source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Me. Justice Rehnquist Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES et al. v. EUGE
    No. 78-1453.
    Argued November 26, 1979
    Decided February 20, 1980

      RehNquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and Stewart, White, BlacicmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. BreN-NAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and SteveNS, JJ., joined, post, p. 719. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 720.

      Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Robert E. Lindsay, and Carleton D. Powell.

      James W. Erwin, by appointment of the Court, 442 U. S. 915, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William L. Hungate and Charles A. Newman.

   Me. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States sued in the District Court seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service summons requiring respondent to appear and provide handwriting exemplars. Enforcement was denied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 587 F. 2d 25 (1978) (en banc), and we granted certiorari. 441 U. S. 942. We now hold that Congress has empowered the IRS to compel handwriting exemplars under its summons authority conferred by 26 U. S. C. § 7602.

I

The facts are not in dispute. In October 1977, an agent in the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service was assigned to investigate respondent’s income tax liability for the years 1973 through 1976. Respondent had not filed any tax returns for those years. The Service sought to employ the "bank deposits method” of reconstructing respondent’s income for those years, as a means of calculating his tax liability. Under this method of proof, the sums deposited in the taxpayer’s bank accounts are scrutinized to determine whether they represent taxable income.

During the course of the investigation, the agent found only two bank accounts registered in respondent’s name. Twenty other bank accounts were discovered, however, which the agent had reason to believe were being maintained by respondent under aliases to conceal taxable income. The statements for these accounts were sent to post office boxes held in respondent’s name; the signature cards for the accounts listed addresses of properties owned by respondent; and the agent had documented frequent transfers of funds between the accounts.

In an effort to determine whether the sums deposited in these accounts represented income attributable to respondent, the agent issued a summons on October 7, 1977, requiring respondent to appear and execute handwriting exemplars of the various signatures appearing on the bank signature cards. Respondent declined to comply with the summons.

The United States commenced this action under 26 U. S. C. § 7604 (a). The District Court held that the summons should be enforced, ordering respondent to provide 10 handwriting exemplars of 8 different signatures. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the summons authority vested in the Internal Revenue Service under 26 U. S. C. § 7602 does not authorize the IRS to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars.

II

The structure and history of the statutory authority of the Internal Revenue Service to summon witnesses to produce evidence necessary for tax investigations has been repeatedly reviewed by this Court in recent years. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964); United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 (1976); United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978). Under § 7602, the Secretary of the Treasury, and therefore the IRS as his designate, is authorized to summon individuals to “appear before the Secretary . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry. ...” The question presented here is whether this power to compel a witness to “appear,” to produce “other data,” and to “give testimony,” includes the power to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars. We conclude that it does, for several reasons. While the language may not be explicit in its authorization of handwriting exemplars, the duty to appear and give testimony, a duty imposed by § 7602, has traditionally encompassed a duty to provide some forms of nontestimonial, physical evidence, including handwriting exemplars. Further, this Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that if the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies. The authority claimed here is necessary for the effective exercise of the Service’s enforcement responsibilities; it is entirely consistent with the statutory language; and it is not in derogation of any constitutional rights or countervailing policies enunciated by Congress.

A

Through § 7602, Congress has imposed a duty on persons possessing information “relevant or material” to an investigation of federal tax liability to produce that information at the request of the Secretary or his delegate. That duty to provide relevant information expressly obligates the person summoned to produce documentary evidence and to “appear” and “give testimony.” Imposition of such an evidentiary obligation is, of course, not a novel innovation attributable to § 7602. The common law has been the source of a comparable eviden-tiary obligation for centuries. In determining the scope of the obligation Congress intended to impose by use of this language, we have previously analogized, as an interpretive guide, to the common-law duties attaching to the issuance of a testimonial summons. See United States v. Bisceglia, supra, at 147-148; United States v. Powell, supra, at 57. Congress, through legislation, may expand or contract the duty imposed, but absent some contrary expression, there is a wealth of history helpful in defining the duties imposed by the issuance of a summons.

The scope of the “testimonial” or evidentiary duty imposed by common law or statute has traditionally been interpreted as an expansive duty limited principally by relevance and privilege. As this Court described the contours of the duty in United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950): “[P]er-sons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery.... We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned.” While the Court recognized that certain exemptions would be upheld, the “primary assumption” was that a summoned party must “give what testimony one is capable of giving” absent an exemption “grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.” Ibid.

One application of this broad duty to provide relevant evidence has been the recognition, since early times, of an obligation to provide certain forms of nontestimonial physical evidence. In Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-253 (1910) (Holmes, J.), the Court found that the common-law evidentiary duty permitted the compulsion of various forms of physical evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 764 (1966), this Court observed that traditionally witnesses could be compelled, in both state and federal courts, to submit to “fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). In Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-267 (1967), handwriting was held, “like the . . . body itself” to be an “identifying physical characteristic,” subject to production. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), this Court again confirmed that handwriting is in the nature of physical evidence which can be compelled by a grand jury in the exercise of its subpoena power. See also United States v. Mullaney, 32 F. 370 (CC Mo. 1887).

This broad duty to provide most relevant, nonprivileged evidence has not been considered to exist only in the common law. The Court has recognized that by statute “Congress may provide for the performance of this duty.” Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932). By imposing an obligation to produce documents as well as to appear and give testimony, we believe the language of § 7602 suggests an intention to codify a broad testimonial obligation, including an obligation to provide some physical evidence relevant and material to a tax investigation, subject to the traditional privileges and limitations. This conclusion seems inherent in the imposition of an obligation to “appear,” since an obligation to appear necessarily entails an obligation to display physical features to the summoning authority. Congress thereby authorized the Service to compel the production of some physical evidence, and it is certainly possible to conclude that this authorization extended to the execution of handwriting exemplars, one variety of relevant physical evidence. This construction of the language conforms with the historical notions of the testimonial duty attaching to the issuance of a summons.

