author: Justice Alito

text:
    WHORTON, DIRECTOR, NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. BOCKTING
    No. 05-595.
    Argued November 1, 2006
    Decided February 28, 2007

      Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      George J. Chanos, Attorney General of Nevada, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gerald Gardner, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Victor-Hugo Schulze II and Rene L. Hulse, Senior Deputy Attorneys General.

      Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Kathleen A. Felton.

      Frances A. Forsman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Michael Pescetta.

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Kristofer S. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, and Fredericka Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, and Brian Means, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, David W. Marquez of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark Bennett of
        Hawaii, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Cox of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Tom Corbett of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Larry Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark Shurtleff of Utah, Bob McDonnell of Virginia, Rob McKenna of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.

      A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey T. Green and Marianne T. Caulfield.

      A brief of amici curiae was filed for former District Judge Edward N. Cahn et al. by Timothy P. O’Toole, Catharine F. Easterly, and former Judges John J. Gibbons, Timothy K. Lewis, H. Curtis Meaner, Stephen M. Orlofsky, and Patricia M. Wald, all pro se.

   Justice Alito

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether, under the rules set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), our decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), is retroactive to cases already final on direct review. We hold that it is not.

I

A

Respondent Marvin Bockting lived in Las Vegas, Nevada, with his wife, Laura Bockting, their 3-year-old daughter Honesty, and Laura’s 6-year-old daughter from a previous relationship, Autumn. One night, while respondent was at work, Autumn awoke from a dream crying, but she refused to tell her mother what was wrong, explaining: “ ‘[D]addy said you would make him leave and that he would beat my butt if I told you.’ ” App. 119. After her mother reassured her, Autumn said that respondent had frequently forced her to engage in numerous and varied sexual acts with him. Ibid.

The next day, Laura Bockting confronted respondent and asked him to leave the house. He did so but denied any wrongdoing. Two days later, Laura called a rape crisis hotline and brought Autumn to the hospital for an examination. At the hospital, Detective Charles Zinovitch from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sexual Assault Unit attempted to interview Autumn but found her too distressed to discuss the assaults. Detective Zinovitch then ordered a rape examination, which revealed strong physical evidence of sexual assaults. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order in Nevada v. Bockting, Case No. C-83110 (D. Nev., Sept. 5,1994), App. 47, 119.

Two days later, Detective Zinovitch interviewed Autumn in the presence of her mother, and at that time, Autumn provided a detailed description of acts of sexual assault carried out by respondent; Autumn also demonstrated those acts using anatomically correct dolls. Id., at 47-48; 119. Respondent was then arrested, and a state grand jury indicted him on four counts of sexual assault on a minor under 14 years of age.

At respondent’s preliminary hearing, Autumn testified that she understood the difference between a truth and a lie, but she became upset when asked about the assaults. Although she initially agreed that respondent had touched her in a way that “[she] didn’t think he was supposed to touch [her],” id., at 14, she later stated that she could not remember how respondent had touched her or what she had told her mother or the detective, id., at 19-21. The trial court, however, found the testimony of Laura Bockting and Detective Zinovitch to be sufficient to hold respondent for trial.

At trial, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether Autumn could testify. After it became apparent that Autumn was too distressed to be sworn in, id., at 25-26, the State moved under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.385 (2003) to allow Laura Bockting and Detective Zinovitch to recount Autumn’s statements regarding the sexual assaults. App. 25-27. Under the Nevada statute, out-of-court statements made by a child under 10 years of age describing acts of sexual assault or physical abuse of the child may be admitted if the court finds that the child is unavailable or unable to testify and that “the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” §51.385(l)(a). Over defense counsel’s objection that admission of this testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause, id., at 27-28, the trial court found sufficient evidence of reliability to satisfy §51.385.

As a result of this ruling, Laura Bockting and Detective Zinovitch were permitted at trial to recount Autumn’s out-of-court statements about the assaults. Laura Bockting also testified that respondent was the only male who had had the opportunity to assault Autumn. In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence regarding Autumn’s medical exam. Respondent testified in his own defense and denied the assaults, and the defense brought out the fact that Autumn, unlike many children her age, had acquired some knowledge about sexual acts, since she had seen respondent and her mother engaging in sexual intercourse and had become familiar with sexual terms. Id., at 118.

