author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Stevens,

text:
    CODD, POLICE COMMISSIONER, CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. v. VELGER
    No. 75-812.
    Argued December 1, 1976
    Decided February 22, 1977

      W. Bernard Richland argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.

      Sam Resnicoff argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward M. Rappaport.

   Per Curiam.

Respondent Velger’s action shifted its focus, in a way not uncommon to lawsuits, from the time of the filing of his complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which we review here. His original complaint alleged that he had been wrongly dismissed without a hearing or a statement of reasons from his position as a patrolman with the New York City Police Department, and under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, sought reinstatement and damages for the resulting injury to his reputation and future employment prospects. After proceedings in which Judge Gurfein (then of the District Court) ruled that respondent had held a probationary position and therefore had no hearing right based on a property interest in his job, respondent filed an amended complaint. That complaint alleged more specifically than had the previous one that respondent was entitled to a hearing due to the stigmatizing effect of certain material placed by the City Police Department in his personnel file. He alleged that the derogatory material had brought about his subsequent .dismissal from a position with the Penn-Central Railroad Police Department, and that it had also prevented him from finding other employment of a similar nature for which his scores on numerous examinations otherwise qualified him.

The case came on for a bench trial before Judge Werker, who, in the words of his opinion on the merits, found “against plaintiff on all issues.” He determined that the only issue which survived Judge Gurfein’s ruling on the earlier motions was whether petitioners, in discharging respondent had “imposed a stigma on Mr. Yelger that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” After discussing the evidence bearing upon this issue, Judge Werker concluded that “[i]t is clear from the foregoing facts that plaintiff has not proved that he has been stigmatized by defendants.”

Among the specific findings of fact made by the District Court was that an officer of the Penn-Central Railroad Police Department was shown the City Police Department file relating to respondent’s employment, upon presentation of a form signed by respondent authorizing the release of personnel information. From an examination of the file, this officer “gleaned that plaintiff had been dismissed because while still a trainee he had put a revolver to his head in an apparent suicide attempt.” The Penn-Central officer tried to verify this story, but the Police Department refused to cooperate with him, advising him to proceed by letter. In rendering judgment against the respondent, the court also found that he had failed to establish “that information about his Police Department service was publicized or circulated by defendants in any way that might reach his prospective employers.”

Respondent successfully appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court held that the finding of no stigma was clearly erroneous. It reasoned that the information about the apparent suicide attempt was of a kind which would necessarily impair employment prospects for one seeking work as a police officer. It also decided that the mere act of making available personnel files with the employee’s consent was enough to place responsibility for the stigma on the employer, since former employees had no practical alternative but to consent to the release of such information if they wished to be seriously considered for other employment. Velger v. Cawley, 525 F. 2d 334 (1975).

We granted certiorari, sub nom. Cawley v. Velger, 427 U. S. 904 (1976), and the parties have urged us to consider whether the report in question was of a stigmatizing nature, and whether the circumstances of its apparent dissemination were such as to fall within the language of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972) and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976). We find it unnecessary to reach these issues, however, because of respondent’s failure to allege or prove one essential element of his case.

Assuming all of the other elements necessary to make out a claim of stigmatization under Roth and Bishop, the remedy mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “an opportunity to refute the charge.” 408 U. S., at 573. “The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name,” id., at 573 n. 12. But if the hearing mandated by the Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual dispute between an employer and a discharged employee which has some significant bearing on the employee’s reputation. Nowhere in his pleadings or elsewhere has respondent affirmatively asserted that the report of the apparent suicide attempt was substantially false. Neither' the District Court nor the Court of Appeals made any such finding. When we consider the nature of the interest sought to be protected, we believe the absence of any such allegation or finding is fatal to respondent’s claim under the Due Process Clause that he should have been given a hearing.

Where the liberty interest involved is that of conditional freedom following parole, we have said that the hearing required by the Due Process Clause in order to revoke parole must address two separate considerations. The first is whether the parolee in fact committed the violation with which he is charged, and the second is whether if he did commit the act his parole should, under all the circumstances, therefore be revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 479-480 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784 (1973). The fact that there was no dispute with respect to the commission of the act would not necessarily obviate the need for a hearing on the issue of whether the commission of the act warranted the revocation of parole.

But the hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment is solely “to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.” If he does not challenge the substantial truth of the material in question, ho hearing would afford a promise of achieving that result for him. For the contemplated hearing does not embrace any determination analogous to the “second step” of the parole revocation proceeding, which would in effect be a determination of whether or not, conceding that the report were true, the employee was properly refused re-employment. Since the District Court found that respondent had no Fourteenth Amendment property interest in continued employment, the adequacy or even the existence of reasons for failing to rehire him presents no federal constitutional question. Only if the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination is such a hearing required. Both, supra; Bishop, supra.

Our decision here rests upon no overly technical application of the rules of pleading. Even conceding that the respondent’s termination occurred solely because of the report of an apparent suicide attempt, a proposition which is certainly not crystal clear on this record, respondent has at no stage of this litigation affirmatively stated that the “attempt” did not take place as reported. The furthest he has gone is a suggestion by his counsel that “[i]t might have been all a mistake, [i]t could also have been a little horseplay.” This is not enough to raise an issue about the substantial accuracy of the report. Respondent has therefore made out no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment that he was harmed by the denial of a hearing, even were we to accept in its entirety the determination by the Court of Appeals that the creation and disclosure of the file report otherwise amounted to stigmatization within the meaning of Board of Regents v. Roth, supra.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with instructions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

concurring.

I join the Court’s per curiam opinion, but I emphasize that in this case there is no suggestion that the information in the file, if true, was not information of a kind that appropriately might be disclosed to prospective employers. We therefore are not presented with a question as to the limits, if any, on the disclosure of prejudicial, but irrelevant, accurate information.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

dissenting.

I dissent from today’s holding substantially for the reasons expressed by my Brother Stevens in Part I of his dissent, despite my belief that the Court’s ruling is likely to be of little practical importance.

Respondent alleged that he suffered deprivation of his liberty when petitioners terminated his employment and retained stigmatizing information in his employment file, information later disseminated to a prospective employer. Under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972), respondent therefore was entitled to a timely pretermination hearing. The Court today reaffirms Roth, but holds that respondent’s retrospective claim for damages and equitable relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 must be denied because “at no stage of this litigation,” ante, at 628, has he “raise [d] an issue about the substantial accuracy of the report” in question. Ibid. That holding, I believe, erroneously allocates the burden of introducing truth or falsity into the lawsuit.

Twice before this Term we have reasserted the principle that once a plaintiff establishes that another has interfered with his constitutional rights, the burden shifts to the wrongdoer to demonstrate that any such interference was strictly harmless. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., ante, at 270-271, n. 21; Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, ante, at 287. In this case respondent met his initial burden, for he adequately alleged that he has suffered injury to his reputation and job prospects in conjunction with a discharge from public employment, and that petitioners failed to comply with Roth’s resulting requirement of a due process hearing. I agree that the District Court remains open to a determination that petitioners’ denial of respondent’s due process rights produced little or no compensable injury, since, even had the hearing properly been held, the stigmatizing charges would have remained unrefuted. But any such allegation and proof of truthful material properly is a defense to be raised by the defendant wrongdoer — subject, of course, to appropriate disposition of the case by way of summary judgment should, the employee thereupon fail to contest the “substantial accuracy of the report.” Since petitioners interposed no such defense in this case, respondent’s due process claim should be upheld.

