author:
Justice Thomas Justice Stevens,
      Justice Breyer,

text:
    GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. WILSON
    No. 04-169.
    Argued April 20, 2005
    Decided June 20, 2005

      Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General of North Carolina, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Grayson G. Kelley, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Jill B. Hickey, Special Deputy Attorney General.

      Mark T. Hurt argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Brian S. McCoy.

      Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Douglas N. Letter:

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Robert J. Costagliola; for the International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by John Charles Thomas and M. Christine Klein; and for the National Defense Industrial Association et al. by Mark R. Troy, C. Stanley Dees, and Lawrence S. Ebner.

        Ann Lugbill, Mark Kleiman, and Robin Potter filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

        Gregory Stuart Smith and Teresa Wynn Roseborough filed a brief for the National Workrights Institute as amicus curiae.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the 6-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act (FCA or Act), see 31 U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1), governs FCA civil actions for retaliation, see § 3730(h). We hold that it does not and therefore conclude that the most closely analogous state limitations period applies.

I

The FCA prohibits any person from making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. § 3729(a). Persons who do so are liable for civil penalties of up to $10,000 per claim and treble damages. Ibid. The Act sets forth two principal enforcement mechanisms for policing this proscription. First, the Attorney General may sue to remedy violations of § 3729. § 3730(a). Second, private individuals may bring qui tam actions in the Government’s name for §3729 violations. § 3730(b)(1); see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 769-772 (2000). The qui tam relator must give the Government notice of the action, and the Government is entitled to intervene in the suit. § 3730(b)(2). The relator receives up to 30 percent of the proceeds of the action, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs. §§ 3730(d)(1), (2).

The 1986 amendments to the FCA created a third enforcement mechanism: a private cause of action for an individual retaliated against by his employer for assisting an FCA investigation or proceeding. § 3730(h). Section 3730(h) provides in relevant part that

“[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.”

Remedies for retaliation include reinstatement, two times the amount of backpay plus interest, special damages, litigation costs, and attorney’s fees. Ibid.

The 1986 amendments also revised the language of the 6-year statute of limitations applicable to FCA actions. The previous version of the statute provided that "[a] civil action under section 3730 of this title must be brought within 6 years from the date the violation is committed.” § 3731(b) (1982 ed.). The 1986 amendments revised this provision to read:

“(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought—
“(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
“(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed .. . §3731 (2000 ed.).

In January 2001, relator Karen T. Wilson brought an FCA qui tarn and retaliation action against petitioners. Petitioners Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District and Cherokee County Soil and Water Conservation District are special-purpose local government entities; the other petitioners are various local and federal officials. Graham County District employed Wilson as a secretary. Wilson alleged that petitioners made numerous false claims for payment to the United States in connection with a federal disaster relief program, the Emergency Watershed Protection Program, App. 17-20, and in connection with agricultural programs administered by North Carolina but funded by the Federal Government, id., at 17-24.

Wilson contended, in addition, that Graham County District officials retaliated against her for aiding federal officials in their investigation of these false claims. Id., at 25-30. Wilson alerted federal officials to petitioners’ suspected fraudulent activities in December 1995 and cooperated with the ensuing investigation. Id., at 26-27. Because of her cooperation, the complaint alleged, Graham County District officials repeatedly harassed her from 1996 to 1997, eventually inducing her to resign in March 1997. Id., at 28-30.

Petitioners successfully moved to dismiss Wilson’s retaliation action as untimely. They argued that the 6-year limitations period provided in § 3731(b)(1) did not apply to Wilson’s retaliation action. Absent an applicable federal limitations period, they asked the District Court to borrow North Carolina’s 3-year statute of limitations for retaliatory-discharge actions. The District Court agreed and dismissed the retaliation claim, since Wilson filed it more than three years after her March 1997 discharge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a-70a. The court certified that ruling for interlocutory appeal. 224 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050-1051 (WDNC 2002).

On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. In the majority’s view, the plain language of §3731(b)(1) supplies a limitations period for retaliation actions, making it unnecessary to borrow one from North Carolina law. The court reasoned that § 3731(b)(1) governs § 3730(h) retaliation actions, because it applies its 6-year limitations period to “ '[a] civil action under section 3730.’ ” 367 F. 3d 245, 251 (2004) (brackets in original).

We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether § 3731(b)(1)’s 6-year statute of limitations applies to § 3730(h) retaliation actions or whether, instead, the most closely analogous state limitations period governs. 543 U. S. 1042 (2005). Compare Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F. 3d 860, 865-866 (CA7 1994) (holding that FCA 6-year period applies), with United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F. 3d 1027, 1034-1035 (CA9 1998) (holding that most closely analogous state limitations period governs).

