text:
    No. 05-8018.
    Scott v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 05-8053.
    Starling v. Delaware.
   Sup. Ct. Del. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8147.
    Brown v. Polk, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8227.
    Morrisette v. Washington, Acting Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8238.
    Turner v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8245.
    Weber v. Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8250.
    King v. Massachusetts.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8253.
    Lee v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8255.
    Lane v. Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8258.
    Brown v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8269.
    Wood v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8272.
    Williams v. Snyder et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8275.
    Wilcox v. Terry, Warden.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8276.
    Washington v. Fischer, Superintendent, Sing Sing Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8278.
    Daigneault v. Consolidated Controls Corp./Eaton Corp. et al.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8279.
    Childs v. LaVigne, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8283.
    Doyle v. Scutt, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8285.
    Boddie v. Kernan, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8295.
    Cruz v. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8296.
    Corinthian v. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8297.
    Clemons v. West et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8298.
    Ramirez v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8383.
    Olic v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8380.
    Medawar v. Wolfenbarger, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8422.
    Mach v. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8432.
    Johnson v. North Dakota et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8446.
    Remsen v. Knowles, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8449.
    Ahluwalia v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8477.
    Lavalle C. v. Maine Department of Human Services.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8523.
    Stecher v. Colorado Board of Medical Examiners.
   Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8547.
    Sterling v. Smith, Warden.
   Super. Ct. Tatt: nail County, Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8563.
    Jackson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8613.
    Ewing v. Massachusetts.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8621.
    Baker v. Wisconsin.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8622.
    Bates v. Moreles et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8669.
    Lomeli v. Gordon, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8677.
    Warren v. Lee, Administrator I, Caledonia Correctional Institution.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8704.
    Pointer v. Beacon Management.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8707.
    LeCroy v. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8713.
    Rego v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8722.
    Brisbon v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8731.
    Hill v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8758.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8768.
    Evans v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8781.
    Scull v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8784.
    Shields v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8800.
    Crill, aka Cunningham v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8803.
    Eastteam v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8808.
    Anyanwutaku v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8809.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8810.
    Lambert v. Bezy, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8811.
    Butler v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8813.
    Stein v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8826.
    Silo v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8827.
    Rosales v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8829.
    Maddock v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8835.
    Beras v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8839.
    Chisum v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8843.
    Garza v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8846.
    Higgins v. Liston.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8848.
    Julian v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8850.
    Pace v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8852.
    Marxen v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8854.
    Soria-Gobea v. United States; Garcia Almanzan v. United States Avila-Saldana v. United States Gomez-Moreno v. United States Nino-Rodriguez v. United States Vargas-Espinoza v. United States Sanchez-Polanco v. United States Constantino-Garrido v. United States Castillo-Segura v. United States Canizalez-Rivera v. United States and Cortez-Melendez v. United States
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8863.
    Foster v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8864.
    Gill v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8868.
    Corley v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8869.
    Currie v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8870.
    Huong Muessig v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8871.
    Barnbaum v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8872.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8876.
    Diaz v. McGuire.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8881.
    Banwo v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8885.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8890.
    Tavares v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8892.
    Wyman v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8899.
    Dominguez-Benavides v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8901.
    Carr v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8905.
    Holmes v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8907.
    Giddens v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8908.
    Ivery v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8910.
    Hourston v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8912.
    Gonzalez-Capetillo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8916.
    Hernandez-Melchor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8920.
    Lopez-Moreno v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8922.
    Jeffers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8923.
    Martinez-Flores v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8924.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8926.
    Sutton v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8931.
    Brooks v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8932.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8933.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8934.
    Collins v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8936.
    Delancy v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8937.
    Lucky v. Department of Justice et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8938.
    Zielke v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8942.
    Alsop v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8943.
    Arbelaez-Agudelo v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8944.
    Herredia v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8945.
    Hembree v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8946.
    Garris v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8947.
    Goodley v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8948.
    Humphrey v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8949.
    Funchess v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8954.
    Murray v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8955.
    Valentine v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8961.
    Engle v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8966.
    Olubuyimo v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8967.
    Paige v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8968.
    Long Tong Kiam v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8969.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8970.
    Shalit v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8971.
    Shelton v. United States.
   C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8972.
    Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8974.
    Rowland v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8976.
    Garcia-Vargas v. United States Delgadillo-Bernal v. United States Martinez-Trevino v. United States Rodriguez-Terminal v. United States Raya-Romero v. United States Pacheco-Salinas v. United States Escobar-Mendoza v. United States Espinosa-Ibarra v. United States Martin-Gomez v. United States Hernandez-Martinez v. United States Gonzalez-Osorio v. United States Bonilla-Chavez v. United States Gonzalez-Gutierrez v. United States Medina-Lopez v. United States Villafuerte-Navarro v. United States Lopez-Zeladon v. United States Arizaga-Acosta v. United States Rodriguez-Yanez v. United States Escobar-Reyes v. United States and Munoz-Alarcon v. United States
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8980.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8982.
    Mendoza-Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8983.
    Jacobs v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8986.
    Newsom v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8994.
    Duranceau v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8995.
    Montalvo v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-8996.
    Donahue v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-528.
    Miller-Stout, Superintendent, Airway Heights Corrections Center v. Bailey.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-797.
    Guam v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 05-805.
    Washington, Acting Warden v. Morrisette.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-807.
    Reames v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Health Care Authority et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion to substitute John Branscum, Special Administrator of the Estate of Pattie Lynn Reames, Deceased, as. petitioner granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 05-7379.
    Lambert v. Folino, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greene, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 05-7700.
    Mussare et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 05-8433.
    Shymatta v. Microsoft Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 05-8957.
    Wilkerson v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 04-10308.
    No. 05-321.
    No. 05-466.
    No. 05-561.
    No. 05-570.
    No. 05-627.
    No. 05-655.
    No. 05-715.
    No. 05-6322.
    No. 05-6706.
    No. 05-7072.
    No. 05-7177.
    No. 05-7288.
    No. 05-7306.
    No. 05-7356.
    No. 05-7408.
    No. 05-7429.
    No. 05-7872.
    Kalasho v. Republic of Iraq et al., Hicks v. United States, Scheeler, Individually and on Behalf of Scheeler, et al. v. City of St. Cloud, Minnesota, et al., Tocci v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authority et al., Pernett v. American Airlines, Inc., et al., Parks, Chief, Los Angeles Police Department v. Diaz, Taylor v. Georgia Department of Public Safety et al., Hawkins v. United States, Reeves v. United States, Dunkins v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Thomas v. Minneapolis Public Schools et al., Montgomery v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Pridgen v. United States, Kessler v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Parker v. Warner, Governor of Virginia, et al., Genevier v. Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services et al., In re Evans, Greenup v. United States,
   ante, p. 845; ante, p. 1089; ante, p. 1090; ante, p. 1093; ante, p. 1093; ante, p. 1131; ante, p. 1095; ante, p. 1096; ante, p. 956; ante, p. 1042; ante, p. 1101; ante, p. 1102; ante, p. 1053; ante, p. 1105; ante, p. 1107; ante, p. 1108; ante, p. 1088; and ante, p. 1124. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 05-639.
    No. 05-7389.
    Jones v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Parker v. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, et al., Haire v. United States,
   ante, p. 1131; ante, p. 1131; and ante, p. 1131. Petitions for rehearing denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

