text:
    No. 74-699.
    Abbott Laboratories et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 74-714.
    Dellinger et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-720.
    DiGiorgio et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-752.
    Russell v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-763.
    Grossman v. Striepeke, Sheriff.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-776.
    Phelps v. Christison, Trustee in Bankruptcy, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-800.
    Moseley v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-801.
    Mauro v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-804.
    Crouse v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-809.
    Hinman v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-811.
    Reeves v. Administrator, Federal Energy Office, et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-825.
    Clincher et al. v. United States et al.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-827.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-830.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-834.
    Demopoulos v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-836.
    Gutwein et al. v. Easton Publishing Co.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-840.
    Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wood.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-843.
    Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-849.
    Garramone et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-853.
    Geraci, Executrix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-855.
    Fritts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-862.
    Krilich v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-867.
    Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Local Union 77, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-887.
    Rayner et al. v. City Council of the City of Chicago et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-916.
    Radisich v. Radisich.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-929.
    David R. McGeorge Car Co., Inc. v. Leyland Motor Sales, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5777.
    Peeraer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-959.
    Baez v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-938.
    Lausche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-945.
    Riess et ux. v. Murchison et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-962.
    Boyd v. Pennsylvania State Board of Osteopathic Examiners.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-999.
    Bedford Aviation, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5746.
    Morgan v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-937.
    Louis et al. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5789.
    DeBenedictus v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5796.
    Reid v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5812.
    Schall et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5820.
    Snyder v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5833.
    Messina v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5836.
    Ehly v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5864.
    Resnick v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5874.
    Bruce v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5941.
    Wood v. Wilson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5952.
    Moore et ux. v. Csakai et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5953.
    Tipler v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5959.
    Hill v. California Adult Authority Parole Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5962.
    Ward v. Griggs, Institution Superintendent.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5963.
    Smith v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5964.
    Olenz v. Cleary et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5972.
    Chacon v. Younger, Attorney General of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5973.
    Johnson v. Vincent, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5974.
    Powell v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5976.
    Grisolia, aka Derossi v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5980.
    Finley v. Gunn, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5981.
    Konjevic et vir v. Florida Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5983.
    LaPlante v. Wolff, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5989.
    Thompson v. Gray, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5995.
    Stokes v. Robuck, Chairman, Kentucky Parole Board, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-706.
    No. 74-738.
    Pacelli v. United States; and Mallah v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari in No. 74-706.

Reported below: 503 F. 2d 971.


text:
    No. 74-749.
    Art Theatre Guild, Inc., et al. v. Parrish et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5499.
    Carter v. Lee.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5706.
    Orange v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5741.
    Hardwick v. Caldwell, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5810.
    May v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5815.
    Murphy v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-5942.
    Brown v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-333.
    United States v. Cooks.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-615.
    Procunier, Corrections Director v. Bye.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-786.
    Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Motion of respondents Hemmerick et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5855.
    Wright v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 74-821.
    Harding v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of receiving obscene materials which had been transported in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 475 F. 2d 480 (1973). We granted the petition for certiorari, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). 414 U. S. 964 (1973). On remand, the District Court determined that the material was obscene under the Miller standard, and reinstated the judgment of conviction. Again, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

For the reasons stated in my dissent from the remand of this case, 414 U. S., at 965, and because the present judgment was rendered after Miller, I would grant the petition and reverse the judgment.


text:
    No. 74-935.
    Chicago Board of Health et al. v. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-946.
    Duplan Corp. et al. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-986.
    Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Paynter.

      See also note, supra, p. 985.

   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 74-5436.
    No. 74-5816.
    Horne v. United States, Trigg v. Tennessee,
   ante, p. 947; and

ante, p. 938. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 74-5529.
    McHar v. McHale,
   419 U. S. 1115. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    March 31, 1975
    No. 74-743.
    No. 74-762.
    No. 74-833.
    Comet Electronics, Inc., et al. v. United States et al.; George T. Cook Co., Inc., et al. v. United States et al.; and Trans-Mark Services, Inc., et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo. Reported below: 381 F. Supp. 1233.


text:
    No. 74-823.
    Servitron, Inc., et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. La.


text:
    No. 73-1763.
    Lukhard, Director, Department of Welfare and Institutions of Virginia v. Doe.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Burns v. Alcala, ante, p. 575.


text:
    No. 74-637.
    Trainor, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al. v. Wilson.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Burns v. Alcala, ante, p. 575.


text:
    No. 73-1917.
    Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Echeverria.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Reid v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, ante, p. 619.


text:
    No. 74-242.
    Hooker, Director, New Hampshire Division of Welfare v. Carver et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Burns v. Alcala, ante, p. 575.


text:
    No. A-232.
    No. A-262.
    Minnesota et al. v. Reserve Mining Co. et al.; and United States v. Reserve Mining Co. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Renewed applications to vacate indefinite stay order pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1073.


text:
    No. A-684.
    Maroe v. Procunier, Corrections Director, et al.
   D. C. C. D. Cal. Application for bail, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-697.
    DeChamplain v. Lovelace et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Reapplication for bail, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-728.
    B. Coleman Corp. et al. v. Walker et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Application for stay or for injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. 74-362.
    Intercounty Construction Corp. et al. v. Walter, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 419 U. S. 1119.] Motion of the Solicitor General to permit Frank H. Easterbrook, Esquire, to argue pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. A-765.
    Patterson et al. v. Superior Court of California in and for the County of Fresno et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Stay heretofore granted by Mr. Justice Douglas on March 21, 1975, post, p. 1301, is vacated.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from Court’s order vacating his previous stay.


text:
    No. D-45.
    In re Disbarment of Mitchell.
   It is ordered that John Newton Mitchell, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. D-46.
    In re Disbarment of Mardian.
   It is ordered that Robert Charles Mardian, of Phoenix, Ariz., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 73-1888.
    United States v. Alaska.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 419 U. S. 1045.] Motion of respondent for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 74-466.
    Dunlop, Secretary of Labor v. Bachowski et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 419 U. S. 1068.] Motion of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, for additional time to present oral argument denied. The alternative request for divided argument granted only if the Solicitor General agrees to cede some of the time allotted petitioner for oral argument.


text:
    No. 74-389.
    No. 74-428.
    Albemarle Paper Co. et al. v. Moody et al.; and Halifax Local No. 425, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO v. Moody et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 419 U. S. 1068.] Motion of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.


text:
    No. 74-634.
    United States v. Nobles.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 419 U. S. 1120.] Motion of respondent for additional time for oral argument, or in the alternative for divided argument, denied.