B

Congress certainly could have narrowed the common-law testimonial duty in enacting § 7602, and thus we do not rely solely on the common-law meaning of the statutory language. Section 7602 does not, by its terms, compel the production of handwriting exemplars, and therefore, a narrower interpretation of the duty imposed is not precluded by the actual language of the statute. A narrower interpretation is precluded, however, by the precedents of this Court construing that statute. As early as 1911, this Court established the benchmarks for interpreting the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce tax obligations in holding that “the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all appropriate measures for its enforcement, [unless] there is . . . substantial reason for assigning to the phrase [s] ... a narrower interpretation.” United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250, 269. This precise mode of construction has consistently been applied by this Court in construing the breadth of the summons authority Congress intended to confer in § 7602. In United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), the Court declined to construe § 7605 (b), prohibiting the Secretary from conducting “unnecessary examination [s],” to require probable cause for the issuance of a § 7602 summons. The Court found that “[ajlthough a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require some showing of cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted. . . .” 379 U. S., at 53-54. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the Court refused to hold that the summons authority could not be used whenever there was a potential that the civil investigation might later lead to criminal prosecution. In construing the scope of the summons authority, the Court emphasized that it refused to draw the line in a manner that would “stultify enforcement of federal law.” Id., at 536. Finally, in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975), the Court upheld the Service’s authority to issue a John Doe summons to a bank in order to discover the identity of an individual unknown to the Service. The Court reasoned that absent that construction, “no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted” and thus 'Ts]ettled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress.” Id., at 150. There is thus a formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed enforcement authority of the Service if authority is necessary for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary legislative purposes.

Applying these principles, we conclude that Congress empowered the Service to seek, and obliged the witness to provide, handwriting exemplars relevant to the investigation. First, there is no question that handwriting exemplars will often be an important evidentiary component in establishing tax liability. The statutory framework, as reviewed in the numerous precedents recited supra, imposes on the Secretary of the Treasury, and the IRS as his designate, a broad duty to enforce the tax laws. 26 U. S. C. § 7601 (a). Congress has legislated that the Secretary is “required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this title. . . ” 26 U. S. C. § 6201 (a). Under § 6301 the Secretary “shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws.” In order to fulfill these duties, the Service will often need to determine whether a particular name is an alias of a taxpayer. One effective method for resolving that issue is through the use of handwriting exemplars. As we recognized in Bisceglia, the IRS does have a need for investigative devices which assist them in ascertaining the identity of tax evaders. In Bisceglia, we held, in language relevant to this case:

“Whether or not the method of collecting any tax imposed ... is specifically provided for by this title, any such tax may ... be collected by . . . other reasonable devices or methods as may be necessary or helpful in securing a complete and proper collection of the tax.”
“[I]f criminal activity is afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such persons, the broad inquiry authorized by § 7601 will be frustrated in this class of cases. Settled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress.” 420 U. S., at 150.

There is certainly nothing in the statutory language, or in the legislative history, precluding the interpretation asserted by the Service. Nor is there any constitutional privilege of the taxpayer or other parties that is violated by this construction. Compulsion of handwriting exemplars is neither a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections, United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), nor testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). The compulsion of handwriting exemplars has been the subject of far less protection than the compulsion of testimony and documents. Since Congress has explicitly established an obligation to provide the more protected forms of evidence, it would seem curious had it chosen not to impose an obligation to produce a form of evidence tradition has found it less important to protect.

As we have emphasized in other cases dealing with § 7602 proceedings, the summoned party is entitled to challenge the issuance of the summons in an adversary proceeding in federal court prior to enforcement, and may assert appropriate defenses. See Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 151. The Service must also establish compliance with the good-faith requirements recognized by this Court, United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S., at 318, and with the requirement of § 7605 (b) that “[n]o taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigation. . . .” These protections are quite sufficient to lead us to refuse to strain to imply additional ones from the neutral language Congress has used in § 7602.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals refusing enforcement of the summons.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

The Internal Revenue Service, unlike common-law courts, has only such authority as Congress gives it. Cf. United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298, 307 (1978) (validity of Service summonses depends on “whether they were among those authorized by Congress”). Congress has granted the Service authority to summon individuals “to appear before the Secretary ... at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry. . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 7602. The Court holds today that this authority to compel “testimony” includes authority to compel the creation of handwriting exemplars.

The Court, however, is unable to point to anything in the statutory language or legislative history that even suggests that the obligation to “give testimony” includes an obligation to create a handwriting exemplar. Indeed, the Court concedes, as it must, that a handwriting exemplar is a kind of nontestimonial physical evidence.- Certainly, Congress has the power to authorize the Service to compel the creation of exemplars, but it has not chosen to do so in § 7602. Accordingly, I dissent.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

In my view, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination prohibits the Government from requiring a person to provide handwriting exemplars. As I stated in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 33 (1973), “I cannot accept the notion that the Government can compel a man to cooperate affirmatively in securing incriminating evidence when that evidence could not be obtained without the cooperation of the suspect.” The Fifth Amendment privilege is rooted in “the basic stream of religious and political principle [,] . . . reflects the limits of the individual’s attornment to the state,” In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 47 (1967), and embodies the “respect a government— state or federal — must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens,” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 460 (1966). I continue to believe, then, that “[i]t is only by prohibiting the Government from compelling an individual to cooperate affirmatively in securing incriminating evidence which could not be obtained without his active assistance, that ‘the inviolability of the human personality’ is assured.” United States v. Mara, supra, at 34—35 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 460).

In order to avoid this constitutional problem, I agree with my Brother Brennan, see ante, p. 719, that 26 U. S. C. § 7602 should be construed not to permit Internal Revenue Service personnel to compel the production of handwriting exemplars. Accordingly, I dissent.

       The Fourth Circuit reached a contrary result in United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F. 2d 249 (1977). The Sixth Circuit decided this issue in accord with the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Brown, 536 F. 2d 117 (1976).

       The precise reasons for the court’s holding are not clear. In the opinion, the court suggests that the statute does not authorize the IRS to compel a taxpayer to create evidence “out of thin air.” 587 F. 2d 25, 27, n. 3 (1978). The opinion also states, however, that it adopts the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in United States v. Campbell, 524 F. 2d 604, 608 (CA8 1975). The principal reason forwarded in that decision for declining to construe § 7602 to authorize production of handwriting exemplars was the conclusion that such an order would constitute a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed infra, neither rationale supports the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.

       Responsibility for administration and enforcement of the revenue laws is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. 26 U. S. C. § 7801 (a). The Internal Revenue Service, however, is organized to carry out those responsibilities for the Secretary. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 534; 35. Fed. Reg. 2417 et seq. (1970). For the purposes of this opinion, we refer ito the authority and responsibilities of the Secretary and the Service interchangeably.

