author: Justice Souter Justice Thomas,

text:
    LOPEZ v. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL
    No. 05-547.
    Argued October 3, 2006
    Decided December 5, 2006

      Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 60.

      Robert A. Long, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Theodore P. Metzler.

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorneys General Keister and Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Patricia A. Millett, and Donald E. Keener.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and David W. DeBruin; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah; for the Center for Court Innovation et al. by Nancy Morawetz; for Former General Counsels of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by Neal Mollen; for Human Rights First by Linda T. Coberly and Gene C. Schaerr; and for the NYSDA Immigrant Defense Project et al. by Christopher J. Meade, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Marianne C. Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Don Clemmer, Deputy Attorney General, and Amy Warr, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas,
        Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Mark L. Shwrtlejf of Utah, and Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp.

   Justice Souter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question raised is whether conduct made a felony under state law but a misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act is a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2). We hold it is not.

I

A

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines the term “aggravated felony” by a list that mentions “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” § 101(a)(43)(B), as added by §7342, 102 Stat. 4469, and as amended by § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4320, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). The general phrase “illicit trafficking” is left undefined, but § 924(c)(2) of Title 18 identifies the subcategory by defining “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” or under either of two other federal statutes having no bearing on this case. Following the listing, § 101(a)(43) of the INA provides in its penultimate sentence that “[t]he term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law” or, in certain circumstances, “the law of a foreign country.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43).

An aggravated felony on a criminal record has worse collateral effects than a felony conviction simple. Under the immigration statutes, for example, the Attorney General’s discretion to cancel the removal of a person otherwise deportable does not reach a convict of an aggravated felony. § 1229b(a)(3). Nor is an aggravated felon eligible for asylum. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). And under the sentencing law, the Federal Guidelines attach special significance to the “aggravated felony” designation: a conviction of unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States receives an eight-level increase for a prior aggravated felony conviction, but only four levels for “any other felony.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2L1.2 (Nov. 2005) (hereinafter USSG); id., comment., n. 3 (adopting INA definition of aggravated felony).

B

Although petitioner Jose Antonio Lopez entered the United States illegally in 1986, in 1990 he became a legal permanent resident. In 1997, he was arrested on state charges in South Dakota, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting another person’s possession of cocaine, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. See S. D. Codified Laws § 22-42-5 (1988); § 22-6-1 (Supp. 1997); § 22-3-3 (1988). He was released for good conduct after 15 months.

After his release, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began removal proceedings against Lopez, on two grounds: that his state conviction was a controlled substance violation, see 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and was also for an aggravated felony, see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lopez conceded the controlled substance violation but contested the aggravated felony determination, which would disqualify him from discretionary cancellation of removal. See § 1229b(a)(3). At first, the Immigration Judge agreed with Lopez that his state offense was not an aggravated felony because the conduct it proscribed was no felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). But after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) switched its position on the issue, the same judge ruled that Lopez’s drug crime was an aggravated felony after all, owing to its being a felony under state law. See Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (2002) (announcing that BIA decisions would conform to the applicable Circuit law); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F. 3d 308 (CA8 1997) (per curiam) (holding state felony possession offenses are aggravated felonies). That left Lopez ineligible for cancellation of removal, and the judge ordered him removed. The BIA affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA, 417 F. 3d 934 (CA8 2005).

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits about the proper understanding of conduct treated as a felony by the State that convicted a defendant of committing it, but as a misdemeanor under the CSA. 547 U. S. 1054 (2006). We now reverse.

II

The INA makes Lopez guilty of an aggravated felony if he has been convicted of “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ... including,” but not limited to, “a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B). Lopez’s state conviction was for helping someone else possess cocaine in South Dakota, which state law treated as the equivalent of possessing the drug, S. D. Codified Laws §22-3-3, a state felony, §22-42-5. Mere possession is not, however, a felony under the federal CSA, see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a), although possessing more than what one person would have for himself will support conviction for the federal felony of possession with intent to distribute, see § 841 (2000 ed. and Supp. Ill); United States v. Kates, 174 F. 3d 580,582 (CA5 1999) (per curiam) (“Intent to distribute may be inferred from the possession of a quantity of drugs too large to be used by the defendant alone”).

Despite this federal misdemeanor treatment, the Government argues that possession’s felonious character as a state crime can turn it into an aggravated felony under the INA. There, it says, illicit trafficking includes a drug trafficking crime as defined in federal Title 18. Title 18 defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 801 et seq.),” § 924(c)(2), and the CSA punishes possession, albeit as a misdemeanor, see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). That is enough, says the Government, because § 924(c)(2) requires only that the offense be punishable, not that it be punishable as a federal felony. Hence, a prior conviction in state court will satisfy the felony element because the State treats possession that way.

There are a few things wrong with this argument, the first being its incoherence with any commonsense conception of “illicit trafficking,” the term ultimately being defined. The everyday understanding of “trafficking” should count for a lot here, for the statutes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what Congress probably meant. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). And ordinarily “trafficking” means some sort of commercial dealing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1534 (8th ed. 2004) (defining to “traffic” as to “trade or deal in (goods, esp. illicit drugs or other contraband)”); see also Urena-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 341 F. 3d 51,57 (CA1 2003) (similar definition); State v. Ezell, 321 S. C. 421, 425, 468 S. E. 2d 679, 681 (App. 1996) (same). Commerce, however, was no part of Lopez’s South Dakota offense of helping someone else to possess, and certainly it is no element of simple possession, with which the State equates that crime. Nor is the anomaly of the Government’s reading limited to South Dakota cases: while federal law typically treats trafficking offenses as felonies and nontrafficking offenses as misdemeanors, several States deviate significantly from this pattern.

Reading § 924(c) the Government’s way, then, would often turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us very wary of the Government’s position. Cf. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1,11 (2004) (“[W]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence’”). Which is not to deny that the Government might still be right; Humpty Dumpty used a word, to mean “‘just what [he chose] it to mean — neither more nor less,’” and legislatures, too, are free to be unorthodox. Congress can define an aggravated felony of illicit trafficking in an unexpected way. But Congress would need to tell us so, and there are good reasons to think it was doing no such thing here.

First, an offense that necessarily counts as “illicit trafficking” under the INA is a “drug trafficking crime” under § 924(c), that is, a “felony punishable under the [CSA],” § 924(c)(2). And if we want to know what felonies might qualify, the place to go is to the definitions of crimes punishable as felonies under the CSA; where else would one naturally look? Although the Government would have us look to state law, we suspect that if Congress had meant us to do that it would have found a much less misleading way to make its point. Indeed, other parts of §924 expressly refer to guilt under state law, see §§ 924(g)(3), (k)(2), and the implication confirms that the reference solely to a “felony punishable under the [CSA]” in § 924(c)(2) is to a crime punishable as a felony under the federal Act. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony it does not count.

The Government stresses that the text does not read “punishable as a felony,” and that by saying simply “punishable” Congress left the door open to counting state felonies, so long as they would be punishable at all under the CSA. But we do not normally speak or write the Government’s way. We do not use a phrase like “felony punishable under the [CSA]” when we mean to signal or allow a break between the noun “felony” and the contiguous modifier “punishable under the [CSA],” let alone a break that would let us read the phrase as if it said “felony punishable under the CSA whether or not as a felony.” Regular usage points in the other direction, and when we read “felony punishable under the ... Act,” we instinctively understand “felony punishable as such under the Act” or “felony as defined by the Act.” Without some further explanation, using the phrase to cover even a misdemeanor punishable under the Act would be so much trickery, violating “the cardinal rule that statutory language must be read in context.” General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581,596 (2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). That is why our interpretive regime reads whole sections of a statute together to fix on the meaning of any one of them, and the last thing this approach would do is divorce a noun from the modifier next to it without some extraordinary reason.

