author: Per Ctjriam. Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    RINALDI v. UNITED STATES
    No. 76-6194.
    Decided November 7, 1977
   Per Ctjriam.

Petitioner’s participation in a plot to rob safe-deposit boxes of the Doral Beach Hotel in Miami Beach, Fla., violated the laws of both the State of Florida and the United States. He has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment by both sovereigns. He claims that his federal conviction was obtained in violation of established federal policy against multiple prosecutions for the same offense and, for that reason, should be set aside. The Solicitor General agrees and submits that the Court should summarily “vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.” Based on our independent evaluation of the unusual circumstances disclosed by this record, we conclude that such summary disposition is appropriate.

In February 1973, petitioner was charged with state offenses arising out of the Doral Beach Hotel robbery. In March 1973, an indictment was returned in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, charging him with conspiracy to affect interstate commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951. In May, petitioner was convicted of the state charges in the Dade County Circuit Court and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. A subsequent federal trial ended in a mistrial. Thereafter, the District Court questioned Government counsel regarding the need for another trial in view of petitioner’s state convictions. Government counsel responded that he had been instructed by his superiors at the Department of Justice to pursue the federal prosecution vigorously because of their concern that the state convictions might be reversed on appeal. After a second jury trial, petitioner was convicted on the Hobbs Act charge; the District Court imposed a 12-year sentence to run concurrently with the state sentence.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, petitioner argued that his conviction had been obtained in violation of a longstanding federal policy against multiple prosecutions for the same act. See Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529, 530 (1960). The Government acknowledged that its Petite policy had been violated and moved the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the District Court to permit it to seek a dismissal of the indictment. The Court of Appeals granted the motion to remand.

The Government then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48 (a). Noting that the Rule requires “leave of court,” the District Court denied the motion because (1) the motion was not made until after the trial had been completed; and (2) the prosecutor had acted in bad faith by representing to the District Court that he had been properly instructed to maintain the prosecution notwithstanding the fact that petitioner had already been convicted of a state offense. The Government, joined by petitioner and his codefendant Washington, appealed from the denial of the motion to dismiss.

A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, In re Washington, 531 F. 2d 1297 (1976). The Court of Appeals then granted a petition for rehearing en banc and, by a vote of 7 to 6, reaffirmed the panel’s holding. In re Washington, 544 F. 2d 203 (1976). All members of the court agreed that the Government’s motion to dismiss was timely, but they disagreed on the question whether the prosecutor’s bad faith justified the District Court’s refusal to set aside defendant’s conviction.

The majority was of the view that the Government’s unclean hands gave the District Court adequate reason to deny it relief, and that the defendant had no right to have an otherwise valid conviction dismissed simply because the Justice Department violated its own procedures. The dissenters were of the view that the District Court’s inquiry should have been limited to the propriety of the Government’s motivation in seeking a dismissal; under their view, the earlier misconduct was irrelevant and could not justify the judicial imposition of multiple convictions on the defendant.

The policy described in the Petite case limits the federal prosecutor in the exercise of his discretion to initiate, or to withhold, prosecution for federal crimes. The policy is useful to the efficient management of limited Executive resources and encourages local responsibility in law enforcement. But it also serves the more important purpose of protecting the citizen from any unfairness that is associated with successive prosecutions based on the same conduct.

In this respect, the policy represents the Government’s response to repeated expressions of concern by Members of this Court. In United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 383 (1922), for example, Mr. Chief Justice Taft quoted the following passage from Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 435 (1847):

“It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the state and federal sys-terns are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor.”

What has come to be known as the Petite policy was formulated by the Justice Department in direct response to this Court’s opinions in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121 (1959), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959), holding that the Constitution does not deny the State and Federal Governments the power to prosecute for the same act. As these decisions recognize, in our federal system the State and Federal Governments have legitimate, but not necessarily identical, interests in the prosecution of a person for acts made criminal under the laws of both. These cases reflect the concern that if the Double Jeopardy Clause were applied when the sovereign with the greater interest is not the first to proceed, the administration of criminal justice may suffer. Bartkus v. Illinois, supra, at 137; Abbate v. United States, supra, at 195. Yet mindful of the potential for abuse in a rule permitting duplicate prosecutions, the Court noted that “[t]he greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with which a court is in little sympathy.” Bartkus v. Illinois, supra, at 138.

In response to the Court’s continuing sensitivity to the fairness implications of the multiple prosecution power, the Justice Department adopted the policy of refusing to bring a federal prosecution following a state prosecution except when necessary to advance compelling interests of federal law enforcement. The Petite policy was designed to limit the exercise of the power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to situations comporting with the rationale for the existence of that power. Although not constitutionally mandated, this Executive policy serves to protect interests which, but for the “dual sovereignty” principle inherent in our federal system, would be embraced by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In light of the parallel purposes of the Government’s Petite policy and the fundamental constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, the federal courts should be receptive, not circumspect, when the Government seeks leave to implement that policy.

Here, the Government filed a motion under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48 (a) seeking “leave of court” to dismiss the federal charges against petitioner. Under the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, the District Court was empowered to withhold leave if the Government’s decision to terminate this prosecution clearly disserved the public interest. United States v. Cowan, 524 F. 2d 504, 513 (CA5 1975). Pursuant to the instructions of a superior at the Justice Department, Government trial counsel represented to the District Court that the United States had decided to vigorously prosecute the federal charges against petitioner in spite of the prior state prosecution. In fact, however, the federal prosecution had not been authorized as required by the Government’s Petite policy. The Court of Appeals considered the prosecutor’s representations incompatible with the public interest in preserving the integrity of the courts. The salient issue, however, is not whether the decision to maintain the federal prosecution was made in bad faith but rather whether the Government’s later efforts to terminate the prosecution were similarly tainted with impropriety. Our examination of the record has not disclosed (and we will not presume) bad faith on the part of the Government at the time it sought leave to dismiss the indictment against petitioner. The decision to terminate this prosecution, based as it was on the Petite policy, was motivated by considerations which cannot fairly be characterized as “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.” 524 F. 2d, at 513.

