author: Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

text:
    John Kennett, Ezekiel S. Haines, Eden B. Reeder, George Graham, Jr., John McCarty, Joshua Yorke, and Robert B. Bowler, Appellants, v. Thomas J. Chambers.
    ,t belongs exclusively to the political department of the government to recognize ór to refuse to recognize a now government in a foreign country, claiming to have displaced tlie old and established a new one.
    Until the political department of the government acknowledged the independence of Texas, the Judiciary were bound to consider the old order of things as having continued.
    While the government of the United States acknowledged its treaty of limits and of amity and friendship with Mexico as still subsisting and obligatory, no citizen of the .United States could lawfully furnish supplies to Texas to enable it to carry on the war against Mexico.
    A contract, made in Cincinnati, after Texas declared itself independent, but before its independence was acknowledged by the United States, whereby the complainants agreed to furnish, and did furnish money to a General in the Texan army, to enable him to raise and equip troops to be employed against Mexico, was illegal and void, and cannot be enforced in a court of the United States.
    The circumstance that the Texan officer agreed, in consideration of these advances of .money, to convey to them certain lands in Texas, of which he covenanted that he was then the owner, will not make the contract valid when it appears upon the face of rit, and by the averments in the bill, that the object and intention of the complainants in advancing the money was to assist T.exas in its military operations.

      A contract made in the United States at that time for the purchase of land in Texas, ■would have been valid even if the. money was afterwards used to support hostilities with Mexico. But'in this case it was not an ordinary purchase, but the object of the complainants, as avowed in the contract and the bill, was to aid Texas in its war with Mexico.,
    The contract being absolutely void by the laws of the United States at the time it was made, the circumstance that it was valid in Texas, and that Texas has since become a member of the Union,' does not entitle the complainants to enforce it ;u the courts’ of the United States.
    Uo contract can be enforced in the courts of the United States, no matter where made or where to be executed, if it is in violation of the laws of the United States, or is in contravention of the public policy of the government or in conflict with subsisting treaties.
    In this cause Mr. Justice Catron was absent, because of indisposition, during the hearing before the court, and took no part in the decision.
    This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of' Texas.
    The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.-
    There were several causes of demurrer filed' in the court below, but it is necessary to notice only the following, because' the decision in this court turned entirely upon them. ■
    1. The said bill, if the facts therein were true, which is in no sort admitted, contains no matter or thing of equity upon which to ground any decree, or give the complainants any aid or relief.
    2. The complainants’ said bill shows no legal or valid agreement upon which to ask the aid or decree of the court; but, to the contrary, sets out and shows an agreement which was in violation of the neutrality of the United States, towards the Republic of Mexico in her contest with Texas.
    3. The complainants’ said bill seeks the aid or assistance of the court to enforce the specific execution of an agreement made ' in the.State of Kentucky, between citizens thereof'and this defendant, in violation of the policy of the government of the. United States in her intercourse with foreign governments.
    The demurrer was sustained generally by thé'cóurt below, and therefore all the points were open to argument in ¡this court; but it is not- necessary to notice any except those upon which the. judgment of the court rested. -
    It was argued by Mr. Snethen, for the appellants, and there was also a brief filed upon that side by Mr. L. Sherwood. On the part of the appellee it was argued by Mr. Volney E. Howard.

      Mr. Snethen contended that the neutrality and foreign policy of the United States towards Mexico were regulated entirely by law, which was found in the 6th section of the act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, (3 Stat. at Large, 449.) There is an entire absence, in the contract, of all declaration or indication of' the place or country where the proposed military expeditions were to be begun, or of the place whence they were to be carried on. It will not be denied that, to subject an offender to the pains and penalties of this section, it must be incontestably and directly shown and proved that the “military expedition or enterprise ” which he may “ begin or' set on foot,” or “ provide or prepare the means for,” was begun or set on foot “ within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States,” and. was “ to be carried on from thence ” against a nation with whom they were at peace. So obvious a proposition hardly needs the weight of authority to support it. Now the contract proves no such offence. The defendant may have done, and intended to have carried on, all the acts which the complainants enabled him to do, within and from some other country than the United States. ' The place or country where the forbidden acts were done and whence they were to be carried on, cannot be inferred from the language of the contract with any degree of certainty, and the omission cannot be supplied by any known rule of construction.
    The 6th section of the act of 1818, is a penal enactment and must be construed strictly, and the proof, to sustain an offence against it miust.be direct and positive. The contract affords not only no such proof, but no proof at all, that the forbidden acts were done within the United States, and to be carried on "from thence. No such offence, therefore, as that denounced by the act, when strictly construed, having been proved against the parties to the contract, the contract itself consequently was not, when made, in violation of the neutrality or foreign policy of this country towards Mexico and other nations, as established and defined by said section and act.
    The same course of argument was pursued by Mr. L. Sherwood in his brief for the appellants.
    1. Texas, at the time of this contract, was an independent government. And in making the contract the complainants did not violate the laws of the United States, enacted to preserve our neutrality, with nations with whom we were at peace, nor did .they violate' our treaty of amity with Mexico.' Hence, the contract was legal, under the laws of the United States.
    The people of Texas, represented by delegates, met in general convention at Washington, in’ Texas, on the' 2d day' of. March, 1836, and declared themselves a “ Free and Independent Republic.” And then and there set themselves at work jp organize and establish a government.. And on the 17th day of the same month, had fully organized a government by the name of “ The Republic of Texas,” under a written Constitution. (Laws of Republic of.Texas, vol. 1, page 1 to 25.)
    Then a new nation was born. An independent nation, that maintained her independence and freedom among the nations of the earth, and was subsequently recognized by them as possessing all the sovereignty and attributes of other nations. .As such Republic, she maintained her independence in fact and in name, until she became incorporated into the government of the United States, December 29, 1845.
    The first question to be determined by this court is, Whether Texas, at the time before stated; had the right to become, and whether she did become an independent government? .
    That she had the right so to become, will not be doubted by any man, nor by any court, who “ hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.’
    Such right your honors will not doubt. It was happily incorporated in the first principles of the first truly written international law; — in America, the first law that is learned by the courts or by the bar — learned generally, ere professional studies are commenced, and imbibed almost with the first nourishment of the American child.
    That Texas, at the time to which I have referred, became entirely severed from the Republic of Mexico, is fully showu by the reference I have made to the first volume of her laws. That she maintaineu her independence, and was never again subjected to the dominion of Mexico, is a fact, sustained by the history of her struggles, as well as by the history of our owu government, and other governments in their negotiations, with her.
    Although our government had not officially recognized the independence of Texas, at the date of this contract, yet, shortly after that period, official correspondence and intercourse commenced between the United States and the Republic of Texas, and we find a' treaty negotiated between tlr +wo governments, as early as April, 1838. 8 Stat. at Large, 510.
    It is claimed that this contract is void,, as being in violation of the laws of the United States, provided for the punishment of persons who. shall, within the territory of jurisdiction of the United States, “ begin or set on foot, or ‘ provide or prepare, the means for any military éxpedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions' of any foreign prince or State, with whom the United States are at peace.”
    This is a penal statute, and must be construed strictly. And •I respectfully insist, that, while it is the policy of the United States government, to preserve her neutrality between belligerent nations, there is nothing in this law to prevent one of her citizens entering into a contract with a citizen of another independent government .for the purchase of land lying in that government, even though it be recited in the contract, that it is the intention of the person selling his lands to use the money he receives for them in raising and equipping volunteers to maintain and advance the independence of his' country.
    •It does not appear, from the bill, thatthe contract was for the advancement of funds to raise and equip volunteers within the United States, or to carry on war from thence against Mexico. For aught .that appears, the design of. General Chambers was to raise, his voltíñteers in Texas. ' And it might as well be presumed that they- were .to be raised in Europe, as in the United States.
    Besides, Texas was an independent, government. And the purpose of General Chambers, as declared, was, to maintain her independence; and not to make incursions from the United States, or éven from Texas, into Mexico.
    • There is nothing in this statute inhibiting a citizen of the United States from volunteering in the service of another .'government to maintain her independence, already declared; and uphold her government, fully instituted; nor declaring it unlawful for a citizen of the United States to contribute means for such purposes.
    Again, it is insisted by the defendant, that this contract is in violation of, the. treaty of amity, commerce and navigation betweeii the United States of America and the United Mexican States, of April 5, 1832.
    The 1st article- of that treaty is in these words: “ There shall be a 'firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, in all. the extent of their possessions and territories,, and between .their people and citizens respectively, without distinction of persons or places.”
    In revolutions...there must be .a time when an old government ends and a new one begins. And when a .new one begins, it must embrace a certain portion of the- earth of which it has possession. Now with regard to this provision of the Treaty, I' respectfully insist, that, by a revolution, a portion of what was before Mexico, ceased to be any part of the possessions or territory of Mexico, and became the possessions and territory of the new government; and that this provision in the treaty could no longer bind-the United States to regard the revolted territory as any part of the Mexican territory.
    In regard to the obligations of this Treaty, and its binding force upon the United S+ates, in September, 1836, the question is not, whether the United' '^ates had recognized the independence of Texas ;■ but whether ''Téxas had, in. fact, achieved her independence.
    If Texas had not achieved her independence in 1836, when this contract was executed, then she had not achieved it at a subsequent period, when the United States government did officially recognize her independence. And if these citizens of Ohio, in September, 1836, violated this treaty of amity with Mexico, then the_ United States government violated the same treaty in March, 1837, by recognizing, and in April, 1838, by treating with the Republic of Texas... Fort when this contract was made, the revolted colony had already achieved her independence, established her government, and had never relinquished any part of her territory acquired by the revolution.
    The question whether Texas had achieved her independence in September, 1836, was a historic and governmental fact — a fact not depending upon any question of recognition by other and different nations.
    It is true that other governments might or might not, as they should choose, send to and receive from Texas diplomatic agents. But whether they did or not, could nuc alter the fact of Texan independence, so long as Mexico never repossessed herself of the revoking territory. And so far as the fact of Texan independence was concerned, it was no more the province of our government than of any other to determine when that fact transpired. And, as I conceive, no more the province of any government, than of the citizens, except so far as concerns the relations of diplomacy.
    The recognition of the independence of Texas, by the United States, in no way determined the fact as to when she became independent, any more than did the acknowledgment of the in-. dependence of the United States by the British government, determine the fact as to when the United States became independent. If the time or date ¡of the independence of revolting colonies depends on the decision of neutral nations, and hot upon the fact whether the revolting colony has established á civil government which is continued in successful operation, performing all the functions of an independent power, -.then we are all mistaken in the date of our national existence; and insteád of celebrating the anniversary of the 4th of July, 1776, we should ascertain the different days cf the recognition of our independence by other nations, and celebrate them. And thus, instead of having one national holiday, we would have as many as there are nations with whom we have diplomatic relations. By such a decision our boys would be delighted, and the interests of pyrotechnists greatly benefited.

