author: Mr. Chief-Justice TANEY Mr. Justice McLEAN.

text:
    Elisha Bloomer, Appellant, v. John W. McQuewan, Allen R. McQuewan, and Samuel Douglas, Partners, under the name of McQuewans & Douglas.
    The patent for Woodworth’s planing machine was extended from 1842 to 1843, bjr the Board of Commissioners.
    Under that .extension, this court decided, in Wilson v. Rousseau, (4 How. 688,). that an assignee had a right to. continue the use of the machine which he. then had.
    In 1845, Congress, by a special act, extended the time still further from 1849 to 1856. Under that extension, an assignee has still the same right.
    By the cases of Evans v. Eaton, (3 Wheaton, 548,) and Wilson.w. Rousseau, (4 How. 688,) these two propositions are settled, yíz. :
    1. That a special act of Congress in favor of a patentee, ejitehding the time beyond that originally limited, must be considered as ingrafted on the general law.
    2. That, under the general law in force when this special act of Congress was passed, a party who had purchased the right to use a planing machine during the period to which the patent was first limited, was entitled to continue to use it during the extension authorized by that law, unless there is something in the law itself to forbid it.
    But there is nothing in the act of Congress, passed in 1845, forbidding such use; and, therefore, the assignee has the right.

      Mr. Justice Curtis, having been of counsel, did not sit on the trial'of this cause, and Mr. Justice Wayne was absent.
    This was an appeal from the Circuit Coprt of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting, as a Court of Equity;
    It was a bill fried by Bloomer, who claimed under Wilson,the assignee of Woodworth’s planing machine. The whole of Wilson’s title is set forth' in the report of the case of Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 Howard, 646, as is also the act of Congress passed on the 26th February, 1845, (4 How. 662,) extending the patent for seven years from the 27th of December, 1849.
    McQuewan claimed, thrpugh -two mesne assignments from Woodworth and Strong, by virtue of a license granted on the 8th of November,. 1833.
    The bill and answer covered a great deal of ground, which need not be noticed in this report.
    . Amongst other averments was this, that the license conveyed no right to use the machine during the extension for sevén years from 1849, under the act of Congress passed in 1845; and the decision of the court being in favor of thé defendants below upon this point, it is unnecessary to state all the points and árguments upon other matters.
    ■ • The court belo.w were divided in opinion, and the bill was of course dismissed. Bloomer appealed to this court.
    It was -argued by Mr. Keller and Mr. St. George T. Camp-belly for the appellant, and Mr. Dunlop, for the appellees.
    The fourth point made by the counsel for the appellant was as follows:
    ' IV. Whether the licensee of a right to use the patented machiné for the original term of the patent, is’ entitled to continue the use of the same during the extension by Congress.-
    The facts in' this regard appearing by the record, are
    ,1. That Collins and Smith, who wére assignees for the first term of the .district in question; granted to. Barnet - the' right for-the city of Pittsburg and Allegnany county, “ to construct and use during the residue of the said terms of fourteen years,” the patented, machine, and by the same-assignment covenanted “.not themselves to construct and use,” nor to give license to any other person than Barnet “ during the terms aforesaid,” and Barnet covenanted not to construct- more "than fifty machines “ during the terms aforesaid.”
    (The word “terms” is used in the plural, as it will be perceived by the assignment that the grantors were the owners also pf the Emmons .patent, and that the limitation of his right applied to the-duration of both.)
    2. Barnet assigns all his' “ right, title, interest, and claim of the within patent for. Woodworth’s planingjnachine to G. Warner and John W. McQuéwan, their heirs and assigns,” except seven rights previously given.
    3. It seems to have been granted, below, that Warner had assigned his license toMcQnewan, and MeQuewaii to: the two co-defendants, and that the machine-was made during the first. term of the patent; hence, arises the question, have the appellees the right to continue its úse during the congressional extension?
    For the appellants it is’ submitted:
    1. That this question, .and the principles upon which it must be decided, have been already passed upon by this, court.. ' ■
    In Wilson v. Rousseau, (4 Howard,) the question was of the right of the licensee.to continue the use of the machine during the extension by the commissioner. The court were divided in opinion. In that delivered us their judgment, the right of the licensee to the continued use was put exclusively upon the terms .of the 18th section, which werey “ The benefit of such renewal shall extend to assignees and grantees of the right to use the. thing patented, to the extent of their respective interests therein.” Without that provision it is conceded by the learned judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, “ that all the rights of assignees, or grantees, whether in-*a share of the patent or to a. specified portion of the territory held under it, terminate-at the end of the fourteen years, and become reinvested in the patentee by the new grant.” .
    “ From that date he is again, possessed of ‘the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, using, and vending to others the invention,’ whatever it may be, not only portions of. the monopoly held by assignees and grantees, as subjects of trade, and commerce, but the patented articles or machines throughout the country, purchased for practical use ih the business affairs. of life, are embraced within the. operation of the extension. This latter class of assignees and grantees are reached by the new grant of the exclusive,right to use the things patented. Purchasers of the machines', and who were in the use of them at the time, are disabled from further usé immediatély, as that right became vested exclusively in the patentee. Making and vending the invention are prohibited by the corresponding.terms of his grant;”
    And the learned Judge, in expressing the opinion of the court, further declared that the provision in the 18th section, above referred to, was “ intended to restore or save to them,” (those in use of the thing patented at the time of the renewal,) “ that right which, without the clause, would have been vested again exclusively in the patentee.”
    And the learned Judges who dissented from the opinion of the court did so upon, the ground that even this clause of the 1.8th section did not confer upon the licensees the right claimed in their behalf, ■ ’ . . .
    Thus it is clear that the extension /"of a. patent by lawful authority revests in the patentee every right originally possessed by him, and that unless the law, by virtue .of which it is extended, contains a provision in favor of licensees or assignees, their right to use ends with the term of their license. (This, of course, does not apply to cases where the patentee has covenanted to grant any subsequently acquired extensions — none such is pretended in this case.)
    Applying, then, these principles to the act extending this patent, (February 26, 1845,) it will be seen that it contains no such provision as is to be found' in the 18th sfection of' the act of 1836; and that, therefore, in accordance with the opinion of all the judges, the entire right was reinvested in the patentee.
    The general power to renew and extend a patent is conferred by the 18th section of the-act of 1836, which, after providing for •the proof of the prerequisites, declares that “ it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to renew and extend the patent, by making a certificate thereon of such extension’for the term of seven years from and after the expiration of the first term.”
    The act in question provides that the patent “ be, and the same is hereby extended for the term of seven years from and after the 27th of December, 1849, and the Commissioner of Patents is hereby directed to make a certificate of such extension in the name of the administrator of William Woodworth; and append an authenticated copy thereof to the original letters-patent,” &c.; the words being substantially the same as these, judicially construed, and the intention being still further ¿narked, as_well by the-omission of any provision for the licensees, as by the express insertion of the name of the party in whose favor the extension was made, and to whose benefit it was intended to enure.
    The principles upon which the judgment in Wilson v. Rousseau, is founded, are, it is submitted, if possible, more conclusively applicable to the case of such an extension by Congress than to one made by the Commissioner.
    • Such, too, has been the application made of them by'many of the learned Judges in their circuits.- By Mr. Justice Nelson, July 22, 1850, in Gibson v. Gifford, in a written opinion delivered by him; by the late Mr. Justice Woodbury, July, 1850, in Mason v. Tallman, also in a written opinion; and by Mr. Justice Mc Lean, October 22, 1850, in Bloomer v. Stately.
    The opinion of Mr. Justice Woodbury refers- to similar decisions made by the late Justice McKinley, by Judge Ware, and Judge Sprague.
    It may be proper, with reference to the argument .founded upon the supposed intention of Congress, (not declared in the words of the act as already shown,) to permit a continued use during the congressional extension of machines licensed under the original term, to annex a list of the patents, extended by special acts, and thus to refer to the provisions in each, expressly declaring, where such was intended, the existence of such right, and providing for its mode of exercise or enjoyment.
    The absence of such provision in the act of 1845, must, it is submitted, conclusively negative any idea of such intention, even if the judicially decided effect of such an act did not render a reference to such a source for interpretation, unnecessary.
    I. January 21, 1808, to Oliver Evans, 6 Stat. at Large, 70. (With special provision for parties-then using invention.) Under this act the cases of Evans v. Jordan, 9 Cranch, 199, and Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454, were decided.
    II; March 3,1809, to Amos and William Whittemore, 6 Stat. at Large, 80, (without provision for licensees.)
    III. February 7, 1815, Oliver Evans (steam engine.) 6 Stat. at Large, 147, (with proviso that no greater sum should be charged for constructing and using, than;was during prior term, and subject to existing patent laws.)
    IV. March 3, 1821, Samuel Parker, 6 Stat. at Large, 262, (subject to provision of then existing patent laws.)
    V. March 2, 1831, John Adamson, 6 Stat. at Large, 458, (without proviso or reference to existing laws.)
    VI. March 3, 1831, Samuel Browning, 6 Stat. at Large, 467, (without proviso and reference to existing laws.)
    VII. May 19,1832, Jethro Wood, 6 Stat. at Large, 486, (proviso in favor of licensees' that the price shall not be advanced.)
    VIII. June 30, 1834, Thomas’Bianchard, Stat. at Large, 589, (with special proviso in favor of licensees.) (It may not be improper to refer to the opinion of B. F. Butler, Attorney-General, May 25, 1837, that under this act the United States had no right to use, except on the conditions of the original grant.)
    IX. March 3, 1835, Robert Eastman, 6 Stat. at Large, 613, (without proviso or reference to existing laws.)
    X. July 2, 1836, James Barron, 6 Stat. at Large, 678, (extend: ing two patents without proviso in reference to existing laws, and the other with provisos in reference to licensees.)
    XL February 6, 1839, Thomas Blanchard, 6 Stat. at Large, 748, (with proviso in favor of licensees.)
    XII. March 3, 1845, William Gale, 6 Stat.. at Large, 895, (authorizing renewal of patent under eighteenth .section of act of 1836, although it had expired, and subject to the restrictions of that' act.)
    XIII. March 3, 1843, Samuel K. Jennings, 6 ■ Stat. at Large, 899, (directing Commissioner to renew patent, subject to provisions of existing laws.)

