author: Mr. Justice Powell Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    BARNES v. UNITED STATES
    No. 72-5443.
    Argued March 20, 1973
    Decided June 18, 1973

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmttn, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 848. BreN-NAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 852.

      Malcolm, H. Mackey, by appointment of the Court, 411 U. S. 946, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Mark L. Evans, and Sidney M. Glazer.

   Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Barnes was convicted in United States District Court on two counts of possessing United States Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen, two counts of forging the checks, and two counts of uttering the checks, knowing the endorsements to be forged. The trial court instructed the jury that ordinarily it would be justified in inferring from unexplained possession of recently stolen mail that the defendant possessed the mail with knowledge that it was stolen. We granted certiorari to consider whether this instruction comports with due process. 409 U. S. 1037 (1972).

The evidence at petitioner’s trial established that on June 2, 1971, he opened a checking account using the pseudonym “Clarence Smith.” On July 1, and July 3, 1971, the United States Disbursing Office at San Francisco mailed four Government checks in the amounts of $269.02, $164.70, $184, and $268.80 to Nettie Lewis, Albert Young, Arthur Salazar, and Mary Hernandez, respectively. On July 8, 1971, petitioner deposited these four checks into the “Smith” account. Each check bore the apparent endorsement of the payee and a second endorsement by “Clarence Smith.”

At petitioner’s trial the four payees testified that they had never received, endorsed, or authorized endorsement of the checks. A Government handwriting expert testified that petitioner had made the “Clarence Smith” endorsement on all four checks and that he had signed the payees’ names on the Lewis and Hernandez checks. Although petitioner did not take the stand, a postal inspector testified to certain statements made by petitioner at a post-arrest interview. Petitioner explained to the inspector that he received the checks in question from people who sold furniture for him door to door and that the checks had been signed in the payees’ names when he received them. Petitioner further stated that he could not name or identify any of the salespeople. Nor could he substantiate the existence of any furniture orders because the salespeople allegedly wrote their orders on scratch paper that had not been retained. Petitioner admitted that he executed the Clarence Smith endorsements and deposited the checks but denied making the payees’ endorsements.

The District Court instructed the jury that “[possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen.”

The jury brought in guilty verdicts on all six counts, and the District Court sentenced petitioner to concurrent three-year prison terms. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding no lack of “rational connection” between unexplained possession of recently stolen property and knowledge that the property was stolen. 466 F. 2d 1361 (1972). Because petitioner received identical concurrent sentences on all six counts, the court declined to consider his challenges to conviction on the forgery and uttering counts. We affirm.

I

We begin our consideration of the challenged jury instruction with a review of four recent decisions which have considered the validity under the Due Process Clause of criminal law presumptions and inferences. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 (1965).

In United States v. Gainey, supra, the Court sustained the constitutionality of an instruction tracking a statute which authorized the jury to infer from defendant’s unexplained presence at an illegal still that he was carrying on “the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law.” Relying on the holding of Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467 (1943), that there must be a “rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,” the Court upheld the inference on the basis of the comprehensive nature of the “carrying on” offense and the common knowledge that illegal stills are secluded, secret operations. The following Term the Court determined, however, that presence at an illegal still could not support the inference that the defendant was in possession, custody, or control of the still, a narrower offense. “Presence is relevant and admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing of the defendant’s function at the still, its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt — ‘the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary . . . .’ Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467.” United States v. Romano, supra, at 141.

Three and one-half years after Romano, the Court in Leary v. United States, supra, considered a challenge to a statutory inference that possession of marihuana, unless satisfactorily explained, was sufficient to prove that the defendant knew that the marihuana had been illegally imported into the United States. The Court concluded that in view of the significant possibility that any given marihuana was domestically grown and the improbability that a marihuana user would know whether his marihuana was of domestic or imported origin, the inference did not meet the standards set by Tot, Gainey, and Romano. Referring to these three cases, the Leary Court stated that an inference is “ ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” 395 U. S., at 36. In a footnote the Court stated that since the challenged inference failed to satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard, it did not have to “reach the question whether a criminal presumption which passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal ‘reasonable doubt’ standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use.” Id., at 36 n. 64.

Finally, in Turner v. United States, supra, decided the year following Leary, the Court considered the constitutionality of instructing the jury that it may infer from possession of heroin and cocaine that the defendant knew these drugs had been illegally imported. The Court noted that Leary reserved the question of whether the more-likely-than-not or the reasonable-doubt standard controlled in criminal cases, but it likewise found no need to resolve that question. ’ It held that the inference with regard to heroin was valid judged by either standard. 396 U. S., at 416. With regard to cocaine, the inference failed to satisfy even the more-likely-than-not standard. Id., at 419.

The teaching of the foregoing cases is not altogether clear. To the extent that the “rational connection,” “more likely than not,” and “reasonable doubt” standards bear ambiguous relationships to one another, the ambiguity is traceable in large part to variations in language and focus rather than to differences of substance. What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well- as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.

In the present case we deal with a traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law. For centuries courts have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen goods. James Thayer, writing in his Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), cited this inference as the descendant of a presumption “running through a dozen centuries.” Id., at 327. Early American cases consistently upheld instructions permitting conviction upon such an inference, and the courts of appeals on numerous occasions have approved instructions essentially identical to the instruction given in this case. This longstanding and consistent judicial approval of the instruction, reflecting accumulated common experience, provides strong indication that the instruction comports with due process.

This impressive historical basis, however, is not in itself sufficient to establish the instruction’s constitutionality. Common-law inferences, like their statutory counterparts, must satisfy due process standards in light of present-day experience. In the present case the challenged instruction only permitted the inference of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. The evidence established that petitioner possessed recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not know, and it provided no plausible explanation for such possession consistent with innocence. On the basis of this evidence alone common sense and experience tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S., at 417; Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 46. Such evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew the checks were stolen. Since the inference thus satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard, the most stringent standard the Court has applied in judging permissive criminal law inferences, we conclude that it satisfies the requirements of due process.

II

Petitioner also argues that the permissive inference in question infringes his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has twice rejected this argument, Turner v. United States, 396 U. S., at 417-418; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 185 (1925), and we find no reason to re-examine the issue at length. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that petitioner had a constitutional right not to take the witness stand and that possession could be satisfactorily explained by evidence independent of petitioner’s testimony. Introduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. Yee Hem v. United States, supra, at 185.

Ill

Petitioner further challenges his conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the checks were stolen from the mails. He contends that 18 U. S. C. § 1708 requires knowledge not only that the checks were stolen, but specifically that they were stolen from the mails. The legislative history of the statute conclusively refutes this argument and the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly interpreted the statute to require only knowledge that the property was stolen.

