text:
    No. 76-801.
    Richmond v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ya. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    No. 76-5449.
    No. 76-5577.
    Drane v. United States; and Jenkins et al v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to defer consideration in No. 76-5577 denied. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 74-1589.
    No. 74-1590.
    No. 76-249.
    No. 76-394.
    No. 76-487.
    No. 76-488.
    No. 76-516.
    General Electric Co. v. Gilbert et al., Gilbert et al. v. General Electric Co., Poll v. United States, Timmons v. Lawton et al., Bell v. Hopper, Warden, Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., Salvucci v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., et al.,
   ante, p. 125;

ante, p. 125;

ante, p. 977;

ante, p. 1000;

ante, p. 989;

ante, p. 1004; and

ante, p. 1001. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 76-73.
    Young et al. v. United States,
   ante, p. 999. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 1, 1977
    No. 76-645.
    Bonaventure v. First State Bank et al.
   Sup; Ct. N. J. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    February 4, 1977
    No. 76-928.
    Barszcz v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 504, Cook County, Illinois.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    February 10, 1977
    No. 76-5910.
    Slaughter v. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this°Court’s Rule 60.


text:
    February 18, 1977
    No. A-683.
    Dixon v. Thompson, Warden, et al.
   Dixon has filed a motion, addressed to Mr. Justice Stewart as Circuit Justice, and by him referred to the Court, for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 (b) and 1651 (a), and this Court’s Rules 31 and 50. On January 27, 1977, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied Dixon’s habeas corpus petition. Dixon has not appealed from that denial, but the record feveals that the time for appeal has not expired.

This Court does not, absent exceptional circumstances, exercise its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus when aii adequate remedy may be had in a lower federal court. Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U. S. 219 (1943); Ex parte Tracy, 249 U. S. 551 (1919), Since an appeal from the judgment of the District Court may still be had and since there appear to be no exceptional circumstances justifying exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction, the motion is denied. Denial of the motion is not an adjudication on the merits, and is made without prejudice to alternative or subsequent applications for relief. Ex parte Abernathy, supra; Ex parte Tracy, supra.


text:
    February 22, 1977
    No. 76-712.
    Stewart v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Idaho,

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell would dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 76-757.
    Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Colo.


text:
    No. 76-818.
    Fitch, Judge, et al. v. Silva et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex.


text:
    No. 76-5926.
    Mendes et al. v. Coughenour, Court Administrator for New Mexico.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. M.


text:
    No. 76-5929.
    Bisson v. New Hampshire.
   Affirmed on appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H.


text:
    No. 76-734.
    Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Chilivis, Revenue Commissioner.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-744.
    Bennett v. Thomson et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-819.
    Regan, County Executive of Erie County, et al. v. Toia, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-857.
    Frazier v. Alum Crest et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-868.
    James v. Illinois.
   Appeal from App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 76-805.
    Bugg et al. v. Maryland Transportation Authority et al.
   Appeal from Ct. Sp. App. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-821.
    Edwards et ux. v. Suburban Trust Co.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. C. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-823.
    Spartan Electrical Construction Co., Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 3d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-862.
    Campbell v. Georgia.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ga. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-888.
    Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5951.
    Hamburg v. Wyoming.
   Appeal from C. A. 10th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-830.
    Meyers et al. v. Roberts, Nobles County Auditor.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-918.
    Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Pennsylvania.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 76-923.
    Jordan et al. v. Godwin, Governor of Virginia, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 76-5943.
    Raitport v. Commissioners of Cecil County.
   Appeal from D. C. Md. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 76-672.
    Burlington Northern, Inc., et al. v. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Colo. Judgment vacated and case remanded with directions to enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.


text:
    No. 76-922.
    Stivers et al. v. Minnesota et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Minn. Judgment vacated and case remanded for entry of a fresh order from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U. S. 799 (1975),


text:
    No. 75-1691.
    No. 75-1698.
    Guest, President of Methodist Hospital, et al. v. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney of Philadelphia, et al.; and Williamsport Hospital et al. v. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney of Philadelphia, et al.
   Appeals from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 813.] Judgment in No. 75-1691 vacated and case remanded with directions to dismiss cause as moot. Judgment in No. 75-1698 vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening circumstances.


text:
    No. 76-831.
    Rahman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted. On representation of the Acting Solicitor General set forth in his memorandum for the United States, filed February 4, 1977, judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of position presently asserted by the Government.


text:
    No. 76-5593.
    Gordon v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded to Court of Appeals for further proceedings, including re-entry of its judgment affirming petitioner’s conviction and consideration of the appointment of counsel for petitioner in connection with seeking review in this Court of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Doherty v. United States, 404 U. S. 28 (1971); Schreiner v. United States, 404 U. S. 67 (1971).


text:
    No. 75-679.
    Internal Revenue Service v. Fruehauf Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 423 U. S. 1047.] Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1520.


text:
    No. A-346 (76-694).
    Buckley et al. v. McRae et al.
   Renewed application for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied.


text:
    No. A-399.
    Ward v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Application for bail, presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-469.
    McCarthy et ux. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-571.
    Dubose et al. v. Harris, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
   Application to vacate stay of a preliminary injunction entered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-616 (76-1104).
    Sagracy v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of conviction, presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-643.
    St. Louis Board of Education v. Caldwell et al.
   Application to recall and stay mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied by an equally divided Court.

Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. A-647 (76-978).
    Bridgeton Hospital Assn. et al. v. Doe et al.
   Application for stay of judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.


text:
    No. 75-1181.
    Batterton, Secretary, Department of Human Resources of Maryland v. Francis et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 939.] Motion of respondent Francis to strike brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States denied.


text:
    No. 75-1264.
    No. 75-1276.
    International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., et al.; and Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., et al.,
   ante, p. 229. Motion of respondent Robbins & Myers, Inc., to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 75-1704.
    Alexander, Secretary of the Army v. Fioto.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Hoffmann v. Fioto, ante, p. 814.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to permit Stephen L. Urbanczyk, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 75-1707.
    Ohio Bureau of Employment Services et al. v. Hodory.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 814.] Motion of appellants for leave to allocate time to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to argue as amicus curiae denied. Motion of Local No. 1375, United Steel Workers of America, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 75-1906.
    Henderson, Correctional Superintendent v. Kibbe.
   C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 815.] Motion of the District Attorney of Monroe County, New York, for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 76-120.
    United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 917.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to permit Frank H. Easterbrook, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted.


text:
    No. 76-404.
    Illinois Brick Co. et al. v. Illinois et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 938.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Counsel for petitioners allotted an additional 15 minutes for oral argument. Motion of the State of Alabama et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 76-815.
    No. 76-900.
    No. 76-5729.
    Appawora v. Brough. Erie Lackawanna Railway Co. v. Cole. Oliphant et al. v. Suquamish Indian Tribe et al.; and Belgarde v. Suquamish Indian Tribe et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah;

