author: Mr. Chief Justice Burger Me. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    REITER v. SONOTONE CORP. et al.
    No. 78-690.
    Argued April 25, 1979 —
    Decided June 11, 1979

      Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BreNNAN, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. RehNQUist, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 345.

      John E. Thomas argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

      Julian R. Wilheim and Elliot S. Kaplan argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief were Fred L. Wood-worth, Joseph C. Basta, and Deborah J. Palmer.

      Assistant Attorney General Shenefield argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Stephen M. Shapiro, Barry Gross-man, and Bruce E. Fein. Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for the States of Alabama et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Richard B. Allyn, Solicitor General of Minnesota, Alan H. Maclin, Stephen P. Kilgruff, and Thomas Kenyon, Special Assistant Attorneys General; and John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, Walter O. Theiss, Assistant Attorney General, and Roger Bern; joined by other officials for their respective States as follows: Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General, for Alabama; Avrum M. Gross, Attorney General, and Mark E. Ashburn, Assistant Attorney General, for Alaska; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, and Kenneth R. Reed for Arizona; Steve Clark, Attorney General, and Royce O. Griffin, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Arkansas; George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Warren J. Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, and Linda L. Tedeschi, Deputy Attorney General, for California; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, B. Lawrence Theis, First Assistant Attorney General, and William E. Walters, Assistant Attorney General, for Colorado; Carl R. Afelio, Attorney General, Gerard J. Dowling and Larry H. Evans, Assistant Attorneys General, for Connecticut; Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General, and William E. Kirk III, Assistant Attorney General, for Delaware; Jim Smith, Attorney General, Charles R. Ranson, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas C. Kearney, Assistant Attorney General, for Florida; Wayne Minami, Attorney General, and Thomas T. Wood, Deputy Attorney General, for Hawaii; David H. Leroy, Attorney General, and Mike Brassey, Deputy Attorney General, for Idaho; William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Illinois; Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, for Indiana; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gary H. Swanson, Assistant Attorney General, for Iowa; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General, and Wayne E. Hundley, Deputy Attorney General, for Kansas; Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General, and James M. Ringo, Assistant Attorney General, for Kentucky; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, and John R. Flowers, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Louisiana; Richard S. Cohen, Attorney General, and Cheryl Harrington, Assistant Attorney General, for Maine; Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, and Charles O. Monk II, Assistant Attorney General, for Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Paula W. Gold, Assistant Attorney General, and Steven J. Greenfogel for Massachusetts; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, for Michigan; A. F. Summer, Attorney General, and Marshall G. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, for Mississippi; Mike T. Greely, Attorney General, and Jerome J. Cate, Assistant Attorney General, for Montana; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Robert F. Bartle and Paul E. Hofmeister, Assistant Attorneys General, for Nebraska; Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General, for Nevada; Thomas D. Rath, Attorney General, for New líampshire; John J. Degnan, Attorney General, and Alfred J. Luciani for New Jersey; Jeff Bingham, Attorney General, and James J. Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General, for New Mexico; Robert Abrams, Attorney General, and John M. Desiderio, Assistant Attorney General, for New York; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, Howard A. Kramer, Deputy Attorney General, and David S. Crump, Special Deputy Attorney General, for North Carolina; Allen I. Olson, Attorney General, and Dale V. Sandstrom and Terry L. Adkins, Assistant Attorneys General, for North Dakota; William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Eugene F. McShane and Richard M. Firestone, Assistant Attorneys General, for Ohio; Jan Eñe Cartwright, Attorney General, and Manville J. Buford, Assistant Attorney General, for Oklahoma; James A. Redden, Attorney General, and James Kirkham Johns for Oregon; Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, and Norman J. Watkins and John L. Shearburn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Pennsylvania; Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General, and Patrick J. Quinlan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Rhode Island; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, for South Carolina; Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General, and James E. McMahon, Assistant Attorney General, for South Dakota; William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General, and William J. Haynes, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Tennessee; Mark White, Attorney General, for Texas; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, and Andrew W. Buffmire, Assistant Attorney General, for Utah; M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General, and Jay I. Ashman, Assistant Attorney General, for Vermont; Marshall Coleman, Attorney General, and Joseph W. Kaestner, Assistant Attorney General, for Virginia; Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Thomas L. Boeder, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Earle J. Hereford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Washington; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General, and Charles G. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, for West Virginia; Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General, and Michael L. Zaleski, Assistant Attorney General, for Wisconsin; and John D. Troughton, Attorney General, Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General, and James W. Gusea, Assistant Attorney General, for Wyoming.