No. 05-7800.


author: Justice Ginsburg, Circuit Justice.

text:
    DOE et al. v. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
    No. 05A295.
    Decided October 7, 2005
   Justice Ginsburg, Circuit Justice.

This is an emergency application to vacate an order entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit staying a preliminary injunction entered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The applicants — a member of the American Library Association referred to herein as “John Doe,” the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation — brought suit in District Court, alleging that the nondisclosure provision set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 2709(c) violates their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court granted the applicants’ motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of § 2709(c). A panel of the Second Circuit granted the Government’s motion to stay the District Court’s judgment pending an expedited appeal. The same panel denied the applicants’ subsequent motion to vacate the stay in light of changed circumstances. In view of the character of the constitutional issue presented and the expedited schedule ordered by the Court of Appeals, I deny the application and grant the parties’ accompanying motions for leave to file under seal.

Section 2709, as amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (hereinafter Patriot Act), authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to “request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity” if the FBI asserts in writing that the information sought is “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities . . . .” 18 U. S.C. §2709(b) (2000 ed., Supp. II). The provision authorizes the FBI to issue such requests to “electronic communication service provider[s].” § 2709(a) (2000 ed.). In this case, the FBI requested information under this section in the form of a “National Security Letter” (NSL). At issue in this case is § 2709(e), which prohibits the recipient of an NSL from disclosing that fact. Ibid. (prohibiting “disclosure] to any person that the [FBI] has sought or obtained access to information or records under this section”). The current debate over renewal of the Patriot Act has spawned eight bills, currently pending before the Senate and the House of Representatives, proposing various amendments and revisions to §2709.

John Doe received an NSL demanding that it disclose “any and all subscriber information, billing information!,] and access logs of any person or entity” associated with a specified Internet Protocol address during a specified period. Respondents’ Memorandum in Opposition to Application to Vacate Stay Pending Appeal 6 (hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition) (internal quotation marks omitted). The NSL tracked the language of §2709 and included the admonition that Doe was not to disclose that the FBI had sought or obtained information from it. Doe brought suit in District Court, alleging that the gag imposed by § 2709(c) is an unlawful prior restraint on speech that is causing irreparable harm by preventing Doe’s effective participation in the current debate — both in Congress and among the public — regarding proposed revisions to the Patriot Act.

The District Court granted Doe’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that Doe demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm in the absence of the relief sought. Emergency Application to Vacate Stay, App. B, p. 9 (hereinafter Application). The court determined that, as a “categorical prohibition on the use of any fora for speech, on all topics covered by § 2709(c),” the gag provision is a prior restraint and a content-based restriction on free speech. Id., at 12-13. The District Court therefore concluded that the prohibition on disclosure is permissible only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. Id., at 13. In its strict-scrutiny analysis, the court considered two Government interests the gag provision might serve: the Government’s general interest in national security and its particular interest in conducting effective counterterrorism investigations. Id., at 15. While the District Court acknowledged the Government’s general interest in protecting national security and its expertise in the area of counterterrorism, ibid., that court found “nothing in the record” (which included classified and other sealed ex parte submissions) suggesting that the Government has a compelling interest in preventing disclosure of Doe’s identity, id., at 17,18, and nn. 7-8.