The Government thinks it has a good enough reason for doing just that, in the IN A provision already mentioned, that the term “aggravated felony” “applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). But before this provision is given the Government’s expansive treatment, it makes sense to ask whether it would have some use short of wrenching the expectations raised by normal English usage, and in fact it has two perfectly straightforward jobs to do: it provides that a generic description of “an offense ... in this paragraph,” one not specifically couched as a state offense or a federal one, covers either one, and it confirms that a state offense whose elements include the elements of a felony punishable under the CSA is an aggravated felony. Thus, if Lopez’s state crime actually fell within the general term “illicit trafficking,” the state felony conviction would count as an “aggravated felony,” regardless of the existence of a federal felony counterpart; and a state offense of possessing more than five grams of cocaine base is an aggravated felony because it is a felony under the CSA, 21 U. S. C. § 844(a).

The Government’s reliance on the penultimate sentence of 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43) is misplaced for a second reason. The Government tries to justify its unusual reading of a defined term in the criminal code on the basis of a single sentence in the INA. But nothing in the penultimate sentence of § 1101(a)(43) suggests that Congress changed the meaning of “felony punishable under the [CSA]” when it took that phrase from Title 18 and incorporated it into Title 8’s definition of “aggravated felony.” Yet the Government admits it has never begun a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying “drug trafficking crime” was a state felony but a federal misdemeanor. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-36. This is telling: the failure of even a single eager Assistant United States Attorney to act on the Government’s interpretation of “felony punishable under the [CSA]” in the very context in which that phrase appears in the United States Code belies the Government’s claim that its interpretation is the more natural one.

Finally, the Government’s reading would render the law of alien removal, see 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3), and the law of sentencing for illegal entry into the country, see USSG §2L1.2, dependent on varying state criminal classifications even when Congress has apparently pegged the immigration statutes to the classifications Congress itself chose. It may not be all that remarkable that federal consequences of state crimes will vary according to state severity classification when Congress describes an aggravated felony in generic terms, without express reference to the definition of a crime in a federal statute, (as in the case of “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”). But it would have been passing strange for Congress to intend any such result when a state criminal classification is at odds with a federal provision that the INA expressly provides as a specific example of an “aggravated felony” (like the § 924(c)(2) definition of “drug trafficking crime”). We cannot imagine that Congress took the trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors if it meant courts to ignore it whenever a State chose to punish a given act more heavily.

Two examples show the untoward consequences of the Government’s approach. Consider simple possession of marijuana. Not only is it a misdemeanor under the CSA, see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a), but the INA expressly excludes “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less” from the controlled substance violations that are grounds for deportation, 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Yet by the Government’s lights, if a State makes it a felony to possess a gram of marijuana the congressional judgment is supplanted, and a state convict is subject to mandatory deportation because the alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal. See § 1229b(a)(3). There is no hint in the statute’s text that Congress was courting any such state-by-state disparity.

The situation in reverse flouts probability just as much. Possessing more than five grams of cocaine base is a felony under federal law. See 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). If a State drew the misdemeanor-felony line at six grams plus, a person convicted in state court of possessing six grams would not be guilty of an aggravated felony on the Government’s reading, which makes the law of the convicting jurisdiction dispositive. See Brief for Respondent 48. Again, it is just not plausible that Congress meant to authorize a State to overrule its judgment about the consequences of federal offenses to which its immigration law expressly refers.

True, the argument is not all one-sided. The Government points out that some States graduate offenses of drug possession from misdemeanor to felony depending on quantity, whereas Congress generally treats possession alone as a misdemeanor whatever the amount (but leaves it open to charge the felony of possession with intent to distribute when the amount is large). Thus, an alien convicted by a State of possessing large quantities of drugs would escape the aggravated felony designation simply for want of a federal felony defined as possessing a substantial amount. This is so, but we do not weigh it as heavily as the anomalies just mentioned on the other side. After all, Congress knows that any resort to state law will implicate some disuniformity in state misdemeanor-felony classifications, but that is no reason to think Congress meant to allow the States to supplant its own classifications when it specifically constructed its immigration law to turn on them.

In sum, we hold that a state offense constitutes a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

dissenting.

Jose Antonio Lopez pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine, a felony under South Dakota law. The Court holds that Lopez’s conviction does not constitute an “aggravated felony” because federal law would classify Lopez’s possession offense as a misdemeanor. I respectfully dissent.

I

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). As relevant to this case, the INA defines an “aggravated felony” as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance... including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” § 1101(a)(43)(B). And “the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act....” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2).

Lopez’s state felony offense qualifies as a “drug trafficking crime” as defined in § 924(c)(2). A plain reading of this definition identifies two elements: First, the offense must be a felony; second, the offense must be capable of punishment under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). No one disputes that South Dakota punishes Lopez’s crime as a felony. See S. D. Codified Laws § 22-42-5 (1988). Likewise, no one disputes that the offense was capable of punishment under the CSA. See 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). Lopez’s possession offense therefore satisfies both elements, and the inquiry should end there.

The Court, however, takes the inquiry further by reasoning that only federal felonies qualify as drug trafficking crimes. According to the Court, the definition of drug trafficking crime contains an implied limitation: “any felony punishable [as a felony] under the” CSA. The text does not support this interpretation. Most obviously, the language “as a felony” appears nowhere in § 924(c)(2). Without doubt, Congress could have written the definition with this limitation, but it did not.

Furthermore, Lopez’s suggested addition conflicts with the clear meaning of § 924(c)(2), which extends to both state and federal felonies. Specifically, the definition broadly encompasses “any felony” capable of being punished under the CSA. 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2) (emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning____” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997); see also Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 385, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The broad phrase ‘any court’ unambiguously includes all judicial bodies with jurisdiction to impose the requisite conviction...” (footnote omitted)). The term “felony” takes its meaning from Title 18, which classifies crimes as felonies when punishable by death or greater than one year of imprisonment. § 3559(a). “[A]ny felony” therefore includes both federal and state felonies: The classification depends only on the authorized term of imprisonment. Accordingly, by the plain terms of § 924(c)(2), conduct prohibited by the CSA may qualify as a “drug trafficking crime” if under either federal law or state law the conduct is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

This interpretation finds support in other provisions in which Congress placed limits on the types of drug trafficking crimes eligible for consideration. In particular, § 924(c)(1)(A) proscribes the use or possession of a firearm “during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime . .. for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See also 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(5) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (using identical language in proscribing the use or possession of “armor piercing ammunition”). The Court has previously interpreted this language to limit “any . . . drug trafficking crime” to federal crimes. Gonzales, supra, at 5. This language, therefore, acts as a jurisdictional limitation, carving out the subset of federal drug trafficking crimes and making only those eligible for use in §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(5). No similar federal-crime limitation appears in § 924(c)(2). Interpreting the term “drug trafficking crime,” as defined in § 924(c)(2), to reach only federal felonies would render superfluous the federal-crime limitations in these other provisions. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (counseling against interpretations that result in surplus language).

This interpretation also finds support in the INA, which lists “illicit trafficking” and its subset of “drug trafficking crime[s]” as aggravated felonies. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). The INA considers these offenses aggravated felonies “whether in violation of Federal or State law . . . .” §1101(a)(43) (penultimate sentence). Thus, by incorporating §924(c)(2)’s definition of “drug trafficking crime,” the INA supports and confirms the conclusion that the definition of “drug trafficking crime” applies to both federal and state felonies.

Moreover, the INA isolates the relevant inquiry to the prosecuting jurisdiction. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Title 8 makes an alien eligible for deportation only upon a conviction for an “aggravated felony.” The conviction requirement suggests that the jurisdiction issuing the conviction determines whether the offense is a felony. This result makes sense. When faced with an actual conviction, it would be unusual to ask, hypothetically, whether that conviction would have been a felony in a different jurisdiction. Furthermore, that hypothetical inquiry could cause significant inconsistencies. For instance, where a State convicts an alien of a misdemeanor drug crime, but federal law classifies the crime as a felony, the misdemeanor conviction would constitute an aggravated felony. This anomaly does not arise when relying on the prosecuting jurisdiction’s classification of the crime.

II

The Court’s approach is unpersuasive. At the outset of its analysis, the Court avers that it must look to the ordinary meaning of “illicit trafficking” because “the statutes in play do not define the term.” Ante, at 53. That statement is incorrect. Section 1101(a)(43)(B) of Title 8 clearly defines “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” at least in part, as “a drug trafficking crime (os defined in section 92J)(c) of title 18).” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, whatever else “illicit trafficking” might mean, it must include anything defined as a “drug trafficking crime” in § 924(c)(2). Rather than grappling with this definition of the relevant term, the Court instead sets up a conflicting straw man definition.