      Mr: Volney E. Howard, for the appellees.
    We insist that the bill in this case cannot be maintained, because, —
    1. 'It is shown, on the face of the contract and the bill, that the obligation was given to enable General Chambers to raise and equip volunteers, to carry on a war in Texas against the republic of Mexico, and was therefore in violation of our neutrality laws with Mexico. The contract was entered into in Ohio, in September, 1836, before this government had acknowledged the independence of Texas. Contracts to furnish money to carry on war by revolted subjects, against a government with whom we are at peace, are void. 1 Kent, 116, 118, 123; Dewentz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore, C. B. 586. If the government does not interfere, it is illegal for citizens to do so. 1 Kent, 24, note A, 25, note. And, until the government acknowledges the independence of the revolted province, the courts recognize the ancient condition, of things, under which this contract would be illegal. 1 Kent, 25; 9 Ves. 347; 4 Cranch, 272; 13 J. R. 561, 587; 3 Wheat. 324, 610; Wheaton’s Elements, 453.
    2. It appears from the contract, and the allegations of the bill, on page 8 of the record, that the contract in this case was entered into, not only for the purpose of furnishing money to equip volunteers to carry on a war in Texas against Mexico, in aid of the revolutionists, but for the further illegal purpose of raising volunteers to proceed from-this country. The contract was therefore void, as against the laws of the United States and our treaty of amity and friendship with Mexico. The contract was executed in Cincinnati, on the 16th September, 1836, and recites that General Chambers “ is now engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas,” &c. Act of Congress, 1836, p. 53; Senate Journal, 1837, pp. 110, 310; Act of March 10, 1838, 5 Stat. at Large, 212; Ex. Doc. 1835, p. 183; Vol. 6, Doc. 256; Doc. 38, p. 36.
   Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

'delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from the decree o,f the District Court- of the United States for the District of Texas.

The appellants filed a bill in that court against the appellee, to obtain the specific execution of ah agreement which is set out in full in the bill; and which they allege was executed at the city of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, on or about the 16th of September, 1836. Some of the complainants claim as original parties to the contract, and the others as assignees of original parties, who have sold and assigned to them their interest.

The contract, after stating that it was entered into on the day and year above mentioned, between General T. Jefferson Cham: bers, of the Texan army, of the first part, and Morgan Neville and six others, who are named in the agreement, of the city of Cincinnati, of the second part, proceeds to recite the motives and inducements of the parties in the following words: —

“ That the said party of the second ,part, being desirous of assisting the said General T. Jefferson Chambers, who is now engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, and who is in want of means therefor; and, being, extremely desirous to advance the cause of freedom and the independence of Texas, have agreed to purchase of the said T. Jefferson Chambers, of his private estate, the lands hereinafter described.”

And after this recital follows the agreement of Chambers, to sell and convey to. them the land described in the agreement, situated in Texas, for- the sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars, which he acknowledged that he had received in their notes, payable in -equal instalments of four, six, and twelve months, and he covenanted that he had a good title to this land, and would convey it with general warranty. There are other stipulations, on the part of Chambers, to secure the title to the parties, which it is unnecessary to state, as they are not material to the questions before the court.

After setting out the contract at large, the bill avers, that the notes given, as aforesaid, were all paid.; and sets forth the manner in which the complainants, who' were not parties to the original contract, had acquired their interest as assignees; and charges that, notwithstanding the full payment of the money, Chambers, under different pretexts, refuses to convey the land, according to the terms of his agreement.

It further states, that they are informed and believe that.he received full compensation, in money, scrip, land, or other valuable property, for the supplies furnished by him, and in arming and equipping the Texan army referred to in the said contract, and which it was in part the object of the said parties of the second part to assist .him to do, by the said advances made by them-, as before stated, and -which said advances did.enable the said Chambers so to do.

To this bill the respondent (Chambers) demurred, and the principal question which arises on the demurrer is, whether the contract was a legal arid valid one, and such as can be enforced by either party in a court of the United States. It appears on the face of it, and by the averments of the appellants in their bill, that it was made in Cincinnati, with;a general in the Texan army, who was. then engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, to carry on hostilities with Mexico ; and that one of the inducements of the appellants, in entering into this contract and advancing the money, was to assist him in accomplishing these Objects.

The District Court decided that the contract was illegal and .void, and sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill; and we think that the decision was Ught.

The validity of this contract deoends upon the relation in which this country then stood to Mexico and Texas; and the duties which these relations imposed upon the governxnent and citizens of the United States.

