author: Mr. Justice Powell Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Me. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice White,

text:
    UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ
    No. 73-2050.
    Argued February 18, 1975 —
    Decided June 30, 1975

      Mark L. Evans argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Sidney M. Glazer, and Jerome M. Feit.

      Charles M. Sevilla, by appointment of the Court, 420 U. S. 905, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John J. Cleary.

        Sanford Jay Rosen filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Border Patrol officers stopped respondent’s car for a routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint' on Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, Cal., on November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff’d, post, p. 916, to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).

Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol officers had any special reason to suspect that respondent’s car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for United States 16. The only question for decision is whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based on probable cause.

I

In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government’s contention that the Nation’s strong interest in controlling immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several important respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).

A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in southern California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is on the principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F. 2d 308, 312 (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca described the checkpoint as follows:

“Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow lights over the highway stating ‘ALL VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE.’ Three-quarters of a mile further north are two black on yellow signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights stating ‘WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS.' At the checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of California weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended over the highway. These signs each state ‘STOP HERE — U. S. OFFICERS.' Placed on the highway are a number of orange traffic cones tunneling traffic into two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on red ‘STOP' sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent building which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation.” 368 F. Supp., at 410-411.

The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one-third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship. If the officer’s suspicion persists, or if the questioning enhances it, he will “inspect” portions of the car in which an alien might hide. Operations at other checkpoints are similar, although the traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of them.

The Government maintains that these characteristics justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the' Court’s holding in Almeida-Sanchez. It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that case. First, a checkpoint officer’s discretion in deciding which cars to search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By contrast, officers on roving patrol were theoretically free before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and search any car within 100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.

These differences are relevant to the constitutional issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771-772. While the differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a search, Terry v. Ohio, supra, they do not appear to make any difference in the search itself. The greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches especially offensive. See Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013 (1968).

Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the officer’s discretion to select cars for search. The record in the consolidated proceeding indicates that only about 3% of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Throughout the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched, Brief for United States 29, and no checkpoint involved in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or 15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from these figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. The Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed realistically, this position would authorize the Border Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer ever would have to justify his decision to search a particular car.

This degree of discretion to search private automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U. S., at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1970). We are not persuaded that the differences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private vehicles without consent or probable cause.

The Government lists in its reply brief some of the factors on which officers have relied in deciding which cars to search. They include the number of persons in a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver and passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses they give to officers’ questions, the nature of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into account in deciding whether there is probable cause to search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at 884-885, the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. In this case, however, the officers advanced no special reasons for believing respondent’s vehicle contained aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search invalid.

II

The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen, supra, that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. Examination of the Government’s brief in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this question below. On the contrary, it represented to the court that the decision in Bowen would be “determinative of the issues in this case.” We therefore decline to consider this issue, which was raised for the first time in the petition for certiorari.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I joined the dissent of my Brother White in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and recognize that the present decision is an extension of the unsound rule announced in that case. I nonetheless join the opinion of the Court, because a majority of the Court still adheres to Almeida-Sanchez and because I agree with the Court’s analysis of the significance of the Government’s proffered distinctions between roving and fixed-checkpoint searches.

I wish to stress, however, that the Court’s opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such stops involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively serve the important national interest in controlling illegal entry. I do not regard such stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether or not accompanied by “reasonable suspicion” that a particular vehicle is involved in immigration violations, cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873, and I do not understand today’s opinion to cast doubt upon their constitutionality.

Me. Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in the judgment.

Like Mr. Justice White I can, at most, do no more than concur in the judgment. As the Fourth Amendment now has been interpreted by the Court it seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens — and dangerous drugs — that daily and freely crosses our 2,000-mile southern boundary. Perhaps these decisions will be seen in perspective as but another example of a society seemingly impotent to deal with massive lawlessness. In that sense history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and appropriate concern for individual rights, unable — or unwilling — to apply the concept of reasonableness explicit in the Fourth Amendment in order to develop a rational accommodation between those rights and the literal safety of the country.

Given today’s decisions it would appear that, absent legislative action, nothing less than a massive force of guards could adequately protect our southern border. To establish hundreds of checkpoints with enlarged border forces so as to stop literally every car and pedestrian at every border checkpoint, however, would doubtless impede the flow of commerce and travel between this country and Mexico. Moreover, it is uncertain whether stringent penalties for employment of illegal aliens, and rigid requirements for proof of legal entry before employment, would help solve the problems, but those remedies have not been tried.

1 would hope that when we next deal with this problem we give greater weight to the reality that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only “unreasonable searches and seizures” and to the frequent admonition that reasonableness must take into account all the circumstances and balance the rights of the individual with the needs of society. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972).

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BURGER, C. J., CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

Excerpt from Judge Turrentine’s opinion in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-408 (SD Cal. 1973)

THE ILLEGAL ALIEN PROBLEM

The United States through legislative action has determined that it is in the best interest of the nation to limit the number of persons who can legally immigrate into the country in any given year. These controls reflect in part a Congressional intent to protect the American labor market from an influx of foreign labor. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U. S. 231 ... (1929); § 201 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, as amended by the Act of October 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911, 8 U. S. C. § 1151 (a).

Under this policy of limited admission, 385,685 new immigrants entered the United States legally during fiscal year 1972. Since July 1, 1968, the law has established an annual quota of 120,000 persons for the independent countries of the Western Hemisphere. Included within this quota are immigrants from the Republic of Mexico who in fiscal year 1972 totalled 64,040. 1972 Annual Report, Immigration and Naturalization Service, p. 2, 28.

Currently illegal aliens are in residence within the United States in numbers which, while not susceptible of exact measurement, are estimated to be in the vicinity of 800,000 to over one million. Department of Justice, Special Study Group on Illegal Immigrants from Mexico, A Program for Effective And Humane Action on Illegal Mexican Immigrants, 6 (1973), [hereinafter cited as Cramton Rpt.].

Of these illegal aliens, approximately 85 percent are citizens of Mexico. Cramton Rpt. at 6. They are industrious, proud and hard-working people who enter this country for the purpose of earning wages, accumulating savings, and returning or sending their savings home to Mexico.

Since 1970, the number of illegal Mexican aliens in the United States who have been apprehended has been growing at a rate in excess of 20 percent per year. Cramton Rpt. at 6.

The increasingly large numbers of Mexican nationals seeking to illegally enter this country reflects the substantial unemployment and underemployment in Mexico — fueled by one of the highest birth rates in the world. Moreover, Mexican employment statistics are not likely to improve dramatically since fully 45 percent of Mexico’s population is under 15 years of age and, therefore, will soon be attempting to enter the labor market.

Further prompting Mexican nationals to seek employment in the United States is the fact that there is a significant disparity in wage rates between this country and Mexico. In Mexicali and Tijuana, both Mexican cities bordering the Southern District and each with a population in excess of 400,000, the average daily wage is about $3.40 per day. The minimum wage is even lower for workers in the interior of Mexico. The average worker in Mexico, assuming he can find work, earns in a day as much as he can make in only a few hours in the United States.

In addition, it is estimated that the per capita income of the poorest 40 percent of the Mexican population, the strata most likely to leave their homeland in search of employment in the United States, is less than $150 per year.

The manpower needs of the United States generated by World War II resulted in many Mexicans being imported into this country and becoming familiar with employment opportunities and practices in the United States. See Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970).

