text:
    MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. ELAHI
    No. 04-1095.
    Decided February 21, 2006
   Per Curiam.

A private citizen seeks to attach an asset belonging to Iran’s Ministry of Defense in order to help satisfy a judgment for money damages. The question raised is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. Ill), forbids that attachment.

The judgment for money damages consists of a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran (for about $300 million) that the private citizen, Dariush Elahi, obtained in a federal-court lawsuit claiming that the Republic had murdered his brother. Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (DC 2000). The asset is an arbitration award (against a third party), which Iran’s Ministry of Defense obtained in Switzerland. Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 385 F. 3d 1206, 1211 (CA9 2004). The Ministry asked the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California to confirm the award. Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (2002). The court did so. And Elahi then intervened, seeking to impose a lien upon the award. The Ministry opposed the attachment on the ground that the Act grants it immunity from such a claim.

The Federal District Court rejected the Ministry’s immunity defense on the ground that, by suing to enforce the award, the Ministry had waived any such immunity. On appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court about waiver. But it then found against the Ministry on a different ground — a ground that the parties had not argued. The Act says that under certain conditions the property of an “agency or instrumentality ” of a foreign government is “not... immune from attachment ” if the agency is “engaged in commercial activity in the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1610(b) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals found that the Ministry engages in commercial activity and that the other conditions were satisfied. 385 F. 3d, at 1219-1222 (applying § 1610(b)(2)). And it held that this section of the Act barred the Ministry’s assertion of immunity. Ibid.

The Ministry filed a petition for certiorari asking us to review that decision. The Solicitor General agrees with the Ministry that we should grant the writ but limited to the Ministry’s Question 1, namely, whether “the property of a foreign state stricto sensu, situated in the United States,” is “immune from attachment ... as provided in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.” Pet. for Cert, i (citing §§ 1603(a), 1610(a)). The Solicitor General also asks us to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of whether the Ministry is simply a “foreign state” (what the Ministry calls “a foreign state stricto sensu”) or whether the Ministry is an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state (as the Ninth Circuit held). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15-17. We grant the writ limited to Question 1.

The Act, as it applies to the “property in the United States of a foreign state,” § 1610(a) (emphasis added), does not contain the “engaged in commercial activity” exception that the Ninth Circuit described. That exception applies only where the property at issue is property of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state. Compare § 1610(b) (“property ... of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity”) with § 1610(a) (“property ... of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity” (emphasis added)). The difference is critical. Moreover, in the Solicitor General’s view a defense ministry (unlike, say, a government-owned commercial enterprise) generally is not an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state but an inseparable part of the state itself. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8-11; see also Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F. 3d 148, 153 (CADC 1994) (“holding] that armed forces are as a rule so closely bound up with the structure of the state that they must in all cases be considered as the ‘foreign state’ itself, rather than a separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state”).

We shall not now determine whether the Solicitor General is correct about the status of the Ministry, for the Ninth Circuit did not address the question nor did the parties argue the matter before the Circuit. Neither can we fault the Ministry for that failure. As we said, swpra, at 451, the District Court based its denial of immunity upon waiver. The parties’ Ninth Circuit briefs focused on matters not relevant here (such as the waiver question), with one exception. The exception consists of a footnote in Elahi’s brief mentioning the Act’s “agency and instrumentality” provision. That footnote, however, does not ask for affirmance on that basis; nor did it provide the Ministry with clear notice that a reply was necessary. Answering Brief for Appellee in No. .03-55015 (CA9), p. 45, n. 27 (stating that “[iff [the Ministry] is considered ‘an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,’ rather than the foreign state itself, Mr. Elahi’s attachment still is valid” (emphasis added)).

The Ninth Circuit said that it was free to affirm on “any ground supported by the record.” 385 F. 3d, at 1219, n. 15. But the court did not explain what in the record might demonstrate that the Ministry is an “agency or instrumentality” of the state rather than an integral part of the state itself. The court noted that “Elahi appears to concede” that the Ministry is an “agency and instrumentality,” id., at 1218, n. 13, but any relevant concession would have to have come from the Ministry, not from Elahi, whose position the concession favors. Thus, in implicitly concluding that the Ministry was an “agency or instrumentality” of the Republic of Iran within the meaning of § 1610(b), the Ninth Circuit either mistakenly relied on a concession by respondent that could not possibly bind petitioner, or else erroneously presumed that there was no relevant distinction between a foreign state and its agencies or instrumentalities for purposes of that subsection. See §§ 1603(a), (b). Either way, the Ninth Circuit committed error that was essential to its judgment in favor of respondent.

Because the Ninth Circuit did not consider, and the Ministry had no reasonable opportunity to argue, the critical legal point we have mentioned, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ASH et al. v. TYSON FOODS, INC.
    No. 05-379.
    Decided February 21, 2006
   Per Curiam.

Petitioners Anthony Ash and John Hithon were superintendents at a poultry plant owned and operated by respondent Tyson Foods, Inc. Petitioners, who are African-American, sought promotions to fill two open shift manager positions, but two white males were selected instead. Alleging that Tyson had discriminated on account of race, petitioners sued under Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.

A trial proceeded in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. At the close of the plaintiffs’ evidence, Tyson moved for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a). The District Court denied the motion, and the jury found for petitioners, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The employer renewed its motion for judgment under Rule 50(b). The District Court granted the motion and, in the alternative, ordered a new trial as to both plaintiffs under Rule 50(c). App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a; see generally Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., ante, at 399-406 (discussing Rule 50).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 129 Fed. Appx. 529, 536 (2005) (per curiam). As to Ash, the court affirmed the grant of the Rule 50(b) motion, deeming the trial evidence insufficient to show pretext (and thus insufficient to show unlawful discrimination) under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). 129 Fed. Appx., at 533-534. As to Hithon, the court reversed the Rule 50(b) ruling, finding there was enough evidence to go to the jury. The court, however, affirmed the District Court’s alternative remedy of a new trial under Rule 50(c), holding that the evidence supported neither the decision to grant punitive damages nor the amount of the compensatory award, and thus that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial. Id., at 536.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, and the trial court rulings it affirmed, may be correct in the final analysis. In the course of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals erred in two respects, requiring that its judgment now be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration.

First, there was evidence that Tyson’s plant manager, who made the disputed hiring decisions, had referred on some occasions to each of the petitioners as “boy.” Petitioners argued this was evidence of discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “[wjhile the use of ‘boy’ when modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of discriminatory intent, the use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.” Id., at 533 (citation omitted). Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the court’s decision is erroneous.

