author: Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Brennan. Me. Justice Stewaet,

text:
    BONELLI CATTLE CO. et al. v. ARIZONA et al.
    No. 72-397.
    Argued October 15, 1973
    Decided December 17, 1973

      MARSHALL, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNNAN, White, BlackmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 332. RehNQUist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Elmer C. Coker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Leonard C. Langford.

      Dale R. Shumway argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Bork for the United States, and by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jay L. Shavelson, Assistant Attorney General, and Warren J. Abbott and Jerold A. Krieger, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California.
      Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Philip E. von Ammon for the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., and by David H. Getches for the Cocopah Tribe of Indians.

   Opinion of the Court by

Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.

The question for decision is whether title to land abandoned by the stream of the Colorado River as a result of a federal rechanneling project vests in the State of Arizona, as owner of the beds under navigable streams within its borders, or in petitioner cattle company, as the owner of land riparian to the river at the time of the rechanneling.

The circumstances that give rise to this case are as follows. In 1910, the subject land was conveyed by federal patent, as part of a larger parcel, to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. A survey conducted in 1905 and 1906, and approved by the Surveyor General of the United States in 1906, indicates that as of the date of the patent, the Santa Fe parcel abutted the east bank of the Colorado River. Upon admission to the Union in 1912, Arizona succeeded the Federal Government to title to the bed of the Colorado River. The exact location of the river in 1912 in relation to the subject property is unclear from the record, but it is generally agreed that between 1903 and 1959 (when it was rechanneled) the river moved gradually eastward, eroding its east bank and depositing alluvion on its west bank, resulting in the submergence by erosion of the subject land. As the river crept eastward, the boundary between upland owners and the state-owned riverbed moved mechanically with it, transferring title to the lands which became part of the riverbed to the State. The operation of Hoover Dam, begun in 1938, reduced the flow of water in the Colorado River and substantially decreased its annual flood stage high-water mark. Nonetheless, by 1955, when the Bonelli Cattle Co. acquired title to the subject portion of the original Santa Fe grant, all but 60 acres in the southeast corner of its parcel was covered by water. In 1959, a Federal Bureau of Reclamation Project deepened and rechanneled the Colorado River in the area of the subject land, thereby confining the stream of the river to a substantially reduced portion of the Bonelli property.

In 1962, the Bonelli Cattle Co. filed the instant action to quiet title to the land from which the river had withdrawn as a result of the federal rechanneling project. The state trial court granted judgment for Bonelli and against the State of Arizona. The Arizona Court of Appeals, the State’s intermediate appellate court, affirmed, upholding Bonelli’s contention that if the changes in the river were accretive, the surfaced land belonged to Bonelli, as a riparian owner, and if the change were avulsive, the land nonetheless belonged to Bonelli under the doctrine of re-emergence.

The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, Arizona holds title to the beds of all navigable waters within its borders and thus to the subject land as a result of the gradual eastward movement of the river. The Arizona Supreme Court found that, because the federal rechannelization project was an “engineering relocation of the waters of the river by artificial means,” it was, under state law, an avulsive change, which did not divest the State of its title to the exposed land which had formerly been part of the riverbed. The court denied a rehearing and, in a supplemental opinion, clarified the extent of the dry land owned by the State. It held that the high-water mark of the river, to which the State's ownership extends, was fixed by the natural state of the river as it existed in 1938, before the operation of Hoover Dam. We granted certiorari, 410 U. S. 908 (1973). We hold that the ownership of the subject land is governed by federal law, and that the land surfaced by the narrowing of the river channel belongs, not to the State as owner of the riverbed, but to Bonelli as riparian owner. We need not, therefore, reach the question of whether the Arizona Supreme Court properly determined the average high-water mark of the river.

I

The first issue we must decide is whether state or federal law governs this controversy. The State of Arizona claims title to the subject land by virtue of the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, the basic principles of which are as follows. When the Original Colonies ratified the Constitution, they succeeded to the Crown’s title and interest in the beds of navigable waters within their respective borders. As new States were forged out of the federal territories after the formation of the Union, they were “admitted [with] the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction ... as the original States possess within their respective borders.” Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436 (1867). Accordingly, title to lands beneath navigable waters passed from the Federal Government to the new States, upon their admission to the Union, under the equal-footing doctrine. See, e. g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57, 65-66 (1873).

In order for the States to guarantee full public enjoyment of their navigable watercourses, it has been held that their title to the bed of a navigable river mechanically follows the river’s gradual changes in course. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 268 U. S. 252 (1925). Thus, where portions of a riparian owner’s land are encroached upon by a navigable stream, under federal law, the State succeeds to title in the bed of the river to its new high-water mark.

The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 did not disturb these doctrines or their inherent limitations. The Act merely confirmed the States’ pre-existing rights in the beds of the navigable waterways within their boundaries by, in effect, quitclaiming all federal claims thereto. And, consonant with the above-described common-law doctrine concerning title to the bed of a river that has shifted course, the Submerged Lands Act quitclaims all federal rights to title to lands beneath the navigable streams, as “hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction.” 43 U. S. C. §1301 (a)(1).

The State of Arizona asserts title to the subject land on the basis of the following application of these principles. When Arizona achieved statehood in 1912, it assumed title to the land beneath the stream of the Colorado River, by virtue of the equal-footing doctrine. It subsequently acquired title to the subject land when it was submerged by the river’s eastward movement. The State asserts that once having acquired title, it was not divested of its proprietary interest in the land by the subsequent withdrawal of the water due to the rechanneling of the river.

Having concluded that title to the subject land was thus vested in the State as a matter of settled federal law, the state courts determined that local law controlled whether petitioner, as a riparian owner, had any interest in the land thereafter. As the Court said in Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 176 (1918): “[I]t is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to them. . . .”

We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State. But this doctrine does not require that state law govern the instant controversy. The issue before us is not what rights the State has accorded private owners in lands which the State holds as sovereign; but, rather, how far the State’s sovereign right extends under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act — whether the State retains title to the lands formerly beneath the stream of the Colorado River or whether that title is defeasible by the withdrawal of those waters. As this Court observed in Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935): “The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, ... is necessarily a federal question. ... [I] t involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.”

Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra, and the cases cited therein are not to the contrary. In Arkansas v. Tennessee, for example, we held that federal law governed the question of how far into the river channel a State held title. Only then did this Court turn to state law to determine whether riparian owners had been accorded any rights in that land. But even the State’s disposition of its submerged land vis-a-vis private owners was to be “in each case limited by the interstate boundary,” a matter determined by federal law. 246 U. S., at 176. Similarly, in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894), the Court held that under settled federal law, the tidelands there at issue belonged to the State in its sovereign capacity; hence whether the State had accorded riparian owners any interests in the tidelands properly remained a matter of local law; “if [the States] choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections.” Id., at 43. In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 338 (1877), the Court left it to the States to decide whether to accord title to the land beneath non-tidal navigable waters to riparian owners after recognizing that under federal law such lands belong to the States. See also Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229, 24.2 (1913).