The majority states that the ordinary meaning of “illicit trafficking” involves “some sort of commercial dealing.” Ante, at 53. Because mere possession does not constitute commercial dealing, the Court concludes that Lopez’s possession offense cannot qualify as an “illicit trafficking” offense— or, by implication, a “drug trafficking crime.” Yet even the Court admits that the term “drug trafficking crime” includes federal drug felonies, several of which are mere possession offenses. See 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) (possession of more than five grams of cocaine base, possession of flunitrazepam, and repeat possession offenses). If the Court recognizes, in light of § 924(c)(2), some mere possession offenses under the umbrella of “illicit trafficking,” it cannot reject Lopez’s conviction out of hand. Yet the Court downplays these “few exceptions” in two footnotes, concluding that “this coerced inclusion of a few possession offenses” gives no reason to “override [the] ordinary meaning” of “illicit trafficking.” Ante, at 54, 55, nn. 4 and 6.

The inconsistency deserves more than the Court’s passing reference. By encompassing repeat possession offenses, the term “illicit trafficking” includes far more than “a few” offenses outside of its ordinary meaning. It must include every type of possession offense under the CSA, so long as the offender has had a previous possession offense. If defining “illicit trafficking” to include the entire range of unlawful possession does not provide a “clear statutory command to override ordinary meaning,” ante, at 55, n. 6, I do not know what would.

The Court, however, gives only fleeting consideration to the text of § 924(c)(2) itself. After referencing the phrase “felony punishable under” the CSA, the Court asks “where else would one naturally look” other than the CSA to determine whether a felony qualifies as a drug trafficking crime. Ante, at 55. In response to the Court’s rhetorical question, I suggest that one might naturally look to the conviction itself to determine whether it is a felony. When presented with an actual conviction, one would not expect to look to a hypothetical prosecution to determine whether an offender has committed a felony.

Continuing to avoid the text of § 924(c)(2), the Court instead focuses on what the statute does not say. It concludes that Congress could have expressly referenced state law as in §§ 924(g)(3) and (k)(2). Ibid. The response, of course, is that Congress could just as well have defined a “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable as a felony under the CSA.” Rejoining, the Court resorts to an “instinetiv[e] understanding] ” that the statutory definition actually means “‘felony as defined by the Act.’” Ante, at 56. Instinct notwithstanding, we must interpret what Congress actually wrote, not what it could have written.

Furthermore, the Court’s “instinct” to interpret § 924(c)(2) to mean “felony as defined by” the CSA creates an unnecessary ambiguity in the meaning of “felony.” The CSA defines “felony” as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 21 U. S. C. § 802(13). Under the Court’s interpretation, that definition seemingly should apply. The Court concludes otherwise but never resolves the ambiguity it creates: It instead explains that “felony” is defined by the CSA as something other than the CSA’s definition of “felony.” Ante, at 56, n. 7. That explanation is, at best, unsatisfying.

After gliding past the statutory text, the Court expresses concern over the fact that the Government’s interpretation allows federal immigration law to turn on varying state criminal classifications. Congress apparently did not share this concern because some definitions of “aggravated felony” explicitly turn on the State’s authorized term of imprisonment, not a uniform federal classification. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J), (P)-(T). Even the Court finds this variance “not ... all that remarkable.” Ante, at 58. The Court’s real concern therefore has little to do with variations in state law. Rather, it worries that “a state criminal classification [may be] at odds with a federal provision.” Ibid. But, obviously, if a state offense does not qualify under the definitions in § 1101(a)(43), then the offense cannot be an “aggravated felony.” As shown in Part I, supra, though, nothing about Lopez’s offense conflicts with the plain language of § 924(c)(2) as incorporated into § 1101(a)(43)(B). He was convicted of a “felony,” and his offense was “punishable under the” CSA.

The Court also notes apparent anomalies in the Government’s approach. It asserts that, under the Government’s interpretation, a state felony conviction for simple possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana could be an “aggravated felony” even though the INA expressly excludes such an offense as grounds for deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Ante, at 59. The Court’s concern has little basis in reality. Only one State authorizes more than one year of imprisonment for possession of over 20 grams. See Fla. Stat. §§ 893.13(6)(a)-(b), 775.082(3)(d) (2006). A few others classify possession of one ounce (or 28.3 grams) as a felony. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§453.336(l)-(2) (2004), §§453.336(4), 193.130 (2003). The mere possibility that a case could fall into this small gap and lead to removal provides no ground for the Court to depart from the plain meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2).

In fact, it is the Court’s interpretation that will have a significant effect on removal proceedings involving state possession offenses. Federal law treats possession of large quantities of controlled substances as felonious possession with intent to distribute. States frequently treat the same conduct as simple possession offenses, which would escape classification as aggravated felonies under the Court’s interpretation. Thus, the Court’s interpretation will result in a large disparity between the treatment of federal and state convictions for possession of large amounts of drugs. And it is difficult to see why Congress would “authorize a State to overrule its judgment” about possession of large quantities of drugs any more than it would about other possession offenses. Ante, at 59.

Finally, the Court admits that its reading will subject an alien defendant convicted of a state misdemeanor to deportation if his conduct was punishable as a felony under the CSA. Accordingly, even if never convicted of an actual felony, an alien defendant becomes eligible for deportation based on a hypothetical federal prosecution. It is at least anomalous, if not inconsistent, that an actual misdemeanor may be considered an “aggravated felony.”

III

Because a plain reading of the statute would avoid the ambiguities and anomalies created by today’s majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.

       The INS’s immigration-enforcement functions are now handled by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 374, n. 1 (2005).

       Although the Government has deported Lopez, we agree with the parties that the case is not moot. Lopez can benefit from relief in this Court by pursuing his application for cancellation of removal, which the Immigration Judge refused to consider after determining that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony.

       Compare United States v. Wilson, 316 F. 3d 506 (CA4 2003) (state-law felony is an aggravated felony); United States v. Simon, 168 F. 3d 1271 (CA11 1999) (same); United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F. 3d 691 (CA5 1997) (same); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F. 3d 308 (CA8 1997) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F. 3d 998 (CA10 1996) (same); United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F. 3d 361 (CA1 1996) (same), with Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F. 3d 532 (CA7 2006) (state-law felony is not an aggravated felony); United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F. 3d 692 (CA6 2005) (same); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F. 3d 297 (CA3 2002) (same). Two Circuits have construed the aggravated felony definition one way in the sentencing context and another in the immigration context. Compare United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F. 3d 1337 (CA9 2000) (in sentencing case, state-law felony is an aggravated felony); United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F. 3d 142 (CA2 1999) (same), with Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F. 3d 905 (CA9 2004) (in immigration case, state-law felony is not an aggravated felony); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F. 3d 315 (CA2 1996) (same).

       Several States punish possession as a felony. See, e. g., S. D. Codified Laws §§22-42-5 (2004), 22-6-1 (2005 Supp.); Tex. Health & Safety Code Aim. §481.115 (West 2003); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§12.32-12.35 (West 2003); see also n. 10, infra. In contrast, with a few exceptions, the CSA punishes drug possession offenses as misdemeanors (that is, by one year’s imprisonment or less, cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a)), see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) (providing for “a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year” for possession offenses except for repeat offenders, persons who possess more than five grams of cocaine base, and persons who possess flunitrazepam), and trafficking offenses as felonies, see §841 (2000 ed. and Supp. III).

       L. Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 198 (Messner 1982).

       Of course, we must acknowledge that Congress did counterintuitively define some possession offenses as "illicit trafficking.” Those state possession crimes that correspond to felony violations of one of the three statutes enumerated in § 924(c)(2), such as possession of cocaine base and recidivist possession, see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a), clearly fall within the definitions used by Congress in 8 U. S. C. § 1101{a)(43)(B) and 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2), regardless of whether these federal possession felonies or their state counterparts constitute “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” or “drug trafficking” as those terms are used in ordinary speech. But this coerced inclusion of a few possession offenses in the definition of “illicit trafficking” does not call for reading the statute to cover others for which there is no clear statutory command to override ordinary meaning.