text:
    No. 74-878.
    No. 74-879.
    National League of Cities et al. v. Dunlop, Secretary of Labor; and California v. Dunlop, Secretary of Labor.
   Appeals from D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 906.] Motion of Florida Police Benevolent Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. A-776 (74-1185).
    Firestone Plastics Co., a Division of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., et al. v. United States Department of Labor et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 74-6154.
    Morton et al. v. Meacham, Warden, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 74-799.
    United States v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-942.
    Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al. v. Goode et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-492.
    Ohio v. Gallagher.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-928.
    United States v. Dinitz.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-5822.
    Hampton, aka Byers v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-622.
    People of Saipan, by Guerrero et al. v. United States Department of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-649.
    Bellizzi v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-795.
    No. 74-5857.
    Curbelo-Talvara et al. v. United States; and Arias-Diaz et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 165.


text:
    No. 74-841.
    Porter et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-870.
    Lawson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-871.
    New Jersey Chapter, Inc. of the American Physical Therapy Assn., Inc. v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-899.
    LeFaivre et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-907.
    Keyser, dba Keyser Towing Co., et al. v. Dunlop, Secretary of Labor.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-968.
    Barrera v. Roscoe, Snyder & Pacific Railway Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-969.
    Olympic Fastening Systems, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-971.
    Board of Education of the City School District of New York v. Newman.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-983.
    Maloney, dba Apalachicola Times v. Gibson et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5472.
    Nudd v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-1008.
    Bacon et al. v. Texaco Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-1013.
    Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc., et al. v. A Shipment of Rice Now or Lately on Board the Orient Transporter et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5711.
    O’Brien v. United States District Court for the Central District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5729.
    Nunnery v. Barber, Commissioner, Alcohol Beverage Control Commission.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5744.
    McFarland v. Washington.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5753.
    Slaughter et al. v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5759.
    Fernandez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5790.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5803.
    Barnes v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5807.
    Gant v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5817.
    Hodge v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5819.
    Tocco et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5838.
    Poole v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5839.
    Lundy v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5845.
    Hessbrook v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5847.
    Daniels v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5853.
    Rivera v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5886.
    Strawn v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5891.
    Terry v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5906.
    Brogan v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5920.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5926.
    Jewell v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5943.
    Abney v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5987.
    Moore v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5993.
    Forman v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5994.
    Kosky v. Whealon, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-5996.
    Nowlan v. Nowlan.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6001.
    Cole v. District Attorney of Placer County.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6004.
    Eaton v. Buchkoe, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6005.
    Mudd v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6009.
    McHar v. Government Employees Insurance Co. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6010.
    Black et al. v. Hanrahan et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6011.
    Porzuczek, Guardian v. County of San Mateo et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6013.
    Bell v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6017.
    Robinson v. Robinson, State Farm Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6023.
    Hawk v. Michigan et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6024.
    Epperson v. Gunn, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6031.
    Trailor v. Hopper, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6054.
    Smith v. North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-511.
    Trainor, Acting Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Vargas.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 74-779.
    Louisiana v. Saia.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-900.
    City of Parma, Ohio v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 74-980.
    Lee et al. v. Arrowood et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 74-979.
    Twomey, Warden, et al. v. Wright.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-719.
    No. 74-5568.
    Neale et vir v. Hayduk et al., Garcia v. United States,
   ante, p. 915; and

ante, p. 960. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 74-5347.
    No. 74-5348.
    No. 74-5459.
    No. 74-5510.
    Ward v. Griggs, Institution Superintendent, et al., Ward v. Griggs, Institution Superintendent, Ward v. Griggs, Institution Superintendent, Orand v. United States,
   ante, p. 930;

ante, p. 930;

ante, p. 930; and

ante, p. 931. Petitions for rehearing denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas took nó part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas, Circuit Justice.

text:
    PATTERSON et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO et al.
    No. A-765.
    Decided March 21, 1975
   Mr. Justice Douglas, Circuit Justice.

Applicants are two California reporters and the managing editor of their newspaper. In January 1975, they published a series of articles containing references to testimony offered in a Fresno County grand jury proceeding, despite the fact that the transcript of that proceeding had been ordered sealed by the local state-court judge before whom the grand jury’s indictment was returned. The judge instituted an investigation seeking to uncover any possible violations of his order sealing the grand jury transcript; in the course of that investigation, numerous witnesses were called, including applicants. Applicants state that they were excluded from the courtroom during the testimony of the other witnesses, and that their counsel was prevented from cross-examining any of these witnesses. Applicants themselves, when called, refused to answer questions concerning the manner in which they had obtained access to the grand jury transcript, citing various state and federal privileges (not including, except as to one applicant, their privilege against self-incrimination). The judge refused to recognize these claims of privilege, and found applicants in contempt of court on many occasions, although the record before me does not disclose whether these contempt adjudications have ever been formalized in any sense and does not indicate that any sanction has yet been imposed. Applicants unsuccessfully sought extraordinary relief in the state appellate courts, and now state their intention to seek a writ of certiorari to review the denial of such relief, claiming that their confrontation rights and their due process rights, including the right to a fair and impartial hearing, have been violated and will continue to be violated in these proceedings.

I am informed that proceedings are scheduled to continue in the Superior Court at 10 a. m. today. Intervention in a pending state proceeding of this sort undoubtedly is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances. The facts of this case, however, raise disquieting echoes of the constitutional infirmities which we identified in In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955), and In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948). If these proceedings continue in this fashion, applicants may well suffer a deprivation of constitutional rights which can never be adequately redressed. In light of applicants’ expressed intention to seek certio-rari from the denial of extraordinary relief below, I have this day entered an order staying further proceedings with respect to these applicants, pending my referral of this application to the full Court at the earliest opportunity.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan

text:
    VELLA v. FORD MOTOR CO.
    No. 73-1994.
    Argued February 18-19, 1975—
    Decided April 15, 1975
    Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Leonard C. Jaques argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      John A. Mundell, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case limited to the question whether a shipowner’s duty to furnish an injured seaman maintenance and cure continues from the date

the seaman leaves the ship to the date when a medical diagnosis is made that the seaman’s injury was permanent immediately after his accident and therefore incurable. 419 U. S. 894 (1974).