The Government’s argument invoked a “mosaic theory”: Although Doe’s identity “may appear innocuous by itself, it could still be significant to a terrorist organization when combined with other information available to it.” Id., at 18. The District Court acknowledged that federal courts have credited the mosaic concept in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) context, but it noted that the instant case is distinguishable in this respect: “Th[e] difference between seeking to obtain information and seeking to disclose information already obtained raises [the plaintiffs’] constitutional interests in this case above the constitutional interests held by a FOIA claimant.” Id., at 19 (quoting McGehee v. Casey, 718 F. 2d 1137, 1147 (CADC 1983)). In any event, the court held, “the defendants’ conclusory statements that the mosaic argument is applicable here, absent supporting facts, would not suffice to support a judicial finding to that effect.” Application, App. B, at 19-20. The District Court noted in this regard that it had asked counsel for the Government at oral argument if he could confirm that there was, in fact, a “mosaic” in this case — i. e., whether there are in fact other pieces of information that, when combined with Doe’s identity, would hinder the investigation. Counsel could not so confirm. Id., at 20.

The District Court did not “question that national security can be a compelling state interest, or that non-disclosure of [an] NSL recipient’s identity could, in some circumstances, serve that interest.” Ibid. It found, however, that the Government failed to show a compelling interest in preventing disclosure in this case:

“Based on the foregoing, including the sealed portion about Doe, and what Doe is, the nature and extent of information about the NSL that has already been disclosed by the defendants, and the nature and extent of the information that will not be disclosed, this court .concludes that... the government has not demonstrated a compelling interest in preventing disclosure of the recipient’s identity.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).

The District Court concluded that, “[especially in a situation like the instant one, where the statute provides no judicial review of the NSL or the need for its non-disclosure provision, . . . the permanent gag provision ... is not narrowly drawn to serve the government’s broadly claimed compelling interest of keeping investigations secret.” Id., at 22-23. The court also appraised § 2709(c) as “overbroad as applied with regard to the types of information that it encompasses.” Id., at 23. It found §2709(c)’s ban “particularly noteworthy” in light of the fact that proponents of the Patriot Act have “consistently relied on the public’s faith [that the Government will] apply the statute narrowly ....” Id., at 26 (citing Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Protecting Life and Liberty (Memphis, Tenn., Sept. 18, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/ 2003/091803memphisremarks.htm (as visited Oct. 7, 2005, and in Clerk of Court’s case file) (characterizing as “hysteria” fears of the Executive’s abuse of the increased access to library records under the Patriot Act and stating: “[T]he Department of Justice has neither the staffing, the time[,] nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans. No offense to the American Library Association, but we just don’t care.”)).

Having thus concluded that § 2709(c) fails strict scrutiny, the court granted the applicants’ motion for preliminary in-junctive relief, but stayed its ruling until September 20, 2005, to give the Government the opportunity to “file an expedited appeal and submit an application for a stay pending appeal.” Application, App. B, at 29. The Government did just that, and on September 20 the Court of Appeals granted the Government’s motion:

“Although there is a question as to the likelihood of [the Government’s] success on the merits and some injury to [the applicants] if a stay is granted, the [Government has] demonstrated that [it] will suffer irreparable harm and the public interest [will be] significantly injured if a stay is not granted. The balance of harms tilts in favor of [the Government]. Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F. 3d 95, 100 (CA2 2002). This appeal is hereby expedited and the following briefing schedule is in effect: [The Government’s] brief shall be filed no later than September 27, 2005; [the applicants’] brief shall be filed no later than October 4, 2005; [the Government’s] reply brief shall be filed no later than October 10, 2005.” Id., App. D.

Shortly after the Court of Appeals entered the stay, the parties learned that, through inadvertence, Doe’s identity had been publicly available for several days on the District Court’s Web site and on PACER, the electronic docket system run by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id., App. F, at 3-5 (decl. of Melissa Goodman). The parties also learned that the media had correctly reported Doe’s identity on at least one occasion. See, e.g., Cowan, Librarians Must Stay Silent in Patriot Act Suit, Court Says, N. Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2005, at B2. The applicants immediately moved to vacate the stay in light of this information. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, “on the ground that the additional circumstances relied upon by [the movants] do not materially alter the balance of harms----” Application, App. E. The applicants then filed the instant emergency application, urging me, in my capacity as Circuit Justice, to vacate the stay and thereby allow Doe to contribute its firsthand account to the ongoing debate regarding proposed revisions to the Patriot Act.

In support of their plea for an immediate order lifting the stay, the applicants stress that Doe seeks only to confirm its identity as the recipient of an NSL. It does not seek to disclose the content of the NSL, nor does it seek to disclose the date on which it was received. They point out that, in another case bearing the same name involving a facial challenge to §2709, the Government argued that courts should consider the constitutionality of the gag provision on a case-by-case basis, “granting relief where, but only where, it can be shown that the compelling governmental interests] underlying the non-disclosure requirement are not in jeopardy.” Id., App. B, at 18, quoting Defendants-Appellants’ Reply Brief in Gonzales v. Doe, No. 05-0570 (CA2, filed Feb. 3, 2005), p. 25 (on appeal from Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (SDNY 2004)). That is precisely what the District Court did here. The applicants underscore this anomaly: Doe — the only entity in a position to impart a firsthand account of its experience — remains barred from revealing its identity, while others who obtained knowledge of Doe’s identity — when that cat was inadvertently let out of the bag— may speak freely on that subject.

