author: Justice O’Connor Justice Scalia,

text:
    LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES et al.
    No. 04-881.
    Argued November 2, 2005
    Decided December 7, 2005

      O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scaua, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 147.

      Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott L. Nelson.

      Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hun-gar, Barbara C. Biddle, Kent D. Talbert, and Arnold I. Havens

        Stuart Rossman filed a brief for the National Consumer Law Center et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether the United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years.

I

A

Petitioner James Lockhart failed to repay federally rein-sured student loans that he had incurred between 1984 and 1989 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. These loans were eventually reassigned to the Department of Education, which certified the debt to the Department of the Treasury through the Treasury Offset Program. In 2002, the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s Social Security payments to offset his debt, some of which was more than 10 years delinquent.

Petitioner sued in Federal District Court, alleging that under the Debt Collection Act’s 10-year statute of limitations, the offset was time barred. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 376 F. 3d 1027 (2004). We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 998 (2005), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, see Lee v. Paige, 376 F. 3d 1179 (CA8 2004), and now affirm.

B

The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in 31 U. S. C. § 3711(a), an agency head can collect an outstanding debt “by administrative offset.” § 3716(a). The availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited, as the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, makes Social Security benefits, in general, not “subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42 U. S. C. § 407(a). The Social Security Act purports to protect this anti-attachment rule with an express-reference provision: “No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.” § 407(b).

Moreover, the Debt Collection Act’s offset provisions generally do not authorize the collection of claims which, like petitioner’s debts at issue here, are over 10 years old. 31 U. S. C. § 3716(e)(1). In 1991, however, the Higher Education Technical Amendments, 105 Stat. 123, sweepingly eliminated time limitations as to certain loans: “Notwithstanding any other provision of statute ... no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken,” 20 U. S. C. § 1091a(a)(2), for the repayment of various student loans, including the loans at issue here, § 1091a(a)(2)(D).

The Higher Education Technical Amendments, by their terms, did not make Social Security benefits subject to offset; these were still protected by the Social Security Act’s anti-attachment rule. Only in 1996 did the Debt Collection Improvement Act — in amending and recodifying the Debt Collection Act — provide that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including [§407] . . .),” with a limited exception not relevant here, “all payment due an individual under ... the Social Security Act . . . shall be subject to offset under this section.” 31 U. S. C. § 3716(e)(3)(A)(i).

II

The Government does not contend that the “notwithstanding” clauses in both the Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act trump the Social Security Act’s express-reference provision. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the terms of the . . . Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement . . . that modifications must be express[.] But.. . [u]nless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the ... Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the .. . provisions of that Act”); Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908).

We need not decide the effect of express-reference provisions such as § 407(b) to resolve this case. Because the Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset, it provides exactly the sort of express reference that the Social Security Act says is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.

It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner’s Social Security benefits to pay off his student loan debt. Petitioner argues that Congress could not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection Act’s statute of limitations as to offsets against Social Security benefits — since debt collection by Social Security offset was not authorized until five years later. Therefore, petitioner continues, the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits in 1991 only applies to then-valid means of debt collection. We disagree. “The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 158 (1991).

Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Technical Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act, do not explicitly mention §407. But § 407(b) only requires an express reference to authorize attachment in the first place — which the Debt Collection Improvement Act has already provided.

III

Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 1996 re-codification of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner. The Debt Collection Improvement Act, in addition to adding offset authority against Social Security benefits, retained the Debt Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority. But the mere retention of this previously enacted time bar does not make the time bar apply in all contexts — a result that would extend far beyond Social Security benefits, since it would imply that the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits was now a dead letter as to any kind of administrative offset. Rather, the Higher Education Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan context.

Finally, we decline to read any meaning into the failed 2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly authorize offset of debts over 10 years old. See H. R. 5025, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 8, 2004); S. 2806, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 15, 2004). “[F]ailed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’” United States v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990)). In any event, it is unclear what meaning we could read into this effort even if we were inclined to do so, as the failed amendment — which was not limited to offsets against Social Security benefits — would have had a different effect than the interpretation we advance today.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that, even if the express-reference requirement in § 207(b) of the Social Security Act is binding, it has been met here; and I join the opinion of the Court because it does not imply that the requirement is binding. I would go further, however, and say that it is not.

“[Ojne legislature,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crunch 87, 135 (1810). “The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation,” he asserted, “can never be controverted.” Ibid. See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (unlike the Constitution, a legislative Act is “alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 90 (1765) (“Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not”); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 125-126 (1868) (reprint 1987). Our cases have uniformly endorsed this principle. See, e. g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress ... does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding, years”); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559 (1880) (in cases involving “public interests” and “public laws,” “there can be ... no irrepealable law”); see generally 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 2-3, p. 125, n. 1 (3d ed. 2000).

Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legislature cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its . will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate — including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302 (1955), we interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act as impliedly exempting deportation hearings from the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), despite the requirement in § 12 of the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly,” 60 Stat. 244. The Court refused “to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.” 349 U. S., at 310. We have made clear in other cases as well, that an express-reference or express-statement provision cannot nullify the unambiguous import of a subsequent statute. In Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908), we said of an express-statement requirement that “[a]s the section ... in question has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment.” (Emphasis added.) A subsequent Congress, we have said, may exempt itself from such requirements by “fair implication” — that is, without an express statement. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U. S. 653, 659-660, n. 10 (1974). See also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 218 (1910).