Petitioner was a seaman aboard respondent’s Great Lakes vessel, S. S. Robert S. McNamara. He was discharged and left the ship on June 29, 1968. Thereafter he filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, based on a claim that on April 4, 1968, while replacing a lower engineroom deck plate, he slipped and fell on the oily floor plate causing his head to suffer a severe blow when it struck an electrical box. The complaint included a count, among others, for maintenance and cure. The medical testimony at the trial was that petitioner suffered from a vestibular disorder defined as damage to the balancing mechanism of the inner ear. The testimony of respondent’s medical witness, Dr. Heil, an otolaryngologist, supplied the only medical diagnosis as to the time when the disorder became permanent and not susceptible of cura-tive treatment. Dr. Heil testified on April 27, 1972, that he had recently examined petitioner. . He conceded that a severe blow to the head, such as alleged by petitioner, could have caused the disorder. He said, however, that the disorder is not a condition that can be cured by treatment. The jury awarded petitioner maintenance and cure in the amount of $5,848. Respondent moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the award was not within the permissible scope of maintenance and cure. The District Court denied the motion and stated: “While it is true that maintenance and cure is not available for a sickness declared to be permanent, it is also true that maintenance and cure continues until such time as the incapacity is declared to be permanent.” App. 20a. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed without a published opinion, 495 F. 2d 1374 (1974). The Court of Appeals held that “once the seaman reaches ‘maximum medical recovery/ the shipowner’s obligation to provide maintenance and cure ceases,” App. 28a, and since “ [t]he record in this case does not permit an inference other than that [petitioner’s] condition was permanent immediately after the accident,” id., at 29a, the District Court’s holding impermissibly extended the shipowner’s obligation.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals and therefore reverse. The shipowner’s ancient duty to' provide maintenance and cure for the seaman who becomes ill or is injured while in the service of the ship derives from the “unique hazards [which] attend the work of seamen,” and fosters the “combined object of encouraging marine com-

merce and assuring the well-being of seamen.” Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724, 727 (1943). To further that “combined object” we have held that the duty arises irrespective of the absence of shipowner negligence and indeed irrespective of whether the illness or injury is suffered in the course of the seaman’s employment. Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 527 (1938). And, “[s]o broad is the shipowner’s obligation, . . . negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the seaman’s part will not relieve [the shipowner] of the responsibility.” Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 730-731. Thus, the breadth and inclusiveness of the shipowner’s duty assure its easy and ready administration for “[i]t has few exceptions or conditions to stir contentions, cause delays, and invite litigations.” Farrell v. United States, 336 U. S. 511, 516 (1949).

Denial of maintenance and cure when the seaman’s injury, though in fact permanent immediately after the accident, is not medically diagnosed as permanent until long after its occurrence would obviously disserve and frustrate the “combined object of encouraging marine commerce and assuring the well-being of seamen.” A shipowner might withhold vitally necessary maintenance and cure on the belief, however well or poorly founded, that the seaman’s injury is permanent and incurable. Or the seaman,, if paid maintenance and cure by the shipowner, might be required to reimburse the payments, if it is later determined that the injury was permanent immediately after the accident. Thus uncertainty would displace the essential certainty of protection against the ravages of illness and injury that encourages seamen to undertake their hazardous calling. Moreover, easy and ready administration of the shipowner’s duty would seriously suffer from the introduction of complexities and uncertainty that could “stir contentions, cause delays, and invite litigations.”

The Shipowners’ Liability Convention, made effective for the United States on October 29, 1939, Farrell v. United States, supra, at 517, buttresses our conclusion that the District Court correctly held that “maintenance and cure continues until such time as the incapacity is declared to be permanent.” That holding tracks the wording of Art. 4, ¶[ 1, of the Convention which provides: “The shipowner shall be liable to defray the expense of medical care and maintenance until the sick or injured person has been cured, or until the sickness or incapacity has been declared of a permanent character.” 54 Stat. 1696. (Emphasis supplied.) The aim of the Convention “was not to change materially American standards but to equalize operating costs by raising the standards of member nations to the American level.” Warren v. United States, 340 U. S. 523, 527 (1951). Thus Art. 4, ¶ 1, is declaratory of a longstanding tradition respecting the scope of the shipowner’s duty to furnish injured seamen maintenance and cure, Farrell v. United States, supra, at 518, and therefore the District Court’s interpretation was correct.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

       This question is subsumed in Question I presented in the petition for writ of certiorari:
      “Is a disabled seaman who contracted by trauma a permanent disease while in the service of a vessel entitled to maintenance and cure payments during the interim between the period the incident occurred and the time the disease was medically diagnosed and proclaimed incurable?”

       Petitioner also sought damages under counts founded on the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688, and on unseaworthiness under general maritime law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of respondent entered on a jury verdict of no cause for action on either count. We denied review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in respect of that affirmance when we denied the petition for writ of certiorari as respects Question II presented in the petition.

       When asked whether petitioner might be cured by treatment, Dr. Heil testified:
      “No, not really. Treatment is primarily symptomatic for this condition. That is, people with a vestibular disorder are apt to have intermittent episodes of dizziness which, on occasion, are somewhat more severe. Treatment is limited to those times when the patient is particularly dizzy. They can obtain some symptomatic relief with medication. Other than that, there is no specific cure or treatment.”

       On this record maintenance and cure could have been claimed to continue from June 29, 1968, the date petitioner left the vessel, to April 27, 1972, the date Dr. Heil testified that the vestibular disorder was permanent immediately after the accident and not susceptible of curative treatment. The jury, however, awarded petitioner maintenance and cure at $8 per day only for the period from June 29, 1968, to June 29, 1970. Petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals did not, however, draw into question a claim of entitlement.to maintenance and cure for the longer period. App. 25a. In that circumstance petitioner is not entitled to the relief respecting the longer period sought by him in this Court, Brief for Petitioner 19. See Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415, 421-422 (1940). Moreover, in light of our holding that the shipowner’s duty continued until Dr. Heil’s testimony, it is not necessary to address the question whether the jury award might also be sustained on the ground that the shipowner’s duty in any event obliged him to provide palliative medical care to arrest further progress of the condition or to reduce pain, and we intimate no view whatever upon the shipowner’s duty in that regard. Compare Ward v. Union Barge Line Corp., 443 F. 2d 565, 572 (CA3 1971), with the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case. App. 29a n. 1. Nor do we express any view whether a seaman may forfeit his right to maintenance and cure by not reporting a known injury or malady, or by refusing from the outset to allow proper medical examination, or by discontinuing medical care made available.