C. A. 6th Cir.; and

Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 76-447.
    Milliken, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Bradley et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 968.] Motion of the National Association of Attorneys General for leave to join the amicus curiae brief filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania denied.


text:
    No. 76-1105.
    Clark v. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate, et al.
   Appeal from C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to expedite consideration denied.


text:
    No. 76-5187.
    Lee v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1037.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Conrad Kellenberg, Esquire, of Notre Dame, Ind., is appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case.


text:
    No. 76-803.
    Vesco & Co., Inc. v. International Controls Corp.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 76-5896.
    Diamond v. Alabama.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5778.
    No. 76-6040.
    Gamble v. Alabama; and Clark v. Malley, Warden.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 76-6102.
    McDonald v. Thompson, Warden.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 76-5996.
    Loden v. Cunningham, Clerk, U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 76-635.
    United States Steel Corp. et al. v. Multistate Tax Commission et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-879.
    Zablocki, Milwaukee County Clerk v. Redhail.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. Wis. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-860.
    Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Jobst.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-5528.
    Baldwin et al. v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Mont. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Appellants now having paid the docket fee pursuant to this Court’s Rule 52, case is transferred to the appellate docket as No. 76-1150. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 76-616.
    New York v. Cathedral Academy.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 76-624.
    Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-678.
    Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-709.
    Butz et al. v. Economou et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-719.
    National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-811.
    Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-906.
    United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-39.
    Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division et al. v. Craft et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 76-419.
    No. 76-528.
    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.; and Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of Edison Electric Institute et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the motion and petitions.


text:
    No. 75-770.
    Treadway Companies, Inc., et al. v. Brunswick Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-836.
    Valley Distributing Co. v. Davis et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-273.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-384.
    Simon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-449.
    Persico v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-465.
    No. 76-476.
    City of Alexandria v. United States et al.; and Robinson Terminal Warehouse Corp. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-480.
    Robertson v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-486.
    No. 76-612.
    No. 76-640.
    No. 76-5503.
    No. 76-5603.
    De Lutro v. United States; Soldano v. United States; Lucas v. United States; Bolella v. United States; and Magnano et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-503.
    Matya et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-523.
    Church of Scientology of California v. Allard.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-526.
    First National Bank of Fort Collins v. State Banking Board of Colorado et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-561.
    No. 76-5565.
    No. 76-5573.
    Berrada v. United States; Contreras v. United States; and Di Giso v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-567.
    West Penn Power Co. v. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-587.
    Gibbons, Trustee v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 76-590.
    Shuey v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-621.
    Nowicki, dba K & F Food Market v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-634.
    Manning v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-657.
    Newspaper Guild v. Bell, Attorney General.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-665.
    Ernest v. Carter, President of the United States, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-681.
    National Bank of Northern New York, Executor v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-683.
    Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-687.
    Camenisch et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-692.
    Campisi v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir, Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-701.
    Brennan v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-707.
    Sumter Plywood Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-711.
    No. 76-5691.
    No. 76-5715.
    Feliciano et al. v. United States; Iacona v. United States; and Bishop et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-715.
    Van Winkle v. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-727.
    Johnson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-741.
    Hunter v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-746.
    Graves et al. v. Sneed et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-755.
    Dema v. United States et al.
   C. A. 7th dr. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-758.
    Sink v. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-759.
    No. 76-945.
    Kinty, dba Kinty Trucking Co., et al. v. United Mine Workers of America; and United Mine Workers of America v. Kinty, dba Kinty Trucking Co., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-760.
    James v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-763.
    Camelia Builders, Inc., et al. v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-765.
    Urda v. Pennsylvania Farview State Hospital.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-766.
    Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-767.
    Fried v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-775.
    Royal Indemnity Co. v. Prince et al., Trustees.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-779.
    City of Euclid v. Fitzthum et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-780.
    Kelsie v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-782.
    Great Western Sugar Co. v. Davis Cattle Co., Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-788.
    Howland et al. v. City of Monterey et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-791.
    Jacobs et al. v. Kunes, County Assessor of Maricopa County, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-792.
    Glenview Park District v. Melhus.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-796.
    Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-797.
    Rural Foods, Inc., t/a Shop & Save Super Markets v. United States Department of Agriculture.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-798.
    A. H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Department of Health of California et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-806.
    Texas Steel Co. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District 776.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-810.
    McGraw v. Berger, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-813.
    Benson v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-828.
    Markle Manufacturing Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-829.
    Cataldo v. Buglass et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-833.
    Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-837.
    Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-841.
    Illinois et al. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. et al.
   Sp. Ct., R. Reorg. Act. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-844.
    Snyder v. R. I. D. C. Industrial Development Fund.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-845.
    Gilinsky v. Columbia University et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-848.
    McClendon et al. v. Slater, Secretary, State Election Board, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-849.
    Woodmar Realty Corp. et al. v. Samuel C. Ennis & Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-850.
    Black Musicians of Pittsburgh et al. v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-856.
    Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-872.
    No. 76-912.
    Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of the Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers et al.; and Board of Trustees of the Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Burroughs et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-873.
    Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Ohio et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-875.
    Ratliff et al. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government.
   Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-882.
    Cogdell v. Fort Worth National Bank, Trustee.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-883.
    Dodson v. Georgia.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-885.
    Spillman v. City of Dallas.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 11th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-887.
    Camil v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Buena Vista Cinema et al., Real Parties in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-890.
    Hesler et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-891.
    Chambers v. Chambers et al.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-894.
    Schott et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-899.
    McGraw-Edison Co. v. Soper et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-901.
    Doe v. Lamb, Sheriff, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-903.
    Feist et al. v. Luzerne County Board of Assessment Appeals.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-904.
    FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-907.
    Compania Maritima San Basilio, S. A., et al. v. Antypas.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-916.
    Schwartz v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-920.
    Anuszewski et al. v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-925.
    Ferren v. Ferren.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-927.
    Rifkin v. United States.
   Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-940.
    Zemprelli v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-942.
    Anthony v. Anthony.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-963.
    Largent et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-1000.
    Fife v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari. denied.


text:
    No. 76-1007.
    Seligman Development, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-1009.
    Zemprelli v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-1019.
    Afflerbach v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-1032.
    Wood v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5296.
    Inciso v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5341.
    McCurry v. Clerk of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Louisiana.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5357.
    No. 76-5360.
    No. 76-5367.
    Cooper v. United States; Escamilla v. United States; and Alvarado et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5370.
    Mitchell v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5464.
    Lupo v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5465.
    Hairston v. Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5475.
    Sypula v. United States
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5482.
    Starr v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5490.
    Miller v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5507.
    Toon v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5520.
    Chester v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5526.
    Woods v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5527.
    Boyd v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5540.
    Williams v. Alabama.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5546.
    Melian v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5554.
    Rua v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5557.
    Gorham v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5569.
    Teri v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5570.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5571.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5574.
    Cavazos v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5579.
    Mitchell v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5580.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5582.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5585.
    Shryock v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5587.
    Mercer v. United States.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5589.
    Belvin v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5590.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5591.
    Liganoza v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5594.
    Gatt v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5596.
    Highfield et al. v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorári denied.


