source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
Mr. Justice White Me. Justice Stewart,
      Mr. Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Blackmun,

license: Public Domain

text:
    NORTH GEORGIA FINISHING, INC. v. DI-CHEM, INC.
    No. 73-1121.
    Argued November 18, 1974—
    Decided January 22, 1975
    White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BRennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 608. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 609. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, and in numbered paragraph 5 of which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 614.

      Warren N. Coppedge, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Nathaniel Hansford.

      Lemuel Hugh Kemp argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
   Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the statutes of the State of Georgia, plaintiffs in pending suits are “entitled to the process of garnishment.” Ga. Code Ann. § 46-101. To employ the process, plaintiff or his attorney must make an affidavit before “some officer authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any court of record in which the said garnishment is being filed fir in which the main case is filed, stating the amount claimed to be due in such action . . . and that he has reason to apprehend the loss of the same or some part thereof unless process of garnishment shall issue.” § 46-102. To protect defendant against loss or damage in the event plaintiff fails to recover, that section also requires plaintiff to file a bond in a sum double the amount sworn to be due. Section 46-401 permits the defendant to dissolve the garnishment by filing a bond “conditioned for the payment of any judgment that shall be rendered on said garnishment.” Whether these provisions satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the issue before us in this case.

On August 20, 1971, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the Superior Court of Whitfield County, Ga., alleging an indebtedness due and owing from petitioner for goods sold and delivered in the amount of $51,279.17. Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint and prior to its service on petitioner, respondent filed affidavit and bond for process of garnishment, naming the First National Bank of Dalton as garnishee. The affidavit asserted the debt and “reason to apprehend the loss of said sum or some part thereof unless process of Garnishment issues.” The clerk of the Superior Court forthwith issued summons of garnishment to the bank, which was served that day. On August 23, petitioner filed a bond in the Superior Court conditioned to pay any final judgment in the main action up to the amount claimed, and the judge of that court thereupon discharged the bank as garnishee. On September 15, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and to discharge its bond, asserting, among other things, that the statutory garnishment procedure was unconstitutional in that it violated “defendant’s due process and equal protection rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Georgia.” App. 11. The motion was heard and overruled on November 29. The Georgia Supreme Court, finding that the issue of the constitutionality of the statutory garnishment procedure was properly before it, sustained the statute and rejected petitioner’s claims that the statute was invalid for failure to provide notice and hearing in connection with the issuance of the writ of garnishment. 231 Ga. 260, 201 S. E. 2d 321 (1973). We granted certiorari. 417 U. S. 907 (1974). We reverse.

The Georgia court recognized that Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), had invalidated a statute permitting the garnishment of wages without notice and opportunity for hearing, but considered that case to have done nothing more than to carve out an exception, in favor of wage earners, “to the general rule of legality of garnishment statutes.” 231 Ga,, at 264, 201 S. E. 2d, at 323. The garnishment of other assets or properties pending the outcome of the main action, although the effect was to 'impound [them] in the hands of the garnishee,’ ” id., at 263, 201 S. E. 2d, at 323, was apparently thought not to implicate the Due Process Clause.

This approach failed to take account of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), a case decided by this Court more than a year prior to the Georgia court’s decision. There the Court held invalid the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes which permitted a secured installment seller to repossess the goods sold, without notice or hearing and without judicial order or supervision, but with the help of the sheriff operating under a writ issued by the clerk of the court at the behest of the seller. That the debtor was deprived of only the use and possession of the property, and perhaps only temporarily, did not put the seizure beyond scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. “The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause.” Id., at 86. Although the length or severity of a deprivation of use or possession would be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it was not deemed to be determinative of the right to a hearing of some sort. Because the official seizures had been carried out without notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repossession, they were held to be. in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Georgia statute is vulnerable for the same reasons. Here, a bank account, surely a form of property, was impounded and, absent a bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged debt, all by a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer.

Nor is the statute saved by the more recent decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974). That case upheld the Louisiana sequestration statute which permitted the seller-creditor holding a vendor’s lien to secure a writ of sequestration and, having filed a bond, to cause the sheriff to take possession of the property at issue. The writ, however, was issuable only by a judge upon the filing of an affidavit going beyond mere conclusory allegations and clearly setting out the facts entitling the creditor to sequestration. The Louisiana law also expressly entitled the debtor to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on which the writ was issued.

The Georgia garnishment statute has none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana statute. The writ of garnishment is issuable on the affidavit of the creditor or his attorney, and the latter need not have personal knowledge of the facts. § 46-103. The affidavit, like the one filed in this case, need contain only conclusory allegations. The writ is issuable, as jfchis one was, by the court clerk, without participation by a judge. Upon service of the writ, the debtor is deprived of the use of the property in the hands of the garnishee. Here a sizable bank account was frozen, and the only method discernible on the face of the statute to dissolve the garnishment was to file a bond to protect the plaintiff creditor. There is no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment. Indeed, it would appear that without the filing of a bond the defendant debtor’s challenge to the garnishment will not be entertained, whatever the grounds may be.

Respondent also argues that neither Fuentes nor Mitchell is apposite here because each of those cases dealt with the application of due process protections to consumers who are victims of contracts of adhesion and who might be irreparably damaged by temporary deprivation of household necessities, whereas this case deals with its application in the commercial setting to a case involving parties of equal bargaining power. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969). It is asserted in addition that the double bond posted here gives assurance to petitioner that it will be made whole in the event the garnishment turns out to be unjustified. It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the probability of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error. We are no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S., at 89-90.

Enough has been said, we think, to require the reversal of the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court. The case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Me. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 629-636 (dissenting opinion), seems to have been greatly exaggerated. Cf. S. Clemens, cable from Europe to the Associated Press, quoted in 2 A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1912).

Mr. Justice Powell,

concurring in the judgment.

I join in the Court’s judgment, but I cannot concur in the opinion as I think it sweeps more broadly than is necessary and appears to resuscitate Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972). Only last term in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, Co. 416 U. S. 600 (1974), the Court significantly narrowed the precedential scope of Fuentes. In my concurrence in Mitchell, I noted:

“The Court’s decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of [Fuentes’] principle, and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled.” 416 U. S., at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).

Three dissenting Justices, including the author of Fuentes, went further in their description of the impact of Mitchell:

“[T]he Court today has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is barely two years old, without pointing to any change . . . that might justify this total disregard of stare decisis.” 416 U. S., at 635 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).

The Court’s opinion in this case, relying substantially on Fuentes, suggests that that decision will again be read as calling into question much of the previously settled law governing commercial transactions. I continue to doubt whether Fuentes strikes a proper balance, especially in cases where the creditor’s interest in the property may be as significant or even greater than that of the debtor. Nor do I find it necessary to relegate Mitchell to its narrow factual setting in order to determine that the Georgia garnishment statutes fail to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

As we observed in Mitchell, the traditional view of procedural due process had been that “'[wjhere only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.’ ” Id., at 611, quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). Consistent with this view, the Court in the past unanimously approved prejudgment attachment liens similar to those at issue in this case. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U. S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921). See generally Mitchell, supra, at 613-614. But the recent expansion of concepts of procedural due process requires a more careful assessment of the nature of the governmental function served by the challenged procedure and of the costs the procedure exacts of private interests. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-266 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). Under this analysis, the Georgia provisions cannot stand.

