text:
    No. 72-1452.
    Ownby v. United States.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 72-1464.
    Van Vliet v. LeBosquet.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1466.
    Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Williams et al.
   C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1467.
    Perrerra et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1468.
    Wilson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1471.
    American Dairy Assn. et al. v. Rasmussen.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-5432.
    Brown v. Joseph.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6115.
    Jackson v. Zelker, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6231.
    Guthrie v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6233.
    Kennedy v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6286.
    Nelson v. Moore, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6316.
    Burbank v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6365.
    Conklin v. Gasaway, Trustee.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6372.
    McLeod v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6379.
    Saunders v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6401.
    Evans v. Johnson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6455.
    Owens v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6490.
    Montgomery v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6498.
    Jackson v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6507.
    Irons v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6511.
    Woods v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6512.
    Judson v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6524.
    Hanks v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6532.
    Krull v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6546.
    Copeland v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6585.
    Andrade v. Hauck, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6635.
    Babcock v. Swenson, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6641.
    Crenshaw v. James et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6643.
    Smiley v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6656.
    Cleveland v. Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6664.
    Higgens, aka Robinson v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6673.
    Oakes v. Black, Reformatory Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-6674.
    Lemmo v. Vincent, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-1041.
    Douglas et al. v. Covell.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant the petition and affirm the judgment.


text:
    No. 72-1090.
    Annunzio v. Hoellen.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1249.
    Stover v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1317.
    Whitaker et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1340.
    Stanley et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1377.
    Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township, Marion County, Indiana, et al. v. Dillin, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6499.
    Retherford v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6513.
    Cioffi v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6523.
    Mancino v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6647.
    Gron v. Viconovic.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-6689.
    Rodriguez et al. v. Jones et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 72-1260.
    McCune v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Motion to dispense with printing petition granted. Cer-tiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 72-1350.
    Meisel et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Electronic surveillance has increasingly infected criminal trials. My hearing in the Pentagon Papers case last summer (Russo v. Byrne, 409 U. S. 1219), was the beginning of vast disclosures which showed how seriously that trial had in fact been infected. See also 409 U. S. 1013. The indictments involved in it were indeed later dismissed, in part on the grounds that the prosecution failed to disclose the existence and results of wiretaps.

It has become painfully apparent that wiretapping and electronic surveillance are a commonplace tool of those who pursue prosecutions with zeal that knows no bounds, not even the clear mandate of our Constitution or laws. The Nation early eschewed this Machiavellian philosophy.

“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

This case presents a more related facet of the problem than Russo v. Byrne, supra. Here we are concerned with witnesses called to testify before the grand jury. See Tierney v. United States, 410 U. S. 914 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This particular grand jury was investigating firearms transactions between certain Irish-Americans and the Irish Republican Army. The center of attention apparently was one Charles Farrell Malone, who, subsequent to the proceedings below, pleaded guilty to a federal firearms offense. Petitioners, one a friend of Malone’s and the other a babysitter for his seven children, were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury on October 25 and 26, 1972. Both appeared but refused to testify. Approximately one month later, the Government advised petitioners’ counsel that it would apply for an order granting petitioners testimonial immunity, see 18 U. S. C. § 6003, and in the event immunity was granted and petitioners still refused to testify, it would seek immediately to have petitioners held in contempt.

On November 28 petitioners were granted immunity, and the same morning they were brought before the grand jury. They refused to testify on the grounds, inter alia, that the questions propounded to them were the product of illegal electronic surveillance of themselves and their attorney, The contempt hearing took place at 2 o’clock that afternoon. Petitioners again asserted that they had been subjected to illegal electronic surveillance, and they submitted an affidavit of their attorney claiming that his telephones had been wiretapped. The Government attorney filed affidavits disclaiming any surveillance upon petitioners or their premises. The affiant also stated that he knew “the identity of all the sources of information upon which the questioning of [petitioners] is based and no questions asked are the result of electronic surveillance The Government did not specifically respond to the allegation that the attorney had been subjected to surveillance.

Based upon these affidavits and oral argument, the District Court held petitioners in civil contempt. The District Judge refused to hold a hearing regarding the claims óf electronic surveillance and wiretapping or to require the Government to search its files to assure the nonexistence of electronic surveillance on their attorney. Bail was denied, and petitioners were ordered to jail for the life of the grand jury, but not to exceed 18 months. The Court of Appeals, however, granted bail pending appeal. On December 29, 1972, the Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt adjudications and revoked bail. 472 F. 2d 548. I ordered that petitioners be released on their own recognizance pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari. I now would grant their petition and set this case for oral argument.