text:
    No. 76-5600.
    Evans et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5607.
    Robinson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5612.
    Kurowski v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5614.
    Campbell v. Attorney General of the United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5615.
    Clark v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5616.
    Jones et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5622.
    Flores-Amaya v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5635.
    Hannah v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5637.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5638.
    Carrington v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5640.
    Nasim v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5642.
    Bibbs v. Twomey, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5643.
    St. John v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5646.
    Minns v. Paul.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5648.
    Wilson v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5654.
    Schuer v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5656.
    Campise v. Hamilton, Sheriff, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5657.
    Doe v. AFL-CIO, Department of Organization, Region 6, Atlanta, Ga.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5658.
    Taylor v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5659.
    Boscia v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5660.
    No. 76-5786.
    Henkin v. United States; and Abraham v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5662.
    Cox v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5664.
    No. 76-5667.
    Anatala v. United States; and Panebianco v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5671.
    Whitaker v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5675.
    Norton v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5682.
    Lanier v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5684.
    O'Dell v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5687.
    Schreter v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5688.
    Scully v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5699.
    Grant v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5700.
    Childers v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5701.
    Ives v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5705.
    Engelfried et al. v. Aytch et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5709.
    Payne v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5710.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5713.
    De La O v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5721.
    Kelley v. City of Cincinnati.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5725.
    Davis v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5726.
    Auler v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5727.
    Gardner v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5732.
    Marino v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5734.
    Trowery v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5736.
    Stevens v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5743.
    Munz v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5756.
    Nolen v. Brown, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5757.
    Nolen v. Brown, Secretary of Defense.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5775.
    Rodriquez v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5789.
    Dinitz v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5804.
    Darnell v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5810.
    Schmitz v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5836.
    Wilson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5837.
    Martinez v. Malley, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5838.
    Greenfield v. Tibbetts.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5839.
    Wycoff v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5840.
    Treadwell v. Hopper, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5842.
    Richison v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5845.
    No. 76-5851.
    Weiner v. United States; and Shinnick v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5847.
    Crayton v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5848.
    Holland, Administratrix v. Allied Structural Steel Co., Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5850.
    Detwiler v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5855.
    Jackson v. Estelle, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5858.
    Noble v. Black, Reformatory Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5859.
    Houlf v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5866.
    Salter et ux. v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Ashtabula County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5869.
    McDonough v. Maryland et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5870.
    Martin v. Morris, Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services of Washington.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5871.
    Villafane v. Connecticut.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5872.
    Mauch v. Michigan Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5873.
    Lincoln v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5874.
    Simms v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5875.
    Bendter v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5878.
    Johnson v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5891.
    Campbell v. Safeco Insurance Company of America et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5892.
    Jones v. Members of the Board of Directors et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5895.
    Ramsay v. Bailey et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5899.
    Stebbins v. Continental Insurance Companies et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5901.
    McClintock v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Tuscarawas County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5902.
    McDonough v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5905.
    Warne v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5906.
    Kyle v. Kyle.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5909.
    Moore v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5916.
    Strzyzewski v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Medina County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5921.
    Chambers v. Wyrick, Warden.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5922.
    Campbell v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5923.
    Lane v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5924.
    Bressler v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5928.
    Williams v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5927.
    Myers v. Arizona.
   Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5930.
    Parrott v. Government of the Virgin Islands.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5932.
    Handy v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5937.
    Moore v. Hewitt, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5938.
    Richey v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5941.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5945.
    Sanders v. Michigan.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5946.
    Mata v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5948.
    Filion v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5949.
    Miller v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5952.
    Owens v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5953.
    Dreding v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5954.
    Gibson et al. v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5956.
    Johnson v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5961.
    Loder v. Municipal Court for the San Diego Judicial District of San Diego County et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5962.
    Salazar-Medina v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5964.
    Moreno v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5966.
    Vargas v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5968.
    Medina v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5971.
    Fahrig et al. v. LeCompte.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5973.
    Goldstein v. New York et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5976.
    Robertson v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5983.
    Folks v. Smathers, Secretary of State of Florida, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5986.
    Donner v. Bill Seidel's Datsun, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5988.
    Boigner v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5992.
    Bankhead v. Slazas et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5995.
    Eagle v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5997.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5998.
    Cook v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6001.
    Newman v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6021.
    Nixon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6023.
    Phipps v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6025.
    Smith v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6028.
    Kalama v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6029.
    Robin v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6033.
    Monin v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6037.
    Reed v. Del Chemical Corp.
   Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6046.
    Donohue v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6052.
    Nixon v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6054.
    Rose v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6062.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6072.
    Trolley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6073.
    Scott v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 76-6083.
    Brashier v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6087.
    Zamarripa v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6094.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6095.
    Buford v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6100.
    Brown v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-6111.
    Lopez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-1763.
    Gunn, Warden v. Sesser.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Marshall,

text:
    No. 75-6898.
    Freeman v. Zahradnick, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent from the denial of certiorari expresses “grave doubts” that there was any evidence at all to support the petitioner’s conviction. Although unable to accept the view that this conviction is susceptible of challenge under the “no evidence” rule of Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199, I would grant certiorari to reconsider the doctrine of the Thompson case in the light of this Court’s more recent decision in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358.

The Winship case held that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a criminal offense. A jury must be instructed accordingly. Properly instructed juries, however, occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — even when it is clear that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. In a federal trial, such improper application of law (as defined by Winship) to fact requires reversal of the conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence.

The power of a federal court to review the application of federal law to the facts as found also operates, however, in criminal cases originating in state courts. On direct review of a state-court conviction, this Court reviews the application of the “voluntariness” standard to the historical facts to determine whether a confession was admissible, or the application of First Amendment standards to the facts as found to determine whether the conduct in issue was constitutionally protected, to take but two examples. The same rule is applied in federal habeas corpus actions. See generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 506-507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). It is not immediately apparent why application of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Winship to the historical facts should be any more immune from constitutional scrutiny. If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 80, a federal court determines that no rational trier of fact could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the state offense with which he was charged, it is surely arguable that the court must hold, under Winship, that the convicted defendant was denied due process of law.

What I am suggesting is simply that the question whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by a rational trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be of constitutional dimension. Such a view would not require federal courts to second-guess state-court findings of fact or a State’s definition of the elements of a crime. Rather, the federal courts would no more than perform a familiar and appropriate role — reviewing the application of a substantive federal standard (the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) to the historical facts.