II

To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action created by a federal statute, we first ask whether the statute expressly supplies a limitations period. If it does not, we generally “borrow” the most closely analogous state limitations period. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. 29, 33-34 (1995); Reed v. Transportation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 324 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 157-165 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (tracing history of borrowing state limitations periods). In the rare case, we have even borrowed analogous federal limitations periods in the absence of an expressly applicable one, see, e. g., id., at 150-157, but no party points to a reason why we should do so here, and we can think of none. The only arguably applicable express statute of limitations is the 6-year limit set forth in § 3731(b)(1). The question, then, is whether § 3731(b)(1) applies by its terms to retaliation actions under § 3730(h); if it does not, our cases dictate that the most closely analogous state limitations period applies.

Under § 3731(b)(1), “[a] civil action under section 3730 may not be brought... more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.” Following ,the Court of Appeals’ lead and supported by the United States appearing as amicus curiae, Wilson argues that this language unambiguously applies to FCA retaliation actions. She points out that § 3731(b)(1) applies a 6-year limitations period to “a civil action under section 3730,” and that § 3730(h) actions arise under §3730; hence, she claims, the 6-year period governs § 3730(h) actions. See Neal, supra, at 865-866 (arguing same). We think the statute is more complex than this argument supposes. Statutory language has meaning only in context, see, e. g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004), and § 3731(b)(1), read in its proper context, does not govern § 3730(h) actions for retaliation.

Section 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous, rather than clear, about whether a § 3730(h) retaliation action is “a civil action under section 3730.” Another reasonable reading is that it applies only to actions arising under §§ 3730(a) and (b), not to § 3730(h) retaliation actions. That reading is suggested by the language in § 3731(b)(1) tying the start of the time limit to “the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.” In other words, the time limit begins to run on the date the defendant submitted a false claim for payment. See supra, at 412-413. This language casts doubt on whether § 3731(b)(1) specifies a limitations period for retaliation actions. For even a well-pleaded retaliation complaint need not allege that the defendant submitted a false claim, leaving the limitations period without a starting point if § 3731(b)(1) is applicable. A retaliation plaintiff, instead, need prove only that the defendant retaliated against him for engaging in “lawful acts done ... in furtherance of” an FCA “action filed or to be filed,” § 3730(h), language that protects an employee’s conduct even if the target of an investigation or action to be filed was innocent. Applying § 3731(b)(1) to FCA retaliation actions, then, sits uneasily with § 3731(b)(l)’s language, which assumes that well-pleaded “action[s] under section 3730” to which it is applicable include a “violation of section 3729” certain from which to start the time running. Section 3731(b)(1), by contrast, naturally applies to well-pleaded §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. They require the plaintiff to plead that the defendant submitted a false claim for payment, and therefore necessarily specify when §3731(b)(1)’s time limit begins. This textual anomaly, at a minimum, shows that § 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous about whether “action under section 3730” means all actions under § 3730, or only §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions.

Wilson and the United States dispute that the statute contains this anomaly, and instead urge that it clearly applies by its terms to all §3730 actions. They point out that every § 3730(h) action requires the plaintiff to prove that he engaged in protected conduct related to at least a suspected violation of §3729, and argue that §3731(b)(l)’s limitations period simply begins to run on the date of the suspected violation. Assuming, without deciding, that § 3730(h) retaliation actions have as an element a suspected violation of § 3729, their interpretation indeed removes the anomaly, but only at the cost of reading into the statute the word “suspected” before the phrase “violation of section 3729.” Section 3731(b)(1) speaks of “violation[s] of section 3729”— actual, not suspected, ones. Wilson and the United States answer that this argument proves too much, because even §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions involve only “suspected” violations of § 3729 at the pleading stage of litigation; but this response misses the point. Every § 3730(a) or (b) plaintiff who states or proves a valid claim for relief must allege or prove an actual violation of §3729; retaliation plaintiffs need only allege or prove a suspected violation of §3729 (or so we are willing to assume). The point is that § 3731(b)(l)’s language applies naturally to all successfully pleaded or proved retaliation actions only if one reads “suspected” into its terms, as the dissent essentially concedes. See post, at 425-426 (opinion of Breyer, J.).

Section 3731(b)(1)’s literal text, then, is ambiguous. Wilson and the Government ask us to read it as if it said “the [suspected or actual] violation of section 3729.” Petitioners ask us to read § 3731(b) as if it said “civil action under section 3730[(a) or (b)].”

Two considerations convince us that the better way to resolve this ambiguity is to read the 6-year period to govern only §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions, and not § 3730(h) retaliation actions. First, the very next subsection of the statute, § 3731(c), also uses the similarly unqualified phrase “action brought under section 3730” to refer only to §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. Section 3731(c) provides that “[i]n any action brought under section 3730, the United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.” As Wilson and the United States concede, the context of this provision implies that the phrase “any action brought under section 3730” is limited to § 3730(a) actions brought by the United States and § 3730(b) actions in which the United States intervenes as a party, as those are the types of § 3730 actions in which the United States necessarily participates. Otherwise, the United States would be “required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action,” § 3731(c), in all §3730 actions, regardless of whether it participated in the action (a consequence the dissent implicitly embraces by claiming that “any action brought under section 3730” in § 3731(c) means all § 3730 actions, see post, at 423-424 (opinion of Breyer, J.)). This implicit limitation of the phrase “action under section 3730” shows that Congress used the term “action under section 3730” imprecisely in § 3731 and, in particular, that Congress sometimes used the term to refer only to a subset of § 3730 actions. It is reasonable to read the same language in § 3731(b)(1) to be likewise limited.

