 429 U. S. 873. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 78-397.
    Garfinkle et vir v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Wells Fargo Bank et al., Real Parties in Interest),
   ante, p. 949. Motion of Richard B. Spohn, Director of Consumer Affairs of California, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. Petition for rehearing denied.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    January 15, 1979
    No. 77-1688.
    Symm, Tax Assessor-Collector of Waller County, Texas v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Tex.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Powell would dismiss appeal for want of a properly presented federal question.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice joins,

dissenting.

Today the Court summarily affirms the judgment of a three-judge District Court enjoining appellant Symm, the Tax Assessor-Collector and ex officio voting registrar of Waller County, Tex., from using a certain questionnaire designed to aid Symm in determining whether persons registering to vote in Waller County are bona fide residents. Because I believe the three-judge District Court mistakenly exercised jurisdiction over Symm, I dissent.

Waller County, a small rural county west of Houston, has a population of approximately 15,000, a slight majority of which is Negro. Prairie View A & M University is a state-supported, predominately black university located in Waller County. Appellant Symm is responsible for registering voters in the county. Persons personally known to Symm or his deputies as county residents, as well as persons who are listed on the tax rolls as owning property in Waller County, are routinely registered upon filling out the state registration form. Those who fall within neither of these categories are required to complete a residency questionnaire, which asks whether the applicant is a college student and, if so, inquires into the student’s home address, property ownership, employment status, future plans, and so forth.

On October 14, 1976, the Attorney General of the United States filed this action against Symm, Waller County, the State of Texas, and its Secretary of State and Attorney General, alleging that use of the questionnaire denied Prairie View students the right to vote in violation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971 (a), 1971 (c), 1973, 1973j (d), 1973bb, and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments. Pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1973bb (a)(2), the United States moved to convene a three-judge District Court. The request for a three-judge court was predicated on the United States’ claim for injunctive relief to remedy alleged violations of the Twenty-sixth Amendment. The motion was granted, and a three-judge District Court was convened. The District Court found that Symm’s registration practices violated the Twenty-sixth Amendment and permanently enjoined him from, among other things, using the questionnaire. Symm appeals from that judgment.

The effect of an injunction against allegedly discriminatory voting practices in one small county in Texas is of no earthshaking importance, and the District Court may have been justified in concluding that the appellant registrar violated rights guaranteed to Prairie View students under the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the case were here, therefore, on a petition for certiorari and fell within our discretionary jurisdiction, I would have no hesitation in voting to deny certiorari.

But this case is here on direct appeal from the decision of a three-judge District Court. And since we are obligated to decide the merits of cases which Congress allows a party to bring here by appeal, regardless of their importance, I think we are bound to examine on our own motion the jurisdiction of the federal court from which the appeal comes. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 740 (1976).

Section 1937bb directs the Attorney General “to institute, in the name of the United States, such actions against States or political subdivisions, including actions for injunctive relief, as he may determine to be necessary to implement the twenty-sixth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973bb (a) (1) (emphasis added). Suits brought under the statute “shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges ... .” § 1973bb (a) (2). The section unambiguously limits the Attorney General’s authority to bringing actions against States and political subdivisions. Although the United States brought this suit against the State of Texas and Waller County as well as named individual officials, the District Court’s injunction runs only against Symm personally. Indeed, the District Court specifically refused to grant relief “with respect to . . . the State of Texas, and Waller County.”

In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278-279 (1977), this Court distinguished between jurisdiction asserted under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, “the catchall federal-question provision requiring in excess of $10,000 in controversy,” 429 U. S., at 279, and jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343, which requires not only that the technical requirements of jurisdiction be met but that suit against the parties named as defendants be authorized under the cognate provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The language of the jurisdictional provision here, being part of the very statute which creates the substantive cause of action, would seem to require a conclusion that § 1973bb is more akin to 28 U. S. C. § 1343 than it is to 28 U. S. C. § 1331. The jurisdiction of three-judge courts convened under § 1973bb is thus limited, to Twenty-sixth Amendment claims brought by the Attorney General against the parties defendant named in the statute — States and political subdivisions. Since Symm falls within neither category, the District Court’s jurisdiction to enjoin him from using the questionnaire cannot be based on § 1973bb (a)(2). Nor did the other statutes invoked by the United States furnish an independent basis for three-judge-court jurisdiction over the Government’s action against Symm. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1345, 2201; 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971 (d), 1973j (d).