To be sure, legislative express-reference or express-statement requirements may function as background canons of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware. For example, we have asserted that exemptions from the APA are “not lightly to be presumed” in light of its express-reference requirement, Marcello, supra, at 310; see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51 (1955). That assertion may add little or nothing to our already-powerful presumption against implied repeals.

“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent a clearly established congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other “magical password.”

For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, in the Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act, Congress unambiguously authorized, without exception, the collection of 10-year-old student-loan debt by administrative offset of Government payments. In doing so, it flatly contradicted, and thereby effectively repealed, part of § 207(a) of the Social Security Act. This repeal is effective, regardless of whether the express-reference requirement of § 207(b) is fulfilled.

Despite our jurisprudence on this subject, it is regrettably not uncommon for Congress to attempt, to burden the future exercise of legislative power with express-reference and express-statement requirements. See, e. g., 1 U. S. C. § 109; 5 U. S. C. §559; 25 U. S. C. § 1735(b); 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-3(b); 50 U. S. C. §§ 1547(a)(1), 1621(b). In the present case, it might seem more respectful of Congress to refrain from de-daring the invalidity of the express-reference provision. I suppose that would depend upon which Congress one has in mind: the prior one that enacted the provision, or the current one whose clearly expressed legislative intent it is designed to frustrate. In any event, I think it does no favor to the Members of Congress, and to those who assist in drafting their legislation, to keep secret the fact that such express-reference provisions are ineffective.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Scalia Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA et al.
    No. 04-1203.
    Argued November 9, 2005
    Decided January 10, 2006

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 160.

      Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the United States in No. 04-1203. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Schlozman, Patricia A. Millett, David K. Flynn, and Sarah E. Harrington.

      Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for petitioner in No. 04-1236. With him on the briefs were Drew S. Days III, Beth S. Brinkmann, and Seth M. Galanter.

      Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General of Georgia, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, John C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and David E. Langford, Assistant Attorney General.

      Gene C. Schaerr argued the cause and filed a brief for the State of Tennessee et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief were Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Linda T. Coberly, E. King Poor, Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Mike Cox of Michigan, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
      Hardy Myers of Oregon, Rob McKenna of Washington, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.

      Together with No. 04-1236, Goodman v. Georgia et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for ADAPT et al. by Paul M. Smith, Mark R. Heilbrun, Stephen F Gold, Elizabeth Alexander, David C. Fathi, Richard Taranto, Gerald Weber, Catherine Hanssens, Steve Banks, John Boston, Rhonda Brownstein, and Leonard Zandrow; for the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. by James W. Ellis, Michael B. Browde, and April Land; for the American Bar Association by Robert J. Grey, Jr.; for former President George H. W. Bush by C. Boyden Gray and A Stephen Hut, Jr.; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Charles Lester, Jr., Barbara R. Arnwine, Michael L. Foreman, Ossai Miazad, Vincent A Eng, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Angela Ciccolo; for the National Disability Rights Network by Kathleen Behan and Joan A Magagna; for Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. by Jerrold J. Ganzfried and Elizabeth B. Mc-Collum; and for Dick Thornburgh et al. by Charles D. Siegal, Bradley S. Phillips, Daniel P. Collins, Peter Blanch, Arlene Mayerson, and Eve Hill.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 337, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II).

I

A

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” § 12132 (2000 ed.). A “‘qualified individual with a disability’” is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). The Act defines “‘public entity’” to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, ... or other instrumentality of a State,” §12131(1). We have previously held that this term includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U. S. C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U. S. C. § 794a).

In enacting the ADA, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(4). Moreover, the Act provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” § 12202. We have accepted this latter statement as an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 363-364 (2001).

B

Petitioner in No. 04-1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all relevant times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia challenging the conditions of his confinement. He named as defendants the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections (state defendants) and several individual prison officials. He brought claims under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U S. C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, and other provisions not relevant here, seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against all defendants.

Goodman’s pro se complaint and subsequent filings in the District Court included many allegations, both grave and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, he claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities rendered him unable to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which was often denied. On multiple occasions, he asserted, he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own, and, on several other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the waste. He also claimed that he had been denied physical therapy and medical treatment, and denied access to virtually all prison programs and services on account of his disability.

The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the allegations in the complaint were vague and constituted insufficient notice pleading as to Goodman’s §1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the §1983 claims against all defendants without providing Goodman an opportunity to amend his complaint. The District Court also dismissed his Title II claims against all individual defendants. Later, after our decision in Garrett, the District Court granted summary judgment to the state defendants on Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages, holding that those claims were barred by state sovereign immunity.

Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, because Goodman’s multiple pro se filings in the District Court alleged facts sufficient to support “a limited number of Eighth-Amendment claims under § 1983” against certain individual defendants. App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, p. 17a, judgt. order reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court should have given Goodman leave to amend his complaint to develop three Eighth Amendment claims relating to his conditions of confinement:

“First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move his wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be believed, this effectively amounts to some form of total restraint twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day without penal justification. Second, Goodman has alleged several instances in which he was forced to sit in his own bodily waste because prison officials refused to provide assistance. Third, Goodman has alleged sufficient conduct to proceed with a § 1983 claim based on the prison staff’s supposed ‘deliberate indifference’ to his serious medical condition of being partially paraplegic ....” App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a (citation and footnote omitted).

The court remanded the suit to the District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning Goodman not to reassert all the §1983 claims included in his initial complaint, “some of which [we]re obviously frivolous.” Id., at 18a.