Second, the Court of Appeals erred in articulating the standard for determining whether the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for Tyson’s hiring decisions were pretextual. Petitioners had introduced evidence that their qualifications were superior to those of the two successful applicants. (Part of the employer’s defense was that the plant with the openings had performance problems and petitioners already worked there in a supervisory capacity.) The Court of Appeals, in finding petitioners’ evidence insufficient, cited one of its earlier precedents and stated: “Pretext can be established through comparing qualifications only when ‘the disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F. 3d 695, 732 (CA11 2004)).

Under this Court’s decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 187-188 (1989) (indicating a plaintiff “might seek to demonstrate that respondent’s claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position”), superseded on other grounds by 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 259 (1981) (“The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination”); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 148 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”).

The visual image of words jumping off the page to slap you (presumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and imprecise as an elaboration of the standard for inferring pretext from superior qualifications. Federal courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a decision it cited here, have articulated various other standards, see, e. g., Cooper, supra, at 732 (noting that “disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Road v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F. 3d 1185, 1194 (CA9 2003) (holding that qualifications evidence standing alone may establish pretext where the plaintiff’s qualifications are “ ‘clearly superior’ ” to those of the selected job applicant); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d 1284, 1294 (CADC 1998) (en banc) (concluding the factfinder may infer pretext if “a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job”), and in this case the Court of Appeals qualified its statement by suggesting that superior qualifications may be probative of pretext when combined with other evidence, see 129 Fed. Appx., at 533. This is not the occasion to define more precisely what standard should govern pretext claims based on superior qualifications. Today’s decision, furthermore, should not be read to hold that petitioners’ evidence necessarily showed pretext. The District Court concluded otherwise. It suffices to say here that some formulation other than the test the Court of Appeals articulated in this case would better ensure that trial courts reach consistent results.

The Court of Appeals should determine in the first instance whether the two aspects of its decision here determined to have been mistaken were essential to its holding. On these premises, certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Per Curiam. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens,

text:
    LANCE et al. v. DENNIS, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE
    No. 05-555.
    Decided February 21, 2006
   Per Curiam.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by “state-court losers” challenging “state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284 (2005). In this case, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit on the ground that they were in privity with a state-court loser. We hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the plaintiffs from proceeding, and vacate the District Court’s judgment.

I

This is the latest of several rounds of litigation involving the State of Colorado’s congressional redistricting after the 2000 census, under which the State gained a seat in the House of Representatives. Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121 (2005). The first round began in May 2001. When the Colorado General Assembly failed to pass a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elections by the close of its regular session, a group of Colorado voters asked the state courts to create a plan. The courts agreed, drawing a new map reflecting the additional district. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P. 3d 642 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). The 2002 elections were held using this court-ordered plan.

The General Assembly passed its own redistricting plan in the spring of 2003, prompting further litigation — this time about which electoral map was to govern, the legislature’s or the courts’. Two suits were filed seeking to enjoin the legislature’s plan: an original action in the Colorado Supreme Court by the state attorney general seeking to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and a similar action brought in a lower state court by several proponents of the court-ordered plan. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1121. After the Colorado General Assembly intervened to defend its plan in the first case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the plan violated Article V, §44, of the State Constitution, which the court construed to limit congressional redistricting to “once per decade.” People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221, 1231 (2003) (en banc). It therefore ordered the secretary of state to use the court-created plan. We denied certiorari. 541 U. S. 1093 (2004).

The second suit Was removed to federal court by the defendants on the basis of the plaintiffs’ federal-law claims. See Keller v. Davidson, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1175 (Colo. 2004). Once Salazar was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, the viability of the defendants’ coimterclaims was the only remaining issue. A three-judge District Court held that the defendants were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from amending their counterclaims to assert additional challenges to the decision in Salazar. It also held that the defendants’ original coimterclaims, while not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, were precluded under Colorado law. by the judgment in Salazar. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.

Finally, this suit: Before the dismissal in Keller, several Colorado citizens unhappy with Salazar filed an action in the District Court seeking to require the secretary of state to use the legislature’s plan. The plaintiffs argued that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of Article I, §4, of the U. S. Constitution (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof”), and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging . .. the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Colorado preclusion law barred any attack on the Colorado Supreme Court’s judgment in Salazar and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a valid Petition Clause claim.

The three-judge District Court ruled that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it had no jurisdiction to hear the Elections Clause claim. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1127. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court explained, includes three requirements: (1) “[T]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party to the prior state-court judgment or have been in privity with such a party”; (2) “the claim raised in the federal suit must have been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment”; and (3) “the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-court claim.” 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1124. The District Court found the first requirement satisfied on the ground that the citizen-plaintiffs were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly — a losing party in Salazar. Relying on our decisions in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979), and Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320 (1958), the court stated that “when a state government litigates a matter of public concern, that state’s citizens will be deemed to be in privity with the government for preclusion purposes.” 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125. This principle, the court reasoned, applies “with equal force in the Rooker-Feldman context.” Ibid. The court went on to conclude that the Elections Clause claim was actually raised in Salazar, or inextricably intertwined with that decision, and was not parallel to the claims presented in Salazar. As to the Petition Clause claim, the court ruled that neither Rooker-Feldman nor Colorado preclusion law prevented the court from proceeding to the merits, but that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1132; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).

The plaintiffs appealed. See 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We now note jurisdiction, and address whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the plaintiffs from proceeding because they were in privity with a party in Salazar. We conclude it does not, and vacate the judgment of the District Court.

II

This Court is vested, under 28 U. S. C. § 1257, with jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments. We have held that this grant of jurisdiction is exclusive: “Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court.” District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 482 (1988) (emphasis added); see also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416 (1923). Accordingly, under what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the only two cases in which we have applied this rule to find that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction. In Rooker, a party who had lost in the Indiana Supreme Court, and failed to obtain review in this Court, filed an action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the state-court judgment. We viewed the action as tantamount to an appeal of the Indiana Supreme Court decision, over which only this Court had jurisdiction, and said that the “aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do directly.” 263 U. S., at 416. Feldman, decided 60 years later, concerned slightly different circumstances, with similar results. The plaintiffs there had been refused admission to the District of Columbia bar by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and sought review of these decisions in Federal District Court. Our decision held that to the extent plaintiffs challenged the Court of Appeals decisions themselves — as opposed to the bar admission rules promulgated nonjudicially by the Court of Appeals — their sole avenue of review was with this Court. 460 U. S., at 476.

Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U. S., at 292 (Rooker-Feldman does not apply to parallel state and federal litigation); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002) (Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency”); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar actions by a nonparty to the earlier state suit). Indeed, during that period, “this Court has never applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction.” Exxon Mobil, supra, at 287.

