text:
    No. 73-6035.
    Knox v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari, denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 73-6074.
    Gore v. Leeke, Corrections Director
   Sup. Ct. S C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6077.
    Stanley v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6141.
    Zane, aka Logan et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6149.
    Sokyrnyk v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6199.
    Cogwell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6226.
    Tate v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6227.
    Kennedy v. Gray, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6233.
    Alford v. United States Civil Service Commission et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6320.
    John v. Casscles, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6322.
    Hamm v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6326.
    Barnard et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6329.
    Morrison v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.'


text:
    No. 73-6330.
    Satterfield v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari


text:
    No. 73-6331.
    Bunn v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6334.
    Adams v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6337.
    Watson et al. v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6338.
    Layton v. Committee of Bar Examiners of California State Bar.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorári denied.


text:
    No. 73-6342.
    Cody v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6345.
    Dawson v. Bacon, Judge.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6347.
    Umbaugh v. Hutto, Corrections Commissioner.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6408.
    Tulipano v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6477.
    Cozzolino v. Tennessee.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-819.
    Landy et al. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Receiver, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.-

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1323.
    General Motors Acceptance Corp. et al. v. Eason et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief. Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice White, would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-6354.
    Stickney, Executrix v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
   Dist. Ct. .App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-873.
    Halperin v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1088.
    Life of the Land et al. v. Brinegar, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would gránt certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1111.
    Quinault Allottees Assn. et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1332.
    Chaney v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1362.
    Westminster Presbyterian Church of Enid et al. v. Presbytery of Cimarron.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6056.
    Turner et al. v. Haynes, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied..

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6360.
    Wellman et ux. v. Pacer Oil Co.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1104.
    Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Short et al.; and United States v. Short et al.
    No. 73-1244.
   Ct. Cl. Motions of the following for leave to file briefs as amici curiae in Nos. 73-1104 granted: Salt River Pima-Alarieopa Indian Community of the .Salt River Indian Reservation, Arizona; National Tribal Chairmen’s. Assn.; National Congress of American Indians; Colorado River Indian Tribes; Colville Confederated Tribes'of Colville Indian Reservation, Washington; Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation,.Montana, et al.; Fort Mojavé Indian Tribes of Arizona, California, and Nevada, et al.; and Quinault Tribe of Indians of Quinault Reservation, Washington. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari. Reported below: 202 Ct. Cl. 870, 486 F. 2d 561. "


text:
    No. 73-1310.
    Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis et al. v. Gardner et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion' of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.' Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1338.
    Northcross et al. v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-1342.
    Silvestri Corp. v. Marshall Field & Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

MR- Justice Blackmun took no part in thex consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-6106.
    Cannon v. Smyth, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-849.
    Tunnell v. United States, Hayden, Stone Inc., et al. v. Piantes et al., Wolf v. Wolf, Keil v. Glover, aka Edgar, and Smilgus v. Kimmel et al.,
    No. 73-1009.
    No. 73-1154.
    No. 73-6118.
    No. 73-6186.
   415 U. S. 948;

415 U. S. 995;

415 U. S. 958;

415 U. S. 959;

415 U. S. 993. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-637.
    Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
   ante, p. 909. Petition for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    April 25, 1974
    No. A-986.
    Hill, Attorney General of Texas v. Stone et al.
   D. C. N. D. Tex. Application for partial stay, presented to Mr. Justice-Powell, and -by him referred to the Court, granted. It is ordered that the judgment be stayed to the extent that it prohibits the use of dual-box election procedure.. Stay order is to remain in effect pending -timely filing and disposition of an appeal in this Court. If the appeal is timely filed' this stay shall, remain in effect- pending issuance of judgment of "this Court.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.-


text:
    April 29, 1974
    No. 73-6430.
    Bekeny v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 73-1077.
    Berry Transport, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Ore.


text:
    No. 73-1126.
    Wilson et ux. v. Department of Revenue of Oregon.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ore. dismissed for tvant of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-6391.
    Scheffel et al. v. Washington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-6404.
    Smith v. Askins.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Okla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-6054.
    Cole et al. v. California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. sCal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6313.
    Simpkins, dba Cosmic Cultural Co. v. United States.
   Appeal from Ct. Cl. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the "papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6099.
    Ward et al. v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-6459.
    Washington et al. v. White, Secretary of State of Texas, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. dismissed for want of appealable order.


text:
    No. 73-5694.
    Andrade-Gamiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cértiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss cause as moot.


text:
    No. A-928.
    Ohmert v. Young et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Stewabt, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-1026.
    Belli v. State Bar of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay of judgment, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the.Court, denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 27, Orig.
    Ohio v. Kentucky,

   410 U. S. 641, 414 U. S. 989. Second motion of State of Ohio for reconsideration of order of March 5,1973, denied.


text:
    No. 36, Orig.
    Texas v. Louisiana.
   Motion of City of. Port Arthur, Texas, for leave to intervene granted, and motion for a more definite statement denied. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 903.].


text:
    No. 73-187.
    Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 818.] Motion of SCM Corp. for leavé to file supplemental brief as amicus curiae ^fter argument denied.


text:
    No. 73-296.
    Huffman et al. v. Pursue, Ltd.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 974.] Motion of appellants for leave to utilize portions of record printed for use as an appendix to jurisdictional statement in preparing single appendix as required by Rule 17 of the. Rules of this Court denied.


text:
    No. 73-362.
    Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. Mancari et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. M. . [Probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U. S. 1142.] Motion of National Federation of Federal Employees for leave tc file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 73-679.
    Wolff, Warden, et al. v. McDonnell.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1156.] Motion. of Ohio State University College of Law Clinical Programs for leave to file an untimely brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 73-1148.
    DeCoteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial District.
   Sup. Ct. S. D. The Solicitor •General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of' the United States on ór before May 14, 1974.


text:
    No. 73-5845.
    Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of Legal Aid Foundation of Long Beach et al. for Leave to file .a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-1294.
    Goldberg v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 73-1406.
    Chapman et al. v. Meier, Secretary of State of North Dakota.
   Appeal for D. C. N. D.( Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1055.
    Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al., Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; Lorch-Westway Corp. et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; and United States et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.