The present case, however, does not involve a question of the disposition of lands, the title to which is vested in the State as a matter of settled federal law. The very question to be decided is the nature and extent of the title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act. In this case, the question of title as between the State and a private landowner necessarily depends on a construction of a “right asserted under federal law.”

II

We cannot accept the State's argument that the equal-footing doctrine supports its claim to the disputed land. Historically, title to the beds beneath navigable waters is held by the sovereign, Barney v. Keokuk, supra, at 338, as a public trust for the protection of navigation and related purposes.

“[Tjitle to the . . . lands under water . . . enures to the State within which they are situated .... Such title ... [is] held in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery.” Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 381 (1891).

See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, 808 (1950). As this Court observed in an earlier federal water law case:

“Such waters . . . are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing . . . .” Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 11.

The State's title is to the “[riverjbed as a bed,” and the State of Arizona will continue to hold title to the bed beneath the Colorado River to its present high-water mark. But the exposed land involved here is no longer, as described in Shively, “incapable of ordinary and private occupation . . . [whose] primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation . . . .” The equal-footing doctrine was never intended to provide a State with a windfall of thousands of acres of dry land exposed when the main thread of a navigable stream is changed. It would be at odds with the fundamental purpose of the original grant to the States to afford a State title to land from which a navigable stream had receded unless the land was exposed as part of a navigational or related public project of which it was a necessary and integral part or unless, of course, the artificial accretion was somehow caused by the upland owner himself. There has been no showing that the rechannelization project was undertaken to give the State title to the subject lands for the protection of navigation or related public goals. Indeed, the State of Arizona did not participate in the rechannelization of the Colorado River, although it had implicitly assented to the project.

The advance of the Colorado’s waters divested the title of the upland owners in favor of the State in order to guarantee full public enjoyment of the watercourse. But, when the water receded from the land, there was no longer a public benefit to be protected; consequently, the State, as sovereign, has no need for title. That the cause of the recession was artificial, or that the rate was perceptible, should be of no effect.

Nor does the Submerged Lands Act provide a basis for the State's claim to the subject lands. The Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly construed this Act as a grant by Congress to the States of lands “formerly . . . beneath navigable waters.” The Act did not abrogate the federal law of accretion, but defined lands beneath navigable waters as being those covered by streams as “hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction.” Contrary to the implication raised by the Arizona Supreme Court, the Act creates no new rights for the States in the beds of their inland waterways. The Act is not a grant of title to land but only a quitclaim of federal proprietary rights in the beds of navigable waterways. The Act specifically excepts from its scope lands lawfully conveyed or patented by the United States. Since the Act does not extend to the States any interest beyond those afforded by the equal-footing doctrine, the State can no more base its claim to lands unnecessary to a navigational purpose on .the Submerged Lands Act than on that doctrine.

Ill

The question remains as to who owns the subject land under the applicable federal common law. It is, of course, clear that the State of Arizona did hold title to the subject property before the waters of the river receded. Both the State and the Solicitor General of the United States as amicus curiae, urge that the federal common-law doctrine of avulsion is applicable and thus that the State remains holder of title in the former riverbed. Bonelli, the only private claimant, argues that the narrowing of the river course should properly be characterized as an artificial accretion, hence that the disputed land, which had originally been lost from the Bonelli parcel to the river by erosion, should once again belong to it as the riparian owner.

Federal law recognizes the doctrine of accretion whereby the “grantee of land bounded by a body of navigable water acquires a right to any . . . gradual accretion formed along the shore.” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 293 (1967); accord, Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150, 156 (1856). When there is a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land on a navigable riverbank, by way of alluvion or reliction, the riparian owner is the beneficiary of title to the surfaced land:

“It is the established rule that a riparian proprietor of land bounded by a stream, the banks of which are changed by the gradual and imperceptible process of accretion or erosion, continues to hold to the stream as his boundary; if his land is increased he is not accountable for the gain, and if it is diminished he has no recourse for the loss.” Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 624 (1912).

There are a number of interrelated reasons for the application of the doctrine of accretion. First, where lands are bounded by water, it may well be regarded as the expectancy of the riparian owners that they should continue to be so bounded. Second, the quality of being riparian, especially to navigable water, may be the land’s “most valuable feature” and is part and parcel of the ownership of the land itself. Hughes v. Washington, supra, at 293; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Riparianness also encompasses the vested right to future alluvion, which is an “essential attribute of the original property.” County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68 (1874). By requiring that the upland owner suffer the burden of erosion, and by giving him the benefit of accretions, riparianness is maintained. Finally, there is a compensation theory at work. Riparian land is at the mercy of the wanderings of the river. Since a riparian owner is subject to losing land by erosion beyond his control, he should benefit from any addition to his lands by the accretions thereto which are equally beyond his control. Ibid. The effect of the doctrine of accretion is to give the riparian owner a “ ‘ “fee, determinable upon the occupancy of his soil by the river,” and [to afford] the State [a title] to the river bed [which is] likewise a . . . “qualified” fee, “determinable in favor of the riparians upon the abandonment of the bed by the river.” ’ ”

The doctrine of accretion applies to changes in the river course due to artificial as well as natural causes. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, at 64-69; United States v. Claridge, 416 F. 2d 933 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 961 (1970) (changes in the Colorado River’s course, caused by the construction of Hoover Dam, are accretive). Where accretions to riparian land are caused by conditions created by strangers to the land, the upland owner remains the beneficiary thereof.

But the federal law is otherwise where “a stream suddenly and perceptibly abandons its old channel.” Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S., at 624-625. Such an avulsive change does not affect title and the boundary established by the former river stream remains at that line, even if the result is to cut off a landowner’s riparian rights. St. Louis v. Ruts, 138 U. S. 226, 245 (1891). The rationale for the doctrine of avulsion is a need to mitigate the hardship that a shift in title caused by a sudden movement of the river would cause the abutting landowners were the accretion principle to be applied. As this Court, quoting from 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 175, observed in Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 362 (1892):

“ ‘ [When in] deserting its original bed, the river forces for itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury by the loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed.’ ”

The Arizona Supreme Court held that because the re-channeling of the Colorado River was an “engineering relocation of the waters of the river by artificial means/’ it was, under state law, an avulsion and did not divest the State of title to the land from which the river had withdrawn. But federal law must be applied with a view toward the limited nature of the sovereign’s rights in the riverbed, and an analysis of the interests of the State, and Bonelli, in light of the rationales for the federal common-law doctrines of accretion and avulsion, compels the conclusion that, as between the State, as owner of the riverbed, and Bonelli, as a riparian owner, the surfacing of the subject land should be treated as accretion; hence title to the disputed land should be vested in Bonelli.