In Exxon Mobil, decided last Term, we warned that the lower courts have at times extended Rooker-Feldman “far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1738.” 544 U. S., at 283. Rooker-Feldman, we explained, is a narrow doctrine, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 544 U. S., at 284.

Although we have never addressed the precise question before us, we have held Rooker-Feldman inapplicable where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding. See De Grandy, supra, at 1006. In De Grandy, the State of Florida sought, using Rooker-Feldman, to prevent the United States from bringing a challenge under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the reapportionment of state electoral districts. The Florida Supreme Court, in an action initiated by the state attorney general, had already declared the law valid under state and federal law. We held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the United States from bringing its own action in federal court because the United States “was not a party in the state court,” and “was in no position to ask this Court to review the state court’s judgment and has not directly attacked it in this proceeding.” 512 U. S., at 1006.

In the case before us, the plaintiffs were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding in Salazar. Salazar was an action brought by the state attorney general against the secretary of state, in which the Colorado General Assembly intervened. 79 P. 3d, at 1227. The four citizen-plaintiffs here did not participate in Salazar, and were not in a “position to ask this Court to review the state court’s judgment.” De Grandy, supra, at 1006; see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77 (1987) (“[T]he general rule [is] that one who is not a party or has not been treated as a party to a judgment has no right to appeal therefrom”).

Although the District Court recognized the “general rule” that “Rooker-Feldman may not be invoked against a federal-court plaintiff who was not actually a party to the prior state-court judgment,” 379 P. Supp. 2d, at 1123, it nevertheless followed Tenth Circuit precedent in allowing application of Rooker-Feldman against parties who were in privity with a party to the earlier state-court action, 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123 (citing Kenmen Eng. v. Union, 314 F. 3d 468, 481 (2002)). In determining whether privity existed, the court looked to cases concerning the preclusive effect that state courts are required to give federal-court judgments. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125 (citing Washington, 443 U. S., at 693, n. 32; Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S., at 340-341). It concluded that — for Rooker-Feldman as well as preclusion purposes — “the outcome of the government’s litigation over a matter of public concern binds its citizens.” 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125.

The District Court erroneously conflated preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman. Whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules, Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name. The doctrine applies only in “limited circumstances,” Exxon Mobil, supra, at 291, where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.

A more expansive Rooker-Feldman rule would tend to supplant Congress’ mandate, under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, that federal courts “ ‘give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.’” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U. S. 222,246 (1998) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 466 (1982)); see Exxon Mobil, supra, at 293. Congress has directed federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments. Incorporation of preclusion principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act.

* * *

The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Ginsburg,

with whom Justice Souter joins,

concurring.

I agree in full with the Court’s correction of the District Court’s Rooker-Feldman error, and therefore join the Court’s opinion. Although Justice Stevens has persuasively urged that issue preclusion warrants affirmance, see post, at 468-469 (dissenting opinion), that question of Colorado law seems to me best left for full airing and decision on remand.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Rooker and Feldman are strange bedfellows. Rooker, a unanimous, three-page opinion written by Justice Van Devanter in 1923, correctly applied the simple legal proposition that only this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416. Feldman, a nonunanimous, 25-page opinion written by Justice Brennan in 1983, was incorrectly decided and generated a plethora of confusion and debate among scholars and judges. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 Ú. S. 462; id., at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Last Term, in Justice Ginsburg’s lucid opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280 (2005), the Court finally interred the so-called “Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” And today, the Court quite properly disapproves of the District Court’s resuscitation of a doctrine that has produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.

My disagreement with the majority arises not from what it actually decides, but from what it fails to address. Even though the District Court mistakenly believed it had no jurisdiction to hear this matter, its judgment dismissing the cause with prejudice was correct and should be affirmed. See Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1132 (Colo. 2005). The Elections Clause claim . advanced by citizen-appellants in this case is the same as that advanced by their official representatives and decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221, 1231-1232 (2003). See 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1126. As appellee points out, appellants’ second question presented “is literally the same question presented by the General Assembly on certiorari review (and denied) in Salazar.” Motion to Affirm 12. And, as a matter of Colorado law, appellants are clearly in privity with both then-Colorado Attorney General Salazar, who brought the suit on behalf of the people of Colorado, and the Colorado General Assembly, which was also a party to the Salazar litigation. See McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 322, 74 P. 2d 99, 102 (1937) (en banc) (finding privity between taxpayers seeking to challenge the validity of a bond issue and a public official “charged with ministerial and executive duties in connection” with the issuance of the bonds who already brought such a suit); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Board of County Comm’rs of County of Fremont, 95 Colo. 435, 441, 37 P. 2d 761, 764 (1934) (en banc) (explaining that taxpayers are in privity with a political division of the State or its official representative if the case involves “a matter of general interest to all the people”). Thus, all of the requirements under Colorado law for issue preclusion have been met, and appellants’ Elections Clause claim should therefore be dismissed. See generally 28 U. S. C. § 1738; Michaelson v. Michaelson, 884 P. 2d 695, 700-701 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (setting forth requirements for issue preclusion under Colorado law).

Appellants’ spurious Petition Clause claim was also properly dismissed by the District Court. See 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1130-1132. Nothing in the Colorado Constitution prevents appellants from petitioning the Colorado General Assembly with their grievances, id., at 1131; nothing in the United States Constitution guarantees that such a petition will be effective, Smith v. Highway Employees, 441 U. S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam); see also Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U. S. 271,285 (1984). Moreover, as the District Court recognized, appellants’ interpretation of the Petition Clause would lead to absurd results. See 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1131-1132. As such, appellants’ Petition Clause claim was correctly dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See generally Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).

For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.

       Although the secretary of state defended the legislature’s plan in Salazar, following that decision she agreed to defend the court-ordered plan in this litigation and to allow the state attorney general to represent her. 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122, n. 3 (Colo. 2005).

       In holding that Rooker-Feldman does not bar the plaintiffs here from proceeding, we need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state proceeding — e. g., where an estate takes a de facto appeal in a district court of an earlier state decision involving the decedent.

       Our holding also disposes of the claim, which the District Court did not reach, that plaintiffs were barred by Rooker-Feldman because they were in privity with the secretary of state, the other losing party in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). We do not pass on the District Court’s resolution of the merits of the plaintiffs’ Petition Clause claim.