The Court’s decision in United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136, provides support for the approach I have described. Romano held that it was a violation of due process to instruct a jury that presence of a defendant at the site of an illegal still “ ‘shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction [of possession of the still].’ ” Id., at 138. The Court disapproved that instruction because no rational jury could infer possession simply from the fact of presence. And in doing so, it relied upon the decision in Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S. 160, that presence alone was insufficient evidence to convict of possession. See 382 U. S., at 140-144. It seems to me that whether the jury has been expressly instructed that it could (though need not) make an irrational inference— as in Romano — or simply does so on its own — as in Bozza— is probably of no consequence. A jury that convicts in either case would appear to be acting equally irrationally and equally in derogation of the Due Process Clause’s requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court said in Thompson v. City of Louisville that the question in that case turned “not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on whether [the] conviction rests upon any evidence at all.” 362 U. S. 199; accord, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 163; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 94. But the logical application of the “no evidence” doctrine is not an easy matter. “ [A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a 'no evidence’ standard . . ..” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 202 (Warren, C. J., dissenting). Any evidence that is relevant — that has any tendency to malee the existence of an element of a crime slightly more probable than it would be without the evidence, cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 401 — could be thought to be a “mere modicum.” Evidence that a defendant is a narcotics addict makes it more likely that he has stolen property (to finance his habit) than it would be without such evidence. Can it therefore be said that there is “some evidence” that the addict is a thief? If not, can any definable content be discerned in the “no evidence” rule? Indeed, in the Thompson case itself, could it fairly have been said that the mere fact that the defendant was found in a café, rather than home in bed, was some relevant evidence that he was guilty of loitering and disorderly conduct?

My tentative view is that where the evidence falls far short of supplying adequate proof of guilt for a rational trier, to require judges to determine how speculative is too speculative to satisfy the no-evidence rule is to require the impossible. The ordinary standard of “sufficiency of the evidence,” by contrast, is one familiar to state and federal judges and lawyers. Although like most legal standards it is not reducible to any mechanical formula, it does have a stable content permitting predictable adjudication.

A sufficiency standard would not only be more certain in application, but also far truer to the constitutional rationale of Winship. For the law as it now stands — with only the Thompson rule in force — can lead to bizarre results. Defendant A, whose guilt is conclusively established by 20 eyewitnesses, clear fingerprints, and an unimpeachable confession, is denied due process if the jury is instructed that he can be found guilty by a preponderance of the evidence; that much is clear from Winship. Defendant B, against whom there is but one flimsy piece of evidence — which falls far short of sufficiency to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but barely meets the “greater than zero” test of the no-evidence rule — is not denied due process so long as the instructions are proper. Clearly, however, defendant B is much more likely to be innocent than defendant A. That pair of results could well be thought to be at war with the purpose of the Winship decision — to reduce “the risk of convictions resting on factual error,” to provide “concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,” 397 U. S., at 363, and to ensure that “the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.” Id., at 364..

The approach I suggest would expand the contours of one kind of claim cognizable on federal habeas corpus. But if such an approach is constitutionally required, a federal habeas court asked to determine whether the evidence in a state prosecution was sufficient would be discharging the principal function underlying its jurisdiction — determining whether a defendant’s custody is in violation of federal constitutional law. And the question whether a defendant has been convicted without sufficient evidence is hardly irrelevant to innocence. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465. Indeed, an affirmative answer to this question means not merely that a defendant might have been, but that he was in fact improperly convicted.

On the evidence in this case as summarized in Me. Justice Marshall’s opinion, I think a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was in possession of the shotgun, as that offense is defined by the State — that he exercised, alone or jointly, ownership, possession, or control. To address the question whether it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trier of fact to convict a defendant where the evidence cannot fairly be considered sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, I would grant certiorari.

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Surry County, Va., of unlawfully possessing a sawed-off shotgun for an aggressive purpose. Va. Code. Ann. § 18.1-268.3 (Supp. 1971), now § 18.2-301 (1975). He received a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. After exhausting his state remedies, he filed this federal habeas corpus action. The District Court granted relief, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed.

The shotgun petitioner was convicted of possessing was found in a leather case in the locked trunk of a car rented by one Coyle Persons. At the time the shotgun was found, the car was at a garage, having been towed there following an accident. The Commonwealth offered circumstantial evidence tending to prove that petitioner, along with three other Negro men, had been riding in the car at the time of the accident. To link petitioner more directly to the shotgun in the trunk, the prosecution attempted to establish that two hours earlier these men had participated in a robbery, and that all but $700 of the proceeds of the robbery had been placed in the body and trunk of the car. The robbery victim convincingly identified the money found in the car as having come from his store. But the victim testified that only three robbers had entered the store, and he was unable to identify petitioner as one of them. It was undisputed that petitioner was not driving the car at the time of the accident.. The only evidence tying petitioner to the robbery, then, aside from his presence in the car with the proceeds two hours after the crime, came from a nurse who worked at the second hospital to which petitioner was taken after the accident. She testified that she had found $600 in a pair of pants that she had been told belonged to petitioner.

The petition for certiorari raises two issues. First, petitioner contends that his conviction and confinement on the basis of the meager evidence produced at trial violates the Due Process Clause. Second, petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was infringed by the admission of the nurse’s testimony identifying the pants. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s first contention without explanation, and did not reach the second.

I entertain grave doubts as to whether the Commonwealth produced any evidence, cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960), that petitioner possessed the shotgun. Even if the Commonwealth had conclusively proved that petitioner had robbed the store and had placed the proceeds in the trunk, this would not establish that petitioner had even seen the leather case or knew that it contained a shotgun, let alone that petitioner was exercising dominion or control over the shotgun. The Court of Appeals’ conclusory assertion to the contrary is hardly reassuring.

But if it were conceded that proof of petitioner’s participation in the robbery whose proceeds were found in the trunk established petitioner’s guilt of possession of the shotgun, then it is clear that the nurse’s testimony identifying the pants with the $600 as petitioner’s deprived petitioner of his right of confrontation. The nurse was essentially repeating the statement of an anonymous declarant. That person was not subjected to cross-examination at trial or at the time the statement first was made. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 153-168 (1970). The declarant was not even identified so that petitioner could have called him or her as a witness. Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 88 n. 19 (1970). There were no indicia of reliability surrounding the out-of-court statement, cf. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204, 213-216 (1972); to the contrary, in the rush to get six injured persons to the hospital, and then to transfer them to at least three other hospitals, it is altogether possible that the unidentified declarant became confused as to which clothes belonged to which person. Finally, the out-of-court statement provided a far from “peripheral” link in tying petitioner to the robbery. Cf. Dutton v. Evans, supra, at 87-88. Thus, no matter how the Confrontation Clause is construed, compare id., at 80-90 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.), with id., at 100-111 (Marshall, J., dissenting), it was violated in this case.

The Court of Appeals justified its decision not to determine whether petitioner’s right of confrontation had been infringed on the ground that in any event there was some evidence of guilt. But that is entirely irrelevant. Once an independent constitutional error is established, the remaining question is not whether there is some evidence, but whether the evidence is such that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). This the Court of Appeals failed to consider.

The Court’s decision to deny certiorari is puzzling, to say the least. I can understand, if not agree with, the Court’s apparent unwillingness to decide the relatively narrow question of whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Thompson v. City of Louisville, supra. But I cannot comprehend the Court’s refusal to consider the novel and important issue of constitutional law that Mr. . Justice Stewart raises in his dissent. And I am positively baffled by the Court’s failure to at least vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case with instructions that it consider the Confrontation Clause issue on the merits as Chapman v. California, supra, requires. Cf. Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., ante, p. 651; Moore v. United States, ante, p. 20.

