text:
    No. 75-6969.
    Lee, aka Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 75-7012.
    Katz v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-8.
    Bamford v. Federal Communications Commission.
   C. A, D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-21.
    Bertucci et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-22.
    Fruchtman v. Kenton, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-23.
    Patriarca v. Taylor et al.
   C. A. 1st Cür. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-25.
    Doulin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-27.
    Naples v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-51.
    Goodfriend Western Corp., dba Wrangler Wranch v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-55.
    Central Bank v. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-87.
    Whiteley v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-88.
    Pogue, Warden v. Azbill.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-123.
    Donkin's (a California Corporation) v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-134.
    McMahon v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-137.
    Davis v. Hecht et al., Commissioners, Board of Elections of Dutchess County.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-138.
    Goff v. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-163.
    Service Parts, Inc., et al. v. Saf-Gard Products, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-171.
    Smith et ux. v. Jaramillo, Director, Department of Alcohol Beverage Control of New Mexico.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-186.
    Restaurant Industries Corp. et al. v. Bylicki et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-207.
    Szima v. New Jersey.
   Sup. Ct.. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-226.
    Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-241.
    Ocean Sands Holding Corp. v. Virginia Department of Taxation.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-248.
    Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-266.
    Griffin v. Zurz, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-269.
    Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-285.
    O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., et al. v. Butler.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-295.
    Hicks et al. v. Uniroyal, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-297.
    Turzillo et al. v. P & Z Mergentime.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-298.
    Stolberg v. Members of the Board of Trustees for the State Colleges of Connecticut et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-305.
    Progressive Enterprises, Inc. v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-313.
    Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of Education.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5026.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5034.
    DeVerse v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5042.
    Shatney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5043.
    Rivera deGomez v. Kissinger, Secretary of State, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-5046.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5050.
    Theriault v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5054.
    Torres-Rios v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5069.
    Dove v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5081.
    Sisk v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5108.
    Haskins v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5117.
    Wargo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5150.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5156.
    Harrison v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5223.
    Austin v. McMillan, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5225.
    Kissel v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board et al.
   Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5235.
    Maggitt v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5244.
    Watkins v. Gray, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5252.
    Bynum v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5256.
    Morgan v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5264.
    Pannell v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5265.
    Ralph v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5271.
    Jackson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5279.
    McCrary v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5286.
    Stevens v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5288.
    Cook v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5293.
    Durham v. Hopper, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5294.
    Clark v. City of Danville.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5302.
    White v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1737.
    United States v. Portillo-Reyes.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 75-1719.
    No. 75-6636.
    No. 75-6645.
    No. 75-6741.
    No. 75-6985.
    Carlyle et al. v. United States; Evans v. United States; Nordstrom et al. v. United States; Mize v. United States; and Crouch v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 75-1811.
    In re Allis.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 75-6494.
    Karen v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

At the beginning of his trial for manslaughter, petitioner, who acted as his own counsel throughout the trial, asked the judge to provide him with civilian clothes. He represented that he had been in jail for five years and had no suitable civilian clothing. Although there is some suggestion that petitioner might have been able to obtain suitable clothes, the trial court did not reject his request for that reason. Rather, it held that petitioner’s appearance before the jury in clothes labeled “L. A. CO. JAIL” was “proper.” Petitioner objected.

Only five months ago, this Court unanimously recognized that an accused’s appearance before a jury in identifiable jail clothes could deprive him of his fundamental right to a fair trial by undermining the presumption of innocence:

“[T]he constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror’s judgment. The defendant’s clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 504-505 (1976).

Under Estelle, the trial court’s ruling that clean jail clothes are “proper” attire for trial is clearly wrong.

That petitioner asked that the State supply him with clothes, rather than that he. be allowed to wear clothes of his own, cannot justify the trial court’s ruling. In a system aspiring toward the ideal of equal justice under law, indigence cannot be allowed to deprive an accused of that presumption of innocence which “ ‘lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” Id., at 503, quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453 (1895). “There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19 (1956).

The California Court of Appeal correctly assumed that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. It held, however, that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). In essence, the appellate court reasoned that petitioner was not harmed by his appearance in jail clothing because he was also deprived of the presumption of innocence by other actions taken by the trial court. Specifically, the Court of Appeal recognized that the California procedure of permitting a manslaughter defendant to be tried on an information alleging murder, allowing the prosecutor to argue to the jury that a murder was committed, and instructing the jury on the elements of first- and second-degree murder, inevitably taints the defendant in the eyes of the jury. The appellate court felt constrained to approve this procedure because of California Supreme Court precedent:

“By following the California Supreme Court mandate and permitting defendant to be tried on an information alleging murder, by receiving evidence of murder, and by its instructions to the jury, the trial court informed it that this was not the run-of-the-mill defendant. The damage done by defendant’s appearance in jail clothing was accomplished by a procedure held valid by our Supreme Court. Any error in denying defendant’s motion for civilian clothing thus did not further prejudice him.”

This reasoning transforms the harmless-error rule of Chapman into the legal equivalent of the doctrine that two wrongs make a right.

This Court has never passed on the prejudicial and unnecessary, procedure that the appellate court thought rendered the error here harmless. But in Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970), we did reject a harmlessness claim, in a case almost identical to petitioner’s. In Price, the defendant’s first trial had ended in an acquittal on a murder charge and a conviction on a manslaughter charge; the conviction was reversed on appeal. The defendant then was retried on the murder charge and again convicted only of manslaughter. The State argued that any error in retrying the defendant for murder was harmless in light of the fact that he was acquitted of the murder charge at the second trial. That argument was rejected, in part because the defendant had improperly been made to suffer the trauma and risk of a second murder trial. But the Court considered “perhaps of more importance” the fact that it could not “determine whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844 (CA2 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 913 (1966).” Id., at 331-332. Although there is no possibility here that the jury compromised on the manslaughter conviction since it was instructed that it could return no verdict higher than manslaughter, a similar flaw inheres in the California procedure. It is simply impossible to say that submitting to the jury a heinous crime for which petitioner was not on trial and of which he could not have been convicted might not have “induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence.”

I would grant the writ of certiorari.