Second, reading § 3731(b)(1) to apply only to §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions is in keeping with the default rule that Congress generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues. We have repeatedly recognized that Congress legislates against the “standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 305 (2005) (calling it “highly doubtful” that Congress intended a time limit on pursuing a claim to expire before the claim arose); Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 267 (1993) (declining to coun-tenanee the “odd result” that a federal cause of action and statute of limitations arise at different times “absen[t] . . . any such indication in the statute”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Absent other indication, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff has the right to apply to the court for relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, where, as the case is here, there are two plausible constructions of a statute of limitations, we should adopt the construction that starts the time limit running when the cause of action (here retaliation) accrues.

This approach resolves the ambiguity in § 3731(b)(1) in petitioners’ favor. On the one hand, reading § 3731(b)(1) to exclude retaliation actions will generally start the limitations period running when the cause of action accrues. If § 3731(b)(1) excludes retaliation actions, then no express time limit applies to § 3730(h) actions, and we borrow the most closely analogous state time limit absent an expressly applicable one. See supra, at 414-415. The likely analogous state statutes of limitations virtually all start to run when the cause of action accrues — in retaliation actions, when the retaliatory action occurs.

The interpretation favored by Wilson and the Government, on the other hand, is in tension with this rule of construction. Under their reading, the statute of limitations for FCA retaliation actions begins to run, at best, on the date the actual or suspected FCA violation occurred. Because that date will precede the retaliatory conduct, their reading starts the time limit running before the retaliation action accrues. Even more oddly, their reading allows a retaliation action to be time barred before it ever accrues — for example, if the employer discovers more than six years after the suspected violation of §3729 that an employee aided in investigating that fraud, then retaliates. As we have discussed, § 3731(b)(l),s text permits a construction that avoids these counterintuitive results — that “civil action under section 3730” means only those civil actions under §3730 that have as an element a “violation of section 3729,” that is, §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions.

Granted, other textual evidence cuts against this reading of § 3731(b)(1). In particular, Congress used the phrase “brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730” in § 3731(d); this, it is argued, shows that Congress could have been similarly precise in § 3731(b)(1) if it wished. In the context of this statute, however, that argument proves too much, since the same could be said of § 3731(c), which all agree uses the phrase “action under section 3730” in more limited, and less precise, fashion. See supra, at 417-418. We do not doubt that Congress could have drafted § 3731(b)(1) with more precision than it did, but the presence of the same inexact wording in § 3731(c) means that the more precise language in § 3731(d) casts little doubt on our reading of the statute.

* * *

For the reasons we have discussed, the FCA’s express limitations period does not apply to § 3730(h) actions. The most closely analogous state statute of limitations therefore applies. Judge Wilkinson, in his dissenting opinion below, concluded that the most closely analogous state statute of limitations in this case is North Carolina’s 3-year statute of limitations governing wrongful-discharge claims. See 367 F. 3d, at 261-262. The appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow, however, is not within the scope of the question we granted certiorari to decide, and the Court of Appeals did not pass on the point. We therefore leave that issue for remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Dodd v. United States, ante, p. 360, 1 concur in the judgment.

Justice Breyer,

with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

dissenting.

. As the Court points out, it is unusual to find a statute of limitations keyed not to the time of the plaintiff’s injury, but to other related events. Still, I believe that Congress has written such a statute here, and we should respect its decision.

The language of the statute, 31 U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1), is reasonably clear. It says that “[a] civil action under section 3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after the date on which the violation” of federal false claims law “is committed.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3730 lists three kinds of civil actions, including a retaliation action under § 3730(h). Thus, a retaliation action is a “civil action under section 3730,” and § 3731(b)(1)’s 6-year limitations period applies.

The Court tries to overcome the force of this syllogism with the help of two textual arguments. First, it points to the subsection that follows § 3731(b) — § 3731(c) — which says that “ ‘[i]n any action brought under section 3730, the United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” See ante, at 418. The Court then reasons that, read in context, the phrase “action brought under section 3730” could not refer to all the civil actions listed under § 3730, for the United States is not ordinarily a party to private retaliation suits brought under § 3730(h). Ibid. Rather, the phrase “action brought under section 3730” must refer only to the false claims actions listed in §§ 3730(a) and (b). Ibid. Thus, according to the Court, if in § 3731(c), the phrase “action brought under section 3730” refers only to a subset of the actions listed under §3730, one can read the similar phrase in § 3731(b)(1) to contain a similar limitation. Ibid.