The opportunities available to Mexican aliens have traditionally been in agriculture. While still true in many parts of the United States Southwest, in recent years the pattern has changed and more and more illegal aliens are obtaining employment in the service and manufacturing sectors of our economy. These aliens are increasingly found in virtually all regions of the country and in all segments of the economy. State Social Welfare Board, Issue: Aliens in California, 12 (1973) [Hereinafter cited as Aliens in California].

The nature of the change in employment opportunities available is demonstrated by one estimate that 250,000 illegal aliens are employed in Los Angeles County where agricultural opportunities are known to be limited. Hearings on Illegal Aliens Before Subcom. No. 1 of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 208 (1971) [Hereinafter cited as Hearings on Illegal Aliens].

Other estimates of the impact of illegal aliens in California suggest that in 1971, when 595,000 Californians were unemployed (7.4 percent of the State’s labor force), there were between 200,000 and 300,000 illegal aliens employed in California earning approximately $100 million in wages. Hearings on Illegal Aliens at 150.

Since the majority of Mexicans are unskilled or low skilled workers they tend to compete with Mexican-Americans, blacks, Indians, and other minority groups who, due to the declining percentage of jobs requiring low or no skills, are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain gainful employment. Cramton Rpt. at 12.

Illegal aliens compete for jobs with persons legally residing in the United States who are unskilled and uneducated and who form that very group which our society is trying to provide with a fair share of America’s prosperity.

In addition, illegal aliens tend to perpetuate poor economic conditions by frustrating unionization, especially in such occupations as farm work.

Illegal aliens pose a potential health hazard to the community since many seek work as nursemaids, food handlers, cooks, housekeepers, waiters, dishwashers, and grocery workers. Immigration and medical officials in Los Angeles, for example, have discovered that the illegal alien population in Los Angeles’ barrio is infected with a high incidence of typhoid, dysentery, tuberculosis, tapeworms, venereal disease and hepatitis. L. A. Times, Sept. 16, 1973, pt. II, at 1.

In some states illegal aliens abuse public assistance programs. In some instances entire families who entered the country illegally have been admitted to the welfare rolls. Aliens in California at 35, 43.

Another aspect of the problem created by illegal aliens is that employed aliens tend to send a substantial portion of their earnings to relatives or friends in Mexico. This outflow of United States dollars exacerbates our balance of payments problem to the extent of $1 billion a year. Hearings on Illegal Aliens, pt. 3 at 683.

The net effect of this silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico is suffering by the aliens who are frequently victims of extortion, violence and sharp practices, displacement of American citizens and legally residing aliens from the labor market, and irritation between two neighboring countries.

THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM

Given that illegal aliens are a significant problem in American life, especially for those minority groups who are described as economically deprived, and that Congress has decreed that all but a relatively few aliens are to be permanently excluded, then we must analyze what law enforcement problems exist. In this regard, the following findings of fact are made:

The illegal alien problem is one found primarily in the Southwestern Region of the United States.

This problem along the Mexican-American border has existed for some time with the original responsibility for securing the integrity of the border being assigned to the U. S. Army, along with the Departments of Treasury and Labor, who had about 20,000 men assigned to the border between Brownsville, Texas, and San Diego, California, in 1920. National Geographic Magazine, “Along Our Side of the Mexican Border.” (July 1920).

Currently the burden of controlling the entry of aliens and stemming the flow of illegal aliens along the Mexican-American border is assigned to the INS.

The border extends for almost 2,000 miles from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast.

Along this border there were over 152 million legal entries at authorized ports of entry during fiscal 1972, of which over 91 million were made by aliens. Over 39 million of the legal entries were made at the three ports of entry in Southern California (Calexico, San Ysidro and Tecate) of which over 24 million were made by aliens. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1972 Annual Report, 25.

Of these entries made by aliens, the large portion were made by visitors with official permission to enter the country who had been issued temporary “border passes” such as 1-186 cards (issued to residents of Mexico), which authorize the holder to travel within an area no further than 25 miles from the border and for a period of time not to exceed 72 hours. See 8 C. F. R. § 212.6.

These temporary border passes (1-186) are issued to simplify procedures needed for entry, and the issuing process recognizes the inter-relationship of contiguous communities along both sides of the border. Hearings on Illegal Aliens, pt. 1, 192.

In fiscal 1973 approximately 208,000 1-186 cards were issued and it is estimated that over two million such cards are currently in circulation. Hearings on Illegal Aliens, pt. 1, 173.

Within the INS, the U. S. Border Patrol, which was first established in 1924, has the primary function of preventing the illegal entry of aliens and the apprehension of those who have entered illegally and those who smuggle these illegal entrants.

The Border Patrol has approximately 1,700 agents, who are well-trained law enforcement officers, and of these about 80 percent are assigned along our southern border with Mexico.

A “deportable alien” is a person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official agents.

The number of deportable aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol (which makes the great majority of apprehensions) nationally has grown from 38,861 during fiscal 1963 to 498,123 in fiscal 1973; of this number 128,889 were found by Border Patrol agents working in the Chula Vista sector which includes 70 miles of the border in San Diego County, and 23,125 were located by agents in the El Centro sector which includes the Imperial County of California and 75 miles of the Mexican-American border.

The Border Patrol agents have the power to apprehend illegal aliens since by regulation the Attorney General has designated Border Patrol agents to be immigration officers and authorized them to exercise powers and duties as such officers [8 C. F. R. § 103.1 (i)]; immigration officers by statute § 101 (a) (17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163; as amended by the Act of October 3, 1973, 79 Stat. 911, 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a) (17), are empowered, without a warrant, to stop and interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to remain or to be in the United States. See Au Yi Lau v. I. N. S., 144 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 445 F. 2d 217 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 864 ....

Sec. 287 (a) (3) of the 1952 Immigration Act provides authority for an immigration officer within a reasonable distance from the border of the United States to board and search any conveyance or vehicle; “reasonable distance” as used in that section of the Act means within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States, 8 C. F. R. § 287.1 (b).

Immigration officers also are authorized to conduct inspection of aliens seeking admission or readmission to, or the privilege of passing through, the United States, and also are authorized and empowered to board and search any vehicle or like conveyance in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States. Sec. 235 (a) of the 1952 Immigration Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225 (a).

The deployment of Border Patrol agents along the border is intended to maximize the effectiveness of the limited number of personnel, with the first line of defense being called the “line watch.” The line watch consists of agents being placed immediately upon the physical boundary where experience has shown that large numbers of illegal aliens can be detected attempting entry. A large number of agents so assigned are primarily concerned with responding to sensor alarms (electronic detection equipment) which are located at strategic positions. These agents also respond to citizen complaints concerning the suspected presence of deportable aliens.

In fiscal 1973, there were 175,511 deportable aliens apprehended throughout the nation by agents assigned to the line watch, with 69,147 being apprehended in the Chula Yista sector and 5,908 in the El Centro sector.

While the Border Patrol would like to apprehend all deportable aliens right on the border by agents on the line, watch, inspections at regular points of entry are not infallible and illegal crossings at other than legal ports of entry are numerous and recurring. The maintenance of continuous patrol over the vast stretches of the border in Southern California is physically impossible, since the approximately 145 miles of boundary creates geographic barriers to effective patrol and man-made devices such as fences and electronic devices are in large part ineffective.