The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of Goodman’s allegations under Title II. Instead, relying on its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248 (2004), the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding that Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages against the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted certiorari to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the claims at issue here. 544 U. S. 1031 (2005).

II

In reversing the dismissal of Goodman’s § 1983 claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had alleged actual violations of the Eighth Amendment by state agents on the grounds set forth above. See App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a. The State does not contest this holding, see Brief for Respondents 41-44, and we did not grant certiorari to consider the merits of Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims; we assume without deciding, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of these claims was correct. Moreover, Goodman urges, and the State does not dispute, that this same conduct that violated the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II of the ADA. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 04-1236, p. 46; Brief for Respondents 41-44. In fact, it is quite plausible that the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate Goodman’s disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs constituted “exclusion] from participation in or . . . deni[al of] the benefits of” the prison’s “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 210 (noting that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” in § 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs). Therefore, Goodman’s claims for money damages against the State under Title II were evidently based, at least in large part, on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality opinion) (the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment). In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our other cases addressing Congress’s ability to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its § 5 powers. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 543, n. 4 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (respondents were not actually denied constitutional rights); Nevada Dept, of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 752, 755 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Nevada provided family leave “on a gender-neutral basis”— “a practice which no one contends suffers from a constitutional infirmity”); Garrett, 531 U. S., at 362, 367-368 (failure to make the special accommodations requested by disabled respondents was not unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 69-70, 83-84 (2000) (most petitioners raised nonconstitutional disparate-impact challenges to the State’s age-related policies); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 643-644, and n. 9 (1999) (Florida satisfied due process by providing remedies for patent infringement by state actors); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 512 (1997) (church building permit denied under neutral law of general applicability).

While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g., Lane, 541 U. S., at 513 (majority opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 538 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting), no one doubts that §5 grants Congress the power to “enforce ... the provisions” of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions. “Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id., at 559-560 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976) (“In [§ 5] Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce . . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment” by providing actions for money damages against the States (emphasis added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880) (“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States .... It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce . . . ”). This enforcement power includes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 456. Thus, insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that were based on such unconstitutional conduct.

From the many allegations in Goodman’s pro se complaint and his subsequent filings in the District Court, it is not clear precisely what conduct he intended to allege in support of his Title II claims. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue, it is likewise unclear to what extent the conduct underlying Goodman’s constitutional claims also violated Title II. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered that the suit be remanded to the District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint, but instructed him to revise his factual allegations to exclude his “frivolous” claims — some of which are quite far afield from actual constitutional violations (under either the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision), or even from Title II violations. See, e. g., App. 50 (demanding a “steam table” for Goodman’s housing unit). It is therefore unclear whether Goodman’s amended complaint will assert Title II claims premised on conduct that does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-elaim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.

* * *

The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

concurring.

The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign immunity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that violates the Constitution. Ante, at 159. And the state defendants have correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Title II is constitutional insofar as it authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State. See Brief for Respondents 6; see also Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248, 1264 (CA11 2004). Rather than attempting to define the outer limits of Title II’s valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity on the basis of the present record, the Court’s opinion wisely permits the parties, guided by Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 (2004), to create a factual record that will inform that decision. I therefore join the opinion.

It is important to emphasize that although petitioner Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims provide a sufficient basis for reversal, our opinion does not suggest that this is the only constitutional right applicable in the prison context and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue. As we explain, when the District Court and the Court of Appeals revisit that issue, they should analyze Goodman’s claims to see whether they state “actual constitutional violations (under either the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional provision),” ante, at 159 (emphasis added), and to evaluate whether “Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity [in such contexts] is nevertheless valid,” ibid. This approach mirrors that taken in Lane, which identified a constellation of “basic constitutional guarantees” that Title II seeks to enforce and ultimately evaluated whether Title II was an appropriate response to the “class of cases” at hand. 541 U. S., at 522-523, 531. The Court’s focus on Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims arises simply from the fact that those are the only constitutional violations the Eleventh Circuit found him to have alleged properly. See App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, pp. 18a-19a.

Moreover, our approach today is fully consistent with our recognition that the history of mistreatment leading to Congress’ decision to extend Title IPs protections to prison inmates was not limited to violations of the Eighth Amendment. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 524-525 (describing “backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” leading to enactment of Title II); see also, e. g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 391-424 (2001) (Appendixes to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing submissions made to Congress by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities showing, for example, that prisoners with developmental disabilities were subject to longer terms of imprisonment than other prisoners); 2 House Committee on Education and Labor, Legislative History of Public Law 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1331 (Comm. Print 1990) (stating that persons with hearing impairments “have been arrested and held in jail over night without ever knowing their rights nor what they are being held for”); id., at 1005 (stating that police arrested a man with AIDS and “[]Instead of putting the man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to spend the night”); California Dept, of Justice, Attorney General’s Commission on Disability: Final Report 103 (Dec. 1989) (finding that inmates with disabilities were unnecessarily “confined to medical units where access to work, job training, recreation and rehabilitation programs is limited”). In fact, as the Solicitor General points out in his brief arguing that Title II’s damages remedy constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation in the prison context, the record of mistreatment of prison inmates that Congress reviewed in its deliberations preceding the enactment of Title II was comparable in all relevant respects to the record that we recently held sufficient to uphold the application of that title to the entire class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 533-534. And while it is true that cases involving inadequate medical care and inhumane conditions of confinement have perhaps been most numerous, courts have also reviewed myriad other types of claims by disabled prisoners, such as allegations of the abridgment of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due process violations. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980) (procedural due process); May v. Sheahan, 226 F. 3d 876 (CA7 2000) (access to judicial process, lawyers, legal materials, and reading materials); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F. 2d 729 (CA10 1981) (access to reading and writing materials); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (WDNY 1991) (access to law library and religious services).