I also agree with Part III of Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, and I would therefore remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

Although sharing generally the views expressed in the Court’s opinion, I agree with Part III of Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, and I would for that reason remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

There are three aspects of the Court’s disposition of this case with which I disagree. First, I am not persuaded that a person who claims to have been “stigmatized” by the State without being afforded due process need allege that the charge against him was false in order to state a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Second, in my opinion the Court should not assume that this respondent was stigmatized, because the District Court’s contrary finding was not clearly erroneous. Third, I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the claim that respondent had a property interest in his job, since that court did not decide this issue.

I

The Court holds that respondent’s failure to allege falsity negates his right to damages for the State’s failure to give him a hearing. This holding does not appear to rest on the view that a discharged employee has no right to a hearing unless the charge against him is false. If it did, it would represent a radical departure from a principle basic to our legal system — the principle that the guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to a fair trial. It would also be a departure from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 572-575. In that case the Court concluded that a person is deprived of liberty when the State’s refusal to rehire him destroys his “good name” in the community or forecloses him from practicing his profession. A hearing may establish that such a deprivation of liberty is warranted because the charges are correct. But Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 349, makes it clear that the truth or falsity of the charge “neither enhances nor diminishes [the employee’s] claim that his constitutionally protected interest in liberty has been impaired.” If the charge, whether true or false, involves a deprivation of liberty, due process must accompany the deprivation. And normally, as Both plainly states, the Constitution mandates “a full prior hearing.” 408 U. S., at 574.

This hearing must include consideration of whether the charge, if true, warrants discharge. The discharge itself is part of the deprivation of liberty against which the employee is entitled to defend. Release of unfavorable information can damage an employee’s reputation and employment prospects, but far greater injury is caused by an official determination, based on such information, that the employee is unfit for public employment. Indeed the Court has held that an injury to reputation had not resulted in a deprivation of liberty because it was not associated with the termination of employment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709-710. Since allowing the employee to keep his job would eliminate (or at least lessen) the loss of liberty, due process requires that the hearing include the issue whether the facts warrant discharge. In short, the purpose of the hearing, as is true of any other hearing which must precede a deprivation of liberty, is twofold: first, to establish the truth or falsity of the charge, and second, to provide a basis for deciding what action is warranted by the facts. Even when it is perfectly clear that the charge is true, the Constitution requires that procedural safeguards be observed. Cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 503. For these reasons, I disagree with the Court’s assertion that the purpose of the hearing is “solely” to provide the person with an opportunity to clear his name.

Even, if I agreed with the Court that this was the sole purpose of the hearing, I could not agree with its holding that failure to demonstrate falsity is fatal to the employee’s suit. Surely the burden should be on the State to show that failure to provide due process was harmless error because the charges were true. See Mr. Justice Brennan’s dissent, ante, p. 629. Moreover, failure to provide a hearing might give rise to damages unrelated to the possible outcome of the hearing.

Today’s holding may have the unfortunate effect of encouraging public officials to deny hearings when they feel confident of the correctness of their decision. But, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s oft-quoted words:

“That a conclusion satisfies one’s private conscience does not attest its reliability. The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.” Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 171-172 (concurring opinion).

As the last sentence in this quotation demonstrates, if state action has consequences sufficiently grievous to constitute a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty, it is essential that fair procedures be followed for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the individual case. Today’s holding is only a minor impairment of this principle. But the principle is one that admits of no compromise.

II

Although the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving that he was discharged for a false reason, if he claims that the discharge deprived him of liberty, he does have the burden of proving that he was stigmatized. The District Court found that respondent did not meet that burden in this case. Under the proper standard of appellate review, I cannot .say that finding was clearly erroneous, particularly when the record discloses that the respondent did not prove exactly what the unfavorable information in his file was, or exactly what information was disseminated to others.

The District Court found that unfavorable information from respondent’s police record reached a prospective employer in only one instance. In that instance, a private employer was allowed to see the file with respondent’s permission. The private employer then discharged respondent, who was on probationary status. The District Court expressly found that no' information was released to any government agency to which respondent had applied. App. 113a-114a. Thus, as far as the past effects of the unfavorable file are concerned, we have only the finding that one employer discharged respondent on the basis of the information. This does not in itself constitute a “stigma” as that term is used in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564.

The Court of Appeals also relied on the nature of the information itself as demonstrating that future release to employers would bar respondent from obtaining employment. Velger v. Cawley, 525 F. 2d 334, 336 (CA2 1975). Notwithstanding the broad discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent failed to prove precisely what adverse information was in his personnel file. The revolver incident occurred sometime before respondent’s 21st birthday, when he was still a trainee; as his counsel points out, it might well have been “a little horseplay”; and his subsequent conduct as a police officer was presumably good. There was no finding that the revolver incident was the official reason for discharge. On this record, it cannot be said as a matter of law that prospective employers would reject respondent’s attempts to explain this incident and would uniformly refuse to hire him.

In the performance of our appellate function “[i]t is not enough that we might give the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities differently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the District Court apparently deemed innocent. . . . We are not given those choices, because our mandate is not to set aside findings of fact ‘unless clearly erroneous.’ ” United States v. Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 495-496.

I conclude that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in setting aside the District Court’s findings of fact. Since those findings do not establish the existence of a stigma, the Court of Appeals erred in holding on this basis that a hearing was required.

Ill

It is possible, however, that a hearing was required because the discharge deprived respondent of a property interest. The District Court rejected the claim that he had an entitlement to his job as a matter of state law, but the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach this issue. I believe there is enough merit to the property claim to justify a remand to the Court of Appeals with directions to consider it.

In Bishop v. Wood, the plaintiff’s job was “terminable at the will of either party irrespective of the quality of performance by the other party.” 426 U. S., at 345 n. 9, and accompanying text. There was no right to state judicial review. In this case, however, the state law may afford the employee some protection against arbitrary discharge. According to the state case cited by Judge Gurfein, App. 37a, the Police Commissioner may terminate only “unsatisfactory employee[s],” and his determination is reviewable in the state courts on an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. In re Going v. Kennedy, 5 App. Div. 2d 173, 176-177, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 237-238 (1958), aff’d, 5 N. Y. 2d 900, 156 N. E. 2d 711 (1959); see In re Talamo v. Murphy, 38 N. Y. 2d 637, 345 N. E. 2d 546 (1976). Unlike Bishop, in which a hearing would have been pointless because nothing plaintiff could prove would entitle him to keep his job, in this case the plaintiff may have had a right to continued employment if he could rebut the charges against him.

By directing the Court of Appeals to reinstate the District Court judgment, the Court summarily rejects this claim without the benefit of briefing or oral argument on the point. I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of this claim.

       Respondent’s amended complaint did not seek a delayed Both hearing to be conducted by his former employer at which he would have the opportunity to refute the charge in question. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972). The relief he sought was premised on the assumption that the failure to accord such a hearing when it should have been accorded entitled him to obtain reinstatement and damages resulting from the denial of such hearing. We therefore have no occasion to consider the allocation of the burden of pleading and proof of the necessary issues as between the federal forum and the administrative hearing where such relief is sought.