Garnishment and attachment remedies afford the actual or potential judgment creditor a means of assuring, under appropriate circumstances, that the debtor will not remove from the jurisdiction, encumber, or otherwise dispose of certain assets then available to satisfy the creditor’s claim. Garnishment may have a seriously adverse impact on the debtor, depriving him of the use of his assets during the period that it applies. But this fact alone does not give rise to constitutional objection. The State’s legitimate interest in facilitating creditor recovery through the provision of garnishment remedies has never been seriously questioned.

Pregarnishment notice and a prior hearing have not been constitutionally mandated in the past. Despite the ambiguity engendered by the Court’s reliance on Fuentes, I do not interpret its opinion today as imposing these requirements for the future. Such restrictions, antithetical to the very purpose of the remedy, would leave little efficacy to the garnishment and attachment laws of the 50 States.

In my view, procedural due process would be satisfied where state law requires that the garnishment be preceded by the garnishor’s provision of adequate security and by his establishment before a neutral officer of a factual basis of the need to resort to the remedy as a means of preventing removal or dissipation of assets required to satisfy the claim. Due process further requires that the State afford an opportunity for a prompt post-garnishment judicial hearing in which the garnishor has the burden of showing probable cause to believe there is a need to continue the garnishment for a sufficient period of time to allow proof and satisfaction of the alleged debt. Since the garnished assets may bear no relation to the controversy giving rise to the alleged debt, the State also should provide the debtor an opportunity to free those assets by posting adequate security in their place.

The Georgia provisions fall short of these requirements. Garnishment may issue on the basis of a simple and conclusory affidavit that , the garnishor has reason to apprehend the loss of money allegedly owed. See Ga. Code Ann. § 46-101, set forth in full in the Court's opinion, ante, at 602 n. 1. As shown by the affidavit filed in this case, see ante, at 604 n. 2, an unrevealing assertion of apprehension of loss suffices to invoke the issuance of garnishment. This is insufficient to enable a neutral officer to make even the most superficial preliminary assessment of the creditor’s asserted need.

The most compelling deficiency in the Georgia procedure is its failure to provide a prompt and adequate postgarnishment hearing. Under Georgia law, garnishment is a separate proceeding between the garnishor and the garnishee. The debtor is not a party and can intervene only by filing a dissolution bond and substituting himself for the garnishee. Leake v. Tyner, 112 Ga. 919, 38 S. E. 343 (1901); Powell v. Powell, 95 Ga. App. 122, 97 S. E. 2d 193 (1957). As noted above, the issuance of the garnishment may impose serious hardship on the debtor. In this context, due process precludes imposing the additional burden of conditioning the debtor’s ability to question the validity of its issuance or continuation on the filing of a bond. Moreover, the Georgia statute contains no provision enabling the debtor to obtain prompt dissolution of the garnishment upon a showing of fact, nor any indication that the garnishor bears the burden of proving entitlement to the garnishment.

I consider the combination of these deficiencies to be fatal to the Georgia statute. Quite simply, the Georgia provisions fail to afford fundamental fairness in their accommodation of the respective interests of creditor and debtor. For these reasons, I join in the judgment of the Court.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,

dissenting.

The Court once again — for the third time in less than three years — struggles with what it regards as the due process aspects of a State’s old and long-unattacked commercial statutes designed to afford a way for relief to a creditor against a delinquent debtor. On this third occasion, the Court, it seems to me, does little more than make very general and very sparse comparisons of the present case with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), on the one hand, and with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974), on the other; concludes that this case resembles Fuentes more than it does Mitchell; and then strikes down the Georgia statutory structure as offensive to due process. One gains the impression, particularly from the final paragraph of its opinion, that the Court is endeavoring to say as little as possible in explaining just why the Supreme Court of Georgia is being reversed. And, as a result, the corresponding commercial statutes of all other States, similar to but not exactly like those of Florida or Pennsylvania or Louisiana or Georgia, are left in questionable constitutional status, with little or no applicable standard by which to measure and determine their validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. This, it seems to me, is an undesirable state of affairs, and I dissent. I do so for a number of reasons:

1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), mentioned in passing by the Court in its present opinion, ante, at 605-606, was correctly regarded by the Georgia Supreme Court, 231 Ga. 260, 263-264, 201 S. E. 2d 321, 323 (1973), as a case relating to the garnishment of wages. The opinion in Sniadach makes this emphasis:

“We deal here with wages — a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural due process.” 395 U. S., at 340.

It goes on to speak of possible “tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support,” ibid., and the “enormous” leverage of the creditor “on the wage earner,” id., at 341. Sniadach should be allowed to remain in its natural environment — wages—and not be expanded to arm’s-length relationships between business enterprises of such financial consequence as North Georgia Finishing and Di-Chem.

2. The Court, ante, at 606, regards the narrow limitations of Sniadach as affected by Fuentes. It also bows to Morrow Electric Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (ND Ga. 1974), and the three-judge holding there that the Georgia statutes before us are unconstitutional. Ante, at 605 n. 4. Indeed, perhaps Sniadach for a time was so expanded (somewhat surprisingly,- I am sure, to the Sniadach Court) by the implications and overtones of Fuentes. But Mitchell came along and Morrow was more than three months pre-Mitchell. Sniadach’s expansion was surely less under Mitchell than it might have appeared to be under Fuentes.

3. I would have thought that, whatever Fuentes may have stood for in this area of debtor-creditor commercial relationships, with its 4-3 vote by a bobtailed Court, it was substantially cut back by Mitchell. Certainly, Me. Justice Stewart, the author of Fuentes and the writer of the dissenting opinion in Mitchell, thought so:

“The deprivation of property in this case is identical to that at issue in Fuentes, and the Court does not say otherwise.” 416 U. S., at 631.
"In short, this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent.” Id., at 634.
“Yet the Court today has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is barely two years old .... The only perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court.” Id., at 635.

Surely, Mr. Justice Brennan thought so when he asserted in dissent that he was “in agreement that Fuentes . . . requires reversal” of the Louisiana judgment. Id., at 636. And surely, Mr. Justice Powell thought so, substantially, when, in his concurrence, he observed:

“The Court’s decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of [the Fuentes] principle, and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled.” Id., at 623.

I accept the views of these dissenting and concurring Justices in Mitchell that Fuentes at least was severely limited by Mitchell, and I cannot regard Fuentes as of much influence or precedent for the present case.

4. Fuentes, a constitutional decision, obviously should not have been brought down and decided by a 4-3 vote when there were two vacancies on the Court at the time of argument. It particularly should not have been decided by a 4-3 vote when Justices filling the vacant seats had qualified and were on hand and available to participate on reargument. Announcing the constitutional decision, with a four-justice majority of a seven-justice shorthanded Court, did violence to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s wise assurance, in Briscoe v. Commonwealth’s Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118, 122 (1834), that the practice of the Court “except in cases of absolute necessity” is not to decide a constitutional question unless there is a majority “of the whole court.”