Texas had declared itself independent , a few months previous to this agreement. But it had not been acknowledged by the United States ; and the constituted authorities charged with our foreign relations, regarded the-treaties we had made with Mexico-as still in full force, and' obligatory upon both nations. By the treaty of .limits, Texas had been- admitted by our .government to be a part of the Mexican territory; and by the first article'of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, it was declared, “ that there should be a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship betwéeh the United States of America and the United Mexican States, in all the extent- of thgir possessions and territories, and between their people and citizens respectively, without distinction of persons or place.” These treaties, while they remained in force, were, by the Constitution of the United' States, the supreme law, and binding not Only upon the government, but upon ¿very citizen. No contract could lawfully be made in violation of their provisions.

Undoubtedly, when Texas had achieved her independence, no previous treaty could bind this country to regard it as a part of the Mexican territory. But it belonged to ’the government, and not to individual citizens, to decide when that event had taken place. And that decision, according-to the laws of nations, depended upon the question whether she had or had not a civil government in successful, operation; capable of performing the duties arid fulfilling the obligations of an independent power. It depended upon the state of the fact, and not upon the right which was in contest- between the parties. And the President, in his message to the Senate, of December 22, 1836, in relation- tq the conflict between Mexico and Texas, which was still pending, says: “All questions relative to the government of foreign nations, whether of the old or the new world, have .been treated by the United States as questions of fact only, and our predecessors have .cautiously' abstained from deciding upon them until the clearest evidence was in their possession, to enable them not only to. decide correctly, but to shield their decision from everyunworthy-imputation.” Senate Journal of 1836, 37, p. 54.

Acting upon these principles, the independence of Texas was not acknowledged by the. Government of the United States until the beginning of March, 1837. Up to that time, it was regarded as a part of the territory of Mexico. The treaty which admitted it to be. so, was held to' be still in force and binding on both' parties, and every effort made by the government to fulfil its neutral obligations, and prevent our citizens from taking part in the conflict. This is evident, from an official-communication from the President to the Governor of Tennessee, in reply to an inquiry in relation to a requisition for militia, made by General Gaines. The despatch is dated in August, 1836; and the President uses the following language: “ The obligations of our treaty with Mexico, as well as the general principles which govern our intercourse with foreign powers, require us to maintain a strict neutrality in the contest which now agitates a part of that republic. So long as Mexico fulfils her duties to us, as they are defined by the treaty, and violates none of the rights which are secured by it to our citizens, any act on the part of the Government of the United States, which would tend to foster a spirit of resistance to her government and laws, whatever may be their character or form, when, administered within her own limits and jurisdiction, would be unauthorized and highly improper. Ex. Doc. 1836, 1837, Yol. 1, Doc. 2, p. 58.

And on the .very day on which the agreement of which we are speaking, was made,-(September 16, 1836,) Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, in a note to‘the Mexican'Minister, assured him that the -government had taken measures to secure the execution df the laws for preserving the ^neutrality of the United States, and that the public officers were vigilant in the. discharge of that duty. Ex Doc. Vol. 1, -Doc. 2, page 63-64.

And still later, the President, in his message to the Senate- of December'22, 1836, before referred to, says : “ The acknowledgment of a new- State as independent, and entitled to' a place in the family of nations, is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility; but more especially so when such a State has forcibly separated itself from another, of which it formed an integral part, and which still claims dominion oyer it.” And, after speaking of the policy which our government had always adopted on such occasions, and the duty of maintaining the established character of the United States for fair and impartial dealing, he proceeds to express his opinion against the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, at .that time, in the following words : —

“ It is true, with regard to Texas, the civil authority of Mexico has -been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly organized Government of Texas annihilated within its confines. But, on the other hand, there is,, in appearance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Mexico. The Mexican republic, under another executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader, and menacing a fresh .invasion to recover its lost dominion. Upon the issue of .this threatened invasion, the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended; and, were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis would scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.”

The whole object of this message appears to have been-to impress upon Congress the impropriety of acknowledging the independence of Texas at that time; and the more especially as the American character of her population, and her known desire to become a State of this Union, might, if prematurely acknowledged, bring suspicion upon the motives bv which we were governed.

We have given these extracts from the public documents not only to show that, in the judgment of our 'government, Texas had not established its independence when this contract was made, but to show also how anxiously the constituted authorities were endeavoring to maintain untarnished the honor of the country, and to place it above the suspicion of taking any part in the conflict.

This being the attitude in which the government stood, and this its open and avowed policy, upon what grounds can the parties to such a contract as this, come into a court of justice .of the United States and ask for its specific execution ?• It was made in direct opposition to the policy of the government, to which it was the duty of every citizen to conform. And, while they saw it. exerting all its power to fulfil in good faith its neutral obligations, they made themselves parties to the war; by furnishing means to a general of the Texan army, for the avowed purpose of aiding and assisting him in his military operations.

It might indeed fairly be inferred, from the language of the Contract and the statements in the appellants’ bill, that the volunteers were to be raised, armed, and equipped within the limits of the United States. The language of the contract is : “ That the said party of the second part, (that is the complainants,) being desirous of assisting the said General T. Jefferson Chambers, who is now engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, and is in want of means therefor.” And as General Chambers was then in the United States, and was, as the contract states, actually engaged at that time in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers, and was in want of means to accomplish his object, the inference would seem to be almost irresistible that these preparations were making at or near the place where the agreement was made,-and that the money was advanced to enable him to raise and equip a military force in the United States. And this inference is the stronger, because no place is mentioned where these preparations are to be made, and the agreement contains no engagement on his part, or proviso on theirs, which prohibited him from using these means and making these military preparations within the limits of the United States.

If this be the correct interpretation of the agreement, the contract is not only void, but the parties who advanced .the money were liable to be punished in a criminal prosecution, for a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. And certainly, with such strong indications of a criminal intent, and without any averment in the bill from which their innocence can be inferred, a court of chancery would never lend its aid to carry.the agreement into specific-execution, but would leave the parties to seek their remedy at law. And this ground would of itself be sufficient to justify the decree of the District Court dismissing the bill.

But the decision stands on broader and firmer ground, and this agreement cannot be sustained either at law or in equity. The question is not whether the parties to this contract violated the neutrality laws of the United States or subjected themselves to a-criminal prosecution; but whether such a contract, made at that time, within the United States, for the purposes stated in the contract find the bill of complaint, was a legal. and valid contract, and such as to entitle either party to the aid of the courts of justice of the United States to enforce its execution..

The intercourse of this country with foreign nations, and its policy in regard to them, aré placed by the Constitution of the United States in the h. ids of the government, and its decisions upon these subjects a ' obligatory upon every citizen of the Unión. He is bound tó be at war with the nation against which the war-making power has declared. war, and equally bound to commit .no act of hostility against a-nation with which the government is in amity and • friendship. This principle is universally acknowledged by the laws of nations. It lies at the foundation of all government, as there cóuld be no social order or peaceful relations between the citizens of different countries without it. It is, however, more emphatically true in relation to citizens of the United States. For as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of it, and is himself personally bound by the laws which the representatives of the- sovereignty may pass, or the treaties into which they may enter, within the scope of their delegated authority. And when that authority has plighted its faith to another nation that there shall be peace and friendship between the citizens of the two countries, every citizen of the United States is equally and personally pledged. The compact-is made by the department of the government upon which he himself has agreed to confer-the power. It is his own personal compactas a portion of the sovereignty in whose behalf it is made. And he can' do no act, nor enter into any agreement to promote or encourage revolt 01 hostilities against- the territories of a country with which our government is pledged by treaty to be at peace, without a breach of his duty as a citizen, and the breach of the faith pledged to the foreign nation. And if he does so he cannot claim the aid of a court of justice to enforce it. The appellants say, in their contract, that they were induced to advance the money by the desire to promote the cause of freedom. But our own freedom cannot be-preserved without obedience to our own laws, nor social order preserved' if the judicial branch of the government countenanced and sustained contracts made in violation of the duties which the law imposes, or in contravention of the known and established policy of the political department, acting within the limits of its constitutional power.

But it has been urged in the argument that Texas was in fact independent, and a sovereign state at the time of this agreement; and that the citizen of á neutral nation may lawfully lend money to one that is engaged in war, to enable it to carry on hostilities against its enemy.