        The Court of Appeals did not pass on this "property interest” question. Respondent has not urged it as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment of that court, and indeed has all but conceded in his brief that the District Court’s interpretation of the relevant New York cases is correct in this respect. Brief for Respondent 14. The opinion of the District Court on this point reflects a proper understanding of Roth, supra, and of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 598 (1972), and we see no reason to disturb its application of those cases to particular facets of the New York law of entitlement to public job tenure. Id., at 602 n. 7.

       The Court fortunately makes clear that it is not calling for an “overly technical application of the rules of pleading.” Ante, at 628. Indeed, there may be instances where a plaintiff reasonably cannot be held responsible for failing to plead falsity in his complaint. For example, in this instance, respondent cannot be faulted for his failure to plead falsity, since his complaint alleged that he “does not know the contents of his personnel file and has never seen or been advised of any derogatory matter placed in his file.” App. 51a. Thus, his undoing occurred, according to the Court, in the later “stage[s] of this litigation,” when he learned of the specific contents of the employment file but made little effort “to raise an issue about the substantial accuracy of the report.” Ante, at 628.

       Respondent has never argued that the disseminated information, while truthful, was not properly informative of his role as policeman or employee. As Mr. Justice Blackmun notes, ante, at 629, the Court’s opinion, therefore, does not address — and does not foreclose — the question of whether the Constitution imposes separate constraints upon the collection and dissemination of stigmatizing information that bears only an attenuated relationship to one’s job performance or qualifications.

       A determination of truthful material would preclude an award of damages for false stigmatization of plaintiff’s reputation. Nonetheless, because of petitioners’ failure to satisfy Roth’s requirement of a pretermination due process hearing, respondent still would have suffered deprivation of an established constitutional right. As with any infringement of an intangible constitutional right, e. g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927) (damages allowable for unlawful denial of the right to vote), a jury should be permitted to decide whether to fix and award damages— perhaps only nominal — for the very denial of a timely due process forum where a stigmatized individual could participate in the process of attempting to clear his name.

       The Court indicates, ante, at 625 n. 1, that its holding is premised on the form of relief sought. If falsity were a precondition to the existence of a constitutional violation, the form of relief would be irrelevant. For to grant any relief, the federal court would first have to determine that a violation had occurred, which would in turn require a finding of falsity. I recognize that there is authority for the view that falsity is an element of the violation. See Sims v. Fox, 505 F. 2d 857, 863-864 (CA5 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 1011. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709-710 (describing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, as involving government “defamation”).

       “When we deny even the most degraded person the rudiments of a fair trial, we endanger the liberties of everyone. We set a pattern of conduct that is dangerously expansive and is adaptable to the needs of any majority bent on suppressing opposition or dissension.
      “It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.” Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).

       As I read Part II of Roth, supra, at 572-575, which discusses the kind of “liberty” that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there are two quite different interests which may be implicated when a nontenured employee is discharged. First, the Court, 408 U. S., at 573, considers the individual’s interest in “ ‘good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.’ ” It is with respect to this reputational interest that the Court indicates, id., at 573 n. 12, that a name-clearing hearing is constitutionally required. That footnote does not tell us whether that hearing must precede the injury to reputation, and surely does not imply that such a hearing is the only remedy available to an employee whose constitutional right to due process has been violated.
      Second, in the ensuing paragraphs, the Roth opinion considers the individual interest in avoiding “a stigma or other disability” that forecloses employment opportunities. With respect to this interest, the Court rather clearly indicates, id., at 574, that no such stigma may be imposed without a “full prior hearing.”

         Similarly, since disclosure of the charges is also part of the deprivation of liberty, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 348, the hearing could properly include the issue whether the charges should remain confidential, or whether the written record should at least be modified to reflect a less one-sided description of the events.

       The Court states, ante, at 627:
      "Where the liberty interest involved is that of conditional freedom following parole, we have said that the hearing required by the Due Process Clause in order to revoke parole must address two separate considerations. The first is whether the parolee in fact committed the violation with which he is charged, and the second is whether if he did commit the act his parole should, under all the circumstances, therefore be revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 479-480 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784 (1973). The fact that there was no dispute with respect to the commission of the act would not necessarily obviate the need for a hearing on the issue of whether the commission of the act warranted the revocation of parole.”
      This reasoning is equally applicable to a decision to revoke a person’s employment for a stigmatizing reason. The fact that there is no dispute with respect to the commission of the act involved does not necessarily obviate the need for a hearing on the issue of whether employment should be terminated.

       The Court states, ibid., that “the hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment is solely ‘to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.”’ (Emphasis added.) Earlier, ibid., the Court states: “Assuming all of the other elements necessary to make out a claim of stigmatization under Both and Bishop, the remedy mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘an opportunity to refute the charge.’ 408 U. S., at 573.” Of course, in neither Both nor Bishop did the Court state or imply that a name-clearing hearing was the only ^ remedy mandated by the Constitution.

         The Court’s contrary approach would produce perverse results when the relief sought by the plaintiff includes an administrative hearing. To establish his right to such relief, the plaintiff would have to plead — and presumably prove — that the charges against him are false. But once it is established that the charges are false, there is no longer any reason to hold an administrative hearing on that subject.
      This problem is squarely presented by this case because respondent did request such a hearing. At trial, respondent’s counsel made the following statement:
      “And therefore, he should be reinstated and he should be given a full hearing, an adversary hearing.” App. 93a.
      Under modem trial practice, no more formal request was necessary. The amended complaint had requested a declaratory judgment that “the action of defendants in terminating plaintiff’s employment without charges and without a hearing [was] in violation of the Constitution . . . ,” and had sought “such additional alternative relief as may seem to this Court to be just, proper and equitable.” Id., at 55a-56a. And, of course, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (c) provides that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.”

       See Judge Tone’s thoughtful discussion of this problem in Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. 515, 523 F. 2d 569, 578-580 (CA7 1975).

       The general principle governing review of a District Court’s findings of fact is clear:
      “In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. The authority of an appellate court, when reviewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier of the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence. The question for the appellate court under Rule 52 (a) is not whether- it would have made the findings the trial court did, but whether ‘on the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948).” Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U. S. 100, 123.

       The Court of Appeals found “every indication” that respondent would have obtained a job except for the contents of his file. Velger v. Cawley, 525 F. 2d 334, 335 (CA2 1975). Apart from the one instance of disclosure found by the District Court, this conclusion seems to have been based on an incident in which respondent was told he would be hired if his character investigation was satisfactory, and on the fact that he had passed numerous civil service examinations and received several job interviews but no jobs. The incident referred to by the Court of Appeals proves nothing about the effect of the contents of the file, since respondent testified that he refused to give that employer permission to inspect the file. App. 81a. The fact that respondent was unsuccessful in obtaining a job, despite numerous attempts, good examination scores, and several interviews, does not prove that he was stigmatized by information in his file since the District Court found that those employers had not had access to the file. Entirely apart from the file, there may have been factors which made respondent less attractive to employers than other available applicants.

        Roth recognizes two types of stigma. See n. 3, supra. First, the State’s action “might seriously damage [the employee’s] standing and associations in his community.” 408 U. S., at 573. The release of information to a single employer at the employee’s request can hardly be considered an injury to the employee’s community standing. Second, the State’s action might have the effect of “foréelos [ing] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Ibid. It is not enough, however, to make him “somewhat less attractive to some other employers,” for that “would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of ‘liberty.’ ” Id., at 574 n. 13. The fact that one employer considered the information a bar to employment does not necessarily mean that most other employers would have the same reaction. In short, on the basis of the entire record the District Court could find that this single incident of disclosure and its aftermath do not establish a sufficiently grievous harm to reputation to constitute a deprivation of liberty.

