source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Me. Justice Stevens

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO et al.
    No. 78-156.
    Argued March 27, 1979 —
    Decided June 4, 1979

      Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree and Assistant Attorney General Heymann.

      Michael Edelson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Addonizio. Leon J. Greenspan argued the cause for respondents Whelan and Flaherty. With him on the brief was Joseph D. DeSalvo.

        Kenneth N. Flaxman filed a brief for the Lewisburg Prison Project as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

   Me. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has prolonged their actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the sentencing judge. The question presented is whether this type of allegation will support a collateral attack on the original sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. We hold that it will not.

I

With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before us are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we accept for purposes of decision Addonizio’s view of the facts and the relevant aspects of the Parole Commission’s practices.

After his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, on September 22, 1970, Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $25,000. Factors which led the-District Judge to impose that sentence included the serious character of Addonizio’s offenses, and the judge’s expectation that exemplary institutional behavior would lead to Addonizio’s release when he became eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. The judge did not contemplate that the Parole Corn-mission might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reason for refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive.

In 1973, the Parole Commission markedly changed its policies. Under its new practices the gravity of the offense became a significant factor in determining whether a prisoner should be granted parole. Addonizio became eligible for parole on July 3, 1975. After hearings, the Parole Commission twice refused to release him, expressly basing its refusal on the serious character of his crimes.

Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing. Following the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Salerno, 538 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court accepted jurisdiction, found that the Parole Commission had not given Addonizio the kind of “meaningful parole hearing” that the judge had anticipated when sentence was imposed, and reduced his sentence to the time already served. The judge stated that he had “anticipated — assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined — that [Addonizio] would be actually confined for a period of approximately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence.” This “sentencing expectation” was frustrated by the Parole Commission’s subsequent adoption of new standards and procedures.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F. 2d 147. Because of a conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that § 2255 does not give district courts this type of resentenc-ing authority, we granted the Government’s petition for cer-tiorari in Addonizio’s case and in the consolidated case of two other prisoners in which similar relief was granted. 439 U. S. 1045.

II

We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider the Government’s alternative argument that the significance of the changes in the Parole Commission’s procedures has been exaggerated because it always attached some weight to the character of the offense in processing parole applications. Nor do we have any occasion to consider whether the new guidelines are consistent with the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219; or whether their enforcement may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.

III

When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the procedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral review. It has, of course, long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice. The question in this case is whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental to come within those narrow limits.

Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it “was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” This statute was intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient jurisdiction of the sentencing court. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 216-217.

While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing. Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions and sentences entered by a court without jurisdiction. See, e. g., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-203 (Marshall, C. J.). In later years, the availability of the writ was expanded to encompass claims of constitutional error as well. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104—105; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack has remained far more limited. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 477 n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428.

Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255 proceeding, as amicus here points out, is that traditionally they could have been raised by a petition for a writ of coram nobis, and thus fall within § 2255’s provision for vacating sentences that are “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” But coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors of fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing “in those cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69. Thus, the writ of coram nobis was “available to bring before the court that pronounced the judgment errors in matters of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon and were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under age, appeared by attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or died before verdict or interlocutory judgment.” Id., at 68.

The claimed error here — that the judge was incorrect in his assumptions about the future course of parole proceedings — does not meet any of the established standards of collateral attack. There is no claim of a constitutional violation; the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits; and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or law of the “fundamental” character that renders the entire proceeding irregular and invalid.

The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude distinguishes Addonizio’s claim from those in prior cases, upon which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted. Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, for example, like this case, involved a claim that a judgment that was lawful when it was entered should be set aside because of a later development. The subsequent development in that case, however, was a change in the substantive law that established that the conduct for which petitioner had been convicted and. sentenced was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence would surely have been a “complete miscarriage of justice,” since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful. The change in Parole Commission policies involved in this case is not of the same character: this change affected the way in which the court’s judgment and sentence would be performed but it did not affect the lawfulness of the judgment itself— then or now. Nor is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, analogous to the present case. In that case, the Court ordered resentencing of a defendant whose original sentence had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions secured without the assistance of counsel. But the error underlying the sentence in Tucker, as the Court emphasized, was “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” Id., at 447. We have held that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convictions serve as the basis for enhanced punishment. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115. Whether or not the Parole Commission action in this case was constitutional, a question not presented here, there is no claim that the action taken by the sentencing judge was unconstitutional, or was based on “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”

Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio’s claim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to all of the objective criteria — federal jurisdiction, the Constitution, and federal law — the sentence was and is a lawful one. And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the grounds for collateral attack to include claims based not on any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge.

As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the validity of his j udgment. The record made when Judge Barlow pronounced sentence against Addonizio, for example, is entirely consistent with the view that the judge then thought that this was an exceptional case in which the severity of Addonizio’s offense should and would be considered carefully by the Parole Commission when Addonizio became eligible for parole. If the record is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion is not filed until years later, it will often be difficult to reconstruct with any certainty the subjective intent of the judge at the time of sentencing. Regular attempts to do so may well increase the risk of inconsistent treatment of defendants; on the other hand, the implementation of the Parole Commission’s policies may reduce that risk.

Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts to engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the contrary, the proposed system of sentencing review would be inconsistent with that established by Congress. The decision as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be released has been committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole Commission. Whether wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and in doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges. The authority of sentencing judges to select precise release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited: the judge may select an early parole eligibility date, but that guarantees only that the defendant will be considered at that time by the Parole Commission. And once a sentence has been imposed, the trial judge’s authority to modify it is also circumscribed. Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 35 now authorizes district courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed on appeal. The time period, however, is jurisdictional and may not be extended.

The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has no enforceable expectations with respect to the actual release of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The judge may well have expectations as to when release is likely. But the actual decision is not his to make, either at the time of sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To require the Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial expectations, and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would substantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the Commission and not the courts. Nothing in § 2255 supports — let alone mandates — such a frustration of congressional intent.

Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the validity of the Parole Commission’s actions, either in promulgating its new guidelines or in denying Addonizio’s applications for parole, we hold that subsequent actions taken by the Parole Commission — whether or not such actions accord with a trial judge’s expectations at the time of sentencing — do not retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment itself. The facts alleged by the prisoners in these cases do not provide a basis for a collateral attack on their respective sentences pursuant to § 2255.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore reversed.

It is so ordered.

