author: Mr. Justice Stevens, Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    February 19, 1980
    No. 79-504.
    No. 79-528.
    United States et al. v. Mississippi; and Henry et al. v. Mississippi.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. G. D. C. Reported below: 490 F. Supp. 569.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

In 1965, a three-judge District Court was convened in Mississippi to deal with allegations of malapportionment in Mississippi’s State Legislature. By 1975, an acceptable reapportionment plan still had not been formulated; nevertheless, quadrennial elections were held under a court-ordered plan. In 1978, the Mississippi Legislature enacted a statutory reapportionment plan, which was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq. When the Attorney General objected to the plan, the State brought this action in a three-judge District Court in the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the plan was in compliance with the Act. In 1979, while the Voting Rights Act case was still pending, the three-judge court in Mississippi entered a judgment putting into effect a reapportionment plan agreed to by all parties. Connor v. Finch, 469 F. Supp. 693 (SD Miss.). That plan was essentially a modified version of the statutory plan.

Under the Voting Rights Act the task confronting the District of Columbia court was to determine whether the statutory plan had the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. An impermissible effect is created whenever a reapportionment pian has the effect of diluting existing black voting strength. See Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141. The District of Columbia court compared the statutory reapportionment plan to the 1979 court-ordered plan in order to determine whether any prohibited retrogression had occurred. Concluding that it had not and that there was no purpose to discriminate evident in the statutory plan, the court granted the State a declaratory judgment approving the plan. Both the United States and intervenors (black voters in Mississippi) appealed. The Court today affirms, without opinion.

In my judgment the only significant issue presented on appeal is whether the statutory plan had the impermissible effect of diluting black voting strength. In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Marshall presents a persuasive case that there were significant discrepancies between the statutory plan and the 1979 court-ordered plan. Because I believe that the 1979 plan was not the proper benchmark to be used in determining whether there was an impermissible effect, I have no occasion to comment on his conclusion that the differences between the two plans were sufficient to constitute a “dilution” of black voting strength.

As a technical matter, the court-ordered plan was the plan “in effect” at the time the District of Columbia court decided the case. Nevertheless, all of the parties to both actions realized that the statutory plan would be used in the 1979 elections if it received court approval in time. See Connor v. Coleman, 440 U. S. 612, 622 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, in practical terms, the court-ordered plan was never more than a backup. To use such a plan as a benchmark for judging the effect of the statutory plan on voting rights seems to me to be logically indefensible. No voting rights in Mississippi were ever affected by the backup plan and thus any “changes” due to the imposition of the statutory plan could hardly have diluted those rights. Moreover, to require a state legislature to predict what court-ordered plans may be entered while a Voting Rights Act suit is pending and then to draw its plan to ensure that no dilution occurs seems to me to be a futile exercise clearly not required by the statute.

Thus, in my view the statutory plan was permissible under the Act so long as it did not have a discriminatory purpose and did not dilute black voting strength as it existed at the time the legislation was passed. The District Court’s findings of fact make it clear that the plan met these conditions. I therefore concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the court below.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan

and Mr. Justice White join,

dissenting.

For more than 15 years private litigants, often joined by the United States, have sought to obtain an apportionment plan in Mississippi which satisfies the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By today’s summary affirmance, the Court assures that these efforts will remain to a substantial degree unsuccessful. I dissent.

I

Brought in 1965, this case has a procedural history that can charitably be described as bizarre. Both state officials and the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi have shown a firm determination to avoid implementation of an apportionment plan which complies with constitutional and statutory requirements. The case has been before this Court no fewer than eight times; we have invalidated plans proposed by the District Court on four occasions. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690 (1971); Connor v. Williams, 404 U. S. 549 (1972); Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975); Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407 (1977).

In Connor v. Finch, we ordered the District Court to draw a lawful apportionment plan “with a compelling awareness of the need for its expeditious accomplishment, so that the citizens of Mississippi at long last will be enabled to elect a legislature that properly represents them.” Id., at 426. .Two more years passed, and no such plan was drawn. When the case was here last Term, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the District Court to do what we have ordered. On March 26, 1979, the Court granted leave to file the petition, but it postponed action for 30 days, instructing the District Court to enter a plan “forthwith and without further delay.” Connor v. Coleman, 440 U. S. 612, 614. On April 13, 1979, the District Court entered a final judgment embodying a plan agreed to by all parties. Unfortunately, this settlement plan did not end the litigation.

Almost a year earlier, on April 21, 1978, the Governor of Mississippi had approved a statutory reapportionment plan designed to supersede any court-ordered plan to be produced in this litigation. The statutory plan was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq. On July 31, 1978, the Attorney General entered a timely objection on the ground that the State had failed to carry its burden of proving the absence of a discriminatory purpose or effect. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The State of Mississippi filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment under the Voting Rights Act that the statutory plan did not have the prohibited purpose or effect. Ten Mississippi Negro voters intervened, urging that the statutory plan be declared invalid. On June 1, 1979, the District Court entered the declaration requested by the State, and it is that judgment which is the subject of the present appeal.

II

The legality of the statutory plan depends on whether it has the purpose or effect of diluting Negro voting strength in Mississippi. If the statutory plan is retrogressive, it is forbidden under the Voting Rights Act. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). The District Court correctly measured the statutory plan against the present apportionment of the Mississippi Legislature, which is the settlement plan embodied in the final judgment entered by the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in response to our instruction to enter a plan “forthwith and without further delay.”

The District Court’s findings reyeal a long history of denial of Negro voting rights in Mississippi. Official use of racially discriminatory devices such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries effectively excluded Negroes from participation in the electoral process until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. The current effects of past discrimination are manifested in serious underrepresentation of Negroes in the state legislature. Although the latest census showed that Mississippi’s population is 36.8% Negro, prior to the 1979 elections there were only four Negroes in the 122-member House of Representatives and none in the 52-member Senate. Because of racial bloc voting and low Negro voter registration. and turnout, Negroes must constitute a substantial majority of citizens in a district in order to have a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The court concluded that either a Negro population of 65% or a Negro voting age population of 60% was necessary to provide such an opportunity.

It is evident from the findings of the District Court that the statutory plan significantly weakens the voting strength of Negroes in a number of ways. The statutory plan divides and diminishes Negro population concentrations, combines them with heavily white populations, and creates oddly shaped districts for no apparent reason other than to dilute the Negro vote. Under the plan presently in effect, 49 districts contain a majority of Negro voters; the statutory plan contains only 46 such districts. As the District Court acknowledged, under “the statutory plan’s redistricting of Warren County, a heavy black population concentration is divided among three proposed house districts, turning a black majority into a black minority in all three districts.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 79-504, pp. 18a-19a.