Increased manpower on line watch would not make that activity appreciably more effective as was demonstrated in 1969 during "Operation Intercept” when many more agents were stationed immediately on the border, and yet, the number of illegal aliens apprehended by agents operating inland was not significantly different from like periods when such additional manpower was not located at the boundary.

Once the aliens negotiate their way through the port of entry or, as is most common, walk across the border at a place other than an official port of entry, they find transportation inland either in public conveyances, or private vehicles with increasing numbers being transported by professional smugglers. A few have been known to walk some distance inland and have been apprehended after having walked as far north as Julian, California, which is over 60 miles from the border.

After crossing the line watch some illegal aliens seek employment in the Southern District, but the vast majority attempt to proceed to Los Angeles County and points north.

Once the illegal alien gets settled in a big city far away from the border it becomes very difficult to apprehend him, and therefore, the Border Patrol attempts to contain the illegal entrant within this district. Aliens in California at 7. With this objective in mind, they have (pursuant to their statutory authority discussed above) established, since at least 1927, strategically located traffic inspection facilities, commonly referred to as checkpoints, on highways and roads, for the purpose of questioning vehicle occupants believed to be aliens, as to their right to be, or to remain, in the United States, and also to search such vehicles for illegal aliens. Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol Handbook 9-1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Handbook].

The primary objective of the checkpoints is to intercept vehicles or conveyances transporting illegal aliens, or nonresident aliens admitted with temporary border passing cards (1-186), with particular attention being paid to vehicles operated by smugglers or transporters destined for inland cities in violation of 8 U. S. C. § 1324.

The selection of the location of a checkpoint is determined by factors relevant to the interdiction or interception of deportable aliens who have succeeded in gaining entry in an unlawful manner or are proceeding beyond the immediate border area in violation of conditions of their admission as border crossers, 8 C. P. R. § 212.60. The primary factors in selecting a checkpoint site are:

1. A location on a highway just beyond the confluence of two or more roads from the border, in order to permit the checking of a large volume of traffic with a minimum number of officers. This also avoids the inconvenience of repeated checking of commuter or urban traffic which would occur if the sites were operated on the network of roads leading from and through the more populated areas near the border.

2. Terrain and topography that restrict passage of vehicles around the checkpoint, such as mountains, desert, and, as in the case of the San Clemente checkpoint, the Camp Pendleton Marine Base.

3. Safety factors: an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic, to provide a safe distance for slowing and stopping; parking space off the highway; power source to illuminate control signs and inspection area, and bypass capability for vehicles not requiring examination.

4. Due to the travel restrictions of the 1-186 nonresident border crosser to an area 25 miles from the border (unless issued additional documentation) the checkpoints, as a general rule, are located at a point beyond the 25 mile zone in order to control the unlawful movement inland of such visitors.

Strategic sites that meet the foregoing enumerated criteria are selected for “permanent checkpoints.” These are sites equipped to handle a large volume of traffic on what would be a 24-hour basis except in case of manpower shortage, poor weather, or where traffic becomes excessive causing a potential safety hazard. Handbook at 9-3.

Other traffic checkpoints, known as “temporary checkpoints” are maintained on roads where traffic is less frequent. The placement of these sites will be governed by the same safety factors as involved in permanent site placement and are usually located where the terrain allows an element of surprise. Operations at these temporary checkpoints are set up at irregular intervals and intermittently so as to confuse the potential violator. Handbook at 9-3.

When the checkpoints, whether permanent or temporary, are in operation, an officer standing at the “point” in full dress uniform on the highway will view the decelerating oncoming vehicles and their passengers, and will visually determine whether he has reason to believe the occupants of the vehicle are aliens (i. e., “breaks the pattern” of usual traffic). If so, the vehicle will be stopped (if the traffic at the checkpoint is heavy, as at the San Clemente checkpoint, the vehicle will be actually directed off the highway) for inquiries to be made by the agent. If the agent does not have reason to believe that the vehicle approaching the checkpoint is carrying aliens, he may exchange salutations, or merely wave the vehicle through the checkpoint.

If, after questioning the occupants, the agent then believes that illegal aliens may be secreted in the vehicle (because of a break in the “pattern” indicating the possibility of smuggling) he will inspect the vehicle by giving a cursory visual inspection of those areas of the vehicle not visible from the outside (i. e. trunk, interior portion of camper, etc.).

At the point of location of the sites now in regular use few aliens have reached the locale on foot, with 99 percent having entered a vehicle of one type or another. Approximately 12 percent of all apprehensions of deportable aliens throughout the nation are made at checkpoints.

In the United' States, during fiscal 1973, approximately 55,300 deportable aliens were apprehended by Border Patrol agents working traffic checking operations. In the Chula Vista sector the number for that period was 21,232, while in the El Centro sector the total was 3,825. During fiscal 1973, a total of 4,975 of the above were visitors apprehended at the checkpoints and a majority of these were those who were in violation of the terms of temporary border passes (Form 1-186).

The placement of the checkpoints and their operations are coordinated between the two sectors located in this district and with Border Patrol activities to the east in Arizona. In actual operation the checkpoints, be they “permanent” or “temporary,” have the same basic accouterments. Typically, about one-half mile to one mile south of the checkpoint is the first notification that the checkpoint is ahead. The notice is in the form of a black on yellow sign indicated “STOP AHEAD” which has floodlights for nighttime illumination, Handbook at 9-9. Next, about 200 yards from the checkpoint is another sign cautioning the traffic to slow down or to be careful; this sign usually has flashing yellow lights attached. For the fifty yards directly south of the checkpoint there are placed traffic cones evenly spaced along each side of the highway. The actual checkpoint has a sign indicating to the traffic to stop, with official Border Patrol vehicles parked on each side of the stop zone showing the official Border Patrol emblem and/or the designation U. S. OFFICERS. At this point the agents assigned at the “point,” in their official uniform, conduct checking and inspection operations. Beyond the checkpoint is usually a sign indicating “THANK YOU.”

While a large number of apprehensions are made at the checkpoints each year, as related above, the primary reason for their operation is that they effectively deter large numbers of aliens from illegally entering the country or violating the terms of any temporary crossing card they may have, because they form an effective obstacle and are located on all major routes north out of the border region.

The deterrence aspect of these traffic checkpoint operations is amply demonstrated by the fact that the illegal alien has to resort to the employment of professional smugglers to provide transportation around or through these checkpoints.

Some of these smuggling operations have developed into sophisticated and involved operations with the following general modus operandi:

1. Contact is made between the smuggler and the alien prior to the latter’s leaving Mexico.

2. The aliens then make entry on foot, with possibly the aid of a “guide,” or by use of temporary border passes. Then they enter vehicles approximately 2 or 20 miles inland after having passed through the Border Patrol’s line watch activities.

3. To get through the traffic checkpoint they might use a “drop house,” which acts as a staging area to keep the aliens awaiting inclement weather, or any event that might cause the checkpoint to close down temporarily. Or, they may use a “decoy” vehicle, which is a vehicle loaded with illegal aliens which it is anticipated will be stopped at the checkpoint and would therefore occupy the agents so that other vehicles could pass through without inspection. They even use “scout cars” to probe those roads where temporary checkpoints are maintained, so as to advise other vehicles whether it is safe to proceed.

4. The “load” vehicles themselves can be of any type of conveyance and the methods used to secrete aliens inside them are varied and often show some originality. Unfortunately, sometimes these are very dangerous to the aliens themselves. It has been reported, for example, that it is not at all unusual for an alien to die from asphyxiation while concealed in an automobile trunk or a tank car.