Indeed, given the constellation of rights applicable in the prison context, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit has erred in identifying only the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in performing the first step of the “congruence and proportionality” inquiry set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997). See Miller, 384 F. 3d; at 1272, and n. 28 (declining to entertain United States’ argument that Lane requires consideration of constitutional rights beyond those provided by the Eighth Amendment); App. A to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1236, p. 19a (relying on Miller to find Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages barred by the Eleventh Amendment). By reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in these eases and remanding for further proceedings, we not only provide the parties an opportunity to create a more substantial factual record, but also provide the District Court and the Court of Appeals the opportunity to apply the Boerne framework properly. Given these benefits, I agree with the Court’s decision to await further proceedings before trying to define the extent to which Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in the prison context.

      Such definition is necessary because Title II prohibits “‘a somewhat broader swath of conduct’” than the Constitution itself forbids. Lane, 541 U. S., at 533, n. 24 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 81 (2000)). While a factual record may not be absolutely necessary to our resolution of the question, it will surely aid our understanding of issues such as how, in practice, Title II’s “reasonableness” requirement applies in the prison context, cf. Lane, 541 U. S., at 531-532 (explaining that Title II requires only “ ‘reasonable modifications’ ”), and therefore whether certain of Goodman’s claims are even covered by Title II, cf. App. 83, ¶ 14 (complaining of lack of access to, among other things, “television, phone calls, [and] entertainment”).


author: Justice Ginsburg Justice Stevens,

text:
    VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEBER-SIMCO GMC, INC.
    No. 04-905.
    Argued October 31, 2005
    Decided January 10, 2006

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and O’Connor, Scaua, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 182.

      Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Donald J. Russell, Max Huffman, and David L. Williams.

      Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Pate, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Delrahim, Jonathan L. Marcus, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, and David Seidman.

      Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Richard D. Bernstein, Stephen B. Kinnaird, and Joe D. Byars, Jr

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Petroleum Institute by Carolyn F. Corwin, Harry M. Ng, and Douglas W. Morris; for the National Electrical Manufacturers Association by Clark R. Silcox; for the Truck Manufacturers Association et al. by G. Michael Halfenger; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and David Price.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Automobile Dealers Association by Paul R. Norman and Catherine

        Cetmngolo; and for the North American Equipment Dealers Association et al. by Wayne A Mack.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns specially ordered products — heavy-duty trucks supplied by Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo), and sold by franchised dealers through a competitive bidding process. In this process, the retail customer states its specifications and invites bids, generally from dealers franchised by different manufacturers. Only when a Volvo dealer’s bid proves successful does the dealer arrange to purchase the trucks, which Volvo then builds to meet the customer’s specifications.

Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), a Volvo dealer located in Fort Smith, Arkansas, commenced suit against Volvo alleging that Reeder’s sales and profits declined because Volvo offered other dealers more favorable price concessions than those offered to Reeder. Reeder sought redress for its alleged losses under §2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526,15 U. S. C. § 13 (Robinson-Patman Act or Act), and the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-72-201 et seq. (2001). Reeder prevailed at trial and on appeal on both claims.

We granted review on the federal claim to resolve the question whether a manufacturer offering its dealers different wholesale prices may be held liable for price discrimination proscribed by Robinson-Patman, absent a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers contemporaneously competing to resell to the same retail customer. While state law designed to protect franchisees may provide, and in this case has provided, a remedy for the dealer exposed to conduct of the kind Reeder alleged, the Robinson-Patman Act, we hold, does not reach the case Reeder presents. The Act centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition of that character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process.

I

Volvo manufactures heavy-duty trucks. Reeder sells new and used trucks, including heavy-duty trucks. 374 F. 3d 701, 704 (CA8 2004). Reeder became an authorized dealer of Volvo trucks in 1995, pursuant to a five-year franchise agreement that provided for automatic one-year extensions if Reeder met sales objectives set by Volvo. Ibid. Reeder generally sold Volvo’s trucks through a competitive bidding process. Ibid. In this process, the retail customer describes its specific product requirements and invites bids from several dealers it selects. The customer’s “decision to request a bid from a particular dealer or to allow a particular dealer to bid is controlled by such factors as an existing relationship, geography, reputation, and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by individual dealers.” Id., at 719 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer's specifications, it turns to Volvo and requests a discount or “concession” off the wholesale price (set at 80% of the published retail price). Id., at 704. It is common practice in the industry for manufacturers to offer customer-specific discounts to their dealers. Ibid.; App. 334, 337. Volvo decides on a case-by-case basis whether to offer a discount and, if so, what the discount rate will be, , taking account of such factors as industry-wide demand and whether the retail customer has, historically, purchased a different brand of trucks. App. 348-349, 333-334. The dealer then uses the discount offered by Volvo in preparing its bid; it purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when the retail customer accepts its bid. Ibid.