The court concluded that the elimination of three majority districts was insignificant, relying on its finding that a Negro voting-age population of 60% was necessary in order for Negroes to have a fair opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Apparently the court reasoned that the diminution in the number of districts with a mere majority of Negro voters was not retrogressive since even under the plan presently in effect, Negro voters in those districts could not elect candidates. But a majority population gives Negroes at least some opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice; a minority gives them practically none. Indeed, in some of the counties with Negro majorities under the existing plan but not under the statutory plan, Negroes have been extremely active in city government and have a genuine opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The District Court’s mechanical application of the 60% standard eliminates that opportunity.

In a number of other districts appellee failed to carry its burden of disproving retrogression within the meaning of Beer. In Leflore County, for example, existing law provides for a Negro voting-age population of 71.72%; the statutory plan reduces that population to 64.26%. The statutory plan fragments a heavily Negro population in that county, combining the larger portion with a white community. The record showed that because of past discrimination, Negro voting strength was severely inhibited in the county, in part because most Negroes reside in rural areas, where voter turnout is far less than in urban districts. There was testimony that a 65% Negro voting-age population substantially composed of rural Negroes was insufficient to provide a fair opportunity to elect candidates. By contrast, the 71.72% population provided by the existing plan is fully adequate.

The District Court's findings show that the statutory plan fragments a number of cohesive voting districts, combining communities where Negroes have been politically active with white populations for no discernible reason. There was uncon-tradicted testimony that in seven districts, the statutory plan deprives Negro voters of an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the conclusion that the statutory plan would not lead to a retrogression in the position of Negro voters.

The District Court acknowledged these differences between the two plans, but upheld the statutory plan nonetheless, concluding that the differences were insufficient to constitute a discriminatory effect. The court pointed out that both plans had the same number of districts with Negro voting-age populations of 60% or more, and it relied heavily on “the fact that legislative reapportionment is the preferred vehicle for reapportionment, as is reflected by the broader tolerances which are allowed to legislatures, but not to courts, in the matter of deviations from uniform population requirements.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 79-504, p. 32a. It also relied on findings that the intervenors had not offered sufficient objections during the formulation of the statutory plan.

The District Court’s reasoning amounts to a conclusion that there is a de minimis exception to the fundamental proposition that changes may not be made if they would produce a retrogression in the electoral potential of Negro voters. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). I am unable to discern such an exception in the Voting Rights Act or in any of our decisions. Such a gloss on the Act would invite a series of changes, seemingly insignificant in themselves, which over the course of years could result in a substantial decline in Negro voting strength. Nor is the decision below justified by the principle that legislatures may deviate more broadly than courts from uniform population requirements. The Voting Rights Act flatly prohibits state legislatures from “ 'undo[ing] or defeating] the rights recently won’ by Negroes.” Beer v. United States, supra, at 140. Finally, the asserted failure of the intervenors to offer sufficient objections to the statutory plan is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry required by the Voting Rights Act. The Act’s proscription on retrogression is simply not subject to waiver. The District Court’s conclusion would permit a State freely to dilute Negro voting strength whenever the Negro community is unable or unwilling to participate in the apportionment process.

By today’s summary affirmance, the Court permits the rights won less than a year ago, after generations of political efforts and well over a decade of litigation, to be thwarted by recalcitrant state officials. In so doing, the Court appears to condone a novel interpretation of the law that would find a de minimis exception to the clear and absolute requirements of the Voting Rights Act, and sanctions the application of this new doctrine to a case in which, as the record amply demonstrates, the dilution of Negro voting strength is not de minimis at all, but substantial. The plan approved today ensures that the Negro voters of Mississippi will not yet obtain an apportionment plan which meets the requirements of the Act. I dissent.

       The history of that litigation is described at length in MR. Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Connor v. Coleman, 440 U. S. 612, 614.

       The statutory plan could not become effective until it was cleared pursuant to the Voting Rights Act by either the Attorney General or the three-judge court in the District of Columbia. Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656. The judgment entered by the Mississippi court, on the other hand, specifically provided that the court-ordered plan was to be in "full force and effect for the 1979 regular state legislative elections and thereafter unless and until altered according to law.” Connor v. Finch, 469 F. Supp. 693, 694 (SD Miss. 1979). Thus, the court-ordered plan would have remained in effect if the District of Columbia court had not approved the statutory plan.

       The court noted that when compared to the 1975 apportionment plan that had governed the last elections, the statutory plan constituted a “clear enhancement of the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise. . . .” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 79-504, p. 32a, n. 6.

       The procedural background is described in detail in my dissenting opinion in Connor v. Coleman, 440 U. S. 612, 614-621 (1979).

       I would have issued the writ immediately. See Connor v. Coleman, swpra, at 614 (dissenting opinion).

       The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied on May 21, 1979, Connor v. Coleman, 441 U. S. 792; we noted that the Clerk of the District Court had “stated that all parties to the litigation have announced in open court that there will be no appeal.” Ibid.

       The argument that retrogression should be measured against the 1975 court-ordered plan which was in effect when the legislature adopted the statutory plan is manifestly incorrect. The mandate of the Voting Rights Act is that a plan may not be adopted if it would dilute existing Negro voting strength. There is no dispute that the 1979 court-ordered plan was the governing law at the time the court below rendered its decision. If the statutory plan were not put into effect, future elections would be conducted under the court-ordered plan. Accordingly, it is simply incorrect to suggest that Negro voting rights were not “affected” by the 1979 court-ordered plan or that a subsequent statutory plan could not dilute the rights won under that plan. To suggest, as does Mr. Justice Stevens, ante, p. 1050, that the court-ordered plan that is now the law in Mississippi may be disregarded because the parties viewed it as a mere “backup” not only denigrates a final judgment of a federal court, entered at our direction after over a decade of litigation; it would also permit a state legislature freely to dilute Negro voting strength gained through any court-ordered plan under which elections had not yet been held. Such a result is plainly contrary to the Voting Rights Act.

       For example, in the Warren County district the community of Vicksburg has recently elected a Negro to the City Council. In addition, Bolton and Edwards, primarily Negro towns in the Hinds County district, have predominantly Negro city governments.

       For example, in western Hinds County, a heavily Negro district under the present law is divided into three sections, each of which is combined with greater white populations in surrounding suburbs. In Marshall County, the only district that has elected a Negro supervisor is split up, and the voting strength of Negro voters in the county’s House district is diluted by the inclusion of the predominantly white Holly Springs precinct. The county’s Negro voting population is thus reduced from 62% to 56%. In Adams County, the statutory plan divides the only supervisors’ district with a majority Negro population into two districts. The northern portion of Adams County is then combined with heavily white populations, which reduces the Negro population from almost 70% to 63%.
      The District Court altogether ignored the retrogression in the electoral strength of Negro voters within the counties. This was a serious error, for county delegations to the Mississippi Legislature play a crucial role in local government. Legislation affecting the county is enacted by a scheme of bills of local application in the state legislature; boards of supervisors exercise little legislative power. As a result, the county delegation is largely responsible for local governance. If the statutory plan is viewed from the perspective of particular counties, it is even more difficult to account for the District Court’s finding that any retrogression was “insignificant.”

