author:
      Me. Chief Justice Burger Mr. Justice Brennan,
      Mr. Justice Stewart,

text:
    CITY OF MADISON JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 8 et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.
    No. 75-946.
    Argued October 12, 1976
    Decided December 8, 1976

      Gerald C. Kops argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Henry A. Gempeler.

      Robert C. Kelly argued the cause for appellee Madison Teachers, Inc. With him on the brief was William Haus

      Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by William W. Van Alstyne for the American Association of University Professors; by Robert T. Thompson and Lawrence Kraus for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by James Newton Wilhoit III, Rex H. Reed, and James K. RuKly for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation; by Sylvester Petro for the Public Service Research Council; by John J. Gunther for the United States Conference of Mayors; and by James F. Clark and Karen A. Mercer for the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc.
      Briefs of amid curiae were filed by J. Albert WoU and Laurence Gold
        for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by Robert H. Chanin and David Rubin for the National Education Assn.

   Me. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented on this appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is whether a State may constitutionally require that an elected board of education prohibit teachers, other than union representatives, to speak at open meetings, at which public participation is permitted, if such speech is addressed to the subject of pending collective-bargaining negotiations.

The Madison Board of Education and Madison Teachers, Inc. (MTI), a labor union, were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement during the calendar year of 1971. In January 1971 negotiations commenced for renewal of the agreement and MTI submitted a number of proposals. One among them called for the inclusion of a so-called “fair-share” clause, which would require all teachers, whether members of MTI or not, to pay union dues to defray the costs of collective bargaining. Wisconsin law-expressly permits inclusion of “fair share” provisions in municipal employee collective-bargaining agreements. Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (2) (1973). Another proposal presented by the union was a provision for binding arbitration of teacher dismissals. Both of these provisions were resisted by the school board. The negotiations deadlocked in November 1971 with a number of issues still unresolved, among them “fair share” and arbitration.

During the same month, two teachers, Holmquist and Reed, who were members of the bargaining unit, but not members of the union, mailed a letter to all teachers in the district expressing opposition to the “fair share” proposal. Two hundred teachers replied, most commenting favorably on Holmquist and Reed’s position. Thereupon a petition was drafted calling for a one-year delay in the implementation of “fair share” while the proposal was more closely analyzed by an impartial committee. The petition was circulated to teachers in the district on December 6, 1971. Holmquist and Reed intended to present the results of their petition effort to the school board and to MTI at the school board’s public meeting that same evening.

Because of the stalemate in the negotiations, MTI arranged to have pickets present at the school board meeting. In addition, 300 to 400 teachers attended in support of the union’s position.. During a portion of the meeting devoted to expression of opinion by the public, the president of MTI took the floor and spoke on the subject of the ongoing negotiations. He concluded his remarks by presenting to the board a petition signed by 1,300-1,400 teachers calling for the expeditious resolution of the negotiations. Holmquist was next given the floor, after John Matthews, the business representative of MTI, unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade him from speaking. Matthews had also spoken to a member of the school board before the meeting and requested that the board refuse to permit Holmquist to speak. Holmquist stated that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools” and that he desired to inform the board of education, as he had already informed the union, of the results of an informational survey concerning the “fair share” clause. He then read the petition which had been circulated to the teachers in the district that morning and stated that in the 31 schools from which reports had been received, 53% of the teachers had already signed the petition.

Holmquist stated that neither side had adequately addressed the issue of “fair share” and that teachers were confused about- the meaning of the proposal. He concluded by saying: “Due to this confusion, we wish to take no stand on the proposal itself, but ask only that all alternatives be presented clearly to all teachers and more importantly to the general public to whom we are all responsible. We ask simply for communication, not confrontation.” The sole response from the school board was a question by the president inquiring whether Holmquist intended to present the board with' the petition. Holmquist answered that he would. Holmquist’s presentation had lasted approximately 2% minutes.

Later that evening, the board met in executive session and voted a proposal acceding to all of the union’s demands with the exception of “fair share.” During a negotiating session the following morning, MTI accepted the proposal and a contract was signed on December 14, 1971.