The overriding purpose of the Petite policy is to protect the individual from any unfairness associated with needless multiple prosecutions. The defendant, therefore, should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the Government. Without derogating from the concern expréssed by the Court of Appeals regarding the actions of certain Government officials at an earlier stage in this prosecution, we agree with the Solicitor General that “ [n] o action by the Department or the Court can now replace the waste of judicial and prosecutorial resources expended in obtaining petitioner’s conviction . . . [and] no societal interest would be vindicated by punishing further a defendant who has already been convicted and has received a substantial sentence in state court and who, the Department has determined, should not have been prosecuted by the federal government.”

It was, therefore, an abuse of the discretion of the District Court to refuse to grant the Government’s motion on the ground that the violation of the Petite policy in this case resulted from prosecutorial misconduct rather than inadvertence. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for the purpose of dismissing the indictment.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissents.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Mr. Justice White joins, dissenting.

In Watts v. United States, 422 U. S. 1032 (1975), this Court, with three Justices dissenting, remanded a federal criminal case with instructions to dismiss the indictment because of the concession of the Solicitor General that the Justice Department had accidentally violated its own Petite policy. See also Ackerson v. United States, 419 U. S. 1099 (1975); Hayles v. United States, 419 U. S. 892 (1974). Whatever may be the propriety of our assisting in the enforcement of the Justice Department’s internal Petite policy, the Court today places its imprimatur on a quite different and unsettling prosecu-torial policy. Under this new policy, the Government prosecutes under federal laws individuals who have already been tried and convicted of violating similar state laws in order to protect against the possibility of the state convictions’ being reversed on appeal, but the policy contemplates that the federal prosecutions will be dismissed, even after entry of guilty verdicts, if the state convictions are ultimately affirmed. According to the Court of Appeals:

“[T]he Government attorney conceded that a ‘responsible person’ within the Department of Justice . . . was aware that the Petite Policy was being violated through its prosecution of defendants, but nevertheless, out of his fear that the state convictions would be reversed on appeal, instructed the trial attorney to proceed with the case; only after a Florida appellate court affirmed the state convictions and after defendants raised the Petite Policy on appeal did the Government move for dismissal. . . . [According to the Government attorney], the position of the Department of Justice is not that the prosecution should never have been brought, but that once the state convictions had been affirmed the Government could properly have moved to dismiss the federal indictment against defendants. Indeed,, he states that had permission to prosecute been sought from an Assistant Attorney General by the ‘responsible person’ in charge of the case, it might well have been given and hence, there would have been no violation of the Petite Policy. Had that event occurred, ... it would have then been absolutely proper, once the Florida appellate court affirmed the state conviction on appeal, for the Department of Justice to rescind, retroactively, its authorization of the prosecution and now, finding the Petite Policy to have been violated by a federal trial for an offense for which a state prosecution was made, to seek a dismissal based on this violation of the policy and the interest against duplicitous prosecutions that it seeks to promote.” In re Washington, 544 F. 2d 203, 207.

Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 48 (a) allows the United States to move to dismiss an indictment only “by leave of court.” This proviso was specifically added as an amendment to the original draft, which had provided for automatic dismissal upon the motion of the United States, and would seem clearly directed toward an independent judicial assessment of the public interest in dismissing the indictment. Cf. United States v. Cowan, 524 F. 2d 504 (CA5 1975). Here, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that dismissal would not be in the public interest. I cannot find this conclusion an abuse of the discretion given the lower courts by Rule 48 (a). As the Court of Appeals reasoned, “the Government’s attempt to manipulate the use of judicial time and resources through its capricious, inconsistent application of its own policy clearly constitutes bad faith and a violation of the public interest; our sanction of such conduct would invite future misconduct by the Government.” 544 F. 2d, at 209.

In the past, the Court has ordered indictments dismissed upon the Government’s concession that it violated its own Petite policy without discussing the justification for its action. Here, in its first full opinion on the subject, the Court again fails to enunciate why federal courts must reverse a valid conviction because of the Government’s admission of administrative error not going to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Cf. Watts, supra, at 1032-1038 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). The apparent inability of the Court to agree on a rationale for enforcing the Government’s Petite policy at its request suggests that this case is inappropriate for summary disposition and should be set for full argument.

       Memorandum for United States 9.

       The state offenses were conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and carrying a concealed weapon.

       Section 1951 provides in part:
      “(a) Whoever in any way or degree . . . affects commerce ... by robbery ... or conspires so to do . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”

       He was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy to commit robbery and grand larceny counts and a consecutive term of one year’s imprisonment on the weapons count. On the State’s confession of error, petitioner’s conviction of conspiracy to commit grand larceny was reversed on appeal. His convictions on the other two counts were affirmed. See Scaldeferri v. State, 294 So. 2d 407 (Fla. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Pompeo v. State, 303 So. 2d 21 (Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Washington v. Florida, 419 U. S. 993 (1974).

       The Petite policy is most frequently applied against duplicating federal-state prosecutions. As stated by the Department of Justice, under that policy a federal trial following a state prosecution for the same act or acts is barred “unless the reasons are compelling.” A United States Attorney contemplating a federal prosecution in these circumstances is required to obtain authorization from an appropriate Assistant Attorney General. In this case, the Justice Department official who instructed trial counsel to insist upon a retrial had not obtained the requisite approval.
      But, as the Petite case itself illustrates, the policy also encompasses successive federal prosecutions arising out of the same transaction. In that case, the Solicitor General represented that “it is the general policy of the Federal Government ‘that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement.’ The Solicitor General on behalf of the Government represents this policy as closely related to that against duplicating federal-state prosecutions, which was formally defined by the Attorney General of the United States in a memorandum to the United States Attorneys. (Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 6, 1959).” 361 U. S., at 530-531.

       Rule 48 (a) states:
      “The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.”

       See n. 5, supra.

       The prior-authorization requirement in the Petite policy ensures that the Department of Justice will normally make the “compelling reasons” determination prior to commencement of the federal prosecution. On occasion, however, a prosecution is initiated and a conviction obtained in violation of the policy. When the Solicitor General has discovered such a violation in a case pending before this Court, he has sought to remedy it by moving to have the case remanded to allow the Government to dismiss the indictment. Exercising our power to afford relief which is “just under the circumstances,” 28 U. S. C. § 2106, we have granted the Government’s motion on several occasions. See Watts v. United States, 422 U. S. 1032 (1975); Ackerson v. United States, 419 U. S. 1099 (1975); Hayles v. United States, 419 U. S. 892 (1974); Cf. Redmond v. United

        States, 384 U. S. 264 (1966); Marakar v. United States, 370 U. S. 723 (1962); Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529 (1960).