       The court also found that the State had carried its burden of proving that the statutory plan was not the product of a discriminatory intent, a conclusion that is in my view highly questionable. The unexplained discriminatory elements of the statutory plan, when combined with the State’s prior history of discrimination, suggest that the State had not carried its burden. Indeed, the court entirely ignored testimony tending to show that members of the state legislature’s joint reapportionment committee were aware that the statutory plan dilutes the strength of the Negro vote and that alternative configurations would preserve existing Negro population concentrations.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 79-555.
    Donnell et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.

Me. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 78-1914.
    Uniroyal Englebert Belgique, S. A. v. Connelly.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-771.
    Orr v. Orr.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Ala. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certio-rari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-894.
    Parker v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-925.
    Baker et al. v. Oregon State Bar et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ore. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-945.
    Wall v. Vermont.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Vt. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-971.
    Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mass, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5740.
    Wayland v. Kurtz et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5777.
    Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Clark County School District.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Nev. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-533.
    Jackson v. White, Administrator, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-546.
    Home Federal Savings & Loan Association of Hollywood v. Chemical Realty Corp.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-841.
    Bailey et ux. v. Pennington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Del. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-844.
    Furman, dba Northside Secretarial Service v. Florida Bar.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-933.
    Porter v. Porter.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Tenn. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1007.
    Hughes v. Hughes.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-948.
    North Ridge General Hospital, Inc., et al. v. City of Oakland Park et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-981.
    Minnesota Education Assn. et al. v. Minnesota et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1023.
    Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-1048.
    Carlson v. Minnesota.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 79-992.
    Austin Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gudvangen.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-5521.
    Thompson v. Thompson.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-5816.
    Fieldhouse et ux. v. Public Health Trust of Dade County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-5532.
    Strube v. Sumner.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 78-1005.
    Brown, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Allen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Secretary of Navy v. Huff, ante, p. 453.


text:
    No. 79-517.
    Eschmann Bros. & Walsh, Ltd. v. V. Mueller & Co.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, ante, p. 286.


text:
    No. 79-5215.
    In re Otis et al. (Subler, Petitioner).
   Ct. App. Ohio, Van Wert County. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 924.] Upon consideration of motion of petitioner for summary reversal, it is ordered that the judgment be vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N. E. 2d 66 (1980).


text:
    No. 79-5499.
    Skipper v. Brummer et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1012.] Upon consideration of motion of the State of Florida for reconsideration of the order of this Court entered on January 7, 1980 [ante, p. 1012], it is ordered that the judgment be vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of subsequent proceedings referred to in respondent’s motion for reconsideration and supplement thereto.


text:
    No. A-636.
    California v. Braeseke.
   Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of the Supreme Court of California, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending timely filing and disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens would deny the application.


text:
    No. A-644.
    Mead Corp. et al. v. Adams Extract Co. et al.
   Application for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, addressed to Mr. Justice Brennan and referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. A-663.
    Buckley et al. v. McRae et al.
   Application for stay of judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the application.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al.
   Motion of Mississippi for entry of a supplemental decree and cross-motion of the United States referred to the Special Master. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1029.]


text:
    No. 65,
    Orig.
    Texas v. New Mexico.
   Motion of New Mexico to strike response of the United States denied. Alternative request to file a reply granted. Objections to Report of the Special Master on the obligations of New Mexico to Texas under the Pecos River Compact set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 912.]


text:
    No. 73,
    Orig.
    California v. Nevada.
   Exceptions to Report of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 922.]


text:
    No. 84,
    Orig.
    United States v. Alaska.
    [For earlier order herein, see 442 U. S. 937.]
   It is ordered that J. Keith Mann, Esquire, of Stanford, Cal., be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.

The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.

It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new designation which shall have the same effect as if originally made by the Court.


text:
    No. 85,
    Orig.
    Texas v. Oklahoma.
   Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint granted and the defendant shall have 60 days to answer.


text:
    No. 78-1793.
    Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 822.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 78-6899.
    Godfrey v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 897.] Motion of Rayfield Newlon for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-1.
    American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 924.] Motion of respondent Vinal Ship Maintenance for divided argument denied.


text:
    No. 79-4.
    No. 79-5.
    No. 79-491.
    Williams et al. v. Zbaraz et al.; Miller, Acting Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al. v. Zbaraz et al.; and United States v. Zbaraz et al.
   D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 962.] Motions of Washington Legal Foundation and United States Catholic Conference for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-8.
    United States v. Raddatz.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Andrew J. Levander, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 79-48.
    Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Glover Construction Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 962.] Motion of Association of American Indian Affairs et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-81.
    Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 924.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Alan I. Horowitz, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 79-116.
    Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 962.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-192.
    New York Gaslight Club, Inc., et al. v. Carey.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 897.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-244.
    United States v. Salvucci et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 989.] Motions of respondents for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that John C. McBride, Esquire, of Everett, Mass., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent Zackular; and it is ordered that Willie J. Davis, Esquire, of Boston, Mass., be appointed to serve as counsel for respondent. Salvucci in this case. Motions of respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 79-394.
    United States v. Ward, dba L. O. Ward Oil & Gas Operations.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 939.] Motion of Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 79-421.
    No. 79-425.
    No. 79-435.
    Bryant et al. v. Yellen et al.; California et al. v. Yellen et al.; and Imperial Irrigation District et al. v. Yellen et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 978.] Motion of petitioners for additional time for oral argument granted, and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 79-509.
    Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 961.] Motion of Associated Dry Goods Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 79-701.
    Roadway Express, Inc. v. Monk et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1012.] Joint motion to dispense with printing appendix granted.


text:
    No. 79-725.
    No. 79-907.
    Maine Public Utilities Commission v. Central Maine Power Co. Ingram, Secretary, Department of Human Services of New Mexico v. Nolan.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me.; and

C. A. 10th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 79-972.
    Westvaco Corp. et al. v. Adams Extract Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this order.


text:
    No. 79-5927.
    Burks v. United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5888.
    Bradin v. Day, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 79-5857.
    No. 79-5925.
    Clark v. United States District Court for the District of New Mexico; and Ford v. Aldisert, U. S. Circuit Judge, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 79-5699.
    Ryan et al. v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 79-983.
    United States v. Will et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. In addition to the questions presented by the statement as to jurisdiction, the parties are directed to address the effect of 28 U. S. C. § 455 on the jurisdiction of the District Court and on the jurisdiction of this Court.


text:
    No. 79-870.
    United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ind. Motions of National Railway Conference and Railway Labor Executives’ Association for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 79-1268.
    Harris, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. McRae et al.
   Application for stay of judgment of tbe United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the application.