       The District Court did find that a private employer who inspected the file had “gleaned” from the file that this was the reason for the discharge.

       In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, the employee could be discharged only for “ 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of [the] service,’” id., at 151-152 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Six Members of the Court were satisfied that that standard was sufficient to create an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause. This respondent had a right to keep his job if he proved “satisfactory.” I do not know whether the difference between Kennedy’s entitlement and this respondent’s is of constitutional dimensions, but the similarity to Arnett is sufficient to justify a remand.

         In In re Going v. Kennedy, the Appellate Division noted that the appointing officer had been delegated the authority to terminate “unsatisfactory employee [s],” and compared the probation period to an additional employment test designed to determine whether an employee is “able to meet all requirements or expectations in filling the position.” 5 App. Div. 2d, at 178, 170 N. Y. S. 2d, at 239. The New York Court of Appeals, citing Going with approval, applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in Tálamo to determine whether there was a “rational basis” for the police commissioner’s decision to discharge a probationary police officer. 38 N. Y. 2d, at 639, 345 N. E. 2d, at 547. See also In re Farrell v. New York City Police Dept., 44 App. Div. 2d 782, 355 N. Y. S. 2d 99 (1974), aff’d, 37 N. Y. 2d 843, 340 N. E. 2d 469 (1975).

       Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601:
      “A person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.”
      Even if respondent’s entitlement is a sufficient property interest to trigger due process, he is not necessarily entitled to an elaborate adversary hearing. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481: But at least respondent would be entitled to notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to respond, if only in writing.

       Respondent did not abandon that claim in this Court. The portion of his brief cited by the majority, ante, at 628 n. 2, concerns the issue whether state law itself requires a hearing, see Brief for Respondent 14; this is an entirely different issue than whether state law creates a sufficient entitlement to trigger a federal right to a hearing. To preserve his right to a remand, the party prevailing below need not argue the merits of claims the lower court failed to reach. See generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476, n. 6.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WARREN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.
    No. 76-489.
    Decided February 22, 1977
   Per Curiam.

The motion of Eddie Thomas et al. for leave to file a brief, as amici curiae, is granted.

In November 1970, the Board of Supervisors of Warren County, Miss., submitted a county redistricting plan to the Attorney General for his approval under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The new plan was to replace a plan in effect since 1929. After requesting and receiving additional information, the Attorney General entered an objection to the plan. Despite this objection, the Board held elections in 1971 pursuant to the 1970 plan. After the elections, the Board sought reconsideration of the objection. The Attorney General refused to withdraw the objection and in 1973 .filed a complaint, pursuant to § 5, in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged that the Attorney General’s objection to the 1970 redistricting plan rendered that plan unenforceable under § 5, and that the election districts in effect prior to the 1970 redistricting were malapportioned under the Fourteenth Amendment. Three forms of relief were requested: (1) a declaration that implementation of the 1970 plan violated § 5; (2) an injunction against implementing the 1970 plan or any other new plan until there had been compliance with one of the two procedures required by § 5; and (3) an order that a new redistricting plan be developed and implemented after being found acceptable under § 5.

A properly convened three-judge court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. In its later order implementing that judgment, the court found that because the upcoming 1975 County elections could not be held as scheduled “without abridging rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution,” the elections had to be stayed subject to compliance with the procedure set out in the court’s order. The order provided that the County submit a redistricting plan to the Attorney General for § 5 review and, if no objection were interposed, that elections then be held in accordance with a stipulated schedule. In the event that the County submitted no plan by a stated deadline, or that the Attorney General objected to a submitted plan, or that a submitted plan contained infirmities with respect to the one-person-one-vote requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court would consider plans prepared by both parties and adopt an appropriate redistricting plan to be used in elections held according to the ordered schedule.

The County then informally submitted two plans to the Attorney General for comment and the Attorney General indicated his reservations concerning the validity of the plans. This impasse continued until the deadline in the court’s order, after which time the court directed the parties to file their proposed plans for its consideration. After a hearing, the court adopted one of the plans prepared by the County despite the fact that the plan had not been approved pursuant to § 5 procedures. The court found that the adopted plan “neither ■ dilutes black voting strength nor is deficient in one-man, one-vote considerations.” It ordered that the county’s districts be reorganized according to the plan and that elections be held. The United States appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1973c and 28 U. S. C. § 1253.

Section 5 provides for two alternative methods by which a State or political subdivision covered by the Act may satisfy the requirement of federal scrutiny of changes in voting procedures. First, the State or political subdivision may institute an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the proposed change does not have the purpose or effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race; second, it may submit the proposed change to the Attorney General. No new voting practice or procedure may.be enforced unless the State or political subdivision has succeeded in its declaratory judgment action or the Attorney General has declined to object to a proposal submitted to him. See n. 1, supra. Attempts to enforce changes that have not been subjected to § 5 scrutiny may be enjoined by any three-judge district court in a suit brought by a voter, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554-563 (1969), or by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States, Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§12 (d), (f), 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973j (d), (f).

In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), this Court held that the separate procedures of § 5 imposed a limitation on the determinations that may be made by district courts entertaining actions brought to enjoin § 5 violations:

“What is foreclosed to such district court is what Congress expressly reserved for consideration by the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General — the determination whether a covered change does or does not have the purpose or effect 'of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color/ ” 400 U. S., at 385.

Adhering to Allen, the Court held that the inquiry of a local district court in a § 5 action against a State or political subdivision is “limited to the determination whether 'a [voting] requirement is covered by § 5, but has not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny.’ ” 400 U. S., at 383, quoting Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 561. This holding was subsequently reaffirmed in Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975).

Allen, Perkins, and Connor involved private suits by voters claiming noncompliance with § 5 procedures; we now hold that the same limitations on the inquiry of local district courts apply in § 5 actions brought by the Attorney General. The limitation inheres in Congress’ determination that only the District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether a proposed change actually discriminates on account of race and that other district courts may consider § 5 “coverage” questions. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 558-559.

The District Court in this case twice exceeded the permissible scope of its § 5 inquiry. In the order implementing its summary judgment for the United States, the court apparently decided that the 1970 redistricting plan did not comply with the Fifteenth Amendment. In its later Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approving a plan submitted to the court by Warren County, the court “proceeded on the premise that if . . . Fifteenth Amendment protections had not been accorded by any plan proposed, the court could have instituted its own plan,” and then determined that the County plan “will not lessen the opportunity of black citizens of Warren County to participate in the political process and elect officials of their choice.” In both instances the court below erred in deciding the questions of constitutional law; it should have determined only whether Warren County could be enjoined from holding elections under a new redistricting plan because such plan had not been cleared under § 5. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

       Section 5 requires, in relevant part, that whenever a State or political subdivision covered by the Act seeks to administer “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,” it may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that “such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Until the District of Columbia court enters a declaratory judgment to that effect, no person may be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with the new practice or procedure. As an alternative to the requirement of a declaratory judgment, § 5 permits the State or political subdivision to enforce a new voting procedure if the procedure has been first submitted to the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorney General has not, within 60 days, interposed an objection to the proposed change. All actions under § 5 are required to be heard by a three-judge court. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c.
      There is no dispute in this case that Warren County is a political subdivision covered by the Act, that realignment of election districts is a voting practice or procedure, and that Warren County has not instituted a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

       The court’s order enjoined the holding of the 1975 elections because they could not be held without abridging Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. The court did not elaborate, but it appears to have held that Fourteenth Amendment, one-person-one-vote rights would be abridged if the election were conducted under the old districting plan and the Fifteenth Amendment rights of black voters would be violated if the 1970 redistricting plan were used.