The jury found respondent guilty of three counts of sexual assault on a minor under the age of 14, and the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences and another concurrent life sentence.

B

Respondent took an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, which handed down its final decision in 1993, more than a decade before Crawford. In analyzing respondent’s contention that the admission of Autumn’s out-of-court statements had violated his Confrontation Clause rights, the Nevada Supreme Court looked to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), which was then the governing precedent of this Court. See Bockting v. State, 109 Nev. 103, 847 P. 2d 1364 (1993) (per curiam). Roberts had held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of a hearsay statement made by a declarant who was unavailable to testify if the statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability, either because the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” relating to the statement in question. 448 U. S., at 66. Applying Roberts, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the admission of Autumn’s statements was constitutional because the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements provided particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The court cited the “natural spontaneity” of Autumn’s initial statements to her mother, her reiteration of the same account to Detective Zinovitch several days later, her use of anatomically correct dolls to demonstrate the assaults, and her detailed descriptions of sexual acts with which a 6-year-old would generally not be familiar. Bock-ting, supra, at 109-112, 847 P. 2d, at 1368-1370.

C

Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The District Court denied the petition, holding that respondent was not entitled to relief under the habeas statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), because the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision was not “ ‘contrary to’ ” and did not “ ‘involv[e] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Order in Bockting v. Bayer, No. CV-N-98-0764-ECR (Mar. 19, 2002), App. 69-70. Respondent then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

While this appeal was pending, we issued our opinion in Crawford, in which we overruled Roberts and held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial” are admissible “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].” 541 U. S., at 59. See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813 (2006). We noted that the outcome in Roberts — as well as the outcome in all similar cases decided by this Court — was consistent with the rule announced in Crawford, but we concluded that the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause set out in Roberts was unsound in several respects. See Crawford, supra, at 60 (“Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales”). First, we observed that Roberts potentially excluded too much testimony because it imposed Confrontation Clause restrictions on non-testimonial hearsay not governed by that Clause. 541 U. S., at 60. At the same time, we noted, the Roberts test was too “malleable” in permitting the admission of ex parte testimonial statements. 541 U. S., at 60. We concluded:

“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’... Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right to confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.” Id., at 61.

D

On appeal from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, respondent contended that if the rule in Crawford had been applied to his case, Autumn’s out-of-court statements could not have been admitted into evidence and the jury would not have convicted him. Respondent further argued that Crawford should have been applied to his case because the Crawford rule was either (1) an old rule in existence at the time of his conviction or (2) a “ ‘watershed’ ” rule that implicated “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion)).

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F. 3d 1010, as amended, 408 F. 3d 1127 (2005). In the panel’s lead opinion, Judge McKeown concluded that Crawford announced a new rule of criminal procedure, 399 F. 3d, at 1014-1016, but that the decision was nevertheless retroactive on collateral review because it announced a watershed rule that “rework[ed] our understanding of bedrock criminal procedure,” id., at 1016 Judge Noonan concurred, but his preferred analysis differed from Judge McKeown’s. Judge Noonan believed that Crawford did not announce a new rule, 399 F. 3d, at 1022-1024, but “[a]s an alternative to [this] analysis and in order to provide a precedent for [the] court,” he “also concurred] in' Judge McKeown’s analysis and opinion,” id., at 1024. Judge Wallace, concurring and dissenting, agreed with Judge McKeown that Crawford announced a new procedural rule but argued that Crawford did not rise to the level of a watershed rule under this Court’s jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with nine judges dissenting. 418 F. 3d 1055 (2005).

The panel’s decision that Crawford is retroactive to cases on collateral review conflicts with the decision of every other Court of Appeals and State Supreme Court that has addressed this issue. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 547 II S. 1127 (2006).

II

A

In Teague and subsequent cases, we have laid out the framework to be used in determining whether a rule announced in one of our opinions should be applied retroactively to judgments in criminal cases that are already final on direct review. Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). A new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a “ ‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Saffle, supra, at 495 (quoting Teague, supra, at 311 (plurality opinion)).

B

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent’s conviction became final on direct appeal well before Crawford was decided. We therefore turn to the question whether Crawford applied an old rule or announced a new one. A new rule is defined as “a rule that . . . was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Saffle, supra, at 488 (quoting Teague, supra, at 301 (plurality opinion); emphasis in original).