5. The cost of the transportation provided to the aliens is approximately $225 to $250 for each alien for the trip through the checkpoint on to the Los Angeles area. Since smuggling operations are almost exclusively “cash and carry” businesses and the average income among Mexican nationals who may wish to seek residence here illegally is quite small, this cost tends to act as a very significant deterrent in and of itself. The checkpoints are the major reason for such a high price and if they were discontinued for any length of time it would be one more encouragement to illegal immigration.

The deterrent impact of these checkpoints has been noted on several occasions when they, resumed operation unexpectedly and a great number of aliens were apprehended.

The evidence presented before this court clearly established that there is no reasonable or effective alternative method of detection and apprehension available to the Border Patrol in the absence of the checkpoints, for even a geometric increase in its personnel or line watch would not leave any control over those admitted as temporary visitors from Mexico.

Of the approximately half million illegal aliens apprehended in fiscal 1973, virtually none were prosecuted, unless they presented counterfeit or altered documents or aided in smuggling endeavors.

This district has only 3 percent of the total length of land borders, and yet fully 30 percent of all apprehensions of deportable aliens made in the United States are made within this district.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Black-mun joins, concurring in the judgment.

Given Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), with which I disagreed but which is now authoritative, the results reached in these cases were largely foreordained. The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my Brother Rehnquist notwithstanding, that under the Court’s opinions checkpoint investigative stops, without search, will be difficult to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In any event, the Court has thus dismantled major parts of the apparatus by which the Nation has attempted to intercept millions of aliens who enter and remain illegally in this country.

The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow; and its costs, including added burdens on the courts, have been substantial. Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful for business firms and others to employ aliens who are illegally in the country. This problem, which ordinary law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially poses questions of national policy and is chiefly the business of Congress and the Executive Branch rather than the courts.

I concur in the judgment in these two cases.

       Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and beneath the chassis. If the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which the springs had been removed. Id., at 286 (White, J., dissenting).

       The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search may vary with the circumstances, as there are significant differences between “an automobile and a home or office.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S., at 279 (Powell, J., concurring).

       Not every aspect of a routine automobile “inspection,” as described in n. 1, supra, necessarily constitutes a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. There is no occasion in this case to define the exact limits of an automobile “search.”
      Nor do we have occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 275 (Powell, J., concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). We also need not decide whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the same for all purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint without reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873. Nor do we suggest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that different considerations would apply to routine safety inspections required as a condition of road use.

      [This opinion applies also to No. 74-114, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873.]

       The Court today recognizes that as many as 12 million illegal aliens are now present in this country. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at 878, and n. 4. See also U. S. News & World Report, July 22, 1974, p. 27; id., Dec. 9, 1974, p. 77. By all indications the problem will increase in the future, not abate. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-403 (SD Cal. 1973). In the Baca case Judge Turrentine conducted a thorough review of the entire problem and the present Government response. Appended to this opinion is an excerpt from Judge Turrentine’s Baca opinion describing the illegal alien problem and the law enforcement response.

       For example, testimony in the Baca hearings revealed that a complement of 21,000 officers would be needed to control adequately the 75 miles of border in the El Centro sector alone.

       The.notation “INS” when used herein has reference to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

       Apparently apprehensions other than those actually made at the checkpoint are included in these figures, but they are a representation of the total activity at these checkpoints and the majority of apprehensions included therein are made at the checkpoints [R. T. 274, 396],

      [This opinion applies also to No. 74-114, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873.]


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Powell

license: Public Domain

text:
    BOWEN v. UNITED STATES
    No. 73-6848.
    Argued February 18, 1975 —
    Decided June 30, 1975

      Michael D. Nasatir, by appointment of the Court, 419 U. S. 1017, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Jerald W. Newton.

      Mark L. Evans argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Sidney M. Glaser

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and by Arthur Wells, Jr., for Gilbert Bryant Foerster.

   Mr. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was convicted of federal drug offenses based on evidence seized in January 1971 when Border Patrol officers stopped his camper pickup at a traffic checkpoint on California Highway 86, about 36 air miles from the Mexican border. The officers first determined that petitioner was a United States citizen, then asked him to open the camper so that they could search for concealed aliens. When petitioner opened the door, one officer noticed a strong odor of marihuana. He entered the camper and discovered approximately 356 pounds of the drug. A subsequent search of the passenger compartment produced a number of benzedrine tablets.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed petitioner’s conviction, rejecting his argument that the search was unlawful. 462 F. 2d 347 (1972). A petition for certiorari was pending when we announced our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of roving patrols to search vehicles, with neither a warrant nor probable cause, at points removed from the border and its functional equivalents. We vacated the judgment in petitioner’s case and remanded for reconsideration in light of Almeida-Sanchez. 413 U. S. 915 (1973).

The Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc and held, in a sharply divided opinion, that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to searches conducted at traffic checkpoints as well as searches conducted by roving patrols. The Court nevertheless affirmed petitioner’s conviction, holding that Almeida-Sanchez would not be applied to invalidate searches that occurred prior to the date of that decision. 500 F. 2d 960 (1974). We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict with the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. King, 485 F. 2d 353 (1973), and United States v. Maddox, 485 F. 2d 361 (1973).

We hold today in United States v. Ortiz, ante, p. 891, that the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in AlmeidaSanchez, forbids searching cars at traffic checkpoints in the absence of consent or probable cause. In this case the Government does not contend that the Highway 86 checkpoint is a functional equivalent of the border, that the officers had probable cause to open the camper, or that petitioner consented to the search. The primary question for decision is whether the principles of Almeida-Sanchez should have been applied retroactively.

In United States v. Peltier, ante, p. 531, we refused to apply Almeida-Sanchez to a roving-patrol search conducted before June 21, 1973, even though a direct appeal was pending on that date. We think the decision in Peltier is controlling here, as the reasons that dictated a holding of nonretroactivity in that case are equally applicable. At the time of our decision in Almeida-Sanchez, all the Courts of Appeals in Circuits adjacent to the Mexican border had held that immigration officers at traffic checkpoints could search automobiles for concealed aliens. E. g., United States v. McCormick, 468 F. 2d 68 (CA10 1972); United States v. De Leon, 462 F. 2d 170 (CA5 1972); Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F. 2d 1011 (CA9 1970) , This Court had not ruled on the question, and no contrary precedent was reported in other Courts of Appeals. The Border Patrol reasonably relied on the decisions of the Court of Appeals in performing the search in this case and others like it, and in these circumstances the purposes of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would not be served by applying the principles of Almeida-Sanchez retroactively.

Petitioner further argues that even if Almeida-Sanchez is not to be applied retroactively he is entitled to the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ decision that AlmeidaSanchez extended to checkpoint searches. He invokes this Court’s practice of applying new constitutional doctrine in the case that establishes the point, and maintains that the Court of Appeals’ refusal to apply its extension of Almeida-Sanchez in his case made its discussion of that point mere dictum. We conclude, however, that the only error of the Court of Appeals was its reaching out to decide that Almeida-Sanchez applied to checkpoint searches in a case that did not require decision of the issue.