The sole ground for denying a hearing was the Government disclaimer that petitioners themselves had been subject to electronic surveillance or that any questions to be asked were the result of surveillance of third parties. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, we held that when the results of electronic surveillance are arguably relevant to the defense, the records must be submitted for adversary hearing before the trial judge. “Adversary proceedings are a major aspect of our system of criminal justice. Their superiority as a means for attaining justice in a given case is nowhere more evident than in those cases, such, as the ones at bar . . . .” Id., at 183. I find the failure to afford a hearing especially troubling in this case. The Government's affiant, an official of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, stated that he had “caused an inquiry to be made” among certain listed federal agencies and this inquiry had not disclosed that petitioners had been subject to any illegal electronic surveillance. Even though the subject of the grand jury investigation was firearms transactions with the Irish Republican Army, the affiant had not checked with military intelligence agencies. We have learned that the results of illegal surveillance often are secreted away, whether for reasons of national security or for fear of public disclosure. For that reason, no stone should remain unturned. Although the District Judge himself was concerned with the failure to consult with these agencies, he nevertheless denied petitioners an evidentiary hearing either on the adequacy of the Government's denial or the actual existence of surveillance of petitioners by more federal agencies. Moreover, the Government totally failed to respond to the claim that petitioners’ attorney had been subjected to illegal surveillance.

We should no longer tolerate procedures which allow the prosecution to pyramid the secrecy of its clandestine activities. It is by no means an easy task to uncover the intricacies and interrelationships of the Executive’s ever-expanding security mechanism, but we certainly cannot even start without the rudiments of due process.

       Petitioners’ attorney, who also represented Malone, who had been indicted before petitioners were granted immunity, had withdrawn as counsel that morning in order to avoid any conflict of interest. It is clear to me that we must treat that attorney as petitioners’ counsel in considering their constitutional rights before the grand jury.

       In Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 41, we held that a grand jury witness has standing to challenge questions propounded to him on the ground that they are derived from illegal electronic surveillance. The interrelationship of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in this area requires, in my mind, that this rule extend to surveillance of a witness’ attorney. See Tierney v. United States, 410 U. S. 914 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

       As we said in Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165:
      “An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused’s life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government’s case.” Id., at 182.


text:
    No. 72-1409.
    Local Union 1791, United Mine Workers of America, et al. v. McGuire Shaft & Tunnel Corp. et al.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Cer-tiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

We are asked to review a decision of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals holding that § 210 (a) of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 85 Stat. 748, 12 U. S. C. § 1904, Note (1970 ed., Supp. II), overrides the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., and permits a district court to enjoin a work stoppage in violation of regulations of the Pay Board.

On January 14, 1972, respondent construction companies entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Mine Workers of America providing for a wage increase in excess of 18%. In accordance with the Economic Stabilization Act, this agreement was submitted to the Pay Board for approval, but the Board authorized an increase of only 9.54%. Subsequently, employees of the construction companies, members of three different locals of the United Mine Workers, went out on strike in support of their demand for a wage increase as provided by the agreement. Pickets soon appeared at five coal mines operated by two other respondents, and the miners honored the picket lines.

The four employers affected by the work stoppages immediately sought preliminary injunctions from the District Court. The District Court issued the injunctions, and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals affirmed. 475 F. 2d 1209. It determined that the work stoppages constituted a violation of § 1 (a) of Executive Order 11640, which provides that “no person shall, directly or indirectly, . . . use any means to obtain payment of wages and salaries in any form, higher than those permitted hereunder . . . 37 Fed. Reg. 1214. It also determined that the stoppages constituted a violation of Pay Board Reg. § 201.17 (c), which provided that it shall be a violation of Pay Board regulations to “[i]n-duce, solicit, encourage, force, or require, or attempt to induce, solicit, encourage, force or require, any other person to pay or to receive any portion of a wage and salary increase not authorized by such regulations or Pay Board decision . . . 6 CFR §201.17 (c) (1972). The court concluded that respondents were persons “suffering legal wrong” within the meaning of § 210 (a) of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and were thereby entitled to injunctive relief. As to petitioners’ claim that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred injunctive relief against a union work stoppage in an action brought by an employer, the court stated:

“In light of the importance of the Economic Stabilization Program to economic welfare of the United States, the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be interpreted to accommodate the overriding Congressional intent expressed in the Economic Stabilization Act. Such accommodations have been made in the past when the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act conflicted with other specific intentions of Congress.” 475 F. 2d, at 1215.