        David Berger, H. Laddie Montague, Jr., Merrill G. Davidoff, Stanley J. Friedman, Frederick P. Furth, Thomas B. Fahrner, Aaron M. Fine, and Josef D. Cooper filed a brief for the plaintiffs in Kennedy Smith v. Toyota Motor Sales U. S. A. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

   Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of antitrust violations sustain an injury in their “business or property” within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15.

I

Petitioner brought a class action on behalf of herself and all persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids manufactured by five corporations, respondents here. Her complaint alleges that respondents have committed a variety of antitrust violations, including vertical and horizontal price fixing. Because of these violations, the complaint alleges, petitioner and the class of persons she seeks to represent have been forced to pay illegally fixed higher prices for the hearing aids and related services they purchased from respondents’ retail dealers. Treble damages and injunctive relief are sought under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26.

Respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint or summary judgment in the District Court. Among other things, respondents argued that Reiter, as a retail purchaser of hearing aids for personal use, lacked standing to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act because she had not been injured in her “business or property” within the meaning of the Act.

The District Court held that under § 4 a retail purchaser is injured in “property” if the purchaser can show that antitrust violations caused an increase in the price paid for the article purchased. The District Court relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906), and the legislative history of the Clayton Act set forth in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 486 n. 10 (1977), indicating that Congress intended to give a § 4 remedy to consumers. 435 F. Supp. 933, 935-938 (Minn. 1977).

The District Court determined, however, that the respondents had raised a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” id., at 938, and accordingly certified the question for interlocutory review under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). It then stayed further proceedings in the case and declined to express any opinion on the merits of the other issues raised by respondents’ motions or on the certifiability of the class.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retail purchasers of consumer goods and services who allege no injury of a commercial or business nature are not injured in their “business or property” within the meaning of § 4. 579 F. 2d 1077 (CA8 1978). Noting the absence of any holdings on this precise issue by this Court or other courts of appeals, the court reasoned that the phrase “business or property” was intended to limit standing to those engaged in commercial ventures. It relied on the legislative history and this Court’s statement in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 264 (1972), that “business or property” referred to “commercial interests or enterprises.” A contrary holding, the Court of Appeals observed, would add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained dockets of the federal courts and could be used to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses. Small and medium-sized retailers would be especially hard hit by “gigantic consumer class actions,” and granting standing to retail consumers might actually have an anticompeti-tive impact as a consequence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals thought “it sensible as a matter of policy and compelled as a matter of law that consumers alleging no injury of a commercial or competitive nature are not injured in their property under section 4 of the Clayton Act.” 579 F. 2d, at 1087.

We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979). We reverse.

II

As is true in every case involving the construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, provides:

“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U. S. C. § 15 (emphasis added).

On its face, § 4 contains little in the way of restrictive language. In Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 (1978), we remarked:

“ ‘The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.’ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138-139. And the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress used the phrase 'any person’ intending it to have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the floor debates of any more restrictive definition.” Id., at 312.

Similarly here, the word “property” has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage “property” comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed. See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1818 (1961). Money, of course, is a form of property.

Respondents protest that, if the reference to “property” in § 4 means “money,” the term “business” then becomes superfluous, for every injury in one’s business necessarily involves a pecuniary injury. They argue that if Congress wished to permit one who lost only money to bring suit under § 4, it would not have used the restrictive phrase “business or property” ; rather, it would have employed more generic language akin to that of § 16, for example, which provides for injunctive relief against.any “threatened loss or damage.” 15 U. S. C. § 26. Congress plainly intended to exclude some category of injury in choosing the phrase “business or property” for § 4. Only a “commercial interest” gloss, they argue, both gives the phrase the restrictive significance intended for it and at the same time gives independent significance to the word “business” and the word “property.” The argument of respondents is straightforward: the phrase “business or property” means “business activity or property related to one’s business.” Brief for Respondents 11 n. 7.

That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive “or” and rob the term “property” of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it would convert the noun “business” into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 739-740 (1978). Congress’ use of the word “or” makes plain that “business” was not intended to modify “property,” nor was “property” intended to modify “business.”

When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury in both its “business” and its “property.” But neither term is rendered redundant by recognizing that a consumer not engaged in a “business” enterprise, but rather acquiring goods or services for personal use, is injured in “property” when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of the anticompetitive conduct complained of. The phrase “business or property” also retains restrictive significance. It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered. E. g., Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (Mont. 1967). Congress must have intended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property.” But it taxes the ordinary meaning of common terms to argue, as respondents do, that a consumer’s monetary injury arising directly out of a retail purchase is not comprehended by the natural and usual meaning of the phrase “business or property.” We simply give the word “property” the independent significance to which it is entitled in this context. A consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been injured “in his . . . property” within the meaning of § 4.