      XIV. February 26, 1845, William Woodworth, 6 Stat. at Large, 936, (extending patent. Commissioner to certify to the extension in the name of the administrator — no proviso in favor of licensees, or reference to'existing laws.)
    . XV. February 15/1847, Thomas Blanchard, 9 Stat. at Large, 683, (with proviso in favor of licensees, on terms to be agreed or adjusted by the Circuit Court, &c.)
    The point that; by an accidental error in the bill, the word “fourteen” wag inserted, instead of “tweijty-eight,”- is not deemed a proper subject of objection in this court. No such ground appears to have been taken below; the patent itself forms part of the record, and an amendment would have been, it is •submitted, instantly allowed by the court below, had the objection been there made. That the patent on its face was for twenty-eight years, forms one of the objections of the appellees to its validity, and the error complained of is set right by answer ■of the defendants themselves.
    It is not deemed necessary by the appellants to present any authorities to meet the point argued by the appellees, that an act of Congress, extending a patent for seven years, is unconstitutional and void.
    It is therefore submitted that the decree should be reversed, and that the appellant is entitled to a perpetual injunction- and an account.
    The counsel for the appellees made several .points, amongst which was the following:
    1. That, defendants are protected as assignees.
    The bill (pages 14 to 20) asserts, and the answer admits, that the respondents claim to use the machine they are alleged to have infringed, as assignees, from 1833, the year of their purchase, udder assignments from'the original patentee. Being then assignees under the original- patent, can they claim to continue unmolested in the use of the machine they purchased and paid for, and have erected and used for seventeen years?
    Was it the design of the .act of 1845, to bring disasters upon the respondents, to deprive them of the rights they had acquired in good faith, to depreciate their property, to render useless their establishments, in which they had invested large sums of money, to destroy their business, and disable them from the performance of their contracts? Such flagrant outrages are not to be imputed to a statute, unless the terms of it" imperatively demand it.
    The language of the act calls for no such harsh, unreasonable, and impolitic construction. It is a simple extension of the patent of 1828, and nothing more. Could any design in Congress to spread such disasters, be predicated of the simple meaning of this statute 1 ,
    Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania, has laid down a rule which must commend itself to the judgment of every . one,— that in the construction of statutes, the Judges, when one of those cases of hardship occurs,' which • continually arise, should do what their consciences irresistibly persuade them the legislature would have done, if the occurrence had been foreseen. Pennock v. Hart, 8 S. & R. 369.
    And can any one doubt that if the idea of the propriety of protecting the purchasers of rights, and the uses of the thing patented, had been suggested, but they would immediately have inserted such a clause ? .
    This act of 1845 is a private act, made for the special benefit of a particular individual, and should not have such construction as will be detrimental to others. Chief Justice Parsons, in the case of Coólidge v. Williams, has laid down the rule to be that private, statutes, made for the accommodation of particular citizens or corporations, ought not to be construed to affect, the rights or privileges of others, unless such construction, results from express words, or from necessary implication. 4 Mass. 145.
    ' There are no express words in this statute, which demands the construction contended for by the plaintiff.
    We may appeal, too, to the language of Mr. Justice Washington, in the case of' Evans v. Jordan, that arguments founded upon hardship, would .be entitled to. great weight, if the language of the act was not so peremptory as to forbid a construction at variance with the clear meaning of the" legislature 9 Craneh,. 199.
    There are no words in this act to justify such savage construction as urged by the plaintiff'. It declares a simple extension of the patent, and manifestly intends an extension similar' to that Which may be conferred by the Patent-Office, under which the rights of persons, using the invented machine under license, are protected in the enjoyment of it.
    The same learned Chief Justice of Massachusetts, has also declared in the case of Wales v. Stetson, that in the consideration of the provisions of any statute, they ought to receive such a reasonable construction if the words and subject-matter will admit of it, as that the existing rights of the public or individuals be not injured. 2 Mass. 146.
    If the legislature meant a simple extension of the patent for seven years, is it not a reasonable construction to suppose that it meant an extension, as ordinarily understood; as an extent sion of the nature of the extensions of the Patent-Office, and with the restrictions and privileges of such extensions ? Is it not reasonable to conclude that they had in their mind the general act of 1836, and the clause which gave to purchasers and users of the thing patented, the right to continue that use? Is it not a reasonable construction that they meant that this special act should be construed in reference to the general law of the land? The language-of the act is, that the patent of 1828 “be extended for seven years.” . Now what benefit would that extension be, even to complainant, without an incorporation with the general law? How could he.be assignee of the right? how could he enjoy the use of the patent? how could he pretend to recover damages, without an appeal for add to the act of 1836 ? The plaintiff is obliged to invoke the aid of the general law, to maintain this very action. The very plaintiff in this cause is an assignee, and undertakes to maintain this’ action in his own name, by calling into requisition the act of 1836.
    The rule of law undoubtedly is, that laws on the same subject are to be construed together; that laws on' the same subject are to.be construed pari passu, and with reference to parallel legislation. This is- clearly the rule as to general laws, which in relation to the same subject, are to be construed as one act. They are to be construed, too, in reference to parallel legislation. Penn v. Hamilton, 2 Watts, 60; 17 S. & R. 81; 7 Id. 404.
    The right of appeal,' given by the Pennsylvania act relating to divorces a vinculo matrimonii, was extended by implication, to the act of 1817, respecting divorces a mensa et thoro. Roberts v. Roberts, 9 S. & R. 191.
    So the right to appeal from justices’ judgments, in cases of contracts, was held to extend to trespass, to which the powers of magistrates had been extended, without expressly giving the right of appeal. 4 S. & R. 73.
    And this wise and safe rule of construction has been held to apply.to statutes which have been repealed, or may not have been noticed by the statutes to be construed. Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 447.
    And Lord Mansfield, in that case, said, “that where theTe are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system.” In the expressive language of Tilghman, Ch. J., of Pennsylvania, in one of the cases cited, they were so blended together as to form one statute.
    -And from the cases cited from Burrow, this blending of statutes, this analogy of legislation, is not confined to public statutes, but that public laws may receive aid in their construction from private laws, and vice versa; for his Lordship says, in the case cited, page 448, that the aet of Parliament, of 1740, relating to St. Martins, and the overseers of that parish, (which was, I apprehend,' clearly a private act,) which extended the number of. overseers of the poor to be appointed by two justices, under the general act of 43 Elizabeth, to the number of nine, “ shows ” (says the Chief Justice) “ the construction put by the legislature themselves, upon the 43 Elizabeth, on this head, and excepts this very large parish of St. Martins, out of it.
    . I need, not burden your honors with any name of books on this, so obvious a rule of construction. This case, in Burrow, was carefully considered; it had been argued several times before Ch. J. Ryder, and afterwards before Lord Mansfield, by great counsel, and if any case is entitled to respect of courts, it is a case so considered, and so decided.
    ' But we have cases nearer home, and more german to this very matter of private acts, in relation to these very patent-rights.
    In the Case of Evans v. Eaton, (3 Wheat. 454,) it was declared, that an act of Congress, authorizing the Secretary of State to issue á patent to.Oliver Evans, for his improvements in the manufacture of flour, “ was ingrafted on the general act for the' promotion of Useful arts,- and that the patent was issued under both acts,” ,the public and the private one.
    So in the case of Evans v. Jordan, 9 Cranch, 199, which was an action to recover damages under the same private act, Washington, J., said, in declaring the opinion of the court, that “ it should be recollected, that the right of the, plaintiff to recover damages for using his improvement, after the issuing of his. patent, arises, not under this law, but the general law of 1793.”
    . If the plaintiff is obliged to invoke the aid of the act of 1836, he must take the whole of it. It is' a-well-established rule of law, that he who claims the benefit of his title, must admit its disadvantages. Qui sentit commodum sentiré debet et onus.

   Mr. Chief-Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellants, on the 6th of July, 1850, in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Western District of Penpsylvania, to obtain -an injunction restraining the appellees from the use of two of Woodworth’s planing taachines in the city of Pittsburg. The term for which Woodworth’s patent was originally granted, expired in 1842, but it was extended seven years by the board established by the 18th section of the act of 1836. And afterwards, by the act of Congress of February 26, 1845, this patent was extended for seven years more, commencing on the 27th of December, 1849, at which time the previous extension would have terminated.