Treating the application as a statement as to jurisdiction, probable jurisdiction noted. Appellees’ request to expedite the briefing schedule granted. Opening briefs on the merits shall be filed on or before March 18, 1980. Replies thereto shall be filed on or before April 10, 1980. Case set for oral argument in tandem with No. 79-4, Williams v. Zbaraz; No. 79-5, Miller v. Zbaraz; and No. 79-491, United States v. Zbaraz [probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 962].


text:
    No 78-1841.
    Cuyler, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Adams.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-770.
    Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Assn. et al.; and Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Consolidation Coal Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 601 F. 2d 111 (first case); 604 F. 2d 239 (second case).


text:
    No. 79-816.
    Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U. S. Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-927.
    Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, v. Investment Company Institute.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-938.
    Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, Personal Representative of Hague's Estate.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-952.
    Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-567.
    United States v. DiFrancesco.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-935.
    Allen et al. v. McCurry.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-939.
    Delaware State College et al. v. Ricks.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 3 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 79-5267.
    Perez v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 79-5602.
    Fedorenko v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 78-1100.
    Brown v. Blamey.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 78-6798.
    Bryan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-419.
    Weaver v. Iowa.
   Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-422.

    Taibe v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-527.
    Jock et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-579.
    Erwin et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-601.
    Driver et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-613.
    Moss v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-650.
    Cruz v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-654.
    Merlino v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-673.
    Providence Journal Co. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-692.
    Schwartze et al. v. Wenz et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-713.
    Morrilton School District No. 32 et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. [See also ante, p. 1050.]


text:
    No. 79-710.
    Honicker v. Hendrie et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-718.
    Vignola v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-724.
    Cortellesso et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-736.
    South African Marine Corp., Ltd. v. Elgie & Co.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-741.
    Safeway Trails, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-745.
    Chenoweth et al. v. Nevada et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-747.
    Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-748.
    Goldman et al., Trustees v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-749.
    Blanco et ux. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-750.
    Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-752.
    Certified Meats, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-753.
    Hoffman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-754.
    Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-757.
    Cummins Engine Co., Inc. v. Carney.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-761.
    Packard v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-774.
    Labriola v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-779.
    Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974, et al. v. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ International Association of the United States and Canada et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-789.
    Fatico v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-791.
    Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-792.
    Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-793.
    Houston Lighting & Power Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-799.
    Jones et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-800.
    Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche et al. v. Federal Election Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-801.
    Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche et al. v. Federal Election Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-805.
    Community Cash Stores, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-808.
    Frezzo Brothers, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-811.
    Claiborne Hardware Co. et al. v. Henry et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-823.
    Hanson v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-829.
    First Jersey Securities, Inc., et al. v. Biunno, U. S. District Judge (Bergen et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-830.
    Vinson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-831.
    Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Phillips et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-832.
    Dean v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-833.
    Kondrat v. City of Willoughby Hills et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-835.
    Wilson et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-839.
    Irons & Sears v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-840.
    Wickham Contracting Co., Inc., et al. v. Robert J. Harder, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-842.
    Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc., t/a Delaware Valley Memorial Center, et al. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-846.
    Bramscher, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Zahn et ux.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-858.
    Kirkpatrick v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-849.
    Smith’s Food King v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1442, Retail Clerks International Assn., AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-853.
    Elias et al. v. A & C Distributing Co., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-860.
    Roberts v. Upper Milford Township et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-861.
    Connelly Containers, Inc. v. Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-863.
    Gregg v. U. S. Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-866.
    Jago, Correctional Superintendent v. Speigner.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-867.
    Thompson v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-868.
    Adolph Coors Co. v. R. E. Spriggs Co., Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-869.
    Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 150 et al. v. Sherrod.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-872.
    Bailey, Administratrix v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-873.
    Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-875.
    Shui Ping Wu et al. v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-877.
    Lorch et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-878.
    Westmoreland Hospital Assn. et al. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-879.
    Tracy, Judge v. Golston et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-887.
    Terry v. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-888.
    Billingsley et ux. v. Moore et al.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-889.
    Romeros v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-890.
    Lamers Dairy, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-893.
    Roy et ux. v. Onondaga County Department of Social Services.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-895.
    International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-898.
    Edgar et ux. v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-905.
    No. 79-916.
    No. 79-5734.
    Josiah v. Government of the Virgin Islands; Rivera v. Government of the Virgin Islands; and Rios v. Government of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 609 F. 2d 501.


text:
    No. 79-906.
    Rancho La Costa, Inc., dba La Costa Country Club v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-909.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-911.
    Koehl, Administrator, et al. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-918.
    Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-919.
    Whiskers et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-922.
    Gould v. Gavett et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-931.
    Hayes et al. v. Solomon et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-940.
    De Toledano v. Nader.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-942.
    Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile
   Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-946.
    Ramey v. Ramey.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-947.
    Calhoun et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-950.
    Saverslak, Trustee v. Davis-Cleaver Produce Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-954.
    Shanahan v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-957.
    Panarella v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-961.
    Ambassador College v. Goetzke.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-964.
    Hixson v. Arkansas.
   Ct. App. Ark. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-966.
    Lykos et al. v. American Home Assurance Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-967.
    Floyd v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-968.
    Coughenour v. Mills.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-970.
    Llinas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-976.
    Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Local No. 153, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-977.
    Neilson et al. v. Wyoming.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-982.
    Roberts, Attorney General of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Electric Co.
   Sup. Ct. R. I. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-985.
    Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-987.
    Jones et al. v. Wolf et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-988.
    Krause et al. v. City of Brunswick et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-990.
    Campbell v. Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-993.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-995.
    American Federation of Government Employees (AFL-CIO) v. Gale, Judge.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-997.
    Librach v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-998.
    Glickman et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-999.
    Florida East Coast Railroad Co. v. Department of Revenue of Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Pla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1001.
    Shuffman, Executrix v. Hartford Textile Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1002.
    Marchiondo v. Traub, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1004.
    Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.
   Ct. App. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1008.
    Illinois v. Bishop.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1010.
    Siebert v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1011.
    Randell v. Banzhoff.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1012.
    Lashmett v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1021.
    Granville Central School District et al. v. Thomas et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1026.
    Vahalik v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1032.
    Refrigerated Food Line, et al. v. Republic Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1034.
    Panko v. Rodak, Clerk of U. S. Supreme Court, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1037.
    Stockton & Hing v. Evans, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1046.
    Smith v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1052.
    Price v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1054.
    Poe v. King, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1066.
    Fuselier v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1081.
    Dressel v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1083.
    Pride v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1086.
    Foshee et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1089.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1095.
    Jizmejian v. Department of Air Force.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1113.
    Scott v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1114.
    Cary v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-1118.
    No. 79-1125.
    Gleason v. United States; and Luftig v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 616 F. 2d 2.