The Court encountered the same situation a century ago with respect to the Legal Tender Cases; mishandled the decisional process similarly; and came to regret the error. Originally, in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1870), the Court, assertedly by a 6-3 vote, with one vacancy, held the Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345, to be unconstitutional with respect to prior debts. Mr. Justice Grier, who was in failing health, was noted as concurring. 8 Wall., at 626. It was stated that the case “was decided in conference” on November 27, 1860, and the opinion “directed to be read” on January 29,1870. Ibid. Mr. Justice Grier, however, had submitted his resignation to the President in December 1869, effective February 1, 1870, and it had been accepted on December 15. The Justice last sat on January 31. 8 Wall., at vii-viii. The opinion and judgment in Hepburn actually were rendered on February 7, when Mr. Justice Grier was no longer on the bench.

A year later, with the two vacancies filled, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, overruled Hepburn and held the Legal Tender Act constitutional with respect to all debts. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Court said:

“That case [Hepburn v. Griswold] was decided by a divided court, and by a court having a less number of judges than the law then in existence provided this court shall have. . . . We have been in the habit of treating cases involving a consideration of constitutional power differently from those which concern merely private right [citing Briscoe v. Commonwealth’s Bank of Kentucky]. We are not accustomed to hear them in the absence of a full court, if it can be avoided.” Id., at 553-554.

The failure in Hepburn to recall or adhere to the practice announced by the Marshall Court resulted in confusion, prompt reversal of position, embarrassment, and recrimination. See the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Chase in dissent. 12 Wall., at 572.

Later, Mr. Justice Burton called attention to this lapse and heartily endorsed the practice of withholding decision on a constitutional issue by less than a majority of a full Court, that is, today, by less than five votes when vacancies exist and are waiting to be filled or have been filled. Burton, The Legal Tender Cases: A Celebrated Supreme Court Reversal, 42 A. B. A. J. 231 (1956), reprinted as Chapter IX in The Occasional Papers of Mr. Justice Burton (E. Hudon ed. 1969). We allowed his advice, as well as that of the Marshall Court, to go unheeded when we permitted Fuentes to come down with only four supporting votes when a nine-Justice Court already was available on any reargument.

The admonition of the Great Chief Justice, in my view, should override any natural, and perhaps understandable, eagerness to decide. Had we bowed to that wisdom when Fuentes was before us, and waited a brief time for reargument before a full Court, whatever its decision might have been, I venture to suggest that we would not be immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one way, Mitchell another, and now this case decided in a manner that leaves counsel and the commercial communities in other States uncertain as to whether their own established and long-accepted statutes pass constitutional muster with a wavering tribunal off in Washington, D. C. This Court surely fails in its intended purpose when confusing results of this kind are forthcoming and are imposed upon those who owe and those who lend.

5. Neither do I conclude that, because this is a garnishment case, rather than a lien or vendor-vendee case, it is automatically controlled by Sniadach. Sniadach, as has been noted, concerned and reeks of wages. North Georgia Finishing is no wage earner. It is a corporation engaged in business. It was protected (a) by the fact that the garnishment procedure may be instituted in Georgia only after the primary suit has been filed or judgment obtained by the creditor, thus placing on the creditor the obligation to initiate the proceedings and the burden of proof, and assuring a full hearing to .the debtor; (b) by the respondent’s statutorily required and deposited double bond; and (c) by the requirement of the respondent’s affidavit of apprehension of loss. It was in a position to dissolve the garnishment by the filing of a single bond. These are transactions of a day-to-day type in the commercial world. They are not situations involving contracts of adhesion or basic unfairness, imbalance, or inequality. See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U. S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U. S. 191 (1972). The clerk-judge distinction, relied on by the Court, surely is of little significance so long as the court officer is not an agent of the creditor. The Georgia system, for me, affords commercial entities all the protection that is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

6. Despite its apparent disclaimer, the Court now has embarked on a case-by-case analysis (weighted heavily in favor of Fuentes and with little hope under Mitchell) of the respective state statutes in this area. That road is a long and unrewarding one, and provides no satisfactory answers to issues of constitutional magnitude.

I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Me. Chief Justice Burgee dissents for the reasons stated in numbered paragraph 5 of the opinion of Ms. Justice Blackmun.

      The relevant provisions of the Georgia Code Annotated are as follows:
      § 46-101
      “Right to writ; wages exempt until after final judgment
      “In cases where suit shall be pending, or where judgment shall have been obtained, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the process of garnishment under the following regulations: Provided, however, no garnishment shall issue against the daily, weekly or monthly wages of any person residing in this State until after final judgment shall have been had against said defendant: Provided, further, that the wages of a share cropper shall also be exempt from garnishment until after final judgment shall have been had against said share cropper: Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be construed as abridging the right of garnishment in attachment before judgment is obtained.”
      §46-102
      “Affidavit; necessity and contents. Bond
      “The plaintiff, his agent, or attorney at law shall make affidavit before some officer authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any court of record in which the said garnishment is being filed or in which the main case is filed, stating the amount claimed to be due in such action, or on such judgment, and that he has reason to apprehend the loss of the same or some part thereof unless process 'of garnishment shall issue, and shall give bond, with good security, in a sum at least equal to double the amount sworn to be due, payable to the defendant in the suit or judgment,, as the case may be, conditioned to pay said defendant all costs and damages that he may sustain in consequence of suing out said garnishment, in the event that the plaintiff shall fail to recover in the suit, or it shall appear that the amount sworn to be due on such judgment was not due, or that the property or money sought to be garnished was not subject to process of garnishment. No person shall be taken as security on the bond who is an attorney for the plaintiff or a nonresident unless the nonresident is possessed of real estate in the county where the garnishment issues of the value of the amount of such bond.”
      §46-103
      “Affidavit by agent or attorney
      “When the affidavit shall be made by the agent or attorney at law of the plaintiff, he may swear according to the best of his knowledge and belief, and may sign the name of the plaintiff to the bond, who shall be bound thereby in the same manner as though he had signed it himself.”
      §46-104
      “Affidavit and bond by one of firm, etc.
      “When the debt for recovery of which garnishment is sought shill be due to partners or several persons jointly, any one of said partners or joint creditors may make the affidavit and give bond in the name of the plaintiff, as prescribed in cases of attachment.”
      §46-401
      “Dissolution of garnishments; bond; judgment on bond
      “When garnishment shall have been issued, the defendant may dissolve such garnishment upon filing in the clerk's office of the court, or with the justice of the peace, where suit is pending or judgment was obtained, a bond with good security, payable to the plaintiff, conditioned for the payment of any judgment that shall be rendered on said garnishment. The plaintiff may enter up judgment upon such bond against the principal and securities, as judgment may be entered against securities upon appeal, whenever said plaintiff shall obtain the judgment of the court against the property or funds against which garnishment shall have been issued.”