       See Desmond v. United States, 217 F. 2d 948, 950 (CA2 1954): “The shipowner is liable for maintenance and cure only until the disease is cured or recognized as incurable” (emphasis supplied); Vitco v. Joncich, 130 F. Supp. 945, 949 (SD Cal. 1955), aff’d, 234 F. 2d 161 (CA9 1956): “The shipowner’s obligation to furnish maintenance is coextensive in time with his duty to furnish cure . . . and neither obligation is discharged until the earliest time when it is reasonably and in good faith determined by those charged with the seaman’s care and treatment that the maximum cure reasonably possible has been effected” (emphasis supplied).
      It is therefore unnecessary to address the conflict between commentators whether the Convention is applicable to Great Lakes shipping. Compare G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 323 (2d ed. 1975) (“Evidently the Convention was not to apply to . . . Great Lakes shipping”), with 4 E. Benedict, Admiralty 296 (6th ed. 1940) ("[T]he Convention would seem to apply to the Great Lakes, which are not ‘inland waters’ in the usual sense . . .”). The United States’ reservation to the Convention provides: “[T]he United States Government understands and construes the words ‘maritime navigation’ appearing in this Convention to mean navigation on the high seas only.” 54 Stat. 1704.


author: Mr. Justice Blackmun Mr. Justice Réhnquist,

text:
    STANTON v. STANTON
    No. 73-1461.
    Argued February 19, 1975
    Decided April 15, 1975

      Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 18.

      Bryce E. Roe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was William G. Fowler.

      J. Dennis Frederick argued the cause for appellee. On the brief was D. Gary Christian.

   Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether a state statute specifying for males a greater age of majority than it specifies for females denies, in the context of a parent’s obligation for support payments for his children, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

Appellant Thelma B. Stanton and appellee James Lawrence Stanton, Jr., were married at Elko, Nev., in February 1951. At the suit of the appellant, they were divorced in Utah on November 29, 1960. They have a daughter, Sherri Lyn, born in February 1953, and a son, Rick Arlund, born in January 1955. Sherri became 18 on February 12, 1971, and Rick on January 29, 1973.

During the divorce proceedings in the District Court of Salt Lake County, the parties entered into a stipulation as to property, child support, and alimony. The court awarded custody of the children to their mother and incorporated provisions of the stipulation into its findings and conclusions and into its decree of divorce. Specifically, as to alimony and child support, the decree provided:

“Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month as child support and alimony, $100.00 per month for each child as child support and $100.00 per month as alimony, to be paid on or before the 1st day of each month through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk.” App. 6.

The appellant thereafter remarried; the court, pursuant to another stipulation, then modified the decree to relieve the appellee from payment of further alimony. The appellee also later remarried.

When Sherri attained 18 the appellee discontinued payments for her support. In May 1973 the appellant moved the divorce court for entry of judgment in her favor and against the appellee for, among other things, support for the children for the periods after each respectively attained the age of 18 years. The court concluded that on February 12,1971, Sherri “became 18 years of age, and under the provisions of [§] 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, thereby attained her majority. Defendant is not obligated to plaintiff for maintenance and support of Sherri Lyn Stanton since that date.” App. 23. An order denying the appellant’s motion was entered accordingly. Id., at 24-25.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. She contended, among other things, that Utah Code Ann. . § 15-2-1 (1953) to the effect that the period of minority for males extends to age 21 and for females to age 18, is invidiously discriminatory and serves to deny due process and equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the corresponding provisions of the Utah Constitution, namely, Art. I, §§ 7 and 24, and Art. IV, § 1. On this issue, the Utah court affirmed. 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P. 2d 1010 (1974). The court acknowledged: “There is no doubt that the questioned statute treats men and women differently,” but said that people may be treated differently “so long as there is a reasonable basis for the classification, which is related to the purposes of the act, and it applies equally •and uniformly to all persons within the class.” Id,., at 318, 517 P. 2d, at 1012. The court referred to what it called some “old notions,” namely, “that generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,” ibid.;' that “it is a salutary thing for him to get a good education and/or training before he undertakes those responsibilities,” id., at 319, 517 P. 2d, at 1012; that “girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys”; and that “they generally tend to marry earlier,” ibid. It concluded:

“[I]t is our judgment that there is no basis upon which we would be justified in concluding that the statute is so beyond a reasonable doubt in conflict with constitutional provisions that it should be stricken down as invalid.” Id., at 319, 517 P. 2d, at 1013.

If such a change were desirable, the court said, “that is a matter which should commend itself to the attention of the legislature.” Id., at 320, 517 P. 2d, at 1013. The appellant, thus, was held not entitled to support for Sherri for the period after she attained 18, but was entitled to support for Rick “during his minority” unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. Ibid., 517 P. 2d, at 1014.

We noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U. S. 893 (1974).

i — !

The appellee initially suggests that the support issue is moot and that, in any event, the appellant lacks standing. These arguments are related and we reject both of them.

A. The mootness suggestion is based on the propositions that both the appellant and Sherri are now over 21 and that neither possesses rights that “can be affected by the outcome of this proceeding.” Brief for Appellee 9. At the time the case was before us on the jurisdictional statement, the appellee suggested that the case involved a nonjusticiable political question. Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss 6-7. Each approach, of course, overlooks the fact that what is at issue is support for the daughter during her years between 18 and 21. If appellee, under the divorce decree, is obligated for Sherri’s support during that period, it is an obligation that has not been fulfilled, and there is an amount past due and owing from the appellee. The obligation issue, then, plainly presents a continuing live case or controversy. It is neither moot nor nonjusticiable.

B. The suggestion as to standing is that the appellant is not of the age group affected by the Utah statute and that she therefore lacks a personal stake in the resolution of the issue. It is said that when the appellant signed the stipulation as to support payments, she took the Utah law as it was and thus waived, or is estopped from asserting, any right to support payments after the daughter attained age 18.

We are satisfied that it makes no difference whether the appellant’s interest in any obligation of the appellee, under the divorce decree, for Sherri’s support between ages 18 and 21, is regarded as an interest personal to appellant or as that of a fiduciary. The Utah court has described support money as “compensation to a spouse

for the support of minor children.” Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 306, 172 P. 2d 132, 135 (1946). And the right to past due support money appears to be the supplying spouse’s not the child’s. Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 228, 300 P. 2d 596, 598 (1956). See also Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P. 2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). The appellant, therefore, clearly has a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 102 (1968). We see nothing in the stipulation itself that is directed to the question when majority is reached for purposes of. support payments or that smacks of waiver. In addition, the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act has been in effect in Utah since 1957. Laws of Utah, 1957, c. 110, now codified as Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 (Supp. 1973). Section 78-45-4 specifically provides: “Every woman shall support her child.” This is in addition to the mandate contained in § 78-45-3: “Every man shall support his wife and his child.” “Child” is defined to mean “a son or daughter under the age of twenty-one years.” §78-45-2 (4). And § 78-45-12 states: “The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution [of] any other rights.”