       See, e. g., Comment, Collateral Estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The Problematic Effect These Preclusion and Jurisdictional Principles Have on Bankruptcy Law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 579 (2005); Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1555 (2001); Proctor, Wirth, & Spencer, Rooker-Feldman and the Jurisdictional Quandary, 2 Fla. Coastal L. J. 113 (2000); Rowley, Tenth Circuit Survey, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78 Denver U. L. Rev. 321 (2000); Symposium, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (1999); Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Semi

        nole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 161 (1998); Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Principles of Federalism and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bates v. Jones, 131 F. 3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 881 (1998); Schmucker, Possible Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 17 J. Nat. Assn. Admin. L. Judges 333 (1997); Casenote, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 627 (1987); Comment, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 767 (1986).


author: Justice Scalia

text:
    DOMINO’S PIZZA, INC., et al. v. McDONALD
    No. 04-593.
    Argued December 6, 2005
    Decided February 22, 2006

      Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Auto, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs was J. Scott Ballenger.

      Allen Lichtenstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David T Goldberg, Eric Schnapper, and Pamela S. Karlan.

       Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, by Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, Phill Kline of Kansas, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Rob McKenna of Washington; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Robert J. Costagliola; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by John H. Findley and Paul J. Beard II.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Hdlligan, Solicitor General, Michelle Aronowitz,- Deputy Solicitor General, and Shaifali Puri and Benjamin N. Gutman, Assistant Solicitors General, by Kerry E. Drue, Acting Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike McGrath of Montana, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Thomas S. Martin, Barbara R. Am-wine, Sarah C. Crawford, Trida G. Jefferson, Jennifer K Brown, Theodore M. Shaw, Jacqueline A Berrien, Norman J. Chachkin, and Robert Strowp.

   Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide whether a plaintiff who lacks any rights under an existing contractual relationship with the defendant, and who has not been prevented from entering into such a contractual relationship, may bring suit under Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42U.S. C. §1981.

I

Respondent John McDonald, a black man, is the sole shareholder and president of JWM Investments, Inc. (JWM), a corporation organized under Nevada law. He sued petitioners (collectively Domino’s) in the District Court for the District of Nevada, claiming violations of § 1981. The allegations of the complaint, which for present purposes we assume to be true, were as follows.

JWM and Domino’s entered into several contracts under which JWM was to construct four restaurants in the Las Vegas aréa, which would be leased to Domino’s. After the first restaurant was completed, Domino’s agent Debbie Pear refused to execute the estoppel certificates for JWM required by the contracts to facilitate JWM’s bank financing. The relationship between the parties further deteriorated when Pear persuaded the Las Vegas Valley Water District to change its records to show Domino’s, rather than JWM, as the owner of the land JWM had acquired for restaurant construction. McDonald had to go to the Water District to prove JWM’s ownership of the land. In the course of what were apparently many and fruitless discussions between McDonald and Pear, McDonald “explained that he intended to see [the contracts] through to completion,” even though Pear made clear that unless he agreed to back out of the contractual relationship, he would suffer serious consequences. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12-13. At one point Pear said to McDonald, “ 1 don’t like dealing with you people anyway,’ ” refusing to specify what she meant by “ ‘you people.’ ” Id., at 13. Pear threatened to use Domino’s attorneys to “bury” McDonald if he should sue. Ibid. The contracts'between Domino’s and JWM ultimately remained uncompleted.

At least in part because of the failed contracts, JWM filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trustee for JWM’s bankruptcy estate initiated an adversary proceeding against Domino’s for breach of contract. For whatever reason, the trustee chose not to assert a § 1981 claim alleging Domino’s interference with JWM’s right to make and enforce contracts. The breach-of-contract claim was settled for $45,000, and JWM gave Domino’s a complete release. Consequently, no further claims arising out of the same episode could be pursued on JWM’s behalf. While the bankruptcy proceedings were still ongoing, McDonald filed the present §1981 claim against Domino’s in his personal capacity.

The gravamen of McDonald’s complaint was that Domino’s had broken its contracts with JWM because of racial animus toward McDonald, and that the breach had harmed McDonald personally by causing him “to suffer monetary damages and damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation.” Id., at 16. The complaint demanded that Domino’s discharge its “obligations under the contracts which McDonald would have received, but for the discriminatory practices, including, but not limited to front pay, back pay and other lost benefits,” as well as “compensatory damages for pecuniary losses, including pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental anguish, and humiliation,” and punitive damages. Id., at 17.

Domino’s filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. It asserted that McDonald could bring no § 1981 claim against Domino’s because McDonald was party to no contract with Domino’s. The District Court granted the motion. It noted that Domino’s had “rel[ied] on the basic proposition that a corporation is a separate legal entity from its stockholders and officers,” id., at 6, and concluded that a corporation may have “standing to assert a §1981 claim” but that “a president or sole shareholder may not step into the shoes of the corporation and assert that claim personally,” id., at 7 (citing Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., 295 F. 3d 1065, 1072-1073 (CA10 2002)).

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It agreed that an “injury suffered only by the corporation” would not permit a shareholder to bring a § 1981 action. 107 Fed. Appx. 18 (2004). But relying on its earlier decision in Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hospital of San Jose, 698 F. 2d 1019, 1021-1022 (1983), the Ninth Circuit concluded that when there are “injuries distinct from that of the corporation,” a nonparty like McDonald may nonetheless bring suit under § 1981. 107 Fed. Appx., at 18-19. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this approach set it apart from other Circuits. Ibid. We granted certiorari. 544 U. S. 998 (2005).

hH

Among the many statutes that combat racial discrimination, § 1981, originally § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, has a specific function: It protects the equal right of “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States” to “make and enforce contracts” without respect to race. 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a). The statute currently defines “make and enforce contracts” to “inelud[e] the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” § 1981(b).

McDonald argues that the statute must be read to give him a cause of action because he “made and enforced contracts” for JWM. On his reading of the text, “[i]f Domino’s refused to deal with the salesman for a pepperoni manufacturer because the salesman was black, that would violate the section 1981 right of the salesman to make a contract on behalf of his principal.” Brief for Respondent 12. We think not. The right to “make contracts” guaranteed by the statute was not the insignificant right to act as an agent for someone else’s contracting — any more than it was the insignificant right to act as amanuensis in writing out the agreement, and thus to “make” the contract in that sense. Rather, it was the right — denied in some States to blacks, as it was denied at common law to children — to give and receive contractual rights on one’s own behalf Common usage alone is enough to establish this, but the text of the statute makes this common meaning doubly clear by speaking of the right to “make and enforce” contracts. When the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was drafted, it was well known that “[i]n general a mere agent, who has no beneficial interest in a contract which he has made on behalf of his principal, cannot support an action thereon.” 1 S. Livermore, A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent 215 (1818).