       The affidavit in its entirety was as follows:
      “SUPERIOR COURT OF Whitfield COUNTY GEORGIA, Whitfield COUNTY.
      “Personally appeared B. L. Foster, President of Di-Chem, Inc., who on oath says that he is President of Di-Chem, Inc., plaintiff herein and that North Georgia Finishing, Inc., defendant, is indebted to said plaintiff in the sum of $51,279.17 DOLLARS, principal, $., interest, $.attorney’s fees, and $. cost and that said plaintiff has — a suit pending — returnable to the Superior Court of Whitfield County, and that affiant has reason to apprehend the loss of said sum or some part thereof unless process of Garnishment issues.
      “Sworn to and subscribed before me, this August 20, 1971. “/«/ R. L. Foster, Affiant.

        “/s/ Dual Broadrick, Clerk
      “Superior Court of Whitfield County.” App. 3-4.

       Appeal was taken in the first instance to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court, without opinion, transferred the case to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The latter court issued an opinion, 127 Ga. App. 593, 194 S. E. 2d 508 (1972). The Georgia Supreme Court then issued certiorari, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S. E. 2d 284 (1973).

       Subsequent to the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in this case, a three-judge federal court, sitting in the Northern District of Georgia declared these same statutory provisions unconstitutional. Morrow Electric Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (1974).

       Petitioner so asserts, relying on Jackson v. Barksdale, 17 Ga. App. 461, 87 S. E. 691 (1916); Powell v. Powell, 95 Ga. App. 122, 97 S. E. 2d 193 (1957). Respondent, without citation of authority states that “[e]ounsel could have attacked the garnishment in other ways either in the State or Federal Courts. . . .” Brief for Respondent 5.

       Garnishment and attachment remedies also serve to insure that the State will retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying controversy. The advent of the more liberal interpretation of the States’ power to exert jurisdiction over nonresidents who are not present in the State, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), diminishes the importance of this function.

       The Court also cites Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), which established an exception for garnishment of an individual’s wages. In such cases, the Due Process Clause requires notice and a hearing prior to application of the garnishment remedy. As the opinion itself indicates, however, the Sniadach rule is limited to wages, “a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.” Id., at 340. The Court did not purport to impose requirements of pregarnishment notice and hearing in other instances. Ibid. I therefore do not consider Sniadach to be more than peripherally relevant to the present case.

       1 am not in accord with the Court’s suggestion that the Due Process Clause might require that a judicial officer issue the writ of garnishment. ' The basic protection required for the debtor is the assurance of a prompt postgarnishment hearing before a judge. Such a hearing affords an opportunity to rectify any error in the initial decision to issue the garnishment. When combined with the availability of the garnishor’s bond to compensate for any harm caused, the possibility of prompt correction of possible error suffices to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process in this context. It thus should be sufficient for a clerk or other officer of the court to issue the original writ upon the filing of a proper affidavit.

       The Georgia courts have not amplified the statutory affidavit requirement through the process of judicial construction. See Wilson v. Fulton Metal Bed Mfg. Co., 88 Ga. App. 884, 886, 78 S. E. 2d 360, 362 (1953).

       Since garnishment can issue in Georgia only in cases in which suit is pending or judgment has been rendered, see Ga. Code Ann. §46-101, the issuing officer need not preliminarily inquire into the allegation of the existence of a debt. Nor do I contemplate that the initial showing of probable inability to collect the debt absent the issuance of the garnishment need be elaborate.
      The facts of this case serve to illustrate the point. From the record and oral argument, it appears that the respondent feared that the only accessible and unencumbered assets of North Georgia Finishing were its bank accounts. At oral argument, counsel for petitioner indicated that North Georgia Finishing’s holdings in real estate and tangible property in the State of Georgia were encumbered by mortgages and factoring contracts. It thus appears that respondent’s apprehension of eventual inability to recover the debt may well have been entirely sufficient to justify the garnishment for the brief period required to conduct the post-garnishment hearing.
      Bank accounts are readily susceptible to almost immediate transfer or dissipation, and this occurrence is often a likelihood where the debtor is a foreign corporation or a nonresident of the State. An affidavit in support of the garnishment or attachment of a nonresident’s bank account would normally be sufficient for the writ if it averred that other less transitory assets were not available within the State to satisfy any prospective judgment.

       Petitioner asserts, without contradiction by the respondent, that Georgia law does not authorize the alleged debtor to question the facts contained in the garnishor’s affidavit or to make a contrary submission of fact indicating that the garnishor’s apprehension of possible loss is misconceived or is insufficient to warrant the continuation of the writ of garnishment.

         Fuentes was decided June 12, 1972. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist had taken their respective seats as Members of the Court five months before, on January 7. 404 U. S. xi-xvii. Fuentes had been argued November 9, 1971.

       See also Broderick’s Executor v. Magraw, 8 Wall. 639 (1870).

       Mr. Chief Justice Hughes described the result in the Legal Tender Cases as one of “three notable instances [in which] the Court has suffered severely from self-inflicted wounds.” C. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 50 (1928). The others he named were the Dred Scott decision, Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), and the Income Tax Case, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895), on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).


text:
    No. 73-1779.
    Thevis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed August 16, 1974, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 73-1796.
    Thevis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed August 16, 1974, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 73-6766.
    Strickland v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed August 16, 1974, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 74-153.
    Loughran v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari dismissed September 16, 1974, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    No. 73-6592.
    Del Valle v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed September 24, 1974, under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    October 9, 1974
    No. 74-165.
    No. 74-166.
    Blanchette et al., Trustees of Property of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. et al.; Smith, Trustee of Property of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. United States et al.; United States Railway Assn. v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. et al.; and United States et al. v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. et al.
    No. 74-167.
    No. 74-168.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. Pa. Motions of Brock Adams et al. and National Industrial Traffic League for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of three hours allotted for oral argument. Motion to expedite granted and cases set for oral argument on Wednesday, October 23, 1974. Reported below: 383 F. Supp. 510.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    October 11, 1974
    No. A-232.
    No. A-262.
    Minnesota et al. v. Reserve Mining Co. et al.; and United States v. Reserve Mining Co. et al.
   Respective applications for an order vacating or modifying stay order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, are both denied. Four Justices, however, state explicitly that these denials are without prejudice to applicants’ renewal of their applications to vacate if the litigation has not been finally decided by the Court of Appeals by January 31, 1975. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1073.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I would vacate the stay issued by the Court of Appeals.

District Judge Lord made detailed findings, 380 F. Supp. 11, 16 (Minn. 1974), as to the health hazard of respondent Reserve Mining Co.’s discharges into the air and into the waters of Lake Superior, findings which I attach as an Appendix to this opinion. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Judge Lord’s conclusion but it stopped short of holding that his findings were “clearly erroneous” within the meaning of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a). Even in its view, the issue, however, was close or rather neatly balanced. It therefore decided that being “a court of law” it was “governed by rules of proof” and that “unknowns may not be substituted for proof of a demonstrable hazard to the public health.”