Since we find that the statute was correctly interpreted and that the trial court’s instructions on the inference to be drawn from unexplained possession of stolen property were fully consistent with petitioner’s constitutional rights, it is unnecessary to consider petitioner’s challenges to his conviction on the forging and uttering counts.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Possession of stolen property is traditionally under our federal system a local law question. It becomes a federal concern in the present case only if the “mail” was implicated. The indictment, insofar as the unlawful possession counts are concerned, charges that the items had been “stolen from the mail.” While there was evidence that these items had gone through the mail, petitioner did not take the stand, nor was there any evidence that petitioner knew that the items had been “stolen from the mail.” As to the possession counts in the indictment the District Court charged the jury that “three essential elements” were required to prove the possession offenses:

“FIRST: The act or acts of unlawfully having in one’s possession the contents of a letter, namely, the United States Treasury checks as alleged;
“SECOND: That the contents of the letter, namely, the United States Treasury checks as alleged, were stolen from the mail; and
“THIRD: That the defendant James Edward Barnes .knew the contents had been stolen.”

The District Court also charged the jury:

“If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the mail described in the indictment was stolen, and that while recently stolen the contents of said mail here, the four United States Treasury checks, were in the possession of the defendant you would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those facts the inference that the contents were possessed by the accused with knowledge that it was stolen property, unless such possession is explained by facts and circumstances in this case which are in some way consistent with the defendant's.”

As noted by the Court, the Act, which originally required proof of possession of articles stolen from the mail “knowing the same to have been so stolen,” 18 U. S. C. § 317 (1934 ed.), was changed by eliminating the word “so” before “stolen.” H. R. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1. And the Act under which petitioner was charged and convicted does not require as an ingredient of the offense that petitioner knew the property had been stolen from the mails.

That, however, is the beginning, not the end of the problem. For without a nexus with the “mails” there is no federal offense. How can we rationally say that “possession” of a stolen check allows a judge or jury to conclude that the accused knew the check was stolen from the mails? We held in Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, that where a federal Act made it unlawful for any convicted person to possess a firearm that had been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, it was unconstitutional to presume that a firearm possessed by such person had been received in interstate or foreign commerce. The decision was unanimous. The vice in Tot was that the burden is on the government in a criminal case to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that use of the presumption shifts that burden. We said: “[I]t is not permissible thus to shift the burden by arbitrarily making one fact, which has no relevance to guilt of the offense, the occasion of casting on the defendant the obligation of exculpation.” Id., at 469. The use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of the crime is indeed treacherous, for it allows men to go to jail without any evidence on one essential ingredient of the offense. It thus implicates the integrity of the judicial system. We held in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364, that the Due Process Clause requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . .” Some evidence of wrongdoing is basic and essential in the judicial system, unless the way of prosecutors be made easy by dispensing with the requirement of presumption of innocence, which is the effect of what the Court does today. In practical effect the use of these presumptions often means that the great barriers to the protection of procedural due process contained in the Bill of Rights are subtly diluted.

May Congress constitutionally enact a law that says juries can convict a defendant without any evidence at all from which an inference of guilt could be drawn? If Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, means anything, the answer is in the negative. The Congress is as unwarranted in telling courts what evidence is enough to convict an accused as we would be to tell Congress what criminal laws should be enacted. That seems inescapably plain by the regime of separation of powers under which we live.

In Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, we held that it was constitutionally impermissible to presume that one who possessed marihuana would be presumed to know of its unlawful importation. We said it would be sheer “speculation” to conclude that even a majority of the users of the plant knew the source of it. Id., at 53. The overall test, we said, was whether it can-be said “with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Id., at 36.

In that case there were some statistics as to the quantity of marihuana grown here and the amount grown abroad that enters the country. There was evidence of the characteristics of local and foreign marihuana, and the like.

Stolen checks may be the product of local burglaries of private homes or offices.

Stolen checks may come from purses snatched or purloined.

Stolen checks may involve any one of numerous artifices or tricks.

In other words, there are various sources of stolen checks which in no way implicate federal jurisdiction.

Checks stolen from national banks, checks stolen from federal agencies, checks lifted from the mails are other sources.

But, unlike Leary, we have no evidence whatsoever showing what amount of stolen property, let alone stolen checks, implicates the mails. Without some evidence or statistics of that nature we have no way of assessing the likelihood that this petitioner knew that these checks were stolen from the mails. We can take judicial notice that checks are stolen from the mails. But it would take a large degree of assumed omniscience to say with “substantial assurance” that this petitioner more likely than not knew from the realities of the underworld that this stolen jiroperty came from the mails. But without evidence of that knowledge there would be no federal offense of the kind charged.

The step we take today will be applauded by prosecutors, as it makes their way easy. But the Bill of Rights was designed to make the job of the prosecutor difficult. There is a presumption of innocence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary. The jury, not the court, is the factfinder. These basic principles make the use of these easy presumptions dangerous. What we do today is, I think, extremely disrespectful of the constitutional regime that controls the dispensation of criminal justice.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr, Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.

Petitioner was charged in two counts of a six-count indictment with possession of United States Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen. The essential elements of such an offense are (1) that the defendant was in possession of the checks, (2) that the checks were stolen from the mails, and (3) that the defendant knew that the checks were stolen. The Government proved that petitioner had been in possession of the checks and that the checks had been stolen from the mails; and, in addition, the Government introduced some evidence intended to show that petitioner knew or should have known that the checks were stolen. But rather than leaving the jury to determine the element of “knowledge” on the basis of that evidence, the trial court instructed it that it was free to infer the essential element of “knowledge” from petitioner’s unexplained possession of the checks. In my view, that instruction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it permitted the jury to convict even though the actual evidence bearing on “knowledge” may have been insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dissent.

We held in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970), that the Due Process Clause requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . .” Thus, in Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 417 (1970), we approved the inference of “knowledge” from the fact of possessing smuggled heroin because ‘“[cjornmon sense’ . . . tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The basis of that “common sense” judgment was, of course, the indisputable fact that all or virtually all heroin in this country is necessarily smuggled. Here, however, it cannot be said that all or virtually all endorsed United States Treasury checks have been stolen. Indeed, it is neither unlawful nor unusual for people to use such checks as direct payment for goods and services. Thus, unlike Turner, “common sense” simply will not permit the inference that the possessor of stolen Treasury checks “inevitably” knew that the checks were stolen. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969).