       Although the record is not clear, the source of the confusion concerning the power of the District Court in this case seems to have arisen from the fact that the Attorney General did not seek merely to enjoin implementation of the 1970 redistricting plan, but also asked the court to enjoin any election until the County had been redistricted in a manner that both met the requirements of the Voting Rights Act and eliminated the malapportionment of the old districts. The malapportionment of the old plan could not, however, be made the subject of a Government suit brought under § 5. The section is addressed only to voting procedures that were not in effect on November 1, 1964. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 138-139 (1976). The ahegedly malapportioned districts had existed long before 1964 and were,- therefore, not properly before the court in the § 5 action.


text:
    DONOVAN v. PENN SHIPPING CO., INC., et al.
    No. 76-613.
    Decided February 22, 1977
   Per Curiam.

The petitioner, while employed by the respondents as a seaman on the SS Penn Sailor, slipped on wet paint, injuring his right wrist and elbow. He sued the respondents under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, and obtained a $90,000 verdict at his juiy trial. The respondents moved to set aside the verdict as excessive. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 50, 59. The District Court granted the motion, and ordered a new trial on damages unless the petitioner agreed to remit $25,000 of the $90,000 award.

After some time the petitioner submitted to the District Court a proposed order stating that he accepted “under protest” the reduced verdict of $65,000, but reserving nonetheless “his right to appeal therefrom.” This language was adopted by the District Court in entering a judgment for the petitioner in the amount of $65,000.

The petitioner sought appellate review of the District Court’s decision to order a conditional new trial. In so doing he asked the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to discard the settled rule that a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may not appeal to seek reinstatement of the original verdict. The Court of Appeals refused the petitioner’s invitation, and dismissed the appeal. 536 F. 2d 536.

The Court of Appeals properly followed our precedents in holding that a plaintiff cannot “protest” a remittitur he has accepted in an attempt to open it to challenge on appeal. A line of decisions stretching back to 1889 has firmly established that a plaintiff cannot appeal the propriety of a remittitur order to which he has agreed. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 29-30 (1889); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U. S. 551, 554-555 (1894); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U. S. 41, 52 (1895); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U. S. 79, 82 (1917).

There are decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals that depart from these unbroken precedents. Those decisions held or intimated that a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur “under protest” may challenge on appeal the correctness of the remittitur order. See, e. g., Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int’l Airlines, Inc., 518 F. 2d 89, 94 (CA1 1975); United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F. 2d 910 (CA5 1970); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F. 2d 1033 (CA5 1970) ; Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F. 2d 266 (CA5 1966) ; Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 F. 2d 11, 15 (CA5 1963). Other decisions have suggested that when entertaining cases pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction, a federal court should look to state practice to determine whether such an appeal is permitted. See Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F. 2d 726 (CA6 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F. 2d 127 (CA6 1973); Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F. 2d 7 (CA6 1964).

The proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is, however, a matter of federal law, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 466-469 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop., 356 U. S. 525 (1958), and that law has always prohibited appeals in the situation at bar. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly adhered to the consistent rule established by this Court’s decisions. In order to clarify whatever uncertainty might exist, we now reaffirm the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal court, whether prosecuting a.state or federal cause of action, may not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant the petition for certiorari but would have the case argued and given plenary consideration rather than disposed of summarily.


author: Per Curiam. Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SOUTHERN OHIO, INC., et al. v. PINE CREEK CONSERVANCY DISTRICT et al.
    No. 76-667.
    Decided February 22, 1977
   Per Curiam.

Chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code establishes procedures for the organization and governance of conservancy districts, political subdivisions of the State invested with the power to carry out flood prevention and control measures. The statute provides for the creation of a conservancy court each time that a petition is duly filed to propose the creation of a new district. It is the conservancy court’s responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing the proposed district and then, if it decides to create the district, to assume the ultimate responsibility for administering the district. A conservancy district may include territory from one or more counties, and the conservancy court is composed of one judge from the court of common pleas in each county having territory within the conservancy district.

In 1966 the Pine Creek Conservancy District was established in accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter 6101. Appellants, who collectively are residents, property owners, and taxpayers in the Pine-Creek District, brought the present action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging, inter alia, that chapter 6101 is unconstitutional.

Appellants leveled three constitutional challenges against the statute in the District Court, and those claims have been renewed in the 'instant appeal. First, they argue that it violates due process for the conservancy courts to make the decision as to whether the conservancy districts that they will administer should be formed. Since the judges of the conservancy courts are entitled to special compensation for their work on those courts, appellants contend that they have a financial incentive to declare the proposed districts organized and that, therefore, persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). Second, appellants contend that the composition of the conservancy courts violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), because the judges on those courts are selected without regard to the size of the population that they represent. Third, appellants argue that chapter 6101 permits the disenfranchisement of freeholders affected by the decision to create a conservancy district because the statute creates a presumption that a local political body, such as a township, represents the views of alb persons within its jurisdiction whenever it supports a petition proposing the creation of a conservancy district.

A three-judge court rejected all of these claims on the single ground that they were foreclosed by Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35 (1918), aff’g 245 F. 486 (WD Ohio 1917), a case in which we rejected a due process and equal protection attack on the statute challenged here. No. C-1-75-5 (WD Ohio, July 6, 1976).

None of the issues presented in this case was raised or passed upon in On. The appellant in On presented four issues to this Court, none of which had anything to do with the issues presented here. The appellant argued that the challenged statute denied him judicial review, that it authorized an impairment of existing contracts, that it improperly conferred legislative powers on the judiciary, and that it authorized a taking without compensation. Our three-page memorandum opinion in On did not purport to go beyond the issues raised by the appellant in that ease. By no stretch of the imagination- can our decision in On be thought to have silently dealt with issues which arose and were decided in later cases such as Ward, Tumey, and Reynolds v. Sims.

Because the court below gave no independent consideration to the issues raised by appellants and relied exclusively on On, although that case considered none of the issues now presented, it is apparent that the merits of appellants’ claims have never been fully considered by any federal court. Without offering any view as to the relative merit of appellants’ contentions, it is fair to say that they are not insubstantial. We therefore reverse the decision below and remand for a full consideration of the issues presented by appellants.

So ordered.

The Chief Justice would note probable jurisdiction and give plenary consideration to this appeal.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens join,

dissenting.

The action the Court takes today in this appeal is unexplained and very likely inexplicable. The three-judge District Court heard the case and rendered a final decision on the merits. It concluded that our affirmance in Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35 (1918), and principles of stare decisis, compelled rejection of the constitutional challenges.