That position, however, with all respect, makes “maximizing profits” the measure of the public good, not health of human beings or life itself. Property is, of course, protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment against federal intrusion. But so are life and liberty. Where the scales are so evenly divided, we cannot say that the findings on health were “clearly erroneous” nor am I able to discover how “maximizing profits” becomes a governing principle overriding the health hazards. If equal justice is the federal standard, we should be as alert to protect people and their rights as the Court of Appeals was to protect “maximizing profits.” If, as the Court of Appeals indicates, there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of humanity, lest in the end our judicial system be part and parcel of a regime that makes people, the sovereign power in this Nation, the victims of the great god Progress which is behind the stay permitting this vast pollution of Lake Superior and its environs. I am not aware of a constitutional principle that allows either private or public enterprises to despoil any part of the domain that belongs to all of the people. Our guiding principle should be Mr. Justice Holmes’ dictum that our waterways, great and small, are treasures, not garbage dumps or cesspools.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING

(3) The particles when deposited into the water are dispersed throughout Lake Superior and into Wisconsin and Michigan.

(4) The currents in the lake, which are largely influenced by the discharge, carry many of the fibers in a southwesterly direction toward Duluth and are found, in substantial quantities in the Duluth drinking water.

(5) Many of these fibers are morphologically and chemically identical to amosite asbestos and an even larger number are similar to amosite asbestos.

(6) Exposure , to these fibers can produce asbestosis, mesothelioma, and cancer of the lung, gastrointestinal tract and larynx.

(7) Most of the studies dealing with this problem are concerned with the inhalation of fibers; however, the available evidence indicates that the fibers pose a risk when ingested as well as when inhaled.

(8) The fibers emitted by the defendant into Lake Superior have the potential for causing great harm to the health of those exposed to them.

(9) The discharge into the air substantially endangers the health of the people of Silver Bay and surrounding communities as far away as the eastern shore in Wisconsin.

(10) The discharge into the water substantially endangers the health of the people who procure their drinking water from the western arm of Lake Superior including the communities of Beaver Bay, Two Harbors, Cloquet, Duluth, and Superior, Wisconsin.

(11) The present and future industrial standard for a safe level of asbestos fibers in the air is based on the experience related to asbestosis and not to cancer. In addition its formulation was influenced more by technological limitations than health considerations.

(12) The exposure of a non-worker populace cannot be equated with industrial exposure if for no other reason than the environmental exposure, as contrasted to a working exposure, is for every hour of every day.

(13) While there is a dose-response relationship associated with the adverse effects of asbestos exposure and may be therefore a threshold exposure value below which no increase in cancer would be found, this exposure threshold is not now known.

       The Solicitor General, at 2-3 of the brief he filed with us in No. A-262, states:
      “In all of this the court of appeals has proceeded on an admittedly preliminary assessment, based on limited exposure to the voluminous record, of the question whether the continued daily discharge of some 67,000 tons of suspended solid waste into Lake Superior and some 100 tons of particulate matter into the air constitutes a significant threat to public health. While we believe that the court of appeals’ conclusion in this regard rests upon crucial assumptions that are refuted by the substantial evidence of record here, we do not think it appropriate to attempt to argue such evidentiary issues to this Court on an even more limited record. Suffice it to say that there is no serious dispute that the amphibole discharges in question are widely believed to entail a risk of asbestosis, cancer, and other adverse health consequences, and the only real dispute concerns the quantitative assessment of the likelihood of such consequences — an assessment that is particularly difficult here because of the apparently long-term and cumulative results of exposure to such materials.”

       498 F. 2d 1073, 1084.

        New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342 (1931).


text:
    No. A-256.
    Hill, Attorney General of Texas, et al. v. Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast et al.
   Application for stay of judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending timely docketing of an appeal and final disposition thereon. Mr. Justice Douglas would deny the application.


text:
    October 15, 1974
    No. 73-1495.
    Cahill et al. v. Cedar County, Iowa, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Iowa.


text:
    No. 73-1675.
    Beame, Mayor of New York City, et al. v. Lavine, Commissioner of Social Services of New York.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 73-1760.
    Bush, dba Bush Distributing Co. v. Texas Highway Department et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex.


text:
    No. 73-1777.
    Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. United States.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Iowa.


text:
    No. 73-1829.
    Bud Brown Enterprises, Inc. v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C.


text:
    No. 73-1835.
    Debrow v. Boswell, Commissioner of Revenue.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala.


text:
    No. 73-1956.
    Yellow Cab of Boca Raton, Inc. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla.


text:
    No. 73-1964.
    Jones et al. v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 73-6914.
    Almeida v. Lucey.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Mass.


text:
    No. 73-7082.
    Owens et al. v. I. F. P. Corp., dba Olshine’s Credit Clothing Co., et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Ky.


text:
    No. 73-1473.
    No. 73-1490.
    No. 73-1670.
    Ann Arbor Railroad Co. et al. v. United States et al.; Kansas City Southern Railway Co. et al. v. United States et al.; and United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission.
   Affirmed on appeals from D. C. E. D. Pa. Mr. Justice Douglas would remand No. 73-1670 to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a finding on the reasonableness of the prescribed rate. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these appeals. Reported below: 368 F. Supp. 101.


text:
    No. 73-1831.
    Scott Paper Co. et al. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.


text:
    No. 73-1370.
    Phelps v. Morgan, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1615.
    Calderon v. Board of Education of El Monte School District of Los Angeles County.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1729.
    Johnson v. Laramie County School District No. 1.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wyo. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1817.
    Brothers, dba A-Advanced Products Co. et al. v. California.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1928.
    Public Utility District No. 1 of Douglas County et al. v. Madden et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1965.
    Shepherd v. Arkansas.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ark. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6591.
    Smith v. California.
   Appeal from App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Alameda, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6704.
    Saffioti v. United States.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6957.
    Boruski v. United States et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6965.
    Falkner et ux. v. Goodhart, Judge, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-43.
    Barnes v. Bell et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Wyandot County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1400.
    Upper Missouri River Corp. v. Board of Review, Woodbury County.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Iowa dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-6933.
    Duchein v. Mayor of New York City et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-7096.
    Epps et al. v. Maryland.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Md. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-1504.
    Consolidated Distilled Products, Inc., et al. v. Mahin, Director, Department of Revenue, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1589.
    Piatak v. Ohio.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1692.
    Streckfus v. City of St. Louis.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Mo. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1738.
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1814.
    International Development, Inc. v. Utah-Louisiana Investment Co. et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. La., 1st Cir., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1826.
    Pettitt et ux. v. City of Fresno et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1953.
    Cannon v. Oviatt.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 74-33.
    Woodside Savings & Loan Assn. v. Gallman et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 74-112.
    Mandarelli v. City of Auburn.
   Appeal from Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 74-120.
    Gormley v. Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court of Arizona.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ariz. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-1555.
    Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. United States.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-1579.
    Mitsubishi Electric Corp. et al. v. United States.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-1907.
    Sumpter v. Indiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ind. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-6918.
    Smith v. Project Construction Co.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Okla. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-6693.
    Gargallo v. Presiding Judge, Franklin County Common Pleas Court, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Motion to defer consideration denied. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-420.
    Bates et al. v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion of appellees to docket and dismiss appeal pursuant to this Court’s Rule 14 (3) granted.


text:
    No. 73-1669.
    Congress of Railway Unions v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss case as moot.


text:
    No. 73-1758.
    Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Jobst.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 301 et seq., 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. II).