The appellant herself thus had a legal obligation under Utah law to support her daughter until Sherri became 21. That obligation, however, obviously was not in derogation of any right she might have against the appellee under the divorce decree. Her interest in the controversy, therefore, is distinct and significant and is one that assures “concrete adverseness” and proper standing on her part.

m

We turn to the merits. The appellant argues that Utah’s statutory prescription establishing different ages of majority for males and females denies equal protection; that it is a classification based solely on sex and affects a child’s “fundamental right” to be fed, clothed, and sheltered by its parents; that no compelling state interest supports the classification; and that the statute can withstand no judicial scrutiny, “close” or otherwise, for it has no relationship to any ascertainable legislative objective. The appellee contends that the test is that of rationality and that the age classification has a rational basis and endures any attack based on equal protection.

We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).

Reed, we feel, is controlling here. That case presented an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Idaho probate code which gave preference to males over females when persons otherwise of the same entitlement applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent’s estate. No regard was paid under the statute to the applicants’ respective individual qualifications. In upholding the challenge, the Court reasoned that the Idaho statute accorded different treatment on the basis of sex and that it “thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id., at 75. The Clause, it was said, denies to States “the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.” Id., at 75-76. “A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).” Id., at 76. It was not enough to save the statute that among its objectives were the elimination both of an area of possible family controversy and of a hearing on the comparative merits of petitioning relatives.

The test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between children warrants the distinction in the appellee’s obligation to support that is drawn by the Utah statute. We conclude that it does not. It may be true, as the Utah court observed and as is argued here, that it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he assumes that responsibility; that girls tend to mature earlier than boys; and that females tend to marry earlier than males. The last mentioned factor, however, under the Utah statute loses whatever weight it otherwise might have, for the statute states that “all minors obtain their majority by marriage”; thus minority, and all that goes with it, is abruptly lost by marriage of a person of éither sex at whatever tender age the marriage occurs.

Notwithstanding the “old notions” to which the Utah court referred, we perceive nothing rational in the distinction drawn by § 15-2-1 which, when related to the divorce decree, results in the appellee’s liability for support for Sherri only to age 18 but for Rick to age 21. This imposes “criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.” A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 535 n. 17 (1975). Women’s activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he attains his education and training, so, too, is it for the girl. To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed. And if any weight remains in this day to the claim of earlier maturity of the female, with a concomitant inference of absence of need for support beyond 18, we fail to perceive its unquestioned truth or its significance, particularly when marriage, as the statute provides, terminates minority for a person of either sex.

Only Arkansas, as far as our investigation reveals, remains with Utah in fixing the age of majority for females at 18 and for males at 21. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 57-103 (1971). See Petty v. Petty, 252 Ark. 1032, 482 S. W. 2d 119 (1972). Furthermore, Utah itself draws the 18-21 distinction only in § 15-2-1 defining minority, and in § 30-1-9 relating to marriage without the consent of parent or guardian. See also § 30-1-2 (4) making void a marriage where the male is under 16 or the female under 14. Elsewhere, in the State’s present constitutional and statutory structure, the male and the female appear to be treated alike. The State’s Constitution provides that the rights of Utah citizens to vote and hold office “shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex,” and that “[b]oth male and female citizens . . . shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges,” Art. IV, § 1, and, since long before the Nation’s adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971, did provide that every citizen “of the age of twenty-one years and upwards,” who satisfies durational requirements, “shall be ' entitled to vote.” Art. IV, § 2. Utah’s statutes provide that any citizen over the age of 21 who meets specified nonsex qualifications is “competent to act as a juror,” Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-8, may be admitted to the practice. of law, § 78-51-10, and may act as an incorporator, i 16-10-48, and, if under 21 and in need, may be entitled to public assistance, § 55-15a-17. The ages at which persons may serve in legislative, executive, and judicial offices are the same for males and females. Utah Const., Art. VI; §5, Art. VII, § 3, and Art. VIII, §2. Tobacco may not be sold, purchased, or possessed by persons of either sex under 19 years of age. §§ 76-10-104 and 76-10-105 (see Laws of Utah, 1974, §§ 39-40). No age differential is imposed with respect to the issuance of motor vehicle licenses. § 41-2-10. State adult education programs are open to every person 18 years of age or over. § 53-30-5. The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act is in effect in Utah and defines a minor, for its purposes, as any person “who has not attained the age of twenty-one years.” § 75-15-2.11 (Supp. 1973). Juvenile court jurisdiction extends to persons of either sex under a designated age. §§ 55-10-64 and 55-10-77. Every person over the age of 18 and of sound mind may dispose of his property by will. § 74-1-1. And the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, noted above and in effect in Utah since 1957, imposes on each parent an obligation of support of both sons and daughters until age 21. §§ 78-45-2 (4), 78-45-3, and 78-45-4 (Supp. 1973).

This is not to say that § 15-2-1 does not have important effect in application. A “minor” may disaffirm his contracts. § 15-2-2. An “infant” must appear in court by guardian or guardian ad litem. Utah Rule Civ. Proc. 17 (b). A parent has a right of action for injury to, or wrongful death of, “a minor child.” § 78-11-6. A person “[.ujnder the age of majority” is not competent or entitled to serve as an administrator of a decedent’s estate, § 75-4-4, or as the executor of a decedent’s will. §75-3-15 (1). The statute of limitations is tolled while a person entitled to bring an action is “[u]nder the age of majority.” § 78-12-36. Thus, the distinction drawn by § 15-2-1 affects other rights and duties. It has pervasive effect, both direct and collateral.

We therefore conclude that under any test — compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between— § 15-2-1, in the context of child support, does not survive an equal protection attack. In that context, no valid distinction between male and female may be drawn.