Applying this definition, it is clear that Crawford announced a new rule. The Crawford rule was not “dictated” by prior precedent. Quite the opposite is true: The Crawford rule is flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford overruled. See Davis, 547 U. S., at 825, n. 4, 834. “The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule.” Saffle, supra, at 488.

In concluding that Crawford merely applied an old rule, Judge Noonan relied on our observation in Crawford that the holdings in our prior decisions, including those that applied the Roberts rule, had been generally consistent with the rule announced in Crawford (and with the Framers’ understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, which provided the basis for the Crawford decision). See 541 U. S., at 57-59. But the Crawford Court was quick to note that the “rationales” of our prior decisions had been inconsistent with the Crawford rule. Id., at 60. “ ‘The “new rule” principle ... validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.’” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, 372-373 (1993) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 414 (1990)). And it is stating the obvious to say that, prior to Crawford, “reasonable jurists,” Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 467 (1993), could have reached the conclusion that the Roberts rule was the rule that governed the admission of hearsay statements made by an unavailable declarant.

Because the Crawford rule was not dictated by the governing precedent existing at the time when respondent’s conviction became final, the Crawford rule is a new rule.

III

A

Because Crawford announced a “new rule” and because it is clear and undisputed that the rule is procedural and not substantive, that rule cannot be applied in this collateral attack on respondent’s conviction unless it is a “‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Saffle, 494 U. S., at 495 (quoting Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion)). This exception is “extremely narrow,” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352 (2004). We have observed that it is “‘unlikely’” that any such rules “‘ha[ve] yet to emerge,’ ” ibid, (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001); internal quotation marks omitted); see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 157 (1997); Graham, supra, at 478; Teague, supra, at 313 (plurality opinion). And in the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status. See, e. g., Summerlin, supra (rejecting retroactivity for Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988)); O’Dell, supra (rejecting retroactivity for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994)); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333 (1993) (rejecting retroactivity for a new rule relating to jury instructions on homicide); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity for Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985)).

In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent “an ‘ “impermissibly large risk” ’ ” of an inaccurate conviction. Summerlin, supra, at 356; see also Tyler, 533 U. S., at 665. Second, the rule must “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). We consider each of these requirements in turn.

B

The Crawford rule does not satisfy the first requirement relating to an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. To be sure, the Crawford rule reflects the Framers’ preferred mechanism (cross-examination) for ensuring that inaccurate out-of-court testimonial statements are not used to convict an accused. But in order for a new rule to meet the accuracy requirement at issue here, “[i]t is . . . not enough ... to say that [the] rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial,” Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 242, or that the rule “is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense,” id., at 243. Instead, the question is whether the new rule remedied “an ‘“impermissibly large risk”’” of an inaccurate conviction. Summerlin, supra, at 356.

Guidance in answering this question is provided by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), to which we have repeatedly referred in discussing the meaning of the Teague exception at issue here. See, e. g., Beard, supra, at 417; Saffle, supra, at 495; Gilmore, supra, at 364 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Gideon, the only case that we have identified as qualifying under this exception, the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent defendant charged with a felony. When a defendant who wishes to be represented by counsel is denied representation, Gideon held, the risk of an unreliable verdict is intolerably high. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 166 (2002); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 658-659 (1984); Gideon, supra, at 344-345. The new rule announced in Gideon eliminated this risk.

The Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the Gideon rule. The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding process is far less direct and profound. Crawford overruled Roberts because Roberts was inconsistent with the original understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, not because the Court reached the conclusion that the overall effect of the Crawford rule would be to improve the accuracy of factfinding in criminal trials. Indeed, in Crawford we recognized that even under the Roberts rule, this Court had never specifically approved the introduction of testimonial hearsay statements. 541 U. S., at 57-60. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the overall effect of Crawford with regard to the accuracy of factfinding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.

With respect to testimonial out-of-court statements, Crawford is more restrictive than was Roberts, and this may improve the accuracy, of factfinding in some criminal cases. Specifically, under Roberts, there may have been cases in which courts erroneously determined that testimonial statements were reliable. But see 418 F. 3d, at 1058 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (observing that it is unlikely that this occurred “in anything but the exceptional case”). But whatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced in this respect must be considered together with Crawford’s elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.