Although the applicants’ arguments are cogent, I have taken into account several countervailing considerations in declining to vacate the stay kept in place by the Second Circuit pending its disposition of the appeal. I am mindful, first, that “interference with an interim order of a court of appeals cannot be justified solely because [a Circuit Justice] disagrees about the harm a party may suffer.” Certain Named and Unnamed Non-citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U. S. 1327, 1330-1331 (1980) (Powell, J., in chambers). Respect for the assessment of the Court of Appeals is especially warranted when that court is proceeding to adjudication on the merits with due expedition. The principal briefs have been filed, and I anticipate that the Court of Appeals will hear argument promptly and render its decision with appropriate care and dispatch.

Also weighing in favor of keeping the stay in effect pending the full airing the Second Circuit has ordered, the District Court held unconstitutional — as applied to the facts of this case — a provision of an Act of Congress. A decision of that moment warrants cautious review. Further, the Government points out that the redacted version of the complaint, prepared in consultation with the Government, identifies Doe as a member of the American Library Association. “The American Library Association,” the Government footnotes, “lobbies Congress on behalf of its members and is free to note that one of those members has been served with an NSL.” Memorandum in Opposition 26, n. 2.

In sum, the applicants have not shown cause so extraordinary as to justify this Court’s intervention in advance of the expeditious determination of the merits toward which the Second Circuit is swiftly proceeding.


author: Justice Thomas

text:
    TEXACO INC. v. DAGHER et al.
    No. 04-805.
    Argued January 10, 2006
    Decided February 28, 2006

      Glen D. Nager argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 04-805 were Craig E. Stewart, Joe Sims, and Louis K. Fisher. On the briefs for petitioner in No. 04-814 were Ronald L. Olson, Bradley S. Phillips, Stuart N. Senator, and Paul J. Watford.

      Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Barnett, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, and Adam D. Hirsh.

      Joseph M. Alioto argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Daniel R. Shulman and Gregory Merz.

      Together with No. 04-814, Shell Oil Co. v. Dagher et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by W. Stephen Smith and Beth S. Brinkmann; for the American Petroleum Institute by Robert A. Long, Jr., Harry M. Ng, and Douglas W. Morris; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Raymond A. Jacobsen, Jr., Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for Verizon Communications Inc. by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Donald J. Russell, John Thorne, and Paul J. Larkin, Jr.; and for Visa U. S. A. Inc. et al. by M. Laurence Popofsky and Stephen V. Bomse.

        Stephen F. Ross filed a brief for the American Antitrust Institute as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both eases for the Northwest Ohio Physician Specialists Cooperative, LLC, by Charles D. Weller and Frederick Byers; and for the Retail Industry Leaders Association et al. by Lloyd Constantine and Michelle A. Peters. Steve C. Vaughn filed a brief for the Parker Hannifin Corp. as amicus curiae in No. 04-805.

   Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

From 1998 until 2002, petitioners Texaco Inc. and Shell Oil Co. collaborated in a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, to refine and sell gasoline in the western United States under the original Texaco and Shell Oil brand names. Respondents, a class of Texaco and Shell Oil service station owners, allege that petitioners engaged in unlawful price fixing when Equilon set a single price for both Texaco and Shell Oil brand gasoline. We granted certiorari to determine whether it is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set the prices at which the joint venture sells its products. We conclude that it is not, and accordingly we reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Historically, Texaco and Shell Oil have competed with one another in the national and international oil and gasoline markets. Their business activities include refining crude oil into gasoline, as well as marketing gasoline to downstream purchasers, such as the service stations represented in respondents’ class action.

In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil formed- a joint venture, Equilon, to consolidate their operations in the western United States, thereby ending competition between the two companies in the domestic refining and marketing of gasoline. Under the joint venture agreement, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to pool their resources and share the risks of and profits from Equilon’s activities. Equilon’s board of directors would comprise representatives of Texaco and Shell Oil, and Equilon gasoline would be sold to downstream purchasers under the original Texaco and Shell Oil brand names. The formation of Equilon was approved by consent decree, subject to certain divestments and other modifications, by the Federal Trade Commission, see In re Shell Oil Co., 125 F. T. C. 769 (1998), as well as by the state attorneys general of California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. Notably, the decrees imposed no restrictions on the pricing of Equilon gasoline.

After the joint venture began to operate, respondents brought suit in District Court, alleging that, by unifying gasoline prices under the two brands, petitioners had violated the per se rule against price fixing that this Court has long recognized under § 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. See, e. g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam). The District Court awarded summary judgment to Texaco and Shell Oil. It determined that the rule of reason, rather than a per se rule or the quick look doctrine, governs respondents’ claim, and that, by eschewing rule of reason analysis, respondents had failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Ninth Circuit reversed, characterizing petitioners’ position as a request for an “exception to the per se prohibition on price-fixing,” and rejecting that request. Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F. 3d 1108, 1116 (2004). We consolidated Texaco’s and Shell Oil’s separate petitions and granted certiorari to determine the extent to which the per se rule against price fixing applies to an important and increasingly popular form of business organization, the joint venture. 545 U. S. 1138 (2005).