Indeed, this Court indicated as much in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1960). There the city alleged that the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants had caused the city to pay more for water pipes purchased for use in the city’s water system. The defendants answered that the pecuniary injury resulting from the alleged overcharges did not injure the city in its “business or property” within the meaning of § 4. This Court, without relying on the fact that the city was engaged in a business enterprise, stated:

“The city was . . . injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe. A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property.” 203 U. S., at 396.

The holding of Chattanooga Foundry could well have been grounded on the undisputed fact that the city was engaged in the commercial enterprise of supplying water for a charge and, therefore, engaged in a business. It was not uncommon for both municipalities and private companies to own and operate competing waterworks at the turn of the century. In operating a municipal public utility, the city was in a real sense engaged in the “business of furnishing water” when it purchased the pipe to carry water from the city’s reservoirs to its customers. Ibid.

Yet, the Court’s holding in Chattanooga Foundry was deliberately grounded on the premise that the city had been injured in its “property” — independent of any injury it had sustained in its “business of furnishing water”' — because the defendants’ antitrust violation caused it to pay a higher price for the pipe than it otherwise would have paid. Ibid. Chattanooga Foundry therefore establishes that monetary injury, standing alone, may be injury in one’s “property” within the meaning of § 4. Thus, the fact that petitioner Reiter was deprived of only money, albeit a modest amount, is no reason to conclude that she did not sustain a “property” injury.

Nor does her status as a “consumer” change the nature of the injury she suffered or the intrinsic meaning of “property” in § 4. That consumers of retail goods and services have standing to sue under § 4 is implicit in our decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 780, 782 (1975). There we held that a bar association was subject to a treble-damages suit brought under § 4 by persons who sought legal services in connection with the purchase of a residence. Furthermore, we have often referred to “consumers” as parties entitled to seek damages under § 4 without intimating that consumers of goods and services purchased for personal rather than commercial use were in any way foreclosed by the statutory language from asserting an injury in their “property.” E. g., Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S., at 313-315; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S., at 486 n. 10; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 494 (1968); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 (1948).

Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 (1972), is not to the contrary. There we held that injury to a state’s total economy, for which the state sought redress in its parens patriae capacity, was not cognizable under § 4. It is true we noted that the words “business or property” refer to “commercial interests or enterprises,” and reasoned that Hawaii could not recover on its claim for damage done to its “general economy” because such injury did not harm Hawaii’s “commercial interests.” 405 U. S., at 264.

However, the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute. Use of the phrase “commercial interests or enterprises,” read in context, in no sense suggests that only injuries to a business entity are within the ambit of § 4. Respondents ignore the Court’s careful use of the disjunctive and the naturally broad meaning of the term “interests” in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., supra. The phrase “commercial interests” was used there as a generic reference to the interests of the State of Hawaii as a party to a commercial transaction. This is apparent from Hawaii’s explicit reaffirmance of the rule of Chattanooga Foundry and statement that, where injury to a state “occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace” through a “payment of money wrongfully induced,” treble damages are recoverable by a state under the Clayton Act. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 263 n. 14. A central premise of our holding in Hawaii was concern over duplicative recoveries. We noted that a “large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the 'general economy’ ” for which the State sued was “no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property’ of consumers” for which, on a proper showing, they could recover in their own right. 405 U. S., at 263-264.

Consumers in the United States purchase at retail more than $1.2 trillion in goods and services annually. 1978 Economic Report of the President 257 (Table B-l). It is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive private enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market. Here, where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially inflated by reason of respondents’ anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an injury in her “property” under § 4.

Nothing in the legislative history of § 4 conflicts with our holding today. Many courts and commentators have observed that the respective legislative histories of § 4 of the Clayton Act and § 7 of the Sherman Act, its predecessor, shed no light on Congress’ original understanding of the terms “business or property.” Nowhere in the legislative record is specific reference made to the intended scope of those terms. Respondents engage in speculation in arguing that the substitution of the terms “business or property” for the broader language originally proposed by Senator Sherman was clearly intended to exclude pecuniary injuries suffered by those who purchase goods and services at retail for personal use. None of the subsequent floor debates reflect any such intent. On the contrary, they suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 (1978). Certainly the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the treble-damages remedy of what is now § 4 as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing. E. g., 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2460, 2558 (1890). Because Congress in 1890 rejected a proposal to allow a group of consumers to bring a collective action as a class, some legislators questioned whether individual consumers would be willing to bring actions for relatively small amounts. See, e. g., id., at 1767-1768, 2569, 2612, 3147-3148, 3150. At no time, however, was the right of a consumer to bring an action for damages questioned.

