author: Mr. Justice Marshall

text:
    KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. NEW MEXICO et al.
    No. 74-1488.
    Argued March 23, 1976
    Decided June 17, 1976

      MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Edmund B. Clark, and Dirk D. Snel.

      George T. Harris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Murdaugh Stuart Madden for the Humane Society of the United States; by Paul A. Lenzini for the International Association of Game, Fish, and Conservation Commissioners; and by Thomas H. Wakefield for Hope Ryden.

        Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by 7. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General, and Sterling A. Case, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming et al.; by Robert List, Attorney General, for the Nevada State Board of Agriculture; by Jack E. Hull and John C. Miller for the Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards et al.; and by David R. Belding and William I. Althen for Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc.

   Mr. Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this case is whether Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution in enacting the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act.

I

The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. 649, 16 U. S. C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted in 1971 to protect “all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States,” § 2 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1332 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.” §1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act provides that all such horses and burros on the public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or by the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service are committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are “directed to protect and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands ... in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. S. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If protected horses or burros “stray from public lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal marshal or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed.” § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

Section 6, 16 U. S. C. § 1336 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Secretaries to promulgate regulations, see 36 CFR § 231.11 (1975) (Agriculture); 43 CFR pt. 4710 (1975) (Interior), and to enter into cooperative agreements with other landowners and with state and local governmental agencies in furtherance of the Act’s purposes. On August 7, 1973, the Secretaries executed such an agreement with the New Mexico Livestock Board, the agency charged with enforcing the New Mexico Estray Law, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 47-14-1 et seq. (1966). The agreement acknowledged the authority of the Secretaries to manage and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States within the State and established a procedure for evaluating the claims of private parties to ownership of such animals.

The Livestock Board terminated the agreement three months later. Asserting that the Federal Government lacked power to control wild horses and burros on the public lands of the United States unless the animals were moving in interstate commerce or damaging the public lands and that neither of these bases of regulation was available here, the Board notified the Secretaries of its intent

“to exercise all regulatory, impoundment and sale powers which it derives from the New Mexico Estray Law, over all estray horses, mules or asses found running at large upon public or private lands within New Mexico .... This includes the right to go upon Federal or State lands to take possession of said horses or burros, should the Livestock Board so desire.” App. 67, 72.

The differences between the Livestock Board and the Secretaries came to a head in February 1974. On February 1, 1974, a New Mexico rancher, Kelley Stephenson, was informed by the BLM that several unbranded burros had been seen near Taylor Well, where Stephenson watered his cattle. Taylor Well is on federal property, and Stephenson had access to it and some 8,000 surrounding acres only through a grazing permit issued pursuant to § 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1270, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 315b. After the BLM made it clear to Stephenson that it would not remove the burros and after he personally inspected the Taylor Well area, Stephenson complained to the Livestock Board that the burros were interfering with his livestock operation by molesting his cattle and eating their feed.

Thereupon the Board rounded up and removed 19 unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law. Each burro was seized on the pub-lie lands of the United States and, as the director of the Board conceded, each burro fit the definition of a wild free-roaming burro under § 2 (b) of the Act. App. 43. On February 18, 1974, the Livestock Board, pursuant to its usual practice, sold the burros at a public auction. After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction under the Act and demanded that the Board recover the animals and return them to the public lands.

On March 4, 1974, appellees filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court held the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) from enforcing its provisions. The court found that the Act “conflicts with . . . the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals,” New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (1975), and is in excess of Congress’ power under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. That Clause, the court found, enables Congress to regulate wild animals found on the public land only for the “protection of the public lands from damage of some kind.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this power was exceeded in this case because “[t]he statute is aimed at protecting the wild horses and burros, not at protecting the land they live on.” Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction, 423 U. S. 818 (1975), and we now reverse.

II

The Property Clause of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In passing the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, Congress deemed the regulated animals “an integral part of the natural system of the public lands” of the United States, § 1, 16 U. S. C, § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), and found that their management was necessary “for achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 5 (1971). According to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats, “contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 69, 122, 128, 138, 169, 183 (1971). Indeed, Congress concluded, the wild free-roaming horses and burros “are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Despite their importance, the Senate committee found:

“[These animals] have been cruelly captured and slain and their carcasses used in the production of pet food and fertilizer. They have been used for target practice and harassed for ‘sport’ and profit. In spite of public outrage, this bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm belief of the committee that this senseless slaughter must be brought to an end.” S. Rep. No. 92-242, pp. 1-2 (1971).

For these reasons, Congress determined to preserve and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States. The question under the Property Clause is whether this determination can be sustained as a “needful” regulation “respecting” the public lands. In answering this question, we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 537 (1911) United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840).

Appellees argue that the Act cannot be supported by the Property Clause. They contend that the Clause grants Congress essentially two kinds of power: (1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property. According to appellees, the first power is not broad enough to support legislation protecting wild animals that live on federal property; and the second power is not implicated since the Act is designed to protect the animals, which are not themselves federal property, and not the public lands. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Act was not passed in part to protect the public lands of the United States or that Congress cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State. But we need not consider whether the Act can be upheld on either of these grounds, for we reject appellees’ narrow reading of the Property Clause.