Any claim brought under § 1981, therefore, must initially identify an impaired “contractual relationship,” § 1981(b), under which the plaintiff has rights. Such a contractual relationship need not already exist, because § 1981 protects the would-be contractor along with those who already have made contracts. We made this clear in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), which subjected defendants to liability under § 1981 when, for racially motivated reasons, they prevented individuals who “sought to enter into contractual relationships” from doing so, id., at 172 (emphasis added). We have never retreated from what should be obvious from reading the text of the statute: Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.

Absent the requirement that the plaintiff himself must have rights under the contractual relátionship, § 1981 would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody’s contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded — or rather, peculiarly bounded — way. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 176 (1989); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42, 44, n. 2 (1984); General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 396 (1982).

Nor has Congress indicated that we should. We held in Patterson that the prior version of § 1981 did “not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations.” 491 U. S., at 171. In 1991, Congress amended the statute, see 105 Stat. 1071, adding § 1981(b), which defines “make and enforce” to bring postformation conduct, including discriminatory termination, within the scope of § 1981. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004). But while Congress revised Patterson’s, exclusion of postformation conduct, it let stand Patterson’s focus upon contract obligations. In fact, it positively reinforced that element by including in the new § 1981(b) reference to a “contractual relationship.”

McDonald’s complaint does identify a contractual relationship, the one between Domino’s and JWM. But it is fundamental corporation and agency law — indeed, it can be said to be the whole purpose of corporation and agency law — that the shareholder and contracting officer of a corporation has no rights and is exposed to no liability under the corporation’s contracts. McDonald now makes light of the law of corporations and of agency — arguing, for instance, that because he “negotiated, signed, performed, and sought to enforce the contract,” Domino’s was wrong to “insist that [the contract] somehow was not his ‘own.’ ” Brief for Respondent 4. This novel approach to the law contradicts McDonald’s own experience. Domino’s filed a proof of claim against JWM during its corporate bankruptcy; it did not proceed against McDonald personally. The corporate form and the rules of agency protected his personal assets, even though he “negotiated, signed, performed, and sought to enforce” contracts for JWM. The corporate form and the rules of agency similarly deny him rights under those contracts.

As an alternative to ignoring corporation and agency law, McDonald proposes a new test for § 1981 standing: Any person who is an “actual target” of discrimination, and who loses some benefit that would otherwise have inured to him had a contract not been impaired, may bring a suit. Under this theory, an individual is the “actual target” if he was the reason a defendant chose to impair its contractual relationship with a third party. McDonald’s formulation simply ignores the explicit statutory requirement that the plaintiff be the “perso[n]” whose “right... to make and enforce contracts,” § 1981(a), was “impaired],” § 1981(c), on account of race. It is just the statutory construction we have always rejected.

McDonald points to several of our prior cases involving plaintiffs whose status as contracting parties was unclear. Because they nonetheless prevailed, McDonald reasons, contractual privity cannot be a sine qua non of a § 1981 claim. In those cases, however, we did not discuss, much less decide, the privity question. In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U. S. 615 (1987), we decided the narrow question whether Jews are a separate and protected race under § 1982. Id., at 618. Similarly, in Runyon, supra, the arguments and the opinion addressed “only two basic questions: whether §1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitutional as so applied.” Id., at 168 (footnote omitted). And in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656 (1987), we decided only the two contested issues: that § 1981 was subject to the state personal injury limitations period, id., at 660-664, and that it violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 1981 for a union to decline to press black employees’ grievances under the governing collective-bargaining agreement, id., at 669. “The Court often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions, and such assumptions — even on jurisdictional issues — are not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 272 (1990) (citations omitted).

McDonald resorts finally to policy arguments. Unless his reading of the statute prevails, he warns, many discriminatory acts will go unpunished. Corporations, for instance, may choose not to bring suit for the racially motivated contract breach. It is not likely to be a common occurrence that the victim of a contract breach will forgo a potent available remedy. Injured parties “usually will be the best proponents of their own rights,” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion). And if and when “the holders of those rights ... do not wish to assert them,” id., at 113-114, third parties are not normally entitled to step into their shoes. Moreover, §1981 is only one of a multitude of civil rights statutes. Many of McDonald’s hypothetical examples of unpunished discrimination would in fact be reachable under Title VII — or even under general criminal law. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 27 (concerning a scenario in which “Domino’s officials had beaten up McDonald in an attempt to intimidate him”). The most important response, however, is that nothing in the text of §1981 suggests that it was meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice. If so, it would not have been limited to situations involving contracts. Trying to make it a cure-all not only goes beyond any expression of congressional intent but would produce satellite § 1981 litigation of immense scope. McDonald’s theory would permit class actions by all the minority employees of the nonbreaching party to a broken contract (or, for that matter, minority employees of any company failing to receive a contract award), alleging that the reason for the breach (or •for the refusal to contract) was racial animus against them.

Consistent with our prior case law, and as required by the plain text of the statute, we hold that a plaintiff cannot state a claim under §1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes “to make and enforce.” Section 1981 plaintiffs must identify injuries flowing from a racially motivated breach of their own contractual relationship, not of someone else’s. Because the District Court correctly recognized and applied these principles, the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing its judgment.

* * *

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is accordingly

Reversed.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       Since JWM settled its claims-and is not involved in this case, we have no occasion to determine whether, as a corporation, it could have brought suit under § 1981. We note, however, that the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have concluded that corporations may raise § 1981 claims. See, e. g., Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F. 2d 702, 706 (CA2 1982).

       McDonald’s “pepperoni salesman” analogy is imprecise. It would better parallel the facts here if the analogy had been to a salesman unable to collect on accounts receivable because he was black, rather than to one who was unable to make the contract in the first place. The fundamental point, however, is the same: An individual seeking to make or enforce a contract under which he has rights will have a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, while one seeking to make or enforce a contract under which someone else has rights will not.

       We say “under which the plaintiff has rights” rather than “to which the plaintiff is a party” because we do not mean to exclude the possibility that a third-party intended beneficiary of a contract may have rights under § 1981. See, e. g., 2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304, p. 448 (1979) (“A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty”). Neither do we mean to affirm that possibility. See, e. g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Until relatively recent times, the third-party beneficiary was generally regarded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it”). The issue is not before us here, McDonald having made no such claim.