' It is not necessary, in the case before us, to decide how far the' judicial tribunals of the United States would enforce a contract like this, when-two -states, acknowledged to be independent, were at war, and this country neutral. . It is a sufficient answer to the argument to say that the question whether Texas had or had not at that time.become an independent state, was a question for that department of our government exclusively which is charged with oiir foreign relations. And until the period when that department recognized it as an independent state, the judicial tribunals of the country were bound to consider the old order of things as having continued, and to regard Texas as a part of the Mexican territory. And if we undertook to inquire whether she had not in fact become an independent sovereign state before she was recognized as such- by the treaty-making power, we should take upon ourselves the exercise of political authority, for which a judicial tribunal is wholly unfit, and which the Constitution has conferred exclusively upon another departr ■ment.

This is not a new question. It came before the court in the case of Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 272, and again iñ Hoyt v. Gelston, 3 Wheat. 324. And in both of these cases the court-said, that it-belongs exclusively to governments to recognize new states in- the revolutions which may occur in.the world; and until such recognition, either by our own government or the go-, vernment to which the new state belonged, courts of justice are-bound to. consider the-'ancient state of things as remaining unaltered.

It-was upon this ground that the Court of Common Pleas in England, in the case of De Wutz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore’s C. B. Reports, 586, decided that it was contrary to the law of nations for persons residing in England to enter intp engagements to raise money by -way of loan for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign state in arms against a government in friendship with England, and that no right of action attached upon any such contract. And this decision is quoted with approbation by Chancellor Kent, in 1 Kent’s Com. 116.

Nor can the subsequent acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, and her admission into the Union as a sovereign State, affect the question. The agreement being illegal and absolutely void at the time it was made, it can-derive' no force-or validity from events which afterwards happened.

But it is insisted, on the part of the appellants, that this contract was to be executed in Texas, and was valid by the laws of Texas, and that the District Court for that State, in a controversy between individuals, was bound to administer the laws of the State, and ought therefore to have enforced this agreement.

This argument is founded in part on a mistake of the fact. The contract was not only made in Cincinnati, but all the stipulations on the part of the appellants were to be performed there and not. in Texas. And the advance of money .which they agreed to make for military purposes was in fact made and intended to be made in Cincinnati, by the delivery of their promissory notes, which were accepted by the appellee as payment of the money. This appears on the face of the contract. And it is this advance of money for the purposes mentioned in the agreement, in contravention of the neutral obligations and policy of the United States, that avoids the contract. The mere agreement. to accept a conveyance of land lying in Texas, for a valuable consideration paid by them, would have been free from objection.

But' had the fact been otherwise, certainly no law of Texas then or now in force could absolve a citizen of the United States, while he continued such, from his duty to this government, nor compel a court of the United States to support a contract, no matter where made or where to be- executed, if that contract was in violation of their laws, or contravened the public policy of the government, or was in conflict with subsisting treaties with a foreign nation.

We therefore hold this contract to be illegal and void, and ■ affirm the decree of the District Court.

Mr. Justice DANIEL and’ Mr. Justice GRIER, dissented.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice NELSON

license: Public Domain

text:
    Joseph Wiswall, Plaintiff in Error, v. David Sampson, Lessee of Edward Hall and Edward S. Dargan.
    Where real estate is in the custody of a receiver, appointed by a court of chancery,' a sale of the property under an execution issued by virtue of a judgment at law, is illegal and void.
    The proper modes of proceeding pointed out, to be pursued by any person who claims title to the property, either by mortgage, or judgment, or otherwise. ■
    This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States -for the Southern' District of Alabama.

      It was an ejectment for the following lot, in the city of Mobile, bounded south by St.' Francis street, and lying between Water and Commerce and Planters streets of the said, city, having a front of thirty-live feet on St. Francis street, and extending to Planters street, with the same breadth; bohnded east by lands formerly belonging to M. D. Eslava, and west by a lot of Beach, Ela & Co.
    The declaration contained three counts ; two upon a demise from Edward Hall, a citizen of the State of Maryland, an-.l the third a demise from Edward S. Dargan.
    Although the decision of the court turned upon a single point, it is necessary to connect it with the other circumstances of the case which are somewhat complicated.
    The following table contains a reference to the principal facts bearing upon the respective titles of the plaintiff and defendant.