       The majority described the Government’s bad faith in the following terms:
      “In this case, an unidentified, but responsible, official within the Department authorized a federal prosecution with full knowledge that such a prosecution was forbidden by the Petite Policy. For the Government to attempt to dismiss by arguing that no compelling reason now exists for a separate federal conviction, when the considerations that allegedly imply a lack of 'compelling reason’ were known as fully to the Government throughout both federal trials as now, does, for this court, constitute bad faith.” 544 F. 2d, at 208.

       The majority stated:
      “The fact that the Justice Department is now reconsidering its original decision to prosecute does not vest defendants with any right to have an otherwise valid conviction dismissed. . . . While a determination of such a motion obviously affects defendants, it is not a defendant’s interest in avoiding a validly obtained conviction that we weigh in our examination of the propriety of . . . [the District Court’s] order.” Id., at 209.

       They stated:
      “[T]he withholding of leave [to dismiss] in this case was not justified. The motive of the prosecutor in moving for dismissal was based upon the Petite Policy which is not contrary to the public interest. The prosecutor may have acted in the conduct of the entire litigation in a manner not consistent with the public interest, but his motion to dismiss should not be tainted with that prior activity.” Id., at 213 (emphasis in original).

       The dissenters also questioned the logic of the majority’s “bad faith” rationale:
      “[I]n what has been determined and, indeed, confessed to have been bad faith, the government persisted in a prosecution and obtained, as a result of that bad faith, convictions. The majority holds today that, in order not to 'invite future misconduct by the Government,’ we insist that the government be rewarded with the very convictions that it obtained through bad faith prosecutions and, we deny government counsel the right at long last to recant and in good faith dismiss the indictment.” Id., at 210-211.

       In announcing the policy, Attorney General Rogers stated:
      “Cooperation between federal and state prosecutive officers is essential if the gears of the federal and state systems are to mesh properly. We should continue to make every effort to cooperate with state and local authorities to the end that the trial occur in the jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the public interest is best served. If this be determined accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent cooperation of state and federal law enforcement authorities, then consideration of a second prosecution very seldom should arise.” Dept, of Justice Press Release, Apr. 6, 1959, p. 3.

       At the heart of the policy announced by Attorney General Rogers was the statement:
      “It is our duty to observe not only the rulings of the Court but the spirit of the rulings as well. In effect, the Court said that although the rule of the Lanza case is sound law, enforcement officers should use care in applying it.
      “Applied indiscriminately and with bad judgment it, like most rules of law, could cause considerable hardship. Applied wisely it is a rule that is in the public interest. Consequently — as the Court clearly indicated — those of us charged with law enforcement responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and with self-restraint in this area.” Ibid.

       The words “leave of court” were inserted in Rule 48 (a) without explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the “leave of court” requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecu-torial harassment, e. g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when, the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection. See, e. g., United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5), cert. denied, sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U. S. 935 (1965); Woodring v. United States, 311 F. 2d 417, 424 (CA8), cert. denied, sub nom. Felice v. United States, 373 U. S. 913 (1963). But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F. 2d 504 (CA5 1975); United States v. Ammidown, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 28, 33, 497 F. 2d 615, 620 (1973). It is unnecessary to decide whether the court has discretion under these circumstances, since, even assuming it does, the result in this case remains the same.

       In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the remarks of a Government attorney during oral argument. Attempting to rebut the charge that the “responsible person” in the Justice Department who authorized this prosecution showed bad faith by not seeking the approval of the Attorney General, the Government attorney apparently contended it would be proper to continue a federal prosecution until the integrity of a prior state conviction was assured and then to seek dismissal of the federal charges. If counsel’s argument represented the position of the United States, it would indeed mark a departure from the Petite policy. But we are persuaded that counsel’s overzealous attempt to rationalize the prior conduct of the prosecution did not signal a new Executive policy on multiple prosecutions. The Solicitor General unequivocally states that the Government has strictly adhered to the Petite policy since its announcement in 1959. Memorandum for United States 3, 7. The Solicitor General represents further that the Government sought dismissal of the indictment in this case because it discovered on appeal from petitioner’s federal conviction that the prosecution was initiated and maintained without the prior authorization required by the Petite policy. Id., at 3, 6-7. There is no suggestion in this case that the Assistant Attorney General charged with enforcement of the Petite policy was cognizant of the violation until shortly before the Government’s request for leave to dismiss the indictment. In these circumstances, we cannot accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the Government’s decision to dismiss the indictment was made in bad faith.

       The Court of Appeals thought it necessary to deprive petitioner of the policy’s benefit in order to deter future misconduct by Government attorneys. As did the dissenters below, we fail to see how rewarding those responsible for the Petite policy violation with a conviction serves to deter prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, a result which leaves intact a conviction obtained through a prosecution tainted by bad faith may encourage repetition of the impropriety disclosed by the record in this case.

      The Solicitor General does not contradict or repudiate the position of the Government attorney who argued before the Court of Appeals. Under such circumstances, this Court should not casually reject the Court of Appeals’ understanding of the position of the Department of Justice in this case, an understanding that the dissenters there apparently shared. According to the Solicitor General, when the Government’s appellate counsel was informed that the prosecutor had not strictly followed the Justice Department’s Petite policy, further consideration was given to the case within the Department and “it was determined that there were no compelling reasons to justify retroactive authorization of petitioner’s prosecution.” Memorandum for United States 3 (emphasis added). By this time, as the Court of Appeals noted, the state conviction was safely affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Blackmun Me. Justice Stewart,

license: Public Domain

text:
    CITIZENS & SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK v. BOUGAS
    No. 76-398.
    Argued October 3, 1977
    Decided November 8, 1977
    BlacKmüN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stewart, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 45.