II

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” 15 U. S. C. § 1. This Court has not taken a literal approach to this language, however. See, e. g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]his Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints” (emphasis added)). Instead, this Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful. See, e. g., id., at 10-19. Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements that are “so plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality.” National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 692 (1978). Accordingly, “we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules . . . ‘where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.’ ” State Oil, supra, at 10 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 458-459 (1986)).

Price-fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful. See, e. g., Catalano, supra, at 647. These cases do not present such an agreement, however, because Texaco and Shell Oil did not compete with one another in the relevant market — namely, the sale of gasoline to service stations in the western United States — but instead participated in that market jointly through their investments in Equilon. In other words, the pricing policy challenged here amounts to little more than price setting by a single entity — albeit within the context of a joint venture — and not a pricing agreement between competing entities with respect to their competing products. Throughout Equilon’s existence, Texaco and Shell Oil shared in the profits of Equilon’s activities in their role as investors, not competitors. When “persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit.. . such joint ventures [are] regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the market.” Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U. S. 332, 356 (1982). As such, though Equilon’s pricing policy may be price fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 9 (1979) (“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally 'price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act”).

This conclusion is confirmed by respondents’ apparent concession that there would be no per se liability had Equilon simply chosen to sell its gasoline under a single brand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. We see no reason to treat Equilon differently just because it chose to sell gasoline under two distinct brands at a single price. As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price. If Equilon’s price unification policy is anticompetitive, then respondents should have challenged it pursuant to the rule of reason. But it would be inconsistent with this Court’s antitrust precedents to condemn the internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture as per se unlawful.

The court below reached the opposite conclusion by invoking the ancillary restraints doctrine. 369 F. 3d, at 1118-1124. That doctrine governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such as a business association or joint venture, on nonventure activities. See, e. g., National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 113-115 (1984); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 135-136 (1969). Under the doctrine, courts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business association, and thus valid. We agree with petitioners that the ancillary restraints doctrine has no application here, where the business practice being challenged involves the core activity of the joint venture itself — namely, the pricing of the very goods produced and sold by Equilon. And even if we were to invoke the doctrine in these cases, Equilon’s pricing policy is clearly ancillary to the sale of its own products. Judge Fernandez, dissenting from the ruling of the court below, put it well:

“In this case, nothing more radical is afoot than the fact that an entity, which now owns all of the production, transportation, research, storage, sales and distribution facilities for engaging in the gasoline business, also prices its own products. It decided to price them the same, as any other entity could. What could be more integral to the running of a business than setting a price for its goods and services?” 369 F. 3d, at 1127.

See also Broadcast Music, supra, at 23 (“Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are ... not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all”).

* * *

Because the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act, respondents’ antitrust claim cannot prevail. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

       We presume for purposes of these cases that Equilon is a lawful joint venture. Its formation has been approved by federal and state regulators, and there is no contention here that it is a sham. As the court below noted: “There is a voluminous record documenting the economic justifications for creating the joint ventures. [T]he defendants concluded that numerous synergies and cost efficiencies would result” by creating Equilon as well as a parallel venture, Motiva Enterprises, in the eastern United States, and “that nationwide there would be up to $800 million in cost savings annually.” 369 F. 3d 1108, 1111 (CA9 2004). Had respondents challenged Equilon itself, they would have been required to show that its creation was anticompetitive under the rule of reason. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 768 (1984).

       Respondents have not put forth a rule of reason claim. 369 F. 3d, at 1113. Accordingly, we need not address petitioners’ alternative argument that § 1 of the Sherman Act is inapplicable to joint ventures.

       Respondents alternatively contend that petitioners should be held liable under the quick look doctrine. To be sure, we have applied the quick look doctrine to business activities that are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory examination before imposing antitrust liability. See California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U. S. 756, 770 (1999). But for the same reasons that per se liability is unwarranted here, we conclude that petitioners cannot be held liable under the quick look doctrine.


author: Justice Breyer

text:
    SCHEIDLER et al. v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.
    No. 04-1244.
    Argued November 30, 2005
    Decided February 28, 2006

      Alan Untereiner argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs in No. 04-1244 were Roy T. Englert, Jr., Kathryn S. Zecca, Noah Messing, Thomas Brejcha, Deborah Fischer, and D. Colette Wilson. On the briefs in No. 04-1352 were Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Stuart J. Roth, Vincent P. McCarthy, Ann-Louise Lohr, Thomas P. Monaghan, John P. Tuskey, Laura B. Hernandez, Shannon D. Woodruff, Larry L. Crain, and Robert W. Ash.

      Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Kneedler, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richter, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Kathleen A. Felton, and Frank Marine.

      Erwin Chemerinsky argued the cause for the National Organization for Women, Inc., et al., respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Paul Hoffman, Laurie Levenson, Catherine Fisk, Fay Clayton, Lowell E. Sachnoff, Jack L. Block, and Frank Susman.