       Brief for Respondent 27-28. Petitioner’s mother was in the courtroom and other relatives resided in the community. Their presence cannot excuse the State from meeting its responsibility to petitioner, who was over 21 and had been a prisoner for five years. Cf. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Guidelines for the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act, c. 2, p. 8 (1975) (determination of eligibility for appointed counsel to be made without reference to resources of defendant’s family).

       The trial court also did not find, as the appellate court suggested, see Brief for Petitioner, Ex. A, pp. 31-32, that petitioner had available civilian clothes which he considered unsuitable.

       Petitioner’s first trial for murder resulted in a conviction of second-degree murder. That conviction was reversed on appeal. His second trial resulted in a voluntary manslaughter conviction, which was also reversed. His third trial ended with another voluntary manslaughter conviction. The appellate court reduced that conviction to involuntary manslaughter because of an error in jury instructions. The judgment of guilty of involuntary manslaughter is before us on the present petition.

       See People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal. 481, 71 P. 568 (1903), cited in In re McCartney, 64 Cal. 2d 830, 415 P. 2d 782 (1966). McCartney relied on McFarlane for the proposition that a defendant whose manslaughter conviction on a murder information had been reversed could be retried for manslaughter despite the running of the statute of limitations for that crime.

       The California Court of Appeal noted:
      “The result sought by the awkward approach is obtainable without the confusion and prejudice flowing from it. Where there is a reversed conviction of an offense included in a greater charge, the information can be amended accordingly and the jury instructed that for the purposes of the particular case the lesser offense is defined to include the ultimate facts which constitute the definition of the greater crime originally alleged.”


author: Mr. Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 75-6839.
    Hebert v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner Hebert instituted this suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60. He allegedly sustained disabling injuries in a fall while at work in 1969. Respondent-defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a common carrier by rail, filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hebert was not “employed by such carrier,’’ within the liability-imposing language of § 51. The District Court, relying specifically on Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 486 F. 2d 1084 (CA9 1973), and despite the then-outstanding grant of certiorari in that case-by this Court, 416 U. S. 935 (1974), sustained the motion. It held that at the time of his injury petitioner Hebert was an employee of Southern Pacific Transport Company, a trucking company wholly owned by the respondent railroad, and was not an employee of the respondent, and that Kelley “appears to be on all fours’’ with Hebert’s case.

Kelley, however, as decided by the Ninth Circuit and as so relied on by the District Court, did not survive unscathed. This Court thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and sent the case back “with instructions to remand the case to the District Court for further findings in accordance with this, opinion.” 419 U. S. 318, 332 (1974). Although I dissented from the Court’s opinion, id., at 341, as did Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, id., at 333, the Court in Kelley appears to have set forth standards for the trier of fact to apply in determining whether an injured plaintiff, although technically employed by the carrier’s wholly owned trucking company, is nevertheless entitled to coverage under the FELA. The Court concluded that the District Court in Kelley’s case had applied erroneous standards and that the Court of Appeals should have remanded and not reversed. As I read the Court’s opinion, it determined that what was dispositive in a situation of this kind was whether a master-servant relationship existed between the defendant railroad and the claimant, id., at 323, and that the resolution of this issue ultimately depended on the employer’s control or right to control the conduct of the claimant-employee. The Court, in elaboration, set forth three methods by which employment for FELA purposes could be established.

The interesting and significant fact is that upon the remand to the District Court claimant Kelley prevailed under the sub-servant theory approved by this Court. The trial court found that the unloading operation “was the responsibility” of the railroad; that the carrier “supplied the necessary ramps and working area”; that its employees were required to check safety aspects daily and “to make all necessary repairs”; that the railroad “had the right to control the physical conduct of the [trucking company’s] employees”; that the trucking company “was acting as the servant” of the carrier “when performing the unloading operations”; and that Kelley “was in fact a subservant of a servant” of the carrier when he was injured. The trial court then concluded that Kelley was covered by the FELA. See File No. C-45344 AJZ (ND Cal.), order entered Sept. 3,1975.

In petitioner Hebert’s case, the District Court made its findings prior to this Court’s Kelley decision and, in so doing, regarded as “[djireetly on point” and as “on all fours” the very ruling of the Court of Appeals in Kelley that thereafter was vacated by this Court. And on that remand the injured claimant has prevailed.

It is true, of course, that the Court of Appeals (but not the District Court) in the present cáse had before it the precedent of this Court’s decision in Kelley. It said that this Court “approved the approach of the Ninth Circuit,” rather than the “more liberal approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 407 F. 2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 979,” and that “there is no necessity for a remand” because the trial court “accurately forecast the law and correctly applied the now-aifirmed standard to the undisputed facts of this case.” 526 F. 2d 936, 937 (CA5 1976). I read the District Court’s findings, however, as directly focused on the technical employment of Hebert by the trucking company. But that • technical employment proved not to be sufficient and dispositive in Kelley.

I cannot equate a trial court’s flat reliance on a Court of Appeals opinion subsequently discredited by this Court as an end to the matter. It seems to me that Hebert, like Kelley, is entitled to have the trial court consider his employment relationship to the respondent carrier in the light of the standards enunciated by this Court in its subsequent Kelley decision, untainted by other standards that it thought were controlling and that were thereafter held to be incorrect. To deny Hebert what Kelley received is to do him a judicial injustice. It may be that on remand Hebert would not prevail. In my view, however, he is entitled to the opportunity to make his case.

I, therefore, dissent from the denial of certiorari. I would grant the petition, vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with directions to remand to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision in Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U. S. 318 (1974).

       Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment. 419 U. S., at 332.

       “First, the employee could be serving as the borrowed servant of the railroad at the time of his injury. . . . Second, he could be deemed to be acting for two masters simultaneously. . . . Finally, he could be a sub-servant of a company that was in turn a servant of the railroad.” Id., at 324.