text:
    No. 79-1131.
    Awerkamp v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5440.
    Foley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5483.
    Sosa v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5519.
    Green v. White, Training Center Superintendent.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5522.
    No. 79-5579.
    No. 79-5580.
    Brown v. United States; Parsons v. United States; and Caldwell v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 79-5522, 605 F. 2d 1197; No. 79-5579, 605 F. 2d 1198; No. 79-5580, 605 F. 2d 1197.


text:
    No. 79-5537.
    Walker v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5540.
    Heath v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5550.
    Dickinson v. Golden et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5557.
    Goode v. Markley, Warden, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5560.
    Bailey v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5566.
    Taylor v. Hooper, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5578.
    Fiorentino v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5583.
    Perry v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5590.
    Mayfield v. Mohn, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Ya. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5613.
    Hough v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5614.
    Jacobs v. Smith, Superintendent, Maryland State Police, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5619.
    Morel v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5623.
    McClanahan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5625.
    Brown v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5629.
    Alcorta v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5641.
    Enriquez-Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5642.
    Hatcher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5647.
    Lawrence v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5650.
    Frazier v. Lane, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5652.
    Belvin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5655.
    Flores v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5657.
    Hill v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5659.
    Montalalou v. Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5665.
    Johnson v. Michigan.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5674.
    Huber v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5677.
    Coyle v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5679.
    Patterson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5680.
    Vitagliano v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5681.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5683.
    Jones et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5702.
    Figueroa v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5719.
    Calfon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5728.
    Ross v. Carey, Governor of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5733.
    Jones et ux. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5732.
    Wolfel v. Jago, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5736.
    Johnson v. Hilton, Prison Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5737.
    Johnson v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5738.
    Sims v. Rowe, Corrections Director, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5739.
    Brice v. Day, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5745.
    Hails v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5746.
    Traylor v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5751.
    Hudson v. Blackburn, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5752.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5753.
    Russo v. Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5754.
    Ginsburg v. Overlook Hospital et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5755.
    Solomon v. Frame et al.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5757.
    Wilkerson v. Blakenship, Correctional Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5761.
    Osvaldo M. v. City of New York; Jose L. v. City of New York; and Walter B. v. City of New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 N. Y. 2d 603, 396 N. E. 2d 207 (first and third cases); 48 N. Y. 2d 633, 396 N. E. 2d 478 (second case).


text:
    No. 79-5764.
    Blake v. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5767.
    Floyd v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5773.
    Sawaya v. Bernalillo County Assessor.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5774.
    Wasilowski v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5776.
    Gore v. Leeke, Corrections Commissioner, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5783.
    Gamez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5785.
    McPherson v. Tennessee.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5789.
    Moore v. Clements, Sheriff.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5792.
    Foster v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5793.
    Johnson v. Koehler, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5797.
    Bustillo v. Wilkinson, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5798.
    Berry v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5799.
    Moore v. Mitchell, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5800.
    Rinehart v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5801.
    Taylor v. Garrison.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5802.
    Clark v. Payne et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5803.
    Simmons v. McDaniel et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5807.
    Newtop v. Merit Systems Protection Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5811.
    Stuart v. Ponder, Judge.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5812.
    Sheptin v. City of Houston et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5813.
    Cole v. Randles et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5814.
    Knowles v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5815.
    Conner v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5818.
    Miller v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5819.
    Reed v. Schwab et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5822.
    Paige v. Brooks, Attorney General of North Carolina.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5824.
    Prenzler v. Pike et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5827.
    Ayala-Carapia v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5828.
    Holsey v. Watkins, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5829.
    Kennedy v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Warren County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5832.
    Fitzpatrick v. Ward.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5833.
    Hannon v. Maine.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5834.
    No. 79-5896.
    Clark v. United States; and Artez v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 610 F. 2d 521.


text:
    No. 79-5836.
    Winfield v. Van Male Buick, Inc., et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5843.
    Little v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5845.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5847.
    Simmons v. Egeler et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5848.
    Beardslee v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5850.
    Rabago v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5852.
    Zuniga v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5854.
    Crawford v. Dial, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5855.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5856.
    Owen v. Heyne et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5859.
    White v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5862.
    Hayden v. Kentucky.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5865.
    Wagner v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5866.
    Dortch v. Fenton, Warden.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5868.
    Moore v. Medicab of Michigan, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5869.
    Toney, dba Tradewinds Ltd., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5870.
    Cole v. Lane, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5874.
    Lawson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5875.
    Moore v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5880.
    Lang v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5881.
    Wilson v. Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5882.
    Opdahl v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5884.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5887.
    Livingstone v. Little, Brown & Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5889.
    Shapiro et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5890.
    Yaple v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5891.
    Johnson v. Carter, President of the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5907.
    McDonald v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5912.
    Kaewnil v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5913.
    Holliday v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5914.
    Humbel v. Foltz, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5922.
    LaJune v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5923.
    Karsky v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5924.
    Garcia v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5928.
    Gamble v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5955.
    Mahler v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5960.
    Adam et al. v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5963.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5967.
    Lyons v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5972.
    Nolen v. Department of Human Resources of Georgia.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5981.
    Rivera v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5986.
    Mahler v. Nelson, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5990.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-88.
    California v. Whyte.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-920.
    White, Training Center Superintendent v. Green.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-934.
    Pennsylvania v. Starr.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-943.
    Michigan v. Gardner.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    No. 79-427.
    No. 79-499.
    Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.; and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and set cases for oral argument.

Reported below: 603 F. 2d 263.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins,

dissenting.

An obviously carefully considered opinion of the Court of Appeals comprising 99 pages in a separate appendix to the petition for certiorari in this case, dealing as it does with the complexities, refinements, and contradictions embodied in the decisional law construing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is obviously not an attractive candidate for review under our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I do not think we may “let this cup pass from us” unless we are prepared to forgo the opportunity to review some propositions enunciated by the Court of Appeals in this case which strike me as little less than bizarre.