The Government raised two questions in the Court of Appeals: whether Almeida-Sanchez applied retroactively, and if it did, whether it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. This Court consistently has declined to address unsettled questions regarding the scope of decisions establishing new constitutional doctrine in cases in which it holds those decisions nonretroactive. E. g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 49-50 (1973); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968). This practice is rooted in our reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960); Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) . Because this reluctance in turn is grounded in the constitutional role of the federal courts, United States v. Raines, supra, the district courts and courts of appeals should follow our practice, when issues of both retro-activity and application of constitutional doctrine are raised, of deciding the retroactivity issue first. As the Court of Appeals correctly decided in this case that Almeida-Sanchez did not apply to a 1971 search, it should have refrained from considering whether our decision in that case applied to searches at checkpoints.

Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that once the Court of Appeals addressed the unnecessary issue it was bound to apply that ruling in his case. Because it refused to do so, petitioner says the court rendered a hypothetical decision forbidden by Art. Ill of the Constitution. It is true that this Court has suggested that Art. Ill is the primary impetus for applying new constitutional doctrines in cases that establish them for the first time. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967). But petitioner’s case is altogether different. Almeida-Sanchez already had established the principle, and there was a genuine controversy between petitioner and the United States over its retroactive application. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court’s jurisdiction to resolve that controversy could not be dislodged by its discussion of an unnecessary issue.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Douglas dissents for the reasons stated in his dissent in United States v. Peltier, ante, p. 543.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall dissent and would reverse substantially for the reasons expressed in Mr. Justice Brennan’s dissent in United States v. Peltier, ante, p. 544.

Mr. Justice Stewart dissents.

       While approving checkpoint searches for aliens, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had limited the Border Patrol’s authority to search for contraband at points away from the border. E. g., Cervantes v. United States, 263 F. 2d 800 (1959); see Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F. 2d 1011 (1970). The search of petitioner’s camper was not invalid under these cases because the agent was engaged in a search for aliens, legal under the Ninth Circuit’s decisions, when he developed probable cause to believe that the camper contained marihuana.
      There was some ground for confusion about the state of the law in the Fifth Circuit at the time Almeida-Sanchez was decided. Early cases had affirmed immigration officers’ authority to search for aliens at traffic checkpoints. E. g., Ramirez v. United States, 263 F. 2d 385 (1959); Kelly v. United States, 197 F. 2d 162 (1952). Later cases took the same view, e. g., United States v. De Leon, 462 F. 2d 170 (1972), although one opinion seemed to hold that the authority to search at checkpoints was qualified by a requirement that the location and operation of the checkpoint be reasonable. United States v. McDaniel, 463 F. 2d 129, 133 (1972). Two decisions by other panels of the court ambiguously suggested that a search at a checkpoint must be supported by “reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Wright, 476 F. 2d 1027 (1973) ; United States v. Maggard, 451 F. 2d 502 (1971). But a later opinion seemed to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between searches for aliens and searches for contraband, suggesting that immigration searches could be made without suspicion while customs searches required a foundation for believing that the particular car contained contraband. United States v. Thompson, 475 F. 2d 1359, 1362 (1973).
      Neither of the cases suggesting that “reasonable suspicion” was required for immigration searches resulted in a decision invalidating a search, and none of the court’s opinions indicated disagreement with the earlier cases establishing an unqualified right to search for aliens at checkpoints whose location and operation were reasonable. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Government reasonably relied on the earlier cases in continuing to make immigration searches at checkpoints.

       See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967); compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), with DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968); compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), with Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 (1973).


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist Me. Justice Douglas,

text:
    DORAN v. SALEM INN, INC., et al.
    No. 74-337.
    Argued April 21-22, 1975 —
    Decided June 30, 1975

      Joseph H. Dar ago argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Francis F. Doran, pro se.

      Herbert S. Kassner argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Ralph J. Schwarz, Jr.

   Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant is a town attorney in Nassau County, N. Y., who, along with other local law enforcement officials, was preliminarily enjoined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York from enforcing a local ordinance of the town of North Hemp-stead. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478 (1973), aff’d, 501 F. 2d 18 (CA2 1974). In addition to defending the ordinance on the merits, he contends that the complaint should have been dismissed on the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and its companion cases.

Appellees are three corporations which operate bars at various locations within the town. Prior to enactment of the ordinance in question, each provided topless dancing as entertainment for its customers. On July 17, 1973, the town enacted Local Law No. 1-1973, an ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners and others to permit waitresses, barmaids, and entertainers to appear in their establishments with breasts uncovered or so thinly draped as to appear uncovered. Appellees complied with the ordinance by clothing their dancers in bikini tops, but on August 9, 1973, brought this action in the District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinance violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Their pleadings sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. The prayer for a temporary restraining order was denied instanter, but the motion for a preliminary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22, 1973.

On August 10, the day after the appellees’ complaint was filed, and their application for a temporary restraining order denied, one of them, M & L Restaurant, Inc., resumed its briefly suspended presentation of topless dancing. On that day, and each of the three succeeding days, M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal summonses based on violation of the ordinance. These summonses were returnable before the Nassau County Court on September 13, 1973. The other two appellees, Salem Inn, Inc., and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc., did not resume the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars until after the District Court issued its preliminary injunction.

On September 5, 1973, appellant filed an answer which alleged that a criminal prosecution had been instituted against at least one of the appellees; the District Court was urged to “refuse to exercise jurisdiction” and to dismiss the complaint. App. 33.

On September 6, 1973, on the basis of oral argument and memoranda of law, the District Court entered an opinion and order in which it “[found] that (1) Local Law No. 1-1973 of the Town of North Hempstead is on its face violative of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights in that it prohibits across the board nonobscene conduct in the form of topless dancing, and (2) that the daily penalty of $500 for each violation of the ordinance, the prior state-court decision validating a similar ordinance, the overbreadth of the ordinance, and the potential harm to plaintiffs’ business by its enforcement justify federal intervention and injunctive relief.” 364 F. Supp., at 483. The court concluded by enjoining appellant “pending the final determination of this action . . . from prosecuting the plaintiffs for any violation of Local Law No. 1-1973 ... or in any way interfering with their activities which may be prohibited by the text of said Local Law.” Ibid. The court did address appellant’s Younger contention, but held that the pending prosecution against M & L did not affect the availability of injunctive relief to Salem and Tim-Rob. As for M & L, it concluded that if federal relief were granted to two of the appellees, “it would be anomalous” not to extend it to M & L as well. Id., at 482.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed by a divided vote. It held that the “ordinance would have to fall,” 501 F. 2d, at 21, and that the claim of deprivation of constitutional rights and diminution of business warranted the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s claim that the District Court ought to have dismissed appellees’ complaint on the authority of Younger v. Harris, supra, and its companion cases. As to Salem and Tim-Rob, Younger did not present a bar because there had at no time been a pending prosecution against them under the ordinance. As for M & L, the court thought that it posed “a slightly different problem,” 501 F. 2d, at 22, since the state prosecution was begun only one day after the filing of appellees’ complaint in the District Court. The court recognized that this situation was not squarely covered by either Younger or Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), but concluded that the interests of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conservation of judicial energy, and of a clearcut method for determining when federal courts should defer to state prosecutions, all militated in favor of granting relief to all three appellees.

We deal first with a preliminary jurisdictional matter. This appeal was taken under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), which provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction at the behest of a party relying on a state statute held unconstitutional by a court of appeals. There is authority, questioned but never put to rest, that § 1254 (2) is available only when review is sought of a final judgment. Slaker v. O’Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956). But see Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83 (1958). The present appeal, however, seeks review of the affirmance of a preliminary injunction. We also are less than completely certain that the Court of Appeals did in fact hold Local Law 1-1973 to be unconstitutional, since it considered the merits only for the purpose of ruling on the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief. We need not resolve these issues, which have neither been briefed nor argued, because we in any event have certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have previously done in an identical situation, El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1965), we dismiss the appeal and, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of certiorari.