text:
    No. 73-1998.
    Driskell et al. v. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. La. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. See Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca, 391 U. S. 352 (1968).


text:
    No. 73-1392.
    Random House, Inc. v. Gordon.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of Association of American Publishers, Inc., and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974). Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 73-1926.
    No. 73-1934.
    Housing Authority of Louisville et al. v. Fletcher; and Department of Housing and Urban Development et al. v. Fletcher.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent in both cases for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of § 201 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 653, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1437-1437j (1970 ed., Supp. IV).


text:
    No. 73-1972.
    Cannon, Warden, et al. v. Thomas et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974).


text:
    No. 73-6255.
    Terrell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings, including re-entry of its judgment affirming petitioner’s conviction and consideration of appointment of counsel for petitioner in connection with seeking review in this Court of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Schreiner v. United States, 404 U. S. 67 (1971).


text:
    No. 73-6349.
    Analla v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Upon representation of the Solicitor General set forth in his brief for the United States filed July 26, 1974, judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Government.


text:
    No. A-151.
    Doe v. Mundy, Director, Institutions and Departments of Milwaukee County, et al.
   D. C. E. D. Wis. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-196.
    Save Crystal Beach Assn. et al. v. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for further extension of temporary restraining order, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the application pending timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.


text:
    No. 9,
    Orig.
    United States v. Louisiana et al. (Louisiana Boundary Case) .
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the Report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 409 U. S. 17 and 909.]


text:
    No. 31,
    Orig.
    Utah v. United States.
   Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this order. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 416 U. S. 932.]


text:
    No. 35,
    Orig.
    United States v. Maine et al.
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, with supporting briefs to the Report may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, to such exceptions may be filed within 30 days. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 408 U. S. 917.]


text:
    No. 48,
    Orig.
    Mississippi v. Arkansas,
   415 U. S. 302. Parties are directed to submit a proposed amended decree which has the approval of the Special Master.


text:
    No. 52,
    Orig.
    United States v. Florida.
   Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master set for oral argument in due course. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 415 U. S. 905.]


text:
    No. 64,
    Orig.
    New Hampshire v. Maine.
   Motion of New Hampshire Commercial Fishermen’s Assn, et al. for leave to intervene referred to Special Master. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 414 U. S. 996.]


text:
    No. 73-203.
    Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin et al.,
   417 U. S. 156. Motion of petitioner to assess costs denied.


text:
    No. 73-477.
    Gerstein v. Pugh.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Restored to calendar for reargument, 416 U. S. 933.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-434.
    No. 73-435.
    No. 73-436.
    Milliken, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Bradley et al.; Allen Park Public Schools et al. v. Bradley et al.; and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley et al.,
   418 U. S. 717. Motion of respondents to require each party to bear it&own costs denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant the motion.


text:
    No. 73-628.
    Allenberg Cotton Co., Inc. v. Pittman.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Miss. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 415 U. S. 988.] Motion to strike all or certain portions of brief filed by American Cotton Shippers Assn, as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 73-690.
    Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
   416 U. S. 861. Motion of respondent to reassess costs denied.


text:
    No. 73-711.
    Cryan, Sheriff, et al. v. Hamar Theatres, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. J. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 416 TJ. S. 954.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted; however, no additional time granted.


text:
    No. 73-696.
    No. 73-830.
    Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Western Addition Community Organization et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 913.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes are allotted for that purpose. Respondents also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument. Motion of National Retail Merchants Assn., Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-748.
    American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO, et al. v. Mobile Steamship Assn., Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 947.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 73-759.
    Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al. v. Healy et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 911.] Consideration of appellants’ suggestion of mootness deferred to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 73-765.
    International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Upper South Department, AFL-CIO v. Quality Manufacturing Co. et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 968.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-822.
    Fry et al. v. United States.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of Coalition of American Public Employees for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-848.
    Fusari, Commissioner of Labor v. Steinberg et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of Ellenmae Crow et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-1015.
    Crow et al. v. California Department of Human Resources Development et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite consideration to permit consolidation with No. 73-848 [immediately supra] for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 73-1016.
    No. 73-1095.
    Lascaris, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Onondaga County v. Shirley et al.; and Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York v. Shirley et al.
   Appeals from D. C. N. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 943.] Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-1106.
    Cousins et al. v. Wigoda et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 956.] Motion of petitioners for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 73-1162.
    United States v. Wilson et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted; however, no additional time granted.


text:
    No. 73-1231.
    No. 73-1234.
    Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 955.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents in No. 73-1234 also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument. Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-1256.
    Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certi-orari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of petitioner for additional time for oral argument denied.


text:
    No. 73-1313.
    International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., Communications Equipment & Systems Division v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument denied without prejudice to a divided argument.


text:
    No. 73-1346.
    McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. v. DeChamplain.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 418 U. S. 904.] Motion of appellee to dismiss for failure of appellants to prosecute appeal in a timely manner denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant motion to dismiss.


text:
    No. 73-1377.
    No. 73-1378.
    Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. City of New York et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.; and Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 969.] Motion of the State of Michigan for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 73-1475.
    Harris County Commissioners Court et al. v. Moore et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 928.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted; however, no additional time granted.


text:
    No. 73-1446.
    Roe et al. v. Doe.
   Ct. App. N. Y. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 907.] Motion to seal record and appendix granted.


text:
    No. 73-1595.
    Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, Collector of Revenue of Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 966.] Motion of Chapman L. Sanford to permit Whit M. Cook II, Esquire, to argue pro hac vice on behalf of appellee granted.


text:
    No. 73-1750.
    Pitt County Transportation Co. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., for use and benefit of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 73-2006.
    Colorado Magnetics, Inc., dba Sound Values, Inc., et al. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
   C. A. 10th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 73-6935.
    Youakim et al. v. Miller, Director, Department of Children and Family Services, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 74-54.
    Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 73-5677.
    Schick v. Reed, Chairman, United States Board of Parole, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Cer-tiorari granted, 416 U. S. 955.] Motion of Robert N. Sayler to permit Homer E. Moyer Jr., Esquire, to argue pro hac vice on behalf of petitioner granted.


text:
    No. 73-6033.
    Roe et al. v. Norton, Commissioner of Welfare.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of American Academy of Child Psychiatry et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted.


text:
    No. A-175 (74-339).
    Wolman et al. v. Essex et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio. Application for an in-, junction presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the injunction to enjoin Ohio’s state aid to parochial schools. See Marburger v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey, 417 U. S. 961. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant application.