      No. 73-1069.

      No. 73-1070.
    No. 73-1071.
    No. 73-1072.
   Appeals from D. C. W. D. Ark.

In No. 73-1055, probable jurisdiction is noted limited to Questions 2 and 4 presented by the jurisdictional statement which read as follows:

“2. Can a Three-Judge District Court lawfully set aside and enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission granting an extension of a motor carrier certificate on the ground the Court does not agree with the order or may consider the evidence would . warrant a different conclusion?
“4. Whether Commission order issued following extensive hearings, involving a voluminous record, admittedly concluded within all. time limitations and commission rules can be judicially determined to be so stale ‘as a matter of law’ to prohibit any required findings or further consideration. If so, when does such an administrative action reach that poipt?”

In No. 73-1069; probable jurisdiction is noted limited to Question 2 presented by the jurisdictional statement which reads as- follows:

“2. Whether in reversing the Commission’s decision awarding certificates of public convenience and necessity the District Court employed erroneous standards of judicial review and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency.”.

In No. 73-1070, probable jurisdiction is noted limited to subsections (3) and (5) of theNjuestion presented by the jurisdictional statement which read as follows:

“Whether the three-judge court, in setting aside the administrative agency decision, abdicated or abandoned its judicial function by
“(3) failing to give independent judicial consideration and review to the separate grants Of authority to the intervening defendant motor carriers;.
“(5) rejecting Supreme Court precedent limiting the. Court’s scope of review and thereby substituting its judgment for that of the agency charged with the responsibility therefor.” • .

In No. 73-1071, probable jurisdiction is noted limited to Question 2 presented by the jurisdictional statement which.reads as follows:

“2. Whether the Three-Judge District Court improperly adopted a novel and unwarranted concept of de novo review of Commission decisions and changed the statutory relationship between hearing examiners and their agency with respect to recommended and final decisions.”

In No. 73-1072, probable jurisdiction noted. Cases are consolidated and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-1210.
    Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc., et al.
   "Appeal from D. C. Ore. >Motion of Western Railroad Traffic Assn, for leave td file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Probable . jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1290.
    United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-765.
    International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Upper South Department, AFL-CIO v. Quality Manufacturing Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-1363, immediately infra.


text:
    No. 73-1363.
    National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-765, immediately supra.


text:
    No. 73-1377.
    Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. City of New York et al. and Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc.
    No. 73-1378.
   C. A. D. C. Cir.;

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases, consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    (See also Nos. 73-6054 and 73-6313.)
    No. 73-989.
    DeMet v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir; Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1038.
    Appalachian Power Co. et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1113.
    Chicot Land Co., Inc. v. Kelly et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1134.
    PBW Stock Exchange, Inc., et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1156.
    Evangeline Parish School Board et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied,


text:
    No. 73-1186.
    Moxey v. Seely et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1193.
    Considine v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1197.
    Flanders v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1207.
    Berkley, dba Berkley Associates v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1214.
    Buxton v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1225.
    National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1357.
    Cooke County Electric Cooperative Assn. v. Town of Lindsay.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1358.
    Pacific Handy Cutter, Inc., et al. v. City of South El Monte et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1368.
    National Cash Register Co. v. NCR Employees’ Independent Union et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari deniéd.


text:
    No. 73-5787.
    Bustamante-Gamez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5859.
    Valdivieso et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir., Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5873.
    West v. United States.
   C. A. 6th. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5876.
    Lufkins v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5877.
    Holland, aka Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5896.
    Tulipano v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5909.
    Stern v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5914.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5916.
    Young v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5923.
    Tyers v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5963.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6027.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6040.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6043.
    Kelley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6045.
    Mackay v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6055.
    Cole et al. v. California.
   Co. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6070.
    Watkins v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6076.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir* Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6089.
    Campanella v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6100.
    Wilson v. United States.
   C, A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6103.
    Ruth v. United States.
   C. A.. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6145.
    Morgan v. California Personnel Board (Santa Barbara County Welfare Department, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6148.
    Phillips v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6169.
    Cain v. Britton, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6183.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6218.
    Cain v. U. S. Board of Parole et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6321.
    Green v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App; Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6367.
    Carter v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6370.
    Pfeifer v. Bell & Howell Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6371.
    Edgerton v. Lewis, Institution Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6372.
    McKinney v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied,


text:
    No. 73-6376.
    Brown v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari'denied.


text:
    No. 73-6378.
    Griffith v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6382.
    Davis v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6383.
    Dedmon v. Gunn, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6384.
    Terry v. Gray, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6387.
    Hill v. Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6390.
    Tressler v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6392.
    Williams v. Gunn, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6393.
    Brown v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6395.
    Terry v. Gray, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir.' Certiorari'denied.


text:
    No. 73-6396.
    F.R.W. v. Wisconsin.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6401.
    Carbone v. Vukcevich, Prison Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-550.
    Texasgulf Inc. v. Federal Power Commission; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission; Louisiana Gas Service Co. v. Federal Power Commission; Exxon Corp. et al. v. Federal Power Commission; Louisiana et al. v. Federal Power Commission; and New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission.
    No. 73-867.
    No. 73-868.
    No. 73-871.
    No. 73-872.
    No. 73-874.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in The consideration or decision of these petitions.


text:
    No. 73-1179.
    Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al. v. Stamm, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Jus-r tice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5870.
    Weldon v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied..

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6158.
    Gray v. Louisiana.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6325.
    King v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6373.
    Fields v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1271.
    Cowan, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Oliver.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1372.
    Kentner v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-6388.
    McDonald v. Tennessee et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion to amend, petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-924.
    Shelton v. United States, Franks v. Wilson, Judge, et al., Fletcher v. United States, Olsen v. United States, and Wallace v. Hoffman et al.,
    No. 73-1139.
    No. 73-5959.
    No. 73-6156.
    No. 73-6248.
   415 U. S. 976;

415 U. S. 986;

415 U. S. 981;

415 U. S. 993;

ante, p. 908.

Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    May 13, 1974
    No. 73-90.
    Shelton v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Wash.


text:
    No. 73-865.
    Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Okla.


text:
    No. 73-1273.
    Florida Texas Freight, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla.


text:
    No. 72-1173.
    International Business Machines Corp. v. United States.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice Douglas would postpone jurisdiction to a hearing of case on the merits. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 73-1066.
    Cravath, Swaine & Moore v. United States.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N, Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari .denied. Motion to treat jurisdictional statement as a motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case and motion.


text:
    No. 73-1130.
    Lilly v. Lilly.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ya. dismissed for want of substantial federal question..


text:
    No. 73-1419.
    Stuart v. Stuart.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 1st Ápp. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-6182.
    Johnson v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-6207.
    Pope v. Nebraska.
   Appeal from Süp. Ct. Neb. dismissed for want.of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction, treat the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, and set case for oral argument on issue of double jeopardy in light of the dissents in which he joined in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 150, 164. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration' or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 72-1617.
    Civil Service Commission of New York et al. v. Snead; and Department of Social Services of the City of New York et al. v. Snead.
    No. 72-1691.
   Appeals from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Judgment vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, ante, p. 134.


text:
    No. 73-208.
    Collins et al. v. Wilson, Governor of New York, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, ante, p. 134.


text:
    No. 73-219.
    Sanford et al. v. Wilson, Governor of New York, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, ante, p. 134.


text:
    No. A-925.
    In re M. A. C.
   Application for release pending trial in Superior Court of the District of Columbia presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-987.
    Walden v. McLucas, Under Secretary of the Air Force, et al.
   Reapplication for injunction pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Coupt, denied.


text:
    No. A-1058.
    Buck et al. v. Impeach Nixon Committee et al.
   Application for stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit presented to The Chief Justice; and by him referred to the Court, granted.

Motion to vacate stay heretofore granted by The Chief Justice ' denied. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. -Justice Marshall, and Mr. . Justice Powell would discontinue the stay.


text:
    No. A-1065.
    Local 391, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America et al. v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.
   Application for stay of mandate • of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-11.
    In re Disbarment of Hartzog.
   It having been reported to the Court that Benjamin Gerard Hartzog has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the District of Columbia, and this Court by order of October 23, 1973 [414 U. S. 971], having suspended the said Benjamin Gerard Hartzog from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent, who has filed a return; now, upon consideration of the rule to show cause and return aforesaid;

It is ordered that the said Benjamin Gerard Hartzog be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the'roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. 73-203.
    Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 908.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.


text:
    No. 73-671.
    Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. et al. v. General Dynamics Corp. et al.,
   414 U. S. 1146. Respondents are requested to file response to motion for leave to file petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 73-831.
    Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1128.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel nunc pro tunc granted. It is ordered that John J. Witmeyer III, Esquire, of New York, New York, be, arid he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. -


text:
    No. 73-5845.
    Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 913.] Motion of National Consumer Law Genter for leave to file ~a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 72-1662.
    International Business Machines Corp. v. Edelstein, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took'no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 73-6534.
    Black v. Attorney General of the United States et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 73-6304.
    Hoffman et al. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas et al.; and Brady v. Nielsen, U. S. District Judge (State Bar of California et al., Real Parties in Interest).
    No. 73-6416.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 72-1661.
    International Business Machines Corp. v. United States et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition and/or certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and- Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 73-1064.
    International Business Machines Corp. v. United States et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 73-6296.
    Theriault v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 73-1046.
    Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Diaz et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pawperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1256.
    Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1313.
    International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., Communications Equipment & Systems Division v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1162.
    United States v. Wilson et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir- Motion of . respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1288.
    Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Counsel in this case are directed to brief and argue the following questions:

1. Can statements by counsel for the Republic of Cuba, that petitioner’s unjúst enrichment countercláim would not be honored, constitute an act of state?

2. If so, is an exception to the act of state doctrine created, under First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759 (1972), where petitioner’s counterclaim does not exceed the net balance owed to Cuba on its claims by petitioner’s codefendants, and where all claims and counterclaims arise out of the subject matter in litigation in this case?


text:
    No. 73-6038.
    Drope v. Missouri.
   Ct. App. Mo., St'. Louis Dist. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    (See also Nos. 73-1066, 73-6182, and 73-6207, supra.)

    No. 73-221.
    Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. " Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-701.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., Inc., et al.; and The Newspaper Guild v. Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., Inc.
    No. 73-708.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-817.
    Gambino v. United States.
   C. A. 2d. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-905.
    Talbert v. United States.
   C. A- 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-925.
    Allison et al. v. United States.
   C. A. '5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1033.
    Voyager 1000 et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1054.
    Raymond et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1090.
    Nelson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1145.
    Technical Development Corp. et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1149.
    Jossefides et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1150.
    Weedon v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1163.
    Walls v. United States.
   C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1165.
    Fried v. United States.
   C.. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1177.
    Henderson, Warden v. Recasner.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1181.
    Davis v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari dénied.


text:
    No. 73-1187.
    Parkman v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1189.
    Church v. United States
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cértiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1216.
    Walden et vir v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1254.
    United States Steel Corp. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1303.
    Rosenthal et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 9th Cir. • Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1307.
    Rangel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1318.
    Stanley v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. '


text:
    No. 73-1319.
    Villa v. United States.
   C. A. 10th-Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1325.
    Montello et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1327.
    Hamilton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1340.
    Gerstenslager Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1341.
    Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1343.
    Brobeck v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1352.
    Walden et ux. v. Small Business Administration.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1354.
    Business Roundtable v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1359.
    Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1388.
    Mead et al. v. Horvitz Publishing Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lorain County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1389.
    Tradewell v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1401.
    Becker et al. v. Levitt, Comptroller of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1408.
    Board of Education of Aurora Public School District No. 131 of Kane County, Illinois, et al. v. Aurora Education Association East et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1411.
    Paderewski Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Suski et al.
   , App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y, 1st Jud. Dept.Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1421.
    Smith v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1426.
    United Transportation Union et al. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1434
    Cary v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1438.
    Solitron Devices, Inc. v. Island Territory of Curacao.
   C. A. 2d Cir: Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1453.
    Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration et al. v. Massachusetts et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1467.
    American Basketball Assn. v. AMF Voit, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1479.
    Jeffress v. Kramer et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1489.
    Charm Promotions, Ltd. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.'