      William, C. Humphreys, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Daniel B. Hodgson.

      Michael J. Kovacich argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents an issue of state-court venue of a transitory cause of action against a national bank. The .suit Was filed in the state court of the county of the branch and not in the court of the different county specified in the bank’s charter.

The governing statute is Rev. Stat. § 5198, 12 U. S. C. § 94:

“Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”

The dispute obviously centers in the word “located” as it is employed in the statute.

I

Petitioner Citizens and Southern National Bank is a national banking association. It received its charter from the Comptroller of the Currency on May 2, 1927. The “place where its operations . . . are to be carried on,” is described in that charter as the “City of Savannah, in the County of Chatham and State of Georgia.” App. 13. For some time now, however, the bank has done business not only at Savannah but also at branches, authorized under 12 U. S. C. § 36, in other Georgia counties. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. One of these branches is at Decatur in De Kalb County. See United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 422 U. S. 86, 92 n. 4, 94 (1975). De Kalb County adjoins Fulton County; the city of Atlanta lies in both.

In late June 1975 respondent Bougas sued petitioner bank. His complaint was filed in the state court of De Kalb County. He sought actual and punitive damages for an alleged conversion of a $25,000 savings certificate issued to respondent and deposited by him as collateral for his son’s note on which respondent had signed as surety.

The bank accompanied its answer to the complaint with a motion to dismiss respondent’s suit “on the grounds of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over Defendant.” App. 9. It asserted that a national bank may be sued in a state court only “in the county in which its charter was issued,” that is, for petitioner, only in Chatham County. Ibid. The De Kalb County Court denied that motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. A5. The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the bank’s application for interlocutory appeal, but in due course affirmed. 138 Ga. App. 706, 227 S. E. 2d 434 (1976). We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1071 (1977), in order to resolve an apparent conflict, hereinafter noted, among state courts in their construction of the word “located” in 12 U. S. C. § 94, when a defendant national bank is conducting banking business at an authorized branch outside its charter county.

Two issues are suggested by the parties: (1) Where is a national bank “located,” within the meaning of § 94, for purposes of a transitory action brought in a state court, when it conducts banking business at an authorized branch outside its charter county? (2) In any event, does its conduct of banking business at the branch constitute a waiver, actual or presumptive, of any venue restriction § 94 otherwise imposes? We decide the case adversely to the bank on the first issue and do not reach the question of waiver.

II

This Court has had prior occasion to consider § 94. It is now settled that the statute’s provision concerning venue in state courts, despite the presence of what might be regarded as permissive language, “is not permissive, but mandatory, and, therefore, 'that national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located.’ ” National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, 461 (1976), quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 561 (1963). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 152 (1976); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, 467 (1947). The venue provision, however, has been held to be a privilege personal to the bank, and to be subject to waiver. Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, 145 (1889); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 561, and n. 12.

In our view, this language of command does not in itself equate the statute’s word “located” with the county designated in the bank’s organization certificate and in its formal charter. Petitioner insists that the Court’s reference in Langdeau to the effect that a ruling that would recognize state jurisdictional and venue requirements “would render altogether meaningless a congressional enactment permitting suit to bo brought in the bank’s home county,” id., at 560, “implicitly entails the conclusion that a national bank cannot also be sued in any county wherein it operates branch banks.” Brief for Petitioner 17. This, however, overstates the language and holding in Langdeau, a case that did not concern authorized branch banking at all. Langdeau is only the starting point, not the conclusion, for the resolution of the present case.

Ill

A. The lower federal courts appear to be unanimous in holding that a national bank, under § 94, is “established” only in the federal district that encompasses the place specified in the bank’s charter. E. g., Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19, 21-22 (CA2), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677 (1936); Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F. 2d 798, 799-800 (CA5 1973). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, § 220a (4) (1973 ed.); 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.144 [2.-1], p. 1473 (2d ed. 1977). This rule, however, is not without its scholarly criticism. See Steinberg, Waiver of Venue under the National Bank Act: Preferential Treatment for National Banks, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 129 (1976); Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A Procedural Anachronism, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 179 (1973); Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 765 (1966); ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 77, 412-413 (1969). See also Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F. 2d 852, 855 (CA3 1973).

We are not concerned in the present case, however, with this federal aspect of venue, and we have no occasion here to review these rulings.

B. We note in the decided state cases no less than three diverse interpretations of § 94:

1. Several rulings consider the words “established” and “located” to be functionally synonymous. Absent waiver, these cases restrict a state-court action against a national bank to the place designated in the bank’s charter. E. g., Ebeling v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 724, 726-727, 77 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1969); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons, Inc. v. Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N. Y. S. 2d 790, 791 (1966); Prince v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 62 Misc. 2d 855, 310 N. Y. S. 2d 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, § 220b (1973 ed.).

2. In contrast, other decisions hold that “established” and “located” are not synonymous. For state-court purposes, it is said, a bank may be “located” in any place where it operates and maintains a branch doing general banking business, even though, for federal-court purposes, it is “established” only at the place specified in its charter. E. g., Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 281 N. C. 525, 532, 189 S. E. 2d 266, 271 (1972); Holson v. Gosnell, 264 S. C. 619, 623, 216 S. E. 2d 539, 541 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1048 (1976); Central Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 971, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (1973). The Georgia Court of Appeals in the present litigation so interpreted § 94. 138 Ga. App., at 709, 227 S. E. 2d, at 436.

3. Still other courts conclude that by establishing a branch in a county other than that designated in its charter, a national bank presumptively waives any venue restriction of § 94, at least as to a suit arising out of banking activity at that branch. Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 193-195, 240 A. 2d 90, 94-95, cert. denied sub nom. First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lapinsohn, 393 U. S. 952 (1968); Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., supra (alternative ground). See Vann v. First Nat. Bank, 324 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. App. 1975), and Exchange Nat. Bank v. Rotocast Plastics Products, Inc., 341 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. App. 1977).

These inconsistent approaches cannot all be appropriately interpretive of § 94. We therefore look to the legislative history to see what light it may afford.