Appellees ground their argument on a number of cases that, upon analysis, provide no support for their position. Like the District Court, appellees cite Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928), for the proposition that the Property Clause gives Congress only the limited power to regulate wild animals in order to protect the public lands from damage. But Hunt, which upheld the Government’s right to kill deer that were damaging foliage in the national forests, only holds that damage to the land is a sufficient basis for regulation; it contains no suggestion that it is a necessary one.

Next, appellees refer to Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 89 (1907). The referenced passage in that case states that the Property Clause “clearly . . . does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits.” But this does no more than articulate the obvious: The Property Clause is a grant of power only over federal property. It gives no indication of the kind of “authority” the Clause gives Congress over its property.

Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), is of even less help to appellees. Appellees rely upon the following language from Camfield:

“While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection.” Id., at 525-526 (emphasis added).

Appellees mistakenly read this language to limit Congress’ power to regulate activity on the public lands; in fact, the quoted passage refers to the scope of congressional power to regulate conduct on private land that affects the public lands. And Camfield holds that the Property Clause is broad enough to permit federal regulation of fences built on private land adjoining public land when the regulation is for the protection of the federal property. Camfield contains no suggestion of any limitation on Congress’ power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that the power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits.

Lastly, appellees point to dicta in two cases to the effect that, unless the State has agreed to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, Congress’ rights in its land are “only the rights of an ordinary proprietor . . . .” Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527 (1885). See also Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 264 (1963). In neither case was the power of Congress under the Property Clause at issue or considered and, as we shall see, these dicta fail to account for the raft of cases in which the Clause has been given a broader construction.

In brief, beyond the Fort Leavenworth and Paul dicta, appellees have presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S., at 29-30; Light v. United States, 220 U. S., at 537; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 29. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 294-295 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272, 273 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537.

The decided cases have supported this expansive reading. It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides the basis for governing the Territories of the United States. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 673-674 (1945); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 305 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 149 (1904); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537; Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336-337 (1810). See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 381 (1948). And even over public land within the States, “[t]he general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.” Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands “to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them . . . .” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 405 (1917). And we have approved legislation respecting the public lands “[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers [on the public lands].” Cornfield v. United States, supra, at 525. In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor, and of a legislature over the public domain. Alabama v. Texas, supra, at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 297 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 474 (1915). Although the Property Clause does not authorize “an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State,” it does permit “an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 30 (footnote omitted). In our view, the “complete power” that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there.

Ill

Appellees argue that if we approve the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause, then we have sanctioned an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty, legislative authority, and police power of the State and have wrongly infringed upon the State’s traditional trustee powers over wild animals. The argument appears to be that Congress could obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the public lands in the State only by state consent, and that in the absence of such consent Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law. This argument is without merit.

Appellees’ claim confuses Congress’ derivative legislative powers, which are not involved in this case, with its powers under the Property Clause. Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl, 17, of the Constitution by consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the State's subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land. Paul v. United States, 371 U. S., at 264; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., at 541-542. In either case, the legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, e. g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U. S. 285 (1943), to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority. E. g., Paul v. United States, supra, at 265; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S. 518, 528-530 (1938); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 147-149 (1937).

But while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State’s consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers under the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Washington, 302 U. S. 186, 197 (1937); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S., at 403-405; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 283 (1899). And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S., at 100; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 359 (1922). As we said in Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S., at 526, in response to a somewhat different claim: “A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.”

Thus, appellees' assertion that “[ajbsent state consent by complete cession of jurisdiction of lands to the United States, exclusive jurisdiction does not accrue to the federal landowner with regard to federal lands within the borders of the State,” Brief for Appellees 24, is completely beside the point; and appellees’ fear that the Secretary’s position is that “the Property Clause totally exempts federal lands within state borders from state legislative powers, state police powers, and all rights and powers of local sovereignty and jurisdiction of the states,” id., at 16, is totally unfounded. The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where those state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede. McKelvey v. United States, supra, at 359.

Again, none of the cases relied upon by appellees are to the contrary. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 650 (1930), merely states the rule outlined above that, “without more,” federal ownership of lands within a State does not withdraw those lands from the jurisdiction of the State. Likewise, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, 487-488 (1946), holds only that, in the absence of consent or cession, the Federal Government did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal forest reserve lands in Arkansas and the State retained legislative jurisdiction over those lands. No question was raised regarding Congress’ power to regulate the forest reserves under the Property Clause. And in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 230-231 (1925), the Court found that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction over highways within the Rocky Mountain National Park, not that it lacked the power to do so under the Property Clause.

In short, these cases do not support appellees’ claim that upholding the Act would sanction an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereignty. The Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as it attempts to regulate federally protected animals. And that is but the necessary consequence of valid legislation under the Property Clause.

Appellees’ contention that the Act violates traditional state power over wild animals stands on no different footing. Unquestionably the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 402 (1948); Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 549 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 528 (1896). But, as Geer v. Connecticut cautions, those powers exist only “in so far as [their] exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.” Ibid. “No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife], but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920). Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, precludes a State from imposing prohibitory licensing fees on nonresidents shrimping in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, supra; the Treaty Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, permits Congress to enter into and enforce a treaty to protect migratory birds despite state objections, Missouri v. Holland, supra; and the Property Clause gives Congress the power to thin overpopulated herds of deer on federal lands contrary to state law. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928). We hold today that the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding.