It appears, from the pleadings-and evidence.in the case, that, shortly after the. passage of the act of Congress' of 1845, William Woodworth, the administrator of the patentee, in whose name the certificate of extension was directed to be issued, assigned all his right to James G. Wilson, from whom the appellant purchased the exclusive right to cpnstruct and use thismachipe, and to vend to others the right to construct and use it, in a large- district of country described in the grant. Pittsburg, in which the machines in question are used, is included within these limits. And the right wrhich the appellant purchased was regularly transferred to. him1 by Wilson, by an instrument of writing duly recorded in the Patent-Office.

In the year 1833, during the term for which the patent was originally granted, the defendants purchased the right to construct and use a certain number of these machines within the .limits of the city of Pittsburg and Alleghany county; and the right to do so was regularly transferred to them by different assignments, deriving their title from the original patentee. - The two machines mentioned in the bill were constructed and used by the respondents soon after the purchase was made, and the appellees continued to use them up to the time when this bill was filed. And the question is, whether their right to use them terminated with the first extension, or still continues under the extension granted by the act of 1845.

The Circuit Court decided that the right of the appellees still continued, and upon that ground dismissed the appellant’s bill. And the case is now before us upon an appeal from that decree.

In determining this question we must take into consideration not only the special act under which the appellant now claims a .rponopoly, but also, the general laws of .Congress in relation to patents for useful improvements, and the special acts which have from time to time been passed in favor of the particular patentees. They are statutes in pari materia; and all relate to' the same subject, and must be construed together. It was so held in the case, of Evans v. Eaton, (3 Wheat. 518,) where the court said.that the special act of Congress in favor of Oliver Evans, granting him a hew patent for fourteen years, for.his improvements in manufacturing flour and meal, was ingrafted oii the general act,for the promotion of useful arts, and the patent issued in pursuance of both. The rule applies with more-three in the present case ; for this is not the gra-nt of a new patent, but an enlargement of the time for which a patent previously extended under the act of 1836, should continue in force.

Indeed, this rule of construction is necessary to give effect to the special'act under which the appellant claims the monopoly. For. this law does not define the rights or privileges which the patent shall confer, nor prescribe the remedy to which he shall be entitled if his rights are infringed. It merely extends the. duration of the patent, and nothing more. And we are neces-. sarily referred, therefore, to-the general law upon the subject to' ascertain the rights to which the patent entitled him, and also-the remedy which, the law affords :him if these rights are invaded.

Now, the act of 1886, in express terms,'gives the benefit of the extension, authorized by that law to the assignees and grantees of the right to use the thing patented, to the extent of. théir respective interests therein. And under this provision it was decided, in the case of Wilson v. Rousseau, (4 Howard, 688,) that the party who had- purchased and was using this planing machine during the original term for which the patent was granted, had a right to continué the use during the extension. And the distinction is there taken between the grant of the right to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use .it.

The distinction is a plain one. The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent. And when he sells the exclusive privilege of making or vending it for use in a particular place, the purchaser buys a portion of the franchise which the patent confers. He obtains a share in the monopoly, and that monopoly is derived from, and exercised under, the protection of the United States. And the interest he acquires, necessarily terminates at the time limited for its continuance by the law which .created it. • The patentee cannot sell it for a longer time. And the purchaser buys with reference to'that period ; the time for which exclusive privilege is to endure being one of the chief elements of its value. He therefore has no just claim to share in a further monopoly subsequently acquired by the patentee. He does not purchase or pay for it.

But the purchaser of the implement or machine for the purpose of using it in the prdinary pursuits of life, stands on different ground. In using it, he exercises no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does he derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive privilege granted to the patentee. The inventor might lawfully sell it to him, whether he had' á patent or not, if no other patentee stood in his way. And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.' It passes outside of. it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress. And if his right to the implement or machine is infringed, he must seek redress in the courts of the State, according to the laws .of the State, and not in the courts of the United States, nor under the law of Congress granting the patent. The implement or machine becomes his private, individual property, not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the State in which it is situated. Contracts' in relation to it are regulated by the laws of the State, and are subject to State jurisdiction. It was so decided in this court, in the case of Wilson v. Sanford and others, 10 Howard, 99. Like other individual property, it is then subject to State taxation; and from the great number of patented articles now in use, they no doubt, in some of the States, form no inconsiderable portion of its taxable property.

Moreover, the value of the implement or machine in the hands of the purchaser for use, does not in any degree depend on the time for which the exclusive privilege is granted to the patentee ; nor upon the exclusion of others from its use. For example, in the various patented articles used in agriculture, in milling, in manufactures of different kinds, ip steam-engines, or for household or other purposes, the value to the purchaser is not enhanced by the continuance of the monopoly. It is of no importance to him whether it endures for a year or twenty-eight years. He does not look to the duration of the exclusive privilege, but to the usefulness of the thing he buys, and the advantages he will derive from its use. He buys the article for the purpose of using it as' long as it is fit fór use and found, to be profitable. And in the case before us the respondents derive no advantage from the extension of the patent, because the patentee .may place around them as many planing machines as he pleases, so as to reduce the profits of those which they, own to.their just value in an open and fair competition.

. It is doubtless upon these principles that the . act of 1836 draws the distinction between .the assignee of a share ifl the monopoly, and the purchase of one or more machines, to be used in the ordinary pursuits of business. And-that distinction is clearly pointed out and maintained in the case of Wilson v. Rousseau, before' referred to.

Upon the authority, therefore, of the cases of Evans v. Eaton, .and Wilson -v. Rousseau, these two propositions may be regarded,as settled by judicial decision: 1. That a special act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time beyond that originally limited, must be considered as ingrafted on the gene-' ral law; and 2. That under the general law, in force when this special act of Congress was passed, a party who had purchased the right to use- a planing machine during the period to which the patent was first limited, was entitled to continue to use it during .the extension authorized by that law.

.Applying these rules to the pase before us, the respondents must be entitled to continue the use of their.planing,machines, during the time for which the patent i's extended by .the special act of Congress, unless there is something in the language of the law requiring a different construction. •

Biit there is nothing in the law to justify the .distinction claimed in this respect on behalf of the patentee.: Its language is plain and unambiguous. It does not even grant a new patent, as in the case of Oliver Evans. It merely extends the.time of the monopoly to which the patentee was entitled under the general law of 1836; It gives no new rights or privileges, to be superadded to those he then enjoyed, except as to the time' they should endure. The patent, such as it then was, is continued for seven years longer than the period before limited. And this is the whole and only provision contained in this special act. ' In order, therefore, to determine the rights of the patentee during the extended term, we are necessarily referred to the' general law, and compelled to' inquire what they were before this special act operated upon them, and continued them. . Indeed, the court has been obliged to recur to the act of 1836, in- every-stage of this suit, to guide it in deciding upon the rights of the parties, and the mode of proceeding in which they are to be tried. It is necessarily referred to in order .to determine whether the patent under which the complainant claims, was issued by lawful authority, and in the form prescribed by law;-.it was necessary to refer to it in the,.Circuit Court in order to determine whether the patentee was entitled to the patent, as the' original inventor, that fact being disputed in the Circuit Court; also, for the notices to which he was entitled in the trial o'f that question; and for the forum in which he was authorized to sue for an infringement of his rights. And the rights of the appeh. lant to bring the case before the court for adjudication'is derived altogether from the provisions _of the general law. For there is no evidence in the record to show that the machines are worth two thousand dollars, and no appeal therefore would lie from the decision of the Circuit Court, but for the special provision in relation to patent cases in. the act of 1836. And while it is admitted that this special 'act is so ingrafted on the general law,as to entitle the patentee to all the rights and privileges i&rhichthat law has provided, for the benefit and protection of inventors, it can hardly be maintained' that the one in favor of the purchaser of a machine is by construction to be excepted from it, when there are no words in-the special act ter indicate that such was the intention of Congress.

This construction is confirmed by the various special, acts-which have been passed from time to time, in favor of particular, inventors, granting them new patents after the first had. expired or extending the time for which they were originally granted. Many of these acts have been referred to in the argument, some of which contain express provisions, protecting the rights of the purchaser under the first term, and others contain no provision on the subject, and merely grant a new patent, or,'as in the case before the court, extend the duration of the old one. And in several instances special laws in favor of different inventors have been passed within a short time of each other, in one of which the rights of the previous purchaser are expressly reserved, and in the other there is no provision on the subject. And the act of March 3, 1845, authorizing the patent of William Gale, for an improvement in the manufacture of silver spoons and forks to be extended, was passed only a few days after the act in favor of Woodworth, and Gale’s patent is subjected .in express terms to the conditions and restrictions in the act of 1836, and consequently protects previous purchasers from a new demand.

It has been contended, on behalf of the appellant, that the insertion of these restrictions in one special law, and the omission of them in another, shows that, in the latter, Congress did not intend to exempt the purchaser from the necessity óf obtaining a new license from the patentee. And that Congress might well suppose that one inventor had stronger claims upon the public than another, and might, oh that account, give him larger privileges on the renewal.