       With respect to this last possibility, for purposes of § 924(c)(2) the crimes the CSA defines as “felonies” are those crimes to which it assigns a punishment exceeding one year’s imprisonment. As the Government wisely concedes, see Brief for Respondent 25, although for its own purposes the CSA defines the term “felony” standing alone as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” 21 U. S. C. §802(13), that definition does not apply here: § 924(c)(2) refers to a felony “punishable under the [CSA],” not to conduct punishable under some other law but defined as a felony by the CSA.

       Although the parties agree that Congress added the provision that both state and federal offenses qualify as aggravated felonies to codify the BIA’s decision in Matter of Barrett, 20 I. & N. Dec. 171 (1990), see also H. R. Rep. No. 101-681, pt. 1, p. 147 (1990) (noting that the provision reflects congressional approval of Barrett), our enquiry requires looking beyond Congress’s evident' acceptance of Barrett. In Barrett, the BIA held only that the phrase “ ‘drug trafficking crime’ ” includes state “crimes analogous to offenses under the [CSA],” 20 I. & N. Dee., at 177,178, without specifying whether a state crime must be “analogous” to a CSA felony, as opposed to a CSA misdemeanor, to count.

       Contrary to the Government’s response at oral argument, such a prosecution should be possible under the Government’s proffered interpretation because this subset of “drug trafficking crimefs]” still “may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A), albeit at the misdemeanor level. For the same reason, the dissent’s argument that our reading renders superfluous the requirement in § 924(c)(1)(A) that the crime “may be prosecuted in a court of the United States” misses the mark. Post, at 62 (opinion of Thomas, J.). That phrase would be no less superfluous under the dissent’s preferred reading, which would still require that the offense be “capable of punishment under the [CSA],” post, at 61, and therefore subject to prosecution in federal court.

       Indeed, several States treat possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana as a felony. See Fla. Stat. §§893.13(6)(a)-(b), 775.082(3)(d) (2006) (punishing possession of over 20 grams of marijuana as a felony); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 453.336ÜM2) (2004), §§453.336(4), 193.130 (2003) (punishing possession of more than one ounce, or 28.3 grams, of marijuana as a felony); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 19-03.1-23(6) (Lexis Supp. 2005), 12.1-32-01(4) (Lexis 1997) (same); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.605(2) (2003), Act Relating to Controlled Substances, §33, 2005 Ore. Laws p. 2006 (same).

       The majority mistakenly contends that my interpretation also renders this language superfluous. Ante, at 58, n. 9. As I have stated, the plain meaning of “drug trafficking crime” includes two categories of felonies— state and federal. For the limiting language in § 924(c)(1)(A) to have meaning, it must exclude one of those categories. As a state felony, Lopez’s possession offense does not fall within the category of federal drug trafficking crimes. Consequently, it is not eligible for use under § 924(c)(1)(A).

       In its discussion of whether possession may constitute “trafficking,” the Court takes its own trip “through the looking glass.” See ante, at 54. “Commerce,” according to the Court, “certainly... is no element of simple possession . . . .” Ibid. Not long ago, the Court found the opposite to be true when interpreting the scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 22 (2005) (concluding that Congress may regulate the mere possession of marijuana as affecting “commerce”). In Raich, the Court fell into the very trap it purports to identify today by “tumfing] simple possession into [commerce], just what the English language tells us not to expect.” Ante, at 54; see also Raich, supra, at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court’s broadening of the Commerce Clause stands in tension with its present narrow interpretation of “trafficking,” which 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) explicitly alters to include at least some possession offenses.

       Several Courts of Appeals looked to this definition of “felony” when construing the meaning of “drug trafficking crime.” See, e. g., United States v. Wilson, 316 F. 3d 506, 512 (CA4 2003). Although the Government would clearly prevail under 21 U. S. C. § 802(13), it has conceded that this definition does not apply. This concession makes good sense: The definition of “drug trafficking crime” resides in Title 18, and it is therefore most natural to construe “felony” as used in that title. See n. 1, supra. As discussed above, that definition as well requires that a crime be considered a. felony if the State defines it as a felony.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    TOLEDO-FLORES v. UNITED STATES
    No. 05-7664.
    Argued October 3, 2006
    Decided December 5, 2006

      Timothy Crooks argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Marjorie A. Meyers, H. Michael Sokolow, and Brent E. Newton.

      Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorneys General Keisler and Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Patricia M. Millett, and Donald E. Keener

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and David W. DeBruin; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah; for Human Rights First by Linda T. Coberly and Gene C. Schaerr; for the National Association of Federal Defenders et al. by Henry J. Bemporad and Frances H. Pratt; and for the NYSDA Immigrant Defense Project et al. by Christopher J. Meade, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Marianne C. Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas.

      A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Don Clemmer, Deputy Attorney General, and Amy Warr, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia

   Per Curiam.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

It is so ordered.


author:
      Justice Thomas
      Justice Stevens,
      Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter,

text:
    CAREY, WARDEN v. MUSLADIN
    No. 05-785.
    Argued October 11, 2006
    Decided December 11, 2006

      Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alxto, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., post, p. 78, Kennedy, J., post, p. 80, and Souter, J., post, p. 81, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

      Gregory A. Ott, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, former Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy Solicitor General, and Peggy S. Ruffra, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.

      David W Fermino, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 806, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael Scodro, Deputy Solicitor General, and Karl R. Triebel, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Patricia A Madrid of New Mexico, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Paul Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia, Rob Mc-Kenna of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and Peg Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; for the National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. by Douglas E. Beloof; and for the New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center by Richard D. Porwpelio.

        Jonathan D. Hacker and Pamela Harris filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Court has recognized that certain courtroom practices are so inherently prejudicial that they deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 503-506 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, 568 (1986). In this case, a state court held that buttons displaying the victim’s image worn by the victim’s family during respondent’s trial did not deny respondent his right to a fair trial. We must decide whether that holding was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). We hold that it was not.

I

On May 13, 1994, respondent Mathew Musladin shot and killed Tom Studer outside the home of Musladin’s estranged wife, Pamela. At trial, Musladin admitted that he killed Studer but argued that he did so in self-defense. A California jury rejected Musladin’s self-defense argument and convicted him of first-degree murder and three related offenses.

During Musladin’s trial, several members of Studer’s family sat in the front row of the spectators’ gallery. On at least some of the trial’s 14 days, some members of Studer’s family wore buttons with a photo of Studer on them. Prior to opening statements, Musladin’s counsel moved the court to order the Studer family not to wear the buttons during the trial. The court denied the motion, stating that it saw “no possible prejudice to the defendant.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a.

Musladin appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal in 1997. He argued that the buttons deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights. At the outset of its analysis, the Court of Appeal stated that Musladin had to show actual or inherent prejudice to succeed on his claim and cited Flynn, supra, at 570, as providing the test for inherent prejudice. The Court of Appeal, quoting part of Flynn’s test, made clear that it “considered] the wearing of photographs of victims in a courtroom to be an ‘impermissible factor coming into play,’ the practice of which should be discouraged.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a (quoting Flynn, supra, at 570). Nevertheless, the court concluded, again quoting Flynn, supra, at 571, that the buttons had not “branded defendant ‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt’ in the eyes of the jurors” because “[t]he simple photograph of Tom Studer was unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything other than the normal grief occasioned by the loss of [a] family member.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a.

At the conclusion of the state appellate process, Musladin filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court pursuant to § 2254. In his application, Musladin argued that the buttons were inherently prejudicial and that the California Court of Appeal erred by holding that the Studers’ wearing of the buttons did not deprive him of a fair trial. The District Court denied habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability on the buttons issue.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for issuance of the writ, finding that under § 2254 the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). According to the Court of Appeals, this Court’s decisions in Williams and Flynn clearly established a rule of federal law applicable to Musladin’s case. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F. 3d 653, 656-658 (2005). Specifically, the Court of Appeals cited its own precedent in support of its conclusion that Williams and Flynn clearly established the test for inherent prejudice applicable to spectators’ courtroom conduct. 427 F. 3d, at 657-658 (citing Norris v. Risley, 918 F. 2d 828 (CA9 1990)). The Court of Appeals held that the state court’s application of a test for inherent prejudice that differed from the one stated in Williams and Flynn “was contrary to clearly established federal law and constituted an unreasonable application of that law.” 427 F. 3d, at 659-660. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc. 427 F. 3d 647 (2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. 1069 (2006), and now vacate.