Me. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       Title 28 U. S. C. §2255 provides:
      “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or ís otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
      “If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”

       At the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated:
      “Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio’s record of public service] ... is his conviction by a jury in this court of crimes of monumental proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely be exaggerated and the commission of which create the gravest implications for our form of government.
      “Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been convicted of one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive counts of extorting hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons doing business with the City of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of this magnitude, I suggest to you, Mr. Hellring [defense counsel], could have never succeeded without the then-Mayor Addonizio’s approval and participation.
      “These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for which Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted represent a pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic criminal extortion over a period of many years, claiming many victims and touching many more lives.
      “Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed governmental officials are certainly not novel to the law, but the corruption disclosed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by the frightening alliance of criminal elements and public officials, and it is this very kind of totally destructive conspiracy that was conceived, organized and executed by these defendants.
      “. . . It is impossible to estimate the impact upon — and the cost of — these criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark, and, indeed, to the citizens of the State of New Jersey, in terms of their frustration, despair and disillusionment.
      “Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very heart of our civilized form of government and of our society. The people will not tolerate such conduct at any level of government, and those who use their public office to betray the public trust in this manner can expect from the courts only the gravest consequences.
      “It is, accordingly, the sentence of this Court that the defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for a term of ten years, and that, additionally, the defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a fine of $25,000. That is all.” 573 F. 2d 147, 154.

       In his opinion granting Addonizio relief under §2255 in 1977, Judge Barlow stated:
      “At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that petitioner would receive a meaningful parole hearing — that is, a determination based on his institutional record and the likelihood of recidivism — upon the completion of one-third (%) of his sentence. The Court anticipated — assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined — that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approximately three and one-half to four years of'the ten-year sentence, in view of the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to be little probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the case and his personal and social history. This sentencing expectation was based on the Court’s understanding — which was consistent with generally-held notions — of the operation of the parole system in 1970.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a (footnotes omitted).

         The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in 1972 and started to apply them throughout the Nation in November 1973. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31942 (1973). The Commission’s present guidelines are codified at 28 CFR §2.20 (1978). The use of guidelines is now required by statute. See 18II. S. C. §§ 4203 (a) (1) and 4206 (a).

       As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit, the comments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977, explaining its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the reasons given by the trial judge at the time sentence was imposed. The Commission stated:
      “Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity. Your salient factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total of 57 months at time of hearing. Guidelines established by the Commission for adult cases which consider the above factors suggest a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional adjustment. After careful consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, a decision above the guidelines appears warranted because your offense was part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and approximately 14 other co-conspirators. As the highest elected official in the City of Newark, you were convicted of an extortion conspiracy in which, under color of your official authority, you and your co-conspirators conspired to delay, impede, obstruct, and otherwise thwart construction in the City of Newark in order to obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of working on city construction projects.
      “Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted totalling approximately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent citizens of Newark, and because the offense involved a serious breach of public trust over a substantial period of time, a decision above the guidelines is warranted. Parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the law.” 573 F. 2d, at 153-154.

         Bonanno v. United States, 571 F. 2d 588 (CA9 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U. S. 1136.

        United States v. Whelan & Flaherty. In that case, two federal prisoners filed motions under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241 motion was denied by the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed, 573 F. 2d 147, and the prisoners did not seek further review. In the § 2255 motion, which is at issue here, these respondents claimed that the Parole Commission’s action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who had originally sentenced them and who had since died. The case was assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that “the real issue is whether the Parole Commission’s denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious,” 427 F. Supp. 379, 381, and concluded that it was not. The Court of Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to reconsider the case to determine whether Judge Shaw’s sentencing intent had been frustrated. Proceedings on remand have resulted in the release of both respondents.

       See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm’n, 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1978), cert. granted, 440 U. S. 945 (1979).

       See Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F. 2d 170 (CA7 1979).

       See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 (“Of course the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal. . . . This rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained”); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 181-182; Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424.

       Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures. See, e. g., F. James, Civil Procedure 517— 518 (1965). Moreover, increased volume of judicial work associated with the processing of collateral attacks inevitably impairs and delays the orderly administration of justice. Because there is no limit on the time when a collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearings are often inconclusive and retrials may be impossible if the attack is successful. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491 n. 31; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154 n. 13.

       See Brief for Lewisburg Prison Project as Amicus Curiae 10-12.

       A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of his maximum sentence less “good time” computed according to 18 U. S. C. §4161. In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than 5 years’ imprisonment is entitled to be released on parole after serving two-thirds of each consecutive term or 30 years, whichever is first, unless the Commission determines that the prisoner “has seriously or frequently violated institution rules” or that there is a reasonable probability that he would commit further crimes. 18 U. S. C. §4206 (d). The Commission has substantial discretion to determine whether a prisoner should be released on parole, once he is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by statute. Title 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (1970 ed.), in effect when Addonizio was sentenced, provided:
      “If it appears to the Board . . . that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner wifi live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.”
      Under the statute now in effect, 18 U. S. C. § 4206, the Commission is to consider the risk of recidivism and whether “release would . . . depreciate the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for the law.”

       See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94^648, p. 19 (1976).

       The trial court may set a defendant’s eligibility for parole at any point up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed, see 18 U. S. C. §§4205 (a), (b); 18 U. S. C. §§4202, 4208 (1970 ed.). Whether the defendant will actually be paroled at that time is the decision of the Parole Commission. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 47 (“[T]he extent of a federal prisoner’s confinement is initially determined by the sentencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally prescribed range; release on parole is then available on review by the United States Parole Commission, which, as a general rule, may conditionally release a prisoner any time after he serves one-third of the judicially-fixed term”). The trial judge is precluded from effectively usurping that function by splitting a lengthy sentence between a stated period of probation and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a sentence entailing incarceration of more than six months. 18 U. S. C. §3651.

       Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such authority. “The beginning of the service of the sentence in a criminal case ends the power of the court even in the same term to change it.” United States v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347, 358. This rule was applied even though the change related only to the second of a pair of consecutive sentences which itself was not being served at the time. Affronti v. United States, 350 U. S. 79.

       See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45 (b); United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220.


author: Mr. Justice Stevens

text:
    MARCHIORO et al. v. CHANEY et al.
    No. 78-647.
    Argued March 26, 1979 —
    Decided June 4, 1979

      Charles A. Goldmark argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.

      Daniel Brink argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Winship A. Todd, Jr.

   Mr. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Since 1927, a Washington statute has required each major political party to have a State Committee consisting of two persons from each county in the State. The question presented by this appeal is whether the Washington Supreme Court correctly held that this statute does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The powers of the Democratic State Committee are derived from two sources: the authorizing statute and the Charter of the Democratic Party of Washington. The statute gives the State Committee the power to call conventions, to provide for the election of delegates to national conventions and for the nomination of Presidential electors, and to fill vacancies on the party ticket.

The principal activities performed by the State Committee are authorized by the Charter of the Democratic Party of Washington. The Charter provides that the State Committee shall act as the party’s governing body when the Convention is in adjournment. And it gives the State Committee authority to organize and administer the party’s administrative apparatus, to raise and distribute funds to candidates, to conduct workshops, to instruct candidates on effective campaign procedures and organization, and generally to further the party’s objectives of influencing policy and electing its adherents to public office.