IV

In this case, the New Mexico Livestock Board entered upon the public lands of the United States and removed wild burros. These actions were contrary to the provisions of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. We find that, as applied to this case, the Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. We need not, and do not, decide whether the Property Clause would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications.

Appellees are concerned that the Act's extension of protection to wild free-roaming horses and burros that stray from public land onto private land, § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), will be read to provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse or burro that at any time sets foot upon federal land. While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate in this declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act. We have often declined to decide important questions regarding “the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case,” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954), or in the absence of “an adequate and full-bodied record.” Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 113 (1962). Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426 (1948). We follow that course in this case and leave open the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under the Property Clause.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       The landowner may elect to allow straying wild free-roaming horses and burros to remain on his property, in which case he must so notify the relevant Secretary. He may not destroy any such animals, however. § 4 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

       Under the New Mexico law, an estray is defined as:
      “Any bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at large upon public or private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown in the section where found, or which shall be fifty (50) miles or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico . . . .” N. M. Stat. Ann. §47-14-1 (1966).
      It is not disputed that the animals regulated by the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act are estrays within the meaning of this law.

       The record is somewhat unclear on this point, but appellees conceded at oral argument that all the burros were seized on the public lands of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.

       Appellees are the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Livestock Board, the Board’s director, and a purchaser of three of the burros seized at Taylor Well.

       Since appellees did not file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the District Court’s injunction was limited to the Secretary of the Interior, who is the appellant in this Court.

       The court also held that the Act could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because “all the evidence establishes that the wild burros in question here do not migrate across state lines” and “Congress made no findings to indicate that it was in any way relying on the Commerce Clause in enacting this statute.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239. While the Secretary argues in this Court that the Act is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, we have no occasion to address this contention since we find the Act, as applied, to be a permissible exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause.

       Congress expressly ordered that the animals were to be managed and protected in order “to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. 8. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Cf. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928).

       See infra, at 545-546. The Secretary makes no claim here, however, that the United States owns the wild free-roaming horses and burros found on public land.

       Indeed, Hunt v. United States, supra, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), both relied upon by appellees, are inconsistent with the notion that the United States has only the rights of an ordinary proprietor with respect to its land. An ordinary proprietor may not, contrary to state law, kill game that is damaging his land, as the Government did in Hunt; nor may he prohibit the fencing in of his property without the assistance of state law, as the Government was able to do in Camfield.

       Appellees ask us to declare that the Act is unconstitutional because the animals are not, as Congress found, “fast disappearing from the American scene.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). At the outset, no reason suggests itself why Congress’ power under the Property Clause to enact legislation to protect wild free-roaming horses and burros “from capture, branding, harassment, or death,” ibid., must depend on a finding that the animals are decreasing in number. But responding directly to appellees’ contention, we note that the evidence before Congress on this question was conflicting and that Congress weighed the evidence and made a judgment. See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2, 7, 11-14, 17, 26-32, 80, 87-88, 101, 103, 134-136, 139-141 (1971). What appellees ask is that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of Congress. This we must decline to do. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). See also Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 594 (1939). In any event, we note that Congress has provided for periodic review of the administration of the Act. § 10, 16 U. S. C. §1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

       Article I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power:
      “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”

      The Clause has been broadly construed, and the acquisition by consent or cession of exclusive or partial jurisdiction over properties for any legitimate governmental purpose beyond those itemized is permissible. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S. 518, 528-530 (1938).

       Referring to the Act creating the National Park, the Court said:
      “There is no attempt to give exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, but on the contrary the rights of the State over the roads are left unaffected in terms. Apart from those terms the State denies the power of Congress to curtail its jurisdiction or rights without an act of cession from it and an acceptance by the national government. The statute establishing the park would not be construed to attempt such a result. As the [park superintendent] is undertaking to assert exclusive control and to establish a monopoly in, a matter as to which, if the allegations of the bill are maintained, the State has not surrendered its legislative power, a cause of action is disclosed if we do not look beyond the bill, and it was wrongly dismissed.” 268 U. S., at 231 (citations omitted).
      While Colorado thus asserted that, absent cession, the Federal Government lacked power to regulate the highways within the park, and the Court held that the State was entitled to attempt to prove that it had not surrendered legislative jurisdiction to the United States, at most the case stands for the proposition that where Congress does not purport to override state power over public lands under the Property Clause and where there has been no cession, a federal official lacks power to regulate contrary to state law.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION et al. v. ALGONQUIN SNG, INC., et al.
    No. 75-382.
    Argued April 20, 1976
    Decided June 17, 1976

      Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Lee, Mark L. Evans, Leonard Schaitman, and David M. Cohen.

      Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Harold B. Dondis argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief were S. Stephen Rosenfeld and Thomas R. Kiley, Assistant Attorneys General, James S. Hostetler, William F. Griffin, Jr., and William R. Connole.