II

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,110 Stat. 1219:

“(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000), we explained that “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id., at 412. Therefore, federal habeas relief may be granted here if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of this Court’s applicable holdings.

A

In Estelle v. Williams and Flynn, this Court addressed the effect of courtroom practices on defendants’ fair-trial rights. In Williams, the Court considered “whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is denied due process or equal protection of the laws.” 425 U. S., at 502. The Court stated that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes,” id., at 512, but held that the defendant in that case had waived any objection to being tried in prison clothes by failing to object at trial, id., at 512-513.

In Flynn, the Court addressed whether seating “four uniformed state troopers” in the row of spectators’ seats immediately behind the defendant at trial denied the defendant his right to a fair trial. 475 U. S., at 562. The Court held that the presence of the troopers was not so inherently prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial. Id., at 571. In reaching that holding, the Court stated that “the question must be . . . whether 'an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.’” Id., at 570 (quoting Williams, supra, at 505).

Both Williams and Flynn dealt with government-sponsored practices: In Williams, the State compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison clothes, and in Flynn, the State seated the troopers immediately behind the defendant. Moreover, in both cases, this Court noted that some practices are so inherently prejudicial that they must be justified by an “essential state” policy or interest. Williams, supra, at 505 (concluding that the practice “further[ed] no essential state policy”); Flynn, supra, at 568-569 (holding that the practice was not of the sort that had to be justified by an “essential state interest”).

B

In contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices, the effect on a defendant’s fair-trial rights of the spectator conduct to which Musladin objects is an open question in our jurisprudence. This Court has never addressed a claim that such private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair trial. And although the Court articulated the test for inherent prejudice that applies to state conduct in Williams and Flynn, we have never applied that test to spectators’ conduct. Indeed, part of the legal test of Williams and Flynn — asking whether the practices furthered an essential state interest— suggests that those cases apply only to state-sponsored practices.

Reflecting the lack of guidance from this Court, lower courts have diverged widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectator-conduct claims. Some courts have applied Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct. Norris v. Risley, supra, at 830-831 (applying Williams and Flynn to hold spectators’ buttons worn during a trial deprived the defendant of a fair trial); In re Woods, 154 Wash. 2d 400, 416-418, 114 P. 3d 607, 616-617 (2005) (applying Flynn but. concluding that ribbons worn by spectators did not prejudice the defendant). Other courts have declined to extend Williams and Flynn to spectators' conduct. Billings v. Polk, 441 F. 3d 238, 246-247 (CA4 2006) (“These precedents do not clearly establish that a defendant’s right to a fair jury trial is violated whenever an article of clothing worn at trial arguably conveys a message about the matter before the jury”); Davis v. State, 223 S. W. 3d 466, 474-475 (Tex. App. 2006) (“Appellant does not cite any authority holding the display of this type of item by spectators creates inherent prejudice”). Other courts have distinguished Flynn on the facts. Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Ore. App. 350, 360, n. 1, 929 P. 2d 1088, 1093-1094, n. 1 (1996) (in banc). And still other courts have ruled on spectator-conduct claims without relying on, discussing, or distinguishing Williams or Flynn. Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 388-389 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam); State v. Speed, 265 Kan. 26, 47-48, 961 P. 2d 13, 29-30 (1998); Nguyen v. State, 977 S. W. 2d 450,457 (Tex. App. 1998); Kenyon v. State, 58 Ark. App. 24, 33-35, 946 S. W. 2d 705, 710-711 (1997); State v. Nelson, 96-0883, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 12/17/97), 705 So. 2d 758, 763.

Given the lack of holdings from this Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct of the kind involved here, it cannot be said that the state court “unreasonably] applied] clearly established Federal law.” § 2254(d)(1). No holding of this Court required the California Court of Appeal to apply the test of Williams and Flynn to the spectators’ conduct here. Therefore, the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

III

The Court of Appeals improperly concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by this Court. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000), this Court issued two opinions announcing two separate holdings. In Part II-B of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Court held that an incorrect application of federal law was not necessarily an “ ‘unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law’ ” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). 529 U. S., at 409-413. In Parts III and IV of my opinion, in which Justice O’Connor joined, the Court held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of the petitioner’s claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of law as determined by our earlier opinion in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Williams, 529 U. S., at 390-398.

In Strickland, we held that the petitioner had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel and upheld his sentence of death. 466 U. S., at 700. While our ultimate holding rejected the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim, the reasoning in our opinion (including carefully considered dicta) set forth the standards for evaluating such claims that have been accepted as “clearly established law” for over 20 years. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 391. Nevertheless, in a somewhat ironic dictum in her Williams opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that the statutory phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id., at 412. That dictum has been repeated in three subsequent opinions in which a bare majority of the Court rejected constitutional claims that four of us would have upheld. Because I am persuaded that Justice O’Connor’s dictum about dicta represents an incorrect interpretation of the statute’s text, and because its repetition today is wholly unnecessary, I do not join the Court’s opinion.

Virtually every one of the Court’s opinions announcing a new application of a constitutional principle contains some explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to lawyers and judges in future cases. See, e. g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004); Strickland, 466 U. S. 668; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); see also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). It is quite wrong to invite state-court judges to discount the importance of such guidance on the ground that it may not have been strictly necessary as an explanation of the Court’s specific holding in the case. Cf. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also their explications of the governing rules of law”); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 490 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although technically dicta,... an important part of the Court’s rationale for the result that it reache[s] is entitled to greater weight...”). The text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 itself provides sufficient obstacles to obtaining habeas relief without placing a judicial thumb on the warden’s side of the scales.

Ultimately, however, my reasons for joining the Court’s judgment in this case are essentially the same as those expressed by Justice Souter, with one caveat. In my opinion, there is no merit whatsoever to the suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure of protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or symbolic speech to express any point of view about an ongoing proceeding.

Justice Kennedy,

concurring in the judgment.

Trials must be free from a coercive or intimidating atmosphere. This fundamental principle of due process is well established. It was recognized in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), though the Court credited the determination of the state court and granted no relief; and it was the square holding in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), though the Court remanded for factfinding rather than for a new trial. The disruptive presence of the press required reversal in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333,355 (1966), where “newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial,” and Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 550 (1965), where the presence of cameras distracted jurors throughout the proceedings.

The rule against a coercive or intimidating atmosphere at trial exists because “we are committed to a government of laws and not of men,” under which it is “of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly,” and “[t]he constitutional safeguards relating to the integrity of the criminal process attend every stage of a criminal proceeding ... culminating with a trial ‘in a courtroom presided over by a judge.’ ” Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 562 (1965) (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 727 (1963)) (finding a statute did not on its face violate First Amendment rights where it prohibited picketing in courthouses). Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965).

The rule settled by these cases requires a court, on either direct or collateral review, to order a new trial when a defendant shows his conviction has been obtained in a trial tainted by an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation similar to that documented in the foregoing cases. This would seem to be true whether the pressures were from partisans, or, as seems to have been the case in Sheppard, from persons reacting to the drama of the moment who created an environment so raucous that calm deliberation by the judge or jury was likely compromised in a serious way. If, in a given case, intimidation of this nature was brought about by the wearing of buttons, relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) would likely be available even in the absence of a Supreme Court case addressing the wearing of buttons. While general rules tend to accord courts “more leeway... in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations,” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664 (2004), AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied, cf. Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 308-309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

In the case before us there is no indication the atmosphere at respondent’s trial was one of coercion or intimidation to the severe extent demonstrated in the cases just discussed. The instant case does present the issue whether as a preventative measure, or as a general rule to preserve the calm and dignity of a court, buttons proclaiming a message relevant to the case ought to be prohibited as a matter of course. That rule has not been clearly established by our cases to date. It may be that trial judges as a general practice already take careful measures to preserve the decorum of courtrooms, thereby accounting for the lack of guiding precedents on this subject.