In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., supra, after examining the legislative history of § 4, we described the Sherman Act as “conceived of primarily as a remedy for ‘[t]he people of the United States as individuals/ especially consumers,” and the treble-damages provision of the Clayton Act as “conceived primarily as ‘open[ing] the door of justice to every man . . . and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.’ ” 429 U. S., at 486 n. 10. Thus, to the extent that the legislative history is relevant, it supports our holding that a consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in “property” within the meaning of § 4.

Respondents also argue that allowing class actions to be brought by retail consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant burden to the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. That may well be true but cannot be a controlling consideration here. We must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations. Indeed, nearly 20 times as many private antitrust actions are currently pending in the federal courts as actions filed by the Department of Justice. Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep. 101, Table 28 (1978). To be sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the federal courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the judicial resources necessary to execute its mandates.

Finally, respondents argue that the cost of defending consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any event. These are not unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress than to this Court. However accurate respondents’ arguments may prove to be — and they are not without substance — they cannot govern our reading of the plain language in § 4.

District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested in them by Ted. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to matters involving the certification and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions. See generally Durham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 299. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory language “business or property” need not result in administrative chaos, class-action harassment, or “windfall” settlements if the district courts exercise sound discretion and use the tools available.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Me. Justice Brennan took- no part in the decision of this case.

Me. Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion and write separately only to point out that the concern expressed by the Court of Appeals that an interpretation of “business or property” in the manner in which the Court interprets it today would “add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained dockets of the federal courts and could be used to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses,” ante, at 336, is by no means an unfounded one. And pronouncements from this Court exhorting district courts to be “especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements” will not be a complete solution for those courts which are actually on the firing line in this type of litigation. Ante, at 345. But I fully agree that we must take the statute as Congress wrote it, and I also fully agree with the Court’s construction of the phrase “business or property.” I think that the Court’s observation, ante, at 343 n. 6, that “the treble-damages remedy of § 4 took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23” is a miracle of understatement; and in the absence of any jurisdictional limit, there is considerable doubt in my mind whether this type of action is indeed ultimately of primary benefit to consumers themselves, who may recover virtually no monetary damages, as opposed to the attorneys for the class, who stand to obtain handsome rewards for their services. Be that as it may, the problem, if there is one, is for Congress and not for the courts.

       Specifically, Reiter alleges that respondents violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14. She claims respondents restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by their retail dealers, used the customer lists of their retail dealers for their own purposes, prohibited unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing their hearing aids, and conspired among themselves and with their retail dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids.

       Differing views on this issue have been expressed by various courts. See, e. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F. 2d 1077 (CA8 1978) (case below); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Industries, 552 F. 2d 90, 98-99, and n. 23 (CA3), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 823 (1977); Cleary v. Chalk, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 415, 419 n. 17, 488 F. 2d 1315, 1319 n. 17 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 938 (1974); Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (EDNY 1978); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (ND Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1725 (CA9).

       The Court of Appeals expressly noted that Reiter’s claim for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act was riot before it on interlocutory appeal. 579 F. 2d, at 1087 n. 19. The court therefore expressed no view as to Reiter’s standing to raise this claim. It also expressly refused to decide whether Reiter’s claim for treble damages under § 4 was barred by the direct-purchaser rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977). 579 F. 2d, at 1079 n. 3. Accordingly, these issues are not before us.

       See, e. g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 261 (1972); Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880, 882-883 (ND Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1547 (CA9); M. Forkosch, Antitrust and the Consumer 2-3 (1956); Comment, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 237, 242-243, 249-252 (1979). See also 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 106, pp. 14r-16 (1978).

       As originally introduced, the bill that ultimately became the Sherman Act authorized "any person or corporation injured or damnified by [an unlawful] arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination” to sue for damages thereby sustained. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (1889).

       Of course, the treble-damages remedy of § 4 took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.

       Although in no sense a controlling consideration, we note that our holding is consistent with the assumption on which Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1394, 15 U. S. C. § 15c et seq. The 'text and legislative history of this statute make clear that in 1976 Congress believed that consumers have a cause of action under § 4, which the statute authorizes the states to assert in a parens patriae capacity. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 15c (a)(1), 15c (a)(1) (B)(ii), 15c (b)(2); H. R. Rep. No. 94^499, pp. 6, 9 (1975). See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S., at 734 n. 14.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Brennan

license: Public Domain

text:
    ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. SIERRA CLUB et al.
    No. 78-625.
    Argued April 18, 1979 —
    Decided June 11, 1979

      BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Assistant Attorney General Harmon argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Sagalkin, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Raymond N. Zagone, and Dirk D. Snel.