       The District Court’s decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the appeal was later dismissed pursuant to Fed. Rule App. Proc. 42 (b). Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., No. 75-3818, order entered Aug. 18, 1976. This voluntary dismissal means, of course, that Kelley finally recovered under the criteria set out in this Court's opinion.


text:
    No. 75-6894.
    Schuer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied,

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-145.
    Carpenters District Council of Southern Colorado et al. v. Reid Burton Construction, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-191.
    Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-5044.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Michael Olmo for leave to join in petition and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5114.
    In re K, a Minor, by Atchley.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-5175.
    C. v. F. et al.
   Ct. App. Ore. Motion of Child Advocacy Project et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari.


text:
    October 29, 1976
    No. A-342.
    McCarthy et al. v. Contessa et al., New York State Board of Elections.
   Application for stay of judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, dated October 28, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by' him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    November 1, 1976
    No. 76-287.
    Howell et al. v. DeBusk et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex.


text:
    No. 75-1886.
    Texas ex rel. Vogtsberger v. City of Wichita Falls.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-67.
    Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County, Washington v. Madden et ux.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5343.
    Ridley v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-338.
    Ballentine et al. v. Willingham et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-5029.
    Hamilton v. Florida.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-5301.
    Silver v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


author: Mr. Justice Stevens, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 75-1883.
    United States v. Jacobs, aka Kramer.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564 (1976).

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring.

My original reaction to the proposal to vacate and remand in the light of United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, was exactly that expressed by Mr. Justice Marshall in dissent. For as a Circuit Judge I had the experience of trying to decipher similar Delphic orders, and I agree completely that a constitutional holding is not controlling on a question involving nothing more than an exercise of an appellate court’s supervisory power. Nevertheless, there is an omission in the Court of Appeals opinion which makes it appropriate for that court to re-examine its holding.

As the concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart in Mandujano demonstrate, the fact that the prosecutor may have erred in failing to give a grand jury witness adequate warnings does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the witness cannot be prosecuted for perjury. Cf. United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 82. The Court of Appeals opinion seems to assume that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise. Since I think it would be appropriate for that court to address that precise point in the first instance, I acquiesce in the remand.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

As Mr. Justice Marshall explains, this order of the Court is little short of irrational. While our heavy caseload necessarily leads us sometimes to dispose of cases summarily, it must never lead us to dispose of any case irresponsibly. Yet I fear precisely that has happened here.

The Court of Appeals to which this case is now remanded cannot but find this order totally incomprehensible.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart join,

dissenting.

“In the interest of uniformity in criminal procedure within the circuit,” the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision to suppress respondent’s grand jury testimony. The Court of Appeals explicitly disclaimed a constitutional basis for its holding. Its action was taken “pursuant to [its] supervisory function.” 531 F. 2d 87, 90 (1976).

There is no reason to expect the Court of Appeals to reach a different result in light of our decision in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564 (1976). Our holding that respondent would not have had a constitutional right to have her testimony suppressed simply has no bearing on a lower court decision which did not assume the existence of such a constitutional right. And it is clear that the well-established supervisory power of the courts of appeals over the district courts in their respective jurisdictions is not limited to enforcing constitutional rights. See, e. g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 146 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 n. 29 (1972); United States v. Thomas, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 109-111, 449 F. 2d 1177, 1185-1187 (1971) (en banc); cf., e. g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589, 597 n. 9 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 797-798 (1975); id., at 804 (Burger, C. J., concurring).

Accepting the Government’s suggestion that we vacate and remand so that the Court of Appeals can reconsider its decision in light of an irrelevant case is a waste of the time of two courts. I respectfully dissent.

      The Court of Appeals determined that it is the universal practice of United States Attorneys in the Second Circuit to warn a grand jury witness who is the target of an investigation. Respondent was called before the grand jury by a Strike Force attorney operating in the Eastern District of New York but based in Washington. She received no warning.


author: Mr. Justice Stevens,

text:
    No. 76-126.
    Chase Manhattan Bank v. Sailboat Apartment Corp. et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for a determination of whether petitioner has waived protection of the venue provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 94. See National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460 (1976).

Mr. Justice Stevens,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

The Court’s action in this case is not supported by the precedent on which it.relies. In National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, the Utah Supreme Court erroneously held that 12 U. S. C. § 94 was “permissive and not exclusive.” We remanded because that court had not reached the waiver issue in its previous opinion. In the present case, however, the state courts have given no explanation for their rejection of petitioner’s venue claim. A remand in this case can only rest on the unwarranted assumption that the state courts relied on some ground other than waiver. The presumption, however, should be that the state courts recognized and relied on the strongest argument in favor of their holding — in this case, the waiver argument.

I am therefore unable to concur in the Court's summary-action in this case. Since this case is unworthy of plenary review, I would deny certiorari.

      The waiver argument is based on the conduct of petitioner’s alleged corporate alter ego. Apparently the Court finds some possible merit in this argument; otherwise, it would simply reject the argument summarily as it did the “local action” argument in National Bank, 425 U. S., at 461 n.


text:
    No. 76-5006.
    No. 76-5208.
    McCall v. North Carolina; and McKenna v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgments vacated insofar as they leave undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and cases remanded for further proceedings. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976).


text:
    No. A-301.
    Enomoto, Corrections Director, et al. v. Wright et al.
   Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, entered September 30, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, granted.


text:
    No. A-306.
    Board of Curators of the University of Missouri et al. v. Horowitz.
   Application for stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, entered September 9, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending timely filing and disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.


text:
    No. D-60.
    In re Disbarment of Hoffer.
   It is ordered that Harry Hoffer, of Merrick, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-61.
    In re Disbarment of Hemlock.
   It is ordered that Alfred J. Hemlock, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-62.
    In re Disbarment of Persky.
   It is ordered that Robert S. Persky, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the pratice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-63.
    In re Disbarment of Smiley.
   It is ordered that Morton H. Smiley, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-64.
    In re Disbarment of Wasserman.
   It is ordered that Jack Seymour Wasserman, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-65.
    In re Disbarment of Gallant.
   It is ordered that Samuel Gallant, of Westport, Conn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-66.
    In re Disbarment of Seffern.
   It is ordered that John J. Seffern, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-67.
    In re Disbarment of Meyer.
   It is ordered that Allen A. Meyer, Jr., of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be . disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 71-6625.
    Holt v. City of Richmond et al.,
   408 U. S. 931. Motion to dissolve injunction granted by this Court on April 24, 1972 [406 U. S. 903], granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 75-503.
    Cook et al. v. Hudson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 941.] Motion of National Education Assn. to reconsider order [ante, p. 810] denying leave to file brief as amicus curiae granted, and it is now ordered that motion for leave to file be granted and brief filed.