But this argument only looks to one side of the question, that is, to the interest and claims of the inventor. There is another, and numerous class of persons, who have purchased patented articles, and paid for them the full price which the patentee demanded, and we are bound to suppose that their interests and their rights would not be overlooked or disregarded by Congress. And still less, that any distinction would be drawn between those who purchased one description of patented machines and those who purchased another. For example, the act granting a new patent to Blanchard, in 1834, for cutting or turning irregular forms, saves the rights of those who had bought under the original patent. And we ought not to presume, without plain words to require it, that while Congress acknowledged the justice of such Claims in the ease of Blanchard, they intended to disregard them in the case of Woodworth. Nor can it be said that the policy of Congress has changed in this respect after 1834, when 'Blanchard’s patent was renewed. For, as we have .already said, the same protection is given to purchasers in the' special .law, authorizing the renewal of Gale’s patent, which was passed a few days after the law of which we are speaking.

The fair inference from all of these special laws is this, that Congress has constantly recognized the rights of those who purchase for use a patented implement or machine; that in these various special laws the patentee and purchasers of different inventions were intended to be placed on the same ground; and that the relative rights of both parties under the extension', by special act of Congress, were intended to be the same as they were when the extension was granted under the general law of 1836. It would seem that in some cases the attention of the legislature was more particularly called to the subject,*and the rights of the purchaser recognized and cautiously guarded. And when the provision is omitted, the just presumption is, that Congress legislated on the principle decided by this, court in Evans v. Eaton, and regarded the special law as ingrafted on' the general one, and subject to all of its restrictions and provisions, except only as to the time the patent- should endure. Time is the only thing upon which they legislate. And-any other construction would make the legislation of Congress, on these various special"laws, inconsistent with itself, and impute to it the intention of dealing out a different measure of justice to purchasers of different kinds of implements. and machines ; protecting some of them, and disregarding the equal and just claims of others.

And if such coiild be the interpretation of this law, the power of Congress to pass it would be open to serious objections. -For it can hardly be maintained that Congress could lawfully deprive a citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute and unlimited right from the inventor, and when that property was no longer held under the protection and control of the General Government, but under the protection of the State, and on that account subject to State taxation.

The 5th amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or. property, without due process of law.

The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased .and paid for without any limitation as to the time for which they were to be used. They were the property of the respondents. Their only value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress, passed afterwards, depriving the appellees of the right to use them, certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.

Congress undoubtedly have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings ánd discoveries.

But it does not follow that Congress may, from time tq time, as often as they think proper, authorize an inventor to recall rights which he had granted to cithers ; or reinvest in him rights of property which he had before conveyed for a valuable and fair consideration.

But we forbear to pursue this inquiry, because we are of opinion that- this special act of Congress does not, and was-not inténded to interfere with rights of property, before acquired ; but that it leaves them as they stood during the extension under the general law. And in this view of the subject, the appellant was' not.entitled to the injunction he sought to obtain, and the- Circuit Court were right in dismissing the bill.

As the decision on this point disposes of the case, it is unnecessary to examine the other grounds, of defence taken by the appellees.

The decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.

Mr. Justice McLEAN and Mr. Justice NELSON dissented.

Mr. Justice McLEAN.

Woodworth’s patent bears date the 27tb of /December, 1828, and runs for fourteen years. On the 29th of July, 1830, the patentees conveyed to Isaac Collins and Barzillai C. Smith the right to construct, use, an.d vend to others, the planing machine invented within several States, including Pennsylvania, except the city of Philadelphia. On the 19th of May, 1832, Collins and Smith transferred to James Barnet the right to construct and use, during the residue of the aforesaid term of fourteen yéars, fifty planing machines, within Pittsburg and Alleghany county, for which he agreed to pay four thousand dollars. Bar-net agreed not to construct or run more than fifty machines during the term aforesaid, and Collins and Smith bound themselves not to license during the term, nor to construct or use .themselves during the term, or allow others to do so, in the limits of Pittsburg and Alleghany county.

On the 27th of December, 1842, the patent expired, but it was renewed and extended for seven years, under the act of 1836. This extension expired in 1849; but Congress, on the 26th of February, 1845, passed an act which provided that the said letters-patent be, and the same is hereby, extended for the term of seven years, from and after the twenty-seventh day of December, 1849.”

The patentee, by deed dated the 14th of March, 1845, and also by a further deed dated the 9th of July, 1845, conveyed to James E. Wilson all his interest as administrator in the letters patent under the extension by the act of Congress. And Wilson, on the 4th of June, 1847, for the- consideration of twenty-five thousand dollars, gave to Bloomer, $ie plaintiff, a license to con-; struct and use, and vend to others to construct and use, during the two extensions, “ all that part pf Pennsylvania lying west of the- Alleghany Mountains, excepting Alleghany county, for the first extension, which expires on the 27th day of December, 1849, and the States of Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, excepting certain parts of each State.”

The defendants continued to run their machines during the residue of the fourteen years, for which the patent was granted, and during the first extension; and the complainant filed his bill to enjoin the defendants from running their machines under the second extension, by the act of Congress.

The contract of the defendants was entered into the 19th of May, 1831, and under it Barnet had a right “to construct and use during the residue of the aforesaid term of fouriéen ypars, fifty planing machines,” &c. The patent expired on the 27th of D'ecerñber, in 1842. The contract of defendants Was made the 19th of May, 1832, leaving about nine years and six months, for the patent to run, and this was the time limited by the contract, and for which the consideration of four thousand dollars was paid. This was not left to construction from the life of the patent, but the' contract expressly declared the right was purchased “ for the residue of the aforesaid term of fourteen years.”

This term was enjoyed by the defendants, and under the decision of this court, in the case of Wilson v. Rousseau et al. (4 Howard, 646,) the sever? years’ extension under the act of 1836, was also enjoyed by the defendants. This construction of-the act of 1836, in my judgment, was not authorized, and was not within the intention of the law, as was expressed at the time. That extension having expired, another extension is claimed-under the act of Congress. This claim is set up to an injunction'bill, filed by the complainant, who is the assignee of the patent for a part of Pennsylvania and other States. And by the decision of four-of my brethren, just delivered, the defendants are to enjoy this extension, making fourteen years beyond their control. This would seem to imply, that, under the act of 1836, and under the act of 3 845, the assignees were the favored objects of Congress. But this is not the case. The patentee who. made the inventiqn, and through whose ingenuity, labor, and.expense, a great benefit has been conferred.on the public, in justice,.is entitled to remuneration, and that only was the ground of extension, whether-under the law of'1836, or the special aqt of 1845.

This, as well as the former decision, was influenced by the consideration that the, owners of the machines are, in equity, entitled to run them so long as the exclusive right of the patent shall be continued. It is said that the machines are property, and that no act of Congress should deprive the owners of the use of their property. But in this view, the property .of the ■patentee seems not to be tak.en into the account. He is the meritorious claimant for protection. The assignee for a specific time, rests upon his contract. He has conferred no benefit on society. ' His investment was made with an exclusive reference to his own advantage. He has no more claims upon the public sympathy than he who rents a mill, a farm, or engages in a .business, open to all who expect a profit by it.

But the hardship is supposed to exist, in the fact that, to use the right, a planing machine mpst be. Constructed at an expense ■of some four or five hundred dollars, ahd this will be lost to the occupier, if by an extension he shall not be permitted to run his machine. The answer-is, when he entered into the.contract he knew, or is presumed to have known, that the patent might be extended under the law of 1836 or by special act, and if he desired an interest under the renewed patent, he should have provided for it in his contract. Having failed to do this, it would seem to be unjust that, under a contract to run the machine less than ten. years, he should be entitled to run it sixteen years. The consideration paid was limited to the term specified in the contract. But, it is answered, that the assignee expected to run his machine after the‘termination of the contract oh which the ■exclusive right would end and Become vested in the public.

Let us examine this plea, and it will be found that á great fallacy prevails On this subject. A right that is common, is no more valuable to orle person than another, as all may use it. The injury, then, consists, so far as the licensee is concerned, in the reduction of the value of his machine, by the extension of the exclusive right in the patentee, to the exclusion of the assignee. It is true this deprives him of the monopoly which his contract secured to him. But he has enjoyed this to the extent of -his contract, and for which he has paid the stipulated consideration. Now his only equitable plea to run his machine during the renewed patent, arises alone from the supposed difference in the value of his machine, under the renewal, without a líbense, and;where the right becomes vested in the public.-

If there had been no renewal, the licensee might run his machine, and any other person might run one. It is a fact known to every observing individual, when a new business is set up,, .as a planing machine, supposed to be very profitable generally,-a competition is. excited, which reduces the profit below a reasonable compensation for the labor and expense of the business! If the monopoly continued, as enjoyed under the contract,’the consideration paid for the monopoly would be added to the profits, which would make them large. But when the mqnopoly ceases, the profits, if not destroyed, are ■ reduced by competition, at least as low, if not below the ordinary profit of capital employed in other investments.

If the business of. the,county or city required the number of planing machines in operation, the licensee could sell his machine. at.a reasonable reduction for the time it had run. The machines of 'the defendant had. run, probably, from twelve to fifteen years. A considerable reduction would be expected by the purchaser, as a machine could not be expected to last more than twenty years. But suppose it can be used thirty, then one half of the value must be deducted for the wear of the machine fifteen years, which would reduce it to some two hundred and fifty or three hundred dollars.