text:
    No. 73-1505.
    Ballenger et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1506.
    Harlan #4 Coal Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. ’ Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1519.
    Crosby & Co., Inc. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, aka Air France.
   App. Div., Sup; Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5732.
    Shriver v. United States; and Marx v. United States.
    No. 73-5893.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5789.
    McGonagle v. United States; and Ferreira v. United States.
    No. 73-5996.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5807.
    Ogden v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5889.
    Banks et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5918.
    Westbrook v. United States.
   C. Á. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5948.
    Da Silva v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5960.
    Hargraves v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari' denied.


text:
    No. 73-5970.
    Ogden v. United States.
   C. A.. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5995.
    Sharpe et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6005.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6017.
    Cavenaugh v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir.. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6018.
    Gomez v. United States.
   G A. 9th' Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6021.
    Tyler v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6023.
    Kopacsi v. United States.
   C. Á. 5th Cir.- Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6037.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6041.
    Mercer v. Winston.
   Sup. Ct. Ya. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6052.
    Torres v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6059.
    Ralston v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6062.
    Schwartz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6088.
    Inman v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6093.
    Navarette v. California.
   Sup. .Ct.. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6096.
    Colwell v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6107.
    Griggs v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6108.
    Stocker, aka Lance v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6114.
    Huffman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th .Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6121.
    Reynolds v. United States.
   C. A, 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6126.
    Eckley v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6128.
    Schultz v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6129.
    Burton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6150.
    Verse v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 73-6152.
    Francis v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6157.
    Grill v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6162.
    Daulton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6167.
    Parker v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6171.
    Smith et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6176.
    Bradby v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6180.
    Morgan v. Willingham et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6181.
    Wilson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6185.
    Roddy v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.'


text:
    No. 73-6194.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. '6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6196.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6204.
    Pleasant v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6222.
    Wagner v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6234.
    Lopez v. United States; and Oreyana v. United States.
    No. 73-6246.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6238.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6241.
    Thorpe v. City of Kansas City.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 73-6247.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cértiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6258.
    Dorman v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 73-6259.
    Brewer v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6263.
    Rizzo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6264.
    Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir; Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6285.
    Whitley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6292.
    Edwards v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6298.
    Frazier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A, 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6303.
    Burch v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6309.
    Gray v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6343.
    Resnick v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6369.
    Doe, aka Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6386.
    Davis v. Johnson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6389.
    Cohran v. Deyton, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6410.
    Gonzalez v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C.- A". 2d Cir.- Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6412.
    Collins v. Warden, Nevada State Prison.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6417.
    Burns v. Decker et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. '


text:
    No. 73-6420.
    Blum v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6422.
    Pinedo v. California.
   Super. Ct. Cal., County of Orange. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6424.
    Cadogan v. Montanye, Correctional Superintendent.
   Ápp. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6436.
    Hughes v. Carson, Sheriff.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6437.
    Nelson v. North Carolina.
   Gen. Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Wake County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6438.
    Collins v. Maryland.
   Ct. Spec. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6441.
    Deavers v. Van Ness et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6442.
    Daniels v. McCarthy, Warden.
   C. A.. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6444.
    Bradley v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   Ct. Crim. App; Tex. Certiorari denied,


text:
    No 73-6448
    Starkey v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6455.
    Gainey v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.' Dist.- Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6465.
    Guajardo v. Estelle, Corrections Director, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6473.
    Bennett v. Utah.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-793.
    Chalker v. United States.
   C. A; 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would,grant certiorari1.


text:
    No. 73-824.
    Becker v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-840.
    Riely v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-853.
    Forbicetta v. United States.
   C. A.'5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-870.
    Marks et al. v. City of Newport.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1120.
    National Helium Corp. et al. v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. '

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1138.
    Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied:

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1173.
    Horton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari-.


text:
    No. 73-1220.
    Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl.. Certiorari denied.

Mr.- Justice Douglas' would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1229.
    Israel, Attorney General of Rhode Island, et al. v. Doe et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1240.
    Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Assn., Local No. 550, TWU, AFL-CIO v. Zipes et al.; and Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al. v. Zipes et al.
    No. 73-1416.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1409.
    Wasnowic et al. v. Chicago Board of Trade et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6010.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6115.
    Harris v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice . Douglas would grant certiorari,


text:
    No. 73-6122.
    Morales-Jaramillo v. United States.
   ,C. A.'9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6221.
    Wansley v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6243.
    Strong v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-6250.
    Smith v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari;


text:
    No. 73-6406.
    Kraft v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would' grant certiorari..


text:
    No. 73-6421.
    Langs, Guardian v. Harder, Commissioner of Welfare.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari;


text:
    No. 73-1065.
    International Business Machines Corp. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


author: The Chief Justice,

text:
    No. 73-1144.
    Fortune et al. v. Bazaar et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice,

concurring.

I join in the denial of certiorari on my reading of the temporary restraining order of the District Court as not. requiring the University to continue to make available to the respondents, at public expense, facilities of the University for the production of any future publication. Those attending a state university have a right to be free from official censorship in their speech and writings, bqt this right does not require the University-to commit its faculty or financial resources to any activity which it considers to be of substandard or marginal quality.


text:
    No. 73-1394.
    Smith et al. v. Curtis.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1403.
    Graziani v. Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas adheres to his dissent in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 440, and would reverse judgment of lower' court.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 73-5842.
    Ciuzio v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall, join,

dissenting.