       McDonald also argues in his merits brief (for the first time) that we should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment because Domino’s interfered with McDonald’s own contracts with JWM. Counsel for McDonald asserted at oral argument that this contention is not a new argument (see this Court’s Rule 15.2), but is a “sort of formulatio[n] of the same argument” that he had properly raised. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. As such, it fails for the same reasons that the argument fails in its original incarnation. McDonald acknowledges that JWM did not breach any contractual obligation to him, see Brief for Respondent 44, and so any injury he may have received still derived from impairment of the contractual relationship between JWM and Domino’s, under which McDonald has no rights.


author: Justice Kennedy Justice Thomas,

text:
    DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al.
    No. 04-848.
    Argued November 7, 2005
    Decided February 22, 2006

      Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 492. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      James R. Radmore argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael T Kirkpatrick.

      Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Robert D. Kamenshine, Mary Anne Gibbons, Lori J. Dym, and Stephan J. Boardman.

         Harold Krent, Daniel J Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Each day, according to the Government’s submissions here, the United States Postal Service delivers some 660 million pieces of mail to as many as 142 million delivery points. This case involves one such delivery point — petitioner Barbara Dolan’s porch — where mail left by postal employees allegedly caused her to trip and fall. Claiming injuries as a result, Dolan filed a claim for administrative relief from the Postal Service. When her claim was denied, she and her husband (whose claim for loss of consortium the Dolans later conceded was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that the Postal Service’s negligent placement of mail at their home subjected the Government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The District Court dismissed Dolan’s suit, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 377 F. 3d 285 (2004). Both courts concluded that, although the FTCA generally waives sovereign immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s claims were barred by an exception to that waiver, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b). We disagree and hold that Dolan’s suit may proceed.

I

Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., the Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States,” §201. Holding a monopoly over carriage of letters, the Postal Service has “significant governmental powers,” including the power of eminent domain, the authority to make searches and seizures in the enforcement of laws protecting the mails, the authority to promulgate postal regulations, and, subject to the Secretary of State’s supervision, the power to enter international postal agreéments. See Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U. S. 736, 741 (2004) (discussing 39 U. S. C. §§ 101, 401, 407, 601-606). Consistent with this status, the Postal Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver. See ibid.; cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit”).

Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally “waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued in its official name/ ” Flamingo Industries, supra, at 741 (quoting 39 U. S. C. §401(1)), the statute also provides that the FTCA “shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service,” § 409(c).

The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in two different sections of the United States Code. The first confers federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of cases involving negligence committed by federal employees in the course of their employment. This jurisdictional grant covers:

“claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1).

As to claims falling within this jurisdictional grant, the FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” though not “for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” § 2674; see generally United States v. Olson, ante, at 44.

The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the exceptions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The 13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2680, and the relevant subsection for our purposes, pertaining to postal operations, is § 2680(b). It states:

“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”

As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal employees commit torts under local law, but not for claims defined by this exception.

This was the provision relied upon by the District Court and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Raila v. United States, 355 F. 3d 118, 121 (2004). We granted certiorari. 544 U. S. 998 (2005).

II

We assume that under the applicable state law a person injured by tripping over a package or bundle of papers negligently left on the porch of a residence by a private party would have a cause of action for damages. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether, when mail left by the Postal Service causes the slip and fall, the § 2680(b) exception for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” preserves sovereign immunity despite the FTCA’s more general statements of waiver.

If considered in isolation, the phrase “negligent transmission” could embrace a wide range of negligent acts committed by the Postal Service in the course of delivering mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from leaving packets and parcels on the porch of a residence. After all, in ordinary meaning and usage, transmission of the mail is not complete until it arrives at the destination. See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2429 (1971) (defining “transmission” as “an act, process, or instance of transmitting” and “transmit” as “to cause to go or be conveyed to another person or place”). In large part this inference— transmission includes delivery — led the District Court and Court of Appeals to rule for the Government. See 377 F. 3d, at 288; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-6a. The definition of words in isolation, however, is not necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis. Here, we conclude both context and precedent require a narrower reading, so that “negligent transmission” does not go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address. See Raila, supra, at 121 (holding the postal exception covers “damages and delay of the postal material itself and consequential damages therefrom”). The phrase does not comprehend all negligence occurring in the course of mail delivery.

Starting with context, the words “negligent transmission” in §2680(b) follow two other terms, “loss” and “miscarriage.” Those terms, we think, limit the reach of “transmission.” “[A] word is known by the company it keeps” — a rule that “is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[Wjords grouped in a list should be given related meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as both parties acknowledge, mail is “lost” if it is destroyed or misplaced and “miscarried” if it goes to the wrong address. Since both those terms refer to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if “negligent transmission” swept far more broadly to include injuries like those alleged here— injuries that happen to be caused by postal employees but involve neither failure to transmit mail nor damage to its contents.

Our interpretation would be less secure were it not for a precedent we deem to have decisive weight here. We refer to Kosak v. United States, 466 U. S. 848 (1984). In Kosak, an art collector alleged in an FTCA suit that artworks he owned were damaged when the United States Customs Service seized and detained them. Id., at 849-850. The question was whether the Government retained immunity based on § 2680(c), a provision that has since been amended but at the time covered:

“[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” Id., at 852, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In its opinion concluding the exception did apply and thus that the United States retained sovereign immunity, the Court gave specific consideration to the postal exception. In a part of the opinion central to its holding, the Court contrasted what it called the “generality of § 2680(c)” with the “specificity of § 2680(b),” id., at 855. The Court observed:

“One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault. In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility — namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’ — thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).

In the present case neither party suggests Kosak’s conclusion regarding negligent operation of postal motor vehicles should be ignored as dictum. In light of Kosak’s discussion, we cannot interpret the phrase “negligent transmission” in § 2680(b) to cover all negligence in the course of mail delivery. Although postal trucks may well be delivering — and thus transmitting — mail when they collide with other vehicles, Kosak indicates the United States, nonetheless, retains no immunity.

Séeking to distinguish postal auto accidents from Dolan’s fall, the Government argues that negligent driving relates only circumstantially to the mail, whereas Dolan’s accident was caused by the mail itself. Nothing in the statutory text supports this distinction. Quite the contrary, if placing mail so as to create a slip-and-fall risk constitutes “negligent transmission,” the same should be true of driving postal trucks in a manner that endangers others on the road. In both cases the postal employee acts negligently while transmitting mail. In addition, as the Second Circuit recognized and as the Government acknowledged at oral argument, focusing on whether the mail itself caused the injury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on whether a mail sack causing a slip-and-fall was empty or full, or whether a pedestrian sideswiped by a passing truck was hit by the side-view mirror or a dangling parcel. See Raila, 355 P. 3d, at 122-123.