      Upon the trial, the-following bill of exceptions was taken Be it remembered, that on the trial of this cause on this 4th day. of January, 1849, before the Honorable William Crawford; Judge, the plaintiffs, ho show title.in their lessors, offered-in-evidence k judgment rendered ip this court on the 28th December, 1840-, in favor of C. S. Fowler & Co:, against John Ticknor, for $4,991, besides costs ;■ also a judgment rendered in this court, on the--31st. December, 1840, in favor of Crouch and . Sneed against John Ticknor, $7,176.25 and costs; upon each of which judgments fi.fys. were issüed within a year and returned lay the inarshal, No property found; no other, executions or- process issued', upon either-of these judgments, except the following: Upon the judgment of ‘Crouch and Sneed an alias fi.fa. was issued on the 24th February, 1845", and levied on the-property ¡Sued- for, upon which the- marshal returned, Levied — and “ the. salé of the property levied on postponed by Judge E. S.- Dargan, until further order ” And on the 17th May, 1845, a pluries fi. fa. issued on this judgment and was levied on the same property. Upo^i the judgment of C. S. Fo.wler & Co. an alias fi. fa. was issued oh the 7th -of 'April, 1845, and levied on the same property, and returned, For. want of ‘time, to sell. And on the first day of May, 1845, a venditioni exponas issued, upon which and • the execution on the Crouch and Sneed -judgments, issued.' the 17th May,- the property was sold by the marshal on the 7th July, 1845, to Edward S. Dargan, for $7,500' and a deed was made by the marsnal to said.Dargan, bearing date the thirteenth of August, 1845. The plaintiff further offered in evidence a deed of release and quitclaim of thé same premises, from Edward S. Dargan to Edward. Hall, one of the lessors, bearing date-the 3d of April, 1848, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked X; to the reading of which the defendant,-by his'attorney, objected, on the ground that it was "neither acknowledged nor recorded; but. the objection was overruled by the court, and the deed admitted in evidence upon the proof of the .handwriting of Dargan, and the defendant excepted. ‘ The plaintiff-fur ther offered evidence to show-that John Ticknor was in possesSion-of the property sued iof from' 1838 or 1839 claiming title, and that he remained in possession until about 1845; but whether, after 1840, Ticknor claimed it as his own, or held possession as the tenant of some-one else, witness did not know. It further appeared that' Ticknor built the store; that in 1839 or 1840, he became embarrassed, and that he owed, a large sum of mori.ey tó one James L. Day, and from some time-in 1840 carried on business in the store as thq agent of said Day. Day was oftén there and had the control, but Ticknor managed-all the details. It was -further proved that McCoy and Johnson, the tenants served with the declaration, were in possession of •the premises in April, 1848,-and had been in 'possession since November, 1847.
    The defendant .then offered in evidence a judgment obtained in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, on the 14th day of June,-1842, in favor of Joseph Wiswall against John Ticknor, for the sum of $2,233.17, besides costs; and á fi. fa. issued' thereon the. 1st July, 1842, returnable to the fall' term4 ol said Court, which"was returned 'by the sheriff, No property found; also the transcripts ' from the'records, duly certified, of a deed •made by John Ticknor to James L. Day, bearing date the 28th of April, 1840, a. copy of which is annexed, marked A-; also the exemplificatipn of a decree and proceedings in a suit in .chancery, filed the 7th of February, 1843, by Joseph Wiswall, •as a ifidgment creditor of John Ticknor, against said Ticknor arid-James L.’Day ; a copy of which bill, answers, and decrees, are hereto annexed, marked B; also a decree and -proceedings in the same court of chancery upon a bill filed March 1st, 1845, by the' president, directors, and cbmpany of the Bank of Mobile, JamesStewart, and Henry Lazarus, several judgment creditors of said Ticknor, and against said Ticknor and James. S. Day,: which bill" was similar in its form and object to the bill of Wiswall, and was.served on the. defendant, Ticknor, on the 1st' Maych, Í845; a copy of the answer of Day, arid the decree, is annexed, marked C. -The defendant then p-oved that’War-in g-j -the receiver of the Court of Chancery in‘the above two suits, went into the possession of the property sued for on St. Francis street, as such receiver-, on the 27th day of June, 1845, arid remained in possession as such receiver until the same was sold-.by him on the first Monday of March, 1847; that notice was given at the marshal’s sale, when the property was'bid off by Dargan, of. the pendency of the above-named suits in chancery, and the claims- of. the complainants there asserted, and ithat he was, as receiver aforesaid, then in possession of said property under the décreés in chancery in the above suits. The property was .duly sold by the receiver on the 1st. day of Marchr 1847, to K. B. Sewall for six thousand five hundred dollars, and a deed of the samé made to him by the said receiver and master m chancery; and on the tenth day of May, 1847, the- same was conveyed.by said Sewall to the defendant; Joseph Wiswall; it was also shown -that the purchaser tV-om the receiver went into possession, and that the wliole amount of the purchase-money was paid and appropriated under the1 directions of. the Court of Chancery.
    The. defendant then offered in evidence, the transcript of a decree and proceedings bad in. a court of chancery, in Mobile, upon the petition of Edward S. Dargan against Moses Waring, receiver, Joseph Wiswall, John Ticknor, and James L.. Day, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked Exhibit D ; which decree had been affirmed by the Supreme .Court; C. Cuyler, the deputy marshal who Made the sale to Dargan, testified- that no money whatever was paid upon said sale, but that Dargan gave Ms note to the Marshal for the costs.
    John F..Adams testified that he acMd as the attorney óf C. S. Fowler &.Co..in recovering their judgment in this court, and had ever since represented said judgment; and that E. S. Dargan, from some.tithe prior to the marshal’s sale, represented the judgment of Crouch and Sneed;, that it was agreed between said attorneys, Adams and Dargan, representing said judgments, that the land should be sold upon them, and bid off in the name of Dargan, and. that- if the title" thus acquired should enable Dargan .to recover the property, the judgment of C. S. Fowler &• Co. should be paid out of it; but that if the property should not be recovered by such title, then the sale was tó be considered a nullity, and no monéy to he paid whatever on account of it; and that this was the understanding of Adams, but that after the sale- he yielded to the views of Dargan, and signed a memorandum to the effect that Dargan should be a trustee for the parties. •' It was further in evidence that with the arrangeraénts between Dargan and Adams there was no connection on the part-of Ticknor, the defendant in the judgment, and no aSsent was given by him to them.
    - Adams also testified that, as the representative' of the judgment of C. S. Fowler & Co., he entered a motion in this court at the spring term, 1847, to amend' the marshal’s return made upon the execution in that case, to show that no money was in fact paid on said bid of Dargan ; and said motion was produced .arid read to the jury, and is .still pending and undetermined
    Defendant then offered-to read a bill filed in the Chancery ■Court of Mobile, on the 18th February, 1847, in the name of David A. Hall, assignee in bankruptcy of C. S3. Fowler & Co., against John Ticknor, James L. Day, -Moses Waring, receiver, Joseph Wiswall, Bank of Mobile, James Stewart, and Henry Laxaras,' the object of which bill was to reach and. have appropriated to the-payment of said judgment of C. S. Fowler & Co. the proceeds of the sale of the property to be made in that' court upon the bill of said Wiswall and others; said bill was filed by J. F. Adams, as solicitor of the' parties, and sets forth, among-.other, things, the following: “ That the said premises were sold on. the ..1st of July, 1845, by the marshal,’to Edward S. .Dargan, -for the nominal sum of $7,500, and the marshal ex? etented to said Dargan his formal deed for the same, and thereupon made return upon the process that the premises were sold for the sum above narped, And your orator now averreth, that in fact neither the sum of $7,500, nor any other sum, was paid by said Dargan to-the'plaintiffs in execution, or to any person for them, but his said bid was made upon his stipulation made with the plaintiffs’ attorney, and on the distinct understanding and intent on his. part, that in case his title under the said sale should prove to be valid a-nd effectual in law, he would pay to the said plaintiffs or your orator so much money upon his said bid as he might thereafter be able.to realize by a sale; but if the said title .should not prove to be ayailable nor enable him to obtain possession, that in that case he should pay nothing.” Said bill is not sworn to, and is still pending in the Court of Chancery: to the introduction of this bill as evidence, the. plaintiffs objected on the ground that' it was not connected with the plaintiffs in this suit, and as being' the statement of counsel merely, and not evidence against C. S. Fowler & Co.; and the objection was sustained, and the said bill excluded; to whieh the defendant, by his counsel, excepted. This was all the evidence offered in the case, and thereupon the court charged the jury —
    That the deed from Ticknor to Day, of April 28th, 1840, was, upon its face, in connection with the answers of Ticknor and Day, fraudulent as to creditors, and void; to which, the defend^ ant excepted.
    The court further qharged, that the title of Dargan, derived from the marshal’s sale, under the judgment of C. S. Fowler & Co. and of Crouch & Sneed, was superior to the title of Wis-' wall, derived from the sale under the chancery proceedings, and' entitled the plaintiffs to recover; to which the defendant, by his counsel, excepted.
    The court further charged the jury, that the proceedings and decree in the Court of Chancery, upon the petition of Dargan, was not binding Or conclusive upon the parties in this suit; that it was not necessary for Dargan - to go into the Court of Chancery for aid, that his remedy was at law, and the proceedings there upon his petition had no effect whatever upon his title, and must be wholly disregarded in this suit; to. which the defendant, by his counsel, also excepted, and requested the court to give the following charges do the jury: —
    1. That, if thé jury believe the deed from the marshal to. Dargan was made without any pecuniary consideration, it could pass no title; which the court refused; but charged that, under the- evidence before them, it was valid if no money was paid by the purchaser, to which the defendant excepted.
    2. That the filing of Wiswall’s bill in chancery,, and the proceedings thereon, to- a final decree -in his favor, gave him a specific lien upon the property of Ticknor, from the commencement of his suit, which could not be divested by any subsequent proceedings upon the older judgments under which the plaintiffs here claim; which was refused, and the defendant excepted.
    . 3. That the receiver of the Court of Chancery, in the suits of Wiswall and others, being in possession of the property under the order of that court at the time of the- marshal’s sale, and notice thereof being given at that sale, aífécted the purchaser, and invalidated his title; which was. refused; and the court charged that such possession and notice in no manner affected the marshal’s sale, or the purchaser under it; and the defendant excepted.
    4. That the proceedings in the Court of Chancery, upon he petition of Dargan, the purchaser at the marshal’s .sale, was conclusive upon the parties and his title thus acquired; which-was .refused; and the defendant excepted.
    5. That, under the statutes and decisions of Alabama, it is not* the oldest judgment, but the judgment lien, that has been kept alive by the oldest execution, regularly issued, without the loss of a term,.that has the priority as between judgment creditors ; which was refused; and the defendant excepted.
    6. That, if neither Dargan nor Edward Hall were in possession of the property on the 3d of .April, 1848, the deed of that date, from Dargan to Hall, was void and conveyed no title; this was also.refused; and the court charged that, under.the evidence before the jury, this deed was valid; to all which the defendant excepted.'
    -'And the defendant tenders the.above as his bill of exceptions in the -ease, and prays the court to sign and seal the sanie, which is done, accordingly.
    William Crawford, [seal.]
    All the exceptions were argued in this court; but it is only necessary to refer to the above charge, viz., that the title of Dargan was superior to that, of Wiswall, and that the decree in chancery, on the petition of Dargan, was not conclusive upon the, rights of the parties; that he was not bound to go into that court for relief, as his remedy was at law-
    It-was argued by Mr. Seward, for the plaintiff in error, with a brief of Mr. Sewall, and.by Mr. Chilton, for the defendant in error, with a brief of Mr. John A. Campbell.
    It was contended, by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, “ that the receiver of the Court of Chancery, in the suits of Wiswall and others, being in possession of the property,, under-the order of the court, at the time of the marshal’s sale, and notice thereof being give r at that sale, affected the purchase by Dargan and invalidated his title, and in charging, on the contrary, that such possession and notice in no manner affected the marshal’s sale, or the purchase under it.” Because, —
    1. The levy, under the -judgments of C. S. Fowler & Co. and Crouch. & Sneed, invested neither the marshal with any title nor the Federal Court with any jurisdiction over the land, nor could it divest any title, if the defendant Ticknor was in possession, unless. followed by an actual sale by the marshal, and payment of the purchase-money by the purchaser. Forrest & Lyon v. Camp, 16 Ala. 647.
    And then, not until the sale took place and the money -rag paid. The sale took place in July; the deed was made in August 1 Rich. Eq. Rep. 340.
    2. But Ticknor wasnot in possession. The Court of Chancery, by its receiver, was in .possession on the 25th June previous ; and held, not for Ticknor, but for ’Wiswall and the other parties claiming against Ticknor. 3 P. Wms. R. 379; 2 Story, Eq. § 833. The Court of Chancery was not holding the pro-. .perty in safe custody, until the right should be determined between Wiswall on the one side, and Ticknor & Day on the other; for it had already determined the right in favor of Wis-wall, and ordered a sale, and the proceeds to be applied to his judgment. Ticknor & Day v. Wiswall, 6 Ala. 178. Its jurisdiction was complete, and adverse to all third parties. 10 Paige, 43.
    Where different courts have concurrent jurisdiction, that before which proceedings are first had, and whose jurisdiction first attaches, has authority, paramount to the others, and cannot be ousted by subsequent proceedings in those courts. . The Court of Chancery took jurisdiction to decide upon the right and title to this land, when Wiswall filed his bill oh the 7th February, 1843, and it continued its jurisdiction over it until it was sold under its decree. No jurisdiction as to the premises attached-to the Federal Court before the sale to Dargan, if then. Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat. 532; Corning v. White, 2 Paige, 567; The Robert Fulton, 1 Paine, 621; P. & M. Bank v. Walker, 7 Ala. 945; Parker v. Browning, 8 Paige, 389.
    The counsel for the defendant in error thus noticed this point: —