Under both party rules and state law, the State Convention rather than the State Committee is the governing body of the party. The Charter explicitly provides that the Convention is “the highest policy-making authority within the State Democratic Party.” And the State Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the “state convention of a major political party is the ultimate repository of statewide party authority. . . . [T]he state convention is implicitly empowered to establish the permanent state organization of the party, create committees, delegate authority, and promulgate, adopt, ratify, amend, repeal or enforce intraparty statewide rules and regulations.”

In 1976, the State Democratic Convention adopted a Charter amendment directing that the State Committee include members other than those specified by state statute. The Charter amendment provided that in addition to the two delegates from each of the State's 39 counties, there should be one representative elected from each of the State’s 49 legislative districts. Pursuant to this Charter amendment new legislative district representatives were elected to serve on the State Committee. At the January 1977 meeting of the State Committee, a motion to seat these newly elected representatives was ruled out of order, apparently in reliance on the statutory definition of the composition of the Committee.

Thereafter, members and officers of the State Democratic Party, including four who had been elected as legislative district representatives, instituted this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the King County Superior Court. Among their contentions was a claim that the statutory restriction on the composition of the Democratic State Committee violated their rights to freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Superior Court granted appellants’ motion for a partial summary judgment. On appeal, a divided State Supreme Court reversed that part of the trial court’s judgment that invalidated the statutory definition of the central Committee. The state court reasoned that although “ ‘substantial burdens’ ” on the right to associate for political purposes are invalid unless “ ‘essential to serve a compelling state interest,’ ” these appellants failed to establish that this statute had imposed any such burden on their attempts to achieve the objectives of the Democratic Party. Since this initial burden had not been met, the court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged statute.

We noted probable jurisdiction, 439 U. S. 1044, and now affirm the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.

The requirement that political parties form central or county committees composed of specified representatives from each district is common in the laws of the States. These laws are part of broader election regulations that recognize the critical role played by political parties in the process of selecting and electing candidates for state and national office. The State's interest in ensuring that this process is conducted in a fair and orderly fashion is unquestionably legitimate; “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 730. That interest is served by a state statute requiring that a representative central committee be established, and entrusting that committee with authority to perform limited functions, such as filling vacancies on the party ticket, providing for the nomination of Presidential electors and delegates to national conventions, and calling statewide conventions. Such functions are directly related to the orderly participation of the political party in the electoral process.

Appellants have raised no objection to the Committee’s performance of these tasks. Rather, it is the Committee’s other activities — those involving “purely internal party decisions,” Brief for Appellants 5 n. 11 — that concern appellants and give rise to their constitutional attack on the statute.

The Committee does play a significant role in internal party affairs: The appellants’ description of its activities makes this clear:

“Between state conventions, the Democratic State Committee is the statewide party governing body. It meets at least four times each year, exercises the party’s policy-making functions, directs the party’s administrative apparatus, raises and distributes funds to Democratic candidates, conducts workshops to instruct candidates on effective campaign procedures and organization, and seeks generally to further the party’s objectives of influencing policy and electing its adherents to public office. Insofar as is relevant here, the state committee is purely an internal party governing body.” Id., at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).

None of these activities, however, is required by statute to be performed by the Committee. With respect to each, the source of the Committee’s authority is the Charter adopted by the Democratic Party.

In short, all of the “internal party decisions” which appellants claim should not be made by a statutorily composed Committee are made not because of anything in the statute, but because of delegations of authority from the Convention itself. Nothing in the statute required the party to authorize such decisionmaking by the Committee; as far as the statutory scheme is concerned, there is no reason why the Convention could not have created an entirely new committee or one, for example, composed of members of the State Committee and such additional membership as might be desired to perform the political functions now performed by the State Committee. The fact that it did not choose such an alternative course is hardly the responsibility of the state legislature.

The answer to appellants’ claims of a substantial burden on First Amendment rights, then, turns out to be a simple one. There can be no complaint that the party’s right to govern itself has been substantially burdened by statute when the source of the complaint is the party’s own decision to confer critical authority on the State Committee. The elected legislative representatives who claim that they have been unable to participate in the internal policymaking of the Committee should address their complaint to the party which has chosen to entrust those tasks to the Committee, rather than to the state legislature. Instead of persuading us that this, is a case in which a state statute has imposed substantial burdens on the party’s right to govern its affairs, appellants’ own statement of the facts establishes that it is the party’s exercise of that very right that is the source of whatever burdens they suffer.

The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       Washington Rev. Code §29.42.020 (1976) provides:

        “State Committee. The state committee of each major political party shall consist of one committeeman and one committeewoman from each county elected by the county committee at its organization meeting. It shall have a chairman and vice chairman who must be of opposite sexes. This committee shall meet during January of each odd-numbered year for the purpose of organization at a time and place designated by a sufficient notice to all the newly elected state committeemen and committeewomen by the authorized officers of the retiring committee. For the purpose of this section a notice mailed at least one week prior to the date of the meeting shall constitute sufficient notice. At its organizational meeting it shall elect its chairman and vice chairman, and such officers as its bylaws may provide, and adopt bylaws, rules and regulations. It shall have power to:
      “(1) Call conventions at such time and place and under such circumstances and for such purposes as the call to convention shall designate. The manner, number and procedure for selection of state convention delegates shall be subject to the committee’s rules and regulations duly adopted;
      “(2) Provide for the election of delegates to national conventions;
      “(3) Fill vacancies on the ticket for any federal or state office to be voted on by the electors of more than one county;
      “(4) Provide for the nomination of presidential electors; and
      “(5) Perform all functions inherent in such an organization. “Notwithstanding any provision of this [1972 amendatory act], the committee shall not set rules which shall govern the conduct of the actual proceedings at a party state convention.”
      Between 1909 and 1927, the statute provided for one member to be elected from each county.
      A “major political party” is defined as “a political party of which at least one nominee for president, vice president, United States senator, or a statewide office received at least five percent of the total vote cast at the last preceding state general election in an even-numbered year . . . .” Wash. Rev. Code §29.01.090 (Supp. 1977).

       The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
      “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
      The freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30-31.

       Charter, Art. IV (G) (1), App. 10.

       Charter, Arts. IV (G)(1), (2), (5), App. 10-11; Charter, Art. VII (C)(1), App. 19.

       Charter, Art. Y (F) (5), App. 15.

        King County Republican Central Committee v. Republican State Committee, 79 Wash. 2d 202, 211-212, 484 P. 2d 387, 392 (1971). See also 90 Wash. 2d 298, 313, 582 P. 2d 487, 496 (1978) (case below).

       An appeal from that ruling was defeated by a vote of 56 to 17. App. 4 — 5.