But suppose the exclusive right should be continued in the patentee, by an extension of it seven years. Then, if the machines were not more numerous than the public required, they would be wanted by their owners, or by; others disposed to engage in the business. And I hazard nothing in saying, that, after deducting the compensation from the profits, paid for the exclusive right, they would be larger than could be hoped for,, where the right was common. . Under such circumstances, I can entertain no doubt, that a machine would sell for more money, under the extension of the patent, than where the right goes to the public.

The idea that to refuse the use of a machine under the extension of a patent, is an unjust interference with property, I think, is unfounded. There is no interference with the property in the machine. The owner may sell it to any one who has a license to use it. It is not the property in the machine that ia complained of, but. because the right to run it longer than the contract provided for, is not given. The licensee has used the franchise, as long as he purchased and paid for it; and can he in justice claim more than his comract. The extension of the right to use, while the extended patent continues, does a wrong to the patentee, by taking his property, without compensation, and giving it to the licensee. The franchise is property, and it can no more be transferred to another, without compensation or contract than any other property. It would seem that this description of property is not governed by contract. That a contract to use the franchise ten years, does not mean what is expressed, but may mean a right for twenty years, or any other term to which the patent may be extended.

Every man who has sense enough to make a contract, takes into his estimate the contingency of a loss, to some extent, in going out of the business. He fixes his own time for the contract, and if he wishes to provide for the contingency arising from the renewal of a patent, he can. embrace it in his contract for a stipulated compensation.

It may be true, that, unless the contrary appear, when the patentee sells a planing machine, a right to use it may be applied. But the right to construct and the right to use, are dis-. tinct. Some purchase of the patentee -the right to construct the-machine, others to use it. This planing machine cannot be compared to a plough, or añy other article whieh may be considered the product of the patent. The machine is the instrument through which the plank is planed. The plank is the' product, and may be sold in the market as other property. But the planing machine cannot. be used, without' a license. The law protects the franchise, by prohibiting the use of the machine without a license. When Barnet purchased the franchise for the fifty machines, he d,id not buy the machines for a term as long as the machines could run, but for nine years and six month's. The contract, neither expressly nor impliedly, extended beyond that term.

In this view, I think that I am not mistaken, and if I am not, the license is not injured a dollar by the termination of his right to run his machine, as fixed in his contract. But, on whom is the injury inflicted by extending the contract of the licensee with the patentee, and that without compensation ? In the present case, the patentee has been injured, by the use of the fifty machines, at least four thousand dollars, the amount agreed to be paid for the right to run them less than ten years. .. And must not the property of the patentee be taken into the account, as well as the imagined rights of the licensee?

The patentee. is justly considered a public benefactor. He has conferred a great benefit upon the world; and he is entitled, under our laws, to at least a compensation for his expense, ingenuity, and labor.

That the patentee is the only one whose interests are regarded,as the ground of extending the patent in the act of 1836, is clear. Now, suppose the patentee has assigned the whole of the patent, without receiving such a compensation as the law authorizes; there can be no doubt he is entitled, on' that ground, to a renewal of the patent; and yet, under the decision now1 given, his assignees would receive all the benefits of the renewal: Should not this- fact cause doubts whether the rule of construction of the statute can be a sound one, which defeats its avowed object? If this be the cqnsequenee of the' assignment of the entire interest by the patentee, any partial assignment must produce the same result, though to a more'limited extént. A principle which will, not bear this test is not sound..

The act of 1845, extending, this patent, annexed no conditions. The exclusive right was extended to the administrator of Woodworth for seven years, from the 27th of December, 1849. But the décision now given, in effect declares this exclusive right is not given. Indeed the object of Congress must be defeated • if the machines, in operation at the time of the passage of the act, are to be continued Without compensation. It is presumed there are few places where planing machines were not constructed before 1849, the time the renewal took' effect, if the public required them.' On this supposition, the extension of the patent can be of little or no benefit to the heirs of the patentee. Congress could have granted the act1 only upon the ground to remunerate the heirs of the inventor. -

There seems to be a great mistake as to the profits of this patent. It was .a valuable patent, but, as. in all other cases, its value excited the rapacity of men who seek to enrich themselves by taking the property of others. The records of the-courts show, that piracies were committed on this patent in every part of the country; and that to sustain it, much expenditure and labor have been required. It is stated that the sum of near two hundred thousand dollars has been thus expended to establish this patent. Congress have extended many patents; in some instances conditions have been imposed, in others, the franchise has been extended unconditionally. Now, where the patent .is extended by act of Congress, without conditions, I am unable to perceive how the court can impose conditions. Such an act’would be-legislation, and not construction.

By the act of the 15th February, 1847, the patent of Thomas Blanchard, for. cutting irregular forms out of wood, brass, or iron,. was extended for fourteen years, from the 20th of January, 1848: “ Provided that such extension shall enure to the use and benefit of the said Thomas Blanchard, his executors and administrators and to no othet persons whomsoever, except that a bond fide assignee of the invention, by virtue of an assignment from the patentee heretofore made, shall have the benefit of this act, upon just, reasonable, and equitable terms, according to his interest therein. And if the said Thomas Blanchard, his exe-cutors or administrators, cannot agree with such ■assignee, the terms shall be ascertained and determined by the Circuit Court of the United States for the district in which such assignee resides, to be decreed upon a bill to .be filed by such assignee for that purpose. And provided further, that no assignee shall have the benefit of this act unless.he shall, within ninety days from its passage, agree with- the said Thomas-Blanchard as to the consideration upon which he is to have it, or file his bill,” fcc.

Every one must perceive the justice and propriety of this act; under the decision now given, the assignee of Blanchard would {lave had the benefit of the extension without paying for it. This act, extending Blanchard’s patent, was passed two yeafs after the decision of this court in Wil on v. .Rousseau, which, under the act of 1836, gave the benefit of the extension to the assignee. This must have been known to Congress, and yet they deemed a special provision in behalf of the assignee necessary. This act, and several others of a similar character, cannot fail to convince every one that Congress did not suppose that the courts have power to annex a condition to a legislative grant.

In the case of Evans v. Jordan and Morehead, (9 Cranch, 199,) this court held, that the act of January, 1808, for the relief of Oliver Evans, does not authorize. those who erected their machinery between the expiration of their old patents and the issuing of the new one, to use it after the issuing of the latter.

The above act extended the patent fourteen yeafs, “ provided that no person who may have heretofore paid the said Oliver Evans for license to use the said improvements, shall be obliged to renew said license or be subject to damages for not renewing the same; and provided also, that no person who shall have used the said improvements, or have erected the same for dse, before the issuing of the said patent, shall be liable to damages therefor.”

This was a much stronger case for equitable considerations than the one before us. Evans’s patent had expired. His improvements were free to the public, and they were adopted by the defendants, before he made application tó Congress for a renewal of his patent. ■ I will cite the reasoning of the Supreme Court on that case. “ The language,” they say, “ of this last proviso is so precise, and so entirely free from all ambiguity, that it is difficult for any course of reasoning to shed light upon its meaning. It. protects against any claim for damages which Evans might make, those who have used his improvements, or who may have erected them for use, prior to the issuing of his patent under this law. The protection is limited to acts done prior to another act thereafter to be performed, to wit, the issuing of the patent. To extend it, by construction, to acts which might be done subsequent to the issuing of the patent, would be to' make, not to interpret, the law.” “ The injustice of denying to the defendants 'the use of machinery which they had erected after the expiration of Evans’s first patent, and prior to the passage of this law, has been strongly-urged as a reason why the words of this proviso should be so construed as to have a prospective operation. But it should be recollected that the . right of the plaintiff to recover damages for using his improvement after the issuing of his patent, under this law although it had been erected prior thereto, arises not under this law, but under the general law of the 21st of February, 1793. The -provisos in this law profess to protect, against the operation of the general law, three classes of persons — those who had paid Evans for a license prior to the passage of the law;. those who may have used his improvements; and those who may have erected them for use before the issuing of the patent.”

And the court say, “ The legislature might have proceeded still further, by providing a shield- for persons standing in the situation of these defendants. It is believed that the reasonableness of such a provision could have been questioned by no one. But the legislature have not thought proper to extend the protection of these provisos beyond the issuing of the patent under that law; and this court would transgress the limits of the judicial power by an attempt to supply, by construction, this supposed, omission of the legislature. The argument founded upon the hardship Of this and similar cases, would be entitled to great weight if the words of this proviso were obscure and open to construction. But considerations of this nature can never sanction a construction at variance with the manifest meaning of the legislature, expressed in plain and an unambiguous language.”