       “Sec. 7602. Examination of Books and Witnesses.
      “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized—
      “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
      “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
      “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”

       Legislative efforts to expand the scope of the testimonial obligation would, of course, be limited by the applicable constitutional guarantees.

       The word “testimony” has been used loosely in this context to refer to physical and documentary, as well as oral, evidence. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2194, p. 76 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).

       Wigmore has identified the testimonial duty as including an obligation “to disclose for the purpose of justice all that is in his control which can serve the ascertainment of the truth, [and] this duty includes not only mental impressions preserved in his brain and the documents preserved in his hands, but also the corporal facts existing on his body.” Ibid.

       As indicated elsewhere, we do not suggest that the evidentiary obligation codified in § 7602 in all respects conforms to the common law. We rely on the analogy only as one interpretive guide. Supra, at 712.

       Congressional intent to provide the Secretary with broad latitude to adopt enforcement techniques helpful in the performance of his tax collection and assessment responsibilities is expressed throughout the Code. In § 6302, for example, Congress has conferred the Secretary with discretion to devise methods of tax collection not specifically provided by statute:

       The United States suggests there are numerous uses of handwriting exemplars helpful to the Service. Not only are they useful in identifying the holder of a bank account, but they are also said to be useful for identifying persons who file multiple tax returns under false names claiming income tax refunds, purchase of money orders under false names, and forgery of joint returns to take advantage of lower joint rates.

       Respondent argues that the language of § 7602 suggests that it only requires the production of documents already in existence. Since handwriting exemplars must be created by the witness, it is argued that the statute is inapplicable. First, we do not view the exhibition of physical characteristics to be equivalent to the creation of documentary evidence. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 6 (1973). Further, the statute obviously contemplates the transformation of some evidence not formerly tangible, since it obligates the summoned individual to provide testimony. The testimony, of course, creates evidence not previously in existence. We see no difference between the nature of the evidence created when the witness is ordered to talk and that created when he is ordered to write.
      We express no opinion on the scope of the Service’s authority to otherwise order the witness to generate previously nonexistent documentation under § 7602. The Service in fact has expressly disclaimed any intention to order the creation of documents. The Internal Revenue Manual § 4022.64 (4) (CCH 1977) provides that an administrative summons “should not require the witness to do anything other than to appear on a given date to give testimony and to bring with him/her existing books, papers and records. A witness cannot be required to prepare or create documents.”
      The section states, however, that “[t]he giving of exemplars, for example,, handwriting exemplars, at an appearance pursuant to a summons is not 'creating a document.’”

       The legislative history is simply unilluminating. The only conclusion which that history supports is that Congress did not intend to change the expanse of the §7602 summons authority by its amendments in 1954. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). Since there are no pre-1954 interpretations of the statute precluding the issuance of handwriting exemplars, the legislative history sheds no light on the construction intended by Congress.

        Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967), demonstrates the minimal level of protection afforded handwriting exemplars, and the reasons why such protection is unnecessary. The Court found that production of the exemplars was not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege, and that their creation did not represent a critical stage requiring counsel. The Court found only a “minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from [a] right to a fair trial.’' Id., at 267. The Court concluded that “[ijf, for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this can be brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial since the accused can make an unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts.” Ibid.

         Palmer v. United States, 530 F. 2d 787 (CA8 1976), similarly construed 28 U. S. C. § 1826 (a). That statute authorizes the imposition of contempt on witnesses who refuse to “testify or provide other information.” The statute does not explicitly authorize contempt sanctions for refusal to execute handwriting exemplars. The court found that the legislative history indicated that Congress had intended, through the use of the language employed in the statute, to “codify present civil contempt practice.” Since that practice had included the power to punish a witness for refusing to create a handwriting exemplar, the court reasoned that Congress must have thought this phrasing adequate to cover production of handwriting samples.

       The Court also places some reliance on the word “appear,” which the Court suggests “necessarily entails an obligation to display physical features to the summoning authority.” Ante, at 714. Plainly “appear” adds nothing to the authority of the Service. The word is used only to indicate that the person summoned must deliver the requested testimony or documents at the designated time and place.

       The Court’s use of the label “nontestimonial” is meaningful, for “[t]es-timony properly means only such evidence as is delivered by a witness . .., either orally or in the form of affidavits or depositions.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (5th ed. 1979). Testimony is a statement of knowledge or belief by a witness as opposed to the mere display of a physical characteristic.

       Even if I thought the statute were ambiguous, I would reach the same result because I strongly believe that “until Congress has stated otherwise, our duty to protect the rights of the individual should hold sway over the interest in more effective law enforcement.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U. S. 238, 263 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).


text:
    October 1, 1979
    No. 78-1882.
    Wolman et al. v. Walter et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart dissent.


text:
    No. 78-1671.
    Dodson Insurance Group v. Maloney, Judge.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. M. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1833.
    Monroe v. Monroe.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Conn, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6645.
    Carter v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6743.
    Welch v. Falke, Prosecuting Attorney of Montgomery County, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating . the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6765.
    Linden v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6768.
    Raitport v. Lyons, Prison Superintendent.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6771.
    Wayland v. Harkaway.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6875.
    Linden v. Shore et al.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6876.
    Wayland v. Moore et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6896.
    Berenholz v. Berenholz.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6904.
    Kalenian v. Kalenian.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5072.
    Garcia v. Arizona.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ariz. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1710.
    Ford v. Texas.
   Appeal from County Ct. at Law, Comal County, Tex., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-5100.
    Petrillo v. Spatola.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1808.
    Conway et al. v. Hospital Corporation of America et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 6th Sup. Jud. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1812.
    O’Donnell et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1828.
    Sparks et al. v. Parker, Judge.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1854.
    Warren et al. v. Sun Oil Co.
   Appeal from Ct; App. Okla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1936.
    Rinehart v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
   Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-6704.
    Fince v. Klein, Commissioner, Department of Human Services, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-6911.
    Lamar v. Georgia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-34.
    Stinson v. Louisiana State Bar Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-13.
    Foster v. County School Board of Prince William County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-38.
    Perry, Administratrix v. Kalamazoo State Hospital.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mich, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-49.
    Prest v. Herbst, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources of Minnesota, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-90.
    Skelton v. City of Birmingham.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-126.
    Dudley et ux. v. Nebraska State Bank.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Neb. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-146.
    Slagle et al. v. Parker et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-164.
    Spiegel, Inc. v. South Dakota ex rel. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. S. D. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-5098.
    Wilson v. Ohio.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-5099.
    Hinkle v. Ohio.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-5165.
    Postell v. Texas.
   Appeal from County Ct. at Law No. 4, El Paso County, Tex., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1937.
    Metro Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. P. R. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reported below: -P. R. R.-.