      We deny'-that the Court of Chancery could prevent the execution of the levy made by the marshal, ,by placing a receiver in possession. The Court of Chancery insists upon no such power.
    The rule of chancery is stated in 7 Paige, 513. The head-notes are: “ When property is rightfully in the hands of a receiver, it is in the custody of the court, and cannot be dis-strained upon - for rent without permission of the court by whom the receiver was appointed; and any person who. takes the property out of the possession of the receiver .without such permission, after he .has notice, of the character in which possession is holden, is guilty of a contempt.”
    The samé prinéiples are applicable to any interference with-the possession of a receiver, sequestrator, committee, or custodee, who holds the property as the officer of the Court of Chancery; as his possession is the possession of the court itself. Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige, 513.
    “ Where a receiver is in possession of real estate which is subject to the lien of a judgment, the sale of the premises by the sheriff, upon an execution on such judgment, does not disturb the possession of the receiver; and the sheriff cannot, therefore, be proceeded against for a contempt in making such a sale. But the purchaser cannot disturb the possession of the receiver, when he obtains his conveyance from the sheriff, without the permission of the court. 9 Paige, 373.
    This subject is discussed at large in a late case before Lord • Truro, reported in 3 Gordon & Macnaghten It. 104, from which we extract.
    “ I am of opinion, that it is not competent for any one to interfere with the possession of a receiver, or to disobey an injunction or any other order of the court, on the ground that such orders were im providently made. .Parties must take a proper course to question their validity;' but Avhile they exist they must be.obeyed. I consider the rule to.be of such importance to the interests and safety of the public, and to the due administration of justice,'that it ought on all occasions to be inflexibly maintained.' I do not see how the court can expect its officers to do their duty, if they do it under the peril of resistance, and of that resistance being justified on grounds tending to’ the impeachment of the order .under which they are acting. In the present case, it would have been perfectly open to the plaintiffs in the execution to have applied to this court, to be heard pro interesse suo, or to naive been heard on a summary application for leave to levy under their execution, notwithstanding the posssesion of the;receiver. There is no instance in which justice may not be readily obtained by persons who are supposed to have their rights interfered with by an order or process issued by this court. Thus, I find, in one case, where a party wished to distrain for rent on property in the possession of a receiver, that the court, being satisfied that the legal right of distress was paramount to' the title of the party for whose benefit the receiver was appointed, allowed the (distress to be made. In another .case, where property liable to distress had been sold, and the receiver had received the proceeds and paid them into court, the landlord having claimed a right to distrain while the receiver was in possession, this court ordered the receiver to pay out of.those prodeeds, to the landlord, the rents that were due to him, the receiver being in possession for the benefit of the tenant for life, who was liable for the payment of that rent which was -so sought to be distrained for on the property in.the possession of the receiver. I apprehend, then, it may be taken as a rule that, though this court may havo issued a process, or have made an order which may interfere with th*e supposed rights and interests of other .parties, not parties to the cause, it is always competent; for such parties to make an application to the coart for relief; and it is not'to be presumed or doubted, but that justice will be duly administered to them, on that application.”
   Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered'the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama.

The suit in the cour-t below was an action of ejectment against Wiswali to recover the possession of a lot of land situated in the city of Mobile.

The lessors of the plaintiff gave in evidence two judgments' against John Ticknor — one in favor of Fowler & Co. for $4,491, rendered 28th December, 1840 — the other in favor of Crouch & Sneed for $7,167.25, rendered 31st December of the same year, each of them in the Circuit Court of the United States. Executions were issued upon each’ of the judgments within the year, and returned by the marshal “ no property found.”

An alias fi. fa. was issued on the judgment in favor of Crouch & Sneed on the 24th February, 1845, and the lot in question, levied on; an alias filfa, was also issued on the judgment in favor of Fowler & Co. on the 7th April, 1845, and a levy made on the same; and on the 7th July the lot was sold on both executions, and bid off by Dargan, one of the lessors of the plaintiff', for the sum of. .$7,500, and a deed executed to him by the marshal on the 13th August of the same year. Dargan quit-claimed the premises to Hall, the other lessor. The lessors of the plaintiff claim title under this sale.

The defendant, Wiswall, gave in evidence a judgment in his favor against Ticknor in the Circuit Court of the State for $52,233.17; rendered 14th June, 1842; an execution issued 1st July of the same year; which was returned by the sheriff “ no property found; ” also a deed of the lot in question from Ticknor to one Jataes L. Day, bearing date 28 April, 1840; and the exempli'fi- . cation of a decree and the proceedings in chancery on a bi1' filed 7th February, 1843, by Wiswall against Ticknor and Day, setting aside the deed to Day as fraudulent and void against creditors. The decree was rendered April term, 1845. Also the appointment of a receiver by the court, to whom possession of the property was delivered on .the 27th June of the same year. The receiver remained in the possession till the lot was sold' by the master, 1st March, 1847, under the decree in chancery, and was purchased in for the defendant Wiswall for the sum of $6,500.

The defendant claims under this title.

Notice was given, on the day of sale, by the marshal, under the two judgments, of the pendency of this suit in chancery, and of the appointment of a receiver, and that he was in the possession of the property.