Reeder was one of many Volvo dealers, each assigned by Volvo to a geographic territory. Reeder’s territory encompassed ten counties in Arkansas and two in Oklahoma. 374 F. 3d, at 709. Although nothing prohibits a Volvo dealer from bidding outside its territory, ibid., Reeder rarely bid against another Volvo dealer, see id., at 705; 5 App. in No. 02-2462 (CA8), pp. 1621-1622 (hereinafter C. A. App.). In the atypical event that the same retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, Volvo’s stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer competing head to head for the same sale. 4 id., at 1161-1162; 5 id., at 1619, 1621.

In 1997, Volvo announced a program it called “Volvo Vision,” in which the company addressed problems it faced in the market for heavy trucks, among them, the company’s assessment that it had too many dealers. Volvo projected enlarging the size of its dealers’ markets and reducing the number of dealers from 146 to 75. 374 F. 3d, at 705. Coincidentally, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a price concession greater than the concessions Reeder typically received, and “Reeder came to suspect it was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate.” Ibid. Reeder filed suit against Volvo in February 2000, alleging losses attributable to Volvo’s violation of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.

At trial, Reeder’s vice-president, William E. Heck, acknowledged that Volvo’s policy was to offer equal concessions to Volvo dealers bidding against one another for a particular contract, but he contended that the policy “was not executed.” 4 C. A. App. 1162. Reeder presented evidence concerning two instances over the five-year course of its authorized dealership when Reeder bid against other Volvo dealers for a particular sale. 374 F. 3d, at 705, 708-709. One of the two instances involved Reeder’s bid on a sale to Tommy Davidson Trucking. 4 C. A. App. 1267-1268. Volvo initially offered Reeder a concession of 17%, which Volvo, unprompted, increased to 18.1% and then, one week later, to 18.9%, to match the concession Volvo had offered to another of its dealers. 5 id., at 1268-1272. Neither dealer won the bid. Id., at 1272. The other instance involved Hiland Dairy, which solicited bids from both Reeder and Southwest Missouri Truck Center. Id., at 1626-1627. Per its written policy, Volvo offered the two dealers the same concession, and Hiland selected Southwest Missouri, a dealer from which Hiland had previously purchased trucks. Ibid. After selecting Southwest Missouri, Hiland insisted on the price Southwest Missouri had bid prior to a general increase in Volvo’s prices; Volvo obliged by increasing the size of the discount. Id., at 1627. See also id., at 1483-1488; 374 F. 3d, at 720 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between concessions Volvo offered when Reeder bid against non-Volvo dealers, with concessions accorded to other Volvo dealers similarly bidding against non-Volvo dealers for other sales. Reeder’s evidence compared concessions Reeder received on four occasions when it bid successfully against non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions other successful Volvo dealers received in connection with bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. Id., at 705-706. Reeder also compared concessions offered by Volvo on several occasions when Reeder bid unsuccessfully against non-Volvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions received by other Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did not bid. Id., at 706-707.

Reeder’s vice-president, Heck, testified that Reeder did not look for instances in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, although he acknowledged it was “quite possible” that such instances occurred. 5 C. A. App. 1462. Nor did Reeder endeavor to determine by any statistical analysis whether Reeder was disfavored on average as compared to another dealer or set of dealers. Id., at 1462-1464.

The jury found that there was a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder and other Volvo truck dealers, and that Volvo’s discriminatory pricing injured Reeder. App. 480-486. It further found that Reeder’s damages from Volvo’s Robinson-Patman Act violation exceeded $1.3 million. Id., at 486. The District Court summarily denied Volvo’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and the company’s alternative motion for new trial or remittitur, awarded treble damages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment.

A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court noted that, “as a threshold mat-tery Reeder had to show [that] it was a ‘purchaser’ within the meaning of the [Act],” 374 F. 3d, at 708, i. e., that “there were actual sales at two different prices[,] ... a sale to [Reeder] and a sale to another Volvo dealer,” id., at 707-708. Rejecting Volvo’s contention that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to claims under the Robinson-Patman Act, id., at 708-709, the Court of Appeals observed that Reeder was “more than an unsuccessful bidder,” id., at 709. The four instances in which Reeder “actually purchased Volvo trucks following successful bids, on contracts,” the court concluded, sufficed to render Reeder a purchaser within the meaning of the Act. Ibid.

The Court of Appeals next determined that a jury could reasonably decide that Reeder was “in actual competition” with favored dealers. Ibid. “[A]s of the time the price differential was imposed,” the court reasoned, “the favored and disfavored purchasers competed at the same functional level . . . and within the same geographic market.” Ibid. (quoting Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F. 2d 578, 585 (CA2 1987)). The court further held that the jury could properly find from the evidence that Reeder had proved competitive injury from price discrimination. Specifically, the court pointed to evidence showing that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the number of its dealers; (2) Reeder lost the Hiland Dairy contract, for which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer; (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, had it received the concessions other dealers received; and (4) Reeder’s sales had declined over a period of time. 374 F. 3d, at 711-712. The court also affirmed the award of treble damages to Reeder. Id., at 712-714.

Judge Hansen dissented as to the Robinson-Patman Act claim. “Traditional [Robinson-Patman Act] cases,” he observed, “involve sellers and purchasers that carry inventory or deal in fungible goods.” Id., at 718. The majority, Judge Hansen commented, “attempted] to fit a square peg into a round hole,” ibid., when it extended the Act’s reach to the marketplace for heavy-duty trucks, where “special-order products are sold to individual, pre-identified customers only after competitive bidding,” ibid. There may be competition among dealers for the opportunity to bid on potential sales, he noted, but “[o]nce bidding begins,... the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate sale.” Id., at 719. Violation of the Act, in Judge Hansen’s view, could not be predicated on the instances Reeder identified in which it was a purchaser, for “there was no actual competition between” Reeder and another Volvo dealer at the time of Reeder’s purchases. Ibid. “Without proof of actual competition” for the same customer when the requisite purchases were made, he concluded, “Reeder cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility of competitive injury.” Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 903 (2005), to resolve this question: May a manufacturer be held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail customer? Satisfied that the Court of Appeals erred in answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.