In short, the practical effect of the challenged instruction was to permit the jury to convict petitioner even if it found insufficient or disbelieved all of the Government’s evidence bearing directly on the issue of “knowledge.” By authorizing the jury to rely exclusively on the inference in determining the element of “knowledge,” the instruction relieved the Government of the burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction thereby violated the principle of Winship that every essential element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

       The witness’ findings with respect to the Young and Salazar signatures were inconclusive.

       This explanation of petitioner’s possession of the checks, presented through the postal inspector’s testimony, was adopted by petitioner’s counsel in argument to the jury. Tr. 107-108.

       The full instruction on the inference arising from possession of stolen property stated:
      “Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen.
      “However, you are never required to make this inference. It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury to draw from the possession of recently stolen property.
      “The term 'recently' is a relative term, and has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property, and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in the case. The longer the period of time since the theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may reasonably be drawn from unexplained possession.
      “If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the mail described in the indictment was stolen, and that while recently stolen the contents of said mail here, the four United States Treasury checks, were in the possession of the defendant you would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those facts the inference that the contents were possessed by the accused with knowledge that it was stolen property, unless such possession is explained by facts and circumstances in this case which are in some way consistent with the defendant’s innocence.
      “In considering whether possession of recently stolen property has been satisfactorily explained, you are reminded that in the exercise of constitutional rights the accused need not take the witness stand and testify.
      “Possession may be satisfactorily explained through other circumstances, other evidence, independent of any testimony of the accused.” Tr. 123-124.

       The Turner Court also considered the validity' of inferring that a defendant knowingly purchased, sold, dispensed, or distributed a narcotic drug not in or from the original package bearing tax stamps from the fact that the drugs had no tax stamps when found in the defendant’s possession. 26 U. S. C. §4704 (a) (1964 ed.). The Court upheld the inference that a defendant possessing unstamped heroin knowingly purchased it in violation of the statute, but struck down the inference with regard to cocaine. 396 U. S., 398, 419-424.

       Thayer also described the historical development of the presumption:
      “[T]he laws of Ine [King of Wessex, A. D. 688-725] provide that, ‘if stolen property be attached with a chapman, and he have not brought it before good witnesses, let him prove . . . that he was neither privy (to the theft) nor thief; or pay as wite (fine) xxxvi shillings.’ To be found thus in the possession of stolen goods was a serious thing; if they were recently stolen, then was one ‘taken with the mainour,’ — a state of things that formerly might involve immediate punishment, without a trial; and, later, a trial without a formal accusation; and, later still, a presumption of guilt which, in the absence of contrary evidence, justified a verdict, and at the present time is vanishing away into the mere judicial recognition of a permissible inference . . . .” Id., at 328. (Citations omitted.)

       See, e. g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896); Commonwealth v. Millard, 1 Mass. 6 (1804); Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 (1870); State v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345 (1878); Cook v. State, 84 Tenn. 461 (1886).

        E. g., United States v. Russo, 413 F. 2d 432 (CA2 1969); United States v. Smith, 446 F. 2d 200 (CA4 1971); United States v. Winbush, 428 F. 2d 357 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 918 (1970); United States v. Hood, 422 F. 2d 737 (CA7), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 820 (1970); United States v. Dilella, 354 F. 2d 584 (CA7 1965).

       The reasoning of the statutory-inference cases is applicable to analysis of common-law inferences. Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 70 (1965); Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (proposed Nov. 20, 1972), Rule 303 (a), 56 F. R. D. 212. Common-law inferences, however, present fewer constitutional problems. Such inferences are invoked only in the discretion of the trial judge. While statutes creating criminal law inferences may be interpreted also to preserve the trial court’s traditional discretion in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury and in charging the jury, Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 406 n. 6 (1970); United States v. Gainey, supra, at 68-70, such discretion is inherent in the use of common-law inferences.

       Of course, the mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain a defendant’s possession consistent with innocence does not bar instructing the jury on the inference. The jury must weigh the explanation to determine whether it is “satisfactory.” Supra, at 840 n. 3. The jury is not bound to accept or believe any particular explanation any more than it is bound to accept the correctness of the inference. But the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did have knowledge that the property was stolen, an essential element of the crime, remains on the Government.

       “ ‘Common sense’ . . . tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless they practice a studied ignorance to which they are not entitled.”

       It is true that the practical effect of instructing the jury on the inference arising from unexplained possession of recently stolen property is to shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant. If the Government proves possession and nothing more, this evidence remains unexplained unless the defendant introduces evidence, since ordinarily the Government’s evidence will not provide an explanation of his possession consistent with innocence. In Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943), the Court stated that the burden of going forward may not be freely shifted to the defendant. See also Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 44-45 (1969). Tot held, however, that where there is a “rational connection” between the facts proved and the fact presumed or inferred, it is permissible to shift the burden of going forward to the defendant. Where an inference satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard, as in the present case, there will certainly be a rational connection between the fact presumed or inferred (in this case, knowledge) and the facts the Government must prove in order to shift the burden of going forward (possession of recently stolen property).
      We do not decide today whether a judge-formulated inference of less antiquity or authority may properly be emphasized by a jury instruction.

       Nor can the instruction “be fairly understood as a comment on the petitioner’s failure to testify.” United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S., at 70-71.

       “Whoever . . . unlawfully has in his possession, any . . . mail . . . which has been so stolen . . . , knowing the same to have been stolen, . . . [shall be fined or imprisoned or both].”

       Prior to 1939 the statute required proof of possession of articles stolen from the mail “knowing the same to have been so stolen.” 18 U. S. C. § 317 (1934 ed.) (emphasis added). See, e. g., Brandenburg v. United States, 78 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1935). In 1939 Congress eliminated the word “so” preceding the word “stolen.” H. R. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1939), explains the change: “The reported bill amends the existing law so that it will sustain a conviction for the Government to prove that the property was in fact stolen from the mails and that the defendant knew the property he received had been stolen. The committee feel that this should be sufficient without requiring the Government to prove also that the defendant knew the property received had been stolen from the mails.”
      See also S. Rep. No. 864, 76th Cong., 1st Sess (1939).

        United States v. Hines, 256 F. 2d 561 (CA2 1958); Smith v. United States, 343 F. 2d 539 (CA5), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 861 (1965); United States v. Gardner, 454 F. 2d 534 (CA9), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 867 (1972); United States v. Schultz, 462 F. 2d 622 (CA9 1972).

       Although affirmance of petitioner’s conviction on two of the six counts carrying identical concurrent sentences does not moot the issues he raises pertaining to the remaining counts, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), we decline as a discretionary matter to reach these issues. Cf. United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136, 138 (1965).