The opinion of the District Court sets forth every one of the challenges detailed by the Court today, and it is clear from its opinion that each of these claims was considered and rejected by it. On appeal here from such a decision, in the absence of relevant intervening circumstances, see, e. g., Guste v. Jackson, ante, p. 399; Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 423 U. S. 808 (1975); Weinberger v. Jobst, 419 U. S. 811 (1974), or procedural irregularities in the District Court’s consideration of the case, e. g., Westby v. Doe, 420 U. S. 968 (1975), this Court ordinarily either affirms, modifies, or reverses the judgment of the District Court. But in this case it has chosen none of these courses. Disagreeing with the District Court as to the scope of Orr v. Allen, it remands for “full consideration” of claims based on eases decided since Orr, in the teeth of the obvious fact that the District Court did consider these claims and rejected them. I agree with the Court that Orr does not afford an adequate basis for our affirming the District Court, although I am not nearly as certain that it Was not an adequate basis for the District Court’s decision. But even though the Members of this Court are agreed that Orr is not authority for rejecting appellants’ claims based on Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), that amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the reasoning of the District Court on the merits of the case. We should treat those claims, here now, rather than “remanding” to the District Court as if we were editing a law student’s first draft of a law review note.

Believing as I do that we should reach and decide these claims, I shall state briefly my reasons for concluding that they are not sufficiently substantial to warrant setting the case for argument, and that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

Appellants raise three constitutional objections. Two of them are connected in the sense that they do not relate to the operation of the Pine Creek Conservancy District, but, rather, are objections solely to the formation of that district. The first of these contentions is that persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. The second is that chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code permits disenfranchisement of freeholders to object to the formation of the district if the local political body supported the petition.

The district was formed in 1966, and these two objections were fully available to be raised at that time. This lawsuit was not filed until 1975. Absent some persuasive demonstration of a reason for such delay, I would view such a leisurely attack on the formation of a governmental body as barred by laches. "There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of the court.” McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161, 168 (1843). The appellants seek not merely a reapportionment of the voting population of the district, but a judicial declaration that its formation was a nullity. Surely an attack on the formation of an organ of government is one of the situations where “both the nature of the claim and the situation of the parties was such as to call for diligence.” Benedict v. City of New York, 250 U. S. 321, 328 (1919). There has been no such diligence here, and neither the pleadings nor the proof intimates any excuse for the delay.

These two challenges, I believe, fare no better on the merits. The first, again, challenges the constitutionality, under Tumey v. Ohio, supra, of having court of common pleas judges decide whether the district should be formed, since, under § 141.07 of the Ohio Revised Code Ann. (Page 1975 Supp.), they will receive extra compensation if such district is formed. Neither Tumey nor Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972), has any direct bearing on the constitutionality of the Ohio procedure for forming a conservancy district. As Tumey and Ward made clear, those cases involved quintessentially judicial functions, see, e. g., Tumey, supra, at 522. Here, however, the determinations, although made by judges, are essentially legislative in nature. As Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, the determination of legislative facts does not necessarily implicate the same considerations as does the determination of adjudicative facts. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441 (1915). Since I know of no constitutional objection to the formation of such districts through legislative or executive action — without giving opposing citizens a chance to air their objections, see Houck v. Little River Dist., 239 U. S. 254, 262 (1915) — I see no constitutional objection to the procedures followed here. Those procedures simply insured an additional check on the process of formation, already petitioned for by the town governments, and the fact that they may not have been before an “impartial” judicial officer offends no constitutional right of appellants.

The second “formation” challenge, as presented by appellants, raises the following issue:

“Section 6101.05, Ohio Revised Code, submits the first decision in the creation of a conservancy district to' the freeholders, who must petition for its creation. This is the only step in the entire procedure which calls for any participation in support or opposition, by the residents or landowners, to the creation of the district or the execution of its projects. . . . Section 6101.05, Ohio Revised Code, provides that the petition may be signed by the governing body of any public corporation in the proposed district. When such a public corporation signs the petition, all freeholders within it are conclusively presumed to favor creation of the district. In effect, all persons living in the three townships and one village which signed the petition who opposed the district were deprived of the right to oppose the district.” Jurisdictional Statement 13-14.

This constitutional challenge is wholly insubstantial. I know of nothing, and appellants suggest nothing, which would even arguably make the issue one that freeholders were constitutionally entitled to vote on. Thus, had the statute simply allowed the governing bodies of the respective townships to form such a district, there is surely no constitutional objection simply because the populace did not vote, Houck v. Little River District, supra, at 262, 264. To the extent the claim here protests the “discrimination” against the freeholders in a town whose governing body signs the petition, in that they “were deprived of the right to oppose the district,” it is simply wrong on the facts. There is no conclusive presumption, when the governing body signs a petition, that “all freeholders . . . favor creation of the district.” Rather, opposing freeholders in such towns remain as free as opposing freeholders in towns where petitions are circulated, to appear before the conservancy court and “object to the organization and incorporation of said district . . . .” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 6101.08 (Page 1975 Supp.). They are entitled to no more under the Constitution.

Appellants raise one other objection to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme, although not limited exclusively to the formation of the district. This is the claim that the selection of judges for the conservancy court violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, supra, and its progeny. But the one-man, one-vote decisions do not apply to the selection of judges, Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (MD La. 1972), aff’d, 409 U. S. 1095 (1973). As the majority of the functions of the conservancy court are admittedly judicial, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 6101.07, 6101.28, 6101.33 (Page 1975 Supp.), the majority of such a one-man, one-vote challenge has already been squarely rejected by Wells. With respect to the remaining functions, essentially legislative or executive in nature, the scope of powers granted to a conservancy district itself are so narrowly confined as not to call into play the strict application of one-man, one-vote doctrines. Conservancy districts, established solely for flood prevention and control, do not exercise “general governmental powers,” as that phrase was defined in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474 (1968). Rather, flood control is a “special limited purpose,” much like that found in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U. S. 719 (1973), and, likewise, “the popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds [v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964)] and succeeding cases are inapplicable ....” Id., at 730. In such a situation, where both counties have an interest, and there is no evidence of discrimination against any group, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), such a selection process is permissible, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., supra; cf. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161 (1907). As I am unable to conclude that the decision to have one judge for each affected county is “wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation’s objectives,” Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556 (1947), I would also reject this challenge and affirm the judgment of the District Court.

       Appellants’ reply brief before the District Court amply argues that Orr was not controlling because that case concerned other constitutional challenges. Thus, the District Court was aware of the arguments this Court now relies on for a remand.

       The judgment order entered in the case states: “This matter came on for hearing by agreement of the parties upon the briefs of the parties on the issues of constitutionality of various sections of Chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with Conservancy Districts.” The District Court thus did canvass the contentions going to the merits, and decided the issue, albeit on a ground not favored by the majority of this Court. But there can be no contention that appellants were precluded from entering relevant evidence into the record, or precluded from presenting a pertinent legal argument. Both parties, in essence, presented all they wished to on the constitutional issues to the District Court. Nor is there any hint that the factual record is in such a shape as to preclude determination of the issues by this Court. I am simply at a loss to explain this Court’s curious remand.

       None of the named plaintiffs allege in their complaint that they were residents at the time of the formation of the Conservancy District, although there are recitations in the body of the complaint that might indicate that at least some were residents at that time. Because of the failure to allege residency in 1966, their standing to raise such contentions is questionable.