In all events, it seems to me the case as presented to us here does call for a new rule, perhaps justified as much as a preventative measure as by the urgent needs of the situation. That rule should be explored in the court system, and then established in this Court before it can be grounds for relief in the procedural posture of this case.

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Justice Souter,

concurring in the judgment.

In this habeas proceeding, a federal court may not set aside the state judgment sustaining Musladin’s conviction without finding it contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). While the ground between criteria entailed by “clearly established” and “unreasonable application” may be murky, it makes sense to regard the standard governing this case as clearly established by this Court. We have a number of decisions dealing with threats to the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial posed by conditions in (or originating in) the courtroom, see, e. g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965), and the two most recent ones agree on a general formulation harking back to Estes, id., at 542-546: the question is whether the practice or condition presents “ ‘an unacceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming into play’ ” in the jury’s consideration of the case. Flynn, supra, at 570 (quoting Williams, supra, at 505). The Court’s intent to adopt a standard at this general and comprehensive level could not be much clearer.

As for the applicability of this standard, there is no serious question that it reaches the behavior of spectators. The focus of the later cases is on appearances within the courtroom open to the jurors’ observation. There is no suggestion in the opinions, and no reason to think now, that it should matter whether the State or an individual may be to blame for .some objectionable sight; either way, the trial judge has an affirmative obligation to control the courtroom and keep it free of improper influence. Sheppard, supra, at 363. And since the Williams-Flynn standard is a guide for trial judges, not for laypersons without schooling in threats to the fairness of trials, its general formulation is enough to tell trial judges that it applies to the behavior of courtroom visitors.

Nor is there any reasonable doubt about the pertinence of the standard to the practice in question; one could not seriously deny that allowing spectators at a criminal trial to wear visible buttons with the victim’s photo can raise a risk of improper considerations. The display is no part of the evidence going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons are at once an appeal for sympathy for the victim (and perhaps for those who wear the buttons) and a call for some response from those who see them. On the jurors’ part, that expected response could well seem to be a verdict of guilty, and a sympathetic urge to assuage the grief or rage of survivors with a conviction would be the paradigm of improper consideration.

The only debatable question is whether the risk in a given case reaches the “unacceptable” level. While there is a fair argument that any level of risk from wearing buttons in a courtroom is unacceptable, two considerations keep me from concluding that the state court acted unreasonably in failing to see the issue this way and reverse the conviction. First, of the several courts that have considered the influence of spectators’ buttons, the majority have left convictions standing. See, e. g., State v. Speed, 265 Kan. 26, 47-48, 961 P. 2d 13, 29-30 (1998); State v. Braxton, 344 N. C. 702, 709-710, 477 S. E. 2d 172, 176-177 (1996); State v. Lord, 128 Wash. App. 216, 219-223, 114 P. 3d 1241, 1243-1245 (2005); Nguyen v. State, 977 S. W. 2d 450, 457 (Tex. App. 1998). I am wary of assuming that every trial and reviewing judge in those cases was unreasonable as well as mistaken in failing to embrace a no-risk standard, and so I would find it hard to say the state judges were unreasonable in this case, given the lack of detail about the buttons’ display. Second, an interest in protected expression on the part of the spectators wearing mourners’ buttons has been raised, but not given focus or careful attention in this or any other case that has come to our notice. Although I do not find such a First Amendment interest intuitively strong here, in the absence of developed argument it would be preferable not to decide whether protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by spectators’ buttons.

For these reasons, I think Musladin has not shown the state judge’s application of our law to be unreasonable, and on that ground concur in the Court’s judgment.

       The record contains little concrete information about the buttons. The buttons were apparently two to four inches in diameter and displayed only a photograph of Studer. It is not clear how many family members wore the buttons or how many days of the trial they wore them.

       This Court has considered cases in which the proceedings were a sham or were mob dominated. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91 (1923) (describing allegations that “the whole proceeding [was] a mask — that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 324-325 (1915) (“[T]he disorder in and about the court-room during the trial and up to and at the reception of the verdict amounted to mob domination, that not only the jury but the presiding judge succumbed to it”).

      See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 660-661 (2004); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71 (2003); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 664 (2001).


author: Justice Auto

text:
    BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO., successor in interest to AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., et al. v. BURTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al.
    No. 05-669.
    Argued October 4, 2006
    Decided December 11, 2006

      Auto, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Steven R. Hunsicker.

      Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, Deputy Solicitor General

      Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, Martin J. Lalonde, and John A. Bryson

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Petroleum Institute by Jonathan A Hunter, Shannon S. Holtzman, and Harry M. Ng; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by William Perry Pendley.

        Jill Elise Grant, Harry R. Sachse, Thomas H. Shipps, Patricia A Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Christopher D. Coppin, Martin Lobel, and Richard Chivaro filed a brief for the Jicarilla Apache Nation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Auto

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether administrative payment orders issued by the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) for the purpose of assessing royalty underpayments on oil and gas leases fall within 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a), which sets out a 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. We hold that this provision does not apply to these administrative payment orders, and we therefore affirm.

I

A

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease public-domain lands to private parties for the production of oil and gas. 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq. MLA lessees are obligated to pay a royalty of at least “12.5 percent in amount or value of the production removed or sold from the lease.” § 226(b)(1)(A).

In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), 96 Stat. 2447, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., to address the concern that the “system of accounting with respect to royalties and other payments due and owing on oil and gas produced from such lease sites [was] archaic and inadequate.” § 1701(a)(2). FOGRMA ordered the Secretary of the Interior to “audit and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all current and past lease accounts for leases of oil or gas and take appropriate actions to make additional collections or refunds as warranted.” § 1711(c)(1). The Secretary, in turn, has assigned these duties to MMS. 30 CFR §201.100 (2006).

Under FOGRMA, lessees are responsible in the first instance for the accurate calculation and payment of royalties. 30 U. S. C. § 1712(a). MMS, in turn, is authorized to audit those payments to determine whether a royalty has been overpaid or underpaid. §§ 1711(a) and (c); 30 CFR §§ 206.150(c), 206.170(d). In the event that an audit suggests an underpayment, it is MMS’ practice to send the lessee a letter inquiring about the perceived deficiency. If, after reviewing the lessee’s response, MMS concludes that the lessee owes additional royalties, MMS issues an order requiring payment of the amount due. Failure to comply with such an order carries a stiff penalty: “Any person who — (1) knowingly or willfully fails to make any royalty payment by the date as specified by [an] order... shall be liable for a penalty of up to $10,000 per violation for each day such violation continues.” 30 U. S. C. § 1719(c). The Attorney General may enforce these orders in federal court. § 1722(a).

An MMS payment order may be appealed, first to the Director of MMS and then to the Interior Board of Land Appeals or to an Assistant Secretary. 30 CFR §§290.105, 290.108. While filing an appeal does not generally stay the payment order, § 218.50(c), MMS will usually suspend the order’s effect after the lessee complies with applicable bonding or financial solvency requirements, § 243.8.

Congress supplemented this scheme by enacting the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996 (FOGRSFA), 110 Stat. 1700, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. FOGRSFA adopted a prospective 7-year statute of limitations for any “judicial proceeding or demand” for royalties arising under a federal oil or gas lease. § 1724(b)(1). The parties agree that this provision applies both to judicial actions (“judicial proceeding[s]”) and to MMS’ administrative payment orders (“demand[s]”) arising on or after September 1, 1996. Ibid. This provision does not, however, apply to judicial proceedings or demands arising from leases of Indian land or underpayments of royalties on pre-September 1,1996, production. FOGRSFA §§ 9,11,110 Stat. 1717, notes following 30 U. S. C. § 1701.

There is no dispute that a lawsuit in court to recover royalties owed to the Government on pre-September 1, 1996, production is covered by 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a), which sets out a general 6-year statute of limitations for Government contract actions. That section, which was enacted in 1966, provides in relevant part:

“Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.)

Whether this general 6-year statute of limitations also governs MMS administrative payment orders concerning preSeptember 1, 1996, production is the question that we must decide in this case.