        Tot v. United States was decided in 1943, four years after the passage by Congress of the 1939 amendment to the present Act eliminating the need to prove knowledge that the property had been stolen from the mails. Had Tot been decided before 1939 it is inconceivable that Congress would have made the 1939 change in the present Act.

       Mr. Justice Black and I previously have voiced this concern. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 425 (dissenting opinion) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 72, 74 (dissenting opinions).

       What we said in Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84, 89, that “all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt” has been the guiding rule at least on the issue of guilt. And it is cogently argued that presumptions of the existence of elements of a crime have no place in our constitutional framework. See 22 Stan. L. Rev. 341 (1970). That seems indubitably true to me, at least in the present case where knowledge that the checks were stolen from the mails has only suspicion to support it.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    May 17, 1973
    No. 72-6442.
    King, aka Ravelli v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    May 21, 1973
    No. 72-1105.
    Stephens Truck Line, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Tenn.


text:
    No. 72-1215.
    Diamond et al. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 72-1342.
    Kaplan et al. v. Milliken, Judge, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Ky. For the reasons stated in their dissent in Wells v. Edwards, 409 U. S. 1095 (1973),

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and give plenary consideration to this case.


text:
    No. 72-1313.
    Silverton v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-6197.
    Shoemaker v. Dwyer et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 70-42.
    Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973).


text:
    No. 71-939.
    Joiner et al. v. City of Dallas, Texas, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972); and Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).


text:
    No. 72-6241.
    Webb v. United States.
   Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari granted. Upon representation of the Solicitor General as set forth in his memorandum for the United States filed April 24, 1973, judgment vacated and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Government.


text:
    No. 72-498.
    Tinder v. Virginia.
   Corp. Ct., Norfolk, Va. It appearing that petitioner, a defendant in a state criminal proceeding, died on March 17, 1973, petition for writ of certiorari dismissed. Gersewitz v. New York, 3£6 U. S. 687 (1945).


text:
    No. 61,
    Orig.
    Petersen v. Spiliotopoulos.
   Motion of plaintiff for leave to proceed in -forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied.


text:
    No. A-1069.
    Applegate et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Application for stay of judgment, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1118.
    Miceli et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay of mandate, presented to Mr. Justice Stewart and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the stay.


text:
    No. A-1123.
    Reid v. Marquette University et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay of mandate, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1136.
    Greensphan v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for recall of mandate, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 72-586.
    Cady, Warden v. Dombrowski.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 409 U. S. 1059.] Motion of the State of Florida for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioner, after argument, granted.


text:
    No. 72-782.
    Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 410 U. S. 953.] Motion of National Association of Manufacturers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 72-812.
    No. 72-6050.
    Storer et al. v. Brown, Secretary of State of California, et al.; and Frommhagen v. Brown, Secretary of State of California, et al.
   Appeals from D. C. N. D. Cal. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 410 U. S. 965.] Motion of appellants in No. 72-812 for divided argument granted. It is ordered that Paul N. Halvonik, Esquire, and Joseph Remcho, Esquire, be permitted to present oral argument in the consolidated cases. Motion of appellant in No. 72-6050 to argue orally pro se denied.


text:
    No. 72-822.
    Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certio-rari granted, 410 U. S. 907.] Motion of respondents to permit two counsel to argue orally granted.


text:
    No. 72-887.
    American Party of Texas et al. v. White, Secretary of State of Texas.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, sub nom. American Party of Texas v. Bullock, 410 U. S. 965.] Motion of appellant Dunn for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted only to the extent that a typewritten brief may be filed.


text:
    No. 72-1148.
    Cupp, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Naughten.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 411 U. S. 947.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Ross R. Runkel, Esquire, of Salem, Oregon, a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 72-6575.
    No. 72-6578.
    No. 72-6601.
    Johnson v. Wyoming et al.; Loddy v. Meacham et al.; and Hawkins v. Wyoming et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-6432.
    Sprouse v. United States.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-1254.
    Smith, Sheriff v. Goguen.
   Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 72-1319.
    United States v. Chavez et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent George Apodaca for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-1097.
    Burks et al. v. Perk, Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1153.
    Brick v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1200.
    Lindsey v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1211.
    Mendoza v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1222.
    Cope et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1224.
    Teresi v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1239.
    Olson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1250.
    Hagen v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1265.
    Simas Bros. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1298.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Moritz.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1312.
    Aossey v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1314.
    Snitoff v. Board of Managers of Chicago Bar Assn.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1335.
    Moore v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1336.
    Kearney v. District of Columbia.
   Super. Ct. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1337.
    W. J. Jones & Son, Inc. v. Weyer-Haeuser Co. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1358.
    O’Meara et al. v. McDonald.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6152.
    Mixen v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6189.
    Hensley v. Hardy.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6291.
    Connors v. Harrison, Corrections Director, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6332.
    Argo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6335.
    Denman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6353.
    DiMario v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6366.
    DeBetham v. United States.
   C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6367.
    Mandina v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6368.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6373.
    Hauff v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6376.
    Miles v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6457.
    Washington v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6458.
    O’Shea v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6461.
    Canty v. Board of Education of the City of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6462.
    Thompson v. Lambert’s Point Docks, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6465.
    Sander v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Darke County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6474.
    O’Neill v. Superior Court of Alameda County.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6487.
    Rivera v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6493.
    Bonafini v. New Jersey et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6494.
    Farese et ux. v. Home Savings & Loan Assn. et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6496.
    German v. Florida et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6501.
    Richardson v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6502.
    Layman v. Tollett, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6508.
    Mitchell v. Conboy, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1064.
    Barton, Reformatory Superintendent v. Tabasko.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1209.
    Hanly et al. v. Kleindienst, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1232.
    Willis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1311.
    California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6201.
    Eldridge v. New York.
    Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6287.
    Rosenthal v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1331.
    Allen et al. v. City of Mobile et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1349.
    Freeman v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda (Bay Farm Island Reclamation District No. 2105 et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 72-6075.
    Bland v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

Petitioner was 16 years old at the time of his arrest and at the time of his indictment for armed robbery of a post office. He was charged as an adult under D. C. Code Ann. § 16-2301 (3)(A) (Supp. V, 1972). He moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the statutory basis for prosecuting him as an adult failed to provide him with procedural due process. The District Court dismissed the indictment, 330 F. Supp. 34, and the Court of Appeals by a divided vote reversed that judgment, 153 U. S. App. D. C. 254, 472 F. 2d 1329.