The problem with this argument lies in its conclusion. The reason that § 3731(c) may apply only to §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions has nothing to do with the phrase “action brought under section 3730.” Rather, any limitation on §3731(c)’s application comes from different words, namely, “the United States.” These latter words make clear not that the phrase “under section 3730” has a different meaning than in (b), but that (c) comes into play only in cases in which the United States is a party (and only in such cases, cf. ibid.). Because it is these words — the subject of the subsection, “the United States” — that determines whether (c) has application in any given case, there is nothing in § 3731(c) that would make it “reasonable,” ibid., to read the phrase “action under section 3730” in § 3781(b)(1) to apply, as the Court concludes, to only “two out of three actions under section 3730.”

The subsections surrounding §§ 3731(b) and (c) further undermine the Court’s extratextual limitation on “[a] civil action under section 3730.” In § 3731(a), Congress apparently used the phrase “under section 3730” to mean all three § 3730 actions. § 3731(a) (a “subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a trial or hearing conducted under section 3730 of this title may be served at any place in the United States”). And in § 3731(d), Congress used the very words that the Court seeks to find in § 3731(b), but that do not there exist — namely, the words “under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730” — when it meant to narrow a provision’s compass to two out of the three §3730 causes of action. § 3731(d) (“[A] final judgment rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding charging fraud or false statements ... shall estop the defendant from denying the essential elements of the offense in any action which involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding and which is brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730”); see also ante, at 421-422. The statutory context therefore shows that Congress did not intend for the phrase “[a] civil action under section 3730” to mean anything other than what it says.

Second, the Court points to language in § 3731(b)(1) that specifies when the limitations period begins to run: “the date on which the violation” of the false claims provision, § 3729, “is committed.” See ante, at 415-416. It then points out that a retaliation action does not necessarily involve an actual false claims violation, because (it assumes) a retaliation plaintiff need only show “a suspected violation.” Ante, at 417 (emphasis in original). Thus, adopting relator’s and the Government’s reading, the Court reasons, would require reading some words into § 3731(b)(1) — so that it would say “ ‘the [suspected or actual] violation’ ” — which would distort the statute more than reading some other, different words into the statute — so that it would say “ ‘[a] civil action under section 3730[(a) or (b)].’” Ibid.

The difficulty with the Court’s choice of the latter linguistic addition is that the two sets of textual insertions — on the one hand “suspected or actual,” on the other hand “(a) or (b)” — are not equivalent. Statutes of limitations, when referring to starting points, generally refer not to actual events, but to alleged events. Thus, a plaintiff’s tort action is timely if he files it within, say, three years of the alleged negligently caused injury; a plaintiff’s breach-of-contract action is timely if filed within, say, one year of the alleged breach. And a plaintiff who loses such an action because the defendant shows, say, that there was no such injury or no such breach, has not, for that reason, brought the action outside the limitations period. Rather, the suit is still timely even though the violation remains nothing more than “alleged” after trial. Such a plaintiff has simply lost a timely filed action on the merits.

The provision before us is no different. Section 3731(b)(l)’s 6-year time clock begins to run on “the date on which the violation” of federal false claims law, §3729, “is committed.” Thus, any § 3730 plaintiff — even one bringing a false claims action under § 3730(a) or § 3730(b) — has six years from the moment of a suspected — that is, an unproven — violation of the False Claims Act’s antifraud provision. Thus, as naturally interpreted, the words “the date on which the violation ... is committed” refer to the date on which the suspected violation occurs.

I recognize that there is a relevant distinction in this case. In the typical case (say, the tort or contract case) the plaintiff must ultimately prove all the relevant allegations. Here, the retaliation victim need not prove that her employer did in fact violate federal false claims law, but only that she believed that there was such a violation. See ibid. But that distinction does not make the difference. Given the clear link between claimed violations of federal false claims law and retaliation actions (the latter depend on the former) and given that triggering events in statutes of limitations implicitly mean alleged triggering events, § 3731(b)(1) remains most naturally read as implicitly referring to alleged or suspected violations of federal false claims law. And at the very least, reading the statute in this way, especially in light of the other statutory indicators, see supra, at 423-424, does far less violence to § 3731(b)(1)’s text than does the Court’s addition of “(a) or (b).”

The Court’s far stronger argument is not textual. It concerns the limitations provision’s purpose. That purpose, after all, includes providing victims of retaliation a reasonable time within which they can file an action to vindicate • their rights. Cf. S. Rep. No. 99-345, p. 34 (1986) (addition of a retaliation cause of action intended “to halt companies . . . from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence ‘whistleblowers’ ” and to “assure those who may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts”). How can we reconcile that purpose with a reading of the statute that, as a matter of logic, could allow the limitations period to begin to run, perhaps even to terminate, before the forbidden retaliation occurs? See ante, at 421.