The absence of a statutory basis of three-judge-court jurisdiction over Symm does not end the matter, however, for it is conceivable that the District Court based its injunction against Symm on some unarticulated, hybrid concept of pendent-party jurisdiction. Resolution of this issue also requires reference to § 1973bb since under cases such as Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14 (1976), and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365 (1978), we must carefully inquire not only into the existence of a case or controversy under Art. Ill of the United States Constitution but also into the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the District Court.

In Aldinger this Court observed that “as against a plaintiff’s claim of additional power over a 'pendent party,’ the reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed in light of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial power has been extended by Congress.” 427 U. S., at 17 (emphasis in original). Petitioner, who was discharged from her job as a county employee, brought a § 1983 civil rights claim against county officials and a state-law claim against the county itself. Because Congress had excluded municipal corporations such as counties from the class of “person [s]” suable under § 1983, and therefore from the corresponding grant of jurisdiction in § 1343 (3), we held that “where the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction over a municipal corporation is not diversity of citizenship, but is a claim of jurisdiction pendent to a suit brought against a municipal officer within § 1343, the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against municipal corporations under the cognate provisions of § 1983 is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of pendent-party jurisdiction.” 427 U. S., at 17-18, n. 12.

In this case I think an exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction over Symm would be demonstrably wrong under Aldinger, supra, and Owen, supra. The civil action created by § 1973bb is plainly limited to suits brought against States and political subdivisions. Accordingly, the special grant of three-judge-court jurisdiction contained in the statute is similarly limited. The other jurisdictional statutes invoked by the United States provide no independent basis of three-judge-court jurisdiction over Symm. Since the District Court could, in my opinion, have quite readily attributed Symm’s actions as voting registrar to Waller County, a party statutorily authorized to be named and in fact named as a defendant, I would reverse the judgment against Symm and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings against the county. While the injunctive relief ordered against Symm is contrary to Aldinger, supra, and Owen, supra, injunctive relief against Waller County, if the District Court decides such relief is appropriate, would be fully authorized and equally efficacious in vindicating the right of Prairie View students. In the absence of such relief, I would think that any student could bring an action against Symm under 28 U. S. C. §1343. This analysis may all seem very “legalistic” and “technical,” but since the case is here on direct appeal, we have no choice but to examine the question of federal jurisdiction. Upon such examination, I believe Aldinger, supra, and Owen, supra, require reversal of the judgment entered by the District Court.

       “The undersigned, at the request of the Registrar of Waller County, answers the following questions in support of the application of the undersigned for a voter registration certificate or for appointment as a Deputy Registrary, as the case may be:

      “Please print or type your name and address:. Are you a college student?. If so, where do you attend school?.... . How long have you been a student at such school? . Where do you live while in college?. . How long have you lived in Texas?. In Waller County?. Do you intend to reside in Waller County indefinitely?.How long have you considered yourself to be a bona fide resident of Waller County?.What do you plan to do when you finish your college education?.Do you have a job or position in Waller County?.Own any home or other property in Waller County?. Have an automobile registered in Waller County?. Have a telephone listing in Waller County?. Belong to a Church, Club or some Waller County Organization other than college related?. If so, please name them: . Where do you live when the college is not in session ?. . What address is listed as your home address with the college?. Give any other information which might be helpful.”

       “The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted under [§ 1973bb], which shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973bb (a) (2).

       This possibility is suggested by the District Court's exercise, despite the objection of appellee United States, of “pendent jurisdiction” over appellant Symm’s cross-claim against the Texas Secretary of State, in which Symm charged that the Secretary lacked authority under Texas law to prohibit use of the residency questionnaire.