The rationale for the application of the doctrine of avulsion is not applicable to this dispute because of the limited interests of the State in the subject property. The Federal Government, which holds a paramount navigable servitude in the river, determined that it was too wide and shallow to permit navigation in the area of the subject land, and that the river therefore needed to be deepened and rechanneled. The resulting changes in the river’s thread actually enhanced the State’s interest in the navigability of the river. The State’s acquisition of the exposed land here could only be a windfall, since unnecessary to the State’s purpose in holding title to the beds of the navigable streams within its borders. Accordingly, the narrowing of the river and vesting of title to the surfaced land in riparian owners does not detract from the State’s legitimate interest in title to the riverbed, so as to require mitigation of the accretion principle by application of the doctrine of avulsion.

The policies behind the doctrine of accretion are, however, fully applicable. That doctrine guarantees the riparian character of land by automatically granting to a riparian owner title to lands which form between his holdings and the river and thus threaten to destroy that valuable feature of his property. The riparian owner is at the mercy,, not only of the natural forces which create such intervening lands, but also, because of the navigational servitude, of governmental forces which may similarly affect the riparian quality of his estate. Accordingly, where land cast up in the Federal Government's exercise of the servitude is not related to furthering the navigational or related public interests, the accretion doctrine should provide a disposition of the land as between the riparian owner and the State. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Assn., 342 Mass. 251, 173 N. E. 2d 273 (1961).

Similarly, riparian lands may suffer noncompensable losses or be deprived of their riparian character altogether by the State or Federal Government in the exercise of the navigational servitude. In compensation for such losses, land surfaced in the course of such governmental activity should inure to the riparian owner where not necessary to the navigational project or its purpose. In the case before us, all of the subject land, which composed a substantial portion of Bonelli’s parcel, was lost to the State by erosion to serve the public interest in the navigability of the river. Now that the land has resurfaced in the process of rechannelization, it should return to the estate of the riparian owner.

“No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded [by a navigable stream], is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory: and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.” New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717 (1836).

Finally, recognition of the State’s claim to the subject land would raise a serious constitutional issue as to whether the State’s assertion of title is a taking without compensation, a question which we find unnecessary to decide on our view of the case. As Mr. Justice Stewart warned in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S., at 298 (concurring opinion):

“Although the State in this case made no attempt to take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a retroactive transformation of private into public property — without paying for the privilege of doing so. . . . [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended than when it is deliberate ...

In the exercise of its navigational servitude, the State or Federal Government may decrease the value of riparian property without compensation because the property is held subject to the exercise of that servitude. The government may, without paying compensation, deprive a riparian owner of his common-law right to use flowing water, St. Anthonys Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs, 168 U. S. 349 (1897), or to build a wharf over the water, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894). We have held that the State may deprive the owner of the riparian character of his property in the exercise of its navigational servitude. United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121 (1967). But there is no claim here by the State that depriving Bonelli of the subject land is necessary to any navigational or related purpose. Cf. United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P. 2d 3 (1967), cert, denied, 390 U. S. 949 (1968). Moreover, what is involved in this case is not just the diminution or elimination of riparian rights, but the State’s attempt to completely divest all of Bonelli’s title and interest in the subject land. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall., at 504.

IV

We hold that title to the subject land, which was exposed by the federal rechannelization of the Colorado River, is vested in petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Me. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Me. Justice Stewaet,

dissenting.

The Court in this case holds that federal common law governs the resolution of conflicting claims to the exposed bed of a navigable river between Arizona as the owner of the riverbed and a riparian landowner. I think this ruling emasculates the equal-footing doctrine, under which this Court has long held “that the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction ... as the original States possess within their respective borders.” Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436 (1867).

After the Revolution, the 13 Original States succeeded both to the Crown’s title to the beds underlying navigable rivers and to its sovereignty over that property. Ibid. “[T]he shores of navigable waters and the soils under the same in the original States were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the several States.” Ibid. If the equal-footing doctrine means what it says, then the States that were later admitted to the Union must hold the same title and must exercise the same sovereignty. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57, 65-66 (1873); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 16 (1894); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845). Just as with other real property within a State’s boundaries, an element of sovereignty over the property constituting the riverbed is the power of the State’s courts to determine and apply state property rules in the resolution of conflicting claims to that property. Today, however, the Court holds that federal common law supersedes the common-law property rules applied by Arizona pursuant to its sovereign authority over the property in question.

This Court has repeatedly recognized a State’s power, as a function of its sovereignty over the lands within its borders, to apply state common-law property rules such as those applied by the Supreme Court of Arizona in this case:

“Th[e] right of the States to regulate and control the shores of tide waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the Crown in England. In this country the same rule has been extended to our great navigable lakes . . . ; and also ... to navigable rivers . . . ; but it depends on the law of each State to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the State over the lands under water shall be exercised.” Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 382 (1891).

With respect to an avulsion exposing large portions of riverbed and leading to conflicting claims to the ownership of the exposed land, virtually the twin of this case, the Court has said:

“How the land that emerges . . . shall be disposed of as between public and private ownership is a matter to be determined according to the law of each State, under the familiar doctrine that it is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to them. . . . Thus, [the State] may limit riparian ownership by the ordinary high-water mark ... [or] may, in the case of an avulsion followed by a drying up of the old channel of the river, recognize the right of former riparian owners to be restored to that which they have lost through gradual erosions in times preceding the avulsion . . . .” Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 175-176 (1918).

Along the same vein, the Court has said:

“It is generally conceded that the riparian title attaches to subsequent accretions to the land effected by the gradual and imperceptible operation of natural causes. But whether it attaches to land reclaimed by artificial means from the bed of the river, or to sudden accretions produced by unusual floods, is a question which each State decides for itself. . . . The confusion of navigable with tide water, found in the monuments of the common law, long prevailed in this country .... [I]t laid the foundation in many States of doctrines with regard to the ownership of the soil in navigable waters above tide-water at variance with sound principles of public policy. Whether, as rules of property, it would now be safe to change these doctrines where they have been applied ... is for the several States themselves to determine. . . . [The decision] properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty . . . Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 337-338 (1877).