      James Hillson Cohen argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents.

        Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, and Raymond M. Momboisse filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
      Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Roberts B. Owen and Charles H. Montange for the National Wildlife Federation et ah; and by Mitchell Rogovin and David R. Boyd for the Wilderness Society.

   Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for decision is whether § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C), requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS’s) to accompany appropriation requests. We hold that it does not.

I

NEPA sets forth its purposes in bold strokes:

“The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation_” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321.

Congress recognized, however, that these desired goals could be incorporated, into the everyday functioning of the Federal Government only with great difficulty. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969). NEPA therefore contains “action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies [of the Act] are implemented.” Ibid. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409 (1976). Section 102 (2)(C) of the Act sets out one of these procedures:

“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
“(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on- — •
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
“(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
“(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis supplied).

The thrust of § 102 (2) (C) is thus that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making. The “detailed statement” it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the “action-forcing” characteristics of § 102 (2)(C) would be lost. “In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning .... As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level— and this often means the Congress — environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 20. For this reason the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require federal agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values . . . .” 43 Fed. Reg. 55992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1501.2).

In 1974, respondents, three organizations with interests in the preservation of the environment, brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that § 102 (2) (C) requires federal agencies to prepare EIS’s to accompany their appropriation requests. Respondents named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of'the Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB), and alleged that proposed curtailments in the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), 80 Stat. 927, 16 U. S. C. § 668dd, would “cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units within the System.” Complaint ¶ 17. The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and consists of more than 350 refuges encompassing more than 30 million acres in 49 States. The primary purpose of the NWRS is to provide a national program “for the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for the protection and preservation of endangered or threatened species and their habitat; and for the management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the maximum benefits from these resources.” 50 CFR § 25.11 (b) (1978). Respondents alleged that the proposed budget curtailments would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and hence should have been accompanied by an EIS prepared both by the Fish and Wildlife Service and by OMB.

The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Relying on provisions of the then applicable CEQ guidelines, and on the Department of the Interior’s Manual, the District Court held that “appropriation requests are 'proposals for legislation’ within the meaning of NEPA,” and also that “annual proposals for financing the Refuge System are major Federal actions which clearly have a significant effect on the environment.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188, 1189 (1975). The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and provided declaratory and injunctive relief. It stated that the Department of the Interior and OMB were required “to prepare, consider, and disseminate environmental impact statements on annual proposals for financing the National Wildlife Refuge System.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit modified the holding of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was apprehensive because “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 125, 581 F. 2d 895, 903 (1978). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 102 (2) (C) required the preparation of an EIS only when an appropriation request accompanies “a 'proposal’ for taking new action which significantly changes the status quo,” or when “the request for budget approval and appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic course following a programmatic review.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. Section 102 (2) (C) would thus have no application to “a routine request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals held, however, that there was no need for injunctive relief because the Fish and Wildlife Service had completed during the pendency of the appeal a “Programmatic EIS” that adequately evaluated the environmental consequences for the NWRS of various budgetary alternatives. Id., at 126, 581 F. 2d, at 904. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976).

We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979), and we now reverse.

II

NEPA requires EIS’s to be included in recommendations or reports on both “proposals for legislation . . . significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and “proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See CEQ regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 56001 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1506.8 (a)). Petitioners argue, however, that the requirements of § 102 (2)(C) have no application to the budget process. The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals rests on two alternative interpretations of § 102 (2)(C). The first is that appropriation requests which are the result of “an agency’s painstaking review of an ongoing program,” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903, are “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of § 102 (2) (C). The second is that appropriation requests which are the reflection of “new” agency initiatives constituting “major Federal actions” under NEPA, are themselves “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” for purposes of § 102 (2)(C). We hold that neither interpretation is correct.

A

We note initially that NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine.” When Congress has thus spoken “in the plainest of words,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978), we will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a statute, even for the purpose of fashioning from the resulting fragments a rule that “accords with ‘common sense and the public weal.’ ” Id., at 195. Therefore, either all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation,” or none does.

There is no direct evidence in the legislative history of NEPA that enlightens whether Congress intended the phrase “proposals for legislation” to include requests for appropriations. At the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, CEQ guidelines provided that § 102 (2) (C) applied to “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a)(1) (1977). At that time CEQ’s guidelines were advisory in nature, and were for the purpose of assisting federal agencies in complying with NEPA. § 1500.1 (a).