IV

Our conclusion that in the context of child support the classification effectuated by § 15-2-1 denies the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not finally resolve the controversy as between this appellant and this appellee. With the age differential held invalid, it is not for this Court to determine when the appellee’s obligation for his children’s support, pursuant to the divorce decree, terminates under Utah law. The appellant asserts that, with the classification eliminated, the common law applies and that at common law the age of majority for both males and females is 21. The appellee claims that any unconstitutional inequality between males and females is to be remedied by treating males as adults at age 18, rather than by withholding the privileges of adulthood from

women until they reach 21. This plainly is an issue of state law to be resolved by the Utah courts on remand; the issue was noted, incidentally, by the Supreme Court of Utah. 30 Utah 2d, at 319, 517 P. 2d, at 1013. The appellant, although prevailing here on the federal constitutional issue, may or may not ultimately win her lawsuit. See Harrigfeld v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P. 2d 822 (1973); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A. 2d 851 (1974); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 542-543 (1942).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Réhnquist,

dissenting.

The Court views this case as requiring a determination of whether the Utah statute specifying that males must reach a higher age than females before attaining their majority denies females the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court regards the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1953) as properly at issue because of the manner in which the Supreme Court of Utah approached and decided the case. But this Court is subject to constraints with respect to constitutional adjudication which may well not bind the Supreme Court of Utah. This Court is bound by the rule, “to which it has rigidly adhered, . . . never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,” Liverpool, N. Y. & Phila. S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885), and we try to avoid deciding constitutional questions which “come to us in highly abstract form,” Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 575 (1947). Fidelity to these longstanding rules dictates that we have some regard for the factual background of this case, as fully outlined in the Court’s opinion, before deciding the constitutional question that has been tendered to us.

The Utah statute which the Court invalidates “in the context of child support,” ante, at 17, does not by its terms define the age at which the obligation of a divorced parent to support a child ceases. The parties concede that the Stantons could have provided in their property settlement agreement that appellee’s obligation to support Sherri and Rick would terminate when both turned 18, when both turned 21, or when one turned 18 and the other turned 21. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 14, 23. This case arises only because appellant and appellee made no provision in their property settlement agreement fixing the age at which appellee’s obligation to support his son or daughter would terminate. The Supreme Court of Utah, faced with the necessity of filling in this blank, referred to the State’s general age-of-majority statute in supplying the terms which the parties had neglected to specify themselves.

. Had the Supreme Court of Utah relied upon the statute only insofar as it cast light on the intention of the parties regarding the child support obligations contained in the divorce decree, there would be no basis for reaching the constitutionality of the statute. In supplying the missing term in an agreement executed between two private parties, a court ordinarily looks to the customs, mores, and practice of the parties in an .attempt to ascertain what was intended. If, upon consideration of these factors, including the age-of-majority statute, the Utah Supreme Court had concluded that the Stantons intended to bestow more of their limited resources upon a son than a daughter, perhaps for the reasons stated in the opinion of that court, that strikes me as an entirely permissible basis upon which to construe the property settlement agreement.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Utah may have concluded that, the parties having failed to specify this term of the agreement, the question became one of Utah statutory law rather than one of determining the intent of the parties. If that were its determination, the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1953), would indeed be implicated in this case.

I do not think it possible to say with confidence which of these two approaches was taken by the Supreme Court of Utah in this case. In addition to this difficulty, there is another element of attenuation between the claim asserted on behalf of Sherri to be treated like her brother for purposes of child support, and the actual case before us. Utah has a comprehensive scheme dealing with child support in its Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973). Under that Act, “child” is defined as “a son or daughter under the age of twenty-one years,” §78-45-2 (4). Thus, for purposes of any direct claim by Sherri against appellee, Utah law treats her precisely as it does her brother. The claim asserted in this case is not by Sherri, but by her mother, and the source of any claim which the mother has against appellee necessarily arises out of the voluntary property settlement agreement which they executed at the time of their divorce.

These factors lead me to conclude that the issue which the Court says is presented by this case, and which it decides, cannot properly be decided on these facts if’we are to adhere to our established policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication. I would dismiss the appeal for that reason. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra; Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972).

       “15-2-1. Period of minority. — The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage.” As is so frequently the case with state statutes, little or no legislative history is available on § 15-2-1. The statute has its roots in a territorial Act approved February 6, 1852, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1876, § 1035.


author: Mr. Justice Powell Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

text:
    McLUCAS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, et al. v. DeCHAMPLAIN
    No. 73-1346.
    Argued December 9, 1974
    Decided April 15, 1975

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White,-BlackmüN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. BrenNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 34.

      Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Leonard Schaitman, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer.

      Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was David Rein.

         Melvin L. Wvlf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The District Court for the District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined appellants, the Secretary of the Air Force and five Air Force officers, from proceeding with appellee DeChamplain’s court-martial (i) on charges based upon Art. 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 934, and (ii) on any charges whatever unless appellants allowed civilian defense counsel and certain other persons unlimited access to documents material to DeChamplain’s defense. 367 F. Supp. 1291 (1973). The military authorities appealed directly to this Court, averring jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We postponed the jurisdictional question to the hearing on the merits. 418 U. S. 904 (1974). We hold the case properly here under § 1252 and, finding its disposition controlled by our intervening decisions in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975), vacate the preliminary injunction and remand with directions to dismiss the action.

I

Article 134 provides, inter alia, that “crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense ....”' This clause of the article is an assimilative crimes provision, conferring court-martial jurisdiction over service-connected, non-capital federal offenses not covered by specific provisions of the Code. In 1971, court-martial charges were preferred under this provision against appellee DeChamplain, an Air Force master sergeant. Specifically, DeChamplain was charged with having copied classified documents, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 793 (b), and with having attempted to deliver such copies to an unauthorized person, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 793 (d). DeChamplain was also charged, under Art. 81 of the Uniform Code, 10 U. S. C. § 881, with conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government, in violation of Art. 134 and 50 U. S. C. § 783 (b), and, under Art. 92, 10 U. S. C. § 892, with failure to obey an Air Force regulation requiring that contacts with foreign agents be reported. All of these charges were premised on allegations that, while stationed in Thailand, DeChamplain twice had been in the company of a Soviet embassy official and subsequently was found in possession of 24 official Air Force documents, ranging in classification from “confidential” to “top secret.” The general court-martial convicted DeChamplain of all charges. On appeal, the Air Force Court of Military Review held that certain inculpatory statements made by DeChamplain should not have been admitted into evidence; the court therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed.