text:
    No. 73-6867.
    No. 73-6893.
    No. 73-6922.
    No. 73-6953.
    No. 73-7013.
    No. 73-7091.
    No. 73-7117.
    No. 74-5018.
    No. 74-5085.
    No. 74-5164.
    No. 74-5172.
    Berkley v. Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana, et al.; Kurth v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary; Scott v. United States; Phillips v. Warden, Nevada State Prison; Souder v. McGuire, Hospital Superintendent, et al.; Taylor v. Estelle, Corrections Director; Dorrough v. Hogan, Warden; Rando v. Estelle, Corrections Director; Merrill v. Matthes, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al.; In re McGhee; and Williams v. Procunier, Corrections Director.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 74-5188.
    No. 74-5230.
    Anderson v. Illinois; and Davis v. New York.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 73-1625.
    No. 73-1690.
    No. 73-1957.
    No. 73-6588.
    No. 73-6660.
    No. 73-6862.
    No. 73-6952.
    No. 73-6954.
    No. 73-7027.
    No. 73-7029.
    No. 73-7111.
    No. 74-12.
    No. 74-5084.
    Williamson et ux. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas; Phelps v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit et al.; Bearden et al. v. Fulton, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court; Anderson v. United States; Mitchell v. New Hampshire; Carter v. Rayburn, Judge; House v. Maryland et al.; Ross v. Larkins, U. S. District Judge; Harrelson v. United States et al.; Ransom v. Florida; Dollar v. Nelson, Warden; Rea et al. v. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and Featheringham v. Ohio et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 73-1822.
    No. 73-1976.
    No. 73-6740.
    Phelps v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit et al.; Tallant et al. v. Moye, U. S. District Judge; and Pearson v. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 73-6817.
    Kimble v. Hamilton, Judge, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 73-1701.
    United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1723.
    Hill, Attorney General of Texas v. Stone et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1765.
    Meek et al. v. Pittenger, Secretary of Education, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1869.
    Beer et al. v. United States et al.
   Appeal from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1892.
    Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Wiesenfeld.
   Appeal from D. C. N. J. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1942.
    Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.
   Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-2060.
    Austin et al. v. New Hampshire et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-1966.
    No. 73-1971.
    Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. et al. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) et al.; and United States et al. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) et al.
   Appeals from D. C. D. C. Probable jurisdiction noted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this order. Reported below: 371 F. Supp. 1291.


text:
    No. 73-1452.
    Oregon v. Hass.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1541.
    Reid et ux. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1742.
    Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1773.
    Foster v. Dravo Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1923.
    Eastland et al. v. United States Servicemen’s Fund et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1977.
    Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-2024.
    Warth et al. v. Seldin et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-13.
    Mullaney et al. v. Wilbur.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1708.
    Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Iowa, et al. v. Alcala et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of respondents Doe et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1808.
    Laing v. United States et al.
   C. .A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 74-75, immediately infra.


text:
    No. 74-75.
    United States et al. v. Hall.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-1808, immediately supra.


text:
    No. 73-2050.
    United States v. Ortiz.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with Nos. 73-6848 and 74-114, immediately infra.


text:
    No. 73-6848.
    Bowen v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-2050, immediately supra, and No. 74-114, immediately infra.


text:
    No. 74-114.
    United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted and case set for oral argument with Nos. 73-2050 and 73-6848, immediately supra.


text:
    No. 73-6336.
    Rogers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 74-5140.
    Cassius v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certio-rari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1291.
    No. 73-1558.
    Bruce v. United States; and Walker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 1224.


text:
    No. 73-1379.
    Forkert v. California.
   App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1387.
    Fithian v. Fithian.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1418.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1420.
    No. 73-1547.
    Dellacroce v. United States; and Catalano v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 268.


text:
    No. 73-1447.
    Wagner v. Wagner.
   Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1448.
    Presta et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1454.
    Thompson et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1459.
    Mahoney et al. v. Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye House Workers International Union, Local 93, of Springfield, Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1468.
    Texeira et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1488.
    Pacelli v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1494.
    Maher v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1496.
    Gonzalez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1509.
    No. 73-1527.
    Abramo v. United States; and D’Amato et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 359.


text:
    No. 73-1511.
    No. 73-6673.
    Miller, Commissioner, Department of Mental Hygiene of New York, et al. v. Dale; and Dale v. Miller, Commissioner, Department of Mental Hygiene of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 486 F. 2d 76.


text:
    No. 73-1520.
    Thomas v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1522.
    Marquez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1523.
    Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1530.
    Malnik v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1538.
    Rafter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1540.
    Sechrest et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1549.
    Scappatone v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1552.
    Rural Foods, Inc., t/a Shop & Save Super Markets v. United States Department of Agriculture.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1553.
    Green et al. v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1557.
    Casamento v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1559.
    Fairview Nursing Home v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1561.
    Marihart et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1574.
    No. 73-6610.
    No. 73-6913.
    No. 73-6986.
    Arroyo v. United States; Perez v. United States; Gonzalez v. United States; and Sanchez v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1316.


text:
    No. 73-1577.
    Dolloff Industries, Inc. v. Lambros, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1582.
    Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1588.
    Anderson et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1593.
    Provision House Workers Union Local 274, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1594.
    Cement Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1599.
    Kirtley et al. v. Bickerstaff, District Director of Internal Revenue, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1603.
    No. 73-1674.
    No. 73-1849.
    No. 73-1850.
    Borgman, aka Miller, et al. v. United States; Frank v. United States; Hemlock v. United States; and Hoffer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 145.


text:
    No. 73-1611.
    Campbell v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1613.
    Lam Man Chung v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1614.
    No. 73-1752.
    Wolder et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Boyce et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 608.


text:
    No. 73-1616.
    Madden v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1617.
    Shrout et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1619.
    Peterson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1631.
    Ostrer v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1633.
    O’Connell v. City of Cincinnati.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1636.
    No. 73-1762.
    Sokolsky et al. v. Cle-Ware Industries, Inc., et al.; and Whalen et al. v. Cle-Ware Industries, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1641.
    Knapp-Sherrill Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1645.
    Donahoe et al. v. Beech Aircraft Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1646.
    Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Beard.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1649.
    Eyraud v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1652.
    No. 73-1687.
    Your Host, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Chef Foods, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 489 F. 2d 957.


text:
    No. 73-1654.
    Leona Lee Corp. et al. v. International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 66, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1656.
    Simmons v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1659.
    No. 73-6864.
    Zanfardino v. United States; and Boria v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 887.


text:
    No. 73-1660.
    Shadletsky, aka Shad v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1661.
    Kovash v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1662.
    Tibbitts et ux. v. Cussen, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1664.
    Bailey v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1665.
    Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1677.
    Borg-Warner Corp. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1678.
    Donaldson v. City Council, City of Plantation.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1681.
    George Steinberg & Son, Inc. v. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1684.
    Garner v. Louisiana State Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1685.
    Arber et al. v. Essex Wire Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1691.
    Paris, dba General Security Services, Inc. v. Wedren, Director, Department of Commerce, et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1694.
    Brenner v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1695.
    Rosenberg v. Laffal et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1696.
    Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping Co., S. A.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1698.
    Jackson v. New York City Transit Authority.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1699.
    Travelers Insurance Co. v. Sheris.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1703.
    Boatel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1704.
    Peterson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1706.
    Pitt River Tribe v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1707.
    Collier v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1712.
    Local 445, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. Sperry Systems Management Division, Sperry Rand Corp., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1709.
    Sneiders v. Henry.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1713.
    Smyzer v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1714.
    Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1715.
    Waldrop et al. v. Hite et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1716.
    Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1717.
    Fritz et ux. v. Town of Clermont.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1719.
    No. 73-1759.
    No. 73-6628.
    Ponzio v. United States; Somers v. United States; and LaSane v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 723.