We think it more likely that Congress intendedrto retain immunity, as a general rule, only for injuries arising, directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address. Illustrative instances of the exception’s operation, then, would be personal or financial harms arising from nondelivery or late delivery of sensitive materials or information (e. g., medicines or a mortgage foreclosure notice) or from negligent handling of a mailed parcel (e. g., shattering of shipped china). Such harms, after all, are the sort primarily identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail throughout the United States.

Resisting this conclusion, the Government emphasizes the Postal Service’s vast operations — the 660 million daily mailings and 142 million delivery points mentioned at the outset. See Brief for Respondents 36. As delivery to mailboxes and doorsteps is essential to this nationwide undertaking, Congress must have intended, the Government asserts, to insulate delivery-related torts from liability. If, however, doorstep delivery is essential to the postal enterprise, then driving postal trucks is no less so. And in any event, while it is true “[t]he § 2680 exceptions are designed to protect certain important governmental functions and prerogatives from disruption,” Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992), the specificity of § 2680(b), see Kosak, supra, at 855, indicates that Congress did not intend to immunize all postal activities.

Other FTCA exceptions paint with a far broader brush. They cover, for example: “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(i); “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,” §2680(j); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” §2680(k); “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(Z), or “the Panama Canal Company,” §2680(m); and “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” § 2680(n). Had Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts related to postal delivery— torts including hazardous mail placement at customer homes — it could have used similarly sweeping language in § 2680(b). By instead “carefully delineat[ing]” just three types’ of harm (loss, miscarriage, and negligent transmission), see Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855, Congress expressed the intent to immunize only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course of mail delivery.

Further supporting our interpretation, losses of the type for which immunity is retained under § 2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insurance. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual 609.1.1 (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/ 609.htm (as visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s ease file) (allowing indemnity claims for loss or damage of “insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with postal insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR § 111.1 (2005) (incorporating by reference the Domestic Mail Manual). The same was true when Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946. See 39 U. S. C. §245 (1940 ed. and Supp. V) (setting rates and conditions for mail insurance); §381 (1946 ed.) (“For the greater security of valuable mail matter the Postmaster General may establish a uniform system of registration, and as a part of such system he may provide rules under which the senders or owners of any registered matter shall be indemnified for loss, rifling, or damage thereof in the mails . . . ”). As Kosak explains, one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available,” 465 U. S., at 858 — an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and insurance. While the Government suggests other injuries falling outside the FTCA'are also subject to administrative relief, even assuming that is true, the provision the Government cites permits only discretionary relief, not an automatic remedy like postal insurance. See 39 U. S. C. § 2603 (indicating the Postal Service “may adjust and settle” personal-injury and property-damage claims “not cognizable” under the FTCA’s administrative relief provision); see also 31 U. S. C. §224c (1940 ed.) (indicating that “[w]hen any damage is done to person or property by or through the operation of the Post Office Department .. . the Postmaster General is invested with power to adjust and settle any claim for such damage when his award for such damage in any case does not exceed $500”); Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 424(a), 60 Stat. 846-847 (repealing §224c as to negligence claims cognizable under the FTCA).

The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-and-fall claims inundating the Postal Service. It is true that, in addition to other considerations we have identified, Kosak describes “avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims” as a principal aim of the FTCA exceptions, 465 U. S., at 858. Slip-and-fall liability, however, to the extent state tort law imposes it, is a risk shared by any business that makes home deliveries. Given that “negligent transmission,” viewed in context and in light of Kosak, cannot sweep as broadly as the Government claims, ordinary protections against frivolous litigation must suffice here, just as they do in the case of motor vehicle collisions.

Finally, it should be noted that this case does not implicate the general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity .will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). As Kosak explains, this principle is “unhelpful” in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute,” 465 U. S., at 853, n. 9, which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 547 (1951); see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing “[w]e have on occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity where that was consistent with Congress’ clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping language’ of the [FTCA]” (quoting Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 547)). Hence, “the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception’ — no less and no more.” Kosak, supra, at 853, n. 9 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). Having made that inquiry here, we conclude Dolan’s claims fall outside § 2680(b).

* * *

The postal exception is inapplicable, and Dolan’s claim falls within the FTCÁ’s general waiver of federal sovereign immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Thomas,

dissenting.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Government’s sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking money damages

“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1),

save several exceptions found in §2680. As relevant here, Congress reserved to the Government its sovereign immunity respecting “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” § 2680(b) (postal exception).

Petitioner Barbara Dolan claims to have suffered personal injuries when she tripped over letters, packages, and periodicals that an employee of the United States Postal Service (Postal Service) negligently left on her porch. Today, the Court concludes that Dolan’s lawsuit may proceed because her claim does not fall within the exception. I disagree. Dolan’s claim arises out of the Postal Service’s “negligent transmission” of mail and is thus covered by the terms of the postal exception. Even if the exception is ambiguous, this Court’s cases require that ambiguities as to the scope of the Government’s waiver of immunity be resolved in its favor. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I

The text of the postal exception, and every term therein, should be ascribed its ordinary meaning. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 477 (1994) (noting that we interpret a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning when that term is not defined in the statute). The term in controversy here is “negligent transmission.” The crux of my disagreement with the majority is its failure to assign the term “transmission” its plain meaning. That term is defined as the “[a]ct, operation, or process, of transmitting.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2692 (2d ed. 1934, as republished 1945). “Transmit” is defined as, inter alia, “[t]o send or transfer from one person or place to another; to forward by rail, post, wire, etc., . . . [t]o cause ... to pass or be conveyed.” Id., at 2692-2693. There is no cause to conclude that Congress was unaware of the ordinary definition of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” when it enacted the FTCA and the postal exception in 1946. Nor is there textual indication that Congress intended to deviate from the ordinary meaning of these terms. Accordingly, I would interpret the term “transmission” consistent with its ordinary meaning, see ante, at 486, and conclude that the postal exception exempts the Government from liability for any claim arising out of the negligent delivery of the mail to a Postal Service patron, including Dolan’s slip-and-fall claim.

Rejecting the “ordinary meaning and usage” of “negligent transmission,” the majority concludes that the term covers only injury arising “directly or consequentially” from “negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address.” Ante, at 486, 489. Thus, in the majority’s view, “negligent transmission” covers direct injury to the mail as well as personal injury arising from injury to the mail, but does not cover personal injury that does not arise from damage to the mail. For example, in the majority’s view, if a mail carrier negligently drops a box containing glassware on a patron’s doorstep, causing the contents to shatter, and the patron later injures himself while attempting to handle the shards of glass, the postal exception would bar a claim for damages for the destroyed item as well as a related claim for personal injury. That view is correct, as far as it goes. However, under the majority’s view, if the mail carrier negligently places a heap of mail on a patron’s front porch and the patron trips and falls over the mail as he walks out of his front door, his personal injury claim may go forward. There is no basis in the text for the line drawn by the majority. Indeed, the majority’s view is at odds with the broad language of the postal exception, which expressly applies to “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” § 2680(b) (emphasis added).