To put the matter bluntly, the Court’s application of the equal-footing doctrine in this, case seems to me wholly wrong. While conceding that the later admitted States have “ ‘the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction ... as the original States possess within their respective borders/ ” ante, at 318, the Court holds that “the nature and extent of the title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State under the equal-footing doctrine” involves a “ ‘right asserted under federal law’ ” that must be determined under the rules of federal common law. The effect of the Court’s analysis is completely to undercut the equal-footing doctrine. As noted above, the original States derived their sovereign rights and powers directly from the Crown after the Revolution and retained whatever powers they did not later surrender or limit in the Federal Constitution. Even under the Court’s “title” analysis, therefore, federal common law would not govern the conflicting claims involved here if the river were located in Massachusetts or Virginia, rather than in Arizona.

The upshot of the Court’s decision is that the 13 Original States are free to develop and apply their own rules of property law for the resolution of conflicting claims to an exposed bed of a river, while those States admitted after the Constitution’s ratification must under today’s decision knuckle under to this Court’s supervisory view of “federal common law.” A later-admitted State like Arizona is thus not at all on an equal footing with the original States in the exercise of sovereignty over real property within its boundaries. And the vehicle used by the Court to arrive at this unjust result is, incredibly, the very doctrine that was intended to insure to the new States equal footing with the original States. Thus, the Court’s strange application of the equal-footing doctrine brings that constitutional principle into fundamental conflict with the purpose it was intended to serve.

If the equal-footing doctrine means anything, it means that Arizona cannot be treated as a second-class State. It means that, upon admission to the Union, it received title to, and sovereignty over, the beds of navigable rivers within its boundaries, to the same extent as the original States after the Revolution. As a function of that sovereignty, Arizona courts have the power to develop and apply state common law in determining legal questions that arise with respect to this property, including conflicting claims to the bed that is later exposed by the vagaries of the river. And the- power of the Arizona courts to decide this controversy under state law surely includes the power to decide it in a way that we here might think is wholly wrong.

       The federal patent to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad conveyed a parcel of land in township 19 North of Range 22 West, described as follows:
      “The lots one, two, three, four, five and six, the south half of the northeast quarter, the south half of the northwest quarter, the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, and the southeast quarter of section three, containing five hundred eighty-nine and forty hundredths acres.”
      The map of the area, approved by the Surveyor General, indicates that, as of 1906, lots 5 and 6 of the Santa Fe parcel abutted the Colorado River. Petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. was deeded a parcel of land constituting roughly the eastern half of the original Santa Fe grant. The Bonelli deed described the subject property as the “E[ast] % [of] Section 3, excepting Lot 2 thereof.”

       The rechannelization also surfaced a small usable pocket of land on the west bank of the Colorado River which was part of the Bonelli parcel. This land is not in Arizona by virtue of the Boundary Compact between Arizona and Nevada, approved by Congress, Pub. L. 87-50, 75 Stat. 93, and hence is not involved in the present controversy.

       11 Ariz. App. 412, 464 P. 2d 999 (1970).

       107 Ariz. 465, 489 P. 2d 699 (1971).

       108 Ariz. 258, 495 P. 2d 1312 (1972).

       Before the operation of Hoover Dam, the river’s annual spring floods covered substantially more of the adjacent land than at any time thereafter. It is to the high-water mark of the river at this annual flood stage that the State of Arizona claims title.

       See Joint Res. No. 8, To Admit the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona as States into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, 37 Stat. 39.

       67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq.

       See discussion, infra, at 321-324.

       The Colorado River has been determined to be a navigable waterway, Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1931), and, once found to be navigable, it remains so. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 408 (1940).

       Petitioner Bonelli and the Solicitor General of the United States, as amicus curiae, assert that this case should be governed by federal law for a different reason. In Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290 (1967), this Court held that where an upland property owner traced its title to a pre-statehood federal patent, the owner’s right to accretions is a question of federal law. Id., at 292. We are here again concerned with the right to accretions conveyed by a pre-statehood federal patent, but it is unclear whether, at the time of Santa Fe Pacific’s patent, the portion of the land which ultimately became Bonelli’s parcel was actually riparian. Bonelli argues that its remote grantor, the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, was given a-patent by the United States which afforded it the right to riparian accretions as governed by federal law, and that it was expected that the river might wander within the parcel of land making parts thereof riparian which were not so at the time of the patent. Petitioner argues that its predecessor was therefore entitled to pass onto his successors all the rights he had in the property- — including his riparian rights. We need not, however, decide whether Hughes compels the application of federal law to the controversy before us, because the State’s claim in this ease is premised on a construction of the federal equal-footing doctrine and the congressionally enacted Submerged Lands Act.

        State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 183, 66 So. 2d 141, 145 (1953). For a perceptive discussion of the historical antecedents for the sovereign’s rights in the beds of navigable waterways and of the State’s modem interests in those lands, see Lundquist, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 Ariz. L. Rev. 315 (1972).

       152 U. S., at 11.

       The Supreme Court of Arizona relied on this Court’s decisions in Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471 (1850), and Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), for the proposition that a federal rechan-neling project could not diminish the extent of the State’s landholdings. Those decisions involved post-statehood federal patents of land covered by navigable waters at the time of statehood. This Court held only that since title to lands beneath navigable waters was vested in Alabama at statehood, the Federal Government did not thereafter own the subject lands, hence its attempted conveyance was void. The Court did not intimate that the operation of federal law could not diminish the State’s title to lands formerly beneath navigable waters.

       For a discussion of the navigational-purpose limitation on the State’s interest in the lands beneath its waterways, see United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416, 432 P. 2d 3, 8-9 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 949 (1968); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Assn., 342 Mass. 251, 173 N. E. 2d 273 (1961). The extent of the State’s interests should not be narrowly construed because it is denominated a navigational purpose. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 910 (1971) (recognizing conservation as a proper interest). Since the State asserts no public need for ownership of the subject land we do not attempt to define the exact parameters of the permissible public purposes.

       In contrast, this Court’s decision in Marine R. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 47 (1921), involved a determination of federal rights in land created when the Federal Government itself filled in tidelands belonging to it under a series of interstate compacts.

         108 Ariz., at 259, 495 P. 2d, at 1313 (emphasis added).

       43 U. S. C. § 1301 (a)(1).

       The legislative history of the Act indicates that it was intended to be merely confirmatory of the State’s existing rights in the beds of their navigable waterways. S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 6-8 (1953); People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1960). See generally 1953 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1395-1640. Congress was concerned about this Court’s decision in United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), which held that the Federal Government had a “paramount interest” in the marginal sea-lands “outside of inland waters, but within territorial limits” — and that the States had no title in those lands. See H. R. Rep. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1948). That concern is irrelevant to the case before us, which involves an inland waterway.