       Appellants also challenged the requirement of Wash. Rev. Code §§29.42.020 and 29.42.030 (1976) that the two persons elected as county delegates be one man and one woman. Appellants argued that this requirement violates the Washington State Equal Rights Amendment, Wash. Const., Art. XXXI. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the claim, 90 Wash. 2d, at 308, 582 P. 2d, at 493. Appellants do not seek review here of the “one man and one woman” requirements of the statute. Nor do they raise any claim based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See n. 12, infra.

       90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P. 2d 487 (1978).

        Id., at 309, 582 P. 2d, at 493, quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 729.

       In 23 States, political parties are required by state law to establish state central committees composed of an equal number of committee members from each unit of representation. See Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 8660, 9160 (West Supp. 1979); Fla. Stat. § 103.111 (1977); Idaho Code § 34-504 (Supp. 1978); Ind. Code § 3-1-2-1 (1976); Iowa Code §43.111 (1979); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-3804 (Supp. 1978); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 52, §1 (West 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.597 (1970); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1978); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.621 (1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §23-3403 (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. §293.153 (1975); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:5-4 (West Supp. 1979); N. D. Cent. Code § 16-17-11 (1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.03 (1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-90 (1976); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 12-5-16 (1975); Tenn. Code Ann. §2-1304 (Supp. 1978); Tex. Elec. Code Ann., Art. 13.38 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 730 (1968); Wash. Rev. Code § 29.42.020 (1976); W. Va. Code §3-1-9 (1979); Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-4^105 — 22-4^110 (1977). Election laws in five States establish state party central committees in which the number of committee members from each unit of representation bears a rough relationship to party membership. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-233 (1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-14-108 (2) (Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:285 (1) (West Supp. 1979); Ore. Rev. Stat. §248.075 (1977); Utah Code Ann. §20-4-2 (1976).
      Political parties are required to establish county central committees comprised of an equal number of committee members from each unit of representation by state law in 21 States. See Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 8820-8825, 9320-9325 (West 1977) (limited to certain counties); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1 — 14—108 (1) (1973); Fla. Stat. § 103.111 (1977); Idaho Code § 34r-502 (Supp. 1978); Ind. Code § 3-1-2-1 (1976); Kah. Stat. Ann. §25-3802 (1973); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:285 (9) (West Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, § 11-2 (Supp. 1978); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 52, § 9 (West 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.599 (1970); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1978); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.607 (1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 23-3401, 23-3402 (Supp. 1977); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-3 (West Supp. 1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.03 (1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-60 (1976); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 12-5-13, 12-5-14 (1975); Tex. Elec. Code Ann., Art. 13.18 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Wash. Rev. Code §29.42.030 (1976); W. Va. Code §3-1-9 (1979); Wis. Stat. §8.17 (1975).
      See Note, Equal Representation of Party Members on Political Party Central Committees, 88 Yale L. J. 167, 168-169, and nn. 5-6 (1978).

       Since appellants do not claim that these statutory requirements impose any impermissible burdens, we have no occasion to consider whether whatever burdens they do impose are justified by the legitimate state interests served by these requirements. By appellants’ own admission, the Committee’s electoral functions are performed rarely; moreover, when they are performed, they conform with the one-person, one-vote principle.
      “Although the state committee on rare occasions performs certain ballot access functions, see RCW 29.18.150 and 29.42.020 (filling vacancies on certain party tickets and nominating presidential electors) and Wash. Const, art. II, § 15 (selecting nominees for certain interim legislative positions), when it does so it is constitutionally required to comply with the principle of one-person, one-vote. See, e. g., Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F. 2d 308, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1972); Fahey v. Darigan, 405 F. Supp. 1386, 1392 (D. R. I. 1975). The state committee has recognized this and has stipulated to the entry of an injunction ordering that the state committee be:
      “enjoined from filling vacancies on the Democratic ticket for any federal or state office to be voted on by the electors of more than one county or selecting Democratic nominees for interim legislative appointments to represent multi-county districts by any method that contravenes the one-person, one-vote rule.

        “Cunningham v. Washington State Democratic Comm., Civ. No. C75-901 (WD Wash., permanent injunction entered Nov. 28, 1977). As a result of this injunction, RCW 29.42.020 — which results in gross deviations from one-person, one-vote — has been superseded insofar as applied to the state committee when it performs electoral functions.” Brief for Appellants 5 n. 11.

       In addition to its enumerated functions, the Committee is authorized by Wash. Rev. Code §29.42.020 (1976) to “[p]erform all functions inherent in such an organization.” See n. 1, swpra. The Committee’s role in internal party affairs, however, is clearly not “inherent” in its performance of the limited electoral functions authorized by statute.

       Indeed, it is the Charter provisions, rather than the state statute, which appellants themselves cite as authority for their description of the Committee activities at issue here. See Brief for Appellants 4 nn. 5-10. Thus, it is Art. IV (G) (1) of the Charter which provides that the Committee is the statewide governing body, shall raise funds for candidates, and shall exercise the party’s policymaking functions. And it is subsection (2) of that same Article which authorizes the Committee to direct the party’s administrative apparatus, while subsection (5) requires it to meet at least four times per year. Finally, the source of the Committee’s authority to conduct workshops for candidates is found in Art. VII (C)(1) of the Charter.

        Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, upan which appellants place their primary reliance, does not support their claim here. In Cousins, unlike this case, there was a substantial burden on associational freedoms. This fact alone distinguishes the two cases, and renders Cousins inapposite.


author: Mr. Justice Brennan Me. Justice White, Mr. Justice Stevens, Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    DUNAWAY v. NEW YORK
    No. 78-5066.
    Argued March 21, 1979 —
    Decided June 5, 1979

      Edward J. Nowak argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was James M. Byrnes.

      Melvin Bressler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lawrence T. Kurlander.

        Richard Emery and Joel M. Gora filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide in this case the question reserved 10 years ago in Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969), namely, “the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest.” Id., at 106.

I

On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a pizza parlor in Rochester, N. Y., was killed during an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, Detective Anthony Fantigrossi of the Rochester Police was told by another officer that an informant had supplied a possible lead implicating petitioner in the crime. Fantigrossi questioned the supposed source of the lead — a jail inmate awaiting trial for burglary — but learned nothing that supplied “enough information to get a warrant” for petitioner’s arrest. App. 60. Nevertheless, Fantigrossi ordered other detectives to “pick up” petitioner and “bring him in.” Id., at 54. Three detectives located petitioner at a neighbor’s house on the morning of August 11. Petitioner was taken into custody; although he was not told he was under arrest, he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted to leave. Opinion in People v. Dunaway (Monroe County Ct., Mar. 11, 1977), App. 116, 117. He was driven to police headquarters in a police car and placed in an interrogation room, where he was questioned by officers after being given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Petitioner waived counsel and eventually made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the crime.