The majority rationalizes its view by concluding that the terms “loss” and “miscarriage” necessarily limit the term “transmission.” Ante, at 486. Applying the rule of nosci-tur a sociis — that a word is known by the company it keeps— the majority reasons that because both “loss” and “miscarriage” refer to “failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if ‘negligent transmission’ swept far more broadly.” Ante, at 487. But there is nothing “odd” about interpreting the term “negligent transmission” to encompass more ground than the decidedly narrower terms “loss” and “miscarriage.”

The rule of noscitur a sociis is intended to prevent ascribing to one word a meaning so expansive that it conflicts with other terms of the provision in a manner that gives “‘unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). That rule, however, “does not require [the Court] to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms,” where, as here, nothing in the text demands a more limited construction. Gustafson, supra, at 586 . (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, to read Congress’ use of narrow terms in a list as limiting the meaning of broad terms in the same list “would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined with one word with a more restricted meaning.” 513 U. S., at 587.

Nor does this Court’s opinion in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984), support the majority’s narrow construction of the postal exception. In Kosak, this Court suggested that the postal exception does not apply to suits arising from the negligent handling of motor vehicles by Postal Service employees. Specifically, the Court stated:

“One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents .... In order to ensure that § 2680(b)... did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility — namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’ . . . .” Id., at 855 (emphasis added).

That observation has no import beyond the recognition that the postal exception — whatever its scope may be — was carefully crafted so as not to undermine an undisputed principal purpose of the FTCA — to waive the Government’s immunity for injuries arising from auto accidents. It says nothing further about the acts Congress intended to capture when enacting the postal exception, and, thus, is unremarkable for purposes of construing the exception.

Even if Kosak does inform the outcome in this case, it does not support the majority’s interpretation of “negligent transmission.” As discussed above, the majority does not purport to limit the type of negligent act that may fall under the postal exception; rather it limits the scope of the exception based on the type of consequence that the negligent act causes (damage to the mail, late delivery, etc.). But Kosak's exclusion of the act of negligent driving — regardless of whether the consequence of that act is damage to the mail or injury to a person — from the scope of the postal exception implies, if anything, that the Kosak Court envisioned discrete acts as being covered, independently of the nature of their consequences. See ibid, (excluding “negligent handling of motor vehicles” from the “types of misconduct” for which liability is barred by the postal exception). As such, Kosak does not support an interpretation of “negligent transmission” based upon the type of injury that is caused by the Postal Service’s negligent handling of the mail.

Assuming that the postal exception is ambiguous, as the majority suggests, see ante, at 486-487, settled principles governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity require us to rule in favor of the Government.

A court may only exercise jurisdiction over the Government pursuant to “a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity ... together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 (2003). “[A] waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). These settled legal principles apply not only to the interpretation of the scope of the Government’s waiver of immunity, but also to the interpretation of the scope of any exceptions to that waiver. See ibid, (explaining that, consistent with rules of construction respecting waivers of sovereign immunity, ambiguities created by conditions on and qualifications of the waiver must be strictly construed in favor of sovereign immunity).

Thus, the majority is incorrect to conclude that “this case does not implicate the general rule that ‘a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in.favor of the sovereign.’” Ante, at 491. As this case clearly illustrates, the Government’s amenability to suit can only be ascertained after construing both the waiver of immunity and its exceptions. The well-established rationale for construing a waiver in favor of the sovereign’s immunity, thus, applies with equal force to the construction of an exception to that waiver. Accordingly, even if I were to conclude that the majority’s interpretation of “negligent transmission” were as plausible as my own, I would still resolve this case in favor of the Government’s sovereign immunity as mandated by our canons of construction.

* * *

For these reasons, I would hold that a tort claim for personal injury arising out of negligent delivery of mail to a postal patron is barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b), the postal exception. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       In fact, this reading is supported by Congress’ routine definitional use of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” in both criminal and civil postal statutes to refer to the handling, processing, and delivery of mail to a final destination. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3,1845, ch. 43, § 6,5 Stat. 734 (respecting deputy postmasters authorized “to transmit to any person or place” official letters or packages, free of charge); 18 U. S. C. §§ 1696(b) and (c) (referring to unlawful “transmission” of letters); §§ 1716(b), (c), (d), and (e) (regulating and proscribing “transmission in the mails” of dangerous items (e. g., medicines) except when the “transmission” is “to,” “from,” or “between” specified individuals or entities).

       In an attempt to reconcile Kosak with this case, the majority argues that “one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid ‘extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available,’... an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to [some] claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and insurance.” Ante, at 490-491 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S., at 858). The majority, however, ignores the fact that, in most cases, such insurance covers only the sender, not the recipient, in which case recipients have no means of obtaining compensation for loss or damage to money, gifts, heirlooms, valuable papers, delayed medicine, or time-sensitive documents. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual 609.4.3(f) and (ae), pp. 1129,1130 (rev. Jan. 6, 2005). ■ The majority’s justification also fails to take into account the fact that postal patrons cannot insure against the loss of items of sentimental value. See 609.4.3, generally. With a more accurate depiction of registration and insurance coverage in hand, the Government’s claim that, like injuries arising from negligent transmission of mail, other injuries outside the reach of the FTCA are also amenable to administrative relief is not so easily dismissed. Ante, at 491. Specifically, 39 U. S. C. §2603, as the Government argues, provides for the settlement of claims, within the discretion of the United States, for injuries caused by the Postal Service that are not otherwise cognizable, which would include claims like Dolan’s. The discretionary nature of such settlements does not alter the fact that §2603 undermines the Court’s position that the purported unavailability of administrative recovery for claims such as Dolan’s supports its proposed interpretation.

       There is no canon of construction that counsels in favor of construing the ambiguity against the Government. Although we have “on occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity,” we have done so in eases where Congress plainly waived the Government’s immunity for the particular claim at issue, and the only question before the Court was the permissibility of the form of the suit. United, States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30,34 (1992) (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951), and United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949)). In cases where, as here, the question whether a particular claim is subject to an exception is disputed, we have construed FTCA exceptions broadly to preclude claims for actions Congress intended to except from the FTCA’s general waiver of immunity. See Dalekite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953); United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807 (1976); Kosah v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984).