       43 U. S. C. §1301 (f).

         E. g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 365-366 (1892); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 (1891); Anderson-Tully Co. v. Tingle, 166 F. 2d 224, 227-228 (CA5), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 816 (1948).

       107 Ariz., at 472, 489 P. 2d, at 706 (Lockwood, J., dissenting), quoting, State v. R. E. Janes Gravel Co., 175 S. W. 2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559, 180 S. W. 2d 144 (1944).

       See sources collected at Burns v. Forbes, 412 F. 2d 995, 997 n. 2 (CA3 1969); cf. Beaver v. United States, 350 F. 2d 4, 11 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 937 (1966); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236, aff’d on rehearing, 233 La. 940, 98 So. 2d 244 (1957).

       See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 633-635 (1912).

       See discussion, supra, at 321-324.

       The State may well have an interest in the river as an interstate boundary justifying application of avulsion principles to determining the location of that boundary; “[t]he emergence of . . . land . . . ought not in reason to have any controlling effect upon the location of the boundary line . . . Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 175 (1918). But, since the land claimed by the State and petitioner is already limited by the interstate boundary, however determined, there is no such interest to compel application of avulsion principles to the disposition of title to the subject property.

       Under the doctrine of re-emergence, when identifiable riparian land, once lost by erosion, subsequently re-emerges as a result of perceptible change in the river course, title to the surfaced land re-vests in its former owner. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S., at 174-175; Beaver v. United States, 350 F. 2d, at 11. The re-emergence doctrine has been accepted by a number of States, Herron v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 228 F. 2d 830 (CA10 1956) (applying Oklahoma law); State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236, aff’d on rehearing, 233 La. 940, 98 So. 2d 244 (1957); Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424, 3 N. E. 581 (1885). Because of the limited interest of the State in the former riverbed, we have held the doctrine of avulsion inapplicable to this suit between the State and a private riparian owner, who is seeking title to surfaced land identifiable as part of his original parcel. In that sense, we have embraced the re-emergence concept.
      But we need not here determine whether, in a suit between private landowners (or in which the State claims title in some capacity other than as owner of the riverbed), the differing interests of the parties might require a holding that, the rechannelization should be treated as an avulsion. Nor need we determine whether, in a suit between a riparian owner and a former owner of surfaced land, the former should take the property as an accretion or the latter as a re-emergence. It is only the State’s claim to title under the equal-footing doctrine which required the invocation of federal law to resolve the instant dispute.

       The Court emphasizes the fact that it is the State that holds the title to the riverbed property. The nature of the title held by the State, however, is such that it could be conveyed to a private owner. (“[T]he settled law of this country [is] that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, or navigable [rivers], within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof . . . Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 47 (1894); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 435 (1892); United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 54-55 (1926).) Since the State could hardly convey more title than it held, it would appear from the Court’s opinion that federal law would also govern the resolution of conflicting claims to the exposed riverbed as between a private owner of the bed and a private riparian owner.

       The Court implies, but does not hold, that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court might constitute a taking of the petitioner cattle company’s property without compensation, in violation of due process of law. My conviction that this infirmity was present in the decision of the Washington Supreme Court was the reason for my special concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 294-298 (1967). Hughes was a case in which a state court effected a retroactive change in state property law that resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. That, however, is not the situation here. The Arizona Supreme Court simply applied its established property rules with regard to the effects of avulsion, accretion, erosion, and reliction in resolving conflicting claims to the exposed riverbed. It declined the petitioners’ invitation to adopt the “enlightened” re-emergence doctrine as part of the law of Arizona. This case, therefore, does not involve a retroactive alteration of state law such as would constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Powell Mr. Justice Brennan,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. CALANDRA
    No. 72-734.
    Argued October 11, 1973
    Decided January 8, 1974

      Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, BlackmuN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. BreNNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 356.

      Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, former Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Lacovara, Keith A. Jones, Jerome M. Feit, and Shirley Baccus-Lobel.

      Robert J. Rotatori argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gerald S. Gold and Niki Z. Schwartz.

        Melvin L. Wulf and Pavl Halvonik filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Powell

Court.

delivered the opinion of the

This case presents the question whether a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. The issue is of considerable importance to the administration of criminal justice.

I

On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calan-dra’s place of business, the Royal Machine & Tool Co. in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued in connection with an extensive investigation of suspected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the object of the search was the discovery and seizure of bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. A master affidavit submitted in support of the application for the warrant contained information derived from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), from physical surveillance conducted by FBI agents, and from court-authorized electronic surveillance.

The Royal Machine & Tool Co. occupies a two-story building. The first floor consists of about 13,000 square feet, and houses industrial machinery and inventory. The second floor contains a general office area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. On December 15, 1970, federal agents executed the warrant directed at Calandra’s place of business and conducted a thorough, four-hour search of the premises. The record reveals that the agents spent more than three hours searching Calandra’s office and files.

Although the agents found no gambling paraphernalia, one discovered, among certain promissory notes, a card indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an affidavit that he was aware that the United States Attorney’s office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possible violations of 18 U. S. C. §§ 892, 893, and 894, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a “loansharking” enterprise then under investigation. The agent concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland’s name was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized along with various other items, including books and records of the company, stock certificates, and. address books.

On March 1, 1971, a special grand jury was convened in the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him questions based on the evidence seized during the search of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Government then requested the District Court to grant Calandra transactional immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2514. Calandra requested and received a postponement of the hearing on the Government’s application for the immunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress the. evidence seized in the search.

Calandra later moved pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e) for suppression and return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the' warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On August 27, the District Court held a hearing at which Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer questions based on the seized materials. On October 1, the District Court entered its judgment ordering the evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the grand jury’s questions based on the suppressed evidence. 332 F. Supp. 737 (1971). The court held that “due process . . . allows a witness to litigate the question of whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the questions asked of him before the grand jury has been obtained in a way which violates the constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure.” Id., at 742. The court found that the search warrant had been issued without probable cause and that the search had exceeded the scope of the warrant.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court had properly entertained the suppression motion and that the exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness before the grand jury to bar questioning based on evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. 465 F. 2d 1218 (1972). The offer to grant Calandra immunity was deemed irrelevant. Id., at 1221.

We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 410 U. S. 925 (1973). We now reverse.

I — I H-f

The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. In England, the grand jury served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by “a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 (1956). The grand jury’s historic functions survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-687 (1972).

Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. “It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.” Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919).

The scope of the grand jury’s powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person. The grand jury’s investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 700; Costello v. United States, supra, at 364.