text:
    No. 75-651.
    No. 75-715.
    Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Rodriguez et al.; Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Herrera et al.; and Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Resendis et al.; and Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Rodriguez et al.; Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Herrera et al.; and Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Resendis et al.
   [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 990.] Motion of National Railway Labor Conference for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-811.
    Superior Court of the District of Columbia et al. v. Palmore et al.; and Swain, Reformatory Superintendent v. Pressley.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 907.] Motion of the Solicitor General to vacate and remand judgment in Superior Court of the District of Columbia v. Palmore granted and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). Remainder of case shall remain on docket of this Court and is now captioned Swain, Reformatory Superintendent v. Pressley.


text:
    No. 75-1153.
    Abood et al. v. Detroit Board of Education et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mich. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 425 U. S. 949.] Motion of American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-1262.
    United States et al. v. County of Fresno; and United States et al. v. County of Tuolumne.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 425 U. S. 970.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 75-1264.
    No. 75-1276.
    International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., et al.; and Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 950.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 75-1397.
    Juidice et al., Judges v. Vail et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 426 U. S. 946.] Motion of New York State Consumer Protection Board for leave to present oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 76-229.
    Alphin et al v. Henson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion to defer consideration granted.


text:
    No. 75-1407.
    Trainor, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, et al. v. Hernandez et ux.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 426 U. S. 918.] Motion of State’s Attorney for Cook County for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 75-1413.
    Stanton, Administrator, Indiana Department of Public Welfare, et al. v. Bond et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 905.] Motion of the State of Illinois for leave to file an untimely brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-1439.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 946.] Motion of Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-1510.
    Weatherford, Agent of the South Carolina Enforcement Division, et al. v. Bursey.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 946.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondent granted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1805.
    Jeffers v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 815.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Stephan Bower, Esquire, of Kentland, Ind., is appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 76-167.
    United States v. Ramsey et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 815.] Motion of respondent James W. Kelly for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Irving R, M. Panzer, Esquire, of Washington, D. C., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondent James W. Kelly in this case.


text:
    No. 75-1404.
    Do-Right Auto Sales et al. v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 76-257.
    Ratcliff v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 76-348.
    Jenneman et ux. v. Dawson et al., Judges.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 76-208.
    Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York, et al. v. Mauclet et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. and D. C. E. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-120.
    United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-333.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-5382.
    Darden v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1280.
    Barket v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.,


text:
    No. 75-1623.
    Brown v. Lundgren, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1761.
    Hilton v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1766.
    Fleishman v. McFee et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1808.
    Calvo v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied,


text:
    No. 75-1831.
    Robinson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1905.
    No. 75-1910.
    Mullenax v. United States; and Ford v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1916.
    Ballard v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6747.
    Frankos v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6815.
    Brown v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6829.
    Bradley v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6870.
    Bradley v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6892.
    Delaney v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6902.
    Bowen v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6923.
    Morris v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6932.
    Zeidman v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6954.
    Scrivens v. Maggio, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6967.
    Holsey v. Watkins, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6976.
    Lowery v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6980.
    Davis et al. v. Director, Patuxent Institution.
   Ct. Spec. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6987.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-7004.
    Braddy et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-7006.
    Eskew v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-1.
    No. 76-11.
    Taylor v. United States; and Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-2.
    Griffin et al. v. United States.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-30.
    Diaco et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d dr. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-31.
    Eisner v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-35.
    Chew et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-43.
    City of Philadelphia et al. v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-44.
    McMurtrey v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-46.
    No. 76-56.
    American Tobacco Co. et al. v. Patterson et al.; and Tobacco Workers' International Union et al. v. Patterson et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-52.
    Arteaga-Limones v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-53.
    LaRue et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-74.
    Fales v. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-79.
    Wolf v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-89.
    Napoli v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-118.
    House v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-140.
    Kent Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-154.
    Book et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-181.
    Biderman et al. v. Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-199.
    Olk v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-209.
    Common Carrier Conference-Irregular Route et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-210.
    Spivey v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-217.
    Stone et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-222.
    Estate of Thalheimer et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.,


text:
    No. 76-227.
    Pacific FM, Inc., dba Radio Station K-101 v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-251.
    Sudler, now DuFresne v. Sudler.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-253.
    Bergh v. Washington et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-262.
    Goldstein v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-275.
    Band-Age, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-277.
    Daley v. Rose Aviation, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-280.
    Forster et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-299.
    Saalfrank v. Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-300.
    Garger et al. v. New Jersey et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-311.
    Louisiana Bank & Trust Company of Crowley, Louisiana v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-322.
    Gene Slagle, Inc., et al. v. General Telephone Company of Ohio et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-324.
    Steinman v. Nadjari et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-340.
    Van de Kamp, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, et al. v. Projection Room Theater et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-341.
    California Department of Water Resources v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irrigation District.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-350.
    Atlantic Improvement Corp. v. City of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-360.
    Friedlander v. Kentucky Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-362.
    Quarles v. Quarles.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-364.
    Woodruff et al. v. Air Properties G., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-393.
    O'Connor v. State Tax Commission of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5001.
    Miyaki v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5005.
    Bunn v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5008.
    No. 76-5128.
    Griffin v. United States; and Montano v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5014.
    Armento v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5025.
    Kimmons v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct, App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5031.
    Gonzalez-Benitez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5051.
    Mahar v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5055.
    Weatherall v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5056.
    Payden v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5063.
    Hurt v. Lorton Complex et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5065.
    Newman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5072.
    Pollack v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5075.
    Flint v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5076.
    Garza v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5083.
    Phillips v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5088.
    Marshall v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5091.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A., 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5093.
    Martinez v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5095.
    Alvarez v. Texas.
   Ct. Grim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5096.
    Olsen v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5097.
    Owens v. Sigler, Chairman, U. S. Board of Parole, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.,