The military authorities then prepared to retry DeChamplain before a general court-martial on substantially the same charges. The charges were amended, however, to delete all allegations pertaining to three of the classified documents, the Air Force choosing to forgo prosecution as to these documents rather than compromise their confidentiality. The Air Force also decided not to introduce at the new trial 12 of the documents, assertedly because of their connection with DeChamplain’s inadmissible inculpatory statements. Copies of all of these documents are contained in the record of DeChamplain’s first court-martial, to which the Air Force has given DeChamplain’s military counsel full access. Civilian defense counsel, however, were allowed access only to unclassified portions of the record and thus were not permitted to inspect those documents that will not be in issue at the retrial. The Air^Force authorized DeChamplain, his military counsel, chief civilian counsel, one legal associate, and one secretary to have access to the nine remaining documents that the charges against DeChamplain now concerii. It imposed restrictions, however, on the use of the documents: they were to be examined only in the presence of persons with appropriate security clearances; no copies were to be made; written notes pertaining to classified information were to remain in Air Force custody; and the information was not to be discussed with anyone other than those who had been authorized access.

At a pretrial hearing conducted pursuant to 10 U. S. C. § 839, DeChamplain challenged these restrictions. The presiding military judge sustained the restrictions, but granted the civilian defense team access to portions of the original record pertaining to the nine documents still at issue, subject to the restrictions applicable to the documents themselves. DeChamplain also moved to dismiss -the charges on various grounds, claiming, inter alia, that Art. 134 was unconstitutional. The presiding judge denied the motion. DeChamplain made the same claims in three petitions to the Court of Military Appeals for extraordinary relief. That court denied the petitions, stating on the last occasion that “[a] petition for extraordinary relief is not a substitute for appeal.”

DeChamplain’s second court-martial was to begin on November 15, 1973. On October 3, he filed this action in the District Court seeking injunctive relief and asserting, among other claims, that Art. 134 was unconstitutionally vague and that the limitations on access to and use of the classified documents denied him due process and effective assistance of counsel. The defendant military "authorities moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief 'could be granted. The court denied the motion. It agreed with the military authorities that “generally a serviceman must first exhaust his military remedies before a federal court will interfere with court martial proceedings.” 367 F. Supp., at 1294. The court believed, however, that the circumstances of the case justified an exception to the rule. Because the issues presented in the case were “purely legal” and did “not necessitate determinations which the military forum is best equipped to make,” and because “Sergeant DeChamplain [would] be denied fundamental constitutional guarantees” unless the court intervened, the court concluded that there was no justification for deferring consideration of the issues until after DeChamplain’s court-martial and subsequent military appellate review. Ibid.

The District Court further concluded that DeChamplain had satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction. It ruled that the unconstitutionality of Art. 134 was clear from the decisions of the Courts of Appeals in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 352, 477 F. 2d 1237 (1973), and Levy v. Parker, 478 F. 2d 772 (CA3 1973), both of which were then pending on certiorari in this Court. The District Court further held that the restrictions on access to the nine documents that the charges now concern and to the record of the previous court-martial were “clearly excessive” and abridged DeChamplain’s right to a fair trial.

Finally, the court concluded that DeChamplain adequately had demonstrated irreparable injury: he had been in confinement since before his original court-martial and, if again convicted, would remain confined pending review by the military appellate courts. The District Court therefore preliminarily enjoined the military authorities from proceeding with the Art. 134 charges. It further enjoined prosecution “on any and all charges” unless the Air Force granted “full and unlimited access to all documents relevant and material to the case” to DeChamplain’s civilian defense counsel “and such legal associates and assistants, subject to an appropriate protective order, as are necessary to said counsel’s adequate preparation for trial.”

II

The case comes to us in a most unusual posture. Insofar as the complaint sought an injunction against enforcement of Art. 134 on the ground of its asserted unconstitutionality, the case falls within the literal mandate of 28 U. S. C. § 2282. That section provides that “[a] n interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges....” Although neither of the parties to this suit applied to the District Court for convention of a three-judge court, the section’s requirement is jurisdictional, and if it applies a single district judge has no power to act. See, e. g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 606-607 (1960); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 153 (1963). A single judge, however, can dismiss the action for want of justiciability or general subject-matter jurisdiction. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 100 (1974). We also have held that general subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking when the claim of unconstitutionality is insubstantial, i. e., obviously without merit or clearly concluded by this Court’s previous decisions. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 32 (1933); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713, 715 (1962); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 518-519 (1973).

The District Court here, however, obviously did not consider DeChamplain’s constitutional claim insubstantial; on the contrary, the court denied the motion to dismiss and went on to grant a preliminary injunction. According to DeChamplain, a three-judge court was deemed unnecessary at the time the complaint was filed, not because his claim was insubstantial, but because the unconstitutionality of the statute appeared settled by the Court of Appeals decision in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, supra, a decision binding on the District Court. Hence, it is said, the case seemed to present a variant, however attenuated, of Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962), and the District Court thought itself empowered to act since the “decision could not possibly go in any manner save one.”

But the prediction proved to be ill-founded; subsequently, the Court of Appeals decision in Avrech was reversed by this Court. Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676 (1974). In consequence of this, appellee DeChamplain argued in his motion to dismiss and brief to this Court that the question of Art. 134’s constitutionality was substantial and thus a three-judge court was required. Moreover, if this is so, appellee urges, this Court has no jurisdiction of the appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Appellee bases this argument on our decisions concerning appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. That section allows a direct appeal to this Court “from an order granting or denying ... an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” On its face, this provision would seem to allow a direct appeal to this Court if a single district judge grants or denies an injunction, when under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 or § 2282 the case was “required ... to be heard and determined” by a three-judge court. This Court has read the statute, however, as allowing direct appeals only from “orders actually entered by three-judge courts.” Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, at 96 n. 14. See Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 15-16 (1930). And we have held that, when a single district judge fails to call for the convention of a three-judge court and goes on to dispose of the case, an appeal lies only to the court of appeals. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra; Hicks v. Pleasure House, Inc., 404 U. S. 1, 3 (1971).

Appellants here, howéver, premise this Court’s jurisdiction on 28 U. S. C. § 1252, rather than § 1253. Section 1252 provides in pertinent part:

“Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.”

The requisites of this provision are met in this case. This is a civil action; the appellant military authorities are, of course, officers of the United States, acting in their official capacities; and Art. 134 is an “Act of Congress.” It might be argued that, in deciding to issue the preliminary injunction, the District Court made only an interlocutory determination of appellee’s probability of success on the merits and did not finally “hold” the article unconstitutional. By its terms, however, § 1252 applies to interlocutory as well as final judgments, decrees, and orders, and this Court previously has found the section properly invoked when the court below has made only an interlocutory determination of unconstitutionality, at least if, as here, that determination forms the necessary predicate to the grant or denial of preliminary equitable relief. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 (1947). In this case, as in United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20 (1960), it is clear that “the basis of the decision below in fact was that the Act of Congress was unconstitutional. . .