The answer, in my view, is that Congress could have had a particular qui tom-related purpose in mind. That is, it could have intended to provide a fairly lengthy limitations period, namely, six years from the time the false claims conduct occurs, applicable to all related actions, and then to put an end to all such litigation. This makes particular sense given the reasonable assumption that false claims and retaliation actions are likely to be litigated together. See, e. g., App. 11-35 (relator’s complaint pursuing both qui tam and retaliation claims in same suit); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F. 3d 1027, 1030 (CA9 1998) (same).

Of course, as the Court emphasizes, such an unusual provision exacts a price, namely, possible injury to an individual who suffers retaliation that comes late in the day. But apparently there is no such individual. Neither the Court nor petitioners have been able to find any actual example. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 6; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28 (United States is unaware of any such example). Nor have I.

By contrast, the Court’s reading of the statute exacts a different, but certain, price. It substitutes for a fairly lengthy — and uniform — 6-yéar limitations term, a crazy quilt of limitations periods stitched together from the laws of 51 jurisdictions which, in some instances, might require a plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim within 90 days, six months, or one year after the retaliation takes place. See, e. g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.103(2) (Lexis 2004) (90-day limitations period for certain whistle-blower actions); Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(8)(a) (2003) (180-day limitations period); Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 1035 (California’s 1-year limitations period for wrongful termination in violation of public policy applies to § 3730(h) action). Rather than shed crocodile tears for the imagined plight of a nonexistent whistle-blower as petitioners ask us to do, I would read the statute to do what the statute says Congress wanted: to provide a relatively long, single, uniform limitations period that, in practice, seems to protect the many real potential plaintiffs, such as relator, who will otherwise find themselves shut out of court. Such a reading also avoids the attendant practical difficulties and uncertainties inherent in requiring federal courts to borrow state statutes of limitations. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 377-380, and n. 13 (2004) (discussing problems with this practice).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

      Justice Souter joins all but footnote 2 of this opinion.

       See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital, 360 F. 3d 220,236 (CA1 2004) (holding that protected conduct is “conduct that reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action”); United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F. 3d 731, 740 (CADC 1998) (same); Childree v. UAP/GAAG CHEM, Inc., 92 F. 3d 1140, 1146 (CA11 1996) (holding that disclosure to employer of possible FCA violation protected conduct where litigation is a “distinct possibility” at the time of the disclosure); Fanslow v. Chicago Mfg. Center, Inc., 384 F 3d 469, 480 (CA7 2004) (protected conduct is where employee had reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer is committing fraud against the United States); Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 314 F. 3d 927, 933 (CA8 2002) (same); Moore v. California Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F. 3d 838, 845-846 (CA9 2002) (same). We endorse none of these formulations; we note only that all of them have properly recognized that proving a violation of §3729 is not an element of a § 3730(h) cause of action.

       Justice Stevens, we believe, misapplies this interpretive rule. Post, p. 422 (opinion concurring in judgment). He argues that § 3731(b)(1) does not govern § 3730(h) actions because “it is so unlikely that a legislature would actually intend” to start the statute of limitations running before the cause of action accrues that he “would presume that the anomaly was the product of a drafting error” regardless of whether the text is ambiguous. Dodd v. United States, ante, at 362, n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is not the proper analysis. Section 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous because its text, literally read, admits of two plausible interpretations. Supra, at 415-417. We apply the rule that Congress generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues to resolve that ambiguity, not to create it in the first instance.

       Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (West 1993) (catchall for tort actions not otherwise enumerated); § 36-26A-4(a) (West 2001) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Alaska Stat. § 09.10.070 (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-541 (West 2003) (wrongful termination); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-115 (Lexis 1987) (catchall); § 21-1-604 (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 335.1 (West Supp. 2005) (personal injuries); § 343 (West 1982) (catchall); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-577, 31-51m (2005) (catchall for tort actions; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 8119 (Lexis 1999) (personal injuries); Tit. 29, § 5115 (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); D. C. Code § 12-301(8) (West Supp. 2005) (catchall); Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3187(8)(a), 448.103 (2003) (whistle-blower actions); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33 (Lexis 1982) (personal injuries); Haw. Rev. Stat. §378-63(a) (Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Idaho Code §§ 5-224, 6-2105(2) (Lexis 1998) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 735, § 5/13 — 202 (West 2003) (personal injuries); Ind. Code §34-11-2-4 (2004) (personal injuries); Iowa Code § 614.1 (2003) (personal injuries); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§60-513, 75-2973(h) (Supp. 2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.120(7) (Lexis Supp. 2004) (catchall); § 61.103(2) (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 3492 (West 1994) (“[djelictual actions”; starts running on day injury or damage sustained, which is when the cause of action generally accrues for retaliatory actions); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, § 752 (West 1980) (catchall); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101 (Lexis 2002) (catchall for civil actions at law); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 260, § 2A, ch. 149, § 185(d) (West 2004) (catchall for tort actions for personal injuries; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.363(1) (West 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Minn. Stat. § 541.07 (2004) (personal injuries); Miss. Code Ann. § 15—1—49 (Lexis 2003) (catchall); Mo. Rev. Stat. §516.120 (2000) (catchall); Mont. Code Ann. §39-2-911(1) (2003) (wrongful discharge); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§25-207, 25-212 (1995) (catchall); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190.4(e) (2003) (personal injuries); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §508:4 (West 1997) (personal actions other than slander or libel); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:14-1, 34:19-5 (West 2000) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); §2 A:14-2(a) (West Supp. 2005) (personal injuries); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (1990) (catchall); N. V. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 215.4 (West 2003) (“action to enforce” a statute “given wholly or partly to any person who will prosecute”); N. Y. Lab. Law Ann. § 740.4(a) (West 2002) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52, 126-86 (Lexis 2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); N. D. Cent. Code §28-01-16 (Lexis 1991) (catchall); §34-01-20.3 (Lexis 2004) (retaliation actions for whistle-blowers); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Lexis Supp. 2003) (catchall for torts); § 4113.52(D) (Lexis 2001) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 2005) (catchall); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (2003) (catchall); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7) (2002) (catchall); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, § 1424(a) (Purdon 1991) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(a) (Lexis 1997) (injuries to the person); § 28-50-4 (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); S. C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (West 2005) (catchall); § 8-27-30(B) (West Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); S. D. Codified Laws § 15-2-14(3) (West 2004) (action for personal injury); Term. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (Lexis 2000) (personal injuries); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 2002) (personal injuries); Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 554.005 (West 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-29(1), (2) (Lexis 2002) (liability created by statute of foreign state; liability created by statute); § 67-21-4(2) (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 511 (Lexis 2002) (catchall); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243(A), 8.01-248 (Lexis 2000) (personal injuries; catchall); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2) (2004) (catchall for injuries to person); W. Va. Code §55-2-12 (Lexis 2000) (catchall); § 6C-1-4(a) (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Wis. Stat. § 893.57 (2003-2004) (intentional torts); Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), 9-11-103(c) (2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers). But see Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 512 (Lexis 2002) (personal injury statute of limitations starts on the date of the discovery of the injury); D. C. Code § 1-615.54 (West 2001) (whistle-blower action may be brought within one year of the time the employee learns of the retaliation). We stress that these are only the likely candidates for analogous state statutes of limitations; it may well not be an exhaustive or authoritative list of the possibilities.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
      Justice Breyer
      Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas,

license: Public Domain

text:
    AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al. v. MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
    No. 03-1230.
    Argued April 26, 2005
    Decided June 20, 2005

      Robert Digges, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Charles Rothfeld and Evan Tager.

      Henry J. Boynton, Assistant Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and David A. Voges, Michael A. Nicker-son, Glenn R. White, and Emmanuel B. Odunlami, Assistant Attorneys General.

      Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed-ler, Mark B. Stern, Sushma Soni, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Paul M. Geier, and Dale C. Andrews

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Christopher J. Wright and Robin S. Conrad; for Deeco Services, Inc., dba Deeco Transportation, et al. by Robert E. McFarland; and for the Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund by Douglas G. Smith.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gary Feiner-man, Solicitor General, Nadine J. Wichern, Assistant Attorney General, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Mark L. Shwrtleff of Utah, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.

   Justice Breyer

delivered, the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider whether a flat $100 fee that Michigan charges trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling violates the dormant Commerce Clause. We hold that it does not.

I

A subsection of Michigan’s Motor Carrier Act imposes upon each motor carrier “for the administration of this act, an annual fee of $100.00 for each self-propelled motor vehicle operated by or on behalf of the motor carrier.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §478.2(1) (West 2002). The provision assesses the fee upon, and only upon, vehicles that engage in intrastate commercial operations — that is, on trucks that undertake point-to-point hauls between Michigan cities. See Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 592-594, 662 N. W. 2d 784, 789 (2003). Petitioners, USF Holland, Inc., a trucking company with trucks that engage in both interstate and intrastate hauling, and the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA), asked the Michigan courts to invalidate the provision. Both petitioners told those courts that trucks that carry both interstate and intrastate loads engage in intrastate business less than trucks that confine their operations to the Great Lakes State. Hence, because Michigan’s fee is flat, it discriminates against interstate carriers and imposes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate trade.

The Michigan Court of Claims rejected the carriers’ claim for three reasons. First, the $100 fee “is regulatory and intended” for the Motor Carrier Act’s administration, which includes “regulation of vehicular size and weight, insurance requirements and safety standards.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. Such a fee “is not amenable to a fee structure based on apportionment by usage rates.” Ibid. Second, the fee reflects a “legitimate expression of the [Sjtate’s concern that the welfare of its citizens be protected,” and hence an appropriate exercise of the State’s police power. Ibid. Third, the fee does not implicate the Commerce Clause because it falls only on intrastate, not interstate, commerce. Id., at 45a.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It did not agree that the intrastate nature of §478.2(1) sheltered the fee from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 255 Mich. App., at 617-619, 662 N. W. 2d, at 802. Nonetheless, the court rejected the truckers’ claim because the statute “regulates evenhandedly,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 804, and because the record lacked any “evidence that any trucking firm’s route choices [were] affected by the imposition of the fee,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803-804. Rather, the record indicated that any “effect . . . on interstate commerce is incidental,” rendering the truckers’ claim of discrimination “a matter of pure speculation.” Ibid.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to appeal. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 469 Mich. 976, 673 N. W. 2d 752 (2003). We granted their petition for certiorari and consolidated the case with Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, post, p. 440, a case in which interstate truckers sought review of a separate state motor carrier fee. We now affirm the Michigan court’s judgment sustaining §478.2(1).