II

Section 2, “when originally enacted as part of the Clayton Act in 1914, was born of a desire by Congress to curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive position of other sellers.” FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 543, and n. 6 (1960) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1914); S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-4 (1914)). Augmenting that provision in 1936 with the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress sought to target the perceived harm to competition occasioned by powerful buyers, rather than sellers; specifically, Congress responded to the advent of large chainstores, enterprises with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could demand. See 14 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2302, p. 11 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter Hovenkamp); P. Areeda & L. Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis ¶ 602, pp. 908-909 (5th ed. 1997) (hereinafter Areeda). The Act provides, in relevant part:

“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . 15 U. S. C. § 13(a).

Pursuant to §4 of the Clayton Act, a private plaintiff may recover threefold for actual injury sustained as a result of a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. See 15 U. S. C. § 15(a); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U. S. 557, 562 (1981).

Mindful of the purposes of the Act and of the antitrust laws generally, we have explained that Robinson-Patman does not “ban all price differences charged to different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 220 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); rather, the Act proscribes “price discrimination only to the extent that it threatens to injure competition,” ibid. Our decisions describe three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman Act claim: primary line, secondary line, and tertiary line. Primary-line cases entail conduct — most conspicuously, predatory pricing — that injures competition at the level of the discriminating seller and its direct competitors. See, e. g., id., at 220-222; see also Hovenkamp ¶ 2301a, pp. 4-6. Secondary-line cases, of which this is one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller’s customers (here, Volvo’s dealerships); cases in this, category typically refer to “favored” and “disfavored” purchasers. See ibid.; Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U. S. 543, 558, n. 15 (1990). Tertiary-line cases involve injury to competition at the level of the purchaser’s customers. See Areeda ¶ 601e, p. 907.

To establish the secondary-line injury of which it complains, Reeder had to show that (1) the relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce; (2) the trucks were of “like grade and quality”; (3) Volvo “discriminate[d] in price between” Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks; and (4) “the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition” to the advantage of a favored purchaser, i. e., one who “receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination.” 15 U. S. C. § 13(a). It is undisputed that Reeder has satisfied the first and second requirements. Volvo and the United States, as amicus curiae, maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the third and fourth requirements, because Reeder has not identified any differentially priced transaction in which it was both a “purchaser” under the Act and “in actual competition” with a favored purchaser for the same customer.

A hallmark of the requisite competitive injury, our decisions indicate, is the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 518-519 (1963) (evidence showed patronage shifted from disfavored dealers to favored dealers); Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 437-438, and n. 8 (1983) (complaint “supported by direct evidence of diverted sales”). We have also recognized that a permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that a favored competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial period of time. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 49-51 (1948); Falls City Industries, 460 U. S., at 435. Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, however, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury required under the Act.

III

The evidence Reeder offered at trial falls into three categories: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-to-purchase comparisons); and (3) evidence of two occasions on which Reeder bid against another Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). The Court of Appeals concluded that Reeder demonstrated competitive injury under the Act because Reeder competed with favored purchasers “at the same functional level . . . and within the same geographic market.” 374 F. 3d, at 709 (quoting Best Brands, 842 F. 2d, at 585). As we see it, however, selective comparisons of the kind Reeder presented do not show the injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act.

A

Both the purchase-to-purchase and the offer-to-purchase comparisons fall short, for in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. Nor did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared dealers were consistently favored vis-á-vis Reeder. Reeder simply paired occasions on which it competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with instances in which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no systematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven months. See 374 F. 3d, at 706, 710.

We decline to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35, 55. No similar risk of manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chainstore paradigm. Here, there is no discrete “favored” dealer comparable to a chain-store or a large independent department store — at least, Reeder’s evidence is insufficient to support an inference of such a dealer or set of dealers. For all we know, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal vis-a-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. See supra, at 172.

Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on potential sales in a broad geographic area. At that initial stage, however, competition is not affected by differential pricing; a dealer in the competitive bidding process here at issue approaches Volvo for a price concession only after it has been selected by a retail customer to submit a bid. Competition for an opportunity to bid, we earlier observed, is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. See supra, at 170. We reiterate in this regard an observation made by Judge Hansen, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit’s Robinson-Patman holding: Once a retail customer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, “the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate sale.” 374 F. 3d, at 719. That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in the same geographic area does not import that they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. In sum, the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder’s “competitors,” hence those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, 460 U. S., at 435 (inference of competitive injury under Morton Salt arises from “proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over time” (emphasis added)).

B

Reeder did offer evidence of two instances in which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. See supra, at 171-172. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier’s product to fulfill its contractual commitment. Because Robinson-Patman “prohibits only discrimination ‘between different purchasers’” Brief for Petitioner 26 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 13(a); emphasis added), Volvo and the United States argue, the Act does not reach markets characterized by competitive bidding and special-order sales, as opposed to sales from inventory. See Brief for Petitioner 27; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 17-20. We need not decide that question today. Assuming the Act applies to the head-to-head transactions, Reeder did not establish that it was disfavored vis-a-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale — let alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. See 1 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 478-479 (5th ed. 2002) (“No inference of injury to competition is permitted when the discrimination is not substantial.” (collecting cases)).