text:
    No. 76-5100.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5106.
    Rini v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5107.
    Collier v. United States.
   C. A., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5112.
    Reyes v. United States.
   C.. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5113.
    Hailey v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5115.
    Raines v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5120.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5121.
    No. 76-5124.
    Herron v. United States; and Tobin v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5126.
    Graham v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5138.
    Karnes v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5142.
    Barrera v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5158.
    Daniel v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5161.
    Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5163.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5169.
    Norman v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5170.
    Lambrecht v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5171.
    Casimiro-Benitez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5180.
    Spencer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5191.
    Harper v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5197.
    Williams v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5198.
    Crespo-Guerrero v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5201.
    Goodman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5202.
    Gutierrez-Gutierrez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5219.
    Hubbard v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5246.
    Houston v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y, 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5247.
    Soto v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5270.
    Santos-Figueroa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5274.
    Jokinen v. Henwood et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5285.
    Martini v. Republic Steel Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5298.
    Welton v. Norenberg.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 9th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5303.
    Watson v. Warden, Virginia State Penitentiary.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5314.
    Lee v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5318.
    Dioquino v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5323.
    Mattingly v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5335.
    Rich v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5337.
    Stathas v. Cox et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5342.
    Bates v. Litchfield Independent Review et al.
   Dist. Ct. Minn., 8th Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5345.
    Kinsley v. Mallar, Chairman, State Board of Workmen's Compensation, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5346.
    Chesson v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5353.
    Melnyczenko v. Hewitt, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5363.
    Jennings v. Dillard et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5365.
    Sensabaugh v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5366.
    Deboes v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5371.
    Stefanick v. Plante et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5374.
    Carter v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5376.
    Alers v. Toledo et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5384.
    Mena v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5385.
    Powell v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5426.
    Cannon et al. v. Johnson, Executive Director, Board of Probation and Parole.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5432.
    Crutchfield v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 75-1600.
    Thevis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted of mailing obscene materials in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1461., I adhere to the view that this statute is “ 'clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.’ ” See, e. g., Millican v. United States, 418 U. S. 947, 948 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 148 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). I therefore would grant certiorari and reverse.


text:
    No. 75-1826.
    Air Line Employees Association, International v. Evans.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1842.
    California v. Ramey.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1918.
    Salerno v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike memorandum for the United States and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6895.
    Doleman v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-112.
    Weyerhaeuser Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-5332.
    Rice v. Genung's, Inc.
   App. Sess., Super. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-185.
    Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Indian Reservation et al. v. Namen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board and Lummi Indian Tribe et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-204.
    Feinberg v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-221.
    Nathan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion, to vacate and remand and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-270.
    Hakim v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   Petition for certiorari and other relief before judgment to C. A. 6th Cir. denied.


text:
    No. 76-293.
    Taylor v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in Sullivan County Criminal Court, Tenn., of exhibiting two allegedly obscene motion pictures in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3013 (A) (1975), which provides in pertinent part:

“It shall be unlawful to knowingly send or cause to be sent, or bring or cause to be brought, into this state for sale, distribution, exhibition, or display, or in this state to prepare for distribution, publish, print, exhibit, distribute, or offer to distribute, or to possess with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute any obscene matter.”

As used in that section,

“(A) ‘Obscene’ means (1) that the average person applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) that the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (3) that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
“(C) ‘Matter’ means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, or other pictorial representation, or any statue, figure, device, theatrical production or live performance, or any recording, transcription, or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction, or any other article, equipment, machine or material that is obscene as defined by §§ 39-3010 — 39-3022.
“(E) ‘Distribute’ as used above means to transfer possession of, whether with or without consideration.
“(F) ‘Knowingly’ as used above means having actual or constructive knowledge of the subject matter. A person shall be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the contents if he has knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable and prudent man on notice as to the suspect nature of the material.” § 39-3010.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Tennessee Supreme Court, which in an earlier case had held the motion pictures involved to be obscene within the meaning of the statute, Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S. W. 2d 692, 699 (1975), refused review.

It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3013 (A) is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with my dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I, supra. See Wasserman v. Municipal Court of Alhambra Judicial District, 413 U. S. 911 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented in this case merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 495 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).


text:
    No. 76-307.
    Wolery v. Ohio.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion of Association of Trial Lawyers of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-377.
    No. 76-5392.
    Peplinski v. North Carolina; and Smith v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. The death penalty having been vacated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5284.
    No. 76-5373.
    Spencer v. Georgia; and Smith, aka Machetti v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id., at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and vacate judgments insofar as they leave undisturbed the sentence of death.


text:
    No. 76-5326.
    Dukes v. Waitkevitch et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.,

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

The Court today refuses to review the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a black male charged with raping a white female in the racially troubled city of Boston is not entitled to have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. I do not believe that the Court of Appeals’ holding is justified by last Term’s decision in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976).

Charges of interracial rape have long played a major role in the mythology of racial prejudice. See, e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 349-355 (1958). When such a charge is made, especially in a city where racial conflict is close to the surface, it blinks reality to conclude, as the Court was able to find in Ristaino, that “[t]he circumstances . . . did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [petitioner’s] trial.” 424 U. S., at 598. Thus, under the standard set forth in Ristaino, this defendant was entitled to assure himself that the jury would consider only the evidence, not his race and the race of the alleged victim, when it determined his fate.

By refusing to review this conviction the Court does not, of course, endorse the Court of Appeals’ understanding of Ristaino. It does, however, add to the lengthening “ ‘epitaph for those “essential demands of fairness” recognized by this Court 40 years ago in Aldridge [v. United States, 283 U. S. 308 (1931)].’ ” Id., at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U. S. 1080, 1085 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). By failing to respond to those demands, the Court empties of meaning the promise of Aldridge and of our recent decision in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973). That promise is the fundamental guaranty of a fair trial before an impartial jury.