text:
    No. 73-1720.
    Impson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1721.
    Abetta Electric Service Corp. v. Levine, Industrial Commissioner of New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1725.
    Irving Berlin Music Corp. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1730.
    Rose et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1731.
    Davidson et al. v. Miller, an infant by Leggett, et al.
   Super. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1732.
    City of Chattanooga v. Cox.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1733.
    Kimbell et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1735.
    Gorden v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1736.
    Weiss et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1743.
    Goldman v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1744.
    Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1748.
    Bishop et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1749.
    Walters v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1751.
    Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., et al. v. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1754.
    International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1756.
    Biddle, Administratrix v. Bowser.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1761.
    Distrigas Corp. et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1769.
    No. 73-6622.
    Thompson v. United States; and Teresi v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 305.


text:
    No. 73-1771.
    Springer et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1775.
    Bradford v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1778.
    Rodgers v. Federal Trade Commission.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1781.
    Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1784.
    Gonzales et vir v. Checker Cabs, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1785.
    Wellman Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1786.
    Duckstein v. General Dynamics Corp., Fort Worth Division.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 2d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1787.
    Ohio Holding Co. v. Masheter, Director of Highways.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1788.
    Local Union No. 2188, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1792.
    Williams v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1793.
    Marks v. Flournoy, Controller of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1794.
    Klee v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1797.
    Milam v. United States et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1803.
    Murtagh et al. v. University Computing Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1806.
    Smith v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1807.
    Papierz et al. v. Rauth.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1810.
    Smith et al. v. Indiana State Board of Health et al.
   Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1815.
    Northway Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1816.
    Perry et ux. v. District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1821.
    Gordon et al. v. Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 612, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1833.
    Rachal v. United States Bureau of Prisons.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1839.
    West India Carriers, Inc. v . Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1840.
    Merck & Co., Inc. v. McGarvey.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1841.
    Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1843.
    Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1844.
    Phelps v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1845.
    Brown et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1847.
    Burgess et ux. v. Fabrizi et ux.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1848.
    Bond et al. v. Beneficial Finance Company of New York, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1851.
    R. E. Huntley Cotton Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1852.
    Sayre, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. City of Cleveland.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1853.
    Griffin v. Griffin.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1854.
    Rogers v. Rogers et al.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1857.
    Whitney v. New York Stock Exchange et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1858.
    Mon Valley Terminal, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1860.
    Makah Development Corp. et al. v. Stanley T. Scott & Co., Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1861.
    South Gwinnett Venture et al. v. Pruitt et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1862.
    Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York v. Albany Welfare Eights Organization et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1863.
    Zim’s Foodliner, Inc., dba Zim’s IGA Foodliner, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1864.

      Brown. v. Georgia Power Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1865.
    Shawnee Plastics, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C: A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1866.
    Turetsky v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1867.
    Schein et al. v. Caesar’s World, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1871.
    Noga et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1872.
    Parker v. McKeithen, Governor of Louisiana, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1873.
    Hawk v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1874.
    Rossi et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1875.
    H & M Cake Box, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union of America, Local No. 45.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1876.
    Brewington v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1877.
    Glatstein v. Walsh.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1879.
    Humphrey v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1880.
    Chicago Patrolmen’s Assn. et al. v. City of Chicago et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1881.
    Ernest Renda Contracting Co., Inc. v. Male, Commissioner, Department of Labor and Industry, et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1883.
    Lake Transport, Inc. v. Railroad Commission of Texas et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1885.
    United Transportation Union General Committee of Adjustment v. Baker et al., Trustees of Property of Penn Central Transportation Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1886.
    Gesser et al. v. Dann, Commissioner of Patents.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1889.
    Whitlock, Executrix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1891.
    Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1893.
    Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1895.
    Texas et al. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1898.
    Michigan National Bank v. Grigg et al.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1899.
    Martain v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1900.
    Twilley et al. v. Governor of Maryland.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1904.
    Digilab, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Labor et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1905.
    Dollar General Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1909.
    Alfin v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1910.
    Radiocall Paging Service v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1911.
    Chase v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1912.
    Carver v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1913.
    Bray et al. v. Elison et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1916.
    Blanks v. Register et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1918.
    Perez-Lopez et al. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1920.
    Ruggiero v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1921.
    Wellco Chemical Products Co. v. Cascade Chemical Coatings, Inc.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1927.
    Freudmann v. Blankstein, Trustee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1936.
    Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services of Kansas v. Seneca Nursing Home et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1937.
    Brandys v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1938.
    Effler v. Tennessee.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1939.
    Gilligan et al. v. Korzen et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1940.
    Altsman et al. v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1941.
    Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of Florida.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1945.
    DeMoon v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1948.
    Perry v. Mas et ux.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1949.
    Nixon Hotel, Inc. v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Butler.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1954.
    Alpha Distributing Company of California, Inc. v. Jack Daniel Distillery et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1958.
    Mohasco Industries, Inc., et al. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1959.
    Adey v. United Action for Animals, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1961.
    Lopez v. Rivera, Judge.
   Super. Ct. P. R. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1962.
    Berman v. Group Health Assn., Inc.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1963.
    Pordum v. Board of Regents of New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1968.
    Gross et al. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1969.
    Winkle v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1970.
    DeBlasis v. County of San Bernardino et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1974.
    Home Insurance Co. et al. v. Garcy Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1981.
    Glimco v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1986.
    Industro Motive Corp. et al. v. Monogram Models, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1989.
    Simon et al. v. Estate of Allen et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 10th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1991.
    City of Naples v. Prepakt Concrete Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1993.
    Signal Mountain Portland Cement, Division of General Portland Cement Co. v. Coolidge et ux.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2002.
    Philadelphia Housing Authority et al. v. Alderman et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2012.
    No. 73-2037.
    Seattle Trust & Savings Bank et al. v. Bank of California, N. A., et al.; and Hart, Supervisor, Division of Banking v. Bank of California, N. A., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 48.


text:
    No. 73-2016.
    Aranda v. Committee on Examinations and Admissions for State Bar of Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2017.
    Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., et al. v. Bryan.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2019.
    Mailman Development Corp. et al. v. City of Hollywood.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2020.
    Lewis v. Hudson Waterways Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2021.
    Outlaw et al. v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2026.
    Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2031.
    No. 73-2035.
    Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co. v. Wasson, dba Wasson Towing Co., et al.; and Wasson, dba Wasson Towing Co., et al. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 571.


text:
    No. 73-1996.
    McNeal v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2033.
    Kuklevich et ux. v. Union Local School District.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Belmont County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2034.
    Wilson v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2041.
    Sewell et al. v. Penn Central Transportation Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2044.
    Karp, Executrix, et al. v. Cooley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. . Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2049.
    Straub et al. v. Woodahl, Attorney General of Montana, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2052.
    Pope et ux. v. Texas et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 14th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-2059.
    Broge et al. v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6215.
    Comcowich v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6280.
    No. 73-6407.
    No. 73-6413.
    Kelley v. United States; Alonso et al. v. United States; and Ziruolo v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 748, 749, 750, and 752.


text:
    No. 73-6348.
    Jerrold v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6358.
    Gutierrez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.