       Once the district is formed, the conservancy court has no incentive to decide a particular fact situation one way or another, as their pay remains the same in either case. The Jurisdictional Statement of appellants, however, suggests another, related attack:
      “To receive payment of this per diem, of course, the treasury of the district must be full. The income of the district comes from assessments based on appraisals which the court must approve or disapprove Yet this challenge is to the remote impact on funding from full town coffers, raised and rejected in Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U. S. 61 (1928). The payments are paid out of assessments, which are the responsibility, in the first instance, of the board of directors of the district, not the conservancy court, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 6101.45, 6101.48 (Page 1975 Supp.). This issue surely raises no further challenge not worthy of a summary affirmance.

       In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 579 (1973), where the proceeding was adjudicative in nature, but not criminal, we discussed whether the “pecuniary interest of the members . . . had sufficient substance to disqualify them . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Here, of course, the proceeding is more legislative than adjudicative, and is neither criminal nor stigmatizing.

       We are told that the Pine Creek Conservancy District lies partially in Lawrence County and partially in Scioto County. We are told that the 1970 population was 56,868 and 76,951, respectively. We are also told that “[i]n neither instance is the entire county included in the district.” We are not told, however, how much of either county is in the district, nor how many freeholders reside in either county. It would seem to follow that appellants fail in their burden of showing that “the voting power of the judges” has not been approximated “to the number of people they represent, or to the land or people within the district which they represent.”


text:
    No. 75-6904.
    Martin v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed August 2,1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 75-1896.
    Ring v. Waddington, Director of Motor Vehicles of New Jersey, et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari dismissed August 4, 1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 75-1751.
    Pearlman v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed August 17, 1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 76-5194.
    Davis v. Brewer, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari dismissed September 7, 1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 76-328.
    Gruner et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Fresno.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari dismissed September 27, 1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 75-6914.
    Mayes v. Pickett.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed September 27, 1976, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    October 4, 1976
    No. 75-1489.
    Balzac Bros., Inc. v. Waring Products Division, Dynamics Company of America, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. P. R.


text:
    No. 75-1490.
    Ziviak, Administrator v. United States.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Mass.


text:
    No. 75-1768.
    Ward v. Board of Examiners of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors of Puerto Rico et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. P. R.


text:
    No. 76-6688.
    Odom v. Caldwell.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga.


text:
    No. 75-1913.
    Habron et al. v. Epstein, Commissioner of Labor and Industry of Maryland, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Md. Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1386.
    Hadley v. New Hampshire.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. dismissed for want of .substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1408.
    Gipson v. Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1662.
    Witz, Administratrix v. Renner Realty Corp. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1699.
    Horodner v. Fisher, Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles of New York, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1734.
    No. 75-1754.
    Kubo et al. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board of California et al.; and Pandol & Sons et al. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board of California et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1917.
    In re Robb.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1735.
    Williams et al. v. Jones, Appraiser of Escambia County, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.-


text:
    No. 75-1818.
    Adams v. Harris County, Texas.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-6728.
    Smith et ux. v. Spradling, Director, Department of Revenue of Missouri.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-6939.
    Taylor v. Anderson.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-32.
    City of Brainerd et al. v. Minnesota State Board of Health.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-34.
    Speck Restaurant, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ore. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-127.
    Acs, Administratrix v. Brady.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct., Ind. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-142.
    Dickson et al. v. New Hampshire.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-149.
    Stathes v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1452.
    Kimbell, Inc., dba Foodway Furr's, Inc., et al. v. Employment Security Commission of New Mexico et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. M. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Stevens would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1581.
    Leemon v. Illinois.
   Appeal from App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1750.
    Dayon v. Downe Communications, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1793.
    Allen et vir v. St. Luke's Hospital of Kansas City.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Mo., Kansas City Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1879.
    Haupt v. Montgomery County Bar Assn. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6860.
    Bills v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6684.
    Tewksbury v. California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6694.
    Strickland et al. v. Tennessee.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Tenn. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-6901.
    Swigert et al. v. Miller et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6.
    Generes v. Stich et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5183.
    House v. Welsh.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1670.
    Levy et al. v. City of New York et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1807.
    Stuart McGuire Co., Inc. v. Forst, Tax Commissioner, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ya. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stewart would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1873.
    Uri et al. v. Alaska.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Alaska dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 75-1878.
    Landgraff v. Wagner et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ariz. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 75-6940.
    Cross v. Eu et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 76-38.
    Bruce et al. v. Wichita State University et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Kan. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 75-6744.
    Figueroa v. Director, New York City Department of Personnel, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-6853.
    Browne v. Massachusetts.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct., E. Middlesex County, Mass., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Costarelli v. Massachusetts, 421 U. S. 193 (1975).


text:
    No. 76-107.
    Smith v. Smith.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Okla. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 76-194.
    White, Judge v. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio, dismissed for want of properly presented federal question.


text:
    No. 75-1672.
    Gustafson v. Hoffman et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. M. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.


text:
    No. 75-1881.
    Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Rheynard.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Mich. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976).


text:
    No. 75-1521.
    No. 75-1609.
    No. 75-1858.
    Dow Chemical Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.; Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.; National Labor Relations Board v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded with directions to remand to the National Labor Relations Board for reconsideration in light of intervening circumstances.


text:
    No. 75-1584.
    Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 1384, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U. S. 397 (1976).


text:
    No. 75-6509.
    Middleton v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976).


text:
    No. 75-1677.
    Carey, Governor of New York, et al. v. Echevarria.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for consideration of question of mootness in light of intervening legislation.


text:
    No. 75-1756.
    Lebowitz v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976).


author: Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 75-6766.
    No. 75-6797.
    Collins v. Arkansas; and Neal v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgments vacated insofar as they leave undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976).

Mr. Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. I would therefore grant certiorari in these cases and vacate the judgments insofar as they leave undisturbed the death sentences imposed.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Because I consider the death penalty to be a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), I would grant certiorari in these cases and vacate the judgments insofar as they leave undisturbed the sentences of death.


text:
    No. 75-6819.
    No. 75-6842.
    No. 75-6847.
    No. 75-6981.
    No. 76-5168.
    Williams v. North Carolina. Carter v. North Carolina. Hunt v. North Carolina. Bush v. North Carolina. Davis v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C.

Sup. Ct. N. C.

Sup. Ct. N. C.

Sup. Ct. N. C.

Sup. Ct. N. C.

Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgments vacated insofar as they leave undisturbed the death penalty imposed, and cases remanded for further proceedings. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976).


text:
    No. 75-1462.
    Delaware Republican State Committee et al. v. Redfearn et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 919.] Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of intervening legislation.


text:
    No.---.
    Pennsylvania Parent Assistance Authority v. Lemon et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion for leave to dispense with printing petition denied. Snider v. All State Administrators, Inc., 414 U. S. 685 (1974).


text:
    No.----.
    Second Avenue Limited Dividend Housing Assn. et al. v. Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis or in the alternative to dispense with printing petition denied.


text:
    No.---.
    Ray v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for appointment of counsel to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 36, Orig.
    Texas v. Louisiana,
   426 U. S. 465. Petition of State of Texas for reconsideration denied.


text:
    No. 54, Orig.
    United States v. Florida et al.
   Defendants’ exceptions to Report of Special Master on motion of defendants for leave to file counterclaim set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 425 U. S. 931.]


text:
    No. 71, Orig.
    New York v. New Jersey.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint denied. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660 (1976).


text:
    No. 72, Orig.
    South Dakota v. Nebraska.
   Motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted and State of Nebraska allowed 30 days in which to answer.