I respectfully dissent.


text:
    No. 75-734.
    No. 75-1501.
    No. 75-6922.
    No. 76-5030.
    No. 76-5078.
    Smith et al. v. Troyan et al., Ivey et al. v. United States, Mason et al. v. Belieu et al., Blackburn v. Florida, Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., Inc., et al.,
   426 U. S. 934;

ante, p. 818;

ante, p. 852;

ante, p. 864; and

ante, p. 865. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 2, 1976
    No. 76-5103.
    Dawson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    November 8, 1976
    No. 76-65.
    Republican Party of Shelby County v. Dixon et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Tenn.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-103.
    Rios et al. v. Jones, Director, Department of Personnel of Illinois, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 74-996.
    United States v. Data Products Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Foster Lumber Co., ante, p. 32.


text:
    No. A-187 (76-326).
    Hinshaw v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Application for stay, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-339.
    Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Secretary of Agriculture et al.
   Application to recall and stay mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Motion to dispense with printing appendix to petition for certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Brennan would grant the application.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this application and motion.


text:
    No. A-346.
    Buckley et al. v. McRae et al.
   Application for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entered October 22, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-371 (75-1440).
    Maher, Commissioner of Social Services of Connecticut v. Roe et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. [Probable jurisdiction.noted, 428 U. S. 908.] Application for stay of judgment, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-68.
    In re Disbarment of Honoroff.
   It is ordered that Alvin Eugene Honoroff, of Los Angeles, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-69.
    In re Disbarment of Lundy.
   It is ordered that Rayfield Lundy, of Compton, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-70.
    In re Disbarment of Weber.
   It is ordered that Jerome Weber, of Beverly Hills, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-71.
    In re Disbarment of Mason.
   It is ordered that Richard W. Mason, Jr., of Kansas City, Mo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-72.
    In re Disbarment of Maner.
   It is ordered that Charles A. Maner, Sr., of Knoxville, Tenn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-73.
    In re Disbarment of McGovern.
   It is ordered that John J. McGovern, of Rockville, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-74.
    In re Disbarment of Foster.
   It is ordered that T. Russell Foster, of Charleston, S. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-75.
    In re Disbarment of Plenty.
   It is ordered that G. Richard Plenty, Jr., of Washington, D. C., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-76.
    In re Disbarment of Thompson.
   It is ordered that Frederick Thompson, of Woodbury, N. J., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-77.
    In re Disbarment of Lacinak.
   It is ordered that Michael A. Lacinak, of Cincinnati, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-78.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
   It is ordered that Earl H. Moore, Jr., of Dayton, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-79.
    In re Disbarment of Moore.
   It is ordered that Forrest P. Moore, of Logan, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 75-503.
    Cook et al. v. Hudson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 941.] Motion of petitioners for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 76-651.
    No. 75-715.
    No. 75-718.
    Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Rodriguez et al.; Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Herrera et al.; and Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Resendis et al.; Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Rodriguez et al.; Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Herrera et al.; and Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Resendis et al.; and East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir., [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 990.] Motion of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-978.
    E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 933.J Motion of American Iron and Steel Institute for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 75-1805.
    Jeffers v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 815.] Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 76-5297.
    Hawkins v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 76-357.
    Linmark Associates, Inc., et al. v. Township of Willingboro et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-404.
    Illinois Brick Co. et al. v. Illinois et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-5206.
    Roberts v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1181.
    Batterton, Secretary, Department of Human Resources of Maryland, et al. v. Francis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent Robert Francis for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-5306.
    Dobbert v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1673.
    Sugg, aka Sanitora v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1740.
    Atkins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1847.
    No. 76-5178.
    Hammond v. United States; and Thompson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6832.
    Dowdy v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-24.
    Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-77.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-95.
    Hernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-96.
    Zeldin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-106.
    Librach v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-113.
    Feldman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-122.
    Field v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-124.
    Madrid v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-214.
    No. 76-379.
    Calnetics Corp. et al. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., et al.; and Volkswagen of America, Inc., et al. v. Calnetics Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-238.
    National Farmers' Organization, Inc. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-261.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-286.
    Robinson v. Henderson, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-319.
    Mickunas v. Kleppe, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-368.
    Markham v. Swails et al.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-371.
    Wood v. Stark Tri-County Building Trades Council et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-375.
    Sonderegger v. Sagittarius Productions, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-378.
    Brockington v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-386.
    Hickland v. Hickland.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-390.
    No. 76-391.
    ICI America, Inc. v. Moraine Products; and Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-392.
    First National Bank in St. Louis v. Kostman, Commissioner of Finance of Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.,


text:
    No. 76-396.
    Wright v. Southwestern Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-397.
    Allright Missouri, Inc., et al. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5035.
    No. 76-5196.
    Morgan v. United States; and Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5037.
    Stidham v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5053.
    Harris et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5077.
    Mari v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5085.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5086.
    Neumann v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5089.
    Payne v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5090.
    Bowers v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5094.
    Pritchard v. Ault, Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5105.
    Belle v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5109.
    Holloway v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5116.
    Francisco v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5147.
    Jines v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5148.
    DeMase v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5154.
    Diaz v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5160.
    Terry v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5172.
    Kloner v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5177.
    Patterson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5207.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5261.
    Harlin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5262.
    Trotter v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5266.
    Schreck v. Rauch, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5372.
    Rodriguez v. Butler, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5381.
    Walker v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5393.
    Teague v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5394.
    Clark v. Rodriguez.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5399.
    Donley v. Scott.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5400.
    Davis v. Pomars et al.
   C„ A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5409.
    Walker v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5410.
    McNamara v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5412.
    Johnson v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5417.
    Alexander v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5418.
    Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5421.
    Smith v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5422.
    Zatko v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5429.
    Good v. Court of Common Pleas.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5430.
    Forrester v. Levine, Industrial Commissioner of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5431.
    Stevenson et al. v. Reed et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5450.
    Peters v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5517.
    Bury v. Florida Department of Commerce et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-98.
    Baranov et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted of mailing obscene materials in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1461. I adhere to the view that this statute is “ 'clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.’ ” See, e. g., Millican v. United States, 418 U. S. 947, 948 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 148 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). I therefore would grant certiorari and reverse.


text:
    No. 76-291.
    Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., et al. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-309.
    Sidle v. Majors.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

This case presents the question whether the Indiana motor vehicle guest statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Forty-seven years ago Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 (1929), held that a Connecticut guest statute, providing that no person carried gratuitously as a guest in a motor vehicle might recover from the owner or operator for injuries caused by its negligent operation, was not in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause because of the distinction it made between passengers so carried and those in other classes of vehicles. The Court’s rationale was that “it is not so evident that no grounds exist for the distinction that we can say a priori that tlm classification is one forbidden as without basis, and arbitrary.” Id., at 123. But under today’s equal protection jurisprudence the classification must satisfy the standard of rationality, and the Court of Appeals in the instant case was of the view that the classification made by the Indiana statute could not be sustained under that standard: “We can find no necessary rational relation to a legitimate state interest . . . that would require us to sustain the legislation.” 536 F. 2d 1156, 1159 (CA7 1976).