At petitioner’s jury trial for attempted robbery and felony murder, his motions to suppress the statements and sketches were denied, and he was convicted. On appeal, both the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction without opinion. 42 App. Div. 2d 689, 346 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (1973), aff’d, 35 N. Y. 2d 741, 320 N. E. 2d 646 (1974). However, this Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court’s supervening decision in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975). 422 U. S. 1053 (1975). The petitioner in Brown, like petitioner Dunaway, made inculpatory statements after receiving Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation following his seizure — in that case a formal arrest — on less than probable cause. Brown’s motion to suppress the statements was also denied and the statements were used to convict him. Although the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that Brown’s arrest was unlawful, it affirmed the admission of the statements on the ground that the giving of Miranda warnings served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements. This Court reversed, holding that the Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves sufficed to cure the Fourth Amendment violation; rather the Court held that in order to use such statements, the prosecution must show not only that the statements meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also that the causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is broken sufficiently to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.

In compliance with the remand, the New York Court of Appeals directed the Monroe County Court to make further factual findings as to whether there was a detention of petitioner, whether the police had probable cause, “and, in the event there was a detention and probable cause is not found for such detention, to determine the further question as to whether the making of the confessions was rendered infirm by the illegal arrest (see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, supra).” People v. Dunaway, 38 N. Y. 2d 812, 813-814, 345 N. E. 2d 583, 584 (1975).

The County Court determined after a supplementary suppression hearing that Dunaway’s motion to suppress should have been granted. Although reaffirming that there had been “full compliance with the mandate of Miranda v. Arizona,” the County Court found that “this case does not involve a situation where the defendant voluntarily appeared at police headquarters in response to a request of the police . . . .” App. 117. The State’s attempt to justify petitioner’s involuntary investigatory detention on the authority of People v. Morales, 22 N. Y. 2d 55, 238 N. E. 2d 307 (1968)— which upheld a similar detention on the basis of information amounting to less than probable cause for arrest — was rejected on the grounds that the precedential value of Morales was questionable, and that the controlling authority was the “strong language” in Brown v. Illinois indicating “disdain for custodial questioning without probable cause to arrest.” The County Court further held that “the factual predicate in this case did not amount to probable cause sufficient to support the arrest of the defendant,” that “the Miranda warnings by themselves did not purge the taint of the defendant’s illegal seizure [,] Brown v. Illinois, supra, and [that] there was no claim or showing by the People of any attenuation of the defendant’s illegal detention,” App. 121. Accordingly petitioner’s motion to suppress was granted. Ibid.

A divided Appellate Division reversed. Although agreeing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner, the majority relied on. the Court of Appeals’ reaffirmation, subsequent to the County Court’s decision, that “[l]aw enforcement officials may detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning for a reasonable and brief period of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample to protect the individual’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 302, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 490, 492 (1978), quoting People v. Morales, 42 N. Y. 2d 129, 135, 366 N. E. 2d 248, 251 (1977). The Appellate Division also held that even if petitioner’s detention were illegal, the taint of his illegal detention was sufficiently attenuated to allow the admission of his statements and sketches. The Appellate Division emphasized that petitioner was never threatened or abused by the police and purported to distinguish Brown v. Illinois, The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s application for leave to appeal. App. 134.

We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 979 (1978), to clarify the Fourth Amendment’s requirements as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation and to review the New York court’s application of Brown v. Illinois. We reverse.

II

We first consider whether the Rochester police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause to arrest, they took petitioner into custody, transported him to the police station, and detained him there for interrogation.

The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .” There can be little doubt that petitioner was “seized” in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police station. And respondent State concedes that the police lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner before his incriminating statement during interrogation. Nevertheless respondent contends that the seizure of petitioner did not amount to an arrest and was therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the police had a “reasonable suspicion” that petitioner possessed “intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved crime.” Brief for Respondent 10. We disagree.

Before Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons was analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for arrest, and warrants based on such probable cause. The basic principles were relatively simple and straightforward: The term “arrest” was synonymous with those seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment. While warrants were not required in all circumstances, the requirement of probable cause, as elaborated in numerous precedents, was treated as absolute. The “long-prevailing standards” of probable cause embodied “the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often opposing interests” in “safeguard [ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy” and in “seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). The standard of probable cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests, without the need to “balance” the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967).

Terry for the first time recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must be based on probable cause. That case involved a brief, on-the-spot stop on the street and a frisk for weapons, a situation that did not fit comfortably within the traditional concept of an “arrest.” Nevertheless, the Court held that even this type of “necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat” constituted a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,” 392 U. S., at 20, 17, and therefore “must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id., at 20. However, since the intrusion involved in a “stop and frisk” was so much less severe than that involved in traditional “arrests,” the Court declined to stretch the concept of “arrest” — and the general rule requiring probable cause to make arrests “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment — to cover such intrusions. Instead, the Court treated the stop-and-frisk intrusion as a sui generis “rubric of police conduct,” ibid. And to determine the justification necessary to make this specially limited intrusion “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court balanced the limited violation of individual privacy involved against the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety. Id., at 22-27. As a consequence, the Court established “a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id., at 27. Thus, Terry departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in two respects. First, it defined a special category of Fourth Amendment “seizures” so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment “seizures” reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. Second, the application of this balancing test led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for weapons.

Because Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope. Terry itself involved a limited, on-the-street frisk for weapons. Two subsequent cases which applied Terry also involved limited weapons frisks. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972) (frisk for weapons on basis of reasonable suspicion); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (order to get out of car is permissible “de minimis” intrusion after car is lawfully detained for traffic violations; frisk for weapons justified after “bulge” observed in jacket). United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1976), applied Terry in the special context of roving border patrols stopping automobiles to check for illegal immigrants. The investigative stops usually consumed less than a minute and involved “a brief question or two.” 422 U. S., at 880. The Court stated that “ [b] ecause of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest.” Ibid. See also United States v. Martines-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976) (fixed checkpoint to stop and check vehicles for aliens); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979) (random checks for drivers’ licenses and proper vehicle registration not permitted on less than articulable reasonable suspicion).

Respondent State now urges the Court to apply a balancing test, rather than the general rule, to custodial interrogations, and to hold that “seizures” such as that in this case may be justified by mere “reasonable suspicion.” Terry and its progeny clearly do not support such a result. The narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the “long-prevailing standards” of probable cause, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S., at 176, only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest. Indeed, Brignoni-Ponce expressly refused to extend Terry in the manner respondent now urges. The Court there stated: “The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.” 422 U. S., at 881-882 (emphasis added). Accord, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 567.

In contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions involved in those cases, the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room. He was never informed that he was “free to go”; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody. The application of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an “arrest” under state law. The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was not “booked,” and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless, while not insignificant for all purposes, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973), obviously do not make petitioner’s seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny. Indeed, any “exception” that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable” only if based on probable cause.

The central importance of the probable-cause requirement to the protection of a citizen’s privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees cannot be compromised in this fashion. “The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.” Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959). Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that “common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’ was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest.” Id., at 101 (footnotes omitted). The familiar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive experience accommodating the factors relevant to the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to the implementation of a workable rule. See Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 175-176.

In effect, respondent urges us to adopt a multifactor balancing test of “reasonable police conduct under the circumstances” to cover all seizures that do not amount to technical arrests. But the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront. Indeed, our recognition of these dangers, and our consequent reluctance to depart from the proved protections afforded by the general rule, are reflected in the narrow limitations emphasized in the cases employing the balancing test. For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite “balancing” has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are “reasonable” only if supported by probable cause.

Moreover, two important decisions since Terry confirm the conclusion that the treatment of petitioner, whether or not it is technically characterized as an arrest, must be supported by probable cause. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969), decided the Term after Terry, considered whether fingerprints taken from a suspect detained without probable cause must be excluded from evidence. The State argued that the detention “was of a type which does not require probable cause,” 394 U. S., at 726, because it occurred during an investigative, rather than accusatory, stage, and because it was for the sole purpose of taking fingerprints. Rejecting the State’s first argument, the Court warned:

“[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed ‘arrests’ or ‘investigatory detentions.’ ” Id., at 726-727.

The State’s second argument in Davis was more substantial, largely because of the distinctions between taking fingerprints and interrogation:

“Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person’s prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the ‘third degree.’ Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time.” Id., at 727.

In Davis, however, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the validity of a “narrowly circumscribed procedure for obtaining” the fingerprints of suspects without probable cause— in part because, as the Court emphasized, “petitioner was not merely fingerprinted during the . . . detention but also subjected to interrogation.” Id., at 728 (emphasis added). The detention therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), similarly disapproved arrests made for “investigatory” purposes on less than probable cause. Although Brown’s arrest had more of the trappings of a technical formal arrest than petitioner’s, such differences in form must not be exalted over substance. Once in the police station, Brown was taken to an interrogation room, and his experience was indistinguishable from petitioner’s. Our condemnation of the police conduct in Brown fits equally the police conduct in this case:

“The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness’ of the fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for investigation’ or for 'questioning.’ . . . The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.” Id., at 605.

See also id., at 602.

These passages from Davis and Brown reflect the conclusion that detention for custodial interrogation — regardless of its label — intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest. We accordingly hold that the Rochester police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause, they seized petitioner and transported him to the police station for interrogation.

Ill

There remains the question whether the connection between this unconstitutional police conduct and the incriminating statements and sketches obtained during petitioner’s illegal detention was nevertheless sufficiently attenuated to permit the use at trial of the statements and sketches. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).

The New York courts have consistently held, and petitioner does not contest, that proper Miranda warnings were given and that his statements were “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. But Brown v. Illinois, supra, settled that “[t]he exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth,” 422 U. S., at 601, and held therefore that “Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.” Ibid.

“If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. . . . Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or 'investigation/ would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom, could well be made admissible at trial by the simple, expedient of giving Miranda warnings.” Id., at 602.

Consequently, although a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, this type of “voluntariness” is merely a “threshold requirement” for Fourth Amendment 'analysis, 422 U. S., at 604. Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached.

Beyond this threshold requirement, Brown articulated a test designed to vindicate the “distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 602. Following Wong Sun, the Court eschewed any per se or “but for” rule, and identified the relevant inquiry as “whether Brown’s statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest,” 422 U. S., at 600; see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 488. Brown’s, focus on “the causal connection between the illegality and the confession,” 422 U. S., at 603, reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. When there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts.

Brown identified several factors to be considered “in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest [: t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.... And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.” Id., at 603-604. Examining the case before it, the Court readily concluded that the State had failed to sustain its burden of showing the confession was admissible. In the “less than two hours” that elapsed between the arrest and the confession “there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever.” Ibid. Furthermore, the arrest without probable cause had a “quality of purposefulness” in that it was an “expedition for evidence” admittedly undertaken “in the hope that something might turn up.” Id., at 605.

The situation in this case is virtually a replica of the situation in Brown. Petitioner was also admittedly seized without probable cause in the hope that something might turn up, and confessed without any intervening event of significance. Nevertheless, three members of the Appellate Division purported to distinguish Brown on the ground that the police did not threaten or abuse petitioner (presumably putting aside his illegal seizure and detention) and that the police conduct was “highly protective of defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” 61 App. Div. 2d, at 303, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 493. This betrays a lingering confusion between “voluntariness” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and the “causal connection” test established in Brown. Satisfying the Fifth Amendment is only the “threshold” condition of the Fourth Amendment analysis required by Brown. No intervening events broke the connection between petitioner’s illegal detention and his confession. To admit petitioner’s confession in such a case would allow “law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the ‘procedural safeguards’ of the Fifth.”

Reversed.

Me. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Me. Justice White,

concurring.

The opinion of the Court might be read to indicate that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), is an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable cause. As our prior cases hold, however, the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness — the balancing of competing interests. E. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653-654 (1979); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 506 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 321-322 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-21; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536-537 (1967). But if courts and law enforcement officials are to have workable rules, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 168 (1978) (dissenting opinion), this balancing must in large part be done on a categorical basis — not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394-395 (1978). On the other hand, the need for rules of general applicability precludes neither the recognition in particular cases of extraordinary private or public' interests, cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 564-565 (1978), nor the generic recognition of certain exceptions to the normal rule of probable cause where more flexibility is essential. Cf., e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra. It is enough, for me, that the police conduct here is similar enough to an arrest that the normal level of probable cause is necessary before the interests of privacy and personal security must give way.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring.

Although I join the Court’s opinion, I add this comment on the significance of two factors that may be considered when determining whether a confession has been obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest.

The temporal relationship between the arrest and the confession may be an ambiguous factor. If there are no relevant intervening circumstances, a prolonged detention may well be a more serious exploitation of an illegal arrest than a short one. Conversely, even an immediate confession may have been motivated by a prearrest event such as a visit with a minister.

The flagrancy of the official misconduct is relevant, in my judgment, only insofar as it has a tendency to motivate the defendant. A midnight arrest with drawn guns will be equally frightening whether the police acted recklessly or in good faith. Conversely, a courteous command has the same effect on the arrestee whether the officer thinks he has probable cause or knows that he does not. In either event, if the Fourth Amendment is violated, the admissibility question will turn on the causal relationship between that violation and the defendant’s subsequent confession.

I recognize that the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule is sometimes interpreted quite differently. Under that interpretation, exclusion is applied as a substitute for punishment of the offending officer; if he acted recklessly or flagrantly, punishment is appropriate, but if he acted in good faith, it is not. But when evidence is excluded at a criminal trial, it is the broad- societal interest in effective law enforcement that suffers. The justification for the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper methods is to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole — not the aberrant individual officer — to adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion of the citizen’s constitutional rights. For that reason, exclusionary rules should embody objective criteria rather than subjective considerations.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice joins,

dissenting.

If the Court did no more in this case than it announced in the opening sentence of its opinion — “decide . . . the question reserved 10 years ago in Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969), namely, The question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest’ ” — I would have little difficulty joining its opinion. The decision of this question, however, does not, contrary to the implication in the Court’s opening sentence, decide this case. For the Court goes on to conclude that petitioner Dunaway was in fact “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that the connection between Duna-way’s purported detention and the evidence obtained therefrom was not sufficiently attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the alleged unlawful police conduct. Ante, at 207, 216-219. I cannot agree with either conclusion, and accordingly, I dissent.

I

There is obviously nothing in the Fourth Amendment that prohibits police from calling from their vehicle to a particular individual on the street and asking him to come over and talk with them; nor is there anything in the Fourth Amendment that prevents the police from knocking on the door of a person’s house and when the person answers the door, inquiring whether he is willing to answer questions that they wish to put to him. “Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). Voluntary questioning not involving any “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes may take place under any number of varying circumstances. And the occasions will not be few when a particular individual agrees voluntarily to answer questions that the police wish to put to him either on the street, at the station, or in his house, and later regrets his willingness to answer those questions. However, such morning-after regrets do not render involuntary responses that were voluntary at the time they were made. In my view, this is a case where the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the station to answer their questions.

In Terry v. Ohio, the Court set out the test for determining whether a person has been “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Ibid. In this case three police officers were dispatched to petitioner’s house to question him about his participation in a robbery According to the testimony of the police officers, one officer approached a house where petitioner was thought to be located and knocked on the door. When a person answered the door, the officer identified himself and asked the individual his name. App. 97-98. After learning that the person who answered the door was petitioner, the officer asked him if he would accompany the officers to police headquarters for questioning, and petitioner responded that he would. Id., at 89-90; see 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 301, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 490, 491 (1978). Petitioner was not told that he was under arrest or in custody and was not warned not to resist or flee. No weapons were displayed and petitioner was not handcuffed. Each officer testified that petitioner was not touched or held during the trip downtown; his freedom of action was not in any way restrained by the police. App. 78-79, 99. In short, the police behavior in this case was entirely free of “physical force or show of authority.”

The Court, however, categorically states in text that “[t]here can be little doubt that petitioner was 'seized’ in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police .station.” Ante, at 207. In an accompanying footnote, the Court states: “Respondent contends that petitioner accompanied the police voluntarily and therefore was not ‘seized.’ . . . The County Court found otherwise . . . and the Appellate Division treated the case as an involuntary detention justified by reasonable suspicion.” Ante, at 207 n. 6. The Court goes on to cite a commentary from the Tentative Draft of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure to the effect that a “request to come to [the] police station ‘may easily carry an implication of obligation, while the appearance itself, unless clearly stated to be voluntary, may be an awesome experience for the ordinary citizen.’ ” Ibid.

The Court’s heavy reliance on the conclusions of the Monroe County Court on this issue is misplaced, however. That court clearly did not apply the Terry standard in determining whether there had been a seizure. Instead, that court’s conclusions were based solely on the facts that petitioner was in the physical custody of detectives until he reached police headquarters and that “had he attempted to leave the company of the said detectives, they would have physically restrained him (per stipulation of People at conclusion of hearing).” App. 117. But the fact that the officers accompanied petitioner from his house to the station in no way vitiates the State’s claim that petitioner acted voluntarily. Similarly, the unexpressed intentions of police officers as to hypothetical situations have little bearing on the question whether the police conduct, objectively viewed, restrained petitioner’s liberty by show of force or authority.

The Appellate Division’s opinion also can be of no assistance to the Court. The Court’s opinion characterizes the Appellate Division’s treatment of the case “as an involuntary detention justified by reasonable suspicion.” Ante, at 207 n. 6. But the Appellate Division did not accept the County Court’s conclusion that, petitioner did not voluntarily accompany the police to the station. To the contrary, in its recitation of the facts, the Appellate Division recites the officers’ testimony that petitioner voluntarily agreed to come downtown to talk with them. 61 App. Div. 2d, at 301, 302, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 491, 492. That the Appellate Division found that it was able to resolve the case on the basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision in People v. Morales, 42 N. Y. 2d 129, 366 N. E. 2d 248 (1977), does not mean that the Appellate Division decided that petitioner had been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, the Court quotes the Model Code for Pre-Arraignment Procedure to support its assertion. Ante, at 207 n. 6. I do not dispute the fact that a police request to come to the station may indeed be an “awesome experience.” But I do not think that that fact alone means that in every instance where a person assents to a police request to come to headquarters, there has been a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The question turns on whether the officer’s conduct is objectively coercive or physically threatening, not on the mere fact that a person might in some measure feel cowed by the fact that a request is made by a police officer. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977).

Therefore, although I agree that the police officers in this case did not have that degree of suspicion or probable cause that would have justified them in physically compelling petitioner to accompany them to the police station for questioning, I do not believe that the record demonstrates as a fact that this is what happened. No involuntary detention for questioning was shown to have taken place. The Fourth Amendment, accordingly, does not require suppression of petitioner’s statements.

II

Assuming, arguendo, that there was a “seizure” in this case, I still cannot agree with the Court that the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of petitioner’s statements and sketches. Relying on Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), the Court concludes that this evidence must be suppressed primarily, it seems, because no intervening events broke the connection between petitioner’s detention and his confession. Ante, at 219. In my view, the connection between petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention and the incriminating statements and sketches is sufficiently attenuated to permit their use at trial. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).

In Brown v. Illinois, supra, we identified several factors to be considered in determining whether inculpatory statements were sufficiently a product of free will to be admissible under the Fourth Amendment. The voluntariness of the statements is a threshold requirement. That Miranda warnings are given is “an important factor.” 422 U. S., at 603-604. Also relevant are “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Ibid. But the Court did not assign equal weight to each of these factors. Given the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, the “purpose and flagrancy” of the police conduct is, in my view, the most important factor. Where police have acted in good faith and not in a flagrant manner, I would require no more than that proper Miranda warnings be given and that the statement be voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part). “Absent aggravating circumstances, I would consider a statement given at th^ station house after one has been advised of Miranda rights to be sufficiently removed from the immediate circumstances of the illegal arrest to justify its admission at trial.” Ibid.

The Court concedes that petitioner received proper Miranda warnings and that his statements were “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Ante, at 216. And the police acted in good faith. App. 61; see United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-537 (1975). At the time of petitioner’s detention, the New York Court of Appeals had held that custodial questioning on less than probable cause for an arrest was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. People v. Morales, 22 N. Y. 2d 55, 238 N. E. 2d 307 (1968) . Petitioner testified that the police never threatened or abused him. App. 35. Petitioner voluntarily gave his first statement to police about an hour after he reached the police station and then gave another statement to police the following day. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, the police conduct in this case was in no manner as flagrant as that of the police in Brown v. Illinois, supra. See 422 U. S., at 605; n. 1, supra. Thus, in my view, the record convincingly demonstrates that the statements and sketches given police by petitioner were of sufficient free will as to purge the primary taint of his alleged illegal detention. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.

       See opinion in People v. Dunaway (Monroe County Ct., Mar. 11, 1977), App. 116-117. An informant had reportedly told the other detective that one James Cole had said that he and someone named “Irving” had been involved in the crime. The informant did not know “Irving’s” last name, but had identified a picture of petitioner Dunaway from a police file. After hearing this information, Fantigrossi interviewed Cole, who was in jail pending an indictment for burglary. Cole denied any involvement in the crime, but stated that he had been told about it two months earlier by another inmate, Hubert Adams. According to Cole, Adams had mentioned that his younger brother, Ba Ba Adams, had told him that he and a fellow named “Irving,” also known as “Axelrod,” had been involved in the crime.

       See 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 301, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 490, 491 (1978). The first statement was made within an hour after Dunaway reached the police station; the following day he made a second, more complete statement.

       We granted certiorari in Morales and noted that “[t]he ruling below, that the State may detain for custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a traditional arrest, is manifestly important, goes beyond our subsequent decisions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), and is claimed by petitioner to be at odds with Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969).” Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102, 104-105 (1969). Nevertheless, inadequacies in the record led us to remand for further development and to reserve the issue we decide today for a record that “squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the factual context in which the question arises.’’ Id., at 105. On remand, the New York courts determined that Morales had gone to the police voluntarily. People v. Morales, 42 N. Y. 2d 129, 137-138, 366 N. E. 2d 248, 252-253 (1977).

       App. 118; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 602, 605.

       61 App. Div. 2d, at 303-304, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 493. Two of the five members of the court dissented on this issue. Id., at 304, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 493 (Denman, J., concurring); id., at 305, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 494 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).

       “It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized’ that person.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16 (1968). Respondent contends that petitioner accompanied the police voluntarily and therefore was not “seized.” Brief for Respondent 7-9. The County Court found otherwise, App. 117, quoted supra, at 205; and the Appellate Division treated the case as an involuntary detention justified by reasonable suspicion. See 61 App. Div. 2d, at 302-303, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 492. See also ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 2.01 (3) and commentary, p. 91 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) (request to come to police station “may easily carry an implication of obligation, while the appearance itself, unless clearly stated to be voluntary, may be an awesome experience for the ordinary citizen”).

       Both the County Court and the Appellate Division'found that the police lacked probable cause, and respondent does not question those findings here. See 61 App. Div. 2d, at 302, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 492; App. 120, citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964).

       See, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976) (felony arrests in public places).

       “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1949), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925). See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 436-480 (1978).

       See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 111-112 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

       The Court stressed the limits of its holding: the police officer’s belief that his safety or that of others is in danger must be objectively reasonable — based on reasonable inferences from known facts — so that it can be tested at the appropriate time by “the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge,” 392 U. S., at 21, 27; and the extent of the intrusion must be carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it.

        Terry specifically declined to address “the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure’ upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention’ and/or interrogation.” Id., at 19 n. 16. Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, made these observations on the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop:
      “There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.” Id., at 34.

       “[B] ecause of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” 422 U. S., at 881.

       The factors that respondent would consider relevant in its balancing test, and the scope of the rule the test would produce, are not completely clear. The Appellate Division quoted two apparently different tests from the Court of Appeals opinion in People v. Morales, 42 N. Y. 2d 129, 366 N. E. 2d 248 (1977):
      “£[L]aw enforcement officials may detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning for a reasonable and brief period of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample to protect the individual’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights’ (42 NY2d, at p. 135). '“[A] policeman’s right to request information while discharging his law enforcement duties will hinge on the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved and the circumstances attending the encounter” ’ (42 NY2d, at p. 137, quoting from People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 219).” 61 App. Div. 2d, at 302, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 492.
      Then, in characterizing the ease before it, the Appellate Division suggested yet a third “test”:
      “[T]his case involves a brief detention for interrogation based upon reasonable suspicion, where there was no formal accusation filed against defendant and where great public interest existed in solving a brutal crime which had remained unsolved for a period of almost five months.” Id., at 303, 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 492.

       See n. 14, supra.

       While the rule proposed by respondent is not entirely clear, the Appellate Division cited with approval a test that would require an officer to weigh before any custodial interrogation “the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved and the circumstances attending the encounter.” See n. 14, supra.

       The officers drew their guns, informed Brown that he was under arrest, and handcuffed him. But Brown, unlike petitioner, was not a teenager; and the police had a report that he possessed a pistol and had used it on occasion, 422 U. S., at 594. The police in this case would have resorted to similar measures if petitioner had resisted being taken into custody. App. 117.

       But see Westover v. United States, 384 U. S. 436, 494-497 (1966) (decided with Miranda v. Arizona).

       See generally, 3 LaFave, supra n. 9, at 630-638; Comment, 25 Emory L. J. 227, 239-244 (1976); Comment, 13 Houston L. Rev. 753, 763-770 (1976).

       The cases are even parallel in that both Brown and petitioner made subsequent statements, see n. 2, supra; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 595-596, which in each case were “clearly the result and the fruit of the first.” Id., at 605, and n. 12.

       Comment, 25 Emory L. J. 227, 238 (1976).

       See, e. g., MR. Justice RehNquist, dissenting, post, at 226.

       I would agree that the officer’s subjective state of mind is relevant when he is being sued for damages, but this case involves the question whether the evidence he has obtained is admissible at trial.

       Neither Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969), nor Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), which the Court treats as points of departure for today’s opinion, supports the Court’s conclusion that petitioner was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In Davis, the State made no claim that Davis had voluntarily accompanied the police officers to headquarters. 394 U. S., at 726. Similarly, in Brown there could be no reasonable disagreement that the defendant had been “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. In Brown, two detectives of the Chicago police force broke into Brown’s apartment and searched it. When Brown entered the apartment, he was told that he was under arrest, was held at gunpoint, and was searched. He then was handcuffed and escorted to the squad ear that eventually took him to the police station. 422 U. S., at 593. No doubt this police activity was the cause of the Court’s observation that “[t]he illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. . . . The manner in which Brown’s arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.” Id., at 605. No such circumstances occurred here.

       This Court granted certiorari in Morales, but, as the Court points out, ante, at 205 n. 3, we ultimately reserved decision on the question of the legality of involuntary investigatory detention on less than probable cause. Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969).