It is thus unclear whether Crawford, on the whole, decreased or increased the number of unreliable out-of-court statements that may be admitted in criminal trials. But the question here is not whether Crawford resulted in some net improvement in the accuracy of factfinding in criminal cases. Rather, “the question is whether testimony admissible under Roberts is so much more unreliable than that admissible under Crawford that the Crawford rule is ‘one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ ” 399 F. 3d, at 1028 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352; internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Crawford did not effect a change of this magnitude.

C

The Crawford rule also did not “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer, supra, at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, see 399 F. 3d, at 1019 (relying on the conclusion that “the right of cross-examination as an adjunct to the constitutional right of confrontation” is a “bedrock procedural rul[e]”), this requirement cannot be met simply by showing that a new procedural rule is based on a “bedrock” right. We have frequently held that the Teague bar to retroactivity applies to new rules that are based on “bedrock” constitutional rights. See, e. g., Beard, 542 U. S., at 418. Similarly, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough.” Summerlin, swpra, at 352.

Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a new, rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding. In applying this requirement, we again have looked to the example of Gideon, and “we have not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rules” do not qualify. Beard, supra, at 418.

In this case, it is apparent that the rule announced in Crawford, while certainly important, is not in the same category with Gideon. Gideon effected a profound and “ ‘sweeping’” change. Beard, supra, at 418 (quoting O’Dell, 521 U. S., at 167). The Crawford rule simply lacks the “primacy” and “centrality” of the Gideon rule, Saffle, 494 U. S., at 495, and does not qualify as a rule that “alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding,” Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).

IV

In sum, we hold that Crawford announced a “new rule” of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed rules. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       Section 51.385 provides, in relevant part:
      “1. [A] statement made by a child under the age of 10 years describing any act of sexual conduct performed with or on the child or any act of physical abuse of the child is admissible in a criminal proceeding regarding that act of sexual conduct or physical abuse if:
      “(a) The court finds, in a hearing out of the presence of the jury, that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; and “(b) The child testifies at the proceeding or is unavailable or unable to testify.
      “2. In determining the trustworthiness of a statement, the court shall consider, without limitation, whether:
      “(a) The statement was spontaneous;
      “(b) The child was subjected to repetitive questioning;
      “(c) The child had a motive to fabricate;
      “(d) The child used terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and “(e) The child was in a stable mental state.”

       The State Supreme Court initially dismissed respondent’s appeal in 1989, Bockting v. State, 105 Nev. 1023, 810 P. 2d 317 (unpublished table opinion), but we granted respondent’s petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U. S. 805 (1990), see Bockting v. Nevada, 497 U. S. 1021 (1990).

       Judge McKeown then held respondent merited habeas corpus relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because that statute incorporates our Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), retroactivity analysis. 399 F. 3d, at 1021-1022.

       See, e. g., Lave v. Dretke, 444 F. 3d 333 (CA5 2006); Espy v. Massac, 443 F. 3d .1362 (CA11 2006); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F. 3d 786 (CA7 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F. 3d 783 (CA6 2005); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F. 3d 1219 (CA10 2004); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F. 3d 327 (CA2 2004); Edwards v. People, 129 P. 3d 977 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 137 P. 3d 1095 (2006); Danforth v. State, 718 N. W. 2d 451 (Minn. 2006); State v. Williams, 695 N. W. 2d 23 (Iowa 2005); Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005); In re Markel, 154 Wash. 2d 262, 111 P. 3d 249 (2005).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice Ginsburg

license: Public Domain

text:
    SINOCHEM INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD. v. MALAYSIA INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORP.
    No. 06-102.
    Argued January 9, 2007
    Decided March 5, 2007

      Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen M. Hudspeth.

      Douglas H. Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Michael S. Raab, and Stephanie R. Marcus.

      Ann-Michele G. Higgins argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Joshua Bachrach and Kevin L. McGee.

   Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which a federal district court may dismiss an action on the ground that a court abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy. We granted review to decide a question that has divided the Courts of Appeals: “[wjhether a district court must first conclusively establish [its own] jurisdiction before dismissing a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens?” Pet. for Cert. i. We hold that a district court has discretion to respond at once to a defendant’s forum non conveniens plea, and need not take up first any other threshold objection. In particular, a court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the cause (subject-matter jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that, in any event, a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case.

I

The underlying controversy concerns alleged misrepresentations by a Chinese corporation to a Chinese admiralty court resulting in the arrest of a Malaysian vessel in China. In 2003, petitioner Sinochem International Company Ltd. (Sinochem), a Chinese state-owned importer, contracted with Triorient Trading, Inc. (Triorient), a domestic corporation that is not a party to this suit, to purchase steel coils. Pursuant to the agreement, Triorient would receive payment under a letter of credit by producing a valid bill of lading certifying that the coils had been loaded for shipment to China on or before April 30, 2003. Memorandum and Order of Feb. 27, 2004, No. Civ. A. 03-3771 (ED Pa.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a (hereinafter Feb. 27 Memo & Order).

Triorient subchartered a vessel owned by respondent Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (Malaysia International), a Malaysian company, to transport the coils to China. Triorient then hired a stevedoring company to load the steel coils at the Port of Philadelphia. A bill of lading, dated April 30, 2003, triggered payment under the letter of credit. Id., at 49a.

On June 8, 2003, Sinochem petitioned the Guangzhou Admiralty Court in China for interim relief, i. e., preservation of a maritime claim against Malaysia International and arrest of the vessel that carried the steel coils to China. In support of its petition, Sinochem alleged that the Malaysian company had falsely backdated the bill of lading. The Chinese tribunal ordered the ship arrested the same day. Id., at 50a; App. in No. 04-1816 (CA3), pp. 56a-57a (Civil Ruling of the Guangzhou Admiralty Court).

Thereafter, on July 2, 2003, Sinochem timely filed a complaint against Malaysia International and others in the Guangzhou Admiralty Court. Sinochem's complaint repeated the allegation that the bill of lading had been falsified resulting in unwarranted payment. Malaysia International contested the jurisdiction of the Chinese tribunal. Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 50a; App. in No. 04-1816 (CA3), pp. 52a-53a (Civil Complaint in Guangzhou Admiralty Court). The admiralty court rejected Malaysia International’s jurisdictional objection, and that ruling was affirmed on appeal by the Guangdong Higher People’s Court. App. 16-23.

On June 23, 2003, shortly after the Chinese court ordered the vessel’s arrest, Malaysia International filed the instant action against Sinoehem in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Malaysia International asserted in its federal court pleading that Sinochem’s preservation petition to the Guangzhou court negligently misrepresented the “vessel’s fitness and suitability to load its cargo.” Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 50a (internal quotation marks omitted). As relief, Malaysia International sought compensation for the loss it sustained due to the delay caused by the ship’s arrest. Sinoehem moved to dismiss the suit on several grounds, including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and international comity. App. in No. 04-1816 (CA3), pp. 14a-20a, 39a-40a.

The District Court first determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (admiralty or maritime jurisdiction). Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 51a-54a. The court next concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Sinoehem under Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301 et seq. (2002). Nevertheless, the court conjectured, limited discovery might reveal that Sinochem’s national contacts sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 55a-63a. The court did not permit such discovery, however, because it determined that the case could be adjudicated adequately and more conveniently in the Chinese courts. Id., at 63a-69a; Memorandum and Order of Apr. 13, 2004, No. Civ. A. 03-3771 (ED Pa.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a-47a (hereinafter Apr. 13 Memo & Order) (denial of Rule 59(e) motion). No significant interests of the United States were involved, the court observed, Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 65a-67a; Apr. 13 Memo & Order, at 44a-47a, and while the cargo had been loaded in Philadelphia, the nub of the controversy was entirely foreign: The dispute centered on the arrest of a foreign ship in foreign waters pursuant to the order of a foreign court. Feb. 27 Memo & Order, at 67a. Given the proceedings ongoing in China, and the absence of cause “to second-guess the authority of Chinese law or the competence of [Chinese] courts,” the District Court granted the motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id., at 68a.

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed there was subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1333(1), and that the question of personal jurisdiction could not be resolved sans discovery. Although the court determined that forum non conveniens is a nonmerits ground for dismissal, the majority nevertheless held that the District Court could not dismiss the case under the forum non conveniens doctrine unless and until it determined definitively that it had both subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 436 F. 3d 349 (2006).