It appeared, also, that the lot was bid off by Dargan at the ■marshal’s sale, by -an arrangement between the attorneys representing the two judgments, Dargan "being the attorney for the one in'favor of Crouch & Sneed, that if the title thus acquired should enable him to recover the property, the judgment in favor of Fowler & Co. should be paid out of it; but, if he should fail to recover it, then the salé was to be considered a nullity, and no money was to be paid.

It further appeared, that an application had been made by the attorney in the judgment in favor of Fowler & Co. to the court to amend the marshal’s return so as to set forth the fact that no money had been paid, and that the motion was then pending in court' And further, that ¿'bill had been filed in chancery by the assignee m óanlsrüptcy of the judgment of Fowler & Co. against the defendant and others, to have the proceeds of the sale of the property on the decree applied to the payment of that judgment,'and'in which bill it .is insisted that the sale under the two judgments was inoperative, on account of the agreement between the attorneys under whom it was made, and that this suit was then pending.

It further appeared, that -Dargan applied to the Court of Chancery on the 26th'November, 1845, by petition, setting out his title under the two judgments to have the possession Of the lot by the receiver delivered up to him, or if that should not be ordered, then that he might be at liberty to bring an action of eiectment against the receiver to recover the same.

That the defendant Wiswall put in his answer, setting-up the same matters now relied on to invalidate the sale to Dargan, and also claiming a paramount lien upon the property by virtue of his judgment, and bill in chancery and decree setting aside the fraudulent conveyance to Day, directing a sale and application of the proceeds to the payment of his judgment, the appointment of-a receiver, &e.

That the chancellor overruled the application, and dismissed the petition on the 10th December, 1845. From which order an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and the decree or order affirmed.

After the .evidence was closed, the court charged the jury, that the title of. Dargan under the marshal’s sale upon the two judgments was superior to that of the defendant under the sale upon the decree in chancery, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. And further, that the decree in chancery on the petition of Dargan was not'conclusive upon the rights of the parties — that he was not .bound'to go into that court for relief, as his remedy was at law.

The case is now before us on exceptions to this charge.'

It was made a question, on the argument, whether or not the lien of the judgments, under which the marshal’s sale took place, had not been postponed to that of Wiswall, on account of laches in the enforcement of them by execution. But in the view we have taken of the case, the validity pf the liens, at"'the time of sale, will be conceded, without, however, intending' to express any opinion upon the question.

Wiswall filed his bill in chancery against Ticknor and Day to set aside the fraudulent conveyance to the latter, and have the property applied to the satisfaction of his judgment, on the 7th February j 1843. In that bill he prayed for a sale of the .real estate, and for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of it with other assets of the judgment debtor; and, also, for an injunction. A temporary injunction -was granted. . On the coming in of the answers of the defendants, the complainant, on the 11th April .of the same year, moved for the. appointment of a receiver, and the defendants, at the same time, moved to dissolve the injunction. The court denied the motion to appoint the receiver, and dissolved the injunction,- expressing the opinion that tlie answers so far explained the circumstances undqr which the deed to Day was giyen, as to remove the charge of fraud against it. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and, on the 10th April, 1844, that court reversed the order of the court below, and remanded the cause for further proceedings : and on the 15th April, 1845, the Chancellor made a decree, that the deed was fraudulent and void, as against the complainant, and referred the case to a master, to take, and state the- account between the parties. He further ordered and decreed that a receiver should be appointed to fake possession of all the property embraced in the fraudulent conveyance, and, particularly, that possession should be delivered to him of the premises in question; and further, that the receiver, under the direction of the master, should sell the same and apply the proceeds-to the payment of the complainant’s judgment, with costs, &c.

The receiver was appointed on the 27th June, 1845, and on the same day Ticknor, who was in possession of the premises, attorned to him, who held possession until the sale was made in pursuance of the decree. It will be recollected' that the execution on the judgment in favor' of Crouch & Sneed, was issued, and levied on the 24th February,-1845; and on that in favor of Fowler &.Co. 7th April of the same year, and that the sale took place under which the lessors of the plaintiff claim, 7th July, 1845.

At the time, therefore, of this sale, the receiver was in the possession of the premises, under the deereb of the Court of Chancery — in other words, the possession and custody of them were in the Court of Chancery itself, (as the court is deemed the landlord,) to abide the final decree to be thereafter rendered .in the suit pending.

The. appointment of a receiver is a matter resting in the discretion of the court; and, as a general rule, in making the appointment on behalf of a complainant seeking to enforce an equitable claim, or a claim which is the subject of equitable jurisdiction, against real estate, it will take care not to interfere with the rights of a person holding a prior legal interest ’in the property.. l'hus, where there is a prior mortgagee having the legal estate, the court will not, by the appointment of a receiver, deprive him of his right to the possession ; but, at the same” time, it will not permit him to object to the appointment’by any act short of a personal assertion of his legal rights,, and the taking of possession himself. 1 J. & W. 648; 2 Swanst. 108, 137; 3 Id., 112, n. 115; 3 Daniel’s Pr. 1950, 1951.

If the person holding the legal interest, is not in possession, the equitable claimant against the property is entitled to the interference of the. court, not only for the purpose of preserving it from. waste, but for the purpose' of obtaining thb rents and profits' accruing, as a fund in court tp abide the result of- the litigation. ■ For until the person holding the legal interest takes possession, or asserts his right to the possession, the accruing rents'and profits present a question simply between the parties to the litigation. And the court will also'áppoint a receiver, even against a party having possession under a'legal title, if it is satisfied such party has wrongfully obtained that interest in the property. Thus, where fraud can be proved, and immediate danger is likely to result, if possession, pending the litigation, should not be taken by the court in the mean time. 13 Ves. 105; 16 Id. 59; 3 Daniel’s Pr. 1955.

The effect of the appointment is not to oust any party of his right to the possession of the property, but merely to retain.it for the benefit of the party who may ultimately appear to be • entitled to it; and when the party entitled to the estate has been ascertained, the receiver will be considered his receiver, (T. & R. 345; Daniel’s Pr. 1982); and the master will usually be directed to inquire what encumbrances there'are affecting the estate, and into the priorities respectively. 10 J. R. 521, Codwise v. Gelston.

When a receiver has been appointed, his possession is- that' of the court, and any attempt to’ disturb it, without the leave of the court first obtained, will be a contempt on the part of the person making it. This was held in Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. 335, both with respect to receivers a.hd sequestrators. When, therefore, a party is prejudiced by having a receiver put in his way, the course has either been to give him leave to bring an ejectment, or to permit him to be examined pro interesse suo. 1 J. & W. 176, Brooks v. Greathed; 3 Daniel’s Pr. 1984; And the doctrine that a receiver is not to be disturbed, extends even to cases in which he has been appointed expressly, without. prejudice to the rights of persons having prior legal or equitable interests. And the individuals having such prior interests must, if they desire to avail themselves of them, apply to the court either for liberty to bring ejectment, or ta be examined pro interesse suo; and this, though their right to the possession is clear. Cox, 422; 6 Ves. 287.

The proper course to be pursued, says Mr. Daniel, in his valuable treatise on Pleading and Practice in Chancery, by any person who claims title' to an estate or other property sequestered, whether by. mortgage or judgment, lease or otherwise, or who has a title paramount to.the sequestration, is to apply to the court to direct the plaintiff to exhibit- interrogatories before one of the masters, in order that the party applying may be examined as .to his title to the estate. An examination of this :sort is called an examination pro interesse suo, and an order for such examination may be obtained by a party interested, as' well where the property consists of goods and chattels, or personalty, .as where it is real estate.

And the mode of proceeding is the same m the case of the receiver. 6 Ves. 287; 9 Id. 336; 1 J. & W. 178; 3 Daniel’s Pr; 1984.