Under the statute of the District of Columbia involved in Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, a juvenile, age 16 or older, who was charged with a felony, might be held for trial as though he were an adult, if the Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction. Kent held that the Act, read in light of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment,” id., at 562 and 557, required a hearing on whether the Juvenile Court should waive its exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile and transfer him to the criminal court of the District. And in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, we held that where under a state juvenile court act a juvenile is declared “delinquent” and either confined or held for regular criminal prosecution, there must be a due process hearing on the issue of “delinquency.”

The District of Columbia Act was modified after Kent so as to give the U. S. Attorney the power to remove a juvenile from the statutory category of “child” merely by charging him with a designated felony. The House Report No. 91-907, p. 50, explains the reason for the change:

“Because of the great increase in the number of serious felonies committed by juveniles and because of the substantial difficulties in transferring juvenile offenders charged with serious felonies to the jurisdiction of the adult court under present law, provisions are made in this subchapter for a better mechanism for separation of the violent youthful offender and recidivist from the rest of the juvenile community.”

The “substantial difficulties” are obviously the constitutional rights explicated in Kent and in Gault. The “better mechanism” is the use of the shortcut employed, viz., the discretion of the prosecutor. Two rather large questions are presented and they seem to me to be substantial.

First. A juvenile or “child” is placed in a more protected position than an adult, not by the Constitution, but by an Act of Congress. In that category he is theoretically subject to rehabilitative treatment. Can he, on the whim or caprice of a prosecutor, be put in the class of the run-of-the-mill criminal defendants, without any hearing, without any chance to be heard, without an opportunity to rebut the evidence against him, without a chance of showing that he is being given an invidiously different treatment from others in his group? Kent and Gault suggest that those are very substantial constitutional questions.

Second. The barricade behind which the prosecutor operates is that this, like other prosecutions, is committed to his informed discretion, which is beyond the reach of judicial intrusion. Mr. Justice Black and I said, in dissent in Berra v. United States, 351 U. S. 131, at 140:

“[I]t is true that under our system Congress may vest the judge and jury with broad power to say how much punishment shall be imposed for a particular offense. But it is quite different to vest such powers in a prosecuting attorney. A judge and jury act under procedural rules carefully prescribed to protect the liberty of the individual. Their judgments and verdicts are reached after a public trial in which a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney. No such protections are thrown around decisions by a prosecuting attorney. Substitution of the prosecutor’s caprice for the adjudicatory process is an action I am not willing to attribute to Congress in the absence of clear command. Our system of justice rests on the conception of impersonality in the criminal law.”

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., gives the courts power to review “agency action” and to hold it unlawful, if found to be “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” § 706 (2)(B). This arguably is broad enough to reach the exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion in a way that violates the standards of due process laid down in Kent and in Oault.

One needs no reminder that government too can be lawless, that government cannot lead the way in law and order when it is the great malefactor. The Administrative Procedure Act is indeed part of the citizen’s arsenal against lawless government. As Professor Kenneth Davis said in Discretionary .Justice 210 (1969): “Under the Administrative Procedure Act judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion is the rule and unreviewability is the exception.”

Respecting “the settled judicial tradition” not to interfere with the prosecuting function, Professor Davis says:

“Is it because the tradition became settled during the nineteenth century when courts were generally assuming that judicial intrusion into any administration would be unfortunate? Is it because the tradition became settled while the Supreme Court was actuated by its 1840 remark that ‘The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief’? Is it because the tradition became settled before the courts made the twentieth-century discovery that the courts can interfere with executive action to protect against abuses but at the same time can avoid taking over the executive function? Is it because the tradition became settled before the successes of the modern system of limited judicial review became fully recognized?
“On the basis of what the courts know today about leaving administration to administrators but at the same time providing an effective check to protect against abuses, should the courts not take a fresh look at the tradition that prevents them from reviewing the prosecuting function? Throughout the governmental system, courts have found that other administrative or executive functions are in need of a judicial check, with a limited scope of review. The reasons for a judicial check of prosecutors’ discretion are stronger than for such a check of other administrative discretion that is now traditionally reviewable. Important interests are at stake. Abuses are common. The questions involved are appropriate for judicial determination. And much injustice could be corrected.” Id., at 211-212.

These two questions are large questions and substantial ones. I would grant the petition for certiorari in order to resolve them.

      ’‘That section reads:
      “(3) The term ‘child' means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that the term ‘child’ does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older and—
      "(A) charged by the United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable with such an offense.”


text:
    No. 72-6491.
    Beckner v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1097.
    No. 72-1025.
    No. 72-1087.
    Yumich et al. v. City of Chicago, B. P. O. E. Lodge No. 2043 of Brunswick et al. v. Ingraham et al., Card v. United States,
   410 U. S. 908;

411 U. S. 924; and

411 U. S. 917. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-1114.
    No. 72-1134.
    No. 72-6040.
    No. 72-6052.
    No. 72-6318.
    Hutter et ux. v. Korzen, Reibert et al. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al., Fayne v. Berg, Landry v. United States, Landes v. Pageant-Poseidon, Ltd.,
   411 U. S. 912;

411 U. S. 938;

410 U. S. 969;

411 U. S. 918; and

411 U. S. 950. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-1270.
    McKee v. United States,
   407 U. S. 910, 409 U. S. 899 and 1019'. Motion for leave to dispense with printing petition granted. Motion for leave to file third petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-5175.
    Meyer v. Weil et al.,
   409 U. S. 1060. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 29, 1973
    No. 72-287.
    No. 72-5272.
    Miller, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of New York, et al. v. Gomez et al.; and DeMundo et al. v. Miller, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of New York, et al.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 72-287 granted. Judgment affirmed. Reported below: 341 F. Supp. 323.


text:
    No. 72-6344.
    Bell et al. v. Heim, Executive Director, New Mexico Health and Social Services Department, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. M.


text:
    No. 72-1302.
    Edelman, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Townsend et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Motions of appellees Alexander and Hucher for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded so that District Court may enter a fresh judgment from which a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals.


text:
    No. 72-1338.
    Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State’s Attorney for Prince Georges County.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-1365.
    Lillian B. A. v. Arthur O. S.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-6506.
    Smith v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Disk, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-5924.
    King v. West Virginia.
   Appeal from Cir. Ct. W. Va., Marion County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6412.
    Quinn v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 6th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6047.
    Laursen v. California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-780.
    No. 72-5770.
    California Adult Authority et al. v. Griffin et al.; and M’Clary v. California Adult Authority et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondents in No. 72-780 and of petitioner in No. 72-5770 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). Reported below: No. 72-780, 464 F. 2d 585 and 602; No. 72-5770, 466 F. 2d 1122.