(1)

In January 1972, MTI filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) claiming that the board had committed a prohibited labor practice by permitting Holmquist to speak at the December 6 meeting. MTI claimed that in so doing the board had engaged in negotiations with a member of the bargaining unit other than the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70 (3)(a)l, 4 (1973). Following a hearing the Commission concluded that the board was guilty of the prohibited labor practice and ordered that it “immediately cease and desist from permitting employes, other than representatives of Madison Teachers Inc., to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective bargaining between it and Madison Teachers Inc.” The Commission’s action was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Dane County.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed. 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N. W. 2d 206. The court recognized that both the Federal and State Constitutions protect freedom of speech and the right to petition the government, but noted that these rights may be abridged in the face of “ ‘a clear and present danger that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that [the legislature] has a right to prevent.’ ” Id., at 211, 231 N. W. 2d, at 212, citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). The court held that abridgment of the speech in this case was justified in order “to avoid the dangers attendant upon relative chaos in labor management relations.” 69 Wis. 2d, at 212, 231 N. W. 2d, at 213.

(2)

The Wisconsin court perceived “clear and present danger” based upon its conclusion that Holmquist’s speech before the school board constituted “negotiation” with the board. Permitting such “negotiation,” the court reasoned, would undermine the bargaining exclusivity guaranteed the majority union under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (3)(a)4 (1973). From that premise it concluded that teachers’ First Amendment rights could be limited. Assuming, arguendo, that such a “danger” might in some circumstances justify some limitation of First Amendment rights, we are unable to read this record as presenting such danger as would justify curtailing speech.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that Holmquist’s terse statement during the public meeting constituted negotiation with the board was based upon its adoption of the lower court’s determination that, “‘[e]ven though Holmquist’s statement superficially appears to be merely a “position statement,” the court deems from the total circumstances that it constituted “negotiating.” ’ ” This cryptic conclusion seems to ignore the ancient wisdom that calling a thing by a name does not make it so. Holmquist did not seek to bargain or offer to enter into any bargain with the board, nor does it appear that he was authorized by any other teachers to enter into any agreement on their behalf. Although his views were not consistent with those of MTI, communicating such views to the employer could not change the fact that MTI alone was authorized to negotiate and to enter into a contract with the board.

Moreover the school board meeting at which Holmquist was permitted to speak was open to the public. He addressed the school board not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his government. We have held that teachers may not be “compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). Where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers who make up the overwhelming proportion of school employees and who are most vitally concerned with the proceedings. It is conceded that any citizen could have presented precisely the same points and provided the board with the same information as did Holmquist.

Regardless of the extent to which true contract negotiations between a public body and its employees may be regulated— an issue we need not consider at this time — the participation in public discussion of public business cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals. To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees. Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972).

(3)'

The WERC’s order is not limited to a determination that a prohibited labor practice had taken place in the past; it also restrains future conduct. By prohibiting the school board from “permitting employes ... to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education” the order constitutes an indirect, but effective, prohibition on persons such as Holmquist from communicating with their government. The order would have a substantial impact upon virtually all communication between teachers and the school board. The order prohibits speech by teachers “on matters subject to collective bargaining.” As the dissenting opinion below noted, however, there is virtually no subject concerning the operation of the school system that could not also be characterized as a potential subject of collective bargaining. Teachers not only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers’ expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the schools would seriously impair the board’s ability to govern the district. The Wisconsin court’s reliance on Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), for the proposition that one whose conduct falls squarely within an otherwise valid proscription may not challenge that proscription on grounds of vagueness, is inapposite. The challenged portion of the order is designed to govern speech and conduct in the future, not to punish past conduct, and as such it is the essence of prior restraint.

The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,

concurring in the judgment.

By stating that “the extent to which true contract negotiations . . . may be regulated [is] an issue we need not consider at this time,” ante, at 175, the Court’s opinion treats as open a question the answer to which I think is abundantly clear. Wisconsin has adopted, as unquestionably the State constitutionally may adopt, a statutory policy that authorizes public bodies to accord exclusive recognition to representatives for collective bargaining chosen by the majority of an appropriate unit of employees. In that circumstance the First Amendment plainly does not prohibit Wisconsin from limiting attendance at a collective-bargaining session to school board and union bargaining representatives and denying Holmquist the right to attend and speak at the session. That proposition is implicit in the words of Mr. Justices Holmes, that the “Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole.” Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915). Certainly in the context of Wisconsin’s adoption of the exclusivity principle as a matter of state policy governing relations between state bodies and unions of their employees, "[t]here must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on.” Ibid. For the First Amendment does not command “that people who want to [voice] their views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 48 (1966). For example, this Court’s “own conferences [and] the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session” may be closed to the public without implicating any constitutional rights whatever. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 684 (1972). Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was correct in stating that there is nothing unconstitutional about legislation commanding that in closed bargaining sessions a government body may admit, hear the views of, and respond to only the designated representatives of a union selected by the majority of its employees.