        Peter Buck Feller, John D. Heckert, and David M. Repass filed a brief for McClure & Trotter as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 232 (b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 877, as amended by § 127 (d) of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1993, 19 U. S. C. § 1862 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), provides that if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,” the President is authorized to

“take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national security.”

All parties to this case agree that § 232 (b) authorizes the President to adjust the imports of petroleum and petroleum products by imposing quotas on such imports. What we must decide is whether § 232 (b) also authorizes the President to control such imports by imposing on them a system of monetary exactions in the form of license fees.

I

The predecessor statute to § 232 (b) was originally enacted by Congress as § 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, c. 169, 69 Stat. 166 (see n. 21, infra), and amended by § 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-686, 72 Stat. 678. The advisory function currently performed under § 232 (b) by the Secretary of the Treasury was performed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) under the 1955 and 1958 statutes. But, like § 232 (b), those statutes allowed the President, on a finding that imports of an article were threatening “to impair the national security,” to “take such action as he deem[ed] necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article . . . In 1959, President Eisenhower, having been advised by the Director of ODM that “ 'crude oil and the principal crude oil derivatives and products are being imported in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security/ invoked the 1958 version of the provision and established the Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP). Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 3 CFR 11 (1959-1963 Comp.). The MOIP, designed to reduce the gap between domestic supply and demand by encouraging the development of domestic production and refinery capacity, imposed a system of quotas on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products. The program was not wholly successful, however, and in the face of domestic consumption which continued to grow faster than domestic production, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon each felt compelled to amend it by raising the permissible quota levels. App. 211-212.

In light of a Cabinet task force conclusion that the MOIP, as then constituted, was not fulfilling its objectives, President Nixon, acting pursuant to § 232 (b), radically amended the program in 1973. Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). The President suspended existing tariffs on oil imports and provided “for a gradual transition from the existing quota method of adjusting imports of petroleum and petroleum products to a long-term program for adjustment of imports of petroleum and petroleum products through . . . the institution of a system of fees applicable to imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products . . . .” Id., at 32. This amended program established a gradually increasing schedule of license fees for importers. With respect to crude oil, the fee was scheduled to increase from an initial 10% cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 21 cents per barrel on May 1, 1975. With respect to most finished petroleum products, the fee was to rise gradually from 15 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 63 cents per barrel on November 1, 1975. Id., at 36. While initially some oil imports were exempted from the license fee requirements, the exemption levels were scheduled to decrease annually so that by 1980 the fees would be applicable to all oil imports.

President Nixon’s 1973 program apparently did not wholly fulfill the objectives to which it was directed. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting pursuant to § 232 (b), see n. 1, supra, initiated an investigation on January 4, 1975, “to determine the effects on the national security of imports of petroleum and petroleum products.” Memorandum from Secretary of the Treasury Simon to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury MacDonald (Simon Memorandum), App. 154. While § 232 (b) directs the Secretary “if it is appropriate [to do so, to] hold public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice” as part of such an investigation, 19 U. S. C. § 1862 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the Secretary found that such procedures would interfere with “national security interests” and were “inappropriate” in this case. Simon Memorandum, App. 154. The investigation therefore proceeded without any public hearing or call for submissions from interested nongovernmental parties.

The Secretary submitted a report on his investigation to President Ford on January 14, 1975. Intimating that the measures then in force under § 232 (b) had indeed not solved the problems to which they were directed, the Secretary indicated that the United States’ dependence on foreign oil had continued to increase since 1966 and that foreign sources currently accounted for well over a third of domestic consumption. The Secretary concluded that

“crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and products, and related products derived from natural gas and coal tar are being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security [and] the foregoing products are being imported into the United States under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” App. 133.

On the basis of these findings, the Secretary recommended to the President that

“appropriate action be taken to reduce imports of crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and products, and related products derived from natural gas and coal tar into the United States . . . .” Ibid.

The President agreed with the findings of the Secretary’s investigation and concluded that it was “necessary and consistent with the national security to further discourage importation into the United States of petroleum, petroleum products, and related products . . . Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975). Invoking § 232 (b), he issued a Proclamation on January 23, 1975, which, effective immediately, raised the so-called “first-tier” license fees that were imposed in 1973, see supra, at 553, to the maximum levels previously scheduled to be reached only some months later. Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, supra. The Proclamation also imposed on all imported oil, whether covered by the first-tier fees or not, a supplemental fee of $1 per barrel for oil entering the United States on or after February 1, 1975. The supplemental fee was scheduled to rise to $2 a barrel for oil entering after March 1, 1975, and to $3 per barrel for oil entering after April 1, 1975. Finally, the Proclamation reinstated the tariffs that had been suspended in April 1973. Soon after issuance of the Proclamation, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) amended its oil import regulations in order to implement the new program. 40 Fed. Reg. 4771-4776 (1975).

Four days after the Proclamation was issued, respondents — eight States and their Governors, 10 utility companies, and Congressman Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts — challenged the license fees in two suits filed against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the FEA, and the Treasurer of the United States in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they alleged that the imposition of the fees was beyond the President's constitutional and statutory authority, that the fees were imposed without necessary procedural steps having been taken, and that petitioners (hereinafter the Government) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the imposition of the fees.