One of the principal issues decided by the Court of Appeals was the obligation of respondent and cross-petitioner Kodak to “predisclose” information about its camera and film system to competing camera manufacturers prior to offering such camera and film for sale to the public. As to the camera market issues, the Court of Appeals held that Kodak had no such obligation, but as to the photofinishing and photofinishing equipment markets, the Court of Appeals held that Kodak violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by using its market power over films and cameras to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to photofinishing and photofinishing equipment. 603 F. 2d 263, 279-285, 304. And as to the joint development project, the court held that Kodak violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by including in the agreement a nondisclosure provision, even though Kodak made an investment of millions of dollars in the project that presumably was essential to its success.

To one not schooled in the niceties of antitrust litigation, the notion that a statute designed to foster competition requires one competitor to disclose to another, in advance of marketing a product to the general public, its plan to introduce the new product, is difficult to fathom. And this Court has held as recently as United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563 (1966), that it is not a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act for a business with monopoly power to achieve “growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” 384 U. S., at 570-571. I should think this reasoning is equally applicable to the alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act which the Court of Appeals also dealt with in its opinion.

But the Court of Appeals in this case held that “the rule of Orinnell must be read together with the teaching of Griffith [United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 107 (1948)], that the mere existence of monopoly power ‘whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired/ is in itself violative of § 2, ‘provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power,’ ” 603 F. 2d, at 274, even though this Court in Grinnell did not express a similar limitation on its holding.

One can understand the exasperation revealed by the statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that “[d] espite the daunting complexity of the case — the exhibits numbered in the thousands — Kodak demanded a jury.” Id., at 268. The trial lasted from July 1977 until March 1978, and since Kodak is entitled as a matter of constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment to demand a jury trial in a case such as this, perhaps the “daunting complexity” of the case — and presumably many other similar cases being litigated in other federal courts — suggests that either the forest is being lost sight of because of the trees, or that an Act of Congress has been battered, tortured, and encrusted with layer after layer of refinement not required by any necessary construction of the Act, but by the results wrought by a century of case-by-case adjudication of it in this Court and other federal courts.

If the Sherman Act requires “predisclosure” by one competitor to another before a new product can be marketed, I think that the raised eyebrows resulting from such a holding should come from this Court, and not from extrapolations by other federal courts of the decisions of this Court interpreting the Sherman Act. I likewise think that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that significant parts of a defendant’s conduct which take place before the statute of limitations period may nonetheless be introduced in evidence is open to serious question under our prior cases.

So long as there are institutes for federal judges concerning the management of complex cases, and judicial panels for handling multidistrict litigation, this Court cannot remain wholly above the battle. In this case, it is conceded that the claimed antitrust violations all arise directly from Kodak’s competitive superiority and technological innovation leading to the development of new products that consumers consider to be desirable. Because I believe that all three of these violations are interrelated, I would grant the petitions for certiorari and limit the questions as follows: (1) Was Kodak’s introduction of the 110 camera and Kodacolor II film system either an attempt to monopolize or actual monopolization of the camera market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act? (2) Did Kodak violate § 2 of the Sherman Act by impermis-sibly using its film monopoly as “leverage” to enhance its position in the photofinishing and photofinishing equipment markets? And (3) did Kodak’s joint development agreements with General Electric and Sylvania violate § 1 of the Sherman Act? I would also grant certiorari on this question raised in the conditional cross-petition: “Did the court of appeals err in not entering judgment for Kodak on the film and color print paper claims, and instead remanding both claims for a determination of whether ‘conduct occurring many years before the commencement of suit contributed to an overcharge . . . within the limitations period’?”


text:
    No. 79-485.
    Eli Lilly & Co. v. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell

joins,

dissenting.

This case presents an issue of great importance, which cannot help but become greater as time goes on and more and more administrative proceedings are conducted either directly under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553, or similar provisions in new Acts of Congress for review of agency action. That question is the degree to which an agency, which publishes a rule for notice and comment under § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act and very substantially changes the rule in response to the comments it receives, is obliged to publish the revised rule to allow another opportunity for notice and comment. In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was fully aware of the problems that could result from a complete “about face” by the administrative agency, see BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F. 2d 637 (1979), as can be seen from this portion of the first paragraph of its opinion concluding that the respondent had complied with the Administrative Procedure Act:

“Petitioners’ first complaint is that EPA failed to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in that the final regulations were so different from the interim final regulations that the interims were not notice of 'either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.’ 5 U. S. C. § 553 (b)(3). This requirement is a critical one because it supports the assumption we make with regard to EPA’s substantive decisions that those decisions are in fact the product of informed, expert reasoning tested by exposure to diverse public comment.” Id., at 641 (emphasis supplied).

Petitioner claims that the differences between the effluent limitations imposed in the original regulations and the ones finally promulgated were so great as to make impossible any such judgment by a reviewing court in the absence of further opportunity for notice and comment on the revised regulations. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the contrary is a carefully reasoned one, and I am not at this point willing to say that I disagree with it. But when we consider the very significant effects that a “rulemaking” procedure may have upon the parties involved, see United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U. S. 224, 244-245 (1973), I think this Court should grant certiorari to examine the question. It is the sort of question upon which there will never be a “square conflict” among the various Courts of Appeals, since the differences between the originally promulgated regulations and the finally promulgated regulations will necessarily be ones of degree. Thus, one need not accept at full face value the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals’ decision squarely conflicts with decisions from the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits in order to realize that the question is a recurring one that will ultimately require interpretation of important statutory language by this Court. Accordingly, I would grant the petition limited to the question whether § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553, required EPA to provide an additional opportunity to comment on the final regulations proposed here.


text:
    No. 79-539.
    Maine v. Dana et al.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-955.
    DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd. v. Betar, Public Administrator of Cook County, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Blackmun,

text:
    No. 79-633.
    County of Ventura v. Castro.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

I believe that this case presents the substantial question whether the ruling of the California Court of Appeal is consistent with this Court’s decision in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U. S. 174 (1972). See also Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P. 2d 188, cert. denied as out of time, 439 U. S. 996 (1978).

The ease concerns an agreement of paternity signed by the alleged father of the unborn child of a welfare recipient. The mother-to-be applied for welfare assistance and informed county employees that respondent was the father of her unborn child. At the request of the District Attorney’s office, respondent came to that office and spoke with Juanita Hickman, a family support officer.