But the First Amendment plays a crucially different role when, as here, a government body has either by its own decision or under statutory command, determined to open its decisionmaking processes to public view and participation. In such case, the state body has created a public forum dedicated to the expression of views by the general public. “Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.” Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). The order sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court obviously contravenes that principle. Although there was a complete absence of any evidence that Holmquist’s speech was part of a course of conduct in aid of an unfair labor practice by the board, the order commands that the board “shall immediately cease and desist from permitting employes, other than [union] representatives ... to appear and speak at [board] meetings on matters subject to collective bargaining . . . .” Obedience to that order requires that the board, regardless of any other circumstances, not allow Holmquist or other citizens to speak at a meeting required by Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1) (1973), now § 19.81 (1) (1976), to be open and dedicated to expressions of views by citizens generally on such subjects, even though they conform with all procedural rules, even though the subject upon which they wish to speak may be addressed by union representatives, and even though they are part of the “public” to which the forum is otherwise open. The order is therefore wholly void. The State could no more prevent Holmquist from speaking at this public forum than it could prevent him from publishing the same views in a newspaper or proclaiming them from a soapbox.

I therefore agree that the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court be reversed.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring in the judgment.

The school board of the city of Madison, acting in accordance with state law, invited all members of the public to attend an open meeting whose agenda included discussion of the desirability of an agency-shop arrangement. The board was entirely willing to hear Holmquist, speaking simply as a member of the community, express his views on this subject. Holmquist did not seek, at the meeting or at any other time, to reach agreement or to bargain with the board. The mere expression of an opinion about a matter subject to collective bargaining, whether or not the speaker is a member of the bargaining unit, poses no genuine threat to the policy of exclusive representation that Wisconsin has adopted. I therefore agree that the order entered by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission unconstitutionally restricts freedom of speech.

Mr. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion reaffirms Mr. Justice Holmes’ observation that “[t]he Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole.” Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 445. A public body that may make decisions in private has broad authority to structure the discussion of matters that it chooses to open to the public. Such a body surely is not prohibited from limiting discussion at public meetings to those subjects that it believes will be illuminated by the views of others. And in trying to best serve its informational needs while rationing its time, I should suppose a public body has broad authority to permit only selected individuals — for example, those who are recognized experts on a matter under consideration — to express their opinions. I write simply to emphasize that we are not called upon in this case to consider what constitutional limitations there may be upon a governmental body’s authority to structure discussion at public meetings.

       MTI had been certified on June 7, 1966, as majority collective-bargaining representative of the teachers in the district by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.

       The text of the letter was as follows:
      “Dear Fellow Madisonian Educator,
      “E. C. — 0. L. 0. G. Y.
      “Educator’s Choice — Obligatory Leadership Or Cover[n]anee by Fou
      “SAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE
      “A Closed Shop (agency shop) Removes This Freedom
      “1. Does an organization which represents the best interests of teachers and pupils NEED mandatory membership deductions?
      “2. Need relationships between administrators and teachers be further strained by LEGALLY providing for mandatory adversary camps? “3. Should minority voices be mandatorily SILENCED?
      “4. Could elimination of outside dissent produce NON-RESPONSIVENESS to change?
      “5. And . . .
      isn’t this lack of FREEDOM OF CHOICE undemocratic? “SUPPORT FREEDOM OF CHOICE— OPPOSE AGENCY SHOP

      “I wish to maintain freedom of choice:
      “I oppose agency shop on principle -
      “I oppose agency shop and would sign a petition stating so -
      “I oppose agency shop and would work actively to maintain freedom of choice -
      “Let us hear from YOU.
      “A1 Holmquist /s/ E. C.— O. L. 0. G. Y.
      “A1 Holmquist P. 0. Box 5184
      “Ralph Reed /s/ Madison, WI 53705
      “Ralph Reed
      “Teacher co-chairmen”

       The text of the petition was as follows:
      “To: Madison Board of Education December 6, 1971
      Madison Teachers, Incorporated
      “We the undersigned ask that the fair-share proposal (agency shop) being negotiated by Madison Teachers, Incorporated and the Madison Board of Education be deferred this year. We propose the following:
      “1) The fair-share concept being negotiated be thoroughly studied by an impartial committee composed of representatives from all concerned groups.
      “2) The findings of this study be made public.
      “3) This impartial committee will ballot (written) all persons affected by the contract agreement for their opinion on the fair-share proposal.
      “4) The results of this written ballot be made public.”