Successive prosecutions of petitioner and one Cioffi resulted from an alleged agreement to sell an undercover agent $500,000 worth of counterfeit 6-cent stamps and an alleged delivery to the agent of a sample sheet of four hundred of the stamps. The first prosecution was upon a two-count indictment that charged the pair in the first count with having attempted to sell stamps known to be falsely made, forged, and counterfeited, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 472, and, in the second count, with conspiracy to violate the same section. The trial on that indictment ended with a directed verdict of acquittal pn the first count as to Cioffi, a dismissal of the first count as to petitioner and a mistrial on the second count when the jury could not agree upon a verdict.

Instead of proceeding to a retrial on the second count, the Government abandoned its efforts under § 472 and procured a second incfictment under 18 U. S. C. § 501 based upon the verv rsame course of conduct. The second indictment was also a two-count indictment, the first count charging that the pair “knowingly did possess with intent to. use and sell, approximately four hundred forged and counterfeited postage stamps,” in violation of § 501, and‘the second count charging conspiracy to violate, that section. The overt acts alleged were the same as in the first indictment and the evidence at the trials was much the same.

I

Petitioner and Cioffi unsuccessfully claimed that, since the second prosecution grew out of the same transaction, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the second prosecution. In my view the rejection of this claim was error. I adhere to the position - that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436. 448, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Mullin v. Wyoming, 414 U. S. 940 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U. S. 1017 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).

II

I would grant certiorari in any event to decide another Double Jeopardy claim argued, by petitioner based upon the action of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in remanding for a new trial after reversing the conviction of petitioner and Cioffi under the second indictment, 487 F. 2d 492 (1973).

The substantive § 501 first count alleged possession of the stamps “with intent to use and sell.” Shortly before submission of the case to the jury, the indictment was. redacted to delete all references to “sell.” The redaction was acquiesced in by the prosecution when sought by the defense, apparently because the Government’s evidence was insufficient to support the charge of possession with intent to “sell.” 'The caser thus went to the jury under instructions limited to the pharge of possession with intent to “use,” The Court of Appeals held, however, that the instructions defining “use” were erroneous because not confined to use for postal purposes. Instead of remanding for a new trial limited to the “use” charge, as was proper,, although-the Government’s evidence at the § 472 trial may have been insufficient, Bryan v. United States, 338 U. S. 552 (1950), the Coúrt of Appeals remanded for a trial on the “sell” charge, finding that the Government’s evidence on that charge was sufficient to present a jury question of possession with intent to “sell.” The Court of Appeals stated;

“There was no evidence in this case that defendants had any. intention to use the counterfeited stamps for large scale mailing of letters; the evidence was rather that they were intent on a sale. In short, when the judge redacted the indictment, he cut out the wrong word; the case should have been submitted to the jury on the basis of possession with intent'to sell rather than possession with intent to use. If the judge’s action was based on a belief of insufficiency of the evidence to show possession with intent to sell, he was mistaken. From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could permissibly infer that defendants intended to sell the sheet of 400 counterfeit stamps . . . .” 487 F. 2d, at 500."

The Court of Appeals recognized that, a double jeopardy question was raised by the remand for a trial of the-“sell” charge:

“There remains the question whether deféndants can be tried again under the same indictment, with the jury this time instructed that it can convict on proof of intent to sell, a charge which the judge erroneously removed from the indictment at the defendants’ request and which' we direct him to restore. Plainly they can be. It is settled that when a defendant has his conviction^ reversed on appeal, the double jeopardy clause jdoes not prevent his retrial for the same offense. . ; . We see no tenable distinction between a case like this where defendants have procured a reversal because the judge submitted the indictment to the jury on a wrong theory and one where they procured reversal because the judge 'submitted a defectiye indictment.” Id., at 50 F

The question, however, is whether the. trial judge’s redaction of the “sell” charge was a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge. Th'etlack of a formal direction of acquittal is not determinative. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 279 n. 7 (1970).. “[T]he trial judge’s disposition is an ‘acquittal’ if it is ‘a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case ....’” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 478 n. 7 (1971); cf. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (1916); Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963). If it was an acquittal, petitioner did not forgo his constitutional defense of former jeopardy on that charge by successfully appealing his erroneous conviction on the “use” charge. “Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 193-194 (1957). See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 796-797 (1969).

The Court of Appeals held this principle inapplicable in denying a petition for rehearing. It based its decision on a reading of § 501 as' establishing a single offense', 487 F. 2d, at 501. This conclusion itself presents an important question even under Justice Gray’s formulation in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), that the test of a single offense is whether “the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of [the charges] would have been sufficient fo warrant con-., viction upon the other.” See, e. g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342 (1911); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932). - Under that test, there is clearly a question whether the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of the charges would have been sufficient to warrant conviction upon the other, since proof of possession with intent to sell seems to require proof of a different element from possession with intent to use.

I would grant the petition for certiorari.and set the case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-6494.
    Jackson v. Norton-Children’s Hospital, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-887.
    American Party of Texas et al. v. White, Secretary of State of Texas, Edelman, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, Slutsky et al., dba “The Nevele” v. United States, Hanners v. United States, Northern v. Procunier, Corrections Director, et al., Sayles v. Sirica, U. S. District Judge, Smilgus v. Kent, Judge, Jimenez v. United States, and Wallace et vir v. Schulims.on, Director, Division of Welfare of Missouri, et al.,
    No. 72-1410.
    No. 73-1032.
    No. 73-1063.
    No. 73-6084.
    No. 73-6119.
    No. 73-6231.
    No. 73-6252.
    No. 73-6327.
   415 U. S. 767;

415 U. S. 651;

ante, p. 937;

ante, p. 951;

ante, p. 943;

415 U. S. 988;

ante, p. 908;

ante, p. 916;

ante, p. 945. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 73-809.
    Rossi et al. v. United States,
   415 U. S. 994. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan

text:
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FOOD STORE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 347, AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS & BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO
    No. 73-370.
    Argued March 18-19, 1974
    Decided May 20, 1974

      BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Mark L. Evans, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher.

      Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the. brief were Bernard Ries, Joseph M. Jacobs, and Judith A. Lonnquist. Fred Holroyd and Jerry Kronenberg filed a brief for Heck’s Inc., intervenor below.
   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The National Labor Relations Board refused to include, in a cease-and-desist order against Heck’s Inc., a provision sought by respondent union, as charging party, that Heck’s reimburse respondent’s litigation expenses and excess organizational costs incurred as a result of Heck’s unlawful conduct. The Board’s stated reason was that “it would not on balance effectuate the policies of the [National Labor Relations] Act to require reimbursement with respect to such costs in the circumstances here.” Heck’s Inc., 191 N. L. R. B. 886, 889 (1971). Respondent prevailed, however, in enforcement and review proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court enlarged the Board’s order by adding provisions, paragraphs 2 (e) and (f), that Heck’s “[p]ay to the Union any extraordinary organizational costs which the Union incurred by reason of Heck’s policy of resisting organizational efforts and refusing to bargain, such costs to be determined at the compliance stage of these proceedings,” and “[p]ay to the Board and the Union the costs and expenses incurred by them in the investigation, preparation, presentation, and conduct of these cases before the National Labor Relations Board and the courts, such costs to be determined at the compliance stage of these proceedings.” 155 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 476 F. 2d 546 (1973). We granted certiorari to consider whether the enlargement of this order was a proper exercise of the authority of courts of appeals under §§ 10 (e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146,, 29 U. S. C. §§ 160 (e) and (f), to “make and enter a decree . . . modifying, and enforcing as so modified” the order of the Board, 414 U. S. 1062 (1973). We reverse.

Heck’s Inc. operates a chain of discount stores in the Southeast section of the country. Its resistance to union organization has resulted in some 11 proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. This case grew out of its efforts to prevent organization by respondent union of Heck’s employees at its store in Clarksburg, West Virginia. The case was twice before the Board. In its first decision, the Board determined that Heck’s violated § 8 (a) (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1), by threatening and coercively interrogating employees during respondent’s organizational campaign, and by conducting a nonsecret poll to ascertain employee support for the union. Further, the Board found that Heck’s “flagrant repetition” of similar unfair labor practices at its other stores and its “extensive violations of the Act” in the Clarksburg store justified an inference that Heck’s did not entertain any good-faith doubt concerning majority support for respondent union when the company refused to recognize and bargain with the union on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of employees. Accordingly, the Board found that Heck’s violated §§ 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1). Finally, because Heck’s extensive violations were found to have made a free and fair election impossible, an order directing Heck’s to bargain with the union was entered. The Board rejected, however, the union’s argument that adequate relief required certain additional remedies, including reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs incurred as a result of Heck’s unlawful behavior. Heck’s Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 2231 n. 2 (1968).

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board’s order, but remanded to the Board for further consideration of additional remedies including reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs. 139 U. S. App. D. C. 383, 433 F. 2d 541 (1970). On remand, the Board amended its original order to encompass certain supplemental remedies, but again refused to order reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs. 191 N. L. R. B. 886. Although the Board found that Heck’s unfair labor practices were "aggravated and pervasive” and that its intransigence had probably caused the union to incur greater litigation expenses and organizational costs, the Board’s rationale, previously mentioned, was that the provision would not effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board reasoned that its “orders must be remedial, not punitive, and collateral losses are not considered in framing a reimbursement order.” Id., at 889 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, a charging party’s participation in the case is, the Board found, primarily for the purpose of protecting its private interests, whereas the Board has the primary responsibility for protecting the public interest. The Board therefore concluded that, although the public interest might also arguably be served “in allowing the Charging Party to recover the costs of its participation in this litigation,” that consideration did not “override the general and well-established principle that litigation expenses are ordinarily not recoverable.” Ibid. (Footnote omitted.)

Prior to review of its supplementary decision by the Court of Appeals, the Board issued its decision in Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N. L. R. B. 1234 (1972), in which the Board ordered reimbursement of litigation expenses in the context of a finding that an employer had engaged in “frivolous litigations.” The Board’s opinion in Tiidee reasoned that industrial peace could be best achieved if “speedy access to uncrowded Board and court dockets [were] available” and therefore that an assessment of legal fees would serve the public interest by “discouraging] future frivolous litigation,” id., at 1236. The Board did not explain why those considerations had not led it to order similar relief in this case. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded in the present case that the Board had abandoned its policy against award of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs, stating:

“Although the Board in its Supplemental Decision in this case has nowhere characterized the litigation as frivolous, it has used the language of ‘clearly aggravated and pervasive’ misconduct; and in its original opinion it questioned Heck’s good faith because of its ‘flagrant repetition of conduct previously found unlawful’ at other Heck’s stores. It would appear that the Board has now recognized that employers who follow a pattern of resisting union organization, and who to that end unduly burden the processes of the Board and the courts, should be obliged, at the very least, to respond in terms of making good the legal expenses to which they have put the charging parties and the Board. We hold that the case before us is an appropriate one for according such relief.” 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 106, 476 F. 2d, at 551.

The Court of Appeals also viewed Tiidee as the signal of a shift in the Board’s attitude toward excess organizational costs. In Tiidee, the Board refused to order reimbursement of excess organizational costs because “ ‘no nexus between [the employer’s] unlawful conduct’ ” had been proved. Ibid. Since, in the instant case, the Board had indicated that Heck’s violations had probably caused respondent to incur excess organizational costs, a nexus' was proved and accordingly the court held that respondent was entitled to an order directing reimbursement of organizational costs.

In the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals, in our view, improperly exercised its authority under §§10 (e) and (f) to modify Board orders, and the case must therefore be returned to the Board. Congress has invested the Board, not the courts, with broad discretion to order a violator “to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c); see, e. g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 176 (1973). This case does not present the exceptional situation in which crystal-clear Board error renders a remand an unnecessary formality. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941); Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 479 (1960). For it cannot be gainsaid that the finding here that Heck’s asserted at least “debatable” defenses to the unfair labor practice charges, whereas objections to the representation election in Tiidee were “patently frivolous,” might have been viewed by the Board as putting the question of remedy in a different light. We cannot say that the Board, in performing its appointed function of balancing conflicting interests, could not reasonably decide that where “debatable” defenses are asserted, the public and private interests in affording the employer a determination of his “debatable” defenses, unfettered by the prospect of bearing his adversary’s litigation costs, outweigh the public interest in uncrowded dockets.