text:
    No. 78-1940.
    O’Connor et al. v. San Francisco Police Commission et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 78-6413.
    Letourneau v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. dismissed as untimely.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would affirm the judgment.


text:
    No. 79-130.
    Behnke v. Committee of Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 78-6750.
    Conrad v. Regan, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 78-1780.
    Crowell, Secretary of State of Tennessee, et al. v. Mader et al.
   Appeal from D. C. M. D. Tenn. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss cause as moot.


text:
    No. 78-6659.
    Blake v. Thompson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979).


text:
    No. 78-6840.
    Corley v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of position presently asserted by the Solicitor General in his memorandum filed August 31, 1979.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Stevens dissent.


text:
    No. 79-110.
    Kentucky v. Martin.
   Ct. App. Ky. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U. S. 786 (1979).


text:
    No. A-1060 (O. T. 1978).
    Nash et al. v. Chandler et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay or to vacate injunction, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-12.
    Chaffin v. Thomas, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay and bail, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1134 (O. T. 1978).
    Pennhurst State School and Hospital et al. v. Halderman et al.
   Application for stay of judgment and order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dated March 5, 1979, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-59 (79-206).
    Manley Investment Co. v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., et al.
   Application for stay of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, addressed to Mr. Justice Rehnquist and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-71.
    Carlos et al. v. United States et al.
   D. C. E. D. N. Y. Application for injunction, addressed to Mr. Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-95.
    Retail Store Employees Union, Local No. 919, et al. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union et al.
   Application for stay pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-101 (79-231).
    No. A-102 (79-232).
    Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al.; and General Telephone Company of California v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Applications for stay, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-133.
    Evans, aka Yonan, et al. v. Secretary of the Army et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for an injunction, addressed to Mr. Justice White and referred to the Court, denied.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. A-172.
    Lenhard et al., Clark County Deputy Public Defenders, individually and as next friends of Bishop v. Wolff, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him stayed to and including October 1, 1979, and referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan

joins,

dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances. Accordingly, I dissent. In addition, however, I feel compelled to note that the present decision is indefensible even under the more restrictive view of the Eighth Amendment taken by a majority of my Brethren. For today the Court grants a man’s wish to be put to death even though the sentencing hearing accorded to him failed to comply with the procedural requirements imposed by the prior decisions of this Court.

I

Since there is no opinion accompanying the denial of the requested stay, a brief review of the events leading up to this application is necessary.

While in the process of robbing a cashier at a Las Vegas casino, Jesse Walter Bishop shot an employee and a patron of the casino who tried to prevent the crime. The patron died as a result of the wound. Bishop was charged with nine felony counts, including first-degree murder.

At the January 13, 1978, arraignment, Bishop stated that he wished to represent himself, to discharge the public defenders assigned to him, and to plead guilty to all charges. On January 23, 1978, after hearing testimony from three court-appointed psychiatrists, the trial judge found Bishop to be competent. The judge informed Bishop that the maximum sentence for first-degree murder was death and suggested that pro se representation was ill-advised. Nevertheless, Bishop insisted on discharging the public defenders. Relying on Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), the judge granted Bishop’s motion for self-representation. The judge did appoint the public defenders as “standby counsel,” however, and informed Bishop that he could confer with them if he wished.

Bishop pleaded guilty to all counts. At the sentencing hearing before a three-judge panel, the State presented evidence of aggravating circumstances. Bishop introduced no evidence in mitigation. Standby counsel sought to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. Bishop, however, refused to agree to the admission of any such evidence. The court acceded to his wishes and did not allow standby counsel to proceed. Finding the existence of aggravating circumstances and noting that Bishop had offered no proof of mitigating circumstances, the court imposed the death penalty.

Bishop initially allowed the public defenders to prosecute an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. After the appeal had been filed, however, Bishop sought to have the appeal dismissed and apparently informed the justices of the Nevada court that he wanted to be executed. The court ignored the pro se effort, reached the issues raised by the public defenders, and affirmed. The court reasoned that, under Faretta, Bishop had the absolute right to represent himself and to decline to introduce any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the capital trial. The court further held that the Nevada death penalty statutes were constitutional because they were similar to the Florida statutes upheld by this Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976).

On August 1, 1979, the state trial court relieved the public defenders of any further responsibility as Bishop’s counsel. Nonetheless, referring to their moral and ethical obligations, they filed this federal habeas corpus petition against Bishop’s wishes on August 16. On August 18, at the State’s request, Bishop submitted to a psychiatric examination. After a 4-hour interview, the psychiatrist determined that Bishop was competent to waive further litigation. This psychiatric evidence was presented to the Federal District Court by affidavit. Bishop refused the public defenders’ request to submit himself to a psychiatrist of their choosing. On August 23, Bishop appeared before the District Court and stated that he did not wish to pursue any further litigation. On the same date, the District Court denied the writ, holding that Bishop had made a valid waiver of his right to pursue federal relief and that therefore the public defenders had no standing to bring this action under Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U. S. 1012 (1976). On August 24, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

On August 25, however, Bishop voluntarily appeared before the Nevada Board of Pardons. He told the Board that he would be willing to accept commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment if the Board saw fit to do so. The Board denied commutation by a 5-2 vote.

II

The majority of this Court assumes that Bishop’s conduct waives the possibility of a challenge to his execution. In my judgment, however, there can be no such waiver. In Gilmore v. Utah, supra, at 1018. Mr. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion in which Me. Justice Beennan and I joined, asserted “that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” In my own dissenting opinion, I expressed the view that “the Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.” 429 U. S., at 1019.

Society’s independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant’s purported waiver. By refusing to pursue his Eighth Amendment claim, Bishop has, in effect, sought the State’s assistance in committing suicide. Society is not powerless, however, to resist a defendant’s effort to prompt the exercise of capital force. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has eloquently recognized in a similar case:

“The doctrine of waiver developed not only out of a sense of fairness to an opposing party but also as a means of promoting jurisprudential efficiency by avoiding appellate court determinations of issues which the appealing party had failed to preserve. It was not, however, designed to block giving effect to a strong public interest, which itself is a jurisprudential concern. It is evident from the record that [the convicted defendant sentenced to death] personally prefers death to spending the remainder of his life in prison. While this may be a genuine conviction on his part, the waiver concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal defendant to choose his own sentence. . . . The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue — the propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.” Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 441, 383 A. 2d 174, 181 (1978).