Heretofore, this Court has recognized implicit exceptions to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act only when there was an unavoidable clash with other labor legislation. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768. We have stated before that “the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on federal injunctions is not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful under some other, nonlabor statute.” Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330, 339. See also Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, 42. The unmistakable mandate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to preclude the federal courts from interfering with peaceful labor disputes by resort to “objective tests.” See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra, at 336; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 101. Although the Economic Stabilization Act affects wages, it is clear to me that it falls within the area of general economic legislation rather than the narrow scope of “labor legislation” as that concept is used in our prior decisions.

Moreover, even when we have carved out an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act to accommodate it with later, more specific labor legislation, we have circumscribed the courts’ discretion to award injunctive relief. In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 772-773, we stated:

“The Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . expresses a basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor unions. ... [T]he policy of the Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunc-tive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right.”

Petitioners contend that private injunctions are not a necessary part of the enforcement scheme of the Economic Stabilization Act, which includes provisions for governmental enforcement, supplemented by private actions for damages.

Finally, § 210 (a) of the Economic Stabilization Act provides for "appropriate relief.” Petitioners argue that the word “appropriate” must be construed to encompass the ordinary constraints of federal equity jurisprudence, thus precluding private suits for injunctive relief against a union in a labor dispute. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321. They buttress this argument with the assertion that the legislative history of the Act gives no indication that § 210 (a) was meant to override the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

To my mind, this case presents substantial questions that deserve consideration by this Court. The decision below is a clear extension of the accommodation doctrine as it has developed in this Court and threatens to erode the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We hardly can conclude that wage and price controls are merely a specter of the past. I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument. I would not without impelling legislative reasons make the Norris-LaGuardia Act — once the pillar of labor strength — a mere ghost to be driven hence by the slogan “stabilization” and made a mockery by financial aggrandizement.

       That section provides:
      “Any person suffering legal wrong because of any act or practice arising out of this title, or any order or regulation issued pursuant thereto, may bring an action in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy, for appropriate relief, including an action for a declaratory judgment, writ of injunction (subject to the limitations in section 211), and/or damages.”

       Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
      “That- no court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this Act; nor shall anj' such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contra^' to the public policy declared in this Act.”
      Section 4 specifies acts which may not be enjoined, including “[Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.”

       The District Court also concluded that the strike violated provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement and could be enjoined under Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue.

       Petitioners concede that the Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions do not apply in Government suits to enforce the Economic Stabilization Act. See § 209 of the Act, 85 Stat. 748.

       The Government contended below, as amicus curiae, that the dispute between the parties does not come within the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of “labor dispute,” 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c).


text:
    No. 72-6359.
    Reece v. Craven, Warden.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the denial of certiorari solely because the judgment below rests on an adequate state ground.


text:
    No. 72-6526.
    Muncaster v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to file an amended petition granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 72-10.
    No. 72-1112.
    No. 72-1199.
    No. 72-5398.
    No. 72-5964.
    No. 72-6090.
    No. 72-6149.
    No. 72-6197.
    No. 72-6392.
    No. 72-6423.
    No. 72-6603.
    Moor et al. v. County of Alameda et al., Coffee-Rich, Inc., et al. v. Fielder, Director of Agriculture, et al., Culpepper v. United States, Gardner v. McCarthy, Facility Superintendent, Black et al. v. Illinois, King v. California, House v. St. Agnes Hospital, Inc., et al., Shoemaker v. Dwyer et al., Wheeler v. United States, Mendes v. Brotherhood of Railway & Airline Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al., Jaynes v. Jaynes et al.,
   411 U. S.693;

411 U. S. 979;

411 U. S. 982;

ante, p. 916;

411 U. S. 967;

411 U. S. 983;

411 U. S. 961;

ante, p. 902;

ante, p. 921;

411 U. S. 971; and

ante, p. 931. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 6505,
    October Term, 1970.
    Niemeyer v. Ciccone, Medical Center Director, et al.,
   401 U. S. 1011. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-780.
    No. 72-5770.
    California Adult Authority et al. v. Griffin et al., and M'Clary v. California Adult Authority et al.,
   ante, p. 916. Petition for rehearing or modification denied.


text:
    No. 72-5935.
    Ruderer v. Kleindienst, Attorney General,
   410 U. S. 949. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing and all other relief denied.


text:
    June 19, 1973
    No. 72-6818.
    Diaz-Rodriguez v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas, Circuit Justice.

text:
    HENRY et al. v. WARNER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, et al.
    No. A-1124.
    Decided May 18, 1973
   Mr. Justice Douglas, Circuit Justice.