There are, however, facial inconsistencies between the Board’s opinion in this case and the Tiidee decision, and the Court of Appeals therefore correctly declined to resolve those inconsistencies by substituting Board counsel’s rationale for that of the Board. 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 107 n. 8, 476 F. 2d, at 552 n. 8; see NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 438, 444 (1965); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962). The integrity of the administrative process demands no less than that the Board, not its legal representative, exercise the discretionary judgment which Congress has entrusted to it. But since a plausible reconciliation by the Board of the seeming inconsistency was reasonably possible, it was “incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review,” NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, at 444, for the Court of Appeals to enlarge the Heck’s order without first affording the Board an opportunity to clarify the inconsistencies.

It is a guiding principle of administrative law, long recognized by this Court, that “an administrative determination in which is imbedded a legal question open to judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145 (1940); see Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S. 146, 148 (1940); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 55 (1948); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 20 (1952); Konigs- berg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 43-44 (1961). Thus, when a reviewing court concludes that an agency invested with broad discretion to fashion remedies has apparently abused that discretion by omitting a remedy justified in the court’s view by the factual circumstances, remand to the agency for reconsideration, and not enlargement of the agency order, is ordinarily the reviewing court’s proper course. Application of that general principle in this case best respects the congressional scheme investing the Board and not the courts with broad powers to fashion remedies - that will effectuate national labor policy. It also affords the Board the opportunity, through additional evidence or findings, to reframe its order better to effectuate that policy. See FPC v. Idaho Power Co., supra, at 20; FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at 55. Moreover, in this case, if the Court of Appeals correctly read Tiidee as having signaled a change of policy in respect of reimbursement, a remand was necessary, because the Board should be given the first opportunity to determine whether the new policy should be applied retroactively.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as paragraphs 2 (e) and (f) were added to the Board’s order, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction that it be remanded to the Board for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

       The many proceedings are cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 102 n. 1, 476 F. 2d 546, 547 n. 1.

       The Board also rejected respondent’s requests for provisions directing the mailing of notices to employees; either a company-wide bargaining order or a shifting of the burden of proof in future cases to require Heck’s to demonstrate its good faith in rejecting authorization cards; injunctions under § 10 (j) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §160(j); increased access to employees; and a “make-whole” provision directing compensation to employees for collective-bargaining benefits lost as a result of the employer’s unlawful conduct.

       The remand was ordered in light of the Court of Appeals’ intervening decision in International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 249, 426 F. 2d 1243 (1970), known as the Tiidee Products case, in which the court had remanded for further Board consideration a union’s submission that similar supplementary remedies were necessary where an employer’s refusal to bargain was found to be "a clear and flagrant violation of the law,” and its objections to a representation election were determined to be “patently frivolous.” Id., at 254, 426 F. 2d, at 1248.

       The Board directed Heck’s to mail notices of the Board’s amended order to the homes of all employees at each of Heck’s store locations; to provide the union with reasonable access for a one-year period to bulletin boards and other places where union notices are normally posted; and to provide the union with a list of names and addresses of all employees at all locations, to be kept current for one year.

       The Board also refused to order, as sought by respondent, that notices of the Board’s decision be read to assembled groups of employees; that a company wide bargaining order be issued; that the company be required to bargain whenever the union obtained an authorization card majority at other locations; that greater access to employees on company property be granted; and that a “make-whole” provision for reimbursement of dues and fees, and collective-bargaining benefits, lost as a result of the unlawful refusal to bargain, be ordered.

       In support of this proposition, the Board relied upon Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 7, 11-12 (1940), and NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361, 364 (1951).

       The Board’s decision in Tiidee was issued after supplementary proceedings following a remand from the Court of Appeals. See n. 3, supra. In an opinion filed April 25, 1974, the Court of Appeals, on review of the Board’s supplementary decision in Tiidee, enforced as modified the Board’s" amended order. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 347, 502 F. 2d 349.

       The Court of Appeals made clear that the enlargement of the Board order was based squarely on the Board’s change of policy perceived to have been made by Tiidee. The court refused to decide the question argued by respondent union that, independently of Tiidee, an order of reimbursement should be directed. The Court of Appeals said:
      “There are, it seems to us, obvious difficulties [in relying upon the subsidiary role of the charging party as a basis for denial of litigation expenses], certainly in the case of an employer who appears to look upon litigation as a convenient means of delaying — and thereby perhaps avoiding — the fatal day of union recognition and collective bargaining. We need not pursue those difficulties in detail, however, for the reason that the Board itself has subsequently departed from the rationale upon which its refusal of litigation expenses in this case is based.” 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 105, 476 F. 2d, at 550 (emphasis added).

       We thus have no occasion at this time to address the question whether the Board’s broad powers under § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c), to fashion remedies include power to order reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs.

       Appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time of the appellate decision, see Bradley v. School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 711 (1974). However, a court reviewing an agency decision following an intervening change of policy by the agency should remand to permit the agency to decide in the first instance whether giving the change retrospective effect will best effectuate the policies underlying the agency’s governing act.
      In its present posture the case does not, of course, present the question whether Board failure, on remand, to clarify the apparent inconsistency in its decisions would warrant reversal on review. Compare Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U. S. 179 (1945), with FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1946). See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 587-588 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 947-950 (1965).


text:
    WILLIAM E. ARNOLD CO. v. CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF JACKSONVILLE AND VICINITY et al.
    No. 73-466.
    Argued March 20, 1974
    Decided May 20, 1974

      BrenNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      John Paul Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Daniel R. Coffman, Jr., and Allan P. Clark.