The District Court denied respondents' motions for preliminary injunctions and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law which, at the request of respondents, it later declared to be final. See 171 U. S-. App. D. C. 113, 124, 126, 518 F. 2d 1051, 1062, 1064 (1975) (appendix to dissenting opinion in Court of Appeals). The court found that § 232 (b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on oil imports. Id., at 128-129, 518 F. 2d, at 1066-1067. It further ruled that the procedures followed by the President and the Secretary of the Treasury in imposing the license fees fully conformed to the requirements of the statute. Id., at 130, 518 F. 2d, at 1068. Finally, the court held that “in view of the emergency nature of the problem and the need for prompt action,” id., at 131, 518 F. 2d, at 1069, the Government was not required to file an environmental impact statement prior to imposition of the fees and hence was not in violation of the NEPA. Ibid.

Respondents’ appeals from these judgments were consolidated with their petitions to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FEA regulations implementing the license fee program. The allegations in the challenges to the regulations were substantially the same as those raised in the District Court actions, adding only a contention that the FEA had failed to follow certain procedural provisions of the Federal Energy Administration Act, 88 Stat. 97, 15 U. S. C. §§761 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp., IV). The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that § 232 (b) does not authorize the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports. 171 U. S. App. D. C. 113, 518 F. 2d 1051 (1975). According to the court, reading the statute to authorize the action taken by the President “would be an anomalous departure” from “the consistently explicit, well-defined manner in which Congress has delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs.” Id., at 117, 518 F. 2d, at 1055. In the court’s view, §232 (b)’s legislative history indicated that Congress’ authorization of the President to “adjust the imports of [an] article” encompassed only the use of “direct” controls such as quotas and did not encompass the use of license fees. Id., at 121, 518 F. 2d, at 1059. Finding no need to address any of the other issues that were raised, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court, instructed that court to enter appropriate relief for respondents, and set aside the challenged FEA regulations.

We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 923 (1975), and now reverse. Both the language of § 232 (b) and its legislative history lead us to conclude that it authorizes the action taken by the President in this case.

II

A

Preliminarily, we reject respondents’ suggestion that we must construe § 232 (b) narrowly in order to avoid “a serious question of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.” Brief for Respondents 42. Even if § 232 (b) is read to authorize the imposition of a license fee system, the standards that it provides the President in its implementation are clearly sufficient to meet any delegation doctrine attack.

In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision empowering the President to increase or decrease import duties in order to equalize the differences between foreign and domestic production costs for similar articles. There, the Court stated:

“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which • the [President] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id., at 409.

Section 232 (b) easily fulfills that test. It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action — inter alia, a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an “article is being imported into the United States in such quantities, or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent “he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.” And § 232 (c), see n. 1, supra, articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under § 232 (b). In light of these factors and our recognition that “[necessity . . . fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules . . . American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946), we see no looming problem of improper delegation that should affect our reading of § 232 (b).

B

In authorizing the President to “take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article and its derivatives,” the language of § 232 (b) seems clearly to grant him a measure of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports. We find no support in the language of the statute for respondents’ contention that the authorization to the President to “adjust” imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods — i. e., quotas — as opposed to monetary methods — i. e., license fees — of effecting such adjustments.

Indeed, reading respondents’ suggested limitation into the word “adjust” would be inconsistent with the range of factors that can trigger the President’s authority under § 232 (b)’s language. Section 232 (b) authorizes the President to act after a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that a given article is being imported “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language reflects Congress’ judgment that “not only the quantity of imports . . . but also the circumstances under which they are coming in: their use, their availability, their character” could endanger the national security and hence should be a potential basis for Presidential action. 104 Cong. Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills). It is most unlikely that Congress would have provided that dangers posed by factors other than the strict quantitative level of imports can justify Presidential action, but that that action must be confined to the imposition of quotas. Unless one assumes, and we do not, that quotas will always be a feasible method of dealing directly with national security threats posed by the “circumstances” under which imports are entering the country, limiting the President to the use of quotas would effectively and artificially prohibit him from directly dealing with some of the very problems against which § 232 (b) is directed.

Turning from § 232’s language to its legislative history, again there is much to suggest that the President’s authority extends to.the imposition of monetary exac-tions — i. e., license fees and duties. The original enactment of the provision in 1955 as well as Congress’ periodic reconsideration of it in subsequent years gives us substantial grounds on which to conclude that its authorization extends beyond the imposition of quotas to the type of action challenged here.

During congressional hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, there was substantial testimony that increased imports were threatening to damage various domestic industries whose viability was perceived to be critical to the national security. In an effort to deal with the problem, the Senate Committee on Finance considered several proposals designed to supplement the existing statutory provision, known as the Sy-mington Amendment that barred reductions in duties “on any article if the President finds that such reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements.” Act of July 1, 1954, Pub. L. 464, § 2, 68 Stat. 360. Among these amendments was one proposed by Senator Neely which provided in relevant part:

“[T]he President shall take such action as is necessary to restrict imports of commodities whenever such imports threaten to retard the domestic development and expansion or maintenance of domestic production of natural resource commodities or any other commodities which he determines to be essential to the national security....” Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1955) (emphasis added).