Bishop’s diligent and conscientious attorneys, who were appointed at trial to represent his interests, are quite capable of litigating the Eighth Amendment questions involved in this case. There is no indication that they would be less vigorous or able advocates than was Gilmore’s mother. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U. S., at 1018 (White, J., dissenting); id., at 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

III

Moreover, the procedures in this case did not even comply with the requirements developed by the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), and its progeny. In 1976, the Court held that capital punishment is not unconstitutional in all circumstances. Gregg, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280. Because "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long,” Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, at 305 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), these decisions require sentencing procedures that are carefully designed to ensure that the death penalty will not “be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 188 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court approved a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases in which, after a guilty verdict has been reached, a sentencing hearing is held in which the State may present evidence of statutorily provided aggravating circumstances and the defendant may present evidence in mitigation. In the sentencing hearing, the sentencing authority must consider the “character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death,” Woodson, 428 U. S., at 304, to ensure that “death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,” id., at 305. See Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 637 (1977); Jurek v. Texas, supra, at 271-272.

Indeed, in one of its most recent decisions on the issue, a plurality of this Court focused on the constitutional importance of individualized sentencing in capital cases. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 602-605 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The plurality noted this Court’s earlier pronouncement that the sentencing authority’s “ ‘possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics’ is ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — [to the] selection of an appropriate sentence. . . .’” Id., at 603 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949)) (emphasis in Lockett). The plurality then concluded:

“Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases. . . . The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.” 438 U. S., at 605.

This need for individualized consideration of the capital defendant led the plurality to conclude that “a statute- that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.” Ibid. As a result, the plurality stated that a death penalty statute that “preclude [s] consideration of relevant mitigating factors” violates the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 608.

In the present case, the defendant Bishop, acting as his own defense counsel, failed to introduce any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Moreover, he was successful in persuading the sentencing tribunal to refuse to permit his standby counsel to present such evidence. By that action, the sentencing court deprived itself of the very evidence that this Court has deemed essential to the determination whether death was the appropriate sentence. We can have no assurance that the death sentence would have been imposed if the sentencing tribunal had engaged in the careful weighing process that was held to be constitutionally required in Gregg v. Georgia and its progeny. This Court’s toleration of the death penalty has depended on its assumption that the penalty will be imposed only after a painstaking review of aggravating and mitigating factors. In this case, that assumption has proved demonstrably false. Instead, the Court has permitted the State’s mechanism of execution to be triggered by an entirely arbitrary factor: the defendant’s decision to acquiesce in his own death. In my view, the procedure the Court approves today amounts to nothing less than state-administered suicide. I dissent.

       Justice Manoukian dissented from the Nevada Supreme Court decision. He argued that a self-represented defendant has no right under Faretta to waive his right to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of his trial. The sentencing court’s refusal to allow the public defenders to present such evidence, he asserted, constituted state-sanctioned suicide. Furthermore, he contended, society has an overriding Eighth Amendment interest in ensuring that capital punishment is imposed only in appropriate cases. That interest would go unsatisfied in a case such as this, where the sentencer is not presented with all available mitigating evidence and therefore cannot make a rational decision as to the propriety of imposing the death penalty.

       Bishop’s “competency” to make such a waiver is by no means self-evident to me. He has been a drug addict for a number of years' and is presently taking a large daily dosage of tranquilizers. In addition, three factors have combined to put Bishop under extreme stress. First, while making an appearance before the state trial court, Bishop complained bitterly of allegedly inhumane conditions in the Nevada state prison and stated that he would rather die than remain incarcerated. Second, apparently because he is convinced that no legal efforts could result in the vacating of his death sentence, Bishop desires his execution to occur swiftly, so that his family will suffer for the shortest possible period. This concern is the evident motivation behind Bishop’s decision to forgo federal habeas corpus proceedings, which he believes would result at most in one or more agonizing stays of execution before the death sentence is finally carried out. Third, Bishop’s testimony before the Nevada Board of Pardons reveals that he considers it undignified to ask for mercy. Indeed, he stated that he had refused to take the stand at the sentencing phase of his trial and to allow any member of his family to do so because, in his view, such testimony would have constituted begging for pity for him.

       In addition, of course, the majority considers Bishop’s conduct as waiving any challenge to the constitutionality of the Nevada statutes under which he was sentenced to death. Not only have these statutes never been reviewed by this Court, it appears that the Court has never before been asked to review a death sentence imposed under them. An execution should not be allowed to proceed until this Court has had the opportunity to review the constitutionality of the statutes under which the sentence of death was imposed. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U. S. 1012, 1017 (1976) (White, J., joined by BrennaN and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id,., at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld these statutes because of their supposed similarity to the Florida death penalty statutes upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976). To the extent that the Nevada provisions do resemble those Florida statutes, I would strike them down not only because I believe that capital punishment is unconstitutional in all circumstances, but also because in my view the Florida statutes have led to the arbitrary and capricious imposition of capital punishment. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 365-370 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

       I concurred in the result in Lockett, reiterating my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and, in addition, agreeing with the plurality’s determination that the Ohio death penalty statute under review “wholly failfed] to recognize the unique individuality of every criminal defendant who comes before its courts.” 438 U. S., at 621.