      Together with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Phill Kline of Kansas, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jim Petro of Ohio, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold; for Americans United for Life by Clarke D. Forsythe, Denise M. Burke, and G. Robert Blakey; for Concerned Women for America by Theresa Schrempp and Mark L. Lorbiecki;
        for Consistent Life et al. by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Joseph Mathias Cosgrove, and Jeffrey S. Kerr; and for the Life Legal Defense Foundation by Catherine W. Short and Andrew W. Zepeda.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the Feminist Majority Foundation et al. by Steven G. Gey; for NARAL Pro-Choice America et al. by Maria T. Vullo; for the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice et al. by Deanne M. Ottaviano and David J. Pfeffer; and for Abner J. Mikva et al. by Molly S. Boast.

      Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Joseph R. Bankoff, Michael L. Foreman, Sarah C. Crawford, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the Legal Defense for Unborn Children by Alan Edward Ernest; for Emily Lyons by Pamela L. Sumners; and for 47 Members of the United States Congress by Jon B. Eisenberg.

        M. Reed Hopper filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae in No. 04-1244.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

A section of Title 18 of the United States Code (called the Hobbs Act) says that an individual commits a federal crime if he or she “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” by (1) “robbery,” (2) “extortion,” or (3) “committing] or threatening] physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan.or purpose to do anything in violation of this section§ 1951(a) (emphasis added). The dispute in these cases concerns the meaning of the underscored words, in particular the words, “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section.” Does this phrase refer to (violence committed pursuant to) those plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce through robbery or extortion? Or does it refer to (violence committed pursuant to) those plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce, plain and simple? If the former, the statute governs only a limited subset of violent behavior, namely, behavior connected with robbery and extortion. If the latter, the statute governs a far broader range of human activity, namely, all violent actions (against persons or property) that affect interstate commerce. In our view, the former, more restrictive reading of the Act is the correct interpretation.

I

Petitioners are individuals (and organizations) who engage in pro-life, anti-abortion protest activities. Respondents are health care climes that perform abortions and a pro-choice national nonprofit organization that supports the legal availability of abortions. In 1986, (pro-choice) respondents, believing that (pro-life) petitioners had tried to disrupt activities at health care clinics that perform abortions through violence and various other unlawful activities, brought this legal action, which sought damages and an injunction forbidding (pro-life) petitioners from engaging in such activities anywhere in the Nation.

Respondents based their legal claims upon the Hobbs Act, certain other laws that forbid extortion, and a federal anti-racketeering statute, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1962. Respondents argued that petitioners’ clinic-related protest activities amounted in context to extortion. They added that these extortionate acts created a “pattern of racketeering activity” — a pattern that RICO defines in terms of certain predicate acts that include acts of extortion. See § 1961(1) (2000 ed., Supp. III). And 'they sought a permanent injunction, which they believed RICO authorized. See §1964 (2000 ed.).

Initially, the District Court dismissed their complaint. It concluded that RICO requires proof that the alleged criminal acts were motivated by an economic purpose — a purpose that is lacking here. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (ND Ill. 1991). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 612 (1992). But this Court held that the statute “requires no such economic motive,” and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994).

After trial, the jury found that petitioners had engaged in a host of extortionate, or extortion-related, acts. It awarded treble damages to two of the respondents (a matter not at issue here), and the District Court entered a nationwide injunction. See §§ 1964(a), (c). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 267 F. 3d 687 (2001).

This Court again reversed. Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393 (2003) (NOW II). We noted that the Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as necessarily including the improper “ ‘obtaining of property from another.’” Id., at 400 (quoting § 1951(b)(2)). We pointed out that the claimed “property” consisted of “a woman’s right to seek medical services from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses or other clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to provide medical services free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion and fear.” Id., at 400-401 (internal quotation marks omitted). We decided that “[wjhatever the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize petitioners’ actions here as an ‘obtaining of property from’ respondents is well beyond them.” Id., at 402. Accordingly, we held that “because they did not ‘obtain’ property from respondents,” petitioners “did not commit extortion” as defined by the Hobbs Act. Id., at 397. We found that the state extortion law violations, and other extortion-related violations, were flawed for the same reason and must also be set aside. Id., at 410.

Our opinion concluded:

“Because all of the predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation must be reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must also be reversed. Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated.” Id., at 411.

On remand, the Court of Appeals did not order the District Court to terminate the cases or to vacate its injunction. Instead, the Court of Appeals considered respondents’ argument that the jury’s RICO verdict rested not only upon many instances of extortion-related conduct, but also upon four instances (or threats) of physical violence unrelated to extortion. 91 Fed. Appx. 510, 512 (2004). The Court of Appeals decided that the parties had not presented this theory to this Court and, as a result, we had no occasion to consider whether these four acts alone might constitute Hobbs Act violations (sufficient, as predicate acts under RICO, to support the nationwide injunction). See id., at 513. The Court of Appeals remanded the cases to the District Court to make that determination. Ibid.