        Aldinger was decided before Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), which overruled prior cases holding that municipal corporations are not “person [s]” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Monell did not disturb, however, the jurisdictional analysis applied in Aldinger, which was recently reaffirmed in Owen: “Monell in no way qualifies the holding of Aldinger that the jurisdictional questions presented in a case such as this one are statutory as well as constitutional 437 TJ. S., at 373 n. 12.


text:
    No. 78-523.
    Bailey et al. v. Hargrove, Judge, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ga.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall dissent.


text:
    No. 78-821.
    Holloway et al. v. Wise, Judge, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ga.


text:
    No. 78-609.
    Cardwell v. Village of Waite Hill.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Lake County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5804.
    Genco v. District of Columbia National Bank.
   Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5631.
    Ahmad v. Rodak, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 78-5689.
    Ahmad et al. v. Aytch et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. D-141.
    In re Disbarment of Gasque.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 906.]


text:
    No. D-142.
    In re Disbarment of Foster.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 906.]


text:
    No. 78-17.
    No. 78-249.
    United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. McCombs et al.
   C. A. 10th Gir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 892.] Motion of Associated Gas Distributors for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 77-983.
    No. 78-119.
    No. 78-139.
    Washington et al. v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn. et al.; and Washington et al. v. Puget Sound Gillnetters Assn. et al. Washington et al. v. United States et al.; Puget Sound Gillnetters Assn. et al. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (United States et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Sup. Ct. Wash.;

C. A. 9th Cir.; and

C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 439 U. S. 909.] Motions of Pacific Legal Foundation, American Institute of Fishery Research Biologists, and Northwest Steel-head & Salmon Council of Trout Unlimited, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-309.
    Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 979.] Motions of petitioner and respondents for additional time for oral argument denied. Alternative motion for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 78-329.
    No. 78-330.
    Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al. v. Baird et al.; and Hunerwadel v. Baird et al.
   D. C. Mass. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 925.] Motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. Motions of Americans United for Life, Inc., et ah, Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights et al., and United States Catholic Conference for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-479.
    Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 952.] Motion of National Association of Stevedores for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Joint motion of respondent and American Export Lines, Inc., et al. as amici curiae for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-349.
    No. 78-546.
    United States v. Helstoski; and Helstoski v. Meanor, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1045.] Motion to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 78-354.
    North Carolina v. Butler.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1046.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that R. Gene Braswell, Esquire, of Goldsboro, N. C., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 78-5072.
    Davis v. Passman.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 925.] Motion of petitioner for divided argument denied. Motion of Peter Barton Hutt, Esquire, to permit Sana F. Shtasel to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 78-5420.
    No. 78-5421.
    Payton v. New York; and Riddick v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1044.] Motion of appellants for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-5732.
    No. 78-5752.
    Green v. Hunter, U. S. District Judge, et al.; and Christiansen v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 77-1546.
    Stafford, U. S. Attorney, et al. v. Briggs et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for argument with No. 78-303, immediately infra.


text:
    No. 78-303.
    Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, et al. v. Driver et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for argument with No. 77-1546, immediately supra.


text:
    No. 78-752.
    Baker v. McCollan.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 77-1615.
    Cantwell et al. v. Hudnut, Mayor of Indianapolis, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 77-6092.
    Hudson v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-129.
    British European Airways v. Benjamins et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-302.
    East Baton Rouge Parish School Board et al. v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-310.
    No. 78-311.
    Helms et al. v. Driver et al.; and Driver et al. v. Helms et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 577 F. 2d 147.


text:
    No. 78-498.
    Boulet v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-504.
    Marra v. West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-535.
    No. 78-536.
    Shell Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.; and Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 578 F. 2d 660.