I respectfully dissent.

         E. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515-516; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50-52 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

        E. g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380.

       A State does not have total freedom in this regard, however. It may not characterize a fact which in substance is an element of the offense as an affirmative defense, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, and a state court may not adopt a construction of an offense that fails to give, fair warning that certain conduct is deemed criminal, Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347.

       The burden that would be imposed on federal habeas courts by adoption of a sufficiency standard is not, of course, the critical inquiry in determining whether that standard is constitutionally required. I would note, however, that that burden is easily exaggerated. State courts would filter out most meritorious claims and in many cases would provide opinions thoroughly analyzing the question; few of the claims that remained would be likely to present difficult questions on the merits, and they could in any event be judged against the written record without the need for an evidentiary hearing.

       The jury instructions were not transcribed, but the record includes a typed instruction on possession, with the word "granted” written in ink at the bottom. That instruction defines “possession” as “single or joint ownership, possession, or control.” Neither the Virginia Supreme Court in refusing to review the conviction, nor the respondent in his brief in opposition to certiorari, has questioned this definition of possession, and it appears to be consistent with Virginia law, cf. Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 741, 173 S. E. 2d 799, 805-806 (1970).

       The first witness at the scene of the accident testified that he saw three black men in one car, a white man and white woman in a second car, and a fourth black man on the ground. The Commonwealth all but ruled out the possibility that petitioner was the man on the ground by showing that the second witness at the scene administered first aid to a man on the ground at the same time that a state trooper was administering aid to petitioner.

       The shotgun apparently was not used in the robbery; an automatic pistol was used and such a pistol also was found in the trunk.

       The state trooper who searched the car testified that the had found a large number of coins, some of which were rolled in paper wrappers; some bills and bus tokens; an envelope with handwriting on it; two books of bus passes, one of which had two passes missing; and a cloth United States Mint bag. The victim of the robbery identified the envelope and Mint bag, and indicated that the rest of what was found closely corresponded with what was taken.

         All the victims were taken to the same hospital following the accident. Four or five of them were transferred to other hospitals within a few hours.

       The nurse also found a pair of ladies’ gloves, two keys, and a piece of paper with an address on it in the pants pocket.

       At the same time, I find myself at least tentatively persuaded by Mr. Justice Stewart’s argument that the Due Process Clause is violated by convictions not supported by evidence that can fairly be considered sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore agree that certiorari should be granted to decide this issue.

       The ambulance attendant who transferred petitioner to- the second hospital did testify that he had carried with him clothes that he believed belonged to petitioner, and had given them to a nurse. The attendant did not name the nurse, however, nor did he indicate what, if anything, he said to her. But even if the attendant were the source of the testimony identifying the pants, the Confrontation Clause problem would remain, since the attendant’s testimony makes clear that he did not have firsthand knowledge as to the ownership of the clothes.


text:
    No. 76-383.
    Ehrlichman v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-408.
    Robles et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner Robert Dale Hart for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan,

text:
    No. 76-445.
    London Press, Inc., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted of offenses relating to the mailing of allegedly obscene materials in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1461. I adhere to the view that this statute is “ ‘clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.’ ” See, e. g., Millican v. United States, 418 U. S. 947, 948 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 148 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). I therefore would grant certiorari and reverse.


text:
    No. 76-554.
    No. 76-555.
    Tulare Lake Canal Co. et al. v. United States; and Salyer Land Co. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Ben Yellen et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-629.
    Matthews v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to strike brief of the United States and certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-636.
    Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc., et al. v. Buchwald et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.-


text:
    No. 76-648.
    City of Adair, Iowa v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-786.
    Mogle v. Board of Education of Sevier County School District et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-650.
    New Mexico et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Flathead Irrigation District et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


author: Mr. Justice Powell,

text:
    No. 76-676.
    Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Webb.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and set case for oral argument.

Mr. Justice Powell,

with whom The Chief Justice joins,

dissenting.

Respondent, captain of a vessel anchored in Seward, Alaska, left the ship and- — -with two crew members — went into town to pick up ship’s provisions at the local bus station. Not surprisingly for Seward in January, walking conditions were hazardous due to accumulations of snow and ice. While standing at the bus station, checking off the supplies being loaded into a truck, respondent slipped and fell, sustaining injuries.

Respondent sued in the District Court, claiming that the failure of petitioner to provide special safety boots or shoes denied respondent a safe place to work, and rendered his vessel “unseaworthy.” He recovered $40,000, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, remanding only for a determination whether the award should be reduced for contributory negligence on the part of respondent.

The doctrine of “seaworthiness,” on which this recovery was predicated, has been extended beyond all reason. I can think of no case that goes quite this far. I would reverse summarily.


text:
    No. 76-726.
    United States v. Empire Gas Corp.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-739.
    Olson Farms, Inc. v. Cackling Acres, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-800.
    Allen et al. v. Eastman Kodak Co. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-5720.
    Gonzales v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir.. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-794.
    Local Union No. 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Ind. v. Marshall, Secretary of Labor, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-874.
    Overmyer v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 76-854.
    Carpenters Pension Trust for Southern California v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange (Cougler, Real Party in Interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Motion of respondent Ann S. Cougler for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5717.
    Phifer et al. v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Death penalties having been vacated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 76-5645.
    Brecht v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 76-926.
    Laredo Newspapers, Inc. v. Foster.
   Sup. Ct. Tex. It appearing that there is no final judgment within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 75-628.
    No. 75-1354.
    No. 75-1631.
    No. 75-6901.
    No. 75-7003.
    No. 76-365.
    No. 76-405.
    No. 76-443.
    No. 76-497.
    No. 76-547.
    No. 76-579.
    No. 76-834.
    No. 76-5231.
    No. 76-5304.
    No. 76-5358.
    No. 76-5368.
    No. 76-5480.
    No. 76-5598.
    No. 76-5634.
    Craig et al. v. Boren, Governor of Oklahoma, et al., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Day et al., Kirkland et al. v. New York State Department of Correctional Services et al., Swigert et al. v. Miller et al., Scherer v. Pogue, Warden, Sloan et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al., Gabriel v. United States et al., Wesson et al. v. United States et al., Taxe v. United States, Simmons v. Council Bluffs Savings Bank, Executor, Spencer et al., dba Ted Spencer & Sons Auto Service v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Nanticoke, Peroff v. Hylton, U. S. Marshal, et al., Gibson v. Georgia, Sellars v. California et al., Henry v. Florida, Alvarez v. Estelle, Corrections Director, Miller v. Hampton, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission, et al., Sayles v. McGuire, U. S. District Judge, Hinton v. Michigan et al.,
   ante, p. 190;

ante, p. 890;

ante, p. 823;