B

Petitioner BP America Production Co. holds gas leases from the Federal Government for lands in New Mexico’s San Juan Basin. BP’s predecessor, Amoco Production Co., first entered into these leases nearly 50 years ago, and these leases require the payment of the minimum 12.5 percent royalty prescribed by 30 U. S. C. § 226(b)(1)(A). For years, Amoco calculated the royalty as a percentage of the value of the gas as of the moment it was produced at the well. In 1996, MMS sent lessees a letter directing that royalties should be calculated based not on the value of the gas at the well, but on the value of the gas after it was treated to meet the quality requirements for introduction into the Nation’s mainline pipelines. Consistent with this guidance, MMS in 1997 ordered Amoco to pay additional royalties for the period from January 1989 through December 1996 in order to cover the difference between the value of the treated gas and its lesser value at the well.

Amoco appealed the order, disputing MMS’ interpretation of its royalty obligations and arguing that the payment order was in any event barred in part by the 6-year statute of limitations in 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a). The Assistant Secretary of the Interior denied the appeal and ruled that the statute of limitations was inapplicable.

Amoco, together with petitioner Atlantic Richfield Co., sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which agreed with the Assistant Secretary that § 2415(a) did not govern the administrative order. Amoco Production Co. v. Baca, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, Amoco Production Co. v. Watson, 410 F. 3d 722, 733 (2005), and we granted certiorari, 547 U. S. 1068 (2006), in order to resolve the conflict between that decision and the contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in OXY USA, Inc. v. Babbitt, 268 F. 3d 1001, 1005 (2001) (en banc). We now affirm.

II

A

We start, of course, with the statutory text. Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994). Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). Read in this way, the text of § 2415(a) is quite clear.

The statute of limitations imposed by § 2415(a) applies when the Government commences any “action for money damages” by filing a “complaint” to enforce a contract, and the statute runs from the point when “the right of action accrues.” The key terms in this provision — “action” and “complaint” — are ordinarily used in connection with judicial, not administrative, proceedings. In 1966, when § 2415(a) was enacted, a commonly used legal dictionary defined the term “right of action” as “[t]he right to bring suit; a legal right to maintain an action,” with “suit” meaning “any proceeding ... in a court of justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1488, 1603 (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter Black’s). Likewise, “complaint” was defined as “the first or initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil action.” Id., at 356. See also Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U. S. 59, 66 (1953) (holding that filing a complaint, in the ordinary sense of the term, means filing a suit in court, not initiating an administrative proceeding: “Commencement of an action by the filing of a complaint has too familiar a history ... for us to assume that Congress did not mean to use the words in their ordinary sense”). The phrase “action for money damages” reinforces this reading because the term “damages” is generally used to mean “pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts.” Black’s 466 (emphasis added).

Nothing in the language of § 2415(a) suggests that Congress intended these terms to apply more broadly to administrative proceedings. On the contrary, § 2415(a) distinguishes between judicial and administrative proceedings. Section 2415(a) provides that an “action” must commence “within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.” Thus, Congress knew how to identify administrative proceedings and manifestly had two separate concepts in mind when it enacted § 2415(a).

B

In an effort to show that the term “action” is commonly used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings, petitioners have cited numerous statutes and regulations that, petitioners claim, document this usage. These examples, however, actually undermine petitioners’ argument, since none of them uses the term “action” standing alone to refer to administrative proceedings. Rather, each example includes a modifier of some sort, referring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or administrative action,” or “administrative enforcement actions.” This pattern of usage buttresses the point that the term “action,” standing alone, ordinarily refers to a judicial proceeding.

Petitioners contend that their broader interpretation of the statutory term “action” is supported by the reference to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any contract.” 28 U. S. C. § 2415(a) (emphasis added). But the broad terms “every” and “any” do not assist petitioners, as they do not broaden the ordinary meaning of the key term “action.”

Petitioners argue that their interpretation is supported by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546 (1986), and West v. Gibson, 527 U. S. 212 (1999), but this reliance is misplaced. In Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, we construed the attorney’s fee provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes a “court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, [to] award costs of litigation ... to any party.” 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d). We permitted the recovery of fees both for work done in court and in subsequent administrative proceedings. But the pertinent statutory provision in that case did not employ the key terms that appear in the statute at issue here. Specifically, the CWA provision referred to “litigation,” not to an “action” commenced by the filing of a “complaint.” Moreover, “the work done by counsel [in the administrative phase of the case] was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief... as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom . . . obtaining the consent decree.” 478 U. S., at 558. And we expressly reserved judgment on the question “whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate . . . when there is no connected court action in which fees are recoverable.” Id., at 560, n. 5.

West helps petitioners even less. There, we considered whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could order a federal agency to pay compensatory damages in an administrative proceeding. Section 717(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(b), authorized the EEOC to employ “appropriate remedies,” but did not specifically authorize damages, and § 717(c) authorized a subsequent court action against an employer agency, 42 U. S. C. § 2Q00e-16(c). In 1991, Congress added Rev. Stat. § 1977A(a)(l), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(l), which provided that “[i]n an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory ... damages.” In West, the respondent employee argued that the enactment of § 1981a(a)(l) showed that Congress did not consider compensatory damages to be “appropriate remedies” in an EEOC proceeding, as opposed to an action brought by an aggrieved employee. If Congress had wished to authorize the award of compensatory damages in an EEOC proceeding, the respondent employee reasoned, Congress would have so provided in § 1981a(a)(l), by expressly cross-referencing § 717(c). We rejected this argument, but in doing so we did not hold that an EEOC proceeding is an “action” under § 1981a(a)(l). Rather, we simply concluded that the EEOC’s authorization under § 717(b) to award “appropriate remedies” was broad enough to encompass compensatory damages. 527 U. S., at 220-221.

For these reasons, we are not persuaded by petitioners’ argument that the term “action” in § 2415(a) applies to the administrative proceedings that follow the issuance of an MMS payment order.

C

We similarly reject petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS letter or payment order constitutes a “complaint” within the meaning of § 2415(a). Petitioners point to examples of statutes and regulations that employ the term “complaint” in the administrative context. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 45(b) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to serve a “complaint” on a party suspected of engaging in an unfair method of competition); 29 CFR § 102.15 (2006) (a “complaint” initiates unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board). But the occasional use of the term to describe certain administrative filings does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the initiation of “a civil action.” Black’s 356. Moreover, even if the distinction between administrative and judicial proceedings is put aside, an MMS payment order lacks the essential attributes of a complaint. While a complaint is a filing that commences a proceeding that may in the end result in a legally binding order providing relief, an MMS payment order in and of itself imposes a legal obligation on the party to which it is issued. As noted, the failure to comply with such an order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day. An MMS payment order, therefore, plays an entirely different role from that of a “complaint.”

D

To the extent that any doubts remain regarding the meaning of § 2415(a), they are erased by the rule that statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the government. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456 (1924). This canon is rooted in the traditional rule quod nullum tern-pus occurrit regi — time does not run against the King. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132 (1938). A corollary of this rule is that when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the statute is ambiguous.

Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S. 346 (1927), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary. There, as here, the issue was the scope of a statute of limitations. The provision in that case, however, provided that “ ‘[n]o suit or proceeding for the collection of any such taxes’ ” shall commence more than five years after the filing of the return. Id., at 348-349. The Government argued that the terms “proceeding” and “suit” were coterminous, and urged further that any ambiguity should be resolved in its favor.

The Court recognized the canon, restating it much as we have above. Id., at 349. But the Court concluded that the canon had no application in that case because the text of the relevant statute, unlike § 2415(a), applied clearly and separately to “suits” and “proceedings,” and the Court saw no reason to give these different terms the same meaning. Id., at 349-350.

E

We come now to petitioners’ argument that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render subsection (i) of the same statute superfluous. Subsection (i) provides as follows:

“The provisions of this section shall not prevent the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716 of title 31.” 28U.S.C. §2415(i).

An administrative offset is a mechanism by which the Government withholds payment of a debt that it owes another party in order to recoup a payment that this party owes the Government. 31 U. S. C. § 3701(a)(1). Thus, under subsection (i), the Government may recover a debt via an administrative offset even if the Government would be time barred under subsection (a) from pursuing the debt in court.