In explaining what action would be authorized under the Neely Amendment, Senator Martin, one of its cosponsors, explained that it authorized the President “to take such action as is necessary, including the imposition of import quotas or the increase in duties, to protect the domestic industry concerned.” Id., at 2097 (emphasis added). Thus, the Neely Amendment clearly would have given the President the authority to impose monetary exactions as a method of restricting imports.

While the Neely Amendment was not reported out of committee, it is strikingly similar in language to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment — the substitute provision that was reported out and eventually enacted into law. The Byrd-Millikin Amendment authorized the President, after appropriate recommendations had been made by the Director of the ODM, to “take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security.” S. Rep. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1955). Given the similarity in the operative language of the two proposals, it is fair to infer that if, as Senator Martin stated, the Neely Amendment was intended to authorize the imposition of monetary ex-actions, so too was the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.

The debate on the Senate floor lends further support to this reading of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Millikin himself stated without contradiction that the Amendment authorized the President “to take whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports . . . [including the use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other methods of import restriction.” 101 Cong. Rec. 5299 (1955). As a statement of one of the legislation’s sponsors, this explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951).

Senator Millikin’s statement does not stand alone. Senator Byrd, another of the Amendment’s sponsors, explained in colloquy with Senator Saltonstall that the Amendment put all commodities “on the same basis as agricultural commodities. It simply leaves to the President the power, in his discretion, to decide whether to impose a quota or to reduce the imports.” 101 Cong. Rec. 5297 (1955) (emphasis added). The reference in the emphasized phrase is to § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the subject of an earlier exchange between Senator Byrd and Senator Thye. 101 Cong. Rec. 5296 (1955). Section 22 allows the President under certain circumstances to “impose such fees ... or such quantitative limitations” as he finds necessary to> protect the domestic production of an agricultural commodity. 49 Stat. 773, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 624 (b) (emphasis added). Senator Byrd's comparison of § 22 and the Byrd-Millikin Amendment thus appears to reflect his understanding that Presidential authority under the Amendment extended to the imposition of fees.

Finally, we note two other statements on the floor of the Senate which lend direct support to the Government’s reading of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Bennett stated that it was his understanding that the amendment would authorize use of “the entire scope of tariffs, quotas, restrictions, stockpiling, and any other variation of these programs in order to protect a particular industry.” 101 Cong. Rec. 5588 (1955). And Senator Barkley, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, expressed his understanding that the Amendment would allow the President to “impose such quotas or take such other steps as he may believe to be desirable in order to maintain the national security.” Id., at 5298 (emphasis added).

In the House debate following Senate passage of the Byrd-Milliken Amendment, id., at 5655, and its acceptance with a minor modification by the House conferees, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 745, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 6-7 (1955), we find further indications that the Amendment authorized the imposition of monetary exactions. In explaining the provisions of the Amendment, Congressman Cooper, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and a member of the Conference Committee, indicated his concern that “any modification of a duty on imports or a quota would [because of retaliation from abroad] inevitably result in a curtailment of exports by the United States.” 101 Cong. Rec. 8161 (1955) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as part of his explanation of the Amendment, Cooper presented a letter he had received from Gerald D. Morgan, Special Counsel to the President, which expressed the administration's understanding that under the Amendment, the President’s action to adjust imports “could take any form that was appropriate to the situation.” Id., at 8162. Thus, when Congress finally enacted the Byrd-Millikin Amendment’s national security provision, 69 Stat. 166, as part of the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, not only had Members of both Houses indicated that the provision authorized the imposition of monetary exactions, but the Executive Branch, too, had advised the Congress of its understanding of the broad scope of the authority granted by the Amendment.

Three years later, in the context of its consideration of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Congress re-examined the Byrd-Millikin national security provision. In the course of its deliberations, the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee had before it a 1957 report submitted to it by the ODM, expressing the views of the Executive Branch that “the imposition of new or increased tariff duties on imports . . . [was] authorized by the language adopted.” Fully aware that the Executive Branch then, as in 1955, understood the provision as authorizing the imposition of monetary exactions, the Committee did not recommend any change in its wording to confine more narrowly the bounds of its authorization. On the contrary, the Committee in its report indicated with approval its own understanding that the statute provided “those best able to judge national security needs . . . [with] a way of taking whatever action is needed to avoid a threat to the national security through imports.” H. R. Rep. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1958) (emphasis added).

While Congress in 1958 made several procedural changes in the statute and established criteria to guide the President’s determination as to whether action under the provision might be necessary, it added no limitations with respect to the type of action that the President was authorized to take. § 8, 72 Stat. 678. The 1958 reenactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the President under appropriate conditions to “take such action” “as he deems necessary to adjust the imports . . . .” Ibid.

When the national security provision next came up for re-examination, it was re-enacted without material change as § 232 (b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In its analysis the Court of Appeals placed great emphasis on the fact that in the course of Congress’ deliberations the Senate passed and the Conference Committee deleted, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1962), an amendment which provided:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may, when he finds it in the national interest, proclaim with respect to any article imported into the United States—
"(1) the increase of any existing duty on such article to such rate as he finds necessary;
“(2) the imposition of a duty on such article (if it is not otherwise subject to duty) at such rate as he finds necessary, and
“(3) the imposition of such other import restrictions as he finds necessary.” 108 Cong. Rec. 19573 (1962).