In 1977, however, President Carter, in order to create a single set of uniform, mandatory regulations, ordered CEQ, “after consultation with affected agencies,” to “[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 124 (1978). The President ordered the heads of federal agencies to “comply with the regulations issued by the Council .. . .” Ibid. CEQ has since issued these regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978), and they reverse CEQ’s prior interpretation of § 102 (2)(C). The regulations provide specifically that “ ' [1] egislation’ includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress . . . but does not include requests for appropriations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.17). (Emphasis supplied.) CEQ explained this reversal by noting that, on the basis of “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors,... the Council in its experience found that preparation of EISs is ill-suited to the budget preparation process.” 43 Fed. Reg., at 55989.

CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U. S. 1301, 1309-1310 (1974) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility “to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in . . . this Act . . . , and to , make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.” 83 Stat. 855, 42 U. S. C. § 4344 (3).

It is true that in the past we have been somewhat less inclined to defer to “administrative guidelines” when they have “conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.” General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). But CEQ’s reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies. See American Trucking Assns. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967). A mandatory requirement that every federal agency submit EIS’s with its appropriation requests raises wholly different and more serious issues “of fair and prudent administration,” ibid., than does nonbinding advice. This is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeals’ correct observation that “ [a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals accurately noted that such an interpretation of NEPA would be a “reductio ad absurdum .... It would be absurd to require an EIS on every decision on the management of federal land, such as fluctuation in the number of forest fire spotters.” Id., at 124, 581 F. 2d, at 902. Even respondents do not now contend that NEPA should be construed so that all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Brief for Respondents 13 n. 6, 55-61.

CEQ’s interpretation of the phrase “proposals for legislation” is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation.” The rules of both Houses “prohibit ‘legislation’ from being added to an appropriation bill.” L. Fisher, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, in 1 Studies in Taxation, Public Finance and Related Subjects — A Compendium 437 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1977). See Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16 (4) (“No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule XXI (2) (1979); 7 C. Cannon, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 1172,1410,1443,1445,1448,1459, 1463, 1470, 1472 (1936). The distinction is maintained “to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another. This division of labor is intended to enable the Appropriations Committees to concentrate on financial issues and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation.” House Budget Committee, Congressional Control of Expenditures 19 (Comm. Print 1977). House and Senate rules thus require a “previous choice of policy . . . before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill.” United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 164 n. 5 (1953). Since appropriations therefore “have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 190, and since the “action-forcing” provisions of NEPA are directed precisely at the processes of “planning and . . . decisionmak-ing,” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (A), which are associated with underlying legislation, we conclude that the distinction made by CEQ’s regulations is correct and that “proposals for legislation” do not include appropriation requests.

B

The Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA is that appropriation requests constitute “proposals for . . . major Federal actions.” But this interpretation distorts the language of the Act, since appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all; they instead fund actions already proposed. Section 102 (2) (C) is thus best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Any other result would create unnecessary redundancy. For example, if the mere funding of otherwise unaltered agency programs were construed to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the resulting EIS’s would merely recapitulate the EIS’s that should have accompanied the initial proposals of the programs. And if an agency program were to be expanded or revised in a manner that constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an EIS would'have been required to accompany the underlying programmatic decision. An additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing.

Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive. For example, respondents allege in their complaint that OMB required the Fish and Wildlife Service to decrease its appropriation request for the NWRS, and that this decrease would alter the operation of the NWRS in a manner that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See n. 9, supra. But since the Fish and Wildlife Service could respond to OMB’s budgetary curtailments in a variety of ways, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976), it is impossible to predict whether or how any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality of the human environment. OMB’s determination to cut the Service’s budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requiring OMB to include an EIS in its budgetary cuts would be premature. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 320 (1975). And since an EIS must be prepared if any of the revisions the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes in its ongoing programs in response to OMB’s budget cuts would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, requiring the Fish and Wildlife Service to include an EIS with its revised appropriation request would merely be redundant. Moroever, this redundancy would have the deleterious effect of circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between appropriation and legislation. It would flood House and Senate Appropriations Committees with EIS’s focused on the policy issues raised by underlying authorization legislation, thereby dismantling the “division of labor” so deliberately created by congressional rules.

C

We conclude therefore, for the reasons given above, that appropriation requests constitute neither “proposals for legislation” nor “proposals for . . . major Federal actions,” and that therefore the procedural requirements of § 102 (2) (C) have no application to such requests. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

So ordered.

       Section 101 (b) articulates these purposes with even greater particularity :
      “In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may—
      “(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
      “ (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings ;
      “(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
      “(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
      “(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
      “(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4331 (b).