In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the importance of the grand jury’s role:

“[T]he investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen . . . .” 408 U. S., at 700.
“The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it. . . . ‘When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area . . . society’s interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation.’ Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand jury investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.’ United States v. Stone, 429 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be made . . . .” Id., at 701-702.

The grand jury’s sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence, Costello v. United States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910); or even on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339 (1958).

The power of a federal court to compel persons to appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly established. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). The duty to testify has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Government. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950). In Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 682 and 688, the Court noted that “[c]itizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas . . .” and that “the longstanding principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence’ ... is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.” The duty to testify may on occasion be burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury to a witness’ social and economic status. Yet the duty to testify has been regarded as “so necessary to the administration of justice” that the witness’ personal interest in privacy must yield to the public’s overriding interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S., at 281. Furthermore, a witness may not interfere with the course of the grand jury’s inquiry. He “is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy, such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his.” Id., at 282. Nor is he entitled “to challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury” or “to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct.” Ibid.

Of course, the grand jury’s subpoena power is not unlimited. It may consider incompetent evidence, but it may not itself violate a valid privilege, whether established by the Constitution, statutes, or the common law. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra; United States v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Although, for example, an indictment based on evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege is nevertheless valid, Lawn v. United States, supra, the grand jury may not force a witness to answer questions in violation of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness is granted immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States, supra. Similarly, a grand jury may not compel a person to produce books and papers that would incriminate him. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886). Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). The grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. A grand jury’s subpoena duces tecum will be disallowed if it is “far too sweeping in its terms to' be regarded as reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 (1906). Judicial supervision is properly exercised in such cases to prevent the wrong before it occurs.

III

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment limits the grand jury's power to compel a witness to answer questions based on evidence obtained from a prior unlawful search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of all citizens “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). This prohibition applies as well to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).

The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim:

“[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims’ homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965).

Instead, the rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures: Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 656; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 (1968). In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.

“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960).

Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed in the contours of the standing requirement. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, supra; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). This standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the Government’s unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search.

IV

In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context. It is evident that this extention of the exclusionary rule would seriously impede the grand jury. Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on the merits and would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the orderly progress of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury’s primary objective. The probable result would be “protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings,” Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 41, 70 (1972) (White, J., concurring), effectively transforming them into preliminary trials on the merits. In some cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury proceedings:

“Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public’s interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 17 (1973).

Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940). In sum, we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury’s duties.

Against this potential damage to the role and functions of the grand jury, we must weigh the benefits to be derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally seized evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial is thought to be an important method of effectuating the Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 174-175, for example, this Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to one who was not the victim of the unlawful search:

“The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.”

We think this observation equally applicable in the present context.

Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence of police misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal. Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment solely to obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained. We therefore decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand jury.

V

Respondent also argues that each and every question based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of the witness’ constitutional rights. Ordinarily, of course, a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury. Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every man owes his testimony. He may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but he may not decline to answer on the grounds that his responses might prove embarrassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919). Respondent’s claim must be, therefore, not merely that the grand jury’s questions invade his privacy but that, because those questions are based on illegally obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one’s person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of these areas of an individual’s life. That wrong, committed in this case, is fully accomplished by the original search without probable cause. Grand jury questions based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independent governmental invasion of one’s person, house, papers, or effects, but rather the usual abridgment of personal privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Whether such derivative use of illegally obtained evidence by a grand jury should be proscribed presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies.

In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant is entitled to the suppression of, not only the evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, but also any derivative use of that evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand jury proceeding, we believe that the damage to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule urged by respondent outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect. Our conclusion necessarily controls both the evidence seized during the course of an unlawful search and seizure and any question or evidence derived therefrom (the fruits of the unlawful search). The same considerations of logic and policy apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between them.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

The Court holds that the exclusionary rule in seareh- and-seizure cases does not apply to grand jury proceedings because the principal objective of the rule is “to deter future unlawful police conduct,” ante, at 347, and “it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal.” Ante, at 351. This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a determination whether its application in a particular type of proceeding furthers deterrence of future police misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it is a purposeful rejection, of the historical objective and purpose of the rule.

The commands of the Fourth Amendment are, of course, directed solely to public officials. Necessarily, therefore, only official violations of those commands could have created the evil that threatened to make the Amendment a dead letter. But curtailment of the evil, if a consideration at all, was at best only a hoped-for effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective. Indeed, there is no evidence that the possible deterrent effect of the rule was given any attention .by the judges chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their concern as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion an enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees. They thus bore out James Madison’s prediction in his address to the First Congress on June 8, 1789:

“If they [the rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.” 1 Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).

Since, however, those judges were without power to direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers, the enforcement tool had necessarily to be one capable of administration by judges. The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people — all potential victims of unlawful government conduct — that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.

That these considerations, not the rule’s possible deterrent effect, were uppermost in the minds of the framers of the rule clearly emerges from the decision which fashioned it:

“The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. . . . The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all condi tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. . . .
“This protection is equally extended to the action of the Government and officers of the law acting under it. . . . To sanction such proceedings would he to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914) (emphasis added).

Mr. Justice Brandéis and Mr. Justice Holmes added their enormous influence to these precepts in their notable dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis said:

“In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Id., at 485.

And Mr. Justice Holmes said:

“[W]e must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.
“. . . If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.” Id., at 470.

The same principles were reiterated less than six years ago. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968), Mr. Chief Justice Warren said for the Court:

“The rule also serves another vital function — ‘the imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.”

It is true that deterrence was a prominent consideration in the determination whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to the States, should be given retrospective effect. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). But that lends no support to today’s holding that the application of the exclusionary rule depends solely upon whether its invocation in a particular type of proceeding will significantly further the goal of deterrence. The emphasis upon deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in the light of the crucial fact that the States had justifiably relied from 1949 to 1961 upon Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and consequently, that application of Mapp would have required the wholesale release of innumerable convicted prisoners, few of whom could have been successfully retried. In that circumstance, Linkletter held not only that retrospective application of Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also that it would not further “the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.” 381 U. S., at 637. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 229 (1969).

Thus, the Court seriously errs in describing the exclusionary rule as merely “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect . . . .” Ante, at 348. Rather, the exclusionary rule is “part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of individual privacy,” Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 651, and “an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,” id., at 657, that “gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.” Id., at 660.

This Mapp summation crystallizes the series of decisions that developed the rule aiid with which today’s holding is plainly at war. For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct. This rejection of “the imperative of judicial integrity,” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960), openly invites “[t]he conviction that all government is staffed by . . . hypocrites[, a conviction] easy to instill and difficult to erase.” Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 258 (1961). When judges appear to become “accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold,” Elkins v. United States, supra, at 223, we imperil the very foundation of our people’s trust in their Government on which our democracy rests. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747, 758-759 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The exclusionary rule is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; a guarantee that does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a chimera. Moreover,

“[Insistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness.” Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958).