ante, p. 805;

ante, p. 1038;

ante, p. 1023;

ante, p. 1011;

ante, p. 1011;

ante, p. 1040;

ante, p. 1001;

ante, p. 1011;

ante, p. 1062;

ante, p. 986;

ante, p. 1025;

ante, p. 951;

ante, p. 1044;

ante, p. 1046;

ante, p. 1036; and

ante, p. 1048. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 76-5653.
    No. 76-5712.
    No. 76-5724.
    No. 76-5735.
    Zenglein v. Lewis et al., Smith v. United States, Powell v. Alabama, Santana v. Ross, Industrial Commissioner of New York,
   ante, p. 1049;

ante, p. 1027;

ante, p. 1065; and

ante, p. 1056. Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 75-1466.
    Boston Home & School Assn. v. Morgan et al.,
   426 U. S. 935 and ante, p. 873. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 76-282.
    No. 76-5144.
    Smart v. Jones, Sheriff, et al., Zilka v. Estelle, Corrections Director,
   ante, p. 887; and

ante, p. 981. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


author: Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

text:
    GREGG v. GEORGIA
    No. A-31 (74-6257).
    Decided July 22, 1976

      Together with Nos. A-31 (75-5706), Proffitt v. Florida, and A-31 (75-5394), Jurek v. Texas.

   Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

The petitioners in these cases have filed with the Court a consolidated petition for rehearing, and also have presented to me as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit an application for a stay of the mandate heretofore scheduled to issue on July 27, the stay to be effective pending the disposition of the consolidated petition for rehearing. Under controlling statutes, such petition cannot be acted upon except by the full Court in regular or special session. If the executions in these cases were carried out before the petition for rehearing could be acted on by the Court, the harm to petitioners obviously would be irreparable. In addition, the cases would then be moot. Nor is there reason to believe that the granting of a stay until the petition for rehearing can be duly considered will prejudice the interests of the respondent States. In these circumstances, I conclude that the issuance of the mandate in each of these cases should be, and hereby is, stayed until further order of this Court.

The decision to grant this stay is not suggestive of my position on the merits of the petition.


author: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

text:
    BATEMAN v. ARIZONA
    No. A-110 (76-5033).
    Decided August 16, 1976
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Applicant has filed a motion denominated an “Application for Bail Pending Certiorari or in the Alternative Application for Stay of Mandate of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.” Such an applicant — who, in effect, seeks to have a single Justice of this Court stay what the state-court system has concluded should not be stayed — bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that he meets the traditional tests which a Circuit Justice must consider in passing on an application of this sort. Because of the serious questions going to applicant's standing to have this Court hear the question he tenders in his petition for a writ of certiorari, the application will,, therefore, be denied.

Applicant was convicted by a jury of one count of sodomy with his wife, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973)', and of one count of lewd and lascivious acts, to wit, forcing his wife to commit fellatio on him, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-652 (Supp. 1973). The jury was instructed:

“Consent is a defense in the infamous crime against nature [the sodomy count], and to the crime of the committing lewd and lascivious acts [the fellatio count]. Any evidence which reasonably tends to show consent is relevant and material.”

As applicant notes, the jury verdict of guilty “necessarily impl[ied]” that the jurors found that applicant’s wife did not consent. After the trial, upon a renewed motion of applicant, the trial court dismissed the information, holding:

“It appear [s] to the court that the Arizona statutes on sodomy and lewdness violate the Arizona and U. S. Constitutions because they could violate the right to privacy, and further that this court’s interpretation of the statutes to permit the defense of consent without the benefit of legislative or appellate court guidance was improper ....”

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P. 2d 732 (1975). Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Arizona, after consolidating this case with State v. Callaway, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction and to sentence applicant, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P. 2d 6 (1976). The Arizona Supreme Court first concluded:

“The Arizona statutes may ... be properly construed to prohibit nonconsensual sexual conduct and remain constitutional.” Id., at 110, 547 P. 2d, at 9.

The court then noted that “[t]he State may also regulate other sexual misconduct in its rightful concern for the moral welfare of its people,” and therefore held:

“[Sjexual activity between two consenting adults in private is not a matter of concern for the State except insofar as the legislature has acted to properly regulate the moral welfare of its people, and has specifically prohibited sodomy and other specified lewd and lascivious acts.” Id., at 111, 547 P. 2d, at 10.

Applicant, in his petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of this judgment, raises the question of whether the Arizona statutes, as construed, are unconstitutional as prohibiting “some sexual acts between consenting married persons . . .

After the Arizona Supreme Court handed down its decision on March 10, 1976, applicant was sentenced to a term of two to four years in the Arizona State Prison on April 15, 1976. On May 11, 1976, the trial judge denied bail pending review in this Court, And, on July 13, 1976, the Arizona Supreme Court likewise denied bail.

Applicant thus presents this application for bail, or, alternatively, for a stay of mandate, to me after similar applications have been denied by two courts, including the highest tribunal of the State of Arizona. In all cases, the fact weighs heavily “that the lower court refused to stay its order pending appeal.” Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in chambers). This normal presumption deserves even greater respect in cases where the applicant is asking a Circuit Justice to interfere with the state judicial process. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378-380 (1976); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 230-231 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 46 (1971). Due respect for the principles of comity necessitates a demonstration of compelling necessity before a single Justice of this Court will stay the considered mandate of the highest state tribunal.

No such showing has been made. The threshold — although by no means the only — question is whether there is a reasonable probability that four Justices will vote to grant certiorari, Graves, supra. Considered abstractly, and without intimating any view on the merits, the question applicant tenders to this Court might be considered to meet this threshold hurdle. But serious doubts exist as to the ability of this applicant to raise a question concerning consensual sexual activity between married adults. These doubts are not lessened by the fact that the Supreme Court of Arizona chose to decide the issue which applicant now tenders to this Court. The courts of a State are free to follow their own jurisprudence as to who may raise a federal constitutional question, but this Court in reviewing a state-court judgment is bound by the requirements of case and controversy and standing associated with Art. Ill of the United States Constitution. See, e. g., Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952).

First of all, applicant was convicted by a jury that had been charged that consent was a defense. Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court would conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court was incorrect in holding that a State may prohibit consensual sexual acts between married adults, it is difficult to see how applicant would be benefited, as his conviction was based on nonconsensual sexual acts, as to which applicant does not press constitutional objections. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 (1960). Doubts such as these make it difficult for me to conclude that applicant’s petition for a writ of certiorari has a substantial chance of being granted.

Secondly, applicant petitions from the March 10 decision of the Arizona Supreme Court which vacated and remanded for the imposition of a judgment of conviction and a sentence. This Court is precluded from taking cases unless the petition is from a “final judgment” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. In a criminal case, the “final judgment” is, of course,, the imposition of a sentence, Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 518 (1956); Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 212 (1937). The Arizona Supreme Court did not remand simply for the performance of a ministerial duty — e. g., the reinstating of a judgment of conviction and sentence — but for the initial imposition of a sentence. It seems likely, therefore, that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court is not a “final judgment.” While applicant was sentenced prior to the filing of his petition for a writ of certiorari, there nonetheless remains a question of the finality of the judgment applicant seeks to have reviewed by this Court. Such a doubt weighs against applicant here, Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Education Assn., 423 U. S. 1301 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).