      Joseph S. Farley, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, and Norton J. Come for the United States, and by Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, and Milton Smith for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida District Court of Appeal erred in refusing to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Circuit Court for Duval County from exercising its jurisdiction over a suit within the purview of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The suit sought to enjoin respondent unions' breach of a no-strike clause contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, which breach arguably is also an unfair labor practice under the Act. The State Supreme Court stated: “It is unquestionable that state courts do have jurisdiction to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement and to enjoin a strike in violation of a ‘no-strike’ clause contained therein, but not when the strike is also arguably an unfair labor practice prohibited by federal law.” 279 So. 2d 300, 302 (1973). We granted certiorari to decide whether the holding of the Florida Supreme Court was consistent with decisions of this Court, including Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), and Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962). 414 U. S. 1063 (1973). We reverse.

Article VI of a collective-bargaining agreement between petitioner, William E. Arnold Co., and respondents, Carpenters District Council of Jacksonville and Vicinity and its affiliate, Local 627 (Carpenters), provides:

“There shall be no work stoppage, slowdown, work cessation or strike because of a Jurisdictional Dispute. A mutually agreeable settlement, or joint decision of the International Unions involved, or decision or interpretation of the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes (or Hearing Panel) shall be binding and all parties agree to accept such decision or interpretation.”

In 1971, during the construction of the Jacksonville General Hospital, one of Arnold’s subcontractors assigned work claimed by the Carpenters to the Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 59. The Carpenters struck Arnold to force reassignment of the work to their members. Arnold thereupon brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Duval County to enjoin the Carpenters from violating the provisions of Art. VI and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the strike. The Carpenters then sought a writ of prohibition from a Florida District Court of Appeal, contending that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to order injunctive relief because the alleged breach of the no-strike clause was also arguably an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (i) (D) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4) (i)(D), and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The District Court of Appeal denied the writ of prohibition and, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed.

When an activity is either arguably protected by § 7 or arguably prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA, the preemption doctrine developed in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), and its progeny, teaches that ordinarily “the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id., at 245. When, however, the activity in question also constitutes a breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board’s authority “is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S., at 197. This exception was explicitly reaffirmed in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 297-298 (1971). It was fashioned because the history of § 301 reveals that “Congress deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law,’” Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 513 (1962). Thus, we have said that the Garmon doctrine is “not relevant” to actions within the purview of § 301, Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S., at 101 n. 9, which may be brought in either state .or federal courts, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra, at 506.

Indeed, Board policy is to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in respect of disputed conduct arguably both an unfair labor practice and a contract violation when, as in this case, the parties have voluntarily established by contract a binding settlement procedure. See, e. g., The Associated Press, 199 N. L. R. B. 1110 (1972); Eastman Broadcasting Co., 199 N. L. R. B. 434 (1972); Laborers Local 423, 199 N. L. R. B. 450 (1972); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971). The Board said in Collyer, “an industrial relations dispute may involve conduct which, at least arguably, may contravene both the collective agreement and our statute. When the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract, we are of the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to function. . . . We believe it to be consistent with the fundamental objectives of Federal law to require the parties ... to honor their contractual obligations rather than, by casting [their] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon procedures.” Id., at 842-843. The Board’s position harmonizes with Congress’ articulated concern that, “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is . . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. ...” § 203 (d) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d).

Furthermore, when the particular contract violation also involves an arguable violation of § 8 (b) (4) (i) (D) of the NLRA concerning jurisdictional disputes, as in this case, the Board has recognized added policy justifications for deferring to the contractual dispute settlement mechanism agreed upon by the parties. Section 10 (k) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k), establishes a special procedure for the Board’s resolution of charges involving jurisdictional disputes:

“Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an'unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158 (b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, § 10 (k) “not only tolerates but actively encourages voluntary settlements of work assignment controversies between unions . . . Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 266 (1964). Recognizing Congress’ preference for voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes, the Board has declined jurisdiction in § 10 (k) cases, commenting that, “[i]f we retained jurisdiction . . . , the statutory purpose to encourage the voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes would be frustrated in that a party receiving an adverse decision from the agreed-upon tribunal for settling its jurisdictional dispute would be encouraged to ignore such decision, lapse into noncompliance, and then come before this Board for a more favorable resolution of the dispute.” Laborers Local 423, 199 N. L. R. B., at 451.

The Board’s practice and policy of declining to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over arguably unfair labor practices which also violate provisions of collective-bargaining agreements for voluntary adjustment of disputes highlight the congressional purpose that § 301 suits in state and federal courts should be the primary means for “promoting collective bargaining that [ends] with agreements not to strike.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 453 (1957). The assurance of swift and effective judicial relief provides incentive to eschew economic weapons in favor of binding grievance procedures and no-strike clauses.

The Carpenters contend, however, that state court jurisdiction over collective-bargaining disputes should be limited to claims for damages, rather than injunctive relief. See Brief for Respondents 7-9. We disagree. To be sure, Lucas, Smith, and Lockridge, all supra, involved only damages claims, but nothing in the opinions in those cases remotely suggests that state court jurisdiction should turn upon the particular type of relief sought. Indeed, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557, 561 (1968), disposes of the argument. We there said: “The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. . . . Any error in granting or designing relief ‘does not go to the jurisdiction of the court.’ Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 331.” Moreover, the policy reasons against extension of the Garmon doctrine to suits within the scope of § 301 are particularly compelling when the relief sought is specific performance of a no-strike obligation, rather than damages. What we said in Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 248 (1970), is pertinent here:

“[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 455. Any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.” (Footnotes omitted.)

See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 382 (1973).

Therefore, we reject the argument of Carpenters that the availability of effective equitable relief should be limited to the federal courts. We have previously expressed our agreement with Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court that “whether or not Congress could deprive state courts of the power to give such [injunctive] remedies when enforcing collective-bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the Norris-La Guardia Act or section 301,” McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P. 2d 322, 332 (1957). See Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, supra, at 247. Rather, the jurisdiction given federal courts under § 301 was “not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the courts of the various States over contracts made by labor organizations,” Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S., at 511.

We do not, of course, pass upon the propriety of the injunctive relief sought in the present case. That is a question to be resolved on remand. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. §185 (a).

       Section 8 (b) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:
      “(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
      “(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work . .. .”