IV

This Court reviewed that history, so far as it concerned the state-court venue provision, in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 558-562. There the Court noted: (a) “Unquestionably Congress had authority to prescribe the manner and circumstances under which [national] banks could sue or be sued in the courts,” id., at 559. (b) The “roots” of the venue problem “reach back to” the National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665. 371 U. S., at 558. (c) Section 59 of the 1863 Act, 12 Stat. 681, spoke only of suits in a federal court “within the district in which the association was established” and made no mention of suits in state courts, 371 U. S., at 559. (d) The 1863 Act was replaced shortly by the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99, ch. 106, which, in its § 57, “carried forward the former § 59 and also added” the provision that “ 'suits . . . may be had ... in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases,’ ” 371 U. S., at 560. (e) “Congress intended that in those courts alone could a national bank be sued against its will,” ibid. (f) Although § 57 was omitted from Title 62 (National Banks) of the Revised Statutes of 1873, Title 13 (the Judiciary) contained provisions, § 563 Fifteenth, “granting the federal courts jurisdiction over suits by and against national banks brought in the district of their residence,” 371 U. S., at 560. And (g) the Act of February 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 320, added to § 5198 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 “provisions substantially identical to § 57 of the 1864 Act,” and thus, “for a second time Congress specified the precise federal and state courts in which suits against national banks could be brought,” 371 U.S., at 560-561.

The conclusions drawn by the Court from Langdeau’s review of the history of § 94’s state-court venue provision were the obvious ones already noted: “[N]ational banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located,” 371 U. S., at 561, and “the statute must be given a mandatory reading,” id., at 562. This is not to say, however— and the Court in Langdeau did not say — that § 94’s pivotal word “located,” in a branch banking context, would mean and be restricted to the place designated in the bank’s charter. What the Court in Langdeau specifically held was that § 94 prevailed, on a plea of privilege, over a state venue statute that would have permitted suit in an outside county where a receivership proceeding for an allegedly defrauded insurance company was pending. Langdeau in no way hampers our consideration of the branch banking problem.

There can be little question, as petitioner argues, Brief for Petitioner 14, that at the time the 1864 Act was passed, the activities of a national bank were restricted to one particular location. That Act’s provisions to the effect that the organization certificate (as 12 U. S. C. § 22 also requires today) shall specifically state “the particular county and city, town, or village” of its place of operations, 13 Stat. 101, and that the bank’s “usual business shall be transacted at an office or banking house located in the place specified in its organization certificate,” 13 Stat. 102 (cf. 12 U. S. C. § 81), indicated as much. National banks (other, perhaps, than those that originally were state banks with existing branches) were not permitted to engage in branch banking until 1927, when the McFadden Act, 44 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1224, was passed; moreover, the McFadden Act allowed national banks to “establish” branches only if permitted by state law, and only “within the limits of the city, town, or village in which said association is situated,” id., at 1228. It was not until 1933 that Congress approved, upon specified conditions, national bank branches beyond the place named in the charter. 48 Stat. 189-190.

Petitioner argues that since a national bank in 1864 was permitted only one “location,” namely, that specified in the charter, “there is no statutory basis for interpreting the word ‘located’ as having multi-county reference.” Brief for Petitioner 15. It says that one may not presume “that the Congress anticipated by some sixty years the advent of multi-county branch banking and formulated its statutory language accordingly.” Ibid.

We need not travel that far analytically in determining congressional intent. It suffices to stress that Congress did not contemplate today’s national banking system, replete with branches, when it formulated the 1864 Act; that there are no sure indicators of 1864 congressional intent with respect to a banking system that did not then exist; and that prior to 1927, and, indeed, prior to 1933, Congress had no occasion whatsoever to be concerned with state-court venue other than at the place designated in the bank’s charter. Throughout this early period, the words “established” and “located” led to the same ultimate venue result.

Nevertheless, the two words are different. One must concede that a federal judicial district, which the statute associates with the word “established,” is not the same as the geographical area that delineates the jurisdiction of a state court, which the statute associates with “located.” Whatever the reason behind the distinction in the words, it does exist, and we recognize it. In fact, in Langdeau, the Court did not coalesce the two terms but said that “national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located,” 371 U. S., at 561.

There is no enduring rigidity about the word “located.” What Congress was concerned with was the untoward interruption of a national bank’s business that might result from compelled production of bank records for distant litigation. Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S., at 145; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 561-562, n. 12. That concern largely evaporates when the venue of a state-court suit coincides with the location of an authorized branch. It is also diminished by improvements in data processing and transportation.

V

Finally, we do not share petitioner’s proposition that, for still another reason, the words “established” and “located,” although different, may not have dichotomous meanings. Petitioner notes the appearance of “any” and “the” in § 94, and argues that the former suggests a potential plurality, whereas the definite article modifies nouns that are singular and denote a unique geographical status. Petitioner then asserts that from this grammatical construction of the statute it may be concluded that if Congress had intended a plurality of places where a national bank could be located, it would have substituted “any” for “the,” or at least would have employed plural nouns rather than singular ones.

This dissection of the face of the statute is possible argumentation. But petitioner does not proffer it as anything more than that. It is certainly not persuasive in itself, and our experience with the inexactitude of congressional language, an inexactitude that perhaps often is inevitable — see, for example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395 (1975) — does not convince us that much weight can be attached to the use of “any” and “the,” respectively, in § 94.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia is

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

The Court’s opinion, despite its disclaimer, may be read by some to imply approval of the view that, for purposes of federal-court venue under 12 U. S. C. § 94, a national bank is “established” only in the district that includes its charter county. See ante, at 39-41, 44, 45. I have serious doubt that the cases so holding were correctly decided, and in any event this question remains an open one here.

Today we decide only that for purposes of state-court venue under § 94 a national bank is “located” in any county in which it has a branch bank. There is no need in this case to consider the meaning of the word “established” in § 94, or to draw any contrast between the words “established” and “located.” It is upon this understanding that I join the opinion of the Court.

       The word “located” appears in at least two other federal statutes concerning national banks:
      Title 28 U. S. C. § 1394 provides:
      “Any civil action by a national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any Act of Congress relating to such associations, may be prosecuted in the judicial district where such association is located.”
      And 28 U. S. C. § 1348 reads:
      “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
      “All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”
      See First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504 (1920), and Herrmann v. Edwards, 238 U. S. 107 (1915), for comments upon the history of these respective statutes.