text:
    No. 78-563.
    American Association of Councils of Medical Staffs of Private Hospitals, Inc. v. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-586.
    Ostrer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-587.
    McLennan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-618.
    Pinner v. United States.
   G. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-653.
    Brennan et vir, dba P. H. Brennan Hand Delivery v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-675.
    Maher v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-694.
    Barone v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-698.
    Shimberg et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-722.
    Starr v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-732.
    Swisher v. United States.
   G. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-766.
    American Cast Iron Co. v. Pettway et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-772.
    Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-782.
    Pipeline Construction Co., Inc. v. Jaffee et al.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-796.
    Sperl v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-810.
    Scholl, Inc. v. S. S. Kresge Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-797.
    K. G. Moore, Inc. v. Anderson.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-799.
    Board of Supervisors of Buckingham Township v. Barness et al.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-814.
    Thompson v. Covington Housing Development Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-815.
    Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-827.
    Ball v. County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-834.
    McAx Sign Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-848.
    R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-879.
    Rabbitt v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-887.
    Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of Financial Institutions of Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-888.
    Grosvenor et al. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-928.
    Lopp v. Lopp.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-891.
    Bomengo, aka Russo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-934.
    Dominguez, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-938.
    Rosato v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-940.
    Green v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-979.
    Stobaugh v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5427.
    Goulden, aka Hart v. Davis, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5429.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5526.
    Cavaness v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5541.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5586.
    Sand v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5591.
    Wallace v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5597.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5600.
    Gibbs v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5612.
    Kelly v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5632.
    Calhoun et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5649.
    Sinclair v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5659.
    Palmere v. United States.
   C- A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5666.
    Burman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5667.
    Peterman v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5673.
    Spratt v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5684.
    Hubbard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5720.
    Wilkins v. Williams, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5721.
    Morrow v. Igleburger et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5726.
    Sommerville v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5728.
    Boler v. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5730.
    Walker v. Wainwright, Director, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5734.
    Floyd v. Jago, Correctional Suprintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5737.
    McDaniel v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5748.
    McDonald v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5749.
    Crawley v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5751.
    Gibson v. Jackson, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5770.
    Wilkins v. Maryland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5780.
    Coleman et ux. v. Wallace, Governor of Alabama, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5786.
    Cobb v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5788.
    Porter v. Continental Bank et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5790.
    Sayers v. Brierton, Prison Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5797.
    Foderaro v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5800.
    Martell v. CBS, Inc., WCBS AM Radio Station, New York, New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5802.
    McGhee v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5816.
    Sullivan v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5821.
    McGuirk v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5822.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5827.
    Howard v. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5830.
    Jeter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5839.
    Ellis v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5840.
    Jordan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5852.
    Johnson v. Department of Public Health Air Management Services of Philadelphia.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5853.
    Hutter v. Faber et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5861.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5865.
    Wallace v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5879.
    Morello v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 77-7004.
    Kerpen v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 78-267.
    Michigan v. James et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-840.
    Rowe et al. v. Durso.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-748.
    Cullerton et al. v. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 78-811.
    City of El Paso v. Darbyshire Steel Co. Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-824.
    Brauer v. Sheet Metal Workers Pension Plan of Southern California, Arizona & Nevada.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion of Motion Picture Industry-Pension Plan for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Black-mun, and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 78-5532.
    Thompson v. Oklahoma et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

In this proceeding pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254, petitioner presents the same questions presented by him in No. 76-5283, cert, denied, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977). For the reasons expressed in my dissent from the denial of certiorari in that case, I would grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.


text:
    No. 78-5696.
    No. 78-5759.
    Jacobs v. Alabama. Woodard v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ala.; and

Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 78-5696, 361 So. 2d 640; No. 78-5759, 261 Ark. 895, 553 S. W. 2d 259.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 76-1660.
    No. 77-5781.
    No. 78-173.
    No. 78-513.
    No. 78-5317.
    No. 78-5388.
    No. 78-5490.
    No. 78-5582.
    Hutto et al. v. Finney et al., Rakas et al. v. Illinois, King v. Norris, Tracy, Judge v. Dixon et al., Mosley v. United States Department of Labor et al., Ford v. Muir, U. S. District Judge, et al., Alderman v. Georgia, Rogers v. Douglas et ux.,
   437 U. S. 678;

ante, p. 128;

ante, p. 995;

ante, p. 983;

ante, p. 986;

ante, p. 978;

ante, p. 991; and

ante, p. 1058. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    January 19, 1979
    No. 78-224.
    City of Cleveland v. Albaugh.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    January 22, 1979
    No. 78-339.
    Wilcox, Sheriff v. Struve.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Idaho dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5814.
    Wayland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co. et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-866.
    Vornado, Inc., et al. v. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-5606.
    Hardy v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., Kansas City Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Duren v. Missouri, ante, p. 357, and Harlin v. Missouri, ante, p. 459.


text:
    No. A-642 (78-961).
    Gambino v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Application for stay, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant the application.


text:
    No. 27,
    Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky.
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs, to report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 410 U. S. 641.]


text:
    No. 79,
    Orig.
    Oklahoma v. Arkansas.
   It is ordered that the Honorable William H. Becker, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have same effect as if originally made by the Court.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 812.]


text:
    No. D-140.
    In re Disbarment of Ray.
   Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 906.]


text:
    No. D-156.
    In re Disbarment of Falk.
   It is ordered that Eugene A. Falk, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 77-983.
    Washington et al. v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn. et al.; and Washington et al. v. Puget Sound Gillnetters Assn. et al. Washington et al. v. United States et al. Puget Sound Gillnetters Assn. et al. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (United States et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Sup. Ct. Wash.;

No. 78-119.