A party, therefore, holding a judgment which is a prior lien upon the property, the same as a mortgagee, if desirous of enforcing it against the estate after it has been taken into the care and custody of the court, to abide the final determination of the litigation, and pending that litigation, must first obtain leave of the court for this purpose. The court will direct a master to inquire into the circumstances, whether it is an existing unsatisfied demand, or as to the priority of the lien, &c., and take care that the fund be applied accordingly.

Chancellor Kent, in delivering the opinion of'-the' court in Codwise. v. Gelston, as Chief Justice, observed, u that if- a* fund for the- payment of $ebts be created under an order or decree in chancery, and the creditors come in to avail themselves of it, the rule of equity then is, that they shall be £>aid in pari passu, or upon a footing of equality. But when the law giw ' a priority, equity will not destroy' it,, and especially -vfrhere legal assets are created by statute, as in case of a judgment lien, they remain so, though the creditors be obliged to go into equity for assistance. The legal priority will be protected and preserved in chancery.”

The settled rule, also, appears to be, that where the subject-matter of the suit in equity is real estate, and which is taken into the possession of the court pending the litigation, by the appointment of a receiver, or by sequestration, the titlé is bound from the filing of the bill; -and any purchaser, pendente lité, even if for a valuable consideration, conies in at his peril. 3 Swanst. 278, n., 298, n.; 2 Daniel’s Pr. 1267; 6 Ves. 287; 9 Id. 336; 1 J. & W. 178; 3 Daniel’s Pr. 1984.

It has been argued, that a sale of the premises oh execution and purchase, occasioned.no interference with tne- possession of the receiver, and hence no contempt of the authority of the court, and that the sale therefore, in such a case, should be upheld. But, conceding the’ proceedings did not disturb the possession of the receiver, the argument does not rheet. the objection. The property is a fund in court, to abide the event of the litigation, and to be applied to the payment of the judgment creditor, who has filed his bill' to remove impediments'-in the way of his execution. If he has succeeded in establishing •his right to the application "of any portion of the fund, it is the duty of the court to. see that such application is made. And, in order to effect this, the court must administer, it independently of any rights acquired by third persons, pending the litigation. Otherwise, the whole fund may have passed out of its hands before the final decree, and the litigation become fruitless.

It is true, in administering the fund’, the court will take care that'the rights of prior liens or encumbrances shall not be ’ destroyed; and will- adopt the proper measures;by reference to the master or otherwise, to ascertain them, and bring them before it. Unless the court be permitted to retain the possession of the fund, thus to administer it, how can it ascertain the interest in the same to which the prosecuting judgment creditor is entitled, and apply it upon his demand ?

There can be no difficulty in ascertaining the prior liens and encumbrances, as all of them, are matters of record. Several of the judgment creditors came in, in this case, and received their share in the distribution.

These two .judgment creditors had notice of the suit before the sale, and might. have ' made themselves -parties to it, and claimed application of the fund according to the priority of their liens.

They were also before the court, pending the litigation, on the petition of Dargan, who had purchased for their benefit, to have the possession of the receiver delivered up to the purchaser. There is no pretence, therefore, for saying that they have not had notice of the proceedings in .thé equity suit. • The prayer of the petition was denied, among other grounds, because their appropriate remedy was a motion to the court, founded on their judgments to have the proceeds of the sale under the decree .applied to them according to priority.

We agree, that the person holding the prior legal lien or encumbrance, must have notice, and an opportunity to come in and claim his prior right to the property or interest in the fund before his legal.right can be affected; and the proper way is by summons or notice upon the order or direction of the court-

This notice can be readily given on the report of tne master, of the prior liens or encumbrances resting upon the estate.

But it is-not necessary to go this length in the case before us, as it is sufficient to say, that the sale under the judgment; pending the equity-suit, and while the court was in possession of the estate .without the leave of the court, was illegal and void. We.do not doubt but that it would be compfetent for the court,'in case the judgment creditor holding the prior lien had hot come in and claimed his interest in the equity suit, to decree a sale in the final disposition of the fund subject to-bis judgment. The purchaser would then be bound to pay it off.' But .this disposition Of the legal prior encumbrance is a very different matter, and comes .to. a véry different result, from that of permitting the- enforcement of.it, pendente Ute, -without the leave of the court. The.rights of the several claimants to the estate or fund is then settled, and the purchase under the decree can be made, with-a full knowledge of the cohdition of the. titlg, or charges- to which it -may be subject.

Neither do we doubt but that it is competent, and might, in some cases, be fit and proper for the court, where the property in dispute is ample, and the litigation protracted, to permit the execution to issue, and compel the prosecuting creditor to pay off the judgment. 3 Beav. 428. But it is manifest that these proceedings, on behalf of the prior encumbrancer, should be under the control of the discretion of the court, as the condition of the title to the property may frequently be so complicated and embarrassed, that unless the sale was withheld until the title was cleared up by the judgment of the court, great sacrifice must necessarily ensue to the parties interested.

This case affords an apt illustration of the remark. The marshal’s sale was made under an arrangement that no rnmiey was to be paid by the purchaser, unless he succeeded in obtaining a title to the property under it. It is' obvious, therefore, if the purchase had been unconditional, and at the risk of the purchaser, it must have been bid off for a nominal consideration.

As we have already said, it is sufficient, for the disposition of this case, to hold, that while'the estate is in the custody of the court, as a fund to abide the result of a suit pending, no sale of the property can take place either on execution or otherwise, without the leave of the court for that purpose. And upon this ground, we hold that the sale by the marshal on the two judgments was illegal and void, and passed no, title to the purchaser;

.We are, also, inclined to think, that the question of title to the property under the marshal’s sale is concluded between these parties by the judgment of the court in the proceedings on the petition by the- purchaser for the removal of the receiver,- and to be let into the possession. This, we have seen, is the appropriate. remedy on behalf of a person claiming a paramount legal right to an estate which has been brought into the possession and safe keeping of the Court of Chancery, pending the litiga-, tion in respéct to it.

This proceeding Was explained by Lord Eldon in Angel v. Smith, (9 Ves. 335),.speaking of the rule in respect to sequestrators, and which he held was equally applicable in the case of. receivers. “ Where sequestrators,” he observed, are in possession under the process of the court, their possession is not-to be disturbed, even by a n adverse title, without leave: upon .this principle,-that the possession of the sequestrators is the possession of the court, and the court being competent to examine the title, will not permit itself to be made a suitor in a court of law, but Will itself examiné the title. And the mode is, by permitting the party to come in to be examined pro, interesse suo ; the practice being, to go before the master to state his title, and there is the; judgment of the master, and afterwards, if necessary, of the court upon it. See also 10 Beav. 318; 2 Daniel’s Pr. 1271; 2 Mad. 21; 1 P. Wms. 308.

An appeal to the House of Lords will lie from the order or decree of the Chancellor upon exceptions to the master’s report in the matter. 2 Daniel’s Pr. 1273; 3 Id. 1633, 1634.

In the petition to the Chancellor in the case before us, the purchaser set out his title at large under the marshal’s- sale, and. claimed the possession of the property by virtue of* his title, that the receiver might be removed, and the possession delivered to the petitioners.

The answer of “Wiswall set up his right to the property under the decree in the suit against Ticknor and Day.

The right of the petitioner, therefore, under his title to the possession of the property as against the right of Wiswall under the proceedings in equity and the. decree in his favor, would seem to be a question directly involved. The court so understood the issue and passed upon it, holding, as we hold in this case, that the sale was illegal and void, having been made while the estate was in the possession and safe keeping of the Court of Chancery. From this decision -an appeal wap taken to the “Supreme Court, where “'he order or decree of the court below was affirmed. 11 Ala. R. 938; Dargan v. Waring and others.

The question is one depending very much upon the local law of Alabama, and the judgment, therefore, in the matter, by the. highest court of the State, is entitled to the highest respect.

For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment of the court below was erroneous and must be reversed, and' the case remitted for further proceedings.

Order.

This cause c"ame on to be heard on tne transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whéreof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is. hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this court.