text:
    No. 72-5398.
    Gardner v. McCarthy, Facility Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973).


text:
    No. A-1137.
    Smith v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Application for stay of mandate, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1164.
    Marburger, Commissioner of Education of New Jersey, et al. v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey et al.
   D. C. N. J. Application for stay of preliminary injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan and by him referred to the Court, granted pending further order of this Court.


text:
    No. A-1173.
    Ruderer v. United States et al.
   Applications for immediate equitable and all other relief, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications.


text:
    No. 72-782.
    Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 410 U. S. 953.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 72-1118.
    Phillips, Acting Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, et al. v. Kennedy et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 411 U. S. 915.] Motion of Michael Kaye for leave to intervene and to file a brief on the merits denied.


text:
    No. 72-6773.
    Shaver v. Sandell et al.
   Justice Court, East Phoenix Precinct No. 2, Maricopa County, Arizona. Motion of petitioner to expedite denied.


text:
    No. 72-6551.
    Lewis v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-6553.
    Dixon v. Young, U. S. District Judge.
   Motion of petitioner to add Harry Friberg et al. as parties respondent granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-1180.
    Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Austin et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 72-617 [Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., certiorari granted, 410 U. S. 925].


text:
    No. 72-1355.
    United States v. Matlock.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-304.
    Howard, Warden v. Hemphill.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-679.
    United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Yablonski et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1059.
    Screen Extras Guild v. Kerr.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1119.
    Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C.A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1165.
    Kaprelian v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1181.
    Prim v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1183.
    Gianone et al., dba Gianone’s Steak House v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1268.
    Williams v. Aetna Life & Casualty
   Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1271.
    Brumbaugh v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1281.
    Essex, Administratrix v. Walters, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1295.
    Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Gilstrap, Collector of Revenue of Missouri, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1299.
    No. 72-6389.
    No. 72-6429.
    Garris v. United States; Wilhelm v. United States; and Terry v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 473 F. 2d 909.


text:
    No. 72-1332.
    Loevsky et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1344.
    California v. Krivda et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1347.
    Lombardi v. Tauro et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1352.
    In re Baker.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1357.
    Western Dealer Management, Inc. v. England, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1364.
    Westroads, Inc. v. Pedersen et al.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1372.
    Dailey v. Liszka, aka Greene.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1373.
    Trimble v. Texas State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 8th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1376.
    Permian Corp. et al. v. Coffee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5709.
    Martinez v. Alldredge.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6203.
    Hall v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6224.
    Berkley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6230.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6244.
    Escobar v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6295.
    Boysaw v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Ash-tabula County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6309.
    Larsen v. Procunier, Corrections Director, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6315.
    Rodrigues v. Dagget, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6324.
    O’Dell v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6336.
    Jacobs v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6351.
    Studt v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6357.
    Maxwell v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6363.
    Matney v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6370.
    Rance v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6375.
    Stansel v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6384.
    O’Clair v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6386.
    Betancourt v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6392.
    Wheeler v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6393.
    Alvarez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6394.
    Bright v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6395.
    Kaczynski v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6404.
    Fisch v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6405.
    Heard v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6408.
    Burns v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6415.
    Duckworth v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6420.
    Tate v. Blackwell, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6516.
    Reardon v. Meacham, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6517.
    David v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6521.
    Bryant et al. v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6525.
    Lee v. Blackledge, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6536.
    Reese v. Marsino, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6545.
    Potter v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1207.
    Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1212.
    County of Nassau et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1367.
    Rhinehart v. Rhay, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6308.
    Sanders v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6528.
    Solomon v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6541.
    Sullivan v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1341.
    Placid Oil Co. et al. v. McIlwain et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent McIlwain for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1343.
    Lenny v. Mellody et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1353.
    Corporacion del Cobre et al. v. Anaconda Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-1375.
    Hobart Brothers Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Ohio Manufacturers Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-871.
    No. 72-5961.
    No. 72-6264.
    Silvers v. Dowling, Judge, et al., Kelly v. United States, Krikmanis v. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, et al.,
   411 U. S. 944;

411 U. S. 933; and

411 U. S. 937. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-6273.
    No. 72-6409.
    Boyd v. New Mexico, Hawkins v. Hawkins,
   411 U. S. 937; and

411 U. S. 971. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-6873.
    Neely v. Field, U. S. District Judge, et al.,
   409 U. S. 871, 1050, and 410 U. S. 917. Motion for leave to file third petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-1294.
    Washington Kelpers Assn. v. Washington et al.,
   411 U. S. 982. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 4, 1973
    No. 72-745.
    Ryan v. Klein et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 72-943.
    Fisher, Commissioner, Department of Health and Welfare of Maine, et al. v. Graves et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Me. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 72-1251.
    Standard Oil Company of California v. United States.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal.

Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.


text:
    No. 72-1406.
    Oldroyd et al. v. Kugler, Attorney General of New Jersey, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. J.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-1408.
    Carleson, Director, Department of Social Welfare v. Yee-Litt et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pav/peris granted. Judgment affirmed.


text:
    No. 72-1178.
    Stein v. Howlett, Auditor of Public Accounts of Illinois, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-1413.
    Itz et ux. v. Penick et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Texas dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-1415.
    Richter et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1447.
    Blackburn v. Indiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-6221.
    Sayles v. Albert Mirman & Associates, Inc.
   Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6293.
    Gemmill et al. v. California.
   Appeal from Super. Ct. Cal., Shasta County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-770.
    No. 72-803.
    Commissioner of Social Services of New York et al. v. Klein et al.; and Nassau County Medical Center et al. v. Klein et al.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. N. Y. Judgment vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973). Reported below: 347 F. Supp. 496.


text:
    No. A-1124.
    Henry et al. v. Warner, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
   Application for order to vacate in part order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, dated May 8, 1973, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 71-1255.
    United States v. Ash.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 407 U. S. 909.] Motion of respondent for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 72-6660.
    No. 72-6662.
    No. 72-6682.
    Buckles v. Meacham, Penitentiary Superintendent, et al.; Ward v. Anderson, Warden; and McKinney v. Craven, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-6537.
    Acarino v. Mishler, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-6156.
    Lewis v. City of New Orleans.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 72-851.
    Oneida Indian Nation of New York et al. v. County of Oneida, New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-1061.
    Windward Shipping (London), Ltd., et al. v. American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-1371.
    Walters, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. “Americans United” Inc.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 71-6416.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-6770.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-267.
    Kelly et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1117.
    Prosch v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1219.
    Ballard v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of San Francisco. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1243.
    No. 72-6364.
    Rachal v. United States; and Hunnicutt v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 473 F. 2d 1338.