Although respondent expressed some doubts, he told Hickman that “more than likely I am the father.” Hickman explained to respondent that he could sign an agreement of paternity which would be filed in court and which would result in a judgment of paternity and an order to pay child support. He was advised, alternatively, that if he was not certain he was the father, the office would institute a paternity action and serve him with a summons and complaint; he then would have 30 days to answer and a trial would follow. Respondent signed a paternity agreement, prepared by Hickman. It was filed with the Ventura County Superior Court. The pertinent part of the agreement read:

“It is hereby agreed by plaintiff, through C. STANLEY TROM, District Attorney for the County of Ventura, and Rudy Castro, Jr., defendant, that the following facts are true and that a judgment be entered against the defendant in accordance with this agreement.
“1. Defendant acknowledges that the District Attorney of Ventura County, does not represent him and that he understands that he has had an opportunity to have an attorney advise and represent him in this matter.
“2. Defendant understands that a judgment for -child support will be entered against him based upon this agreement.
“3. The defendant is the father of: unborn child of Viola Gonzales, due to be born December 1977.
“4. The defendant agrees to pay $125.00 per child per month commencing on Sept. 1, 1977, and on the same date each month thereafter until termination by operation of law or further order of court.”

Six months after entry of judgment, respondent moved to set aside the agreement and judgment on the grounds that he had signed the agreement out of fear that he would be criminally prosecuted, that he did not realize all the rights he was giving up, such as the right to discovery and blood tests of the mother and child, and that he did not know he would be liable for child support until the child reached the age of 18 years. The Superior Court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed. 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1979).

The signed agreement was authorized by § 11476.1 of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. (West Supp. 1973-1978). That section reads as set forth in the margin.

Although the Court of Appeal commented on the facts of the particular case, and the likelihood that there had been no knowing and voluntary waiver of due process rights, the court found § 11476.1 unconstitutional on its face. The statute was declared defective because it does not make adequate provision for the protection of due process rights of the noncustodial parent and it does not address the manner in which the defendant may waive those rights. “Glaringly absent,” 93 Cal. App. 3d., at 469, 156 Cal. Rptr., at 70, was a requirement that the defendant be informed of his right to trial. The court also based its decision on the absence of any provision for prejudgment judicial determination of the volun-tariness of a waiver of due process rights and on the disparity of bargaining power between petitioner and respondent.

In Overmyer this Court stated that “a cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process.” 405 U. S., at 187. We emphasized the need to consider the facts of each situation. Id., at 178, 187-188. While one may sympathize with respondent’s position, the Court of Appeal’s declaration that the California statute is unconstitutional on its face, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, appears to contravene the case-by-case approach of Overmyer. We indicated in Overmyer, id., at 188, that a different result might follow where there is great disparity in bargaining power between the parties, but that question never has been decided specifically by the Court. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U. S. 191 (1972). Because the issue is bound to recur, I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for argument.

      "In any case where the district attorney has undertaken enforcement of support, the district attorney may enter into an agreement with the noncustodial parent, on behalf of the custodial parent, a minor child, or children, for the entry of a judgment determining paternity, if applicable, and for periodic child support payments based on the noncustodial parent's reasonable ability to pay. Prior to entering into this agreement, the noncustodial parent shall be informed that a judgment will be entered based on the agreement. The clerk shall file the agreement without the payment of any fees or charges. The court shall enter judgment thereon without action. The provisions of Civil Code Section 4702 shall apply to such judgment. The district attorney shall be directed to effect service upon the obligor of a copy of the judgment and notify the obligor in writing of the right to seek modification of the amount of child support order upon a showing of changes of circumstances and upon such showing the court shall immediately modify the order and set the amount of child support payment pursuant to § 11350, and to promptly file proof of service thereof.
      “For the purposes of this section, in making a determination of the noncustodial parent’s reasonable ability to pay, the following factors shall be considered:
      “(a) The standard of living and situation of the parties;
      “(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties;
      “(c) The ability of the noncustodial parent to earn;

        “(d) The ability of the custodial parent to earn;
      “ (e) The needs of the custodial parent and any other persons dependent on such person for their support;
      “(f) The age of the parties;
      “(g) Any previous court order imposing an obligation of support.”


text:
    No. 79-782.
    Mississippi Power & Light Co. et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-796.
    Amarex, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-788.
    Diana et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-837.
    Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 79-848.
    Donofrio et al. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-897.
    Stoskus, Administratrix v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to substitute Frances Stoskus, Administratrix of the Estate of Bertha Stoskus, in place of Bertha Stoskus, deceased, granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5765.
    Jarzab v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 79-5849.
    Haughton v. Haughton, Special Administrator.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of respondent for damages and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 79-5705.
    No. 79-5714.
    No. 79-5744.
    No. 79-5830.
    No. 79-5861.
    Stanley v. Zant, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center. Thomas v. Zant, Warden. Alderman v. Balkcom, Warden. Bowden v. Zant, Warden. Coppola v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.;

Sup. Ct. Ga.; and

Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied. Reported below: No. 79-5830, 244 Ga. 260, 260 S. E. 2d 465; No. 79-5861, 220 Va. 243, 257 S. E. 2d 797.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.


text:
    No. 78-6687.
    No. 79-444.
    No. 79-479.
    No. 79-525.
    No. 79-535.
    No. 79-560.
    No. 79-630.
    No. 79-699.
    No. 79-712.
    Ruffin v. Georgia, Fernos-Lopez v. United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico et al., Genins v. Geiger et ux., Moenckmeier v. United States et al., Lampkin-Asam v. Supreme Court of Florida, Vislisel v. United States Department of Labor et al., Hunt et al. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co. et al., Heyne v. Heyne et al., Ash et ux. v. Trustees for Westgate-California Corp.,
   ante, p. 995;

ante, p. 931;

ante, p. 991;

ante, p. 991;

ante, p. 1013;

ante, p. 1014;

ante, p. 992;

ante, p. 1008; and

ante, p. 1015. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-5004. No. 79-5546. No. 79-5554. No. 79-5562. No. 79-5572. No. 79-5616. No. 79-5621. No. 79-5632. No. 79-5636. No. 79-5667. No. 79-5696.
    Parker v. Roth, Platel v. Clark, Judge, et al., Williams v. United States, Chodos v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lillibridge et ux. v. Morton, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., Johns v. Woodbridge Township et al., Bretz v. Montana, Roach v. South Carolina, Gaines v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Company of Indianapolis, Paul v. Stafford, U. S. District Judge, et al., Kennedy v. Indiana,
   ante, p. 920;

ante, p. 994;

ante, p. 1010;

ante, p. 1021;

ante, p. 1046;

ante, p. 1022;

ante, p. 994;

ante, p. 1026;

ante, p. 1023;

ante, p. 1011; and

ante, p. 1047. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 78-6694.
    No. 79-5030.
    Thiess v. Franklin Square Hospital, Inc., et al., Sanders et al. v. Hankins et al.,
   ante, pp. 851 and 975; and

ante, pp. 872 and 975. Motions for leave to file second petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 79-177.
    Jacka v. United States,
   ante, p. 949. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 79-545.
    Holloway v. Times Mirror Press Co.,
   ante, p. 966. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 22, 1980
    No. 79-960.
    Chandler v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    LENHARD et al., CLARK COUNTY DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS, Individually and as Next Friends of Bishop v. WOLFF, WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON SYSTEM, et al.
    Nos. A-172 and A-332.
    Decided October 18, 1979
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

On October 1, 1979, this Court denied the application of Kirk Lenhard and George Franzen, acting as next friends of Jesse Bishop, for a stay of execution pending the filing and determination of a petition for certiorari, Lenhard v. Wolff, ante, p. 807. Respondents have subsequently rescheduled Bishop’s execution for Monday, October 22, 1979. Lenhard and Franzen have now submitted to me, as Circuit Justice, a petition requesting rehearing of this Court’s order of October 1, and an application for stay of execution pending determination of the petition for rehearing.