Petitioners sought certiorari to review this ruling. We granted the writ to consider the following three questions:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals improperly disregarded this Court’s mandate in NOW II by holding that the injunction issued by the District Court might not need to be vacated;

(2) Whether the Hobbs Act forbids violent conduct unrelated to extortion or robbery; and

(3) Whether RICO authorizes a private party to obtain an injunction.

We now answer the second question. We hold that physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act. And since our answer to the second question requires an entry of judgment in petitioners’ favor, we shall not answer the first or third questions.

II

We first set forth the Hobbs Act’s text. The relevant statutory section imposes criminal liability on

“[wjhoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section . . . 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a) (emphasis added).

The question, as we have said, concerns the meaning of the phrase that modifies the term “physical violence,” namely, the words “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section.” Do those words refer to violence (1) that furthers a plan or purpose to “affec[t] commerce ... by robbery or extortion,” or to violence (2) that furthers a plan or purpose simply to “affec[t] commerce”? We believe the former, more restrictive, reading of the text — the reading that ties the violence to robbery or extortion — is correct.

For one thing, the language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural one. The text that precedes the physical violence clause does not forbid obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce (or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce); rather, it forbids obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce by robbery or extortion.” Ibid, (emphasis added). This language means that behavior that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce is a “violation” of the statute only if that behavior also involves robbery or extortion (or related attempts or conspiracies). Consequently, the reference in the physical violence clause to actions or threats of violence “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section” (emphasis added) would seem to mean acts or threats of violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in robbery or extortion, for that is the only kind of behavior that the section otherwise makes a violation.

This restrictive reading is further supported by the fact that Congress often intends such statutory terms as “affect commerce” or “in commerce” to be read as terms of art connecting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the constitutional provision (here, the Commerce Clause) that grants Congress that authority. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 273 (1995); Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858, 859 (1985). Such jurisdictional language may limit, but it will not primarily define, the behavior that the statute calls a “violation” of federal law. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 854 (2000) (holding that by using the term “affecting . . . commerce,” “ ‘Congress did not define the crime described in [18 U. S. C.] § 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce,’” and noting that the Court must look to other “qualifying language” in the provision to define the offense).

For another thing, the statute’s history supports the more restrictive reading. Congress enacted the Hobbs Act’s predecessor in 1934. See Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (reproduced in Appendix A, infra). That predecessor Act prohibited coercion and extortion appropriately connected with interstate commerce, and placed these prohibitions in §§2(a) and 2(b), respectively. 48 Stat. 980. The Act went on in §2(c) to impose criminal liability on anyone who, in connection with interstate commerce, “[cjommits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b).” Ibid.; see also NOW II, 537 U. S., at 407. The 1934 Act explicitly linked § 2(c), the physical violence subsection, with §§2(a) and 2(b). It thereby made crystal clear that the physical violence that it prohibited was not violence in furtherance of a plan to injure commerce, but violence in furtherance of a plan to injure commerce through coercion or extortion.

In 1946, Congress enacted a superseding law, namely, the Hobbs Act. Ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (reproduced in Appendix B, infra). The new law changed the old law in two significant respects: It added robbery while omitting coercion. NOW II, supra, at 407; see United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 377 (1978) (“The bill that eventually became the Hobbs Act. . . substituted specific prohibitions against robbery and extortion for the Anti-Racketeering Act’s language”). The new Act, like the old Act, was absolutely explicit in respect to the point here at issue, the necessary link between physical violence and other crimes (now extortion and robbery).

The 1946 Hobbs Act reads as follows:

“Sec. 2. Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion, shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 3. Whoever conspires with another or with others, or acts in concert with another or with others to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 4. Whoever attempts or participates in an attempt to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 5. Whoever commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.” 60 Stat. 420 (emphasis added).

As § 2 makes clear, the statute prohibits robbery and extortion. As § 5’s reference to § 2 makes clear, the statute prohibits violence only when that violence furthers a plan or purpose to affect commerce by robbery or extortion. Each of the statute’s other sections reflects the same approach; each explicitly refers back to §2’s prohibition against robbery and extortion.

The Act’s legislative history contains nothing to the contrary. Indeed, the Committee Reports and floor debates emphasized that “the purpose of the bill was ‘to prevent anyone from obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by robbery or extortion as defined in the bill.’” Culbert, sufra, at 377 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1945); emphasis added in Culbert); see Culbert, sufra, at 376-378 (discussing legislative history). They nowhere suggested that Congress intended to make physical violence a freestanding crime.

The present Hobbs Act language is less clear than the 1946 version. But the linguistic changes do not reflect a congressional effort to redefine the crime. To the contrary, Congress revised the Hobbs Act’s language in 1948 as part of its general revision of the Criminal Code. That “1948 Revision was not intended to create new crimes but to recodify those then in existence.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 269, n. 28 (1952). This Court has written that it will “not presume that the revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law ‘unless an intent to make such [a] chang[e] is clearly expressed.’” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 209 (1993) (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957); alteration made in Keene). And here there is no evidence of any such intent. Rather, the Reviser’s Notes indicate that the linguistic changes to the Hobbs Act simply amount to “changes in phraseology and arrangement necessary to effect consolidation.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A131 (1947).