Turning to the Younger issues raised by petitioner, we are faced with the necessity of determining whether the holdings of Younger, supra, Steffel, supra, and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), must give way before such interests in efficient judicial administration as were relied upon by the Court of Appeals. We think that the interest of avoiding conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues, while entitled to substantial deference in a unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated to the claims of federalism in this particular area of the law. The classic example is the petitioner in Steffel and his companion. Both were warned that failure to cease pamphleteering would result in their arrest, but while the petitioner in Steffel ceased and brought an action in the federal court, his companion did not cease and was prosecuted on a charge of criminal trespass in the state court. 415. U. S., at 455-456. The same may be said of the interest in conservation of judicial manpower. As worthy a value as this is in a unitary system, the very existence of one system of federal courts and 50 systems of state courts, all charged with the responsibility for interpreting the United States Constitution, suggests that on occasion there will be duplicating and overlapping adjudication of cases which are sufficiently similar in content, time, and location to justify being heard before a single judge had they arisen within a unitary system.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals, therefore, that all three plaintiffs should automatically be thrown into the same hopper for Younger purposes, and should thereby each be entitled to injunctive relief. We cannot accept that view, any more than we can accept petitioner’s equally Procrustean view that because M & L would have been barred from injunctive relief had it been the sole plaintiff, Salem and Tim-Rob should likewise be barred not only from injunctive relief but from declaratory relief as well. While there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them, this is not such a case — while respondents are represented by common counsel, and have similar business activities and problems, they are apparently unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and management. We thus think that each of the respondents should be placed in the position required by our cases as if that respondent stood alone.

Respondent M & L could have pursued the course taken by the other respondents after the denial of their request for a temporary restraining order. Had it done so, it would not have subjected itself to prosecution for violation of the ordinance in the state court. When the criminal summonses issued against M & L on the days immediately following the filing of the federal complaint, the federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had been decided. In this posture, M & Lis prayer for injunction is squarely governed by Y ounger.

We likewise believe that for the same reasons Samuels v. Mackell bars M & L from obtaining declaratory relief, absent a showing of Younger’s special circumstances, even though the state prosecution was commenced the day following the filing of the federal complaint. Having violated the ordinance, rather than awaiting the normal development of its federal lawsuit, M & L cannot now be heard to complain that its constitutional contentions are being resolved in a state court. Thus M & L’s prayers for both injunctive and declaratory relief are subject to Younger’s restrictions.

The rule with regard to the coplaintiffs, Salem and Tim-Rob, is equally clear, insofar as they seek declaratory relief. Salem and Tim-Rob were not subject to state criminal prosecution at any time prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the District Court. Under Steffel they thus could at least have obtained a declaratory judgment upon an ordinary showing of entitlement to that relief. The District Court, however, did not grant declaratory relief to Salem and Tim-Rob, but instead granted them preliminary injunctive relief. Whether injunctions of future criminal prosecutions are governed by Younger standards is a question which we reserved in both Steffel, 415 U. S., at 463, and Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 41. We now hold that on the facts of this case the issuance of a preliminary injunction is not subject to the restrictions of Younger. The principle underlying Younger and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding. In the absence of such a proceeding, however, as we recognized in Steffel, a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of the state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy the requirements for federal jurisdiction. See also Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 509 (1972).

No state proceedings were pending against either Salem or Tim-Rob at the time the District Court issued its preliminary injunction. Nor was there any question that they satisfied the requirements for federal jurisdiction. As we have already stated, they were assuredly entitled to declaratory relief, and since we have previously recognized that “[o]rdinarily . . . the practical effect of [injunctive and declaratory] relief will be virtually identical,” Samuels, 401 U. S., at 73, we think that Salem and Tim-Rob were entitled to have their claims for preliminary injunctive relief considered without regard to Younger’s restrictions. At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will be unnecessary. But prior to final judgment there is no established declaratory remedy comparable to a preliminary injunction; unless preliminary relief is available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable harm. Moreover, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute.

The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits. It is recognized, however, that a district court must weigh carefully the interests on both sides. Although only temporary, the injunction does prohibit state and local enforcement activities against the federal plaintiff pending final resolution of his case in the federal court. Such a result seriously impairs the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger.

But while the standard to be applied by the district court in deciding whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is stringent, the standard of appellate review is simply whether the issuance of the injunction, in the light of the applicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 457 (1973). While we regard the question as a close one, we believe that the issuance of a preliminary injunction in behalf of respondents Salem and Tim-Rob was not an abuse of the District Court’s discretion. As required to support such relief, these respondents alleged (and petitioner did not deny) that absent preliminary relief they would suffer a substantial loss of business and perhaps even bankruptcy. Certainly the latter type of injury sufficiently meets the standards for granting interim relief, for otherwise a favorable final judgment might well be useless.

The other inquiry relevant to preliminary relief is whether respondents made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found such a likelihood. The order of the District Court spoke in terms of actually holding the ordinance unconstitutional, but in the context of a preliminary injunction the court must have intended to refer only to the likelihood that respondents ultimately would prevail. The Court of Appeals properly clarified this point. 501 F. 2d, at 20-21.

Although the customary “barroom” type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In LaRue, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment interest in nude dancing and that a State could therefore ban such dancing as a part of its liquor license program.

In the present case, the challenged ordinance applies not merely to places which serve liquor, but to many other establishments as well. The District Court observed, we believe correctly:

“The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in 'any public place’ with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of the term 'any public place.’ It could include the theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the performance of the 'Ballet Africains’ and a number of other works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance.” 364 F. Supp., at 483.

We have previously held that even though a statute or ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the activities of a particular defendant, that defendant may challenge it on the basis of overbreadth if it is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected speech or expression of other persons not before the Court. As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 114 (1972):

“Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant’s standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.”

Even if we may assume that the State of New York has delegated its authority under the Twenty-first Amendment to towns such as North Hempstead, and that the ordinance would therefore be constitutionally valid under LaRue, supra, if limited to places dispensing alcoholic beverages, the ordinance in this case is not so limited. Nor does petitioner raise any other legitimate state interest that would counterbalance the constitutional protection presumptively afforded to activities which are plainly within the reach of Local Law 1 — 1973. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).

In these circumstances, and in the light of existing case law, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by granting preliminary injunctive felief. This is the extent of our appellate inquiry, and We therefore “intimate no view as to the ultimate merits of [respondents'] contentions.” Brown v. Chote, supra, at 457. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to respondent M & L, and affirmed as to respondents Salem and Tim-Rob.

It is so ordered.

Me. Justice Douglas,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

While adhering to my position in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 58 (1971) (dissenting opinion), I join the judgment of the Court insofar as it holds that Salem Inn and Tim-Rob were entitled to a preliminary injunction pending disposition of their request for declaratory relief. I do not condone the conduct of M & L in violating the challenged ordinance without awaiting judicial action on its federal complaint, but like the Court of Appeals, I find no compelling reason to distinguish M & L from the other respondents in terms of the relief which is appropriate. I would therefore affirm the judgment below in all respects.