       Title 12 U. S. C. § 22 reads in part:
      “The persons uniting to form such an association shall, under their hands, make an organization certificate, which shall specifically state:
      “Second. The place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, designating the State, Territory, or District, and the particular county and city, town, or village.”

       The Supreme Court of Georgia, with one justice dissenting, denied certiorari. App. to Pet. for Cert. A8. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, with two justices dissenting. Id., at A9.

       The Court long ago perceived a “local-action exception” to this rule. Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66, 67-68 (1880). See National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, 461-462, n. (1976); Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591, 593 (1963). The exception, however, as Casey v. Adams itself acknowledges, 102 U. S., at 67, does not apply to an ordinary transitory action. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 561 n. 11 (1963).

       At oral argument petitioner acknowledged that Langdeau “is not determinative of the issue.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15.

         In a number of federal cases the words “established” and “located” have been regarded as essentially the same. E. g., Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19, 21-22 (CA2), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677 (1936); Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F. 2d 798, 799 (CA5 1973); Fisher v. First Nat. Bank, 538 F. 2d 1284, 1286-1287 (CA7 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); United States Nat. Bank v. Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019, 1020 (CA9 1970). See 7A Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 15, §220a (4) (1973 ed.). These cases, however, necessarily were concerned with the word “established” and not with “located.” None dealt with the issue of venue of a state-court suit against a national bank in a county in which the bank was operating only a branch.

       The addition was:
      “That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this title may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
      See Third Nat. Bank v. Impac, Ltd., 432 U. S. 312, 316-318 (1977); id., at 325-327 (dissenting opinion).

       Petitioner argues that the failure of Congress to change § 94 when it approved branch banking 'demonstrates a congressional intent to restrict venue to the charter county. Brief for Petitioner 15-16, n. 28. We do not find this argument persuasive; petitioner offers nothing to the effect that Congress even considered venue when it authorized branch banking in 1927 and 1933.

       One may argue, of course, that the concern also should evaporate with respect to a federal suit at the place of the branch. That issue is not before us. In any event, as has been stated above, we have no occasion here to disturb the consistent authority relating to federal venue.

       This interpretation of § 94 will not inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation in violation of any congressional policy. We recognize that Congress adopts venue provisions in part for the convenience of the parties. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340 (1953) (interpreting 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a)). Litigation of this dispute in De Kalb County inconveniences no one to any real degree. Respondent chose to file his suit there. Petitioner has established a permanent business there, taking advantage of the commerce of the community. Its attorneys have their offices in adjoining Fulton County, part of the Atlanta metropolitan area. Litigation in De Kalb County cannot be more inconvenient than litigation in Chatham County, the place of chartering, some 200 miles away.

      The first case to decide the question, Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19 (CA2), relied primarily on a First Circuit decision holding that a national bank chartered in New York was not “located” in Puerto Rico, where it operated a branch bank, for purposes of taxation of the bank’s shares, National City Bank v. Domenech, 71 F. 2d 13, and on the general provision for corporate venue which at that time limited venue to the district of incorporation. See 1 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.141 [4], p. 1352 (2d ed. 1977). Neither analogy compelled the Second Circuit’s conclusion. Subsequent cases have not amplified Leonardi’s reasoning. See United States Nat. Bank v. Hill, 434 F. 2d 1019 (CA9), and cases cited therein.


author: Mr. Justice Stevens

text:
    CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. JOBST
    No. 76-860.
    Argued October 4, 1977
    Decided November 8, 1977

      Stephen L. TJrbanczyk argued the cause pro hac vice for appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, and William Kanter.

      J. D. Riff el argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion, of the Court.

The question presented is whether Congress has the power to require that a dependent child's social security benefits terminate upon marriage even though his spouse is permanently disabled. Answering that question in the negative, the District Court held that 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (d) (1) (D) and 402 (d) (5) deprive appellee of property without due process of law. Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909. We reverse.

Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He qualified for child’s insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his father died. In 1970 he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal Act, the statute required the Secretary to terminate his benefits.

Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary’s action. The District Court held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, because all child’s insurance beneficiaries are not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who marry other social security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently. The court held this distinction irrational. 368 F. Supp., at 913.

The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1262. Noting that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, this Court remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of that program. Weinberger v. Jobst, 419 U. S. 811. The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 1089.

Although the District Court focused on the statutory consequences of a marriage between two disabled persons, the Secretary argues that the relevant statutory classification is much broader. We therefore first describe the statutory scheme, then consider the validity of a general requirement that benefits payable to a wage earner’s dependent terminate upon marriage, and finally decide whether such a general requirement is invalidated by an exception limited to marriages between persons who are both receiving benefits.

I

As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old and a death benefit payable to the estate of a wage earner who died at an earlier age. 49 Stat. 622-624. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners. See 53 Stat. 1362, 1364-1366. The benefits were intended to provide persons dependent on the wage earner with protection against the economic hardship occasioned by loss of the wage earner’s support. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185-186. Generally speaking, therefore, the categories of secondary beneficiaries were defined to include persons who were presumed to be dependent on the wage earner at the time of his death, disability, or retirement.

Specifically, the child’s benefit as authorized in 1939 was available only to a child who was unmarried, under 18, and dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death or retirement. 53 Stat. 1364. Since Mr. Jobst was 23 at the time of his father’s death, he would not have been eligible for a child’s benefit under the 1939 Act. Under that statute, the child’s benefit, like the benefits for widows and parents, terminated upon marriage. 53 Stat. 1364-1366.

In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child’s benefit to include those who, like Mr. Jobst, were under a disability which began before age 18. For such a person the benefit continued beyond the age of 18 but, as with other secondary benefits, it terminated upon marriage.

In 1958, Congress adopted the amendment that created the basis for Mr. Jobst’s constitutional attack. The amendment provided that marriage would not terminate a child’s disability benefit if the child married a person who was also entitled to benefits under the Act. See 72 Stat. 1030-1031. A similar dispensation was granted to widows, widowers, divorced wives, and parents. In each case the secondary benefit survives a marriage to another beneficiary, but any other marriage — even to a disabled person unable to provide the beneficiary with support — is a terminating event unaffected by the 1958 amendment.