The judges who developed the exclusionary rule were well aware that it embodied a judgment that it is better for some guilty persons to go free than for the police to behave in forbidden fashion. A similar judgment led the Court to decide in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), that a grand jury must be denied access to plainly relevant but illegally seized papers. In that case, after federal agents unlawfully seized papers belonging to the Silverthornes and their corporation, and presented the documents to a grand jury which had previously indicted the Silver-thornes, a district court ordered the documents returned and copies that had been prepared in the interim impounded. After returning the originals, the grand jury attempted to recoup them by issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. Compliance with the subpoena was refused, and contempt convictions followed. In reversing the judgment of convictions, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the Government was barred from utilizing any fruits of its forbidden act, stating that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Id., at 392.

Silverthorne plainly controls this case. Respondent, like plaintiffs in error in Silverthorne, seeks to avoid furnishing the grand jury with evidence that he would not have been called upon to supply but for the unlawful search and seizure. The Court would distinguish Silver-thorne on the ground that there the plaintiffs in error had been indicted and could invoke the exclusionary rule “on the basis of their status as criminal defendants,” since the Government’s effort to obtain the documents was “founded on a belief that they might be useful in the criminal prosecution already authorized by the grand jury.” Ante, at 352 n. 8. The effort was clearly not founded on any such belief. Overlooked is the fact that the grand jury’s interest in again obtaining the documents in Silverthorne may well have been to secure information leading to further criminal charges, especially since indictments of three other individuals, as well as additional indictments of the Silverthornes, had been the consequence of initial submission of the documents to the grand jury. See Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs in Error in No. 358, O. T. 1919, pp. 4, 18-19. Only if Silverthorne is overruled can its precedential force to compel affirmance here be denied.

Congressional concern with the Silverthorne .holding was clearly evidenced in enactment of 18 U. S. C. § 2515, providing that “[w]henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any . . . proceeding in or before any . . . grand jury ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) In Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 41 (1972), we set aside the adjudication in criminal contempt of a grand jury witness who refused to comply with a court order to testify on the ground that interrogation was to be based upon information obtained from the witness’ communications allegedly intercepted by federal agents by means of illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Our reasons track the grounds advanced in Silverthorne.

“The purposes of § 2515 and Title III as a whole would be subverted were the plain command of § 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal interception is called as a witness before a grand jury and asked questions based upon that interception. Moreover, § 2515 serves not only to protect the privacy of communications, but also to ensure that the courts do not become partners to illegal conduct: the evidentiary prohibition was enacted also 'to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings.’ Consequently, to order a grand jury witness, on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evidence that § 2515 bars in unequivocal terms is both to thwart the congressional objective of protecting individual privacy by excluding such evidence and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents.” 408 U. S., at 51 (footnotes omitted).

Similarly to allow Calandra to be subjected to questions derived from the illegal search of his office and seizure of his files is “to thwart the [Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection] of . . . individual privacy . . . and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents.” Ibid. “And for a court, on petition of the executive department, to sentence a witness, who is [himself] the victim of the illegal [search and seizure], to jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of that [conduct in violation of the explicit command of the Fourth Amendment] is to stand our whole system of criminal justice on its head.” In re Evans, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 323, 452 F. 2d 1239, 1252 (1971) (Wright, J., concurring).

It is no answer, to suggest as the Court does, that the grand jury witnesses’ Fourth Amendment rights will be sufficiently protected “by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a- subsequent criminal prosecution of the search victim.” Ante, at 351. This, of course, is no alternative for Calandra, since he was granted transactional immunity and cannot be criminally prosecuted. But the fundamental flaw of the alternative is that to compel Calandra to testify in the first place under penalty of contempt necessarily “thwarts” his Fourth Amendment protection and “entangle [s] the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents” — consequences that Silverthorne condemned as intolerable.

To be sure, the exclusionary rule does not “provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone for any purpose.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 175 (1969). But clearly there is a crucial distinction between withholding its cover from individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated — as has been done in the “standing” cases, Alderman v. United States, supra; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960) — and withdrawing its cover from persons whose. Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been abridged.

Respondent does not seek vicariously to assert another's Fourth Amendment rights. He himself has been the victim of an illegal search and desires “to mend no one’s privacy [but his] own.” Gelbard v. United States, supra, at 63 (Douglas, J., concurring). Respondent is told that he must look to damages to redress the eoncededly unconstitutional invasion of his privacy. In other words, officialdom may profit from its lawlessness if it is willing to pay a price.

In Mapp, the Court thought it had “close[d] the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness” in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. 367 U.S., at 654-655. The door is again ajar. As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy feeling that today’s decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases; for surely they cannot believe that application of the exclusionary rule at trial furthers the goal of deterrence, but that its application in grand jury proceedings will not “significantly” do so. Unless we are to shut our eyes to the evidence that crosses our desks every day, we must concede that official lawlessness has not abated and that nó empirical data distinguishes trials from grand jury proceedings. I thus fear that when next we confront a case of a conviction rested on illegally seized evidence, today’s decision will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case also, that “it is unrealistic to assume” that application of the rule at trial would “significantly further” the goal of deterrence — though, if the police are presently undeterred, it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction of exclusion will induce more lawful official conduct.

The exclusionary rule gave life to Madison’s prediction that “independent tribunals of justice . . . will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.” 1 Annals of Cong. 439 (1789). We betray the trust upon which that prediction rested by today’s long step toward abandonment of the exclusionary rule. The observations of a recent commentator highlight the grievous error of the majority’s retreat:

“If constitutional rights are to be anything more than pious pronouncements, then some measurable consequence must be attached to their violation. It would be intolerable if the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure could be violated without practical consequence. It is likewise imperative to have a practical procedure by which courts can review alleged violations of constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of those rights. The advantage of the exclusionary rule — entirely apart from any direct deterrent effect — is that it provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees. By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long-term this may integrate some fourth amendment ideals into the value system or norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies.” Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 756 (1970).

See also Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1562-1563 (1972).

I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

       On the basis of the same affidavit, federal agents also obtained warrants authorizing searches of Calandra’s residence and automobile. The present case involves only the search of the Royal Machine & Tool Co.

       The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s finding that the search of Calandra’s business and seizure of his property were unlawful. 465 F. 2d 1218, 1226 n. 5. Although the Government does not agree with the court’s finding, it has not sought review of this issue. In addition, the Government has not challenged the District Court’s order directing return of the illegally seized property to Calandra.