These considerations lead me to deny the application.

       The court noted that while the distinction between consenting and nonconsenting adults “does not appear facially from the statutes,” nonetheless, “statutes do not stand alone. Judicial interpretation adds meaning to a statute as certainly as if the words were placed there by the legislature.”

       A motion for rehearing and an application to stay the judgment pending an application for a writ of certiorari in this Court were denied on April 13, 1976.

       Applicant does not claim that there is a constitutional right to bail, after conviction, pending appeal. I am unable to conclude that the standards enunciated in 18 U. S. C. § 3148 apply, to the exclusion of a state court's determination, in the case of a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a state conviction.

       There is little indication that Arizona would vitiate applicant’s conviction should this Court hold the statutes unconstitutional as applied to consensual behavior; certainly it is not “clear” that they would do so, see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 23 (1960). Indeed, the language of the Arizona Supreme Court, quoted supra, at 1303, and n. 1, indicates that the question of nonconsensual activity, applicable here, was decided separately from the question of consensual activity, applicable in deciding State v. Callaway.

       Applicant does not appear to meet the exception whereby the individual may assert a right that cannot otherwise be raised and protected. The question applicant tenders to this Court could be raised, for example, by a person who was convicted after a trial judge had refused to charge a jury that consent is a defense.


author: Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice.

text:
    NEW YORK et al. v. KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.
    No. A-150.
    Decided August 19, 1976
   Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice.

On Friday, August 13, 1976, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York preliminarily enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from proceeding with plans to open, on August 17, 1976, sealed bids due to be submitted for oil and gas leases of submerged lands under the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf. On Monday, August 16, 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the District Court's order. The State of New York, the' Natural Resources Defense Council, and the counties of Suffolk and Nassau, plaintiffs in the District Court, applied to me as Circuit Justice to vacate the stay. After holding oral argument, I concluded that the extraordinary relief they requested was not warranted.

I

The facts are exhaustively stated in the opinion of the District Court, and can be summarized briefly here. In January 1974, President Nixon directed the Department of the Interior to rapidly lease Outer Continental Shelf lands for mining of oil and natural gas. In accordance with this directive, the Department of the Interior prepared a preliminary environmental impact statement (EIS), held hearings on the statement, and in July 1975 issued a final impact statement, as required by § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2)(C), On September 29, 1975, the Acting Secretary announced his decision to adopt the accelerated oil- and gas-leasing programs.

One of the areas to be leased under the accelerated program is an area designated as Mid-Atlantic Sale No. 40, consisting of lands off the coasts of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. In August 1975, the Secretary announced which tracts within the area would be leased. A new EIS devoted specifically to Sale No. 40 was drafted, hearings were held in January 1976, and a final, four-volume EIS was issued in May 1976. On July 16,1976, a notice of the proposed lease sale was published in the Federal Register, 41 Fed. Reg. 29437. Pursuant to the notice, sealed bids were to be submitted for each tract on a cash bonus basis, accompanied by one-fifth of the cash bonus in cash or by cashier’s check, bank draft, certified check, or money order. The bids were due by 9:30 a. m., August 17, 1976, and were to be opened beginning at 10 a. m.; the notice stated that if the bids were not opened by midnight, they would be returned unopened to the bidder. Ibid. After opening the bids, the Secretary has 30 days to accept the highest bid, ibid., see 43 CFR § 3302.5 (1975); if no bid is accepted within 30 days, all bids are deemed rejected, ibid. Once a bid is accepted, the bidder must sign a lease within a specified time or forfeit his deposit. Ibid. The lease grants the lessee the exclusive right to drill for, remove, and dispose of oil and gas deposits in the leased lands; however, the lessee must submit all exploratory drilling plans and development plans to the supervisor of the lease for approval. 30 CFR § 250.34 (1975).

Prior to the publication of the notice of the lease sale, the plaintiffs instituted the instant action to enjoin the lease sale on the ground that the final EIS did not comply with the requirements of the NEPA. After 11 days of hearings the District Court issued a comprehensive opinion. In most respects, the Court found the EIS to be adequate, indeed “[i]f anything . . . too detailed and encyclopedic for a lay executive to fully comprehend.” Nos. 76C1229 and 75C208 (EDNY Aug. 13, 1976). On one issue, however — an issue raised by the court sua sponte during the hearings — the court found the EIS materially deficient: it failed, in the court’s view, to adequately analyze state laws governing the use of shorelines, and to evaluate “the probable extent of state cooperation [with] or opposition” to the offshore exploration program. To the contrary, the court found that the EIS assumed that the States would grant rights-of-way for pipelines on shorelands, thereby obviating the need for the lessees to use tankers to transport the oil and minimizing the risk of oil spills. The court concluded that as a result of this single omission, there was a likelihood that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits in demonstrating a violation of the NEPA, and it found that plaintiffs would be irreparably injured if the Secretary were permitted to grant the leases without prior compliance with the NEPA. Accordingly, the court issued a preliminary injunction.

The Secretary, joined by the National Ocean Industries Association which had intervened on the side of the Secretary, appealed the District Court’s order and requested that the injunction be stayed. After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeals granted the stay. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:

“We find nothing in this case which satisfies us that the August 17, 1976 sale, in and of itself, will cause appellees any irreparable injury. On the other hand, the national interests, looking toward relief of this country’s energy crisis, will be clearly damaged if the proposed sale is aborted.” No. 76-8369 (CA2 Aug. 16, 1976).

II

The power of a Circuit Justice to dissolve a stay is well settled. See, e. g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U. S. 1304, 1308 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers); Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962) (Black, J., in chambers); Cunningham v. English, 78 S. Ct. 3, 2 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1957) (Warren, C. J., in chambers). But it.is equally well established that a Circuit Justice should not disturb, “except upon the weightiest considerations, interim determinations of the Court of Appeals in matters pending before it.” O’Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 623, 624, 4 L. Ed. 2d 615, 616 (1960) (Harlan, J., in chambers). This is especially true where, as here, I had only a few hours to review the District Court’s 200-page opinion, the briefs of the parties, and the four-volume EIS, and where I did not have before me — nor could I have meaningfully considered even if it were here — the voluminous record compiled in the District Court.

Perhaps the most compelling justification for a Circuit Justice to upset an interim decision by - a court of appeals would be to protect this Court’s power to entertain a petition for certiorari before or after the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. See ft. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 17.19 (4th ed. 1969): Despite the practical importance of the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to issue leases for the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf, however, I am not persuaded that the legal question involved here — whether this EIS complied with the uncontested requirements of the NEPA — would warrant review by this Court. Just this past Term, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 (1976), we had occasion to examine the purposes and requirements of the NEPA. Although we disagreed on certain issues, we were unanimous in concluding that the essential requirement of the NEPA is that before an agency takes major action, it must have taken “a 'hard look’ at environmental consequences.” 427 U. S., at 410 n. 21, quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 5, 16, 458 F. 2d 827, 838 (1972). In evaluating the adequacy of EIS’s the Courts of Appeals consistently have enforced this essential requirement, tempered by a practical “rule of reason.” As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained:

“[A]n EIS is required to furnish only such information as appears to be reasonably necessary under the circumstances for evaluation of the project rather than to be so all-encompassing in scope that the task of preparing it would become either fruitless or well nigh impossible.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F. 2d 79, 88 (1975).

In the instant case, respondents do not appear to challenge the requirement that the agency take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences, nor do applicants question the appropriateness of employing a rule of reason in evaluating impact statements. Thus, the sole question at issue is whether the District Court properly applied the controlling standards in concluding that the EIS lacked information concerning state regulation of shorelands which was “reasonably necessary” for evaluating the project. That question appropriately is for the Court of Appeals, and I do not believe that four Members of this Court would vote to grant a writ of certiorari to review its conclusion on such a fact-intensive issue. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for me to exercise my extraordinary powers as Circuit Justice in order to preserve a question for review by the full Court.

Nor is it necessary for me to act in this case “to preserve the rights of the parties pending final determination of the cause.” Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct., at 11, 9 L. Ed. 2d, at 44. The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiffs would not be irreparably injured if the Secretary were permitted to open the bids. I cannot say that the court abused its discretion. It is axiomatic that if the Government, without preparing an adequate impact statement, were to make an “irreversible commitment of resources,” Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 539 F. 2d 824, 844 (CA2 1976), a citizen’s right to have environmental factors taken into account by the decision-maker would be irreparably impaired. For this reason, the lower courts repeatedly have enjoined the Government from making such resource commitments without first preparing adequate impact statements. Indeed this past Term, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, we indicated that it would have been appropriate for the Court of Appeals to have enjoined the approval of mining plans had that court concluded that “the impact statement covering [the mining plans] inadequately analyzed the environmental impacts of, and the alternatives to, their approval.” 427 U. S., at 407-408, n. 16.

In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals apparently decided that the opening of bids does not constitute an “irreversible commitment of resources.” I am unprepared to say that the court was wrong in so holding. In the first instance, it is quite clear that the actual opening of the bids does not involve a commitment of any kind, since the Secretary reserves the right to reject all bids. Thus it is not until a bid is accepted — which may not happen for 30 days — that an irreversible commitment is even arguably made. Moreover, even after the bids are accepted, I cannot say that the Court of Appeals would be without power to declare the leases invalid if the court determined that the Government entered into leases without compliance with the requirements of the NEPA.

For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that this case does not present the “exceptional circumstances,” Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U. S., at 1308, that warrant a Circuit Justice to vacate a stay.

         See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F. 2d 813, 819 (CA5 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F. 2d 1276, 1283 (CA9 1974); Harlem Valley Transportation Assn. v. Stafford, 500 F. 2d 328, 337 (CA2 1974); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Volpe, 487 F. 2d 849, 852 (CA8 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 5, 12, 458 F. 2d 827, 834 (1972).

       See, e. g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC; Environmental Defense Fund v. TV A, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1183-1184 (CA6 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F. 2d 1027, 1034 (CA7 1972); Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 52, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1128 (1971). See generally F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts 239-246 (1973).

       In the instant case, it is possible that before the bids are accepted the District Court will decide that the defect in the EIS has been remedied by a supplemental affidavit prepared by the Secretary in response to the court’s opinion. That affidavit was presented to the Court of Appeals as an appendix to the Government’s brief; it was also presented to me, but because it had not yet been given to the District Court, I declined to consider it. I was informed at argument, however, that the affidavit discusses the extent to which the Secretary considered the possibility of lack of state cooperation in making his decision to approve Sale No. 40.


text:
    GRUNER et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO
    No. A-190.
    Decided September 3, 1976
   Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.

Applicants seek a stay of orders of commitment, pursuant to state contempt judgments, pending this Court’s disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 76-328, on the underlying issue. Applicants also seek a temporary stay until this Court acts upon their request for a stay pending disposition of the petition.

Applicants are editors and reporters employed by the Fresno Bee, a California daily newspaper. Applicants have refused to answer in open court certain questions propounded regarding the identity of sources used by applicants for certain news articles. The articles contained information based upon sealed grand jury testimony. The Superior Court entered judgments of contempt against each of the applicants and ordered that the applicants be jailed until they answer the questions propounded. Applications for stays were denied by the Superior Court in Fresno on August 25, 1976, and by the California Supreme Court on September 2, 1976.

On two prior occasions the applicants have unsuccessfully sought review by this Court. On March 20, 1975, an application for stay pending disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari was filed with this Court and denied shortly thereafter. Patterson v. Superior Court of California, 420 U. S. 1301. No petition for certiorari was filed in that matter. In December 1975, a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the California courts’ affirmation . of the contempt judgments was filed with this Court. The petition for the writ of certiorari was denied. Rosato v. Superior Court of California, 427 U. S. 912 (1976).

On those occasions applicants raised the sort of First and Fourteenth Amendment issues that were dealt with in this Court’s opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972). Their present stay application relies largely on the same grounds; since there were not four Justices of the Court disposed to grant certiorari on this very issue in this very case less than three months ago, there is no reason to think that there are four so disposed now. Applicants in their petition for certiorari raise a somewhat different claim, asserting that, before they may be committed for their refusal to testify, they are entitled to a “due process hearing” to determine whether or not the commitment for contempt has a reasonable prospect of accomplishing its purpose. None of our cases support the existence of any such requirement, and applicants’ position seems to boil down to a contention that if they but assure the court of their complete recalcitrance, the court is powerless to commit them for contempt.

The application for a stay pending the disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 76-328, Gruner v. Superior Court, and the application for a temporary stay are therefore denied.


text:
    McCARTHY et al. v. BRISCOE, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, et al.
    No. A-201.
    Decided September 14, 1976
   Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice.

This application, for a partial stay of an order and judgment of a three-judge District Court for the Western District of Texas, reaches me during the summer recess of the Court. Following a practice utilized by other Justices and by myself on previous occasions, see, e. g., Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201 (1972) (Powell, J., in chambers), I have consulted informally with each of my Brethren who was available. Although no other Justice has participated in the drafting of this order, I am authorized to say that each of those consulted would vote to deny the application for the reason stated below.

In denying injunctive relief to applicants, the three-judge District Court based its action not upon resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim presented (which it resolved in favor of applicants), but upon the equitable doctrine of laches. I conclude, therefore, that direct appeal to this Court does not lie under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U. S. 799, 804 (1975), and that the Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief now requested. Accordingly, the application for a stay is denied, but without prejudice to the right of applicants to seek relief in the Court of Appeals.

      A11 Members of the Court, save two who were not available, have been consulted.