text:
    No. 72-1262.
    Stanley Works v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1266.
    Seuss v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1270.
    Cundy v. South Dakota.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1290.
    Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1293.
    Selb Manufacturing Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1324.
    Gooding v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1354.
    Graci et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1363.
    Monroe Auto Equipment Co., Hartwell Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1381.
    United States v. Tinney.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1384.
    Dumon v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1397.
    Lopez v. Washington, Mayor of Washington, D. C., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1400.
    Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5496.
    Brumley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5691.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5776.
    Spross v. Craven, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6288.
    Jones v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6321.
    Rojas v. Arizona et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6322.
    Meyer v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6358.
    Granger v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6388.
    Martin v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6398.
    Allen v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6400.
    Burroughs v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6402.
    Lemons v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6411.
    Tucker v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6418.
    Trexler v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6424.
    Stroud v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6425.
    Washington v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6427.
    Smith v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6435.
    Novak v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6436.
    Savage v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6440.
    Rowe v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6445.
    Sumida v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6450.
    Prezzi v. Berzak et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6488.
    Barfield v. Harris, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6543.
    Oliver v. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6557.
    Smiley v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6558.
    Smiley v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6571.
    Tanner v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6572.
    Licon v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6577.
    Wheeler v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6581.
    Dodge v. Johnson, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6584.
    Scott v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6590.
    Hinson v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6603.
    Jaynes v. Jaynes et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1108.
    Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1169.
    Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1247.
    Two v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1291.
    Atkins v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6355.
    Mosley v. Smith, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6391.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6503.
    Dragonette v. City of East Cleveland.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6529.
    Duke v. North Texas State University et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6559.
    Williams v. Clinchfield Coal Co.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1048.
    No. 72-6600.
    Cardwell, Warden v. Workman; and Workman v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and motion of respondent for leave to- proceed in forma pauperis in No. 72-1048 granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 471 F. 2d 909.


text:
    No. 72-1279.
    Diamond v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1425.
    United States v. Leathers et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-1436.
    United Transportation Union Lodge 550 et al. v. Rock et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 71-1082.
    No. 71-1545.
    No. 72-6133.
    Askew, Governor of Florida, et al. v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., et al., Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc., Landis v. United States,
   411 U. S. 325;

411 U. S. 182; and

411 U. S. 935. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-5024.
    No. 72-5921.
    Campbell v. Georgia et al., Stokes v. United States Postal Service et al.,
   409 U. S. 984; and

410 U. S. 985. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    June 8, 1973
    No. A-1219.
    Helfant v. Kugler, Attorney General of New Jersey, et al.
   Application for injunction pending disposition of appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    June 11, 1973
    No. 72-1327.
    REA Express, Inc. v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal


text:
    No. 72-1594.
    Diamond et al. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Judgment affirmed. Motion for injunction denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal and these motions.


text:
    No. 72-6725.
    Ross et al. v. Brown Title Corp. et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. La.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from affirmance.


text:
    No. 72-1405.
    Moses Lake School District 161 et al. v. Big Bend Community College, District 18, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-1438.
    Smith v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-6611.
    Ander v. Ander.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 72-6350.
    Mason v. Panama Canal Co.
   Appeal from C. A. 5th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

MR. Justice Douglas dissents from denial of petition believing that case is not moot, and would vacate judgment and remand the cause to- the trial court for resolution of respondent’s counterclaim.


text:
    No. 71-1245.
    No. 71-1472.
    No. 71-1495.
    No. 72-400.
    Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Hammer. Neil, Warden v. Pendergrass. Cowan, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Bruce. Rose, Warden v. Rivera.
    See Michigan v. Payne, ante, p. 58, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, ante, p. 35, and Moon v. Maryland, 398 U. S. 319, 321 (1970), dissenting opinions.
   C. A. 4th Cir.;

C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 456 F. 2d 469 ;

C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 457 F. 2d 365; and

C. A. 6th Cir. Reported below: 465 F. 2d 727. Motions of respondents for leave to- proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgments vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Michigan v. Payne, ante, p. 47, and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, ante, p. 17.

Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgments.


text:
    No. 71-1281.
    Linder, Warden v. Recor.
    See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, ante, p. 35, and Moon v. Maryland, 398 U. S. 319, 321 (1970) (dissenting opinions).
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, ante, p. 17.

Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment.


text:
    No. 72-761.
    United States v. McGrath.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 423 (1973).


text:
    No. D-10.
    In re Disbarment of Kirtz.
   It is ordered that Frank G. Kirtz, of St. Louis, Missouri, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. A-1034.
    Ruderer v. Johnson.
   Application for equitable relief by injunction and enforcement of orders, etc., denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 35,
    Orig.
    United States v. Maine et al.
    [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 408 U. S. 917.]
   Motion of Commonwealth of Massachusetts for preliminary injunction denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the preliminary injunction.


text:
    No. 72-700.
    Hernandez et al. v. Veterans’ Administration et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, 411 U. S. 981. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed on original record granted.


text:
    No. 72-936.
    United States v. Robinson.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 410 U. S. 982.] Motion of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in support of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. A-1194 (72-1418).
    Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana v. Dillin, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay of order of U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, dated March 19, 1973, denied.


text:
    No. A-1196 (72-6862).
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Application for stay of mandate presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 72-6753.
    Hyde v. Craven, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-6555.
    Parker v. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 72-6608.
    Rice v. Bourbon Circuit Court, Paris, Kentucky.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-1035.
    Rogers v. Loether et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing respondents’ brief and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Case set for oral 'argument with No. 72-6041 [Pernell v. Southall Realty, certiorari granted, 411 U. S. 915].


text:
    No. 72-1322.
    Bradley et al. v. School Board of the City of Richmond et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.

Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 72-1410.
    Edelman, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan.
   C, A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent Jordan for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-6476.
    Hagans et al. v. Lavine, Commissioner, New York Department of Social Services, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-6520.
    Lau et al. v. Nichols et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 72-1163.
    Bithoney et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1166.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1179.
    Kanarek v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1182.
    Gaus v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1198.
    An Article of Drug . . . “Bentex Ulcerine” v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1235.
    Whitman Center, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1285.
    Standard Oil Co., Inc., et al. v. Wright et ux.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1300.
    Ruggiero v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1306.
    Radio-Television, S. A., et al. v. Federal Communications Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1309.
    Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union 46, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1321.
    Northern Natural Gas Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1325.
    Mangaiameli v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1329.
    H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1346.
    Ryan et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1351.
    Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Smith et ux.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1361.
    Wood v. United States Post Office Department et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1380.
    Breland v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1390.
    Sansanese v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1402.
    Calandrillo v. O'Connor et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1403.
    Local 42, International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1417.
    Simmons v. Wetherell et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1419.
    Strom et al. v. Alfveby, Referee.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1421.
    DeKalb County et al. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1430.
    Perkins v. Standard Oil Company of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1433.
    International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 12 v. Southern California Testing Laboratory, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1456.
    McClung v. Ford Motor Co.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1459.
    Stockholders' Protective Committee for Moulded Products, Inc. v. Barry, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1607.
    Pfingst v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5507.
    Williams v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6282.
    Morton v. Wyoming et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6290.
    Bruce v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6312.
    Castellon-Duarte v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6443.
    Mackey v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6447.
    No. 72-6448.
    Stanfield v. United States; and Terrell v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6459.
    Billingsley v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6460.
    No. 72-6466.
    Isenberg v. United States; and Isenberg v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6463.
    Walsh v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6464.
    Barrow v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6468.
    Laughlin v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6469.
    Battle v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6478.
    Lavan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6481.
    No. 72-6482.
    Hamilton v. United States; and Benton v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6483.
    Tucker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6485.
    McDonnell v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6489.
    Nocerino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6495.
    Kung How Fong v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6568.
    Schutt v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6593.
    Cook et ux. v. Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6598.
    Boag v. Craven, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6607.
    Morgan v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6623.
    Roy v. Manchester Gas Co.
   Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6625.
    Bradley v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6633.
    Eckert v. Budd Co. et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6691.
    Bezak v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuya-hoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1305.
    Gray et al. v. Shell Oil Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1362.
    Stringer et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1443.
    Savard, Administratrix, et al. v. Perini Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6467.
    Sheard, aka Nixon v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6622.
    Moore v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant cer-tiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6666.
    Thompson v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1389.
    Pennsylvania v. Stafford.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1424.
    Vowell, Commissioner of Public Welfare of Texas v. Rodriguez et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1426.
    Nanes v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A 5th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 71-1178.
    No. 72-1086.
    No. 72-1281.
    No. 72-5572.
    No. 72-6211.
    No. 72-6374.
    No. 72-6410.
    No. 72-6452.
    No. 72-6496.
    Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al., DeLong Corp. et al. v. Oregon, By and Through State Highway Commission, Essex, Administratrix v. Walters, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., Gay v. United States, Lucas v. Wyoming et al., Rando v. Estelle, Corrections Director, Walters v. Walters, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Morris v. Sparrow et al., German v. Florida et al.,
   411 U. S. 747;

411 U. S. 965;

ante, p. 919;

411 U. S. 974;

411 U. S. 983;

411 U. S. 972;

411 U. S. 985;

411 U. S. 985; and

ante, p. 908. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 71-6423.
    No. 72-1084.
    House v. House, Grossman v. Kavanagh, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Michigan,
   409 U. S. 812; and

411 U. S. 914. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-1134.
    Reibert et al. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al.,
   411 U. S. 938, and ante, p. 914. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-5925.
    No. 72-6153.
    No. 72-6255.
    Ruderer v. Sessions et al., Ruderer v. United States Army Aviation Materiel Command et al., Ruderer v. United States et al.,
   410 U. S. 949;

411 U. S. 928; and

411 U. S. 945. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing and all other relief denied.

Mr. Justice Black-mun took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.


text:
    No. 72-6271.
    Ruderer v. Vance et al.,
   411 U. S. 961. Petition for rehearing and all other relief denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    June 13, 1973
    No. A-1221.
    Shapiro v. Ferrandina.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay of mandate presented to Mr. Justice Marshall and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the application.


text:
    No. A-1206 (72-1173).
    International Business Machines Corp. v. United States.
   Application for stay of execution and enforcement of pretrial order No. 5 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and for a stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the application.


text:
    June 18, 1973

      No. 72-1573.
    Applegate et al. v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 72-1565.
    United States v. Trans Texas Bancorporation, Inc., et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 72-1259.
    Teitelbaum v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Motion to dispense with printing jurisdictional statement granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6329.
    McAllister v. Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6385.
    Logan v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-635.
    Glusman et al. v. Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Vlandis v. Kline, ante, p. 441.

Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment.


text:
    No. 72-6012.
    Kelsaw v. Oregon.
   Ct. App. Ore. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cer-tiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Wardius v. Oregon, ante, p. 470.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment for reasons set forth in his separate opinion in Wardius v. Oregon, ante, p. 479.


text:
    No. A-1079.
    Johnson v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Application for bail presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1186.
    Waller v. Florida.
   Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of conviction in Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending further order of this Court.


text:
    No. 72-1035.
    Rogers v. Loether et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 937.] Motion of respondents for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis or in the alternative to submit respondents' brief in typewritten form denied.


text:
    No. 72-1086.
    DeLong Corp. et al. v. Oregon, By and Through State Highway Commission,
   411 U. S. 965. Motion of respondent for allowance of attorney’s fees denied.


text:
    No. 72-1264.
    Mayor of Philadelphia et al. v. Educational Equality League et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 411 U. S. 964.] Motion of respondents for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis denied.


text:
    No. 72-1355.
    United States v. Matlock.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 917.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Donald S. Eisenberg, Esquire, of Madison, Wisconsin, be, and he is hereby, appointed as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 72-6534.
    Orsinger v. Richardson, Attorney General.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 72-1465.
    Procunier, Corrections Director, et al. v. Martinez et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 72-1218.
    Valentine et al. v. Oregon.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1345.
    No. 72-6456.
    No. 72-6479.
    Mosca et al. v. United States; Wolfson v. United States; and Zavod et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 475 F. 2d 1052.


text:
    No. 72-1368.
    Rosciano v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1370.
    Berlin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1374.
    Neff v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1383.
    Decker et al. v. Weinstein, Trustee, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1387.
    American Concrete Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1414.
    Mueller v. Nixon et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1418.
    Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana v. Dillin, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1431.
    Leonhard v. Richardson, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1434.
    Hitchcock v. Civil Service Commission of City of Moses Lake.
   Ct. App. Wash. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1435.
    Robbins v. Noble Drilling Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1442.
    Travelers Insurance Co. v. Chouest.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1444.
    Kellen v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crina. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1451.
    Lavine, Commissioner, New York Department of Social Services v. Lindsay, Mayor of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.