       In addition, my Brethren have considered careful appellate review a requisite to the constitutionality of capital punishment. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 198 (1976). A number of States now have a mandatory appeal procedure for cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. See Ala. Code § 13-11-5 (1977); Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 31.2 (b); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1239 (b) (West Supp. 1979); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209 (g) (Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. § 921-141 (4) (1977) ; Ga. Code § 27-2537 (a) (1978); Idaho Code § 19-2827 (1979); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 9-1 (i) (1977); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.9 (West Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 414 (Supp. 1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2525 (1975); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5 (VI) (Supp. 1977); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.13 (Supp. 1978); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1311 (h) (1978); S. C. Code § 18-9-20 (1976); Va. Code § 17-110.1 (Supp. 1979); Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-103 (1977).


text:
    No. A-193 (79-444).
    Fernos-Lopez v. United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay of proceedings, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-153.
    In re Disbarment of Olitt.
    [For earlier order herein, see 439 U. S. 1042.]
   Disbarment entered.


text:
    No. 5,
    Orig.
    United States v. California.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 439 U. S. 30.]
   Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 423 U. S. 909.]
   Supplemental Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 81,
    Orig.
    Kentucky v. Indiana et al.
    [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 441 U. S. 941.]
   Report of the Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the report may be filed by the parties within 30 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days.


text:
    No. 78-119.
    Washington et al. v. United States et al.,
   443 U. S. 658. Upon consideration of the motion of the State of Washington for modification of the opinion of this Court, the memorandum filed by the respondent tribes, the memorandum filed by the United States and the reply thereto, it is ordered that footnote 16 of the opinion be modified as follows:

"A factual dispute exists on the question of what percentage of the fish in the case area actually passes through Indian fishing areas and is therefore subject to the District Court’s allocations. In the absence of any relevant findings by the courts below, we are unable to express any view on the matter.”


text:
    No. 78-160.
    No. 78-161.
    Wilson et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.; and Iowa et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al.,
   442 U. S. 653. Motion of Maine et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion for modification of the opinion denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 78-599.
    No. 78-1006.
    Secretary of the Navy et al. v. Huff et al.; and Brown, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Glines.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 440 U. S. 957.] Motion of the Solicitor General to consolidate these cases for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-630.
    Washington et al. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation et al.; and Washington v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Wash. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 440 U. S. 905.] Motion of the All Indian Pueblo Council, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-857.
    No. 78-997.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University; and Yeshiva University Faculty Assn. v. Yeshiva University.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 440 U. S. 906.] Motion of National Society of Professional Engineers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-959.
    Perrin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 440 U. S. 956.] Motion of petitioner for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 78-911.
    No. 78-1036.
    Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute et al.; and Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 440 U. S. 906.] Motion of Joseph Cimino et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-1088.
    No. 78-1217.
    Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al.; and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. v. Kissinger.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 441 U. S. 904.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes are allotted for oral argument in these cases.


text:
    No. 78-1248.
    GTE Sylvania, Inc., et al. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 441 U. S. 942.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted, and five additional minutes allotted for that purpose. The non-federal respondent also allotted an additional five minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 78-1422.
    No. 78-1445.
    No. 78-1841.
    No. 79-88.
    No. 79-101.
    Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing, Heating & Piping Industry of Southern California v. Johns. Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Plan et al. v. Johnston et vir. Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Adams. California v. Whyte. Blum, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. v. Swift et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist.;

Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.;

C. A. 3d Cir.;

Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.; and

C. A. 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 78-1318.
    O’Bannon, Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania v. Town Court Nursing Center et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 441 U. S. 904.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of the Legal Aid Society of New York City et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-1501.
    McLain et al. v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 441 U. S. 942.] Motion of Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted. Ten additional minutes allotted for oral argument and the time is allocated as follows: Petitioners, 20 minutes; Solicitor General, 15 minutes; and respondents, 35 minutes.


text:
    No. 78-1651.
    Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. et al. v. Shell Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 442 U. S. 940.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted, and five additional minutes allotted for that purpose. The nonfederal respondents also allotted an additional five minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 78-1789.
    Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 78-1840.
    City of Rome et al. v. United States et al.
   D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 443 U. S. 914.] Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 78-5937.
    Ybarra v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 440 U. S. 970.] Motion of Ralph Ruebner, Esquire, to permit Alan D. Goldberg, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 78-6020.
    No. 78-6029.
    Busic v. United States; and LaRocca v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 442 U. S. 916.] Motions for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Samuel J. Reich, Esquire, of Pittsburgh, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in No. 78-6020, and that Michael A. Litman, Esquire, of Pittsburgh, Pa., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in No. 78-6029.


text:
    No. 78-6933.
    Simon v. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6657.
    Sayles v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 78-1921.
    No. 78-6780.
    No. 78-6813.
    No. 79-166.
    No. 79-188.
    No. 79-5036.
    No. 79-5159.
    No. 79-5200.
    Lecht v. Lecht et al.; Nelson v. Anderson, Warden; Fuller v. Alabama Board of Corrections et al.; Ernest v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Ernest v. Sirica, U. S. District Judge, et al.; MaGee v. Morris, Warden; McIntyre v. Warden, Kilby Correction Facility; and McCrary v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 78-6733.
    No. 78-6856.
    No. 78-6860.
    No. 79-31.
    No. 79-5053.
    No. 79-5094.
    No. 79-5095.
    Barnett et ux. v. Cox, U. S. District Judge, et al.; MaGee v. Wilkins, U. S. District Judge, et al.; Flanagan v. U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit et al.; Cox v. Carter, President of the United States, et al.; Green et al. v. Hunter, U. S. District Judge, et al.; Powell v. Malabuyo, Deputy Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, et al.; and Davis v. Bryan, U. S. District Judge.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 78-6686.
    No. 78-6795.
    No. 79-75.
    Davis et al. v. Hunter, U. S. District Judge, et al.; Jones v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit et al. ; and Knight et al. v. Heaney, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 79-5083.
    Intersimone v. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 78-6739.
    May v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 79-5181.
    Davis v. Russell et al.,
   U. S. Circuit Judges. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-45.
    Lewis, Comptroller of Florida v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Fla. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 79-134.
    Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of New York.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 78-1604.
    Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ariz. Probable jurisdiction noted, and case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 78-1177, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker [certiorari granted, infra, p. 823].


text:
    No. 78-1693.
    United States v. Clarke et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1729.
    United States v. Payner.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1779.
    Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1793.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1815.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior v. Shell Oil Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1821.
    United States v. Mendenhall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1845.
    Illinois v. Vitale.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1862.
    Walker v. ARMCO Steel Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1870.
    Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1918.
    Harrison, Regional Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. v. PPG Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-105.
    Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1177.
    White Mountain Apache Tribe et al. v. Bracker et al.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 5 presented by the petition, and case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 78-1604, Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission [probable jurisdiction noted, supra, p. 822].