II

Our Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935). Thus, this Court has consistently held that the Constitution’s express grant to Congress of the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, contains “a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause,” Oklahoma Tax Common v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995), that “create[s] an area of trade free from interference by the States,” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). This negative command prevents a State from “jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole” by “placing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.” Jefferson Lines, supra, at 180.

Thus, we have found unconstitutional state regulations that unjustifiably discriminate on their face against out-of-state entities, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), or that impose burdens on interstate trade that are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). We have held that States may not impose taxes that facially discriminate against interstate business and offer commercial advantage to local enterprises, see, e. g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99-100 (1994), that improperly apportion state assessments on transactions with out-of-state components, Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948), or that have the “inevitable effect [of] threatening] the free movement of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the State,” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 284 (1987).

Applying these principles and precedents, we find nothing in §478.2(1) that offends the Commerce Clause. To begin with, Michigan imposes the flat $100 fee only upon intrastate transactions — that is, upon activities taking place exclusively within the State’s borders. Section 478.2(1) does not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The statute applies evenhandedly to all carriers that make domestic journeys. It does not reflect an effort to tax activity that takes place, in whole or in part, outside the State. Nothing in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause.

This legal vacuum is not surprising. States impose numerous flat fees upon local businesses and service providers, including, for example, upon insurers, auctioneers, ambulance operators, and hosts of others. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. § 33-36-104 (Lexis 2003); S. C. Code Ann. § 38-7-10 (West 2002). Although we have “long since rejected any suggestion that a state tax . . . affecting interstate commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it attaches only to a ‘local’ or intrastate activity,” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 615 (1981), we have also made clear that the Constitution neither displaces States’ authority “to shelter [their] people from menaces to their health or safety,” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 29 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted), nor “unduly curtail[s]” States’ power “to lay taxes for the support of state government,” McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 48 (1940).

The record, moreover, shows no special circumstance suggesting that Michigan’s fee operates in practice as anything other than an unobjectionable exercise of the State’s police power. To the contrary, as the Michigan Court of Appeals pointed out, the record contains little, if any, evidence that the $100 fee imposes any significant practical burden upon interstate trade. See 255 Mich. App., at 620-622, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803-804. The record does show, for example, that some interstate trucks “top off” some interstate hauls with intrastate pickups and deliveries. See Brief for Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants in Nos. 226052,226122 (Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. 3, Affidavit of James C. Crozier ¶ 7 (licensing and fuel manager of TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc., describing this practice). But it does not tell us the answers to such questions as: How often does “topping off” occur across the industry? Does the $100 charge make a difference by significantly discouraging interstate carriers from engaging in “topping off”? Does the possibility of obtaining a 72-hour intrastate permit for $10 alleviate the alleged problem? See § 478.2(3); see also Brief for Respondents 2, n. 3 (4,928 temporary permits were issued in 2004). If the fees ($100 and $10) discourage “topping off,” does that local commercial effect make a significant interstate difference? Would a variable fee (of the kind the truckers advocate) eliminate such difference? The minimal facts in the record tell us little about these matters. Compare App. 60-61, Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas R. Lonergan ¶ 10(e) (official of the Michigan Public Service Commission stating that, topping off is rare for most interstate carriers because it disrupts schedules and shipping patterns), with Reply Brief for Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants in Nos. 226122,226137 (Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. A, Supplemental Affidavit of James C. Crozier ¶ 6 (TNT Holland frequently tops off interstate loads). And at oral argument, ATA conceded the absence of record facts that empirically could show that the $100 fee significantly deters interstate trade. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.

Neither does the record show that the flat assessment unfairly discriminates against interstate truckers. The fee seeks to defray costs such as those of regulating “vehicular size and weight,” of administering “insurance requirements,” and of applying “safety standards.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. The bulk of such costs would seem more likely to vary per truck or per carrier than to vary per mile traveled. See 255 Mich. App., at 612-617, 662 N. W. 2d, at 799-801. And that fact means that a per-truck, rather than a per-mile, assessment is likely fair. Cf. Jefferson Lines, 514 U. S., at 199 (rejecting taxpayer’s discrimination claim in part because “miles traveled within the State simply are not a relevant proxy for the benefit conferred upon the parties to a sales transaction”). Nothing in the record suggests the contrary.