       The ordinance provides that each day's violation constitutes a separate offense.

       For the purposes of §1254 (2), local ordinances are treated as state statutes. See, e. g., Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77 (1958).

       Respondent M & L urges in defense of its judgment that even if the case is controlled by the principles of Younger and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), it may obtain injunctive and declaratory relief because of the presence of the requisite special circumstances. See Younger, 401 U. S., at 53-54. In particular, M & L claims that it was the subject of “repetitive harassing criminal prosecutions aimed at suppressing the expressive activity carried on” at its bar. Brief for Appellees 35. The District Court did not have occasion to consider this issue, and we decline to do so on the basis of the spare record before us.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    WHITE, SECRETARY OF STATE OF TEXAS, et al. v. REGESTER et al.
    No. 73-1462.
    Argued February 19, 1975 —
    Decided June 30, 1975

      Elizabeth B. Levatino, Special Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, former First Assistant Attorney General, and David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General.

      David R. Richards argued the cause for appellees Regester et al. With him on the brief were Jack Green-berg, James M. Nabrit III, J. Phillip Crawford, Oscar H. Mauzy, Wm. Terry Bray, Sanford Jay Rosen, and George J. Korbel. Don Gladden argued the cause for appellees Escalante et al. With him on the briefs was Marvin Collins.

   Per Curiam.

We are informed that the State of Texas has adopted new apportionment legislation providing single-member districts to replace the multimember districts which are at issue before us in this case. That statute by its terms does not become effective until the 1976 elections, and intervening special elections to fill vacancies, if any, will be held in the districts involved as constituted on January 1, 1975. Rather than render an unnecessary judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court in this case, which we do not undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court for reconsideration in light of the recent Texas reapportionment legislation and for dismissal if the case is or becomes moot.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    HILL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, et al. v. PRINTING INDUSTRIES OF THE GULF COAST et al.
    No. 74-456.
    Argued April 15, 1975 —
    Decided June 30, 1975

      John W. Odam, Executive Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were John L. Hill, Attorney General, pro "se, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Elizabeth B. Levatino, First Special Assistant Attorney General.

      Gerald M. Birnberg argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were James T. Evans and Michael Anthony Maness

         David Crump filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging reversal.

   Per Curiam.

The parties to this case have informed us that the State of Texas has enacted the Political Funds Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1975, which will become effective on September 1, 1975. Section 11 of that Act substantially amends Art. 14.10 (b) (Supp. 1974-1975) of the Texas Election Code, the constitutionality of which is at issue in this appeal. Although the parties take the position that these amendments do not affect this case, we prefer to remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration in light of the recent amendments, rather “than render an unnecessary judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court.” White v. Regester, ante, p. 935.

The judgment of the District Court is vacated. The case is remanded to that court for reconsideration in light of the new legislation and for dismissal if the case is or becomes moot.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       Tex. Const., Art. 3, § 39.


text:
    June 16, 1975

      Appeals Dismissed

    No. 74-1209.
    Westinghouse Electric Corp. et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.

      Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of cases in which orders hereinafter reported were announced on this date, with the exception of the following:
      No. 69-1, Augenblick v. United States, infra, p. 1007; No. 73-1288, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, infra, p. 1005; No. 74-294, Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., infra, p. 1012; No. 74-883, Federal Power Commission v. Moss, infra, p. 1006; No. 74-1045, Moss v. Federal Power Commission, infra, p. 1020; No. 74-1063, Carter v. United States, infra, p. 1020; No. 74-1094, Womack v. United States, infra, p. 1022; No. 74-1096, Conk v. Clegg, infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1103, Estelle v. Johnson, infra, p. 1024; No. 74-1115, Miller v. United States, infra, p. 1024; No. 74-1144, Lawrence v. South Carolina, infra, p. 1025; No. 74-1161, Clements v. Faraca, infra, p. 1006; No. 74-1180, Pinell v. California, infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1192, Karp v. United States, infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1207, American Chemical Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1209, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, infra, this page; No. 74-1228, Miller v. United States, infra, p. 1025; No. 74-1276, Cotten v. Schlesinger, infra, p. 1027; No. 74-1327, Democratic Executive Committee of Columbiana County, infra, p. 1002; No. 74-1342, Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., infra, p. 1002; No. 74-1345, U. S. Merchandise Mart, Inc. v. D&H Distributing Co., infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1362, Waddell v. Fleming, infra, p. 1007; No. 74-1365, Joyner v. North Carolina, infra, p. 1002; No. 74-1379, Poulson v. Walsh-Groves, infra, p. 1002; No. 74-1460, Augenblick v. United States, infra, p. 1007; and No. 74-6195, Waugh v. Gray, infra, p. 1027.

   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 42 Cal. App. 3d 32, 116 Cal. Rptr. 742.


text:
    No. 74-1365.
    Joyner v. North Carolina.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 286 N. C. 366, 211 S. E. 2d 320.


text:
    No. 74-1379.
    Poulson v. Walsh-Groves et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mont, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 166 Mont. 163, 531 P. 2d 1335.


text:
    No. 74-1342.
    Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. 111. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 59 111. 2d 452, 322 N. E. 2d 54.


text:
    No. 74-1347.
    Thompson et ux. v. Property Tax Appeal Board of Illinois et al.
   Appeal from App. Ct. 111., 2d Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 111. App. 3d 316, 317 N. E. 2d 121.


text:
    No. 74-6215.
    Woods v. Georgia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 233 Ga. 347, 211 S. E. 2d 300.


text:
      Vacated and Remanded on Appeal

    No. 74-1327.
    Democratic Executive Committee of Columbiana County, Ohio, et al. v. Brown, Secretary of State of Ohio.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. Judgment vacated and case remanded so that a fresh order or decree may be entered from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U. S. 799 (1975).


text:
      Certiorari Granted — Vacated and Remanded

    No. 73-6761.
    Burko v. Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975).


text:
    No. 74-5632.
    Castro v. Regan, Prison Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). Reported below: 505 F. 2d 731.


text:
      Miscellaneous Orders

    No. A-933. No. A-994.
    Ed. Phillips & Sons Co. et al. v. Novak, Liquor Control Commissioner of Minnesota, et al.; and Griggs, Cooper & Co., Inc., v. Novak, Liquor Control Commissioner of Minnesota, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Minn. Applications for stay of enforcement of Minnesota Laws 1973, c. 664, § 2 (Minn. Stat. § 340.114 (1974)), presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these applications.

      See also note, supra, p. 1001.


text:
    No. A-996 (74-1222).
    Wolff, Warden v. Rice.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application of respondent for bail pending disposition of petition for writ of certiorari, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-41.
    In re Disbarment of Siegel.
   It having been reported to this Court that George J. Siegel, of New York, N. Y., has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of February 24, 1975 [420 U. S. 941], having suspended the said George J. Siegel from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

It is ordered that the said George J. Siegel, be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. D-44.
    In re Disbarment of Morgan.

      See also note, supra, p. 1001.