It was the failure of Congress in 1958 to create a larger class of marriages that do not terminate the child's benefit for disabled persons that the District Court found irrational.

II

The provision challenged in this case is part of a complex statutory scheme designed to administer a trust fund financed, in large part, by taxes levied on the wage earners who are the primary beneficiaries of the fund. The entitlement of any secondary beneficiary is predicated on his or her relationship to a contributing wage earner. If the statutory requirements for eligibility are met, the amount of the benefit is unrelated to the actual need of the beneficiary. See, e. g., Mathews v. De Castro, supra, at 185-186. The statute is designed to provide the wage earner and the dependent members of his family with protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings; it is not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons. Califano v. Coldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 213-214 (opinion of Brennan, J.).

Nor has Congress made actual dependency on the wage earner either a sufficient or a necessary condition of eligibility in every case. Instead of requiring individualized proof on a case-by-case basis, Congress has elected to use simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine probable dependency. A child who is married or over 18 and neither disabled nor a student is denied benefits because Congress has assumed that such a child is not normally dependent on his parents. There is no question about the power of Congress to legislate on the basis of such factual assumptions. General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776.

Of course, a general rule may not define the benefited class by reference to a distinction which irrationally differentiates between identically situated persons. Differences in race, religion, or political affiliation could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for social security benefits, for such differences are totally irrelevant to the question whether one person is economically dependent on another. But a distinction between married persons and unmarried persons is of a different character.

Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an important change in economic status. Traditionally, the event not only creates a new family with attendant new responsibilities, but also modifies the pre-existing relationships between the bride and groom and their respective families. Frequently, of course, financial independence and marriage do not go hand in hand. Nevertheless, there can be no question about the validity of the assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent on his parents for support than one who is unmarried.

Since it was rational for Congress to assume that marital status is a relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule which obtained before 1958, terminating all child’s benefits when the beneficiary married, satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S., at 185; Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, and cases cited at 768-770. That general rule is not rendered invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened thereby. For the marriage rule cannot be criticized as merely an unthinking response to stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group, or as an attempt to interfere with the' individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as marriage.

The general rule, terminating upon marriage the benefits payable to a secondary beneficiary, is unquestionably valid.

Ill

The question that remains is whether the 1958 amendment invalidates this general rule by carving out an exception for marriages between beneficiaries.

The exception does create a statutory classification, but it is not as narrow as that described by the District Court. The District Court identified the relevant classification as one distinguishing between (1) the marriage of a disabled beneficiary to another disabled person who is receiving social security benefits and (2) the marriage of a disabled beneficiary to another disabled person who is not receiving benefits. It is true that persons in the former category are treated more favorably than those in the latter category. It is also true that persons in the latter category may have as great a need for benefits as those in the former category. But it is not correct to conclude, as the District Court did, that only disabled persons are affected by the exception, or that the legislative classification is wholly irrational.

Both the class of persons favored by the 1958 amendment and the class which remains subject to the burdens of the general marriage rule include persons who are not disabled. The broad legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on selected, atypical examples. When so judged, both the exception and its limits are valid.

The 1958 amendment reflects a legislative judgment that a marriage between two persons receiving benefits will not normally provide either spouse with protection against the economic hardship that would be occasioned by the termination of benefits. The Secretary submits, and we agree, that it was reasonable for Congress to ameliorate the severity of the earlier rule by protecting both spouses from the dual hardship which it effected.

Mr. Jobst argues, however, that the reason for the amendment applies equally to his situation. He urges that his hardship is just as great as that which the amendment avoids when one beneficiary marries another, because his spouse is also disabled. He therefore attacks the exception as irrationally underinclusive. We are persuaded, however, that, even if the benign purpose of the 1958 amendment encompasses this case, legitimate reasons justify the limits that Congress placed on it. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78. The exception, like the general rule itself, is simple to administer. It requires no individualized inquiry into degrees of hardship or need. It avoids any necessity for periodic review of the beneficiaries’ continued entitlement. In the cases to which the exception does apply, it is a reliable indicator of probable hardship. Since the test is one that may be applied without introducing any new concepts into the administration of the trust fund, Congress could reasonably take one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the general marriage rule without accomplishing its entire objective in the same piece of legislation. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489. Even if it might have been wiser to take a larger step, the step Congress did take was in the right direction and had no adverse impact on persons like the Jobsts.

It is true, as Mr. Jobst urges, that the limited exception may have an impact on a secondary beneficiary’s desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others. But unless Congress should entirely repudiate marriage as a terminating event, that criticism will apply to any limited exception to the general rule. No one suggests that Congress was motivated by antagonism toward any class of marriages or marriage partners not encompassed by the exception. Congress’ purpose was simply to remedy the particular injustice that occurred when two dependent individuals married and simultaneously lost their benefits.

We are satisfied that both the general rule and the 1958 exception are legitimate exercises of Congress’ power to decide who will share in the benefits of the trust fund. The favored treatment of marriages between secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principle of equality embodied in the Due' Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

       Mrs. Jobst was receiving welfare assistance from the Division of Welfare of the State of Missouri, but was not receiving any social security benefits under 42 U. S. C. §§401-432 (1970 ed. and Supp. V).

       Section 202 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §402 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), provides in pertinent part:
      “(d)(1) Every child (as defined in section 416 (e) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child—
      “ (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits,
      “(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22, or (ii) is under a disability (as defined in section 423 (d) of this title) which began before he attained the age of 22, and
      “(C) was dependent upon such individual—
      “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding whichever of the following first occurs—
      “ (D) the month in which such child dies or marries,
      “(5) In the case of a child who has attained the age of eighteen and who marries—

        “(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subsection (a), (b), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section or under section 423 (a) of this title, or
      “(B) another individual who has attained the age of eighteen and is entitled to benefits under this subsection,
      “such child’s entitlement to benefits under this subsection shall, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection but subject to subsection (s) of this section, not be terminated by reason of such marriage ....
      “(s)(2) . . . [S]o much of subsectio[n] . . . (d) (5) ... of this section as precedes the semicolon, shall not apply in the case of any child unless such child, at the time of the marriage referred to therein, was under a disability . . . .”