Nor would an effort to switch the manner of fee assessment — from lump sum to, for example, miles traveled — be burden free. The record contains an affidavit, sworn by a Michigan Public Service Commission official, that states that to obtain the same revenue (about $8.5 million) through a per-mile fee would require the State to create a “data accumulation system” capable of separating out intrastate hauls and determining their length, and to develop related liability, billing, and auditing mechanisms. App. 64, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas R. Lonergan ¶ 2. This affidavit, on its face, suggests that the game is unlikely to be worth the candle. While petitioners argue the contrary, they do not provide the details of their preferred alternative administrative system nor point to record evidence showing its practicality. See Jefferson Lines, supra, at 195 (State is not required to use a particular apportionment formula just because it may be “possible” to do so).

Petitioners insist that they do not need empirically to demonstrate the existence of a burdensome or discriminatory impact upon interstate trucking, or (presumably) the unfairness of the assessment in relation to defrayed costs, or (presumably) the administrative practicality of the alternatives. They say that our earlier case, American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987), requires invalidation of the $100 flat fee, even in the absence of such proof. We disagree.

In Scheiner, this Court invalidated a flat $25 “marker fee” and a flat “axle tax” that Pennsylvania levied upon all trucks (interstate and intrastate) that used its roads, including trucks that merely crossed Pennsylvania’s borders to transport, say, Ohio goods to New Jersey customers. See id., at 273-275. Data showed that the fees imposed a cost per mile on interstate trucks that was approximately “five times as heavy as the cost per mile borne by local trucks.” Id., at 286. The assessments largely helped to raise revenue “to improve and maintain [the State’s] highways and bridges,” id., at 270, thereby helping to cover costs likely to vary significantly with truck-miles traveled, see ibid. And the assessments did “not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.” Id., at 290. In light of these considerations, Pennsylvania’s lump-sum taxes “threatened] the free movement of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the State of Pennsylvania.” Id., at 284. We concluded that “[i]f each State imposed flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into its territory, there [was] no conceivable doubt that commerce among the States would be deterred.” Ibid.

The present fee, as we have said, taxes purely local activity; it does not tax an interstate truck’s entry into the State nor does it tax transactions spanning multiple States. See 255 Mich. App., at 592-594, 662 N. W. 2d, at 789. We lack convincing evidence showing that the tax deters, or for that matter discriminates against, interstate activities. See supra, at 434-435. Nor is the tax one that, on its face, would seem to call for an assessment measured per mile rather than per truck. See supra, at 435-436. Consequently, we lack any reason to infer that Michigan’s lump-sum levy erects, as in Scheiner, an impermissible discriminatory roadblock.

Petitioners add that Michigan’s fee fails the “internal consistency” test — a test that we have typically used where taxation of interstate transactions is at issue. Generally speaking, that test asks, “What would happen if all States did the same?” See, e. g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U. S. 252, 261 (1989); Jefferson Lines, supra, at 185 (test looks to the structure of the tax to see whether its identical application by every State “would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate”). We must concede that here, as petitioners argue, if all States did the same, an interstate truck would have to pay fees totaling several hundred dollars, or even several thousand dollars, were it to “top off” its business by carrying local loads in many (or even all) other States. But it would have to do so only because it engages in local business in all those States. An interstate firm with local outlets normally expects to pay local fees that are uniformly assessed upon all those who engage in local business, interstate and domestic firms alike. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison, 453 U. S., at 623-624 (dormant Commerce Clause does not seek “to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jefferson Lines, supra, at 187-188 (in context of sales tax, “the Commerce Clause does not forbid the actual assessment of a succession of taxes by different States on distinct events as the same tangible object flows along”). A motor carrier is not special in this respect.

In sum, petitioners have failed to show that Michigan’s fee, which does not seek to tax a share of interstate transactions, which focuses upon local activity, and which is assessed evenhandedly, either burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce, or violates the Commerce Clause in any other relevant way. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) (noting that a tax will be sustained where it is applied to an activity with a “substantial nexus” to the taxing State; where, if applied to interstate activity, it is “fairly apportioned”; where it does not discriminate; and where it is “fairly related to the services provided”).

For these reasons, the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in the judgment.

Michigan imposes a flat fee on trucks that engage in purely intrastate commercial operations. I agree with the Court that this fee does not violate the negative Commerce Clause. Unlike the Court, ante, at 433, 437-438, I reach that determination without adverting to various tests from our wardrobe of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions: the balancing approach from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970), the four-factor test from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), and the internal-consistency test from cases such as American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987). Instead, I ask whether the fee “facially discriminates against interstate commerce” and whether it is “indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court.” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). As the Court correctly concludes, Michigan’s fee meets neither of those conditions. It does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, ante, at 434, and it is distinguishable from petitioners’ best analogue, the fees invalidated in Scheiner, which applied to interstate trucks even when they engaged in no intrastate business, ante, at 436-437.

Justice Thomas,

concurring in the judgment.

I would affirm the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals because “‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application,’ Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute.” Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U. S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).