Reeder’s evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder. 374 F. 3d, at 705. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other dealer the same concession. Volvo ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer, but only after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition Reeder identified, Volvo increased Reeder’s initial 17% discount to 18.9%, to match the discount offered to the other competing Volvo dealer; neither dealer won the bid. See supra, at 172. In short, if price discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the “favored” Volvo dealer.

IV

Interbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the “primary concern of antitrust law.” Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51-52, n. 19 (1977). The Robinson-Patman Act signals no large departure from that main concern. Even if the Act’s text could be construed in the manner urged by Reeder and embraced by the Court of Appeals, we would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition. In the case before us, there is no evidence that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier’s selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands. See id., at 51-52 (observing that the market impact of a vertical practice, such as a change in a supplier’s distribution system, may be a “simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition”). By declining to extend Robinson-Patman’s governance to such cases, we continue to construe the Act “consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.” Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 220 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, n. 13 (1979)); see Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63 (1953) (cautioning against Robinson-Patman constructions that “extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation”).

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Thomas joins,

dissenting.

Franchised dealers who sell Volvo trucks, like those who sell automobiles, farm equipment, washing machines, and a variety of other expensive items, routinely engage in negotiations with prospective purchasers. Sometimes the prospect is simultaneously negotiating with two Volvo dealers, sometimes with a Volvo dealer and a dealer representing another manufacturer, and still other times a satisfied customer who is generally familiar with the options available in a competitive market may negotiate with only one dealer at a time. Until today, the Robinson-Patmah Act’s prohibition of price discrimination would have protected the dealer’s ability to negotiate in all those situations. Today, however, by adopting a novel, transaction-specific concept of competition, the Court eliminates that statutory protection in all but those rare situations in which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two Volvo dealers at the same time.

I

Setting aside for the moment the fact that the case involves goods specially ordered for particular customers rather than goods stocked in inventory, the case is a rather ordinary Robinson-Patman suit. Respondent Reeder alleged a violation of the Act; the parties submitted a good deal of conflicting evidence to the jury; the trial judge properly instructed the jurors on the elements of price discrimination, competitive injury, and damages; and the jury returned a verdict resolving all issues in Reeder’s favor. The Court of Appeals found no error in either the instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence. 374 F. 3d 701 (CA8 2004).

Two issues of fact bear particular mention.

First, Volvo does not challenge the jury’s finding of price discrimination. Reeder’s theory of the case was that Volvo sought to cut back its number of dealers and deemed Reeder expendable. To avoid possible violations of franchise agreements and state laws, Volvo chose to accomplish this goal by offering Reeder worse prices than other regional dealers.

Reeder introduced substantial evidence of this theory. It showed that Volvo had an explicit business strategy, known as the “Volvo Vision,” of “fewer dealers, larger markets.” App. 34. It showed that Volvo could afford to lose sales as it squeezed dealers out, since the boom years of the late 1990’s left Volvo with about as many orders as it could fill. Id., at 256-257. And it showed that Volvo frequently gave worse prices to it than to other regional dealers. On at least four occasions, Volvo sold trucks to Reeder at significantly higher prices than to other dealers buying similar trucks around the same time. To give one example, in the spring of 1998 Volvo sold 20 trucks to Reeder at a 9% concession, but sold similar trucks to a Texas dealer at a 12.3% concession. Id., at 132-134. This left Reeder paying $2,606 more per truck. Id., at 134. Although the Court chides Reeder for failing to perform statistical analyses, see ante, at 172-173, 178, the jury clearly had a sufficient basis for finding price discrimination. It could infer that Volvo’s pricing policies were comparable to a secret catalog listing one set of low prices for its “A” dealers and a higher set for its “B” dealers like Reeder, with an exception providing for the same prices where an “A” dealer and a “B” dealer were engaged in negotiations with the same customer at the same time.

Second, the jury found that the favored dealers at issue in these, comparisons were competitive players in the same geographic market as Reeder. This conclusion is implicit in the jury’s finding of competitive injury, since the jury instruction on that element required Reeder to prove

“a substantial difference in price in sales by defendant to plaintiff and other competing Volvo dealers over a significant period of time. This requires plaintiff to show that it and the other Volvo dealer(s) were retail dealers within the same geographic market and that the effect of the price differential was to allow the other Volvo dealer(s) to draw sales or profits away from plaintiff.” App. 480, Instruction No. 18.

Volvo does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that Reeder and the favored dealers operated in the same geographic market. Volvo’s restraint is wise, as Reeder offered evidence that truck buyers are unsurprisingly mobile, that it delivered trucks to purchasers throughout the region, and that customers would sometimes solicit bids from more than one regional Volvo dealer.

II

For decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the Robinson-Patman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948):

“It is argued that the findings fail to show that respondent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s discounts, although the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. The statute requires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations ‘may be substantially to lessen competition... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.’ After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that ‘the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they “may” have such an effect.’ Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found whát would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate.” Id., at 45-47 (footnote omitted).

We have treated as competitors those who sell “in a single, interstate retail market.”. Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 436 (1983); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320, 327 (1961). Under this approach — uncontroversial until today — Reeder would readily prevail. There is ample evidence that Volvo charged Reeder higher prices than it charged to competing dealers in the same market over a period of many months. That those higher prices impaired Reeder’s ability to compete with those dealers is just as obvious as the injury to competition described by the Court in Morton Salt.