In his motion to dismiss, appellee argued that § 1252 should be subject to the limitations placed on direct appeals to this Court under § 1253. In other words, § 1252 should not be read as allowing a direct appeal from an injunctive order erroneously entered by a single district judge, and instead appeal should be allowed only when the district court acted within its jurisdiction. Such a gloss on § 1252 perhaps would be “consonant with the overriding policy, historically encouraged by Congress, of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court . . . .” Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, supra, at 98. We think, however, that in § 1252 Congress unambiguously mandated an exception to this policy in the narrow circumstances that the section identifies. The language of the statute sufficiently demonstrates its purpose: to afford immediate review in this Court in civil actions to which the United States or its officers are parties and thus will be bound by a holding of' unconstitutionality. The purpose of § 1252 is too plain to allow circumvention, whatever doubts may be entertained about the wisdom of mandatory direct review in other circumstances. Our previous cases have recognized that this Court’s jurisdiction under § 1252 in no way depends on whether the district court had jurisdiction. On the contrary, an appeal under § 1252 brings before us, not only the constitutional question, but the whole case, e. g., United States v. Raines, supra, at 27 n. 7; see 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶[ 110.03 [5], p. 96 (2d ed. 1973), including threshold issues of subject-matter jurisdiction, United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7, 12 n. 7 (1974), and whether a three-judge court was required, Flemming Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 (I960). We follow these cases and hold that, whether the District Court did or did not have jurisdiction to act, this case is properly here under

Proper disposition of the case does not require extended discussion. Appellants argue that, in fact, DeChamplain’s constitutional claim was always insubstantial. The Courts of Appeals decisions in Levy v. Parker and Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, which concluded that Art. 134 suffered from unconstitutional vagueness, concerned only the first two clauses of that article making punishable “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” and “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” DeChamplain, however, was charged under the assimilative crimes clause of the article, and was accused of having committed specific federal offenses. Thus, any possible vagueness in other parts of the article could not have affected DeChamplain. At this point, however, no purpose could be served by our deciding whether, when the complaint was filed, DeChamplain’s constitutional claim was or was not substantial. Under our. decisions in Levy and Avrech, DeChamplain’s claim is, as he concedes, clearly insubstantial now and must be dismissed.

We turn, finally, to the portion of the preliminary injunction requiring the military authorities to allow unlimited access to the original court-martial record and to documents that will be at issue at DeChamplain’s court-martial. Since this claim is independent of the Art. 134 question and unrelated to the validity and interpretation of that article or to any other Act of Congress, a three-judge court was not required to hear it. As to this claim, however, the only harm DeChamplain claimed in support of his prayer for equitable relief was that, if convicted, he might remain incarcerated pending review within the military system. Thus, according to . DeChamplain, intervention is justified now to ensure that he receives a trial free of constitutional error, and to avoid the possibility that he will be incarcerated, pending review, on the basis of a conviction that inevitably will be invalid. But if such harm were deemed sufficient to warrant equitable interference into pending court-martial proceedings, any constitutional ruling at the court-martial presumably would be subject to immediate relitigation in federal district courts, resulting in disruption to the court-martial and circumvention of the military appellate system provided by Congress.

We hold that relief as to the access claim is precluded squarely by our holding in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S., at 758, that “when a serviceman charged with crimes by military authorities can show no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his case in the military court system, the federal district courts must refrain from intervention . . . .” The “unlimited access” aspect of DeChamplain’s suit therefore must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Vacated and remanded.

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

concurring in the judgment.

Although I concur in the judgment, I would direct dismissal of DeChamplain’s suit, not as the Court does on the ground that “the federal district courts must refrain from intervention,” but because DeChamplain makes no claim denying the right of the military to try him at all. Therefore, his claim of right of access to and use of classified documents is properly to be presented to the military tribunals. See my concurring and dissenting opinion in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 762 (1975).

       The Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, and the following officers stationed at Riehards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Mo.: Colonel Hewitt E. Lovelace, Jr., the convening authority; Major Forrest W. Thomas, Staff Judge- Advocate; and Colonel Russell A. Stanley, presiding military judge.

       See United States v. Frantz, 2 U. S. C. M. A. 161, 7 C. M. R. 37 (1953). The full text of the article provides:
      . “Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.”

       46 C. M. R. 784 (1972).

       22 U. S. C. M. A. 150, 46 C. M. R. 150 (1973).

        DeChamplain v. United States, 22 U. S. C. M. A. 211, 46 C. M. R. 211 (1973); DeChamplain v. United States, 22 U. S. C. M. A. 656, 46 C. M. R. 1329 (1973); DeChamplain v. McLucas, 22 U. S. C. M. A. 462, 47 C. M. R. 552 (1973).

        Ibid.

       The District Court also observed that in United States v. Unrue, 22 U. S. C. M. A. 654 (1973), the Court of Military Appeals declined to follow the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 352, 477 F. 2d 1237 (1973). The District Court stated that “[i]t simply offends basic notions of fairness to require plaintiff to endure a possible lengthy court martial and further expect that appellate relief be sought in a tribunal which has clearly and summarily rejected the claims asserted.” 367 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (DC 1973).

       Following the District Court’s decision, the Air Force authorized two consultants selected by DeChamplain’s counsel to have access to the classified materials that will be in issue at the court-martial, subject to the same restrictions imposed on civilian counsel.

        Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vincent, 375 F. 2d 129, 131 n. 1 (CA2) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 839 (1967). Our description of appellee’s argument, of course, does not intimate any approval of the radical expansion of Bailey that it appears to represent.

       There is no question that our appellate jurisdiction as to the access issue depends entirely on whether an appeal properly lies as to the Art. 134 issue.

       Appellee’s counsel vigorously argued this position in both his motion to dismiss and brief. At oral argument before this Court, howéver, counsel receded from this position and now agrees that the appeal properly was taken under § 1252. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.

       As Nestor makes clear, if we were to conclude that § 2282 required a three-judge court, the proper course would be to vacate the judgment below and remand with directions that a three-judge court be convened. 363 U. S., at 606-607.

       Brief for Appellee 21.

       Because of this disposition of the matter, there is no occasion here to decide whether, if the unconstitutionality of Art. 134 had been established conclusively, as the District Court apparently believed, that would have justified an exception to the rule generally barring federal-court intervention into pending court-martial proceedings. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 53-54 (1971).