text:
    No. 78-1577.
    Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-1832.
    Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Sullivan.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1874.
    Massachusetts v. Meehan.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1888.
    Maher, Commissioner of Income Maintenance of Connecticut v. Gagne.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-8.
    United States v. Raddatz.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-121.
    United States v. Henry.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-6809.
    Jenkins v. Anderson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-97.
    California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 78-1218.
    Smith v. Michot, Superintendent of Education of Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1351.
    Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1386.
    Sherman v. American Federation of Musicians.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1402.
    Wilbourn v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1407.
    Boone v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1423.
    Olitt v. Murphy, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1449.
    Hartman et al. v. Virginia.
   Cir. Ct. Prince William County, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1462.
    What It Is, Inc., et al. v. Jackson, Mayor of Atlanta, et al.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1468.
    First National Bank of Peoria v. Childs.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1494.
    Stovall et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1498.
    No. 78-6412.
    Michel et al. v. United States; and Belmares v. United States.
   C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 588 F. 2d 986.


text:
    No. 78-1499.
    Milestone v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1506.
    Mace v. Matthews, Mayor of Newburyport.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1512.
    Schwartz v. Gilster, Sheriff.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1518.
    Griffin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1520.
    Alabama Hospital Assn. et al. v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1526.
    Abel et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1538.
    Callahan et al. v. Kimball et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1539.
    Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Assn. et al. v. Hawaiian Homes Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1540.
    Greenwald v. City of North Miami Beach, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1547.
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1551.
    Ethier v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1561.
    Callahan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1567.
    No. 78-1568.
    No. 78-1569.
    No. 78-1570.
    Holleman v. United States; Winders v. United States; Edwards v. United States; and Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 591 F. 2d 1340.


text:
    No. 78-1571.
    Woo v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1573.
    Johnson v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuya-hoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1581.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1584.
    Mill v. Alaska.
   Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1586.
    Winkle v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1596.
    Lopez v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1597.
    Certified Grocers of California, Ltd. v. Leyva et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1606.
    Gouger et vir v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1607.
    Maryland Lumber Co. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1608.
    Wardell v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1609.
    Goins v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1616.
    Rogers et al. v. Brockette et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1617.
    Bay Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1623.
    Fowler v. Strickland, Revenue Commissioner of Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1625.
    Stones v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1627.
    Cramer v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1628.
    Hanrahan et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1631.
    Berlin v. Nathan et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1632.
    R. M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1633.
    Hallman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1634.
    United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Solien, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1637.
    Shanahan v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System of New Jersey et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1639.
    Morrison et al. v. Stetson, Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1642.
    St. Regis Paper Co. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1644.
    Kane v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1647.
    L. H. Feder Corp., dba Pioneer Institutional Trading Co. v. Atlantic Overseas Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1648.
    Jarecki et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1652.
    Hodder et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1656.
    Independent Stave Co., Diversified Industries Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1658.
    Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1663.
    New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund et al. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1667.
    Citizens Bank & Trust Company of Park Ridge, Illinois v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1668.
    Byrd et al. v. City of San Antonio, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1669.
    Fox et al. v. General Telephone Company of Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1670.
    Millen v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1672.
    Boise Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 7001.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1673.
    Marengo County Board of Education v. Lee et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1674.
    L. W. Bennett & Sons, Inc. v. Anichinapeo et al.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1677.
    Pacific Legal Foundation et al. v. Department of Transportation.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1679.
    Canal Barge Co., Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1682.
    Foran v. Metz, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1685.
    CBS Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1686.
    Hoffman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1687.
    White v. Office of Personnel Management et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1690.
    Union Bank v. Bloor, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1692.
    Solomon v. West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1694.
    C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Company of North America et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1696.
    Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1698.
    De Tenorio et al. v. Lightsey et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1699.
    Ayers et al. v. Spartan Grain & Mill Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1700.
    Conroy et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1705.
    McCutcheon v. Chicago Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1706.
    Crouch v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1707.
    Daly v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1708.
    Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1709.
    Jackson et al. v. Georgia.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Fulton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1701.
    Parker, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Klochko Equipment Rental Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1714.
    Postal et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1716.
    21st Phoenix Corp. et al. v. English et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1717.
    Dottino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1719.
    Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1721.
    WLLE, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1722.
    Benner et al. v. Oswald et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1725.
    Articles of Food v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1726.
    Southard et al. v. Forbes, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1727.
    Fresno Unified School District et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1730.
    Smith v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1731.
    New Mexico et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1732.
    H. Ray Baker, Inc., et al. v. Associated Banking Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1734.
    Golomb v. Wadsworth.
   CL C. P. A. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1740.
    Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, Texas, et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 7th Sup. Jud. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1741.
    Alabama v. Zuck.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1742.
    No. 78-1744.
    Wolf v. Illinois; and Berland v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 74 Ill. 2d 286, 385 N. E. 2d 649.


text:
    No. 78-1745.
    Simko, Administrator, et al. v. C & C Marine Maintenance Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1746.
    Diaz-Buxo v. Monge, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1747.
    United States Brewers Assn., Inc., et al. v. Perez, Secretary, Department of Treasury of Puerto Rico, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1748.
    Leavitt et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1751.
    No. 78-1754.
    No. 78-1755.
    No. 78-1903.
    McPartlin v. United States; Bull v. United States; Janicki v. United States; and Ingram v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 595 F. 2d 1321.


text:
    No. 78-1753.
    Tooke et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1757.
    Renz et al. v. Beeman, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1758.
    Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds, Metropolitan Area, et al. v. North Perry Baptist Church of Pontiac et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1759.
    Helm, Guardian Ad Litem v. Pacific Power & Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1760.
    Oregon v. Fondren.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1764.
    Ryan v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1766.
    Mendola et al. v. Lees Carpets et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1767.
    Wilmington Trust Co. v. Penn Central Transportation Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1768.
    Rowen v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1769.
    Nickols v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1770.
    Kaye v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1771.
    Weibel v. Clark, dba Clark Building, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1773.
    Beckford et al. v. Dade County School Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1774.
    Adams et al. v. United States et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1775.
    Schafer et al. v. Penn Central Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1776.
    Key v. Penn Central Corp. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1777.
    Brewery Drivers & Helpers Local No. 133 v. Grey Eagle Distributors, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1778.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1781.
    In re Lefkowitz.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1782.
    Bowling v. Mathews et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1783.
    Simons et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1784.
    Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1785.
    Grogan et al. v. Kentucky et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1787.
    Barber v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1788.
    Henry Pollak, Inc., et al. v. Miller, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1790.
    Davis v. General Motors Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1792.
    Wornock et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1794.
    Coughlin, Commissioner, New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, et al. v. New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1795.
    Hardwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1796.
    Graham et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1797.
    Newhouse v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1798.
    Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Boggs et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1800.
    Louchheim v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1802.
    American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles of Virginia et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1805.
    McTighe v. University of the Americas Foundation, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1806.
    Brandon et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1807.
    Ault v. Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1809.
    Perez v. Stevens.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1810.
    West v. Janing, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1813.
    Sloan v. Raichle, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1814.
    Melvin v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1816.
    Parness v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1817.
    No. 78-1818.
    Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Colonial Ford, Inc.; and Ford Motor Co. v. Colonial Ford, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 592 F. 2d 1126.