       For a discussion of the history and role of the grand jury, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 279-283 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59 (1906); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *301 et seq.; G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 1-44 (1906); 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 151 (2d ed. 1909); 1 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 321-323 (7th rev. ed. 1956).

       The grand jury is subject to the court’s supervision in several respects. See Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49 (1959); Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 6 and 17; 1 L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 6:108, pp. 475-477 (1966). In particular, the grand jury must rely on the court to compel production of books, papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses, and the court may quash or modify a subpoena on motion if compliance would be “unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c).

       There is some disagreement as to the practical efficacy of the exclusionary rule, and as the Court noted in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960), relevant “[ejmpirical statistics are not available.” Cf. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970). We have no occasion in the present case to consider the extent of the rule’s efficacy in criminal trials.

       In holding that the respondent had standing to invoke the exclusionary rule in a grand jury proceeding, the Court of Appeals relied on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e). 465 F. 2d, at 1222-1224. Rule 41 (e) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court ... for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained . . . .” It further states that “[t]he motion shall be made before trial or hearing . . . .” We have recognized that Rule 41 (e) is “no broader than the constitutional rule.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 173 n. 6 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). Rule 41 (e), therefore, does not constitute a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule.
      The Court of Appeals also found that the Government’s offer of immunity under 18 U. S. C. § 2514 was irrelevant to respondent’s standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. 465 F. 2d, at 1221. We agree with that determination for the' reasons stated in Parts III, IV, and V of this opinion.

       The force of this argument is well illustrated by the facts of the present case. As of the date of this decision, almost two and one-half years will have elapsed since respondent was summoned to appear and testify before the grand jury. If respondent’s testimony was vital to the grand jury’s investigation in August 1971 of extortionate credit transactions, it is possible that this particular investigation has been completely frustrated.

       Respondent relies primarily on Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), which the dissent contends “plainly controls this case.” Post, at 362. In that ease, federal officers unlawfully seized certain documents belonging to the Silverthornes and their lumber company and presented them to a grand jury that had already indicted the Silverthornes and the company. A district court ordered the return of the documents but impounded photographs and copies of the originals. Later, the prosecutor caused the grand jury to issue subpoenas duces tecum to the Silverthornes and the company to produce the originals, and their refusal to comply led to a contempt citation. In reversing the judgment, the Court held that the subpoenas were invalid because they were based on knowledge obtained from the illegally seized evidence, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that the “essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” 251 U. S., at 392.

        Silverthorne is distinguishable from the present case in several significant respects. There, plaintiffs in error had previously been indicted by the grand jury and.thus could invoke the exclusionary rule on the basis of their status as criminal defendants. Moreover, the Government’s interest in recapturing the original documents was founded on a belief that they might be useful in the criminal prosecution already authorized by the grand jury. It did not appear that the grand jury needed the documents to perform its investigative or accusatorial functions. Thus, the primary consequence of the Court’s decision was to exclude the evidence from the subsequent criminal trial. Finally, prior to the issuance of the grand jury subpoenas, there had been a judicial determination that the search and seizure were illegal. The claim of plaintiffs in error was not raised for the first time in a pre-indictment motion to suppress requiring interruption of grand jury proceedings.
      By contrast, in the instant case respondent had not been indicted by the grand jury and was not a criminal defendant. Under traditional principles, he had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. The effect of the District Court’s order was to deprive the grand jury of testimony it needed to conduct its investigation. Furthermore, respondent’s motion to suppress had not been previously made and required interruption of the grand jury proceedings. In these circumstances, Silverthorne is certainly not controlling. To the extent that the Court’s broad dictum might be construed to suggest a different result in the present case, we note that it has been substantially undermined by later eases. See Parts III and IV of this opinion.

       At oral argument, counsel for respondent stated the contention as follows:
      “I submit to the Court that each question asked of the Respondent before the Grand Jury, which question was only asked because of a past violation of the Fourth Amendment, [amounts to] a new, immediate violation of the Fourth Amendment .... [A] question derived from a past violation, a question into the privacy of the witness amounts to another intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.
      “[Rjefusing to answer a question in which the question conceivably is derived from a past violation of the Fourth Amendment, gives rise to an additional or new Fourth Amendment right to resist answering that question because the question itself becomes an additional intrusion . . . .” Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-20.

       It should be noted that, even absent the exclusionary rule, a grand jury witness may have other remedies to redress the injury to his privacy and to prevent a further invasion in the future. He may be entitled to maintain a cause of action for damages against the officers who conducted the unlawful search. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). He may also seek return of the illegally seized property, and exclusion of the property and its fruits from being used as evidence against him in a criminal trial. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931). In these circumstances, we cannot say that such a witness is necessarily left remediless in the face of an unlawful search and seizure.

       The dissent's reliance on Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 41 (1972), is misplaced. There, the Court construed 18 U. S. C. § 2515, the evidentiary prohibition of Tit. Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, as amended, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520. It held that § 2515 could be invoked by a grand jury witness as a defense to a contempt charge brought for refusal to answer questions based on information obtained from the witness’ communications alleged to have been unlawfully intercepted through wiretapping and electronic surveillance. The Court’s holding rested exclusively on an interpretation of Tit. Ill, which represented a congressional effort to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by misuse of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. There was no indication, in either Gelbard or the legislative history, that Tit. Ill was regarded as a restatement of existing law with respect to grand jury proceedings. As Mr. Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in Gelbard, Tit. Ill “unquestionably works a change in the law with respect to the rights of grand jury witnesses . . . .” 408 U. S., at 70.
      The dissent also voices concern that today’s decision will betray “ ‘the imperative of judicial integrity,’ ” sanction “illegal government conduct,” and even “imperil the very foundation of our people’s trust in their Government.” Post, at 360. There is no basis for this alarm. “Illegal conduct” is hardly sanctioned, nor are the foundations of the Republic imperiled, by declining to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings where the rule’s objectives would not be effectively served and where other important and historic values would be unduly prejudiced. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965); and cases cited supra, at 347-348.

       Neither the Silverthorne Lumber Co., because it was a corporation, see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906), nor respondent, because he was granted transactional immunity, could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. The situations are therefore completely comparable.

       The Court also argues that “[t]he [Silverthorne’s claim] was not raised for the first time in a pre-indictment motion to suppress requiring interruption of grand jury proceedings,” ante, at 352 n. 8, and therefore presumably its assertion occasioned no delay. However, the District Court in Silverthorne had granted an earlier application for return of the seized documents from the grand jury after determining that they had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This Court made no intimation that the District Court acted improperly in considering the initial application.