       The statute provides in relevant part:
      "(3) PROHIBITED PRACTICES AND THEIR PREVENTION, (a) It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert with others:
      “1. To. interfere with, restrain or coerce municipal employes in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in sub. (2).
      “4. To refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its employes in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. Such refusal shall include action by the employer to issue or seek to obtain contracts, including those provided for by statute, with individuals in the collective bargaining unit while collective bargaining, mediation or fact-finding concerning the terms and conditions of a new collective bargaining agreement is in progress, unless such individual contracts contain express language providing that the contract is subject to amendment by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement.”

       The detennination of the state courts that certain conduct constituted “negotiating” under state law, standing alone, would not ordinarily be open to our review; only its use as a predicate for restraining speech opens it to review here.

       This meeting was open to the public pursuant to a Wisconsin statute which requires certain governmental decisionmaking bodies to hold open meetings. Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1) (1973), now § 19.81 (1) (1976). There are exceptions to the statute, and one of these has been interpreted to cover labor negotiations between a municipality and a labor organization. 54 Op. Atty. Gen. of Wis. vi (1965), cited with approval, Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 653, 168 N. W. 2d 92, 99-100 (1969). Thus, in contrast to the open session where the public was invited, the true bargaining sessions between the union and the board were conducted in private.

       We need not decide whether a municipal corporation as an employer has First Amendment rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees. It is enough that Holmquist and other teachers and citizens have a protected right to communicate with the board. Since the board’s ability to hear them is “inextricably meshed” with the teachers’ right to speak, the board may assert those rights on behalf of Holmquist. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 409 (1974).

       Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business. See n. 6, supra.

       The WERC order does not prohibit all speech to the board on the subject of collective bargaining. Union representatives would continue to be entitled to come before the board at its public meetings and make their views known. The impact of such a rule is underscored by the fact that the union need not rely upon public meetings to make its position known to the school board; it can also do so at closed negotiating sessions. See n. 6, supra.

       Surely no one would question the absolute right of the nonunion teachers to consult among themselves, hold meetings, reduce their views to writing, and communicate those views to the public generally in pamphlets, letters, or expressions carried by the news media. It would strain First Amendment concepts extraordinarily to hold that dissident teachers could not communicate those views directly to the very decisionmaking body charged by law with making the choices raised by the contract renewal demands.

       Counsel for the union conceded at oral argument that the WERC order was constitutionally overbroad, but asked the Court to narrow it simply to prohibit the board from negotiating with employees in the bargaining unit. It is not the function of this Court to undertake that task.
      On the other hand, it is not the case that Holmquist was speaking “simply as a member of the community.” On the contrary, as noted, supra, at 171, Holmquist opened his remarks to the board by stating that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools.” Thus, he appeared and spoke both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights.

      See discussion and authorities collected in Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae 20-24.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Stewart

license: Public Domain

text:
    MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. De CASTRO
    No. 75-1197.
    Argued November 8, 1976
    Decided December 13, 1976

      Assistant Attorney General Lee argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and Leonard Schaitman.

      Marvin A. Brusman argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Theodore R. Sherwin.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Social Security Act a married woman whose husband retires or becomes disabled is granted benefits if she has a minor or other dependent child in her care. A divorced woman whose former husband retires or becomes disabled does not receive such benefits. The issue in the present case is whether this difference in the statutory treatment of married and divorced women is permissible under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

I

Section 202 (b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 623, as added and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (b) (1) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), provides for the payment of “wife's insurance benefits.” To qualify under this section a woman must be the wife or “divorced wife” of an individual entitled to old-age or disability benefits. Then, assuming that she meets the other statutory requirements, the woman is eligible to receive a monthly payment if she “has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with [her husband]) a child entitled to a child’s insurance benefit. . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 402 (b) (1) (B) (emphasis supplied). As the italicized phrase indicates, a woman under 62 who has in her care an entitled child must currently be married to the wage earner in order to be eligible to receive benefits. A divorced woman receives monthly payments if she is 62 or over and her ex-husband retires or becomes disabled, but if she is under 62, she receives no benefits even if she has a young or disabled child in her care.