The Court of Appeals inferred from the rejection of this amendment that Congress understood the then existing grant of authority to be limited to the imposition of quotas. According to the court, the amendment would have “explicitly [given] the President the same authority he claims derives implicitly from § [232 (b),]” 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 121, 518 F. 2d, at 1059, and Congress’ refusal to enact the amendment was tantamount to a rejection of the Government’s interpretation of the statute.

We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the proposed amendment. The amendment was in reality far more than an articulation of the authority that the Government finds to be contained in § 232 (b). Unlike § 232 (b), the rejected proposal would not have required a prior investigation and findings by an executive department as a prerequisite to Presidential action. Moreover, the broad “national interest” language of the proposal, together with its lack of any standards for implementing that language, stands in stark contrast with §232 (b)’s narrower criterion of “national security” and § 232 (c)’s articulation of standards to guide the invocation of the President’s powers under §232 (b). In light of these clear differences between the rejected proposal and § 232 (b), we decline to infer from the fact that the Senate amendment was proposed, or from the fact that it was rejected, that Congress felt that the President had no power to- impose monetary exactions under § 232 (b).

Only a few months after President Nixon invoked the provision to initiate the import license fee system challenged here, Congress once again re-enacted the Presidential authorization encompassed in § 232 (b) without material change. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1993. Making no mention of the President’s action, both the Senate Committee report and the conference report recited the language of the statute itself to reaffirm that under § 232 (b) the President “may . . . take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary, to adjust imports so as to prevent impairment of the national security.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1644, p. 29 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1298, pp. 96-97 (1974). The congressional acquiescence in President Nixon’s action manifested by the re-enactment of § 232 (b) provides yet further corroboration that § 232 (b) was understood and intended to authorize the imposition of monetary exactions as a means of adjusting imports.

Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 232 (b) belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to limit the President’s authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar the President from imposing a license fee system like the one challenged here. To the contrary, the provision’s original enactment, and its subsequent re-enactment in 1958, 1962, and 1974 in the face of repeated expressions from Members of Congress and the Executive Branch as to their broad understanding of its language, all lead to the conclusion that § 232 (b) does in fact authorize the actions of the President challenged here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary cannot stand.

C

A final word is in order. Our holding today is a limited one. As respondents themselves acknowledge, a license fee as much as a quota has its initial and direct impact on imports, albeit on their price as opposed to their quantity. Brief for Respondents 26. As a consequence, our conclusion here, fully supported by the relevant legislative history, that the imposition of a license fee is authorized by § 232 (b) in no way compels the further conclusion that any action the President might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

       Section 232 (b) provides in full:
      “Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the 'Secretary') shall immediately make an appropriate investigation, in the course of which he shall seek information and advice from, and shall consult with, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and other appropriate officers of the United States, to determine the effects on the national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or motion. The Secretary shall, if it is appropriate and after reasonable notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice relevant to such investigation. The Secretary shall report the findings of his investigation under this subsection with respect to the effect of the importation of such article in such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security and, based on such findings, his recommendation for action or inaction under this section to the President within one year after receiving an application from an interested party or otherwise beginning an investigation under this subsection. If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President and the President shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security, unless the President determines that the article is not being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”
      Section 232 '(e) of the Act, 19 U. S. C. § 1862 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) provides the President and the Secretary of the Treasury with guidance as to some of the factors to be considered in implementing §232 (b). It provides:
      “For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and the President shall, in the light of the requirements of national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national security requirements. In the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.”

       See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question 128 (1970).

       Under President Nixon’s plan, the fee for motor gasoline was scheduled to reach its maximum of 63 cents on May 1,1975. App. 97.

       The Proclamation did not alter the schedule by- which exemptions from the first-tier fees were not to be eliminated until 1980.

       The supplemental fee increases scheduled to go into effect in March and April were twice deferred. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4355, 3A CFR 26 (1975); Presidential Proclamation No. 4370, 3A CFR 45 (1975). While the $2 fee finally went into effect on June 1, 1975, Presidential Proclamation No. 4377, 3A CFR 53 (1975), it was never increased to $3. Indeed, on January 3, 1976, President Ford eliminated the $2 fee. Presidential Proclamation No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977). See n. 8, infra.

       The States joining in the suit together with their Governors were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The State of Minnesota intervened as a plaintiff after the complaint was filed and is also a respondent here.

       The 10 utility companies are Algonquin SNG, Inc., New England Power Co., New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co,, Cambridge Electric Light Co., Canal Electric Co., Montaup Electric Co., Connecticut Light and Power Co., Hartford Electric Light Co., Western Massachusetts Electric Light Co., and Holyoke Water Power Co.

       Subsequent to our granting certiorari, the President signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 871, 42 U. S. C. § 6201 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). That Act is aimed at encouraging domestic oil production by gradually decontrolling the price of domestically produced crude oil. On January 3, 1976, indicating that “the purposes of the supplemental [oil import license] fee” will be served by the Act, the President announced the elimination of the supplemental fees imposed by Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975). Presidential Proclamation No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977). He did not, however, eliminate the “first-tier” fees originally imposed by Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). Since respondents seek to enjoin the first-tier as well as the supplemental fees, the question here whether § 232 (b) grants the President authority to impose license fees remains a live controversy.