       Of course, an EIS need not be promulgated unless an agency’s planning ripens into a “recommendation or report on proposals for legislation [or] other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 (1976). Moreover, although NEPA requires compliance “to the fullest extent possible,” we have held that the duty to prepare an EIS must yield before “a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority.” Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U. S. 776, 788 (1976).

       CEQ regulations state that “[t]he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. ... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.” 43 Fed. Reg. 55994 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.1).
      In Exec. Order No. 11991, President Carter required the CEQ to issue regulations that included procedures “for the early preparation of environmental impact statements.” 3 CFR 124 (1978). As a consequence, CEQ regulations provide:
      “An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal ... so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaldng process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made. . . . For instance:
      “(a) For projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies the environmental impact statement shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later stage if necessary. . . .” 43 Fed. Reg. 55995 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.5).

       Respondents are the Sierra Club, the National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

       CEQ regulations define an “environmental impact statement” to mean “a detailed written statement as required by See. 102 (2) (C) of [NEPA].” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.11).

         See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System 1-8 to 1-9 (Nov. 1976).

       The System is administered according to the provisions of several statutes. The most significant of these are the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 72 Stat. 563, 16 U. S. C. § 661 et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119,16 U. S. C. § 742a et seq.; the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 715 et seq.; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq.

       Respondents brought suit on behalf of themselves, claiming that they had organizational interests in monitoring and publicizing the management of the NWRS, and on behalf of their members, alleging that the latter used the NWRS for recreational and other purposes and would be affected by the proposed budget curtailments.

       Respondents alleged that OMB had “significantly reduced the Interior Department’s request for appropriations for the operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System during fiscal year 1974 and during other years without preparing or considering the environmental-impact statement required by NEPA.” Complaint ¶ 25.
      Respondents also contended that § 102 (2) (B) of NEPA required OMB to develop procedures to assure consideration of environmental factors in the budget process. Section 102 (2) (B) requires all federal agencies to "identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (B).

       At that time, CEQ was authorized by Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3 (h), to issue nonbinding “guidelines to Federal agencies for the preparation of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions affecting the environment.” 3 CFR 904 (1966-1970 Comp.). These guidelines stated that the “major Federal actions” to which § 102 (2) (C) applied included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a) (1) (1974). See § 1500.3.

       At that time the Department of the Interior’s Manual, following CEQ’s proposed guidelines, provided:
      “The following criteria are to be used in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement:
      “A. Types of Federal actions to be considered include, but are not limited to:
      “(1) Recommendations or favorable reports to the Congress relating to legislation, including appropriations.” Department of the Interior Manual, §516.5, 36 Fed. Reg. 19344 (1971).

       Without additional discussion, the District Court also stated that the Director of OMB was required “to develop formal methods and procedures which will, with respect to [OMB]’s own administrative actions and proposals, identify those agency actions requiring environmental statements to be prepared, considered, and disseminated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. See n. 9, supra.

       Respondents do not now challenge this holding.

       The Court of Appeals also affirmed what it took to be the District Court’s declaratory relief requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process . . . 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 12, supra.

       CEQ had taken this position from the first draft of its guidelines. CEQ was required by President Nixon to issue guidelines on March 5, 1970. See Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 CPR 902 (1966-1967 Comp.). On April 30, 1970, CEQ promulgated interim guidelines which provided that “major Federal actions” included “[r]ecommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations.” Council on Environmental Quality, First Annual Report: Environmental Quality 288 (1970). On April 23, 1971, the guidelines were revised to state that “major Federal actions” included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations.” 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). On August 1, 1973, the guidelines were once again revised, this time to the form noted by the Court of Appeals. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
      Relying on the CEQ guidelines, two prior decisions by Courts of Appeals have both interpreted “proposals for legislation” to include appropriation requests. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1181 (CA6 1972); Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 404, 481 F. 2d 1079, 1088 (1973).

       These regulations become effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978).

       The CEQ also noted that “[n]othing in the Council’s determination, however, relieves agencies of responsibility to prepare statements when otherwise required on the underlying program or other actions.” Id., at 55989.

       The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 directs the Comptroller General of the United States, “in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, [to] develop, establish, maintain, and publish standard terminology, definitions, classifications, and codes for Federal fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data and information.” 88 Stat. 327, 31 U. S. C. § 1152 (a) (1). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Comptroller General has published definitions distinguishing “authorizing legislation” from “appropriation.” Authorizing legislation is defined in the following manner:
      “Basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress which sets up or continues the legal operation of a Federal program or agency either indefinitely or for a specific period of time or sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a program. Such legislation is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds of budget authority to be contained in appropriations acts. It may limit the amount of budget authority to be provided subsequently or may authorize the appropriation of 'such sums as may be necessary.’ ” Comptroller General of the United States, Terms Used in the Budgetary Process 4 (1977).