Petitioners argue that, if § 2415(a) applies only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings, there is no need for § 2415(i)’s rule protecting a particular administrative mechanism (i. e., an administrative offset) from the statute of limitations set out in subsection (a). Invoking the canon against reading a statute in a way that makes part of the statute redundant, see, e. g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001), petitioners contend that subsection (i) shows that subsection (a) was meant to apply to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings. We disagree.

As the Court of Appeals noted, subsection (i) was not enacted at the same time as subsection (a) but rather was added 16 years later by the Debt Collection Act of 1982. 96 Stat. 1749. This enactment followed a dispute between the Office of the Comptroller General of the United States, head of the agency then named the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) over whether an administrative offset could be used to recoup a debt where a judicial recoupment action was already time barred.

In 1978, in response to a question from the United States Civil Service Commission, OLC opined that an administrative offset could not be used to recoup a debt as to which a judicial action was already time barred. OLC reached this conclusion not because it believed that § 2415(a) reached administrative proceedings generally, but rather because of the particular purpose of an administrative offset. “Where [a] debt has not been reduced to judgment,” OLC stated, “an administrative offset is merely a pre-judgment attachment device.” Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission Re: Effect of Statute of Limitations on Administrative Collection of United States Claims 3 (Sept. 29,1978), Joint Lodging. OLC opined that a prejudgment attachment device such as this exists only to preserve funds to satisfy any judgment the creditor subsequently obtains. Id., at 4 (citing cases). OLC therefore concluded that, where a lawsuit is already foreclosed by § 2415(a), an administrative offset that is the functional equivalent of a pretrial attachment is also unavailable. Id., at 3.

GAO disagreed. See In re Collection of Debts — Statute of Limitations on Administrative Setojf, 58 Comp. Gen. 501, 504-505 (1979). In its view, the question was answered by

“[t]he general rule ... that statutes of limitations applicable to suits for debts or money demands bar or run only against the remedy (the right 'to bring suit) to which they apply and do not discharge the debt or extinguish, or even impair, the right or obligation, either in law or in fact, and the creditor may avail himself of every other lawful means of realizing on the debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United States, 42 F. 2d 309 (Ct. Cl. 1930), affirmed 282 U. S. 434; and 33 Comp. Gen. 66 (1953). See also Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. Cl. 1955).” Ibid.

That Congress had time barred the judicial remedy, GAO reasoned, imposed no limit on the administrative remedy.

The OLC-GAO dispute reveals that, even under the interpretation of subsection (a) — the one we are adopting — that considers it applicable only to court proceedings, subsection (i) is not mere surplusage. It clarifies that administrative offsets are not covered by subsection (a) even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action.

To accept petitioners’ argument, on the other hand, we would have to hold either that § 2415(a) applied to administrative actions when it was enacted in 1966 or that it was extended to reach administrative actions when subsection (i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of the text of § 2415(a), which has not been amended, refutes the first of these propositions, and accepting the latter would require us to conclude that in 1982 Congress elected to enlarge § 2415 to cover administrative proceedings by inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative vehicle from the statute’s reach. It is entirely unrealistic to suggest that Congress would proceed by such an oblique and cryptic route.

Ill

Petitioners contend that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions results in a statutory scheme with peculiarities that Congress could not have intended. For example, petitioners note that while they are required by statute to preserve their records regarding royalty obligations for only seven years, 30 U. S. C. § 1724(f), the interpretation of § 2415(a) adopted by the Court of Appeals permits MMS to issue payment orders that reach back much further.

We are mindful of the fact that a statute should be read where possible as effecting a “‘symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000), but here petitioners’ alternative interpretation of § 2415(a) would itself result in disharmony. For instance, under FOGRSFA, MMS payment orders regarding oil and gas leases are now prospectively subject to a 7-year statute of limitations except with respect to obligations arising out of leases of Indian land. Consequently, if we agreed with petitioners that § 2415(a) applies generally to administrative proceedings, payment orders relating to oil and gas royalties owed under leases of Indian land would be subject to a shorter (¿ e., 6-year) statute of limitations than similar payment orders relating to leases of other public-domain lands (which would be governed by FOGRSFA’s new 7-year statute). Particularly in light of Congress’ exhortation that the Secretary of the Interior “aggressively carry out his trust responsibility in the administration of Indian oil and gas,” 30 U. S. C. § 1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a shorter statute of limitations for payment orders regarding Indian lands.

Petitioners contend, finally, that interpreting § 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would frustrate the statute’s purposes of providing repose, ensuring that actions are brought while evidence is fresh, lightening recordkeeping burdens, and pressuring federal agencies to assert federal rights promptly. These are certainly cogent policy arguments, but they must be viewed in perspective.

For one thing, petitioners overstate the scope of the problem, since Congress of course can enact and has enacted specific statutes of limitations to govern specific administrative actions. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for an administrative action to recover payments made to state governments for disaster or emergency assistance). Indeed, in 1996, FOGRSFA imposed just such a limitation prospectively on all non-Indian land, oil, and gas lease claims.

Second, and more fundamentally, the consequences of interpreting § 2415(a) as limited to court actions must be considered in light of the traditional rule exempting proceedings brought by the sovereign from any time bar. There are always policy arguments against affording the sovereign this special treatment, and therefore in a case like this, where the issue is how far Congress meant to go when it enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the Government, arguing that an expansive interpretation would serve the general purposes of statutes of limitations is somewhat beside the point. The relevant inquiry, instead, is simply how far Congress meant to go when it enacted the statute of limitations in question. Here prior to the enactment of § 2415(a) in 1966, contract actions brought by the Government were not subject to any statute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U. S., at 132. Absent congressional action changing this rule, it remains the law, and the text of § 2415(a) betrays no intent to change this rule as it applies to administrative proceedings.

In the final analysis, while we appreciate petitioners’ arguments, they are insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the statutory text. We therefore hold that the 6-year statute of limitations in § 2415(a) applies only to court actions and not to the administrative proceedings involved in this case.

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       MMS is not always the auditing body, as MMS may delegate its authority to the host State or an Indian tribe. 30 U. S. C. §§ 1732,1735.

       MMS intended this letter to implement its regulations, which required lessees “to place gas in marketable condition at no cost to the Federal Government unless otherwise provided in the lease agreement.” 30 CFR §206.152® (1996).

       These primary definitions have not changed in substance since 1966. Black’s (8th ed. 2004) now defines “action” as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding” and a “complaint” as “[t]he initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and the demand for relief.” Id., at 31,303.

       Moreover, it seems unlikely that Congress intended administrative proceedings to commence within one year after the conclusion of administrative proceedings.

       See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for “administrative actionfs] to recover any payments] made to a State or local government for disaster or emergency assistance”); 12 U. S. C. § 1441a(b)(ll)(G) (requiring Resolution Trust Corporation to maintain staff to assist with certain “cases, civil claims, and administrative enforcement actions”); 15 U. S. C. § 78u(h)(9)(B) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provision noting that certain “[f]inancial records . . . may be disclosed or used only in an administrative, civil, or criminal action”). See also 7 CFR § 3018.400(c) (2006) (Department of Agriculture regulation regarding “administrative action [s] for the imposition of a civil penalty” for failure to file disclosure forms); 71 Fed. Reg. 7407 (2006) (to be codified in 12 CFR § 1412.2(1)(1)) (Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation regulation defining “prohibited indemnification payment” to include reimbursement for a civil money penalty of judgment resulting from any “administrative or civil action” instituted by the Farm Credit Administration); 10 CFR pt. 820, App. A, IX-b (2006) (“Administrative actions, such as determination of award fees where [Department of Energy] contracts provide for such determinations, will be considered separately from any civil penalties that may be imposed under this Enforcement Policy”).

       There was some question at oral argument whether MMS’ initial letter might constitute a “complaint” within the meaning of § 2415(a). Petitioners did not advance this argument, and recognized at oral argument that neither the statute nor the regulations require the issuance of such a letter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-9. The Government, for its part, observed that all such a letter does is request information, as the agency has not yet decided whether to assert a claim. Id., at 28. This is not a complaint.

       Indeed, what emerges strikingly from OLC's 1978 opinion is that no one at the time — neither OLC nor GAO — even contemplated that § 2415(a) applied to administrative procedures in the first instance. Nor have petitioners pointed to any source demonstrating otherwise.