The appellee, Helen De Castro, was divorced from her husband in 1968, after more than 20 years of marriage. She cares for a disabled child who is eligible for and receives child’s insurance benefits under the Act. In May 1971 her former husband applied for and later was granted old-age insurance benefits. Mrs. De Castro applied for wife’s insurance benefits shortly thereafter. At the time of her ■application she was 56 years old. Her application was denied by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare because no wife’s benefits are payable to a divorced wife under 62 years of age.

Mrs. De Castro then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking judicial review of the Secretary’s decision. Her complaint alleged that § 202 (b) (1) (B) of the Social Security Act “operates to arbitrarily discriminate against divorced wives,” and prayed for an order directing the Secretary to pay benefits to her, a declaration that § 202 (b)(1)(B) is unconstitutional, and an injunction against that section’s application.

A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2282. The court considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and granted the relief prayed for in the complaint, holding that the wife’s benefits provision “invidiously discriminates against divorced wives . . . in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” De Castro v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 23, 30. Central to the court’s ruling was its determination that “there is no rational basis for concluding that a married wife having a dependent child in her care has a greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for such a child.” Id., at 28. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 425 U. S. 957.

II

The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are “not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.” Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640. In enacting legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection “merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis/ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485.

To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged “is not a toothless one,” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. “So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.” Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546. It is with this principle in mind that we consider the specific constitutional issue presented by this litigation.

The old-age and disability insurance aspects of the Social Security system do not purport to be general public assistance laws that simply pay money to those who need it most. That was not the predominant purpose of these benefit provisions when they were enacted or when they were amended. Rather, the primary objective was to provide workers and their families with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings due to illness or old age.

The wife’s insurance benefit at issue here is consistent with this overriding legislative aim: It enables a married woman already burdened with dependent children to meet the additional need created when her husband reaches old age or becomes disabled. Accordingly, the District Court’s observation that many divorced women receive inadequate child-support payments, while undoubtedly true, is hardly in point. The same can be said of the District Court’s statement that “there is no rational basis for concluding that a married wife having a dependent child in her care has a greater economic need than a divorced wife caring for such a child.” For whatever relevance these observations might have in a case involving a constitutional attack on a statute that gave monetary benefits to women based on their general overall need, that is not this case.

Section 202 (b)(1)(B) of the Act addresses the particular consequences for his family of a wage earner’s old age or disability. Congress could rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the consequent disruption in the family’s economic well-being that may occur when the husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with her husband must still care for a dependent child.

Indeed, Congress took note of exactly these kinds of factors when it amended the Social Security Act in 1958. Between 1950 and 1958 wives under retirement age with dependent children received benefits only when their husbands became entitled to old-age insurance payments. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, § 101 (a), 64 Stat. 482. Congress then amended the Act to provide the same benefits when the wage earner becomes disabled. Social Security Amendments of 1958, § 205 (b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. Both the House and Senate Committee reports accompanying the proposed legislation explained that the purpose of the monthly payments was to give “recognition to the problems confronting families whose breadwinners” stop work. The focus was specifically on “adequate protection for [the husband’s] family,” and the reports mentioned the high medical expenses often associated with disability and the possibility that the wife might have to forgo work in order to care for her disabled husband. H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong,, 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong.,, 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).

In view of the legislative purpose, it is hardly surprising that the congressional judgment evidently was a different one with respect to divorced women. Divorce by its nature works a drastic change ■ in the economic and personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily it means that they will go their separate ways. Congress could have rationally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each other for financial and other support than do couples who stay married. The problems that a divorced wife may encounter when her former husband becomes old or disabled may well differ in kind and degree from those that a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must face. For instance, a divorced wife need not forgo work in order to stay at home to care for her disabled husband. She may not feel the pinch of the extra expenses accompanying her former husband’s old age or disability. In short, divorced couples typically live separate lives. It was not irrational for Congress to recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage earners until they reach the age of 62.

This is not to say that a husband’s old age or disability may never affect his divorced wife. Many women receive alimony or child support after divorce that their former husbands might not be able to pay when they stop work. But even for this group' — which does not include the appellee in the present case — Congress was not constitutionally obligated to use the Social Security Act to subsidize support payments. It could rationally decide that the problems created for divorced women remained less pressing than those faced by women who continue to live with their husbands.

In any event, the constitutional question “is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in the statute.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 777. We conclude, accordingly, that the statutory classifications involved in this case are not of such an order as to infringe upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment.