The application for an order vacating the stay of the Court of Appeals is denied on the representation of the Solicitor General that the named applicants in the case have all been released from confinement and that within the Central District of California no persons are currently confined in any military detention facility as a result of a conviction by summary court-martial without the aid of counsel. Whether the District Court has authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for unnamed members of the class outside the District and/or on a worldwide basis is so novel a question that an order granting such relief should be issued only after full argument. Application denied.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger Mr. Justice Blackmun,

text:
    GILLIGAN, GOVERNOR OF OHIO, et al. v. MORGAN et al.
    No. 71-1553.
    Argued March 19, 1973
    Decided June 21, 1973

      BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 12. Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 12.

      Thomas V. Martin, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was William J. Brown, Attorney General.

      Michael E. Geltner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Leonard J. Schwartz, Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford Jay Rosen, and Joel M. Gora.

      Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wood, Robert E. Kopp, Robert W. Berry, and R. Kenly Webster.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David E. Engdahl for the Law Revision Center, and by Jack Greenberg,

        James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Drew S. Days III for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

   Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents, alleging that they were full-time students and officers in the student government at Kent State University in Ohio, filed this action in the District Court on behalf of themselves and all other students on October 15, 1970. The essence of the complaint is that, during a period of civil disorder on and around the University campus in May 1970, the National Guard, called by the Governor of Ohio to preserve civil order and protect public property, violated students’ rights of speech and assembly and caused injury to a number of students and death to several, and that the actions of the National Guard were without legal justification. They sought injunctive relief against the Governor to restrain him in the future from prematurely ordering National Guard troops to duty in civil disorders and an injunction to restrain leaders of the National Guard from future violation of the students’ constitutional rights. They also sought a declaratory judgment that § 2923.55 of the Ohio Revised Code is unconstitutional. The District Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the District Court’s dismissal with respect to injunctive relief against the Governor’s “premature” employment of the Guard on future occasions and with respect to the validity of the state statute. At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that the complaint stated a cause of action with respect to one issue which was remanded to the District Court with directions to resolve the following question:

“Was there and is there a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard which singly or together require or make inevitable the use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders when the total circumstances at the critical time are such that nonlethal force would suffice to restore order and the use of lethal force is not reasonably necessary?”

We granted certiorari to review the action of the Court of Appeals.

I

We note at the outset that since the complaint was filed in the District Court in 1970, there have been a number of changes in the factual situation. At the oral argument, we were informed that none of the named respondents is still enrolled in the University. Likewise, the officials originally named as party defendants no longer hold offices in which they can exercise any authority over the State’s National Guard, although the suit is against such parties and their successors in office. In addition, both the petitioners, and the Solicitor General appearing as amicus curiae, have informed us that since 1970 the Ohio National Guard has adopted new “use of force” rules substantially differing from those in effect when the complaint was filed; we are also informed that the initial training of National Guard recruits relating to civil disorder control has been revised.

Respondents assert, nevertheless, that these changes in the situation do not affect their right to a hearing on their entitlement to injunctive and supervisory relief. Some basis, therefore, exists for a conclusion that the case is now moot; however, on the record before us we are not prepared to resolve the case on that basis and therefore turn to the important question whether the claims alleged in the complaint, as narrowed by the Court of Appeals’ remand, are justiciable.

II

We can treat the question of justiciability on the basis of an assumption that respondents’ claims, within the framework of the remand order, are true and could be established by evidence. On that assumption, we address the question whether there is any relief a District Court could appropriately fashion.

It is important to note at the outset that this is not a case in which damages are sought for injuries sustained during the tragic occurrence at Kent State. Nor is it an action seeking a restraining order against some specified and imminently threatened unlawful action. Rather, it is a broad call on judicial power to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National Guard. This far-reaching demand for relief presents important questions of justiciability.

Respondents continue to seek for the benefit of all Kent State students a judicial evaluation of the appropriateness of the “training, weaponry and orders” of the Ohio National Guard. They further demand, and the Court of Appeals’ remand would require, that the District Court establish standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of orders to control the actions of the National Guard. Respondents contend that thereafter the District Court must assume and exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure compliance with whatever training and operations procedures may be approved by that court. Respondents press for a remedial decree of this scope, even assuming that the recently adopted changes are deemed acceptable after an evidentiary hearing by the court. Continued judicial surveillance to assure compliance with the changed standards is what respondents demand.

In relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, respondents seem to overlook the explicit command of Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, which vests in Congress the power:

"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” (Emphasis added.)

The majority opinion in the Court of Appeals does not mention this very relevant provision of the Constitution. Yet that provision is explicit that the Congress shall have the responsibility for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia (now the National Guard), with certain responsibilities being reserved to the respective States. Congress has enacted appropriate legislation pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, and has also authorized the President — as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces— to prescribe regulations governing organization and discipline of the National Guard. The Guard is an essential reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, available with regular forces in time of war. The Guard also may be federalized in addition to its role under state governments, to assist in controlling civil disorders. The relief sought by respondents, requiring initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and orders of the Guard, would therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government.

The Court of Appeals invited the District Court on remand to survey certain materials not then in the record of the case:

“[F]or example: Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Dept, of Justice, J. Edgar Hoover (1967) . . . ; 32 C. F. R. §501 (1971), 'Employment of Troops in Aid of Civil Authorities’; Instructions for Members of the Force at Mass Demonstrations, Police Department, City of New York (no date); Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).” 456 F. 2d, at 614.

This would plainly and explicitly require a judicial evaluation of a wide range of possibly dissimilar procedures and policies approved by different law enforcement agencies or other authorities; and the examples cited may represent only a fragment of the accumulated data and experience in the various States, in the Armed Services, and in other concerned agencies of the Federal Government. Trained professionals, subject to the day-to-day control of the responsible civilian authorities, necessarily must make comparative judgments on the merits as to evolving methods of training, equipping, and controlling military forces with respect to their duties under the Constitution. It would be inappropriate for a district judge to undertake this responsibility in the unlikely event that he possessed requisite technical competence to do so.

Judge Celebrezze, in dissent, correctly read Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), when he said:

“I believe that the congressional and executive authority to prescribe and regulate the training and weaponry of the National Guard, as set forth above, dearly predudes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters. I can envision no form of judicial relief which, if directed at the training and weaponry of the National Guard, would not involve a serious conflict with a
“‘coordinate political department; ... a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the question]; . . . the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; . . . the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.; . . . an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [and] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.' Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U. S. at 217 .... “Any such relief, whether it prescribed standards of training and weaponry or simply ordered compliance with the standards set by Congress and/or the Executive, would necessarily draw the courts into a nonjusticiable political question, over which we have no jurisdiction.” 456 F. 2d, at 619 (emphasis added).

In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), this Court noted that:

“Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the action. Yet it remains true that '[j justici-ability is . . . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures . . . .’ Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 508 (1961).”

In determining justiciability, the analysis in Flast thus suggests that there is no justiciable controversy (a) “when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion,” (b) “when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments,” and (c) “when there is no standing to maintain the action.” As we noted in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961), and repeated in Flast, “[jJusticiability is . . . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures 367 U. S., at 608.

In testing this case by these standards drawn specifically from Flast, there are serious deficiencies with respect to each. The advisory nature of the judicial declaration sought is clear from respondents' argument and, indeed, from the very language of the court's remand. Added to this is that the nature of the questions to be resolved on remand are subjects committed expressly to the political branches of government. These factors, when coupled with the uncertainties as to whether a live controversy still exists and the infirmity of the posture of respondents as to standing, render the claim and the proposed issues on remand nonjusticiable.

It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible — as the Judicial Branch is not — to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and officials which underlies our entire constitutional system; the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals failed to give appropriate weight to this separation of powers.

Voting rights cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and prisoner rights cases such as Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), are cited by the court as supporting the “diminish [ing] vitality of the political question doctrine.” 456 F. 2d, at 613. Yet, because this doctrine has been held inapplicable to certain carefully delineated situations, it is no reason for federal courts to assume its demise. The voting rights cases, indeed, have represented the Court’s efforts to strengthen the political system by assuring a higher level of fairness and responsiveness to the political processes, not the assumption of a continuing judicial review of substantive political judgments entrusted expressly to the coordinate branches of government.

In concluding that no justiciable controversy is presented, it should be clear that we neither hold nor imply that the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether by way of damages or injunctive relief. We hold only that no such questions are presented in this case. We decline to require a United States District Court to involve itself so directly and so intimately in the task assigned that court by the Court of Appeals. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953).

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall dissent. Dor many of the reasons stated in Part I of the Court's opinion, they are convinced that this case is now moot. Accordingly, they would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss it as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins, concurring.