Resolving in applicants’ favor all questions pertaining to procedures and rules of the Court, I am satisfied that the moving papers would not persuade the requisite number of Justices to grant applicants’ proposed petition for certiorari, to grant the petition for rehearing of this Court’s previous denial of a stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari, or to grant a stay pending Conference consideration of the petition for rehearing. See this Court’s Rule 58. As a consequence, whether the submission presented to me as Circuit Justice on October 16, 1979, is treated as a request for a rehearing of our previous denial of a stay of execution, or as a new request for a stay of execution, it is in all respects

Denied.


text:
    PEEPLES v. BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al.
    No. A-452.
    Decided November 29, 1979
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

Applicant Peeples has presented me with what his attorney denominates as “Application for Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal,” “pending appeal from an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denying him a stay pending appeal to said court.” Application 1. I have quoted verbatim from the application in order to permit some insight into my firm conviction that I have no idea as to what grounds applicant would urge upon the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in seeking reversal of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The application is a hodgepodge of assertions as to the applicant’s good character, his 19 years of service in the United States Navy, and his participation in an alcoholism therapy program.

Applicant complains at one point in the application, id., at 3, that some of the evidence considered by the Administrative Discharge Board related to a prior enlistment and, under a precedent decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth. Circuit, should not have been considered; applicant also states that he made “disclosures to his doctors of isolated apparent incidents of off-duty off-base homosexual behavior while severely intoxicated,” ibid., although on the same page of the application he alleges that “[a] 11 of the examining Navy doctors and alcohol counselors stated that he was not homosexual.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).

According to the application, applicant’s chief convened an Administrative Discharge Board, which heard the evidence obtained during therapy and, over his protest, found him guilty of acts of sexual misconduct and recommended his discharge. He then appealed his discharge to the Secretary of the Navy, who denied the appeal without “any basis in fact or written explanation, and ordered his immediate discharge within 5 working days, whereupon he sought injunctive relief from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.” Id., at 4. Respondents agreed that applicant would be retained in the service at Treasure Island, Cal., pending the hearing of the preliminary injunction; meanwhile, according to applicant, his request for discovery under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, was objected to “and the District Court below refused to rule on Appellant’s motion to compel.” Application 5.

Thereafter, still according to the application, “[t]he District Court granted [respondents’] motion for summary judgment and declined to rule on [applicant’s] motion for a preliminary injunction. A 10-day stay pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit was granted by the trial court. On November 23, 1979, the Ninth Circuit denied [applicant’s] Emergency Motion for a stay and injunction pending appeal whereupon the instant motion was filed.” Ibid.

Applicant urges that he will suffer irreparable injury because he has 19 years of time in the service, because he will be stigmatized by discharge for sexual misconduct, because he will lose flight time, and because “[s]uch a traumatic rejection by the government to whom he has given loyal service could more than likely destroy the successful alcohol rehabilitation efforts to date.” Ibid.

Applicant’s moving papers, though consisting of nine typewritten pages, are remarkably skimpy in their reference to decisions of this Court. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 (1958); Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363 (1957); and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947), are the only cases cited, with no more than cryptic allusions to their relevance to this case.

Applicant makes no effort to indicate what the less than verbatim transcript before the Administrative Discharge Board indicated by way of support for the findings of that Board, or what the law prescribes as the standard of review for the Secretary of the Navy in reviewing the action of the Administrative Discharge Board. Applicant’s moving papers even fail to identify either the standard of review of the United States District Court or that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in reviewing the action of the District Court unfavorable to applicant. In short, I am presented with what applicant’s attorney undoubtedly feels is an appealing set of facts, but with virtually no law to accompany them. If either the District Court or the Court of Appeals gave any explanation for their conclusion in the form of an opinion or memorandum order, applicant has not seen fit to attach them to his application here. Even if applicant’s claim on the merits were more comprehensible and persuasive, in my judgment he would still have failed to show the necessary irreparable injury required for a mandatory injunction. As this Court noted in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 91 (1974), the legislative history of the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596, “suggests that Congress contemplated that [that Act] would be the usual, if not the exclusive, remedy for wrongful discharge.”

Since what applicant actually seeks is not a “stay” in any orthodox sense of that term, but an injunction from me, a jingle Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, ■'■forbidding the carrying out of the judgment of the Administrative Discharge Board, the Secretary of the Navy, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, he labors under a heavy burden indeed. In my opinion, he has not met that burden, and his application is accordingly

Denied.


text:
    SYNANON FOUNDATION, INC., et al. v. CALIFORNIA et al.
    No. A-556.
    Decided December 28, 1979
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice.

Upon consideration of the applicants’ request for a stay of the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denying their prayer for a preliminary injunction precluding respondents, including George Deuk-mejian, the Attorney General of California, from instituting an action against the applicants in state court, the request is hereby denied.

The District Court’s opinion denying the prayer for a preliminary injunction indicates that the Attorney General of California has the traditional power of the chief law enforcement officer of most jurisdictions to intervene in the administration of charitable trusts or corporations when he has reason to believe that they are not being administered in accordance with the trust instrument or with state law. We have stated previously that a trial judge’s determination of a preliminary injunction should be reversed by this Court or by other appellate courts in the federal system only when the judge’s “discretion was improvidently exercised.” Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S. 229, 231 (1929). See also Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U. S. 1207 (1972) (Burger, C. J., in chambers); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 396 U. S. 1215 (1969) (Brennan, J., in chambers).

Applicants contend, however, that by reason of the fact that they are a church, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution they are somehow entitled to different treatment than that accorded to other charitable trusts. But we held only last Term that state courts might resolve property disputes in which hierarchical church organizations were involved in accordance with “neutral principles” of state law. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595, 602 (1979); see also Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440, 449 (1969). The District Court presumably found that this principle will probably be applicable in this litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also denied the application for a stay. I find no reason to differ with the conclusion of these two courts. Applicants' request for relief is accordingly denied.