       It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection principles. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770.

       Title 42 U. S. C. § 402 (b) (1) (1970 ed. and Supp. V) provides in full:
      "(b) Wife’s insurance benefits.
      “(1) The wife (as defined in section 416 (b) of this title) and every divorced wife (as defined in section 416 (d) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such wife or such divorced wife—
      “(A) has filed application for wife’s insurance benefits,
      “(B) has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with such individual) at the time of filing such application a child entitled to a child’s insurance benefit on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such individual,
      “ (C) in the case of a divorced wife, is not married, and
      “(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits based on a primary insurance amount which is less than one-half of the primary insurance amount of such individual,
      “shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a wife’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month in which she becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding the first month in which any of the following occurs—
      “(E) she dies,
      “(F) such individual dies,
      “(G) in the case of a wife, they are divorced and either (i) she has not attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 62 but has not been married to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date the divorce became effective,
      “(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such individual,
      “(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such individual is entitled to a child’s insurance benefit,
      “(J) she becomes entitled to an old-age or disability insurance benefit based on a primary insurance amount which is equal to or exceeds one-half of the primary insurance amount of such individual, or
      “(K) such individual is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits.”

       The Act defines “divorced wife” as “a woman divorced from an individual, but only if she had been married to such individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the date the divorce became effective.” 42 U. S. C. §416 (d)(1). The term “divorce” refers to a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. § 416 (d) (4).

       The conditions upon which a child is entitled to receive “child’s insurance benefits” are set out in § 202 (d) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Generally, the child must be dependent on the wage earner and either under 18 years old (or a full-time student under 22 years old) or under a disability.

       The Act also provides for the payment of “widow’s insurance benefits” and “mother’s insurance benefits.” 42 U. S. C. §§402 (e), (g) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Divorced and married women, with or without dependent children, are eligible to receive monthly payments under these sections in certain circumstances not pertinent here.

       The old-age and disability insurance programs are distinct from the provisions for public assistance to the aged and disabled also contained in the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. §§ 301-306, 1351-1355, partially repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§303 (a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484; 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381 — 1383c (1970 ed., Supp. V). The insurance programs are contributory in nature and are designed to prevent public dependency by protecting workers and their families against common economic hazards. Congress in 1935 contemplated that the old-age insurance benefits would be “payable wholly regardless of the need of the recipient.” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935). The public-assistance-for-the-aged program, on the other hand, was designed “to provide for old people who are dependent upon the public for support . . . ,” id., at 4, and the statute specifically referred to “aged needy individuals.” Social Security Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 620. See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, supra, at 3-6; S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4r-7 (1935); Message of the President Recommending Legislation on Economic Security, H. R. Doc. No. 81,74th Cong,, 1st Sess., 20-28 (1935).
      In 1950 the Act was amended to provide for grants-in-aid to the States so that assistance could be furnished “to needy individuals eighteen years of age or older who are permanently and totally disabled.” Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, § 351, 64 Stat. 555. In 1956 Congress created a program for disability insurance benefits. Social Security Amendments of 1956, § 103 (a), 70 Stat. 815. Again, the insurance program, unlike the public assistance provisions, was not need based, but instead was designed to protect against the specific economic hardships created by involuntary, premature retirement. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28, 53-54 (1949); Recommendations for Social Security Legislation, Reports of the Advisory Council on Social Security, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 69-70, 95-97 (1949); S. Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-6 (1955).

       “Wife’s insurance benefits” first became part of the Social Security-Act in 1939. Amendments enacted that year provided for monthly payments to wives 65 years or older whose husbands were entitled to old-age benefits. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, § 201, 53 Stat. 1362. In 1950 Congress dropped the age requirement for women with retired husbands and entitled children in their care. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, § 101 (a), 64 Stat. 482. In 1958 Congress extended similar benefits to wives of any age who had entitled children and disabled husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1958, §205 (b)(1), 72 Stat. 1021. While the legislative history of the 1950 amendments is sparse, the congressional purpose presumably was to recognize a family need created when the husband reaches old age and stops working. Certainly the sole purpose could not have been to allow the wife to remain at home to take care of the child, as the appellee suggests, because the presence of the retired husband at home ordinarily would ensure parental supervision. Similarly, when Congress provided benefits in 1958 to wives with disabled husbands, it had purposes beyond the mere encouragement of the wife to stay home and take care of the children. See H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (1958).