       Mr. Jobst first exhausted his administrative remedies. A hearing examiner found in his favor, ruling that the denial of benefits was unconstitutional. The Appeals Council reversed; it held that an administrative agency has no power to rule on the constitutionality of the Act it administers.

       See Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V).

       The 1956 amendment replaced the requirement that the child be under 18 at the time of application with a requirement that he be either under 18 or “under a disability . . . which began before he attained the age of eighteen . . . 70 Stat. 807. In 1972, Congress raised the age before which the child’s disability must begin from 18 to 22. 86 Stat. 1343-1345.

       72 Stat. 1030-1032. The House Report explained the purpose of this change:
      “When a secondary beneficiary marries, such person’s benefit is terminated under present law. If he marries a person who is or who will become entitled to an old-age insurance benefit, he may qualify for a new benefit based on the earnings of the new spouse. But if the new spouse is also receiving a secondary benefit, the benefits of both are terminated and ordinarily neither beneficiary can become entitled to any new benefits. Your committee’s bill would eliminate the hardship in these cases by providing that marriage would not terminate a benefit where a person receiving mother’s, widow’s, widower’s, parent’s, or childhood disability benefits marries a person receiving any of these benefits or where a person receiving mother’s or childhood disability benefits marries a person entitled to old-age insurance benefits.” H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958).

       No doubt there are many distant relatives and unrelated persons who do not qualify for benefits even though they are actually dependent on a wage earner. Similarly, some married children and some 19-year-old children remain dependent on their parents because they are unable to support themselves while their younger brothers and sisters may be self-sufficient.

       The idea that marriage changes dependency is expressed throughout the Social Security Act. Most secondary beneficiaries are eligible only if. they have not married or remarried. See 42 U. S. C. §402 (b)(1)(C) (divorced wives); § 402 (e) (1) (A) (widows); § 402 (f) (1) (A) (widowers); § 402 (g) (1) (A) (surviving or divorced mothers); § 402 (h) (1) (C) (parents). With some limited exceptions, §§ 402 (e) (4) and (f) (5), marriage or remarriage marks the end of secondary benefits. §§ 402 (b) (1) (H) (1970 ed., Supp. V), 402 (e)(1), 402 (f)(1), 402 (g)(1), and 402 (h)(1). In each case, however, Congress has excepted marriages to some social security beneficiaries. §§402 (b)(3), 402 (e)(3), 402(f)(4), 402 (g)(3), and 402 (h) (4).

       This proposition is not questioned by appellee. “As a general premise the Secretary undoubtedly correctly concludes it is reasonable to terminate social security payments to child beneficiaries in the event of marriage.” Brief for Appellee 21.

       See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1.

         See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600, 603. Congress adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by banning, or criminally prosecuting, nonconforming marriages. See Loving v. Virginia, supra. Congress has simply recognized that marriage traditionally brings changed responsibilities.

       As we have seen, the burden of the general marriage rule is not limited to disabled beneficiaries; children, widowers, widows, divorced wives, and parents — all are affected by the rule. And although the District Court singled out for analysis marriages to disabled nonbeneficiaries, Congress did not; Mr. Jobst would also have lost his benefits if he had married’an able-bodied woman who was not receiving social security benefits. Finally, the protection extended by the 1958 amendment encompasses many more persons than those described by the District Court. Like the marriage rule itself, the amendment affects widows, widowers, parents, and divorced wives, as well as disabled children. See n. 8, supra.

       The fact that marriage characteristically signifies the end of a child’s dependency on parental support justifies a general rule terminating benefits when a child marries. The fact that a marriage between two spouses who are both receiving dependents’ benefits does not characteristically signify a similar change in economic status justifies the exception. In other words, since the justifying characteristic of the general class does not apply to the excepted class, the exception rests on a reasonable predicate. This is true even though some members of each class may possess the characteristic more commonly found in the other class.

       Even if we were to sustain his attack, and even though we recognize the unusual hardship that the general rule has inflicted upon him, it would not necessarily follow that Mr. Jobst is entitled to benefits. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 17-18; Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U. S. 501. For the vice in the statute stems from the exception created by the 1958 amendment; that vice could be cured either by invalidating the entire exception or by enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nationwide impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst’s case would not control. See Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1136— 1137 (1969). If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be necessary to fashion some new test of need, dependency, or disability. Although the District Court only granted relief for persons marrying a “totally disabled” spouse, its rationale would equally apply to any marriage of a secondary beneficiary to a needy nonbeneficiary.

       We note, however, that Congress could have rationally concluded that beneficiaries who marry other beneficiaries present a more compelling case for legislative relief than beneficiaries who marry needy nonbeneficiaries. Secondary beneficiaries who marry each other lose two sets of benefits and thus may suffer a greater loss than does a couple that sacrifices only one set of benefits.

       In the very Act that created the exception for marriages between beneficiaries, Congress showed its reluctance to use individualized determinations in allocating social security benefits. The 1958 amendments abolished a requirement that disabled children over 18 prove their individual dependency on the wage earner to qualify for benefits. Pub. L. 85-840 § 306, 72 Stat. 1030. Congress concluded that these beneficiaries should be “deemed dependent” because “the older child who has been totally disabled since before age 18 is also likely to be dependent on his parent.” H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1958).

       A logical application of Mr. Jobst’s position would permit the Secretary to end benefits only after an individual determination of disability or need. Congress, however, has sought to make social security payments independent of individual need, while establishing a separate program to serve those who are needy but ineligible for social security benefits. The Supplemental Security Income program is a federally funded welfare program administered through the Social Security Administration. Its purpose is plainly stated by H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 147 (1971):
      “[S]ome people who because of age, disability, or blindness are not able to support themselves through work may receive relatively small social security benefits. Contributory social insurance, therefore, must be complemented by an effective assistance program.”
      Mr. and Mrs. Jobst became eligible for the Supplemental Security Income program as soon as it was instituted. On remand the parties stipulated that, based on the couple’s need, they were receiving monthly payments only $20 less than the amount they would have been receiving if Mr. Jobst’s child’s benefits had been restored.