text:
    No. 74-1471.
    TSC Industries, Inc., et al. v. Northway, Inc.,
   426 U. S. 438 (1976). Motion of respondent to retax costs denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant the motion. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 74-6632.
    Moody v. Daggett, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 942.] Motion of the Attorney General of Tennessee for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-442.
    Poelker, Mayor of St. Louis, et al. v. Doe.
   C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 428 U. S. 909.] Motion of Americans United for Life, Inc., for leave to file brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-492.
    Rosner v. United States,
   427 U. S. 911. The Solicitor General is requested to file a response to petition for rehearing within 30 days.


text:
    No. 75-503.
    Cook et al. v. Hudson et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 941.] Motion of National Education Assn. for leave to file brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-777.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Enterprise Association of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Machine & General Pipefitters of New York and Vicinity, Local Union No. 638.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 908.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-823.
    Belcher v. Stengel et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 425 U. S. 910.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-839.
    Whalen, Commissioner of Health of New York v. Roe et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 424 U. S. 907.] Motion of National Association of Mental Health et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 75-904.
    Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 424 U. S. 908.] Motion of Purex Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Motion of Procter & Gamble Co. and Clorox Co. for leave to file an opposition to motion of Purex Corp. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-1413.
    Stanton, Administrator, Indiana Department of Public Welfare, et al. v. Bond et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 905.] Motion of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 75-1473.
    No. 75-1705.
    E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; and Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 947.] Motion of Appalachian Power Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amid curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 75-1510.
    Weatherford et al. v. Bursey.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 426 U. S. 946.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed further herein in forma papperis granted.


text:
    No. 75-1674.
    No. 75-1710.
    No. 75-6990.
    Kings County et al. v. Santa Rosa Band of Indians et al. Rankin County Board of Education et al. v. Adams et al. Ball v. Dunlap, Chairman, Rhode Island State Pilotage Commission, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir.;

C. A. 5th Cir.; and

C. A. 1st Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in each of these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 75-6927.
    No. 76-5099.
    No. 76-5190.
    No. 76-5222.
    Gomori v. Arnold, Warden, et al.; Brooks v. Scism, Chairman, North Carolina Parole Commission, et al.; Lindsley v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania et al.; and Holmes v. Israel, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 75-1836.
    No. 75-6499.
    No. 75-6581.
    No. 75-6917.
    No. 75-6998.
    No. 76-5155.
    No. 76-5195.
    Thompson et ux. v. Supreme Court of Illinois et al.; Love v. Gray, Warden; Montgomery v. Noel, U. S. District Judge; Williams v. Phillips et al.; Morton et al. v. United States et al.; Green v. Hunter, U. S. District Judge; and Green v. Wangelin, U. S. District Judge.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 75-6891.
    Foster v. Hardy et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 75-1757.
    Clancey v. United States House of Representatives et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 75-1513.
    Howlett, Secretary of State of Illinois v. Love.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 75-1812.
    Shaffer et al. v. Heitner.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Del. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 75-1861.
    Patterson v. New York.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-29.
    Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, Chairman, Mississippi Tax Commission.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Miss. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-128.
    Mandel, Governor of Maryland, et al. v. Bradley et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Md. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-316.
    Bates et al. v. State Bar of Arizona.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ariz. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 75-1691.
    No. 75-1698.
    Guest, President of Methodist Hospital, et al. v. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney of Philadelphia, et al.; and Williamsport Hospital et al. v. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney of Philadelphia.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-1704.
    Hoffmann, Secretary of the Army v. Fioto.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 75-1707.
    Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al. v. Hodory.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. Motions of Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Republic Steel Corp., and United States Steel Corp. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motions of Republic Steel Corp. and United States Steel Corp. for leave to intervene denied. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-63.
    Holshouser, Governor of North Carolina, et al. v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. C. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 75-1721.
    United States v. Chadwick et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1753.
    Santa Fe Industries, Inc., et al. v. Green et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1771.
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1693.
    Blackledge, Warden, et al. v. Allison.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1775.
    Massachusetts v. Westcott.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1805.
    Jeffers v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-156.
    Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1344.
    Scarborough v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question No. 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 75-1906.
    Henderson, Correctional Superintendent v. Kibbe.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1870.
    No. 75-1872.
    E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. et al. v. Collins et al.; and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.


text:
    No. 75-5444.
    Coker v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted limited to Question No. 1 presented by the petition.


text:
    No. 75-6568.
    Hankerson v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-167.
    United States v. Ramsey et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondent James W. Kelly for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 75-1073.
    Pennsylvania v. MacDonald.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1258.
    No. 75-1300.
    No. 75-1314.
    Blackie et al. v. Barrack et al.; Touche Ross & Co. v. Barrack et al.; and Roberts et al. v. Barrack et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1303.
    Qantas Airways Ltd. v. Foremost International Tours, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1357.
    California v. Superior Court of California, County of Mono (Zolnay et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.,


text:
    No. 75-1373.
    Irving v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1392.
    Welch v. Welch, aka Confer.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1415.
    McGuire v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1423.
    Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1424.
    Ciovacco v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1444.
    Joyce v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1432.
    Abell et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1451.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1454.
    Sanchez et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1455.
    DuFresne, aka Sudler, et al. v. Sudler.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1456.
    Lemmons v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1463.
    Cabbler v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1465.
    Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. v. International Engraving Co.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1472.
    Chase v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1475.
    No. 75-1478.
    United States Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.; and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Ford et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1479.
    Local Union No. 795, International Longshoremen's Assn., AFL-CIO, et al. v. McDonald et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1484.
    Lubrano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1486.
    Whitaker, aka Wittaker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1487.
    Evans et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1494.
    Schenker v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1497.
    Acupuncture Center of Washington et al. v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1499.
    Busse v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1501.
    Ivey et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1505.
    A. W. Thompson, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1506.
    Hondo Drilling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1508.
    Fedders Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1514.
    Peskin v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1520.
    Wangrud v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1517.
    Kwiek v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Village of Schaumburg et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1522.
    Kantrowitz v. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1526.
    Biedenharn Realty Co., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1528.
    No. 75-1529.
    Baptista v. United States; and Hathaway v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1530.
    Horan v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1537.
    Blitz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1538.
    Mastrangelo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1540.
    Natick Paperboard Corp. et al. v. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1541.
    No. 75-1554.
    Hoff et al. v. United States; and Stofsky et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1543.
    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. White et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1544.
    Harper v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1548.
    Wiener v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1555.
    Conley v. Hampton, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1557.
    Yokum v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1559.
    Parness et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1567.
    Horton v. United States.
   C. A, 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1568.
    J. Frank Kelly, Inc., et al. v. Swinton et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir, Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 75-1571.
    Entringer v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied..


text:
    No. 75-1574.
    DeFrancis v. Bossier City.
   Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1575.
    Kirschke v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1576.
    Radetsky v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1586.
    Rogers Brothers Wholesalers v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1577.
    No. 75-1647.
    Broderick v. Catholic University of America; and Granfield v. Catholic University of America.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1585.
    McGuire v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1587.
    Snow v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1588.
    Wathen v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1590.
    Miranda v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1591.
    Young v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1593.
    Perkal v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1594.
    Kennebec Log Driving Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1596.
    Grundy et al. v. Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1598.
    Global Marine Development of California, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1599.
    Zager et al. v. Usery, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1604.
    Silver Bell Industries, Inc. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.