The above views do not conflict with the opinion of the court in Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454. In that case the court say, “ Some doubts have been entertained respecting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, as both the plaintiff and defendants are citizens of the same State. The fifth section of the act to promote the progress of useful arts, which gives to every patentee a right to sue in a Circuit Court of the United States, in case his rights be violated, is repealed by the third section of the act of 1800, which gives the action in the Circuit Court of the United States where a patent is granted, ‘pursuant’ to that act, or to.the act for the promotion of useful arts. Th?s patent, it has been said-, is granted, not in pursuance of either of those acts, but in pursuance of the act ‘ for' the relief of Oliver Evans.’ But this court is of opinion, that the act for the relief of Oliver. Evans, is ingrafted on the gene-, ral act for the promotion of useful arts, and that the patent is issued in pursuance.of both. The jurisdiction of the court is therefore sustained ”

There can be no question that the special law extending the grant", as to its validity, is subject to the general patent law. The right was intended to be exclusive, if it be established that Evans was the original inventbr of the improvements claimed, and such improvements were stated with the necessary precision. And also that it came under the class of cases on which suit could be brought in the courts of the United States, without regard to the citizenship of the parties. But it could not have beep intended- to apply to any contract subsequent to the patent, and it could only be held to embrace those general provisions of thé patent law which relate to the validity of the patent. Under the act of Congress, a specification was necessarily filed, and it seems'to be the practice to issue a patent under the act. This, it appears to me, is unnecessary, as the grant in the act is sufficient. But the schedule is necessary to show the nature and extent of the claim, and these must be sustained on those principles which apply to patents generally.

To give any other construction to the above remarks of the court, would be in direct.contradiction to the language used, and the principle decided, in the case above cited from Cranch. In fact, the remark that the relief of Evans was ingrafted on the general law, was made in reference to thé jurisdiction of the. court, and cannot be extended beyond that and other questions, in relation to the validity of the patent.

This .argument of the court, in Evans v. Jordan, applies with all its force and authority to the case before us; and I need only say it was the language of Marshall, of Story, of Washington, and of .'the other Judges of the court, except Judge Todd, who appears to have been absent. I can add nothing to the weight of the argument; but I will proceed to name the Judges of this court who have given opinions opposed to the decision of this case by four of my brethren.

■ Mr. Justice. Wayne being sick, did not sit in the case. In Wilson v. Rousseau, he held that, under the act of 1836, the licensee had no right' to run his machine under the extended patent.

Mr. Justice Curtis having, as counsel, given an opinion op posed to the right of the defendants, did not sit in the case. Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Justice St!ory had both given opinions against the right of the assignee, unless under a special assignment. This was the opinion of Mr. Justice Woodbury, as expressed in 'the case of Wilson v. Rousseau. Mr. Justice McKinley gave an opinion against the right of the assignee under the act of 1845, extending Woodworth’s patent. The same decision has been frequently given, by the Justices of this bench, in the second and seventh circuits.

-Sustained by the authority of. seven Justices of this court, and by. an argument of the Supreme Court, above cited, which, I think, is unanswerable, I shall deem it to be my duty to bring the same question now decided, when it shall arise in my circuit, for the consideration and decision of a full bench.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice GRIER

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lessee of Irwin H. Doolittle, and Others, Plaintiffs, v. Levi Bryan and Others, Defendants.
    A sale of land by a marshal on a. venditioni exportas,.after he is removed from office, and a new marshal appointed and qualified, is not void. .
    Such sale being returned to the court and confirmed by it, on motion, and a deed ordered to bé made to'the. purchaser at the sale, by the new marshal, such sale being made, is valid.
    This case came up from the. Circuit Court of the. United States for the District of Ohio, on a certificate of division in opinion between the,Judges thereof.
    The following was the entire record in the case-:
    The United States of America,

      District of Ohio, ss.

    At a Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Ohio, began and held at the city of Columbus, in'said district, on the third Tuesday in the month of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and of the independence of the United States of America the 76th, before the Honorable John McLean and the Honorable Humphrey EL Leavitt, Judges of said court; among other proceedings had, were the following, to wit:
    The léssee of Irwin B. Doolittle et al.

      v.

    Levi Bryan et al.
    In ejectment.
    In this case, the lessors of the plaintiff, being citizens of Illinois, brought their action of ejectment to recover possession of one thousand acres of land in the State of Ohio; the declaration being duly served on the tenants in- possession, they appeared and entered into the consent rule, and filed the general issue.' On the trial, two' points arose, on which the Opinions of the Judges-were opposed, to wit:

      1. Whether a sale of land by a marshal, on a' venditioni ex-ponas, after he is removed from office, and a new marshal appointed and qualified, is void ?
    2. Whether such sale, being returned to the court, and confirmed by it on motion, and a deed ordered to be made to the purchaser, at the sale, by the new marshal, such sale being made, is valid ?
    And the counsel for the lessors of the plaintiff, moved the court to certify the above points, for decision, to the Supreme Court, under the statute. '
    The practice to confirm the marshal’s sale, is under the fifteenth section of the State statute “regulating judgments and executions,’’ and is 'as follows:
    “ That if the court to which any wit of execution shall be returned by the officer, for the satisfaction of which any lands or .tenements may have been sold, shall, after having carefully examined the proceedings of such officer, be satisfied that the sale has, in all respects, been made in conformity to the provisions of t his act, they shall direct their clerk to make an . entry thereof on the journal, that the court are satisfied with the legality of such sale, and an order that the said officer make to the purchaser a déed for such lands and tenements.”

      October 27, 1851.
    From the arguments of counsel, the following appeared to be the dates of the several transactions.
    On the 19th of February, 1829, a venditioni exponas came to the hands of William Dougherty, then the marshal of Ohio. The writ was returnable to- the July term, 1829.
    On the 20th of April, 1829, Dougherty was removed from office.
    On the 11th of May, 1829, John Patterson was qualified as marshal.
    , On the 10th of July, 1829, Dougherty sold the land in question.
    . At the July term, 1829, the writ of venditioni exponas was returned, by-which it appeared that the lánd was sold to Levi Bryan, one of the defendants. The sale was confirmed by the court, and Patterson, the then marshal, ordered to convey the land to Bryan, the purchaser,,
    The counsel upon both sides agreed that the pla-intiffs in ejectment could not recover unless this was a void sale.
    It was argued by Mr. Stanberry, for the plaintiffs, and Mr. Corwin, for the defendant.
   Mr. Justice GRIER

delivered the opinion of the court.

On the trial of this case in the Circuit Court, two points arose, in which the Judges were divided in opinion, and which have been accordingly certified to this court.

1. Whether a sale of land by a marshal, on a venditioni exponas, after he is removed from office, and a new marshal is appointed, .is void ?

2. Whether such sale, being returned to the court and confirmed by it, on motion, and a deed ordered to be made to the purchaser at the sale, by the new marshal, such sale being made, is valid?

If the first of these questions be answered in the negative, the second will be answered affirmatively, as an undisputed consequence.

Whether a sale, made by a marshal after he is removed from office, on a writ .of venditioni exponas, is void, will depend on the construction of -the third section of the act of May 7, 1800, ch. 45, and whether it is a repeal of the provisions on this subject, contained in the tWenty-eighth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, chap. 20.

So much of the latter act as is material to our inquiry, is as follows: Every marshal or his deputy, when removed from office, or when the term for which the marshal is appointed shall expire, shall have power,- notwithstanding, to execute all such precepts as may be in their hands respectively at the time of such removal or expiration of office,” &c.

The third section of the act of 1800 enacts: “ That whenever a marshal shall sell any lands, tenements, or hereditaments,, by virtue of process from a court of the United States, and shall die or be removed from office, or the term of his commission expire, before a deed shall be executed for the same by him to the purchaser; in every such case the purchaser or plaintiff^ at whose suit the sale was made, may apply to the court from which the process issued, and set forth the case, assigning the reason why. the title was not perfected by the marshal who sold the same; and thereupon the court may order the marshal, for the time being, to perfect the title, and execute a deed to the purchaser, he paying the purchase-mbney and costs remaining unpaid. And. where a marshal shall take in execution any lands, &c., and shall die or be removed from office, or the term of his commission expire before a .sale or other final disposition made of the same, in every case the like process shall issue to the succeeding marshal, and the same proceedings shall be had, as if such former, marshal had not died- or been removed, or the term of his commission had not expired. And the provisions in this section contained, shall be and they are hereby extended ..to all t^ie cases respectively which may have happened before the passing- of this act.”

There is no- express repeal of the act of' 1789 to be found in this act of 1800. Nor does it contain any negative terms which are necessarily contrary to the previous affirmative, act. 'Al latter act is never construed to repeal a prior act unless there be a, contrariety or repugnancy in them, or at least some notice taken of the former act so as to indicate an intention to repeal it, The law does not favor a repeal by implication unless the repugnance - be quite plain- hence it has been decided that, although two acts of parliament be seemingly repugnant, yet if there .be no clause of ñon obstante in the latter they shall, if possible, have such construction that the latter may not be a repeal of the former by implication; Dwarris on Stat. 674, and cases cited.

The purview of'the clause of the act of 1789, now in question, is to define the powers of a marshal having process in his hands at the time he is removed or his office expires; it authorizes him-to execute process previously directed to him. The act. of 1800 is evidently intended to confer rights on the parties to have .the same acts performed by the new marshal. It gives cumulative rights and powers, for the benefit of suitors.