       Respondents’ suits are not barred by the Anti-In junction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a), which in relevant part provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person The Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits brought to restrain assessment of taxes assessable under the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1939. 26 U. S. C. §§7421 (a), 7851 (a)(6)(A), 7851 (a)(6) (C) (iv). The license fees in this case are assessed under neither Code but rather under the authority conferred on the President by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974. The fees are therefore not “taxes” within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.

       Respondents rely on our decision in National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974), to support their delegation doctrine argument. But we find that case clearly distinguishable from the one before us today. In National Cable Television, we held that the fees to be imposed on community antenna television systems should be measured by the “value to the recipient” even though the language of the general statute allowing fee setting by federal agencies, 31 U. S. C. § 483a, permits consideration not only of “value to the recipient” but also of “public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts.” The Court’s conclusion that the words of the last-quoted phrase were not relevant to the CATV situation was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid any delegation doctrine problem that might have -been presented by a contrary conclusion. 415 IT. S., at 342. But what might be considered the open-ended nature of the phrase “public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts” stands in contrast to §232 (b)’s more limited authorization of the President to act only to the extent necessary to eliminate a threat of impairment to the national security, and §232 (c)’s articulation of standards to guide the President in making the decision whether to act. See n. 1, supra.

       The amount of oil exempted from the “first-tier” license fees, see supra, at 553, imposed in 1973 varies among five geographical districts within the Nation. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975); Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). Respondents seize on this fact to argue that the “first-tier” fee schedule contravenes Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution which requires that import duties be uniform throughout the United States. But that issue is not properly before the Court. Sustaining respondents’ Uniformity Clause argument would call, not for invalidation of the entire license fee scheme, but only for elimination of the geographical differences in the exemptions allowed under it. This would represent not an affirmance of the judgments below, which effectively invalidated the entire scheme and its implementing regulations, but rather a modification of those judgments. But since respondents filed no cross-petition for certiorari, they are at this point precluded from seeking such modification. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 381 n. 4 (1970).

       See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 1 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1006 (analytical balance industry), 1264 (petroleum industry) (1955); Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 602 (lead and zinc mining industry), 721 (coal mining industry) (1955).

       The Symington Amendment is currently codified in somewhat modified form at 19 U. S. C. § 1862 (a).

       In contrast to the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Ways and Means concluded that the Symington Amendment was adequate to deal with any potential threats to the national security posed by foreign imports. H. R. Rep. No. 50, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1955).

       A separate portion of the Neely Amendment would have placed quotas on petroleum imports.

       Unlike the Neely Amendment, see n. 15, supra, the Byrd-Millikin Amendment did not single out any named industries for protection by quotas.

       Differing with the Court of Appeals, we do not believe that the fact that Senator Millikin represented a State that might have benefited from an expansive reading of the statute “blur[s] [the] probative value,” 171 U. S. App. D. C. 113, 120, 518 F. 2d 1051, 1058 (1975), of his explanation. Many if not most pieces of legislation are sponsored by Members of Congress whose constituents have a special interest in their passage, but we have never let this fact diminish the weight we give a sponsor’s statements.

       Moreover, Senator Byrd’s reference in the above-quoted exchange to the power of the President under the Amendment “to impose a quota or to reduce the imports,” 101 Cong. Ree. 5297 (1955), also suggests that he imderstood that power to extend beyond the imposition of quotas. See Note, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 432, 435 n. 31 (1975).

       The Court of Appeals characterized Senator Bennett’s remarks as going to “the entire bill and other existing laws.” 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 119, 518 F. 2d, at 1057. Our examination of the context of his remarks persuades us, however, that they were more probably made with specific reference to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.

       A copy of the Morgan letter was also sent to Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. See 101 Cong. Rec. 8162 (1955).

       As finally enacted the Amendment provided:
      “In order to further the policy and purpose of this section, whenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has reason to believe that any article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President, and if the President agrees that there is reason for such belief, the President shall cause an immediate investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis of such investigation, and the report to him of the findings and recommendations made in connection therewith, the President finds that the article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security.”

       We are not unmindful that, as respondents point out, much of the congressional debate referred to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment in the context of giving the President the power to impose import quotas. See, e. g., 101 Cong. Rec. 5572 (1955) (remarles of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 5582, 5584 (remarks of Sen. Douglas); id., at 5593 (remarks of Sen. Monroney). But nowhere do the congressional debates reflect an understanding that under the Amendment the President’s authority was to be limited to the imposition of quotas. In light of this fact, we feel fortified in attaching substantial weight to the positive indications discussed above that the authority was not so limited.

       Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on United States Foreign Trade Policy Collected by the Staff for the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee 643 (1958).

       Indeed, while under the 1955 provision the President was authorized to act only on a finding that “quantities” of imports threatened to impair the national security, the 1958 provision also authorized Presidential action on a finding that an article is being imported “under such circumstances” as to threaten to impair the national security. 72 Stat. 678. See supra, at 561.