        Appropriation, on the other hand, is defined as:
      “An authorization by an act of the Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation usually follows .enactment of authorizing legislation. . . . Appropriations do not represent cash actually set aside in the Treasury for purposes specified in the appropriation act; they represent limitations of amounts which agencies may obligate during the time period specified in the respective appropriations acts.” Id., at 3.
      Congressional enactments employ this distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act requires the President to include in the proposed budget he submits to Congress
      “with respect to each- proposal in the Budget for new or additional legislation which would create or expand any function, activity, or authority, in addition to those functions, activities, and authorities then existing or as then being administered and operated, a tabulation showing—
      “(A) the amount proposed in the Budget for appropriation and for expenditure in the ensuing fiscal year on account of such proposal; and
      “(B) the estimated appropriation required on account of such proposal in each of the four fiscal years, immediately following that ensuing fiscal year, during which such proposal is to be in effect . . . .” As added, 84 Stat. 1169, 31 U. S. C. § 11 (a) (12) (emphasis supplied).
      See also 18 TJ. S. C. § 1913; 22 U. S. C. § 2394 (c).
      The Executive Branch also recognizes the distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, OMB distinguishes its function “[t]o supervise and control the administration of the budget” from its task of assisting “the President by clearing and coordinating departmental advice on proposed legislation.” Requiring Confirmation of Future Appointments of the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, H. R. Rep. No. 93-697, p. 18 (1973). See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1954). OMB Circular No. A-19 (1972) establishes OMB’s procedures for “legislative coordination and clearance,” whereas OMB Circular No. A-ll (1978) sets out OMB’s guidelines for the “Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates.” OMB Circular No. A-19, §6 (a), requires each federal agency to “prepare and submit to OMB annually its proposed legislative program for the next session of Congress. These programs must be submitted at the same time as the initial submissions of an agency’s annual budget request as required by OMB Circular A-ll.” OMB Circular A-ll, § 13.2, on the other hand, provides:
      “If, in addition to the regular appropriation requests, it appears probable that proposals for new legislation may require a further budget request or result in a change in revenues or outlays, a tentative forecast of the supplemental estimate will be set forth separately. . . . Such proposed supplemental must be consistent with items appearing in the agency’s legislative program as required by OMB Circular No. A-19 . . . .”

       L. Deschler, Procedure in the U. S. House of Representatives §26-1.2 (1977) states that “[¡language in an appropriation bill changing existing law is legislation and not in order.” Conversely, “ [restrictions against the inclusion of appropriations in legislative bills are provided for by House rule . . . .” Id., §25-3.1.

       CEQ regulations define “major Federal action” in the following manner:
      “ 'Major Federal action’ includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly .... Actions include the circumstance where the responsible oifi-cials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action.
      “(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals ....
      “(b) Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following categories:
      “(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 651 et seq.; treaties and international conventions or agreements; formal documents establishing an agency's policies which will result in or substantially alter agency programs.
      “(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based.
      “(3) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive.
      “(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004-56005 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18).

      “[M]ajor Federal actions” include the “expansion or revision of ongoing programs.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 20 (1969).

       For example, if an agency were to seek an appropriation to initiate a major new program that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, or if it were to decline to ask for funding so as to terminate a program with a similar effect, the agency would have been required to include EIS’s in the recommendations or reports on the proposed underlying programmatic decisions.

       The Court of Appeals held that EIS’s need be included in appropriation requests for “major Federal actions” only if major changes that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment are proposed in the underlying programs for which funding is sought. See 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. But an appropriation request applies not only to major changes in a federal program, but also to the entire program it is designed to fund. Without appropriations, the underlying program would cease to exist. Therefore, if the existence vel non of that program is a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA would require an EIS to be included in the concomitant appropriation request.
      It is important to note that CEQ regulations provide that the adjective “major” in the phrase “major Federal actions” “reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of [the adverb] significantly” in the phrase “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18). See n. 20, supra. As a consequence, the Court of Appeals’ holding that certain appropriation requests are “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” is operationally identical to its holding that certain appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Both holdings would require EIS’s to accompany funding requests for every federal program that significantly affects the quality of the human environment. Thus, not only do both holdings run the same dangers of “trivializing” NEPA, but also the same “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality,” 43 Fed. Reg. 55989 (1978), which led CEQ to distinguish “appropriations” from “legislation,” would require appropriations to be distinguished from “proposals for . . . major Federal actions.”

       Because we conclude that § 102 (2) (C) has no application to appropriation requests, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 14, supra.