text:
    No. 78-1820.
    Associated Third Class Mail Users v. United States Postal Service et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1822.
    Vila v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1823.
    Teamsters Local Union No. 30 et al. v. Helms Express, Inc., a Division of Ryder Truck Lines, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1824.
    In re Schulman.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1825.
    Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1826.
    Resetar v. State Board of Education of Maryland et al.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1827.
    Moore v. Moore.
   Ct. App. D. C. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1829.
    Mike et al. v. Sigma Nu Fraternity et al.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1830.
    Iampieri v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1831.
    Hesston Corp. v. Deere & Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1834.
    Muñiz et al. v. South Puerto Rico Sugar Corp. et al.
   Super. Ct. P. R., Ponce Sec. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1835.
    Wold v. Wold et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1837.
    Ellis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1842.
    Goldman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; and Goldman v. Meredith, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 593 F. 2d 129 (first case); 596 F. 2d 1353 (second case).


text:
    No. 78-1843.
    Schonwald v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1844.
    Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1846.
    Stovall et al. v. Patterson et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1847.
    Geraci v. St. Xavier High School et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1848.
    United States ex rel. Petrofsky v. Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1851.
    Harris v. H. Schuldt Reederei.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1853.
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. General Telephone Company of California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1857.
    Blasi v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1858.
    National Caucus of Labor Committees et al. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW).
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1859.
    Grey Line Auto Parts, Inc. v. Tharp et. al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1860.
    Leavitt v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1861.
    Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1863.
    Perez, Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Rodriguez de Quiñonez et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1864.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1865.
    No. 78-1875.
    McCabe v. Greenberg; and McCabe v. Greenberg.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: 594 F. 2d.854.


text:
    No. 78-1866.
    International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 82 v. Detroit Coil Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1867.
    Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1868.
    Lemelson v. Centsable Products, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1869.
    Rehahn et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1872.
    No. 79-111.
    Brighton Building & Maintenance Co. et al. v. United States; and Palumbo Excavating Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 598 F. 2d 1101.


text:
    No. 78-1876.
    Del Rio Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1873.
    Gabauer et al. v. Woodcock et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1877.
    Viserto et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1879.
    Galante et al. v. Steel City National Bank of Chicago et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1880.
    Board of Assessors of the City of Boston v. Tregor, Trustee.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1883.
    Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Boyle, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1884.
    Lerner, Administrator v. Haas et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1885.
    Delaplane v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1886.
    Sirico et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1887.
    Smith v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1889.
    No. 78-1908.
    Butler et al. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., et al.; and Kowalski et al. v. Butler et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 589 F. 2d 323.


text:
    No. 78-1890.
    Frissell v. Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1891.
    Lattimore et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1892.
    Chamberlain v. Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1893.
    Bireline v. Seagondollar et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1894.
    Fort Pierce Utilities Authority of the City of Fort Pierce et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1895.
    Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana v. Citizens Energy Coalition of Indiana, dba Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1896.
    Kahn et al. v. East Bay Municipal Utility District.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1897.
    Hak Yung Sze v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1898.
    No. 78-1906.
    Atlantic Richfield Co. et al. v. Newman Oil Co. et al.; and Alkek et al. v. Newman Oil Co. et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 597 F. 2d 275.


text:
    No. 78-1899.
    DeMoss et al. v. Indian Head, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1901.
    Herschensohn et al. v. Hoffman et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1900.
    Smyer et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1910.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1911.
    Robert L. Guyler Co. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1912.
    Pappas v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1915.
    Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1916.
    Tonka v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1919.
    Davila v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1920.
    Eisenberg v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1923.
    Kitchin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1925.
    Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Assn. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1926.
    Schreiber v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1927.
    Genovese v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1928.
    Stuart, Co-Trustee, et al. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, Co-Trustee, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1929.
    Brody v. Montalbano et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1930.
    Theodore D. Bross Line Construction Corp. v. Wendell, Secretary of Revenue of South Dakota.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1932.
    Northern Illinois Automobile Wreckers & Rebuilders Assn. et al. v. Dixon, Secretary of State of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1934.
    No. 78-6924.
    No. 79-18.
    Avarello v. United States; Bowers v. United States; and Avery v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 592 E. 2d 1339.


text:
    No. 78-1935.
    John O. Butler Co. v. Laff.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1938.
    Hauser v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1939.
    Colognino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1941.
    Inendino v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1942.
    Brown, Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Atlanta v. Minter.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1944.
    Stewart v. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1946.
    Wilkes v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1947.
    Abramovich v. Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 of the Town of Brookhaven et al., Suffolk County, New York, aka Three Village Central School District No. 1.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1948.
    Borre v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-1949.
    Pardon-Gonzalez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6333.
    Wing v. White, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6378.
    Christian v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6388.
    Clement v. Kansas.
   Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6406.
    Beck v. Hanberry, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6424.
    Ponting v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6454.
    Fox v. Hopper, Warden.
   Super. Ct. Ga., Tattnall County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6457.
    Marlin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6458.
    Linam v. New Mexico.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6478.
    No. 78-6487.
    No. 78-6509.
    No. 78-6511.
    No. 78-6512.
    Dodaro v. United States; Lynch v. United States; Bertolotti v. United States; Dodaro v. United States; and Malatesta v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 590 F. 2d 1379.


text:
    No. 78-6479.
    Mims v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6481.
    Baca v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6492.
    Tyner v. Perini, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6493.
    Washington v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6514.
    Quick v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6531.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6537.
    Lawrence v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6546.
    Norris v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6550.
    Hayes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6554.
    McMahon v. Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6565.
    Smith v. Leeke et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6569.
    Holder v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6572.
    Lawrence et al. v. Florida; and Barfield v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6582.
    Bradley v. Jago, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6587.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6592.
    Bruneau v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6593.
    Priest v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6597.
    Nevitt v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6598.
    Nicholas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6601.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.