No. 78-139.

C. A. 9th Cir.; and

[Certiorari granted, ante, p. 909.] Motion of Pacific Seafood Processors Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 77-1511.
    Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Elliott et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, ante, p. 816.] Motion of respondents to dismiss or remand denied.


text:
    No. 78-6.
    Moore et al. v. Sims et ux.
   D. C. S. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 925.] Motion of John Quincy Carter for leave to present oral argument pro hac vice denied. Motion of appellees for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-17.
    No. 78-249.
    United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs et al.; and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. McCombs et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 892.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 78-160.
    No. 78-161.
    Wilson et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.; and Iowa et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Motions of parties for additional time for oral argument and for divided argument granted, and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for that purpose to be divided as follows: 45 minutes for petitioners, 25 minutes for the United States, and 20 minutes for the Omaha Indian Tribe. Motion of the Attorney General of California for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 78-225.
    Babbitt, Governor of Arizona, et al. v. United Farm Workers National Union et al.
   D. C. Ariz. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 891.] Motion of American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-329.
    No. 78-330.
    Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al. v. Baird et al.; and Hunerwadel v. Baird et al.
   D. C. Mass. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 925.] Motion of appellants for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 78-5384.
    Sandstrom v. Montana.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1067.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Byron W. Boggs, Esquire, of Anaconda, Mont., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 78-5420.
    No. 78-5421.
    Payton v. New York; and Riddick v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1044.] Motion of ap-pellee for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-5907.
    Camacho v. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 78-5808.
    Clark v. Fifth Judicial District Court of Eddy County, New Mexico.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 78-808.
    Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Boles et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 78-605.
    United States et al. v. Rutherford et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of American Cancer Society for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-503.
    Frisby v. West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-516.
    Borden, Inc. v. Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-641.
    Stivers et al. v. Minnesota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-673.
    Dawson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-687.
    Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-693.
    Bane v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-708.
    Greene et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-709.
    Wetterlin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-714.
    Welch, Administrator v. Claytor, Secretary of the Navy.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-724.
    Walker v. Hoffman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-730.
    American Export Lines, Inc., et al. v. Metal Traders, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-746.
    Grossmann v. Redington, Trustee in Bankruptcy, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-763.
    Rutherford et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-771.
    Quinn v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-778.
    Natter Manufacturing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-785.
    Espinoza v. Copenhaver, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-786.
    McDannald v. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-787.
    DeJaynes et al. v. General Finance Corp. of Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir.


text:
    No. 78-790.
    Shippers Dispatch, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-813.
    Matthews et al. v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-822.
    Wilczynski v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-830.
    Hitson et al. v. Baggett, Secretary of State of Alabama, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-839.
    Leguennec, Registrar of Voters of San Francisco, et al. v. Chinese for Affirmative Action et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-841.
    Shepherd et ux. v. Trevino, Tax Assessor, Collector, and Registrar of Hidalgo County, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-844.
    Plante et al. v. Gonzalez, Executive Director of Florida Commission on Ethics, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-850.
    Morris v. Texas.
   County Crim. Ct., Hunt County, Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-853.
    Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-859.
    Graseck v. Middlemiss et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-862.
    Anderson v. Neuberger et al.; and Morris v. Hayduk et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 N. Y. 2d 708, 381 N. E. 2d 168 (first case) ; 45 N. Y. 2d 793, 381 N. E. 2d 159 (second case).


text:
    No. 78-864.
    Perbello v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-876.
    Smith v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-878.
    Gilmartin et al. v. Board of Dental Examiners of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-898.
    F. C. Y. Construction & Equipment Co., Inc., et al. v. Harrison, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-902.
    Shopmen's Local Union No. 455, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-922.
    Medical Therapy Sciences, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-963.
    Londe v. United States.
   C.. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-969.
    Charles et al. v. United States.
   G. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-976.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-996.
    Perl v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5556.
    Smith v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5569.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5575.
    Okoroha v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5581.
    Burciago v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5589.
    Stewart v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5604.
    Acosta v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5620.
    Goulden v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5650.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5685.
    Polly v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5706.
    Moreno v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5739.
    Herrington v. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5779.
    Walker v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5806.
    Mack v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5811.
    Grooms et al. v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5817.
    Carlsen v. City of Logan, Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5819.
    Alers v. Toledo et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-5824.
    Silo v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.