   It having been reported to this Court that Edward LeRoy Morgan, of Phoenix, Ariz., has been disbarred from the practice of law in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and this Court by order of March 24, 1975 [420 U. S. 988], having suspended the said Edward LeRoy Morgan from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred ;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent and that the time within which to file a return has expired ;

It is ordered that the said Edward LeRoy Morgan, be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.


text:
    No. 73-62.
    Wheeler et al. v. Barrera et al., 417 U. S. 402.
   Motion of petitioners for modification of judgment granted, and the last paragraph of this Court’s judgment, dated June 10, 1974, is hereby modified to read: “On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with directions that the case be remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri for further action consistent with the opinion and judgment of this Court.”


text:
    No. 73-1288.
    Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Case restored to calendar for reargument. In addition to other questions presented by this case, counsel are requested to brief and discuss during oral argument: Should this Court’s holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), be reconsidered?


text:
    No. 74-773.
    Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 420 U. S. 971.] Motion of respondents for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Petitioner also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 74-1141.
    United States v. Gaddis et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 421 U. S. 987.] Motion for appointment of counsel is granted, and Tommy Day Wilcox, Esquire, of Macon, Ga., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondents in this case.


text:
    No. 74-6384.
    No. 74-6436.
    Williams v. United States; and Stewart v. Griffin, Judge, et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 74-6592.
    No. 74-6609.
    Tubbs v. Henderson, Warden; and Ford v. Rees, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
      Certiorari Granted

    No. 74-883.
    Federal Power Commission v. Moss et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 164 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 502 F. 2d 461.


text:
    No. 74-1243.
    Beckwith v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 166 U. S. App. D. C. 361, 510 F. 2d 741.


text:
    No. 74-6293.
    Goldberg v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 8 presented by the petition which reads as follows: “Whether 18 U. S. C. § 3500, the Jencks Act, contains an 'attorney’s work product exception’; and whether a Government attorney’s notes of conversations with the key Government witness, to whom the prosecutors read back their notes from time to time where the witness corrected same, which notes were prepared 'only after lengthy conversations had occurred and a mutual understanding of the factual situation’ had been reached, if not compellable under the Jencks Act, are compellable under the doctrine of Brady vs. Maryland.”


text:
      Certiorari Denied.

    (See also No. 74-1347, supra.)

    No. 74-1161.

    Clements, Director, Mental Retardation Center of Georgia v. Faraca.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 506 F. 2d 956.


text:
    No. 74-1207.
    American Chemical Corp. et al. v. County of Los Angeles et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 42 Cal. App. 3d 45, 57, 59, 63; 116 Cal. Rptr. 751, 758, 759, 761.


text:
    No. 69-1.
    No. 74-1460.
    Augenblick v. United States; and Augenblick v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 206 Ct. Cl. 74, 509 F. 2d 1157.


text:
    No. 74-1096.
    Conk v. Clegg et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 507 F. 2d 1351.


text:
    No. 74-1180.
    Pinell et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 43 Cal. App. 3d 627, 117 Cal. Rptr. 913.


text:
    No. 74-1192.
    Karp v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 1122.


text:
    No. 74-1345.
    U. S. Merchandise Mart, Inc. v. D&H Distributing Co.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 166 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 509 F. 2d 538.


text:
    No. 74 — 1362.
    Waddell v. Fleming.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 510 F. 2d 4.


text:
    No. 74-142.
    H. B. Gregory Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 700.


text:
    No. 74-1214.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 511 F. 2d 1404.


text:
    No. 74-1224.
    Mayes et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 512 F. 2d 637.


text:
    No. 74-1231.
    Owens v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 511 F. 2d 1205.


text:
    No. 74-1256.
    Bowness v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 391.


text:
    No. 74-1259.
    Mandel et al. v. Nouse et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 509 F. 2d 1031.


text:
    No. 74-1273.
    Shamy v. Goldstein, U. S. Attorney, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 510 F. 2d 970.


text:
    No. 74-1309.
    Boren v. Iowa.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 224 N. W. 2d 14.


text:
    No. 74-1330.
    National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Richey, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 167 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 510 F. 2d 1239.


text:
    No. 74-1344.
    House of Vision, Inc. v. Watson, Director, Department of Registration and Education of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 59 Ill. 2d 508, 322 N. E. 2d 15.


text:
    No. 74-1354.
    Wideman, Administrator v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 507 F. 2d 658.


text:
    No. 74-1358.
    May et al. v. Supreme Court of Colorado et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 136.


text:
    No. 74-1359.
    Bennett v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 App. Div. 2d 804, 361 N. Y. S. 2d 37.


text:
    No. 74-1364.
    Rhone-Poulenc, S. A., et al. v. Dann, Commissioner of Patents.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 507 F. 2d 261.


text:
    No. 74-1368.
    Denti v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 App. Div. 2d 513, 365 N. Y. S. 2d 987.


text:
    No. 74-1382.
    Vanderhide v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co., Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 845.


text:
    No. 74-1425.
    Steinman v. Nadjari, Deputy Attorney General of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 515 F. 2d 505.


text:
    No. 74-1432.
    Rubens et ux. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 510 F. 2d 968.


text:
    No. 74-5986.
    Johnson v. Comstock, Men’s Colony Superintendent.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74—6202.
    Hill v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 345.


text:
    No. 74-6248.
    Williams v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 507 F. 2d 1279.


text:
    No. 74-6264.
    Bush v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6271.
    No. 74-6283.
    Westover v. United States; and Roberts v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 511 F. 2d 1154.


text:
    No. 74-6272.
    Acosta de Evans v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6278.
    Weems v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 506 F. 2d 1055.


text:
    No. 74-6287.
    Duemmel v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 513 F. 2d 634.


text:
    No. 74-6297.
    Montoya v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 509 F. 2d 574.


text:
    No. 74-6307.
    McIntyre v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 403.


text:
    No. 74-6340.
    Holland v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 510 F. 2d 453.


text:
    No. 74-6369.
    Poitra v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6397.
    Foster v. Michigan.
   Cir. Ct., Oakland County, Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6399.
    Richards v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 517 S. W. 2d 237.


text:
    No. 74-6405.
    Lasky v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6406.
    Plouf v. Connors, Director, Veterans Administration Regional Office, et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 515 F. 2d 502.


text:
    No. 74-6412.
    Casper v. Blackledge, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6448.
    Denman v. Russell et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 505 F. 2d 729.


text:
    No. 74-6413.
    Chavez v. New Mexico.
   Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 87 N. M. 180, 531 P. 2d 603.


text:
    No. 74-6414.
    Dornau v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 So. 2d 167.


text:
    No. 74-6415.
    Byrd v. Ricketts, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 Ga. 779, 213 S. E. 2d 610.


text:
    No. 74-6419.
    Fitzgerald v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 505 F. 2d 1334.


text:
    No. 74-6421.
    Hewlett v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crina. App. Tenia. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 517 S. W. 2d 760.


text:
    No. 74-6433.
    Stratton v. Dieters et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 513 F. 2d 632.


text:
    No. 74-6439.
    Hayward v. Johnson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 F. 2d 322.


text:
    No. 74-6449.
    Skinner v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6450.
    Navedo v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 App. Div. 2d 773, 365 N. Y. S. 2d 566.


text:
    No. 74-6451.
    Mikell v. Gilchrist County, Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 758.


text:
    No. 74-6453.
    Barksdale v. Ryan, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 511 F. 2d 1405.


text:
    No. 74-6459.
    Ainsworth v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 304 So. 2d 656.


text:
    No. 74-6470.
    Hemstreet v. State Personnel Board.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-6481.
    Hirsch v. Maryland State Bar Assn., Inc.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 274 Md. 368, 335 A. 2d 108.


text:
    No. 74-6517.
    Chambler v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 509 F. 2d 574.


text:
    No. 74-6560.
    Wheeler v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.