Judge Stapleton dissented. Requiring a district court to conduct discovery on a jurisdictional question when it “rightly regards [the forum] as inappropriate,” he maintained, “subverts a primary purpose of” the forum non conveniens doctrine: “protecting] a defendant from ... substantial and unnecessary effort and expense.” Id., at 368. The “court makes no assumption of law declaring power,” Judge Stapleton observed, “when it decides not to exercise whatever jurisdiction it may have.” Id., at 370 (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999), in turn quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d 247, 255 (CADC 1998)).

We granted certiorari, 548 U. S. 942 (2006), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether forum non conve niens can be decided prior to matters of jurisdiction. Compare 436 F. 3d, at 361-364 (case below); Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F. 3d 650, 652-654 (CA5 2005) (per curiam) (jurisdictional issues must be resolved in advance of a forum non conveniens ruling), with Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F. 3d 1038, 1041 (CA7 2006); In re Arbitration Between Monegasque de Reassurances S. A. M. (Monde Re) v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F. 3d 488, 497-498 (CA2 2002); In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d, at 255-256 (forum non conveniens may be resolved ahead of jurisdictional issues). Satisfied that forum non conveniens may justify dismissal of an action though jurisdictional issues remain unresolved, we reverse the Third Circuit’s judgment.

II

A federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and ... trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant... out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or ... the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems.” American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 447-448 (1994) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 241 (1981), in turn quoting Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 524 (1947)). Dismissal for forum non conveniens reflects a court’s assessment of a “range of considerations, most notably the convenience to the parties and the practical difficulties that can attend the adjudication of a dispute in a certain locality.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 723 (1996) (citations omitted). We have characterized forum non conveniens as, essentially, “a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined.” American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 453; cf. In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d, at 255 (forum non conveniens “involves a deliberate abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction”).

The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens “has continuing application [in federal courts] only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad,” American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 449, n. 2, and perhaps in rare instances where a state or territorial court serves litigational convenience best. See 14D C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3828, pp. 620-623, and nn. 9-10 (3d ed. 2007). For the federal court system, Congress has codified the doctrine and has provided for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action. See 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”); cf. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U. S. 463, 466 (1962) (Section 1406(a) “authorize^] the transfer of [a] eas[e]... whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.”).

A defendant invoking forum non conveniens ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum. When the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum, however, the presumption in the plaintiff’s favor “applies with less force,” for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such cases “less reasonable.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U. S., at 255-256.

III

Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998), clarified that a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction). See id., at 93-102. “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause”; it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case. Id., at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).

While Steel Co. confirmed that jurisdictional questions ordinarily must precede merits determinations in dispositional order, Ruhrgas held that there is no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues.” 526 U. S., at 584. In appropriate circumstances, Ruhrgas decided, a court may dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See id., at 578.

Both Steel Co. and Ruhrgas recognized that a federal court has leeway “to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 585; Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 100-101, n. 3. Dismissal short of reaching the merits means that the court will not “proceed at all” to an adjudication of the cause. Thus, a district court declining to adjudicate state-law claims on discretionary grounds need not first determine whether those claims fall within its pendent jurisdiction. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 715-716 (1973). Nor must a federal court decide whether the parties present an Article III case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426, 433-434 (1975). A dismissal under Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105 (1876) (prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements), we recently observed, also “represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ [that] . . . may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.” Tenet v. Doe, 544 U. S. 1, 7, n. 4 (2005). The principle underlying these decisions was well stated by the Seventh Circuit: “[J]urisdietion is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.” Intec USA, 467 F. 3d, at 1041.

IV

A forum non conveniens dismissal “den[ies] audience to a case on the merits,” Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 585; it is a determination that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere. See American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 454; Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U. S. 140, 148 (1988). The Third Circuit recognized that forum non conveniens “is a non-merits ground for dismissal.” 436 F. 3d, at 359. Accord In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d, at 255; Monde Re, 311 F. 3d, at 497-498. A district court therefore may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.