That such is its purview and policy, is evident from its- language— “thé purchaser or the plaintiff,” it is said, “may apply, and the court may order the new marshal for the time being; ” and • although “'may” is changed into “ shall,” in the latter clause of ' the -section; it-is not necessarily inconsistent with, nor repugnant to the powér conferred on the marshal to .execute precepts in his ‘hands, by the act of 1787. The latter act does not set aside or make void process or precepts' in the hands of the outgoing.marshal, or require him to hand them over to the new officer.. It authorizes “like process” to issue to him; and the word “ shall” is used because it is the most proper in conferring a power on the officer, and is not incompatible with the choice given to the plaintiff in the first clause of the section. The laws of the several States affecting Kens on land, and the pr.ocess by which they- may be sold for the satisfaction of judgments, differ-very widely. In some, by attachment á Ken is created at the institution of the suit, In others, thé judgment becomes a Ken at the time of its rendition; while in others, the execution and levy first givé a Ken. In some,-lands are sold on a fi.fa., while ' in others it can be sold only on a vinditioni exponas. . Under the act of 1789, a doubt might have been entertained, whether land attached should be sold by the officer who had originally attached it, and whether, if process issued to a new officer, it might not be a relinquishment of the Ken of the original attach-merit, as by fiction of law the land, like personal property attached, might be considered in the custody of the officer who' attached it. Again, an officer, going out of office, may have an execution in his hands which has created a lien; if the act were construed so as imperatively to require a new or “ like process” to issue to the neyr officer, the lien, and with' it the debt, might be lost. In other cases, on the contrary, a marshal may be, and often is, removed from office, because money, which once gets into his hands, cannot be got out again, and a plaintiff may much prefer to relinquish his execution and take a new one. • Doubts, also, may ha.ve- arisen whether a venditioni exponas could legally issue to the new marshal, where the former one had levied on the land and had it condemned. All these difficulties are obviated by the act of T800, not by repealing the general powers given by the act of 1789, but by conferring-certain powers on the new officer, where it is found expedient or necessary that he should exercise them.

- It is an argument entitled to great weight in the construction of these statutes, — that different constructions have been given them in different States, and the practice under them has been more or less conformed to the1 State practice, without, perhaps, a proper regard to these acts. In some, the act of 1800 has been overlooked altogether. A sharp or stringent construction,' which should now declare the latter to be a repeal of the powers conferred by the former, might have the effect of unsettling titles to land to an extent the court may not be able to anticipate. In the present case, it is said, the land was sold in 1829. The purchaser paid his money and obtained his deed upon the faith' of a judgment of the court that the sale was regular, and has held the land under this.title ever since, Hundreds of similar cases may probably be found, where ■ the same objections to'the sale exist. Under such circumstances a coürt should be even astute in avoiding a. construction which maybe productive' of,much litigation and insecurity of titles.

We therefore answer the first question proposed, in the negative ;■ which involves, as a necessary consequence, ah affirmative answer to the second, so far as it affects.the case before us.’ But we do not mean to say that the confirmation of a void sale by the court, would make it valid.

-Order.

. This cause .came on to be heard, on the transcript of \ the record, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, and on the points or questions on which the Judges oí the said Circuit Court' were opposed in opinion and which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act pf Congress in such.case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereqf, it is the opinion of this court,—

1. “ That a sale of land by a marshal, on a venditioni expopas, .after he is removed from office, and a. new marshal appointed •and qualified,” is pot void.

2. That" “ such sale being returned to the court, and confirmed by it on motion,- and a deed ordered to be made to the purchaser, at the sale, by the new marshal, such sale being made, is valid.” .’

' Whereupon it is now here ordered- and adjudged, by this court, that it be so certified to the 'said Circuit Court.


author: Mr. Justice DANIEL

text:
    Samuel Veazie and Levi Young, Plaintiffs in error, v. Wyman B. S. Moor.
    The' River Renobscot is entirely within the State of Maine, from its source to its ■ paouth. Rorthe last eight miles of its course it is not navigable, but crossed by . four dams- erfected for mamifacturing purposes. Higher up the stream there was an ■imperfect navigation. -

      Á. law of the State, granting the. exclusive navigation of the upper river to a com- ; pany'who were to improve it, is not in conflict with the'8th section of .the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States, and a license to barry on the coasting • trade did not entitle a vessel to navigate the upper waters of the river.
    Tijfs case was. brought up from the Supreme Judicial Court of the. State of Maine, by a writ of error issued under the 25th ^section of the Judiciary Act.
    . The facts in.-the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
    -It was argued by Mr. Paine, for the plaintiffs in error, and by .Mr. Kelley and' Mr. Moor, fpr the defendant in error:
    .The following propositions were contended for, in an elaborate brief, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error:
    1. That the constitutional power of Congress in .question,, ■embraces the right to adopt any means reasonably necessary, in -their opinion, to the successful prosecution of commerce .-among the States and with foreign nations.
    2. That Congress has adopted, ás. such means, the whole comniiercial. marine of the. country, every part of which, as a unit, is under their entire control and regulation, without regard tovthe waters on which the navigation is carried on.
    3. That to. constitute a part of this commercial mariñ'e, no ■ Other qualifications are necessary than those prescribed by Con gréss in the several aet§. regelating the registry and enrolment ' of vessels, and such registry or enrolment is evidéínce of a compliance with the prescribed conditions.
    ■ 4. .That- any vessel so enrolled, being licensed, has an unrestricted right to navigate all the navigable waters ,6f the United States, wherever-they may be found serviceable to its use.
    5. That the power of Congress to reigulate coinmerce is as extensive on land as water, and is irrespective of both; — that these compose no' part of commerce or navigation, but are subject to be adopted as ways or thoroughfares of it, whenever they may be required by the wants of either; — and that in legislating upon the subject, Congress hbs not discriminated between one class or body of navigable waters and another, but has made all such waters -free for the uses of navigation, wherever any portion of the commercial marine of the country may exist.
    •6. That under the statute of 1831, March 2, § 3, the plaintiffs’ boat is expressly included as provided for by said act, and is thus embraced within the power of Congress, even if not included in the general provisions of the acts regulating the “ coasting trade.”
    7. That the right of Congress to regulate “ commerce with the Indian tribes,” extends to and embraces the Penobscot tribe of Indians, and the Legislature of Maine has no right to restrict the people to, or deprive them of, any particular mode of intercourse or trade with them.
    8. That any act of a State Legislature contravening such right of navigation, as does the act set forth in defendants’ bill of complaint, is absolutely null and void.
    The points made by the counsel for the defendant in error, were thus stated:
    The only question ■ here is, whether the grant to Moor is in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which gives Congress the fight to regulate commerce.
    A party alleging that a State law is unconstitutional, takes on himself the burden of establishing ¡these three propositions:

      First. That the matter or subject in controversy is within the legislative jurisdiction of Congress.

      Second. That Congress has de facto legislated on the subject, and embraced it within regulations established by its legislation ; and

      Third. That the party impeaching the. law, has himself acquired rights in the subject-matter which is .in controversy, and that these rights have been invaded by the legislation of the State.

      Applying these rales to this ease, plaintiffs are bound to show, First. That the navigation of the Penobscot' River, above Old-town Falls, is/within the - jurisdiction of Congress.
    ‘ Second. That Congress has embraced this navigation in its legislation, and provided regulations for it; and
    Third.' That they have acquired rights in that navigation under the legislation: of Congress, which rights have been impaired by the law of the State.
    . Plaintiffs must establish all three of thesé propositions. It • is' not enough for them to establish any two of them. If they fail'in any one of them, they have no ground to stand upon.
    1st. As .to the first of these propositions. The grant being confined to waters wholly internal, plaintiffs can carry on no navigation- by means of those waters, with any foreign nation, nor with any other State. We think this is almost too plain for argument. Moor v. Veazie, 32 Maine Rep. 343; Wilson v. Blackbird Co. 2 Pet. 250; 3 Kent’s Com. 458; Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 506; Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Id. 488; Id. 9 Wheat. 1; New Bedford Bridge case, 1 Wood. & Minot, 404; Kellogg v. Union Company, 12 Conn. 7; Passenger case, 7 How., 283; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; 3 Cowen, 713.
    •Again. This grant is' not in conflict with the power of Congress i;o regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.
    1. .Because commerce, in this connection, does not include navigation. 32 Maine, 343.
    2.. Because the constitution manifestly refers only to independent tribes with which the general government may come in'conflict; not to those-small remnants of tribes scattered over the country, which are under State jurisdiction and guardianship. 32 Maine, 343.
    2d. We hold that plaintiffs entirely fail to establish the second proposition, to wit: That ’ the navigation of these waters is embraced within the actual legislation of Congress. None of the acts cited were ever -intended to apply to waters Wholly within the limits of a State, and which could not be reached by vessels from foreign, ports, or from other States.
    Again. . We contend that if Congress has, or should pass any acts interfering with commerce purely internal, they would be unauthorized and void. Passenger case, 7 How. 283; Genesee Chief, 12 Id. 443.
    3d. As tó the third proposition, the case fails to show that plaintiffs. havé acquired any rights in the navigation of the waters of the upper Pénobshot, under airy regulation of Congress, or in any other Way of manner.
    Assuredly there can be no.pretence that plaintiffs were engaged ■ in any commerce on those waters with any foreign nation, o with any other State. Nor is there any fact or evidence in th( case tending to show that they were engaged in commerce' wit} the Penobscot tribe. It does not appear that they traded oj had any intercourse with that tribe, nor that they wished or intended to have any such intercourse. The Penobscots are not represented here.. They do not complain of the grant. There is no fact going to show that this grant has any bearing or. effect on any commerce to which they are parties. If they have any ports of entry or clearance, for aught the case finds, such ports may be as hermetically sealed as those of Japan.
    If plaintiffs fail to show that they have acquired rights which have been taken away, they cannot complain, even if the act was most palpably against the constitution. Wheeling Bridge ease, 13 Howard, 518; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Company, 17 Conn. Rep.
   Mr. Justice DANIEL

delivered the opinion of the court..'