Volvo nonetheless argues that no competitive injury could have occurred because it never discriminated against Reeder when Reeder and another Volvo dealer were seeking concessions with regard to the same ultimate customer. In Volvo’s view, each transaction was a separate market, one defined by the customer and those dealers whom it had asked for bids. For each specific customer who has solicited bids, Reeder’s only “competitors” were the other dealers making, bids. Accordingly, if none of these other dealers were Volvo dealers, then Reeder suffered no competitive harm (relative to other Volvo dealers) when Volvo gave it a discriminatorily high price.

Unlike the Court, I cannot accept Volvo’s vision. Nothing in the statute or in our precedent suggests that “competition” is evaluated by a transaction-specific inquiry, and such an approach makes little sense. It requires us to ignore the fact that competition among truck dealers is a continuing war waged over time rather than a series of wholly discrete events. Each time Reeder managed to resell trucks it had purchased at discriminatorily high. prices, it was forced either to accept lower profit margins than were available to favored Volvo dealers or to pass on the higher costs to its customers (who then might well go to a different dealer the next time). And we have long indicated that lost profits relative to a competitor are a proper basis for permitting the Morton Salt inference. See, e. g., Falls City Industries, 460 U. S., at 435 (noting that to overcome the Morton Salt inference, a defendant needs “evidence breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales or profits” (emphasis added)). By ignoring these commonsense points, the Court gives short shrift to the Robinson-Patman Act’s prophylactic intent. See 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (barring price discrimination where “the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition” (emphasis added)); see also, e. g., Morton Salt, 334 U. S., at 46.

The Court appears to hold that, absent head-to-head bidding with a favored dealer, a dealer in a competitive bidding market can suffer no competitive injury. It is unclear whether that holding is limited to franchised dealers who do not maintain inventories, or exeludes virtually all franchisees from the effective protection of the Act. In either event, it is not faithful to the statutory text.

III

As the Court recognizes, the Robinson-Patman Act was primarily intended to protect small retailers from the vigorous competition afforded by chainstores and other large volume purchasers. Whether that statutory mission represented sound economic policy is not merely the subject of serious debate, but may well merit Judge Bork’s characterization as “wholly mistaken economic theory.” I do not suggest that disagreement with the policy of the Act has played a conscious role in my colleagues’ unprecedented decision today. I cannot avoid, however, identifying the irony in a decision refusing to adhere to the text of the Act in a case in which the jury credited evidence that discriminatory prices were employed as means of escaping contractual commitments and eliminating specifically targeted firms from a competitive market. The exceptional quality of this case provides strong reason to enforce the Act’s prohibition against discrimination even if Judge Bork’s evaluation (with which I happen to agree) is completely accurate.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

       To shield its ability to compete with other manufacturers, Volvo keeps confidential its precise method for calculating concessions offered to dealers. 374 F. 3d 701, 704-705 (CA8 2004); App. 337-338.

       The jury also awarded Reeder damages of $513,750 on Reeder’s state-law claim under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act. No question is before us respecting that claim, which trained on Volvo’s alleged design to eliminate Reeder as a Volvo dealer. See supra, at 171.

       A dealer’s reputation for securing favorable concessions, we recognize, may influence the customer’s bidding invitations. Cf. post, at 183, n. 2. We do not pursue that point here, however, because Reeder did not present — or even look for — evidence that Volvo consistently disfavored Reeder while it consistently favored certain other dealers. See supra, at 172-173.

       The dissent assails Volvo’s decision to reduce the number of its dealers. Post, at 183. But Robinson-Patman does not bar a manufacturer from restructuring its distribution networks to improve the efficiency of its operations. If Volvo did not honor its obligations to Reeder as its franchisee, “[a]ny remedy . .. lies in state laws addressing unfair competition and the rights of franchisees, not in the Robinson-Patman Act.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28.

       See also Hovenkamp ¶ 2333c, p. 109 (commenting that the Eighth Circuit’s expansive interpretation “views the [Robinson-Patman Act] as a guarantee of equal profit margins on sales actually made,” and thereby exposes manufacturers to treble damages unless they “charge uniform prices to their dealers”).

       Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by §1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, provides in relevant part:
      “It shall be unlawful for any person ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. 113(a).

       Additionally, on more than 12 other occasions, Volvo offered worse deals to Reeder than it gave to dealers who made comparable purchases. Arguably due to Volvo’s stingy concessions, Reeder failed to close with its customers in these instances and thus never ended up buying the trucks at issue from Volvo.

       Similarly, and despite its selective discussion of the extensive eviden-tiary record, ante, at 170-173, the Court does not question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Volvo engaged in price discrimination against Reeder relative to other regional Volvo dealers for a significant period of time.

       Indeed, if Volvo’s argument about the meaning of “purchaser,” see ante, at 179-180, ultimately meets with this Court’s approval, then the
      Robinson-Patman Act will simply not apply in the special-order context. Any time a special-order dealer fails to complete a transaction because the high price drives away its ultimate customer, there will be no Robinson-Patman violation because the dealer will not meet the “purchaser” requirement, and any time the dealer completes the transaction but at a discriminatorily high price, there will be no violation because the dealer has no “competition” (as the majority sees it) for that specific transaction at the moment of purchase.

       R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 382 (1978).