As the Third Circuit observed, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 527-530 (1988), does not call for a different conclusion. See 436 F. 3d, at 359-360. Biard presented the question whether a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground oí forum non conveniens qualifies for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). Biard, 486 U. S., at 527. The Court held that a refusal to dismiss for forum non conveniens, an interlocutory order, does not fall within the circumscribed collateral order exception to the firm final judgment rule generally governing federal court proceedings. In that context, the Court observed that some factors relevant to forum non conveniens, notably what evidence will bear on the plaintiff’s claim or on defenses to the claim, “will substantially overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute.” Id., at 529.

That observation makes eminent sense when the question is whether an issue is so discrete from the merits as to justify departure from the rule that a party may not appeal until the district court has rendered a final judgment disassociating itself from the case. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (“To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”). Biard’s point, however, does not carry over to the question here at issue.

Of course a court may need to identify the claims presented and the evidence relevant to adjudicating those issues to intelligently rule on a forum non conveniens motion. But other threshold issues may similarly involve a brush with “factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute.” Biard, 486 U. S., at 529. For example, in ruling on the non-merits threshold question of personal jurisdiction, a court may be called upon to determine whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum relate to the claim advanced by the plaintiff. See, e. g., Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 581, n. 4 (noting that the District Court’s holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction rested on its conclusion “that Marathon had not shown that Ruhrgas pursued the alleged pattern of fraud and misrepresentation during the Houston meetings”). The critical point here, rendering a forum non conveniens determination a threshold, nonmerits issue in the relevant context, is simply this: Resolving a forum non conveniens motion does not entail any assumption by the court of substantive “law-declaring power.” See id., at 584-585 (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d, at 255).

Statements in this Court’s opinion in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), account in large part for the Third Circuit’s conclusion that forum non conveniens can come into play only after a domestic court determines that it has jurisdiction over the cause and the parties and is a proper venue for the action. See 436 F. 3d, at 361-362. The Court said in Gulf Oil that “the doctrine oí forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction,” 330 U. S., at 504, and that “[i]n all cases in which . . . forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process,” id., at 506-507.

Those statements from Gulf Oil, perhaps less than “felicitously” crafted, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, draw their meaning from the context in which they were embedded. The question presented in Gulf Oil was whether a court fully competent to adjudicate the case, i. e., one that plainly had jurisdiction over the cause and the parties and was a proper venue, could nevertheless dismiss the action under the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Court answered that question “yes.”

As to the first statement — that “forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction” — it is of course true that once a court determines that jurisdiction is lacking, it can proceed no further and must dismiss the case on that account. In that scenario “forum non conveniens can never apply.”

The second statement — that forum non conveniens “presupposes at least two forums” with authority to adjudicate the case — was made in response to the Gulf Oil plaintiff’s argument to this effect: Because the federal forum chosen by the plaintiff possessed jurisdiction and venue was proper, the court was obliged to adjudicate the case. See 330 U. S., at 504 (explaining that a court’s statutory empowerment to entertain a suit “does not settle the question whether it must do so”). Notably, in speaking of what the forum non conveniens doctrine “presupposes,” the Court said nothing that would negate a court’s authority to presume, rather than dis-positively decide, the propriety of the forum in which the plaintiff filed suit.

In sum, Gulf Oil did not present the question we here address: whether a federal court can dismiss under the forum non conveniens doctrine before definitively ascertaining its own jurisdiction. Confining the statements we have quoted to the setting in which they were made, we find in Gulf Oil no hindrance to the decision we reach today.

ITie Third Circuit expressed the further concern that a court failing first to establish its jurisdiction could not condition a forum non conveniens dismissal on the defendant’s waiver of any statute of limitations defense or objection to the foreign forum’s jurisdiction. Unable so to condition a dismissal, the Court of Appeals feared, a court could not shield the plaintiff against a foreign tribunal’s refusal to entertain the suit. 436 F. 3d, at 363, and n. 21. Accord In re Papandreou, 139 F. 3d, at 256, n. 6. Here, however, Malaysia International faces no genuine risk that the more convenient forum will not take up the case. Proceedings to resolve the parties’ dispute áre underway in China, with Sinochem as the plaintiff. Jurisdiction of the Guangzhou Admiralty Court has been raised, determined, and affirmed on appeal. We therefore need not decide whether a court conditioning a