Within only the past five years high courts of no less than 17 States have examined or re-examined their automobile guest statutes challenged as denying equal protection, and almost one-half of those courts have struck down their State’s statutes as unconstitutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions. This conflict of view might reasonably lead bench and bar to expect that this Court would grant review of a case that afforded an opportunity to re-examine Silver in light of today's rationality standard. But two Terms ago we summarily dismissed an appeal from the Utah Supreme Court sustaining the constitutionality of the Utah guest statute, which provides that a person injured while being transported gratuitously in any vehicle on a Utah public highway may not recover from the owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation of the vehicle, unless the injury was proximately caused by the intoxication or willful misconduct of the defendant. Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U. S. 810 (1974). Today the Court denies the application for certiorari in this case involving the constitutionality of the Indiana guest statute, which is similar but not identical to the Utah statute. I respectfully dissent from the denial.

The Court of Appeals, despite its considered view that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional, sustained the statute because Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975), decided a year after the summary dismissal in Cannon v. Oviatt, held that state and lower federal courts are as bound by our summary dispositions of appeals as by our dispositions after plenary consideration. 536 F. 2d, at 1160. Thus, even though the summary dismissal of Cannon v. Oviatt was made in the face of widespread conflict among state courts on the impact of the Equal Protection Clause upon their guest statutes, was made without the benefit of briefs or oral argument on the merits, and was announced without opinion or even citation to Silver or any other precedent, the Court denies certiorari in this case and perforce brings to a halt any further dialogue in either state or federal courts. This consequence of Hicks v. Miranda was anticipated in my dissent from denial of certiorari in Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U. S. 913 (1976). It is a consequence that must bode ill for developing constitutional jurisprudence. If significant constitutional issues are to be decided summarily without any briefing or oral argument, and with only momentary and offhanded Conference discussion, and if these summary dispositions nevertheless bind the courts of the 50 States and all lower federal courts, respect for our constitutional decisionmaking must inevitably be impaired.

When Cannon v. Oviatt was summarily dismissed, it is fair to say that not only legal scholars, judges of state and lower federal courts, and practicing attorneys, but also Members of this Court, assumed that summary dispositions without opinion did not have the same precedential force as decisions rendered with opinion after plenary consideration— indeed it was properly perceived that behind our summary dispositions of appeals lie many of the same considerations that account for denials of certiorari. See, e. g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U. S. 246 (1959); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1930); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 648-649 (2d ed. 1973); R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 195, 230-232 (4th ed. 1969). Had the Court foreseen that Hicks, decided a year later, would convert the Cannon dismissal into an ironclad holding compelling the Court of Appeals in this case to abandon its own considered view of the merits, it seems probable that at the very least the Court, because of the doubts widely shared as to the continuing vitality of Silver v. Silver, would have given more thought to the propriety, even desirability, of a summary dismissal. I can say that I certainly would have done so.

Hicks has now eliminated from the consideration of appeals the desirable latitude each of us formerly had to weigh, as in the case of petitions for certiorari, whether the ^issue presented is sufficiently important to merit plenary review, and whether in any event the question might better be addressed after we have had the benefit of the views of other courts. Particularly unfortunate, I think, is the inevitability that Hicks will prematurely cut off, as it has in the case of these guest statutes, consideration of important and evolving federal constitutional questions by the state and lower federal courts. It frequently happens that difficult constitutional issues go through a valuable maturing process, and this Court and developing jurisprudence generally profit enormously from the accumulated wisdom of various courts that have considered the issues in a number of contexts and from a number of angles. Hicks, however, now mandates that summary dispositions must be followed as fully binding precedents by state and lower federal courts, regardless of the maturity of the issue, and regardless of the fact that even when the issue is before us for the first time, our disposition is made without opinion, without briefing or oral argument, and after only the most cursory Conference discussion.

The interaction of Hicks v. Miranda and Cannon v. Oviatt upon the ferment in state courts over the constitutionality of automobile guest statutes reveals yet another reason for granting certiorari in this case. The operation of the Hicks rule on our review of state-court decisions concerning state statutes has an inevitable, and I think heretofore unappreciated, bias in favor of upholding those statutes: the state-court decisions, cited in n. 2, supra, striking down guest statutes held them to be unconstitutional under both the Federal Constitution and their own State Constitutions. Any attempt by this Court to review those decisions would have failed, since the decisions also rested on an adequate state ground. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 (1940). In practical effect, therefore, only a state-court decision sustaining a state statute against federal constitutional challenge could be a vehicle for review, which, as in Cannon v. Oviatt, would probably be by appeal and not by certiorari. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Since our practice of treating appeals similarly to petitions for certiorari has resulted in a number of dismissals that would probably not have been entered if the appeals had been treated fully and seriously on their merits, it follows that these dismissals have had an inevitable tendency to leave intact statutes that might not have survived plenary review in this Court.

Today’s denial again leaves undisturbed, because of Hicks, a decision upholding a statute whose constitutionality is patently open to serious debate. This undesirable and, I must believe, largely unintended result should convince the Court that Hicks should be re-examined. At the very least, since Cannon v. Oviatt is not a precedent binding on us, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974), the petition should be granted so that we may give plenary consideration to the constitutional issue that has stirred such conflict among state and lower federal courts.

       Tlie Indiana statute, Ind. Code § 9-3-3-1 (1973), provides: “Guest of owner of operator — Right to damages. — The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefor, in or upon such motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle.”