The questions raised upon this record, however subdivided or varied they may have been in form or number, are essentially and properly restricted to, the power and the duty of this court, to inquire into the constitutional obligation of- the law of the State of Maine, upon which the decision of the Supreme Court of that State was founded; for if that law and the privileges-conferred thereby, be coincident with the eighth Section of article 1st of the constitution, they can be assailable here upon no just exception.

It is insisted, however, that the statute of the State of Maine is in derogation of the power vested in Congress by the article and section above mentioned, “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” W.e will examine the character of this objection with reference to the facts disclosed by the record, and with reference also to the provisions of the statute in question, as they have been designed to operate on those facts; and as these last are all agreed by the parties, there cambe no need of a comparison of the testimony to ascertain them verity.

The Rivfer Penobscot is situated entirely within the State -of Maine; having its rise far in the interior of the State, it is. not subject to the tides above the city of Bangor, neqr its mouth. Between the city of Bangor and Old' Town, a distance of eight miles, the Penobscot passes over a fall, is crossed by four dams erected for manufacturing purposes, and for the above space is not, at this time, and never has been, navigable; but there is a railroad from Bangor to the steamboat landing at Old Te'wn. On the 30tfi .day of July, 1846, the Legislature of Maine, by law- enacted1, that “William Moor and Daniel Moor, Jr., their associates.and’assigns, were authorized to' improve the navigation of the Penobscot River above Old Town, and for that purpose, were authorized to deepen the channel of the river, to cut down and remove any.gravel or ledge, bars, rocks, or other obstructions in the bed thereof ) to erect in the bed, on the shore or bank of said river, suitable dams and locks, with booms,, piers abutments, breakwaters, and other erections to protect the same; to build upon the shore or bank of said river, any canal or canals to connect the navigable parts of said river, or (in case it shall be deemed the preferable mode of improvement,) arty railroads for the like purpose.

After providing the modes of acquiring lands or gravel on the shores or in the bed of the river, and for compensating the owqers of property used in the prosecution of the contemplated improvement, the act proceeds to limit the time for the completion of the undertaking, within particular termini therein, named, to the period of seven years from its date; and farther requires that,, within the period thus limited, the grantees shall build and run a steamboat between those1 termini, and shall, within the samé time, make a canal and lock around the falls of the river, cir a railroad to connect the route above with that below the falls:

Then follows section fourth of the statute, containing the provision objected to. It is in these words: “If said William Moor and Daniel Moor, Jr., their associates and assigns, shall perform the conditions of this grant as contained in the preceding. section, the sole right of navigating said river by boats propelled by steam from said Old Town so far up as they shall render the same navigable, is hereby granted to them for the term of twenty years-fjom and after the completion of the improvement, as. provided in the third section, of this act.” The deféhdant in error, who is assignee of the original grantees from the legislature, having made .certain improvements in the river by the Removal of- rocks, and by deepening the channel in other places,- so as to enable boats to run therein, with two and a half feet less of water than-was requisite for navigation previously to these improvements, and all within the limit prescribed to him by law, built, and on the 27th of May, 1847, placed upon the said river, the steamboat Governor Neptune, and ran her fromt Old Town over the Piscataquis Ralls, to a place called Nickaton. ' In the spring of the year 1847, the defendant in érrór . placed on the river the steamboat Mattanawcook, and ran her tp Lincoln, till obstructions were removed by him at a place called the.' Mohawk Rips, above the Piscataquis Falls; and has also .built and is now running upon the river, another steamboat called the Sam Houston, in' addition to the Governor Neptune and the Mattanawcook.

The plaintiff in error, Samuel Yeazie, built the steamboat Governor Dana, and, in conjunction with the other plaintiffs, Levi and Warren It. Young, tan her upon the Penobscot River between Old Town, and the Piscataquis Falls, from the 10th day of May,

1849, until they were arrested by an injunction granted at the suit of the defendant' in error. The steámboat Governor Dana was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, at the custom-house at Bangor. The Penobscot tribe of Indians own all the islands in the Penobscot River above Old Town Falls, some of which they occupy; and this tribe always • have been, and, now are, under the jurisdiction and guardianship of - the State of Maine.

Upon this state of facts agreed, the Supreme Judicial -Court of Maine, after argument and advisement, at its June term, 1850, decreed, that the plaintiffs in error be perpetually enjoined to desist and refrain from running and employing the steamboat Governor Dana, propelled by steam, for transporting passengers or merchandise on said river,- or any part thereof above Old Town, and also from building, using, and employing, ,any other boat propelled by steam on that part of the said river for that purpose, without the consent of thé said Wyman B. S. Moor, obtained according to law, until' the said Moor’s exclusive right shall expire. The court farther decreed to the defendant in error, the sum of one thousand and fifty-two dollars and.forty-five cents, for damages and expenses incurred by him, by reason of the interference with- his rights on the part of the. plaintiffs in error.

Upon a comparison of this decree, and of the statute upon which it is founded, with the provision of the Constitution already referred to, we are unable to perceive by what rule of interpretation either the statute or the decree can be brought within either of the categories,comprised in that provision.

These categories are, 1st. Commerce with foreign nations. 2dly. Commerce.amongst the several States. 3dly. Commerce with the Indian tribes. Taking the term commerce- in its broadest acceptation, supposing it to embrace not merely traffic, but the means and vehicles by which it is prosecuted,. can it properly be made to include objects and purposes such as those contemplated by the law under review ? Commerce with foreign nations, must signify commerce which ■ in some sense is necessarily connected with these nations, transactions which either immediately, or at some stage of their progress, must be extraterritorial. The phrase can never be applied to transactions wholly internal, betwe&n citizens of the same community, or to a polity and laws whose ends and purposes and operations are restricted to the territory and soil and jurisdiction of such community. Nor can it be properly concluded, that, because -the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture or manufactures, or in the arts, may ultimately become the subjects,of foreign commerce; that the control of the means or the encouragements by which enterprise is fostered and protected, is legitimately ■within the import of the phrase foreign commerce, or fairly implied in any investiture of the power to regulate such commerce. A pretension as far reaching as this, would extend to contracts between citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pursuits of the planter, the grazier, the- manufacturer, the mechanic, the immense operations of the collieries and mines and furnaces of the country; for there is not one of these avocations,' the results of which may not become the subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne either by turnpikes, canals, or railroads, from point to point within the several States, towards an ultimate destination, like the one above mentioned. Such a pretension would effectually prevent or paralyze every effort at internal improvement by the sevéral States; for it cannot be supposed, that the States would exhaust their capital and their credit in the construction of turnpikes, canals, and railroads; the remuneration derivable from which, and all control over which, might be immediately wrested from them, because such public works would be. facilities for a commerce which, whilst availing itself of those facilities, was unquestionably internal, although intermediately or ultimately it might become foreign.

The rule here given with respect tó the regulation of foreign commerce, equally excludes from the regulation of commerce between, the States and the Indian tribes the control over turnpikes, canals, or railroads, or the clearing and deepening of watercourses exclusively within the States, or the management of the transportation upon and by means of such improvements. In truth, the power vested in Congress by article 1st, section 8th of the Constitution, was not designed to operate upon matters like those embraced in the statute of -the State ‘of Maine, and which are essentially local in their-nature and extent., The design, and object of that power, as evinced in the history of the Constitution, was to establish a perfect equality amongst the several States as to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local and partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain. These were the views pressed upon the public attention by the advocates for the adoption of the Constitution, and in accordance therewith have been the expositions of this 'instrument propounded by this court, in decisions quoted by counsel on either side of this cause, though differently- applied by them. Vide The Federalist, Nos. 7 and 11, and the cases of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; New York v. Milne, 11 Peters, 102; Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; and the License cases in 5 Howard, 504.

The fact of procuring from the collector of -the port of Bangor a license to prosecute the coasting trade for the boat placed upon the Penobscot by the plaintiff in error, (the Governor Dana,) does not affect, in the slightest degree, the rights or condition Of the parties. These remain precisely as they would have stood ,had no such license been obtained. A license to prosecute the coasting trade, is a wurrant to traverse the waters washing or bounding the coasts of the United States. Such a •license conveys no privilege to use, free of tolls, or of any condition whatsoever, the, canals constructed by a State, or the watercourses partaking of the character of canals exclusively within the interior of a State, and made practicable for navigation by the funds of the State, or by privileges she may have conferred for the accomplishment of the same end. The attempt to use a coasting license for a purpose like this, is, in the first place, a departure from the obvious meaning of the document. itself, and an abuse wholly beyond the object and the power of the government in granting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine is in accordance with the 'Constitution of the United States, and ought to be, and is hereby, affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Judicial Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs.