author: Justice Ginsburg

text:
    ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP., dba THE MOONLIGHT CAFE
    No. 04-944.
    Argued January 11, 2006
    Decided February 22, 2006

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Auto, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Jeffrey A. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.

      Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schlozman, Dennis J. Dimsey, Linda F. Thome, Eric S. Dreiband, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Jennifer S. Goldstein.

      Brett J. Prendergast argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent

       Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Phill Kline of Kansas, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Catherine E. Stetson, Robin S. Conrad, and Robert Costagliola; and for the International Municipal Lawyers Association by Gene C. Sehaerr, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Steffen N. Johnson, and Linda T. Coberly.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts: federal-court “subject-matter” jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an employer . . . to discriminate,” inter alia, on the basis of sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Act’s jurisdictional provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions “brought under” Title VII. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Covering a broader field, the Judicial Code gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under” the laws of the United States. 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Title VII actions fit that description. In a provision defining 13 terms used in Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, Congress limited the definition of “employer” to include only those having “fifteen or more employees,” §2000e(b). The question here presented is whether the numerical qualification contained in Title VII’s definition of “employer” affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, instead, delineates a substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim for relief.

The question arises in this context. Jenifer Arbaugh, plaintiff below, petitioner here, brought a Title VII action in federal court against her former employer, defendant-respondent Y&H Corporation (hereinafter Y&H), charging sexual harassment. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Arbaugh in the total amount of $40,000. Two weeks after the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss the entire action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. For the first time in the litigation, Y&H asserted that it had fewer than 15 employees on its payroll and therefore was not amenable to suit under Title VII.

Although recognizing that it was “unfair and a waste of judicial resources” to grant the motion to dismiss, App. to Pet. for Cert. 47, the trial court considered itself obliged to do so because it believed that the 15-or-more-employees requirement was jurisdictional. We reject that categorization and hold that the numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the employee-numerosity requirement relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim, and therefore could not be raised defensively late in the lawsuit, i. e., after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior to the close of trial on the merits.

I

We set out below statutory provisions and rules that bear on this case. Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l). To spare very small businesses from Title VII liability, Congress provided that:

“[t]he term ‘employér’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” § 20006(b).

This employee-numerosity requirement appears in a section headed “Definitions,” §2000e, which also prescribes the meaning, for Title VII purposes, of 12 other terms used in the Act.

Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Title VII surely is a “la[w] of the United States.” Ibid. In 1964, however, when Title VII was enacted, §1331’s umbrella provision for federal-question jurisdiction contained an amount-in-controversy limitation: Claims could not be brought under § 1331 unless the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. See § 1331(a) (1964 ed.). Title VII, framed in that light, assured that the amount-in-controversy limitation would not impede an employment-discrimination complainant’s access to a federal forum. The Act thus contains its own jurisdiction-conferring provision, which reads:

“Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Congress amended 28 U. S. C. § 1331 in 1980 to eliminate the amount-in-controversy threshold. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, §2, 94 Stat. 2369. Since that time, Title VIPs own jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), has served simply to underscore Congress’ intention to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of Title VII claims. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

We note, too, that, under 28 U. S. C. § 1367, federal courts may exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction over state-law claims linked to a claim based on federal law. Plaintiffs suing under Title VII may avail themselves of the opportunity § 1367 provides to pursue complete relief in a federal-court lawsuit. Arbaugh did so in the instant case by adding to her federal complaint pendent claims arising under state law that would not independently qualify for federal-court adjudication.

The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment. Rule 12(h)(3) instructs: “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that, the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455 (2004). By contrast, the objection that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” Rule 12(b)(6), may not be asserted post-trial. Under Rule 12(h)(2), that objection endures up to, but not beyond, trial on the merits: “A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be made in any pleading ... or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.” Cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 459.

From May 2000 through February 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh worked as a bartender and waitress at the Moonlight Cafe, a New Orleans restaurant owned and operated by Y&H. Arbaugh alleged that Yalcin Hatipoglu, one of the company’s owners, sexually harassed her and precipitated her constructive discharge. In November 2001, Arbaugh filed suit against Y&H in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Her complaint asserted claims under Title VII and Louisiana law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1-2.

Arbaugh’s pleadings alleged that her federal claim “ar[o]se under Title VII” and that the Federal District Court had jurisdiction over this claim under § 1331 plus supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims under § 1367. Record, Doc. 3, p. 1 (Amended Complaint). Y&H’s responsive pleadings admitted Arbaugh’s “jurisdictional” allegations but denied her contentions on the merits. Id., Doc. 4, p. 1 (Answer to Complaint). The pretrial order submitted and signed by the parties, and later subscribed by the presiding judge, reiterated that the court was “vested with jurisdiction over [Ar-baugh’s Title VII claim] pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331,” and “ha[d] supplemental jurisdiction over [her] state law claims pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1867.” Id., Doc. 19, p. 2. The order listed “Uncontested Material Facts,” including: “Plaintiff was employed as a waitress/bartender at the Moonlight for Defendants from May, 2000 through February 10, 2001 when she terminated her employment with the company.” Id., p. 3. It did not list among “Contested Issues of Fact” or “Contested Legal Issues” the question whether Y&H had the requisite number of employees under 42 U. S. C. §2Q00e(b). Record, Doc. 19, pp. 4-5. Nor was the issue raised at any other point pretrial or at trial.

The parties consented to trial before a Magistrate Judge. See 28 U. S. C. § 636(c). After a two-day trial, the jury found that Arbaugh had been sexually harassed and constructively discharged in violation of Title VII and Louisiana anti-, discrimination law. The verdict awarded Arbaugh $5,000 in backpay, $5,000 in compensatory damages, and $30,000 in punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment for Arbaugh on November 5, 2002.

Two weeks later, Y&H filed a motion under Federal Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss Arbaugh’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Record, Doc. 44. As sole ground for the motion, Y&H alleged, for the first time in the proceedings, that it “did not employ fifteen or more employees [during the relevant period] and thus is not an employer for Title VII purposes.” Id., p. 2 (Memorandum in Support of Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction). The trial court commented that “[i]t is unfair and a waste of judicial resources to permit [Y&H] to admit Ar-baugh’s allegations of jurisdiction, try the case for two days and then assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in response to an adverse jury verdict.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47. Nevertheless, reciting the text of Rule 12(h)(3), see supra, at 506, the trial court allowed Y&H to plead that it did not qualify as an “employer” under Title VII's definition of that term. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47-48; see supra, at 504-505.

Discovery ensued. The dispute over the employee count turned on the employment status of Y&H’s eight drivers, engaged to make deliveries for the restaurant, and the company’s four owners (the Moonlight Cafe’s two managers and their shareholder spouses). As the trial court noted, “[i]f either the delivery drivers or the four owners are counted with the persons shown on the payroll journals, then Y&H employed fifteen or more persons for the requisite time.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, however, the trial court concluded that neither the delivery drivers nor the owner-managers nor their shareholder spouses qualified as “employees” for Title VII purposes. Id., at 32-43. Based on that determination, the trial court vacated its prior judgment in favor of Arbaugh, dismissed her Title VII claim with prejudice, and her state-law claims without prejudice. Id., at 23.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 380 F. 3d 219 (2004). Bound by its prior decisions, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s “failure to qualify as an ‘employer’ under Title VII deprives a district court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at 224 (citing, e. g., Dumas v. Mt. Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974,980 (1980)). Dismissal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper, the Court of Appeals ruled, for the record warranted the conclusion that Y&H’s delivery drivers, its owner-managers, and their shareholder wives were not “employees” for Title VII purposes, 380 F. 3d, at 225-230, and it was undisputed that Y&H “did not employ the requisite 15 employees without the inclusion of” those persons, id., at 231.

We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 1031 (2005), to resolve conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals on the question whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), is jurisdictional or simply an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief. Compare, e. g., 380 F. 3d, at 223-225 (Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is jurisdictional), and Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (CA6 1983) (same), with, e. g., Da Silva v. Kinsho International Corp., 229 F. 3d 358, 361-366 (CA2 2000) (Title VIFs employee-numerosity requirement is not jurisdictional); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F. 3d 72, 76-83 (CA3 2003) (same); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F. 3d 621, 623-624 (CADC 1997) (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42 U. S. C. § 12111(5)(A), resembling Title VIFs requirement, is not jurisdictional).

Ill

“Jurisdiction,” this Court has observed, “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court, no less than other courts, has sometimes been profligate in its use of the term. For example, this Court and others have occasionally described a non-extendable time limit as “mandatory and jurisdictional.” See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960). But in recent decisions, we have clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, “are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004); accord Eberhart v. United States, ante, at 16-19 (per curiam); Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454-455. See also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 434-435 (1996) (GiNSBURG, J., concurring).

The dispute now before us concerns the proper classification of Title VIFs statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees. If the limitation conditions subject-matter jurisdiction, as the lower courts held it did, then a conclusion that Y&H had fewer than 15 employees would require erasure of the judgment for Arbaugh entered on the jury verdict. But if the lower courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction characterization is incorrect, and the issue, instead, concerns the merits of Arbaugh’s case, then Y&H raised the employee-numerosity requirement too late. Its pretrial stipulations, see supra, at 508, and its failure to speak to the issue prior to the conclusion of the trial on the merits, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2), supra, at 507, would preclude vacation of the $40,000 judgment in Arbaugh’s favor.

On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less than meticulous. “Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate for relief — a merits-related determination.” 2 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.30[1], p. 12-36.1 (3d ed. 2005) (hereinafter Moore). Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit incisively observed, “often obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.” Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361. We have describéd such unrefined dispositions as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect” on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit. Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91.

Cases of this genre include Hiskon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69 (1984), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244 (1991). Hishon involved a Title VII claim brought by a lawyer denied partnership in a law firm. The District Court ruled that Title VII did not apply to the selection of partners and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. We noted that the District Court’s reasoning “ma[de] clear that it dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim cognizable under Title VII.” 467 U. S., at 73, n. 2. Disagreeing with the lower courts, we held that Title VII applies to partnership decisions. Id., at 73-78. That holding, we said, “ma[de] it unnecessary to consider the wisdom of the District Court’s invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id., at 73, n. 2. The former Rule concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, the latter, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See supra, at 507. Our opinion in Hishon thus raised, but did not decide, the question whether subject-matter jurisdiction was the proper rubric for the District Court’s decisions.

In Arabian American Oil Co., we affirmed the judgment of the courts below that Title VII, as then composed, did not apply to a suit by a United States employee working abroad for a United States employer. That judgment had been placed under a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction label. We agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited geographical reach of the statute. 499 U. S., at 246-247. En passant, we copied the petitioners’ characterizations of terms included in Title VII’s “Definitions” section, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, as “jurisdictional.” See 499 U. S., at 249, 251, 253. But our decision did not turn on that characterization, and the parties did not cross swords over it. See Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91 (declining to follow a decision treating an issue as jurisdictional because nothing “turned upon whether [the issue] was technically jurisdictional” in that case). In short, we were not prompted in Arabian American Oil Co. to home in on whether the dismissal had been properly based on the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than on the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. 499 U. S., at 247.

The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Section 1331 provides for “[fjederal-question” jurisdiction, § 1332 for “[djiversity of citizenship” jurisdiction. A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681-685 (1946). She invokes § 1332 jurisdiction when she presents a claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. See § 1332(a).

Arbaugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331, but her case “aris[esj” under a federal law, Title VII, that specifies, as a prerequisite to its application, the existence of a particular fact, i.e., 15 or more employees. We resolve the question whether that fact is “jurisdictional” or relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim mindful of the consequences of typing the 15-employee threshold a determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than an element of Arbaugh’s claim for relief.

First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002). Moreover, courts, including this Court, have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583 (1999). Nothing in the text of Title VII indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is met.

Second, in some instances, if subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized to review the ¿vidence and resolve the dispute on her own. See 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1350, pp. 243-249 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Moore §12.30[3], pp. 12-37 to 12-38. If satisfaction of an essential element of a claim for relief is at issue, however, the jury is the proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150-151 (2000).

Third, when a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety. See 16 Moore § 106.66[1], pp. 106-88 to 106-89. Thus in the instant case, the trial court dismissed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-law claims, see supra, at 506, fully tried by a jury and determined on the merits, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 47. In contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1367, over pendent state-law claims. See 16 Moore § 106.66[1], pp. 106-86 to 106-89.

Of course, Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction in delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332. But neither § 1331, nor Title VIPs jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(3) (authorizing jurisdiction over actions “brought under” Title VII), specifies any threshold ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. § 1332’s monetary floor. Instead, the 15-employee threshold appears in a separate provision that “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982). Given the “unfair[ness]” and “waste of judicial resources,” App. to Pet. for Cert.. 47, entailed in tying the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter jurisdiction, we think it the sounder course to refrain from constricting §1331 or Title VIPs jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Congress’ court. If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. See Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361 (“Whether a disputed matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally both) is sometimes a close question.”). But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Applying that readily administrable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold number of' employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       The same provision further states that the term “employer” does not include the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United States, Indian tribes, certain departments and agencies of the District of Columbia, or tax-exempt “bona fide private membership club[s]” (other °than labor organizations). §2000e(b).

       Congress originally prescribed a 25-or-more-employee threshold, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 78 Stat. 253, but lowered the minimum number of employees to 15 in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 86 Stat. 103.

       The other terms defined in §2000e are: “person,” “employment agency,” “labor organization,” “employee,” “commerce,” “industry affecting commerce,” “State,” “religion,” “because of sex,” “complaining party,” “demonstrates,” and “respondent.”

       Title VII contains a separate jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-6(b), authorizing suite by the Government to enjoin “pattern or practice” discrimination.

       Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”

       See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 147 (2004) (constructive discharge compensable under Title VII includes an employee’s departure due to sexual harassment that renders “working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign”).

       Y&H features Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202 (1997), as supportive of the jurisdictional character of the employeenumerosity requirement. Brief for Respondent 8-10. Y&H urges that the Court must have considered the requirement jurisdictional, for Walters held definitively that, under the correct legal standard, the defendant had more than 15 employees. If the requirement had been seen as a merits issue, Y&H contends, the Court would have remanded the employee count for determination by the trier of fact. But the parties in Walters apparently stipulated to all relevant facts, leaving nothing for a fact trier to resolve on remand. Cf. 519 U. S., at 211-212.

       Congress subsequently amended Title VII to extend protection to United States citizens working overseas. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (“With respect to employment in a foreign country,” the term “employee” “includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.”).

       In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107 (1988), also featured by Y&H, see Brief for Respondent 12, a plurality of this Court noted that “[deactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of federal proceedings serves [a] useful function,” in part because “Title VII does not give the EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against employers of fewer than 15 employees.” 486 U. S., at 119, n. 5. That fleeting footnote addressed the relative administrative provinces of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and state agencies. It did not speak of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction, which was not at issue in the case.

       A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, Bell held, may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i. e., if it is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U. S., at 682-683; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998). Arbaugh’s case surely does not belong in that category.

       Congress has exercised its prerogative to restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts based on a wide variety of factors, some of them also relevant to the merits of a case. Certain statutes confer subject-matter jurisdiction only for actions brought by specific plaintiffs, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1345 (United States and its agencies and officers); 49 U. S. C. §24301(i)(2) (Amtrak), or for claims against particular defendants, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §2707(e)(3) (persons subject to orders of the Egg Board); 28 U. S. C. § 1348 (national banking associations), or for actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §814, or falls below, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §6713(a)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), a stated amount. Other jurisdiction-conferring provisions describe particular types of claims. See, e. g., § 1339 (“any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to the postal service”); § 1347 (“any civil action commenced by any tenant in common or joint tenant for the partition of lands where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint tenants”). In a few instances, Congress has enacted a separate provision that expressly restricts application of a jurisdiction-conferring statute. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-761 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bars 28 U. S. C. § 1331 jurisdiction over suits to recover Social Security benefits).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
Justice Breyer
      Justice Scalia,

license: Public Domain

text:
    OREGON v. GUZEK
    No. 04-928.
    Argued December 7, 2005
    Decided February 22, 2006

      Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 528. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

      Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Peter Shepherd, Deputy Attorney General.

      Kannon K. Shanmugdm argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richter, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Robert J. Erickson.

      Richard L. Wolf, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S. 974, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Kevin Hunt

      A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C. Neuosom, Solicitor General, by Christopher L. Maraño, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, Thomas W Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Judith Williams Jagdmann of Virginia, and Rob McKenna of Washington.

   Justice Breyer

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Randy Lee Guzek was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. The question before the Court is whether the State may limit the innocence-related evidence he can introduce at that proceeding to the evidence he introduced at his original trial. We hold that the limitation does not violate the Constitution.

I

Oregon tried Guzek for the offense of capital murder. The evidence showed that Guzek and two associates decided to burglarize the Houser family home, that they entered the house, that an associate killed Rod Houser, and that Guzek then robbed and killed Lois Houser. After the police learned that Guzek held a special grudge against the Housers, they traced him and his associates. The associates confessed. And they testified at trial, painting Guzek as the ringleader.

Guzek’s defense rested in part upon an alibi. He presented two alibi witnesses, his grandfather and his mother, who testified that Guzek had been with the one or the other at the time of the crime. The jury disbelieved the alibi, it convicted Guzek, and it sentenced him to death.

Guzek appealed; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction; but the. court ordered a new sentencing proceeding. Guzek was again sentenced to death; he again appealed; and the Oregon Supreme Court again ordered resen-tencing. Guzek was sentenced to death for the third time; he again appealed; and yet again the Oregon Supreme Court found the sentencing procedures faulty. 336 Ore. 424, 86 P. 3d 1106 (2004). Seeking to avoid further errors at the next (the fourth) sentencing proceeding, the Oregon Supreme Court also addressed the admissibility of certain evidence Guzek seeks to introduce at that proceeding, including live testimony from his mother about his alibi.

The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce this evidence at his upcoming sentencing proceeding. At Oregon’s request, we agreed to review that determination.

II

Before turning to the merits of Oregon’s claim, we consider a motion that Guzek made, asking us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The motion rests upon Guzek’s claim that, irrespective of federal law, state law gives him the right to introduce his mother’s live testimony — the additional alibi evidence here at issue. See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003). For this reason, he says, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, or, at the least, there is no good practical reason for us to decide the federal issue.

We cannot agree, however, that we lack jurisdiction to hear the case. We possess jurisdiction to review state-court determinations that rest upon federal law. 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a). And the Oregon Supreme Court here based its legal conclusion in relevant part on federal law. The court pointed out that state law permits the introduction (at a new sentencing hearing) of “ ‘evidence . . . relevant to [the] sentence including . . . mitigating evidence relevant to . . . [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 45 (quoting Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.150(l)(a), (b) (2003); emphasis added and deleted). But it immediately added that the state law’s words “relevant .... mitigating evidence” refer (in the present context) only to evidence that the Federal Constitution grants a defendant the right to present. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45-52.

The Oregon court went on to discuss this Court’s statements to the effect that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “ ‘require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor . . . any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ ” Id., at 54 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); emphasis deleted); ef. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56 (recognizing that this aspect of Lockett was adopted by a majority of the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110 (1982)). And the Oregon court then interpreted this Court’s holding in Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), as including, within that federal admissibility requirement, evidence which, like the proffered alibi testimony, tends to show that the defendant did not commit the crime for which he has been convicted. Thus, it held that state law demanded “admissibility” solely for a federal reason. And we possess jurisdiction. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 556, n. 5 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 651-653 (1979).

Neither are we persuaded by Guzek’s argument that we should dismiss the case because irrespective of federal law and irrespective of the Oregon Supreme Court’s federal holding, Oregon law gives him the right to introduce witnesses who testified at the guilt phase; and his mother was such a witness (a fact, he says, that the Oregon Supreme Court overlooked). Guzek points in support to an Oregon capital-case resentencing statute that says,

“[a] transcript of all testimony and all exhibits and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial ... are admissible in the new sentencing proceeding.” Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003).

The provision adds that,

“[ejither party may recall any witness who testified at the prior trial. . . and may present additional relevant evidence.” Ibid.

We do not doubt that these provisions give Guzek the states law right to introduce a transcript of guilt-phase testimony. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43 (authorizing introduction of transcript of Guzek’s grandfather’s alibi testimony). But Guzek wishes to do more than introduce a transcript of his mother’s alibi evidence; he wishes to call his mother to the stand as a live witness and elicit additional alibi testimony. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-39, 41, 55-56. The Oregon statute quoted above does not expressly say whether he may do so. It does give him the right to “recall any witness” who testified at the first trial and to “present additional relevant evidence.” (Emphasis added.) But is this additional evidence “relevant”? The Oregon Supreme Court thought so, but only because federal law insists upon its relevance. And its opinion suggests that, in the absence of federal compulsion, it would not fall within the scope of the state statutory word “relevant.” See supra, at 521.

At most, Guzek has shown that state law might, not that it does, independently give him the right to introduce this evidence. We have made clear that “a possible adequate and independent state ground” for a decision does not “bar [our] reaching the federal questions” where, as here, a “State Supreme Court quite clearly rested its [decision] solely on the Federal Constitution.” California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 997, n. 7 (1983); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 242 (1983); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U. S. 623, 630-631 (1973). And we consequently deny the motion to dismiss the writ.

Ill

As our discussion in Part II, supra, makes clear, the federal question before us is a narrow one. Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments grant Guzek a constitutional right to present evidence of the kind he seeks to introduce, namely, new evidence that shows he was not present at the scene of the crime. That evidence is inconsistent with Gu-zek’s prior conviction. It sheds no light on the manner in which he committed the crime for which he has been convicted. Nor is it evidence that Guzek contends was unavailable to him at the time of the original trial. And, to the extent it is evidence he introduced at that time, he is free to introduce it now, albeit in transcript form. Ore. Rev. Stat, § 138.012(2)(b) (2003). We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing.

We cannot agree with the Oregon Supreme Court that our previous cases have found in the Eighth Amendment a constitutional right broad enough to encompass the evidence here at issue. In Lockett v. Ohio, supra, a plurality of this Court decided that a defendant convicted of acting in concert with others to rob and to kill could introduce at the sentencing stage evidence that she had played a minor role in the crime, indeed, that she had remained outside the shop (where the killing took place) at the time of the crime. A plurality of the Court wrote that,

“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer .. . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Id., at 604 (emphasis added and deleted).

And in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, the Court majority adopted this statement. See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 306 (1987); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637, 642 (1978) (plurality opinion).

But the evidence at issue in these cases was traditional sentence-related evidence, evidence that tended to show how, not whether, the defendant committed the crime. Nor was the evidence directly inconsistent with the jury’s finding of guilt.

The Oregon Supreme Court thought that this latter distinction — the fact that the “alibi evidence was inconsistent with,” rather than “consistent with[,] the underlying convictions” — did not matter. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58. It said that this “factual distinction ... is of no consequence in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. Georgia.” Ibid. In Green, however, the Court focused upon a defendant convicted of murder, who sought to introduce at sentencing a statement his confederate made to a third party that he (the confederate) had alone committed the murder (1 e., without the defendant). The State opposed its use at the defendant’s sentencing hearing on the ground that, as to the defendant, it was hearsay. The Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, noted that the State had used the confession in the confederate’s trial, referred to an earlier case holding that the Constitution prohibits States from “ ‘mechanistically’ ” applying the hearsay rule “ ‘to defeat the ends of justice,’ ” and held that the Constitution prohibited the State from barring use of the confession; 442 U. S., at 97 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973)). The opinion focused only upon the hearsay problem, and it implicitly assumed that, in the absence of the hearsay problem, state law would not have blocked admission of the evidence.

In any event, subsequent to Green, this Court decided Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164 (1988), and that case makes clear, contrary to the Oregon Supreme Court’s understanding, that this Court’s previous cases had not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as providing a capital defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast “residual doubt” on his guilt of the basic crime of conviction. The Franklin plurality said it was “quité doubtful” that any such right existed. Id., at 173, n. 6. And two other Members of the Court added that “[o]ur cases” do not support any such “right to reconsideration by the sentencing body of lingering doubts about... guilt.” Id., at 187 (O’Con-nor, J., concurring in judgment). See also Penry v. Ly-naugh, 492 U. S. 302, 320 (1989) (characterizing Franklin as a case in which a majority “agreed that ‘residual doubt’ as to Franklin’s guilt was not a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor” (brackets omitted)).

Franklin did not resolve whether the Eighth Amendment affords capital defendants such a right, for the plurality held that the sentencing scheme at issue was constitutional “even if such a right existed.” 487 U. S., at 174. But the Court’s statements on the matter make clear that the Oregon Supreme Court erred in interpreting Green as providing a capital defendant with a constitutional right to introduce residual doubt evidence at sentencing.

In this case, we once again face a situation where we need not resolve whether such a right exists, for, even if it does, it could not extend so far as to provide this defendant with a right to introduce the evidence at issue. See, e. g., Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461-462 (1945). The Eighth Amendment insists upon “ ‘reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’” Penry, supra, at 328 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Eighth Amendment also insists that a sentencing jury be able “to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence” about the defendant’s “character or record or the circumstances of the offense.” Penry, supra, at 327-328. But the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted. Rather, “States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’” Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 377 (1990) (quoting Franklin, supra, at 181 (plurality opinion)); see, e. g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 362 (1993); California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 543 (1987).

Three circumstances, taken together, convince us that the State possesses the authority to regulate, through exclusion, the evidence that Guzek seeks to present. First, sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §1A1.1, editorial note, §4(a), p. 4 (Nov. 2004). But the evidence at issue here — alibi evidence — concerns only whether, not how, he did so.

Second, the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence is relevant — whether the defendant committed the basic crime. The evidence thereby attacks a previously determined matter in a proceeding at which, in principle, that matter is not at issue. The law typically discourages collateral attacks of this kind. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94 (1980) (“As this Court and other courts have often recognized, res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication”).

Third, the negative impact of a rule restricting defendant’s ability to introduce new alibi evidence is minimized by the fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the right to present to the sentencing jury all the evidence of innocence from the original trial regardless. That law permits the defendant to introduce at resentencing transcripts and exhibits from his prior trial. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003). The defendant here has not claimed that the evidence at issue was unavailable at the time of his original trial. Thus, he need only have introduced it at that time to guarantee its presentation (albeit through transcripts) to a resentencing jury as well.

The legitimacy of these trial management and evidentiary considerations, along with the typically minimal adverse impact that a restriction would have on a defendant’s ability to present his alibi claim at resentencing convinces us that the Eighth Amendment does not protect defendant’s right to present the evidence at issue here. We conclude that the Oregon court was wrong in holding to the contrary.

IV

Guzek also contends that, even if the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the admission of his mother’s testimony, he is entitled to introduce that evidence to impeach his associates, whose earlier testimony the government intends to introduce at resentencing. The Oregon Supreme Court did not address this issue; nor do we believe it fairly encompassed within the question presented. The Oregon courts are free to consider it on remand should they believe it appropriate to do so.

V

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court, and we remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice Scalia,

with whom Justice Thomas joins,

concurring in the judgment.

In this case, we have the opportunity to put to rest, once and for all, the mistaken notion that the Eighth Amendment requires that a convicted capital defendant be given the opportunity, at his sentencing hearing, to present evidence and argument concerning residual doubts about his guilt. Although the Court correctly holds that there is no Eighth Amendment violation in this case, I would follow the Court’s logic to its natural conclusion and reject all Eighth Amendment residual-doubt claims.

I agree with the Court that we have jurisdiction and should exercise it in this case. What requires me to withhold agreement to the Court’s opinion is the last of the “[t]hree circumstances” on which it relies, ante, at 526— namely, “the fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the right to present to the sentencing jury all the evidence of innocence from the original trial.” Ante, at 526-527 (emphasis in original). The first two of the circumstances are alone sufficient to dispose of the claim that the Eighth Amendment guarantees a capital defendant a second.opportunity, at sentencing, to litigate his innocence. In fact, the Court’s third “circumstance” is an analytical misfit in the company of the other two. The first two — that “sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime,” ante, at 526, and that “the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence is relevant,” ibid. — show that compelling the admission of innocence-related evidence would be improper and unnecessary at a sentencing hearing. The third, by contrast, suggests that there is no constitutional violation in this case because enough of such evidence may be admitted on remand. The latter factor would be relevant only if the former two were not.

If we needed any third factor to justify our holding, a better candidate would be that the claim we consider here finds no support in our Nation’s legal history and traditions. In 1986, Justice Marshall correctly observed that there had been “few times in which any legitimacy has been given to the power of a convicted capital defendant facing the possibility of a death sentence to argue as a mitigating factor the chance that he might be innocent.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162, 205 (dissenting opinion). Nothing has changed on that score in the last 20 years. On the contrary, in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164 (1988), four Members of this Court noted that our “prior decisions ... fail to recognize a constitutional right to have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor,” id., at 174 (plurality opinion). They were, moreover, “quite doubtful” that the purported right existed, because it is “arguably inconsistent with the common practice of allowing penalty-only trials on remand of cases where a death sentence — but not the underlying conviction — is struck down on appeal.” Id., at 173, n. 6. Two other Members of the Court would have rejected the claim outright. Id., at 187 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

After Franklin, the lower courts have unanimously denied constitutional claims like the one we consider today. See, e.g., Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 P. 3d 1300, 1310 (CA11 2003); Evans v. Thompson, 881 F. 2d 117,121 (CA4 1989); Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 40-41 (Fla. 2003); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 115-116, 813 A. 2d 761, 767 (2002); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 501-504, 727 N. E. 2d 302, 338-339 (2000); State v. Fletcher, 354 N. C. 455, 470-472, 555 S. E. 2d 534, 544 (2001); Melson v. State, 775 So. 2d 857, 898-899 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). The last apparent scrap of authority for the contrary view came from our cryptic opinion in Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), on which the Oregon Supreme Court principally relied. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 58-62. The chief virtue of today’s opinion lies in its discarding the notion that Green provides any support for an Eighth Amendment right to argue residual doubt at sentencing. See ante, at 524-525.

In mentioning, however, the superfluous circumstance that Oregon law happens to provide for the admission at sentencing of some evidence that relates to innocence, the Court risks creating doubt where none should exist. Capital de- . fendants might now be tempted to argue that the amount of residual-doubt evidence carried over from the guilt phase in their sentencing hearings is insufficient to satisfy the Court’s third factor. Every one of these “residual-doubt” claims will be meritless in light of the Court’s first two factors. We should make this perfectly clear today.


text:
    October 3, 2005

    No. 04-1066.
    Illinois v. Bartels.

      The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of the orders announced on this date.

   App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-1113.
    SOPHOCLEUS et ux. v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT of Transportation et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir.


text:
    No. 04-1667.
    Guttman v. Khalsa et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-1224.
    No. 04-9239.
    No. 04-9307.
    No. 04-9331.
    Hogan v. United States; Lewis v. United States; Tirado v. United States; and Balsam v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motions of petitioners in Nos. 04-9239, 04-9307, and 04-9331 for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-1382.
    United States v. Maxwell.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-1610.
    Saenz v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir.


text:
    No. 04-1620.
    Mills v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir.


text:
    No. 04-1698.
    Husband v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-9022.
    No. 04-9369.
    No. 04-9417.
    No. 04-9707.
    No. 04-9941.
    No. 04-10221.
    No. 04-10379.
    No. 04-10394.
    No. 04-10487.
    No. 04-10538.
    No. 04-10596.
    No. 04-10608.
    No. 04-10718.
    No. 04-10725.
    No. 05-5106.
    No. 05-5374.
    No. 05-5398.
    No. 05-5614.
    Barton v. United States. Garner v. United States. James v. United States. Mata-Ramirez v. United States. Jose v. United States. Higdon v. United States. Herrera v. United States. Marshall v. United States. Dahlman v. United States. Decarlo v. United States. Singer v. United States. Edmonds v. United States. Avila-Ramos v. United States. Ferguson v. United States. Hintz v. United States. Williams v. United States. Pachinger v. United States. Sandon v. United States. Gillespie v. United States. Newton v. United States. Moody v. United States. Nahia v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 5th Cir. C. A. 1st Cir.; C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 10th Cir.; C. A. 9th Cir. C. A. 9th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 1st Cir.; C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 9th Cir. C. A. 11th Cir. C. A. 6th Cir. C. A. 4th Cir. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pawperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005).

No. 05-5653.

No. 05-5694.

No. 05-5704.

No. 05-5917.


text:
    No. 04-9218.
    Mackey v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-10064.
    Carter v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and ease remanded for further consideration in light of Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-10295.
    Barnette v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231 (2005).


text:
    No. 04-9971.
    Taylor v. Wilson, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 04-10063.
    Perea v. Bush, President of the United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 04-10478.
    Di Nardo v. Qualsure Insurance Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 04-10601.
    Trice v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 04-10683.
    Wells v. City of Beverly Hills, California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 05-5251.
    Taylor v. Milton et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 05-5615.
    Perea v. Bush, President of the United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of .petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 05-5617.
    Murray, aka Hines v. Yates, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pawperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 05-5734.
    Whitehead v. Wickham.
   Ct. App. D. C. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 05-5743.
    Woodberry v. McKune, Warden.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 05-5838.
    Owens-El v. Davis, Warden.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 05-5964.
    Sedgwick v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 05-6046.
    Colida v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Communication (USA) Inc.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 04M78.
    No. 04M80.
    No. 05M2.
    No. 05M3.
    No. 05M4.
    No. 05M5.
    No. 05M6.
    No. 05M7.
    No. 05M9.
    No. 05M10.
    No. 05M11.
    No. 05M12.
    No. 05M15.
    Robinson v. Campbell, Acting Warden; Penbara v. Dover Township, New Jersey, et al.; Gibson v. United States; Valkoun v. Jones, Warden; Johnson v. District of Columbia et al.; Williams v. Farcas, Warden, et al.; Britton v. United States et al.; Caldwell v. El Cortez Hotel & Casino et al.; Jackson v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc.; Webber v. Crosby, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections; Diaz v. Judge Advocate General of the Navy; New York City Department of Education v. M. S., on Behalf of Her Minor Child I. O., et al.; and Turner-El v. Mayo et al.
   Motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.


text:
    No. 04M79.
    Teresa T. et al. v. Ragaglia et al.
   Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without an affidavit of indigency executed by petitioners granted.


text:
    No. 05M1.
    No. 05M13.
    No. 05M14.
    Green v. Texas; Reid v. Tennessee; and Mundo v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
   Motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without affidavits of indigency executed by petitioners denied.


text:
    No. 05M8.
    In re Grand Jury Proceedings.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record granted.


text:
    No. 65,
    Orig.
    Texas v. New Mexico.
   Motion of the River Master for fees and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the River Master is awarded a total of $4,750.22 for the period April 1 through June 30, 2005, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 544 U. S. 1059.]


text:
    No. 03-9046.
    Rhines v. Weber, Warden,
   544 U. S. 269. Motion of Roberto Lange for excess compensation denied.


text:
    No. 04-52.
    Rice, Warden, et al. v. Collins.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 545 U. S. 1151.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. Mark R. Drozdowski, Esq., of Los Angeles, Cal., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 04-108.
    Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al.,
   545 U. S. 469. Motion of respondents to retax costs denied.


text:
    No. 04-373.
    Maryland v. Blake.
   Ct. App. Md. [Certiorari granted, 544 U. S. 973.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Motion of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument denied. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 04-623.
    Gonzales, Attorney General, et al. v. Oregon et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 543 U. S. 1145.] Motion of Charlene Andrews et al. for leave to intervene granted.


text:
    No. 04-944.
    Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., dba The Moonlight Cafe.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 544 U. S. 1031.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 04-1067.
    Georgia v. Randolph.
   Sup. Ct. Ga. [Certio-rari granted, 544 U. S. 973.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 04-1144.
    Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, 544 U. S. 1048.] Motion of Tim Pawlenty, Governor of Minnesota, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time granted.


text:
    No. 04-1152.
    Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 544 U. S. 1017.] Motion of American Civil Rights Union for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 04-1350.
    KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 04-7693.
    Dixon v. City of Minneapolis Water Department et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [543 U. S. 1138] denied.


text:
    No. 04-9185.
    Coombs v. Pennsylvania.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [544 U. S. 1047] denied.


text:
    No. 04-9351.
    McBroom v. Techneglas, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [544 U. S. 1059] denied.


text:
    No. 04-9612.
    Jones v. Birkett, Warden (two judgments).
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [545 U. S. 1112] denied.


text:
    No. 04-10387.
    Okpala v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leavé to proceed in forma pauperis [545 U. S. 1137] denied.


text:
    No. 04-10525.
    No. 04-10724.
    No. 05-5135.
    No. 05-5410.
    Marcone v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Kissi v. Pramco II, LLC. Studer v. Securities and Exchange Commission. Gutnayer v. Cendant Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Pa.; C. A. 4th Cir.; C. A. 2d Cir.; and C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 24, 2005, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 04-1664.
    No. 04-10508.
    No. 04-10549.
    In re Heimermann; In re Williams; In re Rivers; In re Glagola; In re Garcia et al.; In re Deason; In re Rogers; In re Homrich; In re Dennis; In re Olsen; In re Aull; In re Carter; In re Albert; In re Ramos et al.; In re Reuell; In re Holman; In re Brown; In re McCartney; In re Farley; In re Peterson; In re Williams; In re Mattatall; In re Phillips; In re Brown; In re Langon; In re Epperson; and In re Bailey.
    No. 04-10630.
    No. 04-10631.
    No. 04-10648.
    No. 04-10685.
    No. 05-5005.
    No. 05-5016.
    No. 05-5081.
    No. 05-5195.
    No. 05-5239.
    No. 05-5259.
    No. 05-5262.
    No. 05-5341.
    No. 05-5400.
    No. 05-5608.
    No. 05-5643.
    No. 05-5760.
    No. 05-5827.
    No. 05-5903.
    No. 05-5933.
    No. 05-5952.
    No. 05-6053.
    No. 05-6067.
    No. 05-6097.
    No. 05-6168.
   Petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 04-1548.
    No. 04-1597.
    No. 04-1623.
    No. 04-1638.
    No. 04-1717.
    No. 04-9895.
    No. 04-10085.
    No. 04-10203.
    No. 04-10429.
    No. 04-10517.
    No. 04-10521.
    No. 04-10533.
    No. 04-10663.
    No. 04-10670.
    No. 05-119.
    In re Califorrniaa; In re Reidt; In re Lewis; In re Video-Cinema Films, Inc.; In re Von Kahl; In re Beyah; In re Masters; In re White; In re Bellon; In re Wattleton; In re Dunbar; In re Alvarado-Rivera; In re Bailey; In re Vaughan; In re Gould; In re Rodriguez; In re Boyce; In re Boddie; In re Sylvester; In re Williams; In re Patten; In re Adams; In re Dorsey; In re Rivas; In re Sherrill; In re Garza; and In re Nyhuis.
    No. 05-154.
    No. 05-5033.
    No. 05-5110.
    No. 05-5134.
    No. 05-5194.
    No. 05-5215.
    No. 05-5261.
    No. 05-5407.
    No. 05-5551.
    No. 05-5585.
    No. 05-5673.
    No. 05-5993.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 04-1710.
    No. 04-10728.
    No. 05-5292.
    No. 05-5486.
    In re Vey; In re Gottlich; In re Henson; and In re Brinkley.
   Petitions for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.


text:
    No. 04-10529.
    In re Woodberry.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.


text:
    No. 05-5456.
    In re Aranda.
   Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with . Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

Justice Stevens dissents.

See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.


text:
    No. 04-1128.
    Pleeter v. Bookbinder.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1136.
    No. 04-8850.
    No. 04-8856.
    Roane v. United States; Johnson v. United States; and Tipton v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1175.
    Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1207.
    Bannon, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Harris, et al. v. School District of Palm Beach County et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1225.
    Adams et al. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1226.
    Adams et al. v. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1239.
    Cardenas-Garcia et al. v. Texas Tech University et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1249.
    International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1270.
    Rios et al. v. Johnson, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1286.
    No. 04-1440.
    Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc.; and American Collections Enterprise, Inc. v. Goswami.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1292.
    Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1300.
    Macias-Placencia v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1303.
    Board of Education for Warren Community Unit School District No. 205 et al. v. Baird.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1304.
    Allen Oil & Gas, LLC v. Klish et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1328.
    Ferguson v. West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1333.
    National Solid Waste Management Assn. et al. v. Pine Belt Regional Solid Waste Management Authority and Its Board of Commissioners et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1335.
    Geig v. City of Macedonia, Ohio.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1346.
    Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Fujitsu Ltd. et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1361.
    Fullenkamp et al. v. Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1365.
    Capital Suisse, Inc., et al. v. Hentsch Henchoz & Cie et al.
   Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1366.
    Callery v. United States Life Insurance Company in the City of New York et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1368.
    Delaware Tribe of Indians v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1380.
    Jarnis United Properties Co. v. Lefkovitz et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1383.
    Schiff v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1396.
    Sorrentino et ux. v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1404.
    Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc., et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1408.
    Smith et al. v. University of Washington Law School et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1409.
    Steubenville City Schools et al. v. Barrett.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1411.
    Sibley v. Sibley.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1415.
    United States ex rel. Garibaldi et al. v. Orleans Parish School Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1421.
    LeGrand v. Area Resources for Community and Human Services.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1423.
    Alternate Power Source, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1427.
    Ross et al. v. Citifinancial, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1438.
    Drury v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1445.
    No. 04-9907.
    Thompson v. United States; and Jenkins v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1452.
    Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan v. Pascack Valley Hospital, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1455.
    U. S. Bancorp, N. A., et al. v. Oregon Department of Revenue.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1459.
    Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1462.
    Franklin Savings Corp. et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1466.
    Grine et al. v. Coombs, Executor of the Estate of Coombs, Deceased, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1468.
    Boulware v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1470.
    Esab Group, Inc. v. Centricut LLC et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1473.
    Rahim v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1474.
    Pacific Shores Development, LLC v. At Home Corp., dba Excite at Home.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1478.
    Thomas et ux. v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1480.
    Moylan, Attorney General of Guam v. A. B. Won Pat Guam International Airport Authority, By and Through Its Board of Directors.
   Sup. Ct. Guam. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1481.
    O’Rourke v. Smithsonian Institution Press et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1482.
    Wells et al. v. Texas A&M University System, dba Texas A&M University-Commerce, et al.
   Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1487.
    New Jersey Department of Labor v. Reconstituted Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the United Healthcare System, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1488.
    Novak et ux. v. Teitelbaum, Braverman & Borges, P. C.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1490.
    Rodriguez-Realpe v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1491.
    Maine v. Patterson.
   Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1492.
    Lahey Clinic Hospital, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1493.
    Vedder v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1496.
    Grein et al. v. City of Mentor, Ohio, et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1497.
    Ha v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1498.
    Hobbs v. Westchester County, New York, et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1509.
    Winke v. Winke.
   Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1510.
    Ramsey et al. v. Formica Corp. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1511.
    City of New Rochelle, New York, et al. v. Crown Communication New York, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1512.
    Simonsen et al. v. Chicago Board of Education et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1513.
    Maynard v. Stump, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles.
   Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1517.
    Ridenour et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1519.
    Jones v. Fulton County, Georgia.
   C. A. 11th . Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1521.
    Stilley v. Dickey, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1522.
    Lal v. Pennsylvania.
   Commw. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1523.
    Lal v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1524.
    Ralph v. Monsanto Co.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1526.
    Callanan v. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1529.
    Smith v. 403 C Street, LLC, et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1535.
    Peacock et ux. v. City of Murphy, Texas.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1536.
    Jaffe v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1539.
    Katz v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1540.
    Haponik, Acting Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility v. Fernandez.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1542.
    PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L. P. v. Shaw Constructors, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1547.
    Southern California Water Co. v. California Public Utilities Commission.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1549.
    Green v. Office of the Sheriff's Office, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Florida.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1550.
    Gillette v. Stucki.
   Ct. App. Mich. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1551.
    Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation.
   Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1553.
    Flagg et ux. v. Yonkers Savings & Loan Assn., FA, Aka Yonkers Financial.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1554.
    George v. City of Morro Bay, California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1555.
    Hoffinger Industries, Inc., et al. v. Bunch, a Minor, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1556.
    Greene et al. v. Berger Singerman, P. A., et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1557.
    No. 04-1709.
    California Federal Bank v. United States; and United States v. California Federal Bank.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1558.
    Lockhart v. Hofstra University.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1561..
    Oertwig v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1563.
    Takahashi v. Law Office of Brian K. Ross.
   Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1565.
    Andrejic v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1568.
    National Loan Investors, L. P. v. Denofa et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1571.
    Okamoto, dba Supreme Auto Leasing v. Bank West Corp.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1572.
    Minix v. Frazier et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1573.
    Dash v. Patent and Trademark Office.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1574.
    Wende C. et vir v. United Methodist Church, New York West Area, et al.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1575.
    Carty v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1576.
    Whitfield v. Alabama Securities Commission et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1577.
    Lara v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1578.
    Salazar v. LeMaster, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1580.
    Smart et al. v. Wyeth.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1582.
    Musgrave v. Hoyos, Administrative Law Judge, Housing Part Q, Civil Court of the City and County of New York.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1585.
    Abernathy v. Yukins, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1586.
    Castillo v. McFadden et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1587.
    Palm Beach Isles Associates et al. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1588.
    Turner v. Wynder, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1589.
    Losier v. Kalatschinow.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1590.
    Maxim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v. Crosspoint Venture Partners 1997, L. P., et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1591.
    Primeguard Insurance Co., Inc., et al. v. Garamendi, Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1592.
    Thabault v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1593.
    Moore v. City of Asheville, North Carolina, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1594.
    DeWalt v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1595.
    Sellens v. American States Insurance Co. et al.
   Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1596.
    Saxonis v. City of Lynn, Massachusetts, et al.
   App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1598.
    Abundant Life Church, Inc. v. Tubiolo et ux.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1599.
    Aparicio v. Potter, Postmaster General, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1600.
    Jaco v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1601.
    Lazorko, Administrator of the Estate of Norlie, aka Norlie-Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital et al.
   Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1603.
    Shore Club Condominium Assn., Inc., aka SC Condominium Assn., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1604.
    Ware v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Okla. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1606.
    Benson v. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1608.
    Leza v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1609.
    County of Sacramento, California, et al. v. Jones.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1612.
    New York Coastal Partnership, Inc., et al. v. Department of the Interior et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1613.
    Smith v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1614.
    Murphy et al. v. Schwartz.
   App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1616.
    Boulineau et al. v. Donald, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1619.
    Eliakim v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1621.
    Morters v. Barr et al.
   Ct. App. Wis. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1622.
    Strother v. United States.
   C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1624.
    Burton v. Renico, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1625.
    A&F Trademark, Inc., et al. v. Tolson, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Revenue.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1626.
    Noble v. Brinker International, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1627.
    Munson v. Gutierrez, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1628.
    Soler v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1629.
    St. Anne Community High School District No. 302 v. Norman K. et ux., Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Casey K.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1630.
    Powell v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1633.
    Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1635.
    Lordi v. Ishee, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1636.
    Madden et al. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1637.
    Klapper v. Connelly et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1639.
    Chehebar v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1640.
    Wills, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Wills, Deceased v. Amerada Hess Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1641.
    Stainless Systems Inc. v. Nextel West Corp. et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1642.
    Doe et al. v. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1643.
    Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1644.
    Savin Engineers, P. C., et al. v. Savin Corp.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1645.
    Simmons v. Connecticut.
   App. Ct. Conn.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1646.
    PMI Photomagic, Ltd. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., dba Fantasy Entertainment, et al.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1647.
    Harbert v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1648.
    Shen Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1649.
    Soro v. Citicorp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1650.
    South Carolina et al. v. Holliday Amusement Company of Charleston, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1651.
    Osahar v. United States Postal Service.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1652.
    Fryer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board of California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1653.
    Finney v. Nugent, Judge, Superior Court of California, San Diego County, et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1654.
    Mayercheck v. Hathaway, Judge, Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, Westmoreland County, et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1656.
    Sutton v. RHI Hotels Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1658.
    United States ex rel. King v. Jackson County Hospital Corp.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1659.
    Knox v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1661.
    Sheue-Jan Tsay v. Department of the Navy.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1662.
    Uritsky v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1665.
    Gwin v. Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration.
   Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1666.
    Gibson v. Farcas, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1669.
    Sheshtawy et al. v. Sheshtawy.
   Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1670.
    Spritzer v. Hershkop et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1674.
    Ypsilanti Board of Education et al. v. Mulbah.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1675.
    Merritt v. United States et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1676.
    Mercer v. Thomas et al.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1677.
    Moultrie v. Hutchinson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1680.
    Banks v. Chase Manhattan Bank.
   Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1681.
    Pryear v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1682.
    Miramax Film Corp. et al. v. Grosso.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1683.
    Veazey et. ux. v. Ascension Parish School Board.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1684.
    Cranmer v. Tumblebus Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1685.
    Duvall v. Sacramento Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1686.
    Reilly v. Weiss et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1687.
    Davidson et al. v. Vivra Inc. et al.; and Davidson v. Meehan et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1688.
    Bailey v. Clay County, Alabama, et al.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1689.
    Brant et al. v. Whitaker Bank, Inc.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1691.
    Moore v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1692.
    Continental Pet Technologies, Inc. v. Sandoval Palacias.
   Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1694.
    Asarnow v. New Jersey et al.
   Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1696.
    Lumumba v. Mississippi Bar.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1700.
    Guidi, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Guidi, et al. v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp. et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1701.
    Isen v. Federal Express Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1703.
    Forrester, Conservator of the Estate of Bass v. Rosa et al.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1705.
    Everson et al. v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1707.
    Otto et al. v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1708.
    Misek-Falkoff v. Douglas.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1711.
    Brokaw v. Qualcomm, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied:


text:
    No. 04-1713.
    Eagles, Ltd., et al. v. Felder.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1714.
    Gonzales Rios v. California Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1715.
    Tamayo et al. v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1716.
    Madriaga Lim, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al. v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1718.
    Anaya et ux., as Parents of Anaya, a Minor v. Douglas County, Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1720.
    Medlin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1721.
    Barnhardt v. Woodford, Director, California Department of Corrections.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1722.
    Willman et al. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1725.
    Fitzpatrick v. Department of Justice.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1726.
    Herbert v. Cain.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1728.
    Caldwell et al. v. United States.
   C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1730.
    Schwiegerath v. Schwiegerath.
   Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1731.
    Bennett v. Society of Lloyd’s.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1732.
    Anderson v. Wade et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1733.
    French v. Jackson et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1735.
    Southern Oregon Barter Fair v. Oregon.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1736.
    Enright v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1737.
    Coast Automotive Group, Ltd. v. Volkswagen Credit, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1738.
    Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-1741.
    Wilson, By and Through Her Next Friend and Mother, Wilson v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8253.
    Lopez, aka Chan v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8277.
    White v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8624.
    Griffith v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8660.
    Rios v. Ryan, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8765.
    Dowdy v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8938.
    Mejia v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8959.
    Daffin v. Lewis, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8980.
    Camper v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-8996.
    Sargent v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9054.
    Hale v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9072.
    Fields v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9116.
    Thom v. Gonzales, Attorney General.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9139.
    Stoddard v. Idaho.
   Ct. App. Idaho. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9356.
    Clemons v. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9437.
    Glover v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9444.
    Ritchie v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9454.
    Brooks v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9488.
    Madrid-Manriquez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9510.
    Hillhouse v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9517.
    Mares v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9535.
    Villegas v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9538.
    Bazilio v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9556.
    Bonilla v. Ramirez-Palmer, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9561.
    Gates v. Discovery Communications Inc. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9627.
    Ballinger v. United States.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9631.
    Davila v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9642.
    Thomas v. Romanowski, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9657.
    Horning v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9671.
    Rivera v. Hawaii.
   Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9690.
    Williams v. Pennsylvania.
   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9692.
    Southwood v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9702.
    Mooney v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9710.
    Winkles v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9731.
    Archer v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9740.
    Logan v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9783.
    Nicholas v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9795.
    Hamzah v. Federal Express Ground Package System, Inc.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9878.
    Little v. Evans, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9880.
    Crain v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9881.
    Cole v. Tennessee.
   Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9885.
    Morgan v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9889.
    Cooks v. Newland, Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9890.
    Millsap v. Ryan, Acting Warden.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9891.
    Thompson v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9892.
    White v. Wellcare Medicare.
   C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9893.
    Turner v. Kelly, Superintendent, Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 04-9896.
    Boyle v. Phillips, Warden.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.