Finally, respondents’ Hobbs Act interpretation broadens the Act’s scope well beyond what case law has assumed. It would federalize much ordinary criminal behavior, ranging from simple assault to murder, behavior that typically is the subject of state, not federal, prosecution. Decisions of this Court have assumed that Congress did not intend the Hobbs Act to have so broad a reach. See NOW II, 537 U. S., at 405 (noting that the Hobbs Act embodied extortion, which required the obtaining of property, not coercion); id., at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (coercion, which is not covered by the Hobbs Act, “more accurately describes the nature of petitioners’ [non-property-related] actions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Enmons, 410 U. S. 396, 410 (1973) (Hobbs Act does not reach violent, activity by union members seeking higher wages because such violence is not extortion and Congress did not intend to “cover all overtly coercive conduct in the course of” a labor dispute).

Not surprisingly, other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have rejected respondents’ construction of the Act. See United States v. Yankowski, 184 F. 3d 1071 (CA9 1999); United States v. Franks, 511 F. 2d 25 (CA6 1975). And in 1994, Congress enacted a specific statute aimed directly at the type of abortion clinic violence and other activity at issue in this litigation, thereby suggesting it did not believe that the Hobbs Act already addressed that activity. See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U. S. C. § 248(a)(3) (imposing criminal liability on anyone who “intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services”).

Ill

Respondents’ contrary claim rests primarily upon a canon of statutory construction that favors interpretations that give a function to each word in a statute, thereby avoiding linguistic superfluity. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’” (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883))). They claim that, because the definitions of robbery or extortion (or related attempts or conspiracies) already encompass robbery or extortion that takes place through acts of violence (or related threats), “[t]here would be no reason for the statute to include the clause prohibiting violence and threats of violence” unless Congress intended to create a freestanding offense. Brief for Respondents 25; see 18 U. S. C. § 1951(b)(1) (defining “robbery” as the “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property ... by means of actual or threatened force, or violence” (emphasis added)); § 1951(b)(2) (defining “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another . . . by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear” (emphasis added)).

Petitioners, however, have found a small amount of additional work for the words to do. Brief for Petitioners in No. 04-1244, pp. 33-36; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11-12. The Scheidler petitioners point to a hypothetical mobster who threatens violence and demands payment from a business. Those threats constitute attempted extortion; but the subsequent acts of violence against a noncomplying business by the subordinates of that mobster may not constitute attempted extortion and may not be punishable as a conspiracy to commit extortion if the subordinates were not privy to the mobster’s plan. A specific prohibition of physical violence in furtherance of a plan to commit extortion would bring the subordinates’ behavior within the statute’s coverage. The United States adds that the physical violence clause permits prosecutors to bring multiple charges for the same conduct. For instance, the clause would apply to a defendant who injured bystanders during a robbery, permitting the Government to charge that defendant with the Hobbs Act crime of robbery and the separate Hobbs Act crime of using violence in furtherance of the robbery. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.

We concede that this additional work is small. But the need for language to cover such instances, or perhaps simply a desire to emphasize the problem of violence, led Congress in the original 1946 version of the Hobbs Act to make clear that the statute prohibited, not all physical violence, but only physical violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in robbery or extortion. See supra, at 19. And it is similarly clear that Congress intended to carry this view forward into the 1948 recodification. See supra, at 20-21. The canons of interpretation cannot lead us to a contrary conclusion. Those canons are tools designed to help courts better determine what Congress intended, not to lead courts to interpret the law contrary to that intent. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that “canons are not mandatory rules” but guides “designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent,” and that “other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force”).

IV

We conclude that Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act. It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the statute refers to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or conspiracies). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the eases are remanded for entry of judgment for petitioners.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT

A

The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, provided:

“AN ACT
“To protect trade and commerce against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation.
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the term Trade or commerce’, as used herein, is defined to mean trade or commerce between any States, with foreign nations, in the District of Columbia, in any Territory of the United States, between any such Territory or the District of Columbia and any State or other Territory, and all other trade or commerce over which the United States has constitutional jurisdiction.
“Sec. 2. Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to move in trade or commerce—
“(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the payment of wages of a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
“(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right; or
“(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b); or
“(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any of the foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both.
“Sec. 3. (a) As used in this Act the term ‘wrongful’ means in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or Territory.
“(b) The terms ‘property’, ‘money’, or ‘valuable considerations’ used herein shall not be deemed to include wages paid by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee.” (Emphasis in original.)

B

Title I of the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act of 1946, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420, provided:

“Sec. 1. As used in this title—
“(a) The term ‘commerce’ means (1) commerce between any point in a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof, or between points within the same State, Territory, or the District of Columbia but through any place outside thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or any Territory, and (3) all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction; and the term ‘Territory’ means any Territory or possession of the United States.
“(b) The term ‘robbery’ means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property, from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
“(c) The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
“Sec. 2. Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion, shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 3. Whoever conspires with another or with others, or acts in concert with another or with others to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 4. Whoever attempts or participates in an attempt to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 5. Whoever commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.
“Sec. 6. Whoever violates any section of this title shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.”

C

The Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, as amended in 1948, provides:

“(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
“(b) As used in this section—
“(1) The term ‘robbery’ means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
“(2) The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
“(3) The term ‘commerce’ means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
“(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101-115, 151-166 of Title 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45.”