       These decisions are the culmination of many years of controversy over guest statutes. See, e. g., W. Prosser, Law of Torts 186-187 (4th ed. 1971); Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 659 (1974); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases — Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute), 9 Santa Clara Law. 1 (1968); White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-paying Passenger, 20 Va. L. Rev. 326 (1934).
      Cases in which guest statutes have been held unconstitutional are: McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N. M. 308, 540 P. 2d 238 (1975) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P. 2d 574 (1975) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N. W. 2d 636 (1975) (unconstitutional under state law) ; Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N. E. 2d 723 (1975) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P. 2d 1365 (1974) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P. 2d 362 (1974) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N. W. 2d 771 (ND 1974) (unconstitutional under state law); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P. 2d 212 (1973) (unconstitutional under both federal and state law).
      Cases in which guest statutes have been held constitutional are: Sidle v. Majors,-Ind.-, 341 N. E. 2d 763 (1976) (on certified question to the Indiana Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the instant case); Behrns v. Burke,-S. D.-, 229 N. W. 2d 86 (1975); White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627, 519 S. W. 2d 70, dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 423 U. S. 805 (1975); Richardson
        v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P. 2d 536 (1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Ore. 252, 525 P. 2d 99 (1974); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P. 2d 883 (Utah), dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 419 U. S. 810 (1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N. W. 2d 687 (Iowa 1974) ; Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A. 2d 97 (Del. 1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S. W. 2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Delany v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168, 274 N. E. 2d 353 (1971).
      One Federal Court of Appeals, sitting in admiralty, has refused to follow a state boat guest statute, but on statutory and common-law rather than constitutional grounds. St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F. 2d 973, 979-982 (CA8 1974).

       Perhaps the Utah and Indiana statutes can be distinguished, for “it may safely be said that there are as many different guest laws as there are acts.” W. Prosser, Law of Torts 187 (4th ed. 1971). However, the Court of Appeals was in no position to say whether Cannon might be inapplicable for that reason since our bare dismissal gives not the slightest hint of the ground of the dismissal.

       A much commented upon example of a certiorari-lilce dismissal of.a state court appeal is Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 985 (1956), dismissing 197 Va. 734, 90 S. E. 2d 849, which upheld the Virginia miscegenation statute later invalidated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967). For comment, compare H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 46-47 (1961), with A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 174 (1962), and Pollack, The Supreme Court and the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 15, 45 n. 79 (1961).


text:
    No. 76-342.
    Olson Farms, Inc. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-372.
    Michigan v. Johnson.
   Sup, Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied, it appearing that judgment below rests on adequate state grounds.


text:
    No. 76-395.
    San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District v. Salazar.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5358.
    Henry v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; id., at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and vacate judgment insofar as it leaves undisturbed the sentence of death.


text:
    No. 75-1490.
    No. 75-6878.
    No. 75-6918.
    No. 76-5023.
    Ziviak, Administrator v. United States, Anderson v. Reed, Penitentiary Superintendent, Tarkowski v. Smart, Boeckenhaupt v. United States,
   ante, p. 801;

ante, p. 850;

ante, p. 852; and

ante, p. 863. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 76-5027.
    Ginter v. Wisconsin,
   ante, p. 863. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    November 9, 1976
    No. 75-1919.
    California et al. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    November 10, 1976
    No. A-387.
    Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court in and for Oklahoma County et al.
   Application for stay of order of the District Court in and for Oklahoma County, filed August 4, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied for failure to comply with Rule 27 of this Court, but without prejudice to reapplying for an appropriate order should compliance with Rule 27 be effected.


text:
    November 11, 1976
    No. 76-135.
    Hankish v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    November 12, 1976
    No. A-384.
    Moreau et al. v. Tonry et al.
   Application to vacate stay orders heretofore entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, entered on November 3 and 4, 1976, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to' the Court, denied.


text:
    November 15, 1976
    No. 76-213.
    Dorgan, State Tax Commissioner of North Dakota, et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D.


text:
    No. 76-440.
    Hyland, Hall & Co., et al. v. City of Madison et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it appearing that there is no final judgment of the highest court of a state wherein a judgment could be had as required by 28 U. S. C. § 1257.


text:
    No. 76-5267.
    Gormally v. State Board of Elections.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. R. I. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. A-367.
    Company v. United States.
   Application for bail pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-375.
    Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
   Application to stay execution and enforcement of mandate of the Supreme Court of California, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, granted for a period of 30 days. If petition for writ of certiorari is filed within 30 days, stay is to remain in effect pending disposition of case in this Court.


text:
    No. D-80.
    In re Disbarment of Kates.
   It is ordered that Robert A. Kates, of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-81.
    In re Disbarment of Darrow.
   It is ordered that Charles M. Darrow, of Painesville, Ohio, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-82.
    In re Disbarment of Koch.
   It is ordered that Karl A. Koch, of Woodstock, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-83.
    In re Disbarment of Brin.
   It is ordered that E. Stanley Brin, of Edina, Minn., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-84.
    In re Disbarment of Edelstein.
   It is ordered that Alan Earl Edelstein, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-85.
    In re Disbarment of Rothbart.
   It is ordered that Charles J. Rothbart, of Northglenn, Colo., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-86.
    In re Disbarment of Kuta.
   It is ordered that Frank John Kuta, of Chicago, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-87.
    In re Disbarment of Cohen.
   It is ordered that David Saul Cohen, of Glenview, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-88.
    In re Disbarment of Nowak.
   It is ordered that Joseph W. Nowak, of Calumet City, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the pracitce of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-89.
    In re Disbarment of Avgerin.
   It is ordered that Constantine N. Avgerin, of Lake Bluff, Ill., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-90.
    In re Disbarment of Bushman.
   It is ordered that Ted Bushman, of Santa Maria, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-91.
    In re Disbarment of Leonard.
   It is ordered that John M. Leonard, Jr., of Hinsdale, Ill., be suspended from the pratice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-92.
    In re Disbarment of Anderson.
   It is ordered the Dale Anderson, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. D-93.
    In re Disbarment of Hendler.
   It is ordered that Jack Alan Hendler, of Los Angeles, Cal., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 75-562.
    Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, Governor of South Dakota, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 989.] Motion of the Solicitor General to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondent allotted 15 additional minutes to present oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-978.
    No. 75-1473.
    No. 75-1705.
    E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; and Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 933];

C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 947.] Joint motion to consolidate granted and a total of two hours allotted for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 75-1267.
    Bayside Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 970.] Motion of Georgia Poultry Federation, Inc., for leave to' file a brief as amicus curiae denied.