Respondents brought this action in 1970 seeking broad-ranging declaratory and injunctive relief. But the issue presently before the Court relates only to a portion of the relief sought in 1970. Under the Court of Appeals’ remand order the District Court was limited in its review to determining the existence of a pattern of “training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard which singly or together require or make inevitable” the unjustifiable use of lethal force in suppressing civilian disorders. 456 F. 2d 608, 612. The Ohio use-of-force rules have now been changed, and are identical to the Army use-of-force rules. Counsel for respondents stated at oral argument that the use-of-force rules now in effect provide satisfactory safeguards against unwarranted use of lethal force by the Ohio National Guard. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. And, as of 1971, special civil-disturbance-control training had been provided for the various National Guard units.

It is in this narrowly confined setting that we are asked to decide the issues presented in this case. Respondents have informed us that they seek no change in the current National Guard regulations; rather, they wish to assure their continuance through constant judicial surveillance of the orders, training, and weaponry of the Guard.

Were it not for the continuing surveillance respondents seek, I would have little difficulty concluding that the controversy is now moot. Except for that aspect of the case, all relief requested by respondents has been obtained. While one might argue that the likelihood of future changes in the rules is so attenuated that even the claim for continuing review by the District Court is moot, this issue need not be reached, as the District Court is clearly without power to grant the relief now sought.

Respondents’ complaint rests upon a single, isolated, and tragic incident at Kent State University. The conditions that existed at the time of the incident no longer prevail. And respondents’ complaint contains nothing suggesting that they are likely to suffer specific injury in the future as a result of the practices they challenge. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 14 (1972). A complaint based on a single past incident, containing allegations of unspecified, speculative threats of uncertain harm that might occur at some indefinite time in the future, cannot support respondents’ standing to maintain this action. See Complaint, par. 11, App. 5-6; Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 128 (1973).

The relief sought by respondents, moreover, is beyond the province of the judiciary. Respondents would have the District Court, through continuing surveillance, evaluate and pass upon the merits of the Guard’s training programs, weapons, use of force, and orders. The relief sought is prospective only; an evaluation of those matters in the context of a particular factual setting as a predicate to relief in the form of an injunction against continuing activity or for damages would present wholly different issues. This case relates to prospective relief in the form of judicial surveillance of highly subjective and technical matters involving military training and command. As such, it presents an "[inappropriate] . . . subject matter for judicial consideration,” for respondents are asking the District Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, “to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 198, 226 (1962).

For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. On the understanding that this is what the Court’s opinion holds, I join that opinion.

       The complaint was brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 with jurisdiction asserted under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).

       This section provides that, under certain circumstances, law enforcement personnel who are engaged in suppressing a riot are “guiltless” for the consequences of the use of necessary and proper force. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2923.55 (Supp. 1972).

         The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported sub nom. Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F. 2d 608 (CA6 1972).

       Respondents have not sought certiorari with respect to those claims.

        Id., at 612.

       409 U. S. 947 (1972).

       Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 33.

       Memorandum of Petitioners Suggesting a Question of Mootness 2.

       In 1971, the Army began to give National Guard recruits 16 hours of additional special civil-disturbance-control training recognizing the peculiar role of the National Guard in this area.

       F. g., 32 U. S. C. §§ 105, 501-507, 701-714 (1970 ed. and Supp. I).

       32 U. S. C. § 110.

       10 U. S. C. § 331 et seq.

       The initial and basic training of National Guard personnel is, by Regulation of the Department of the Army, pursuant to statutory authority, under federal jurisdiction. Commencing in 1971, National Guard units received, as part of the basic training, 16 hours of special civil-disturbance-control training, in recognition of the likelihood that the National Guard would be the primary source of military personnel called into civil disorder situations. See Dept, of the Army, Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963, CON Supp. 1 to AR350-1, App. XXV, Anx. F, Par. 3c (Aug. 31, 1972).

       392 U. S., at 95 (footnotes omitted).

       In a colloquy with the Court on the scope of the relief sought under the remand, one Justice asked:
      “Would it be a fair characterization of your position that if the case goes back to the district court, you do not quarrel with the specific [National Guard] regulations now in force but (a) you want them made permanent and, (b) you want a continuing surveillance to see that they are carried out; is that a fair statement of your case?”
      Mr. Geltner, counsel for respondents, answered:
      “Yes, Your Honor, that is a fair statement of what we are seeking at this point, understanding that at the time the complaint was filed we were seeking a more specific change in what then existed.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 56.

       See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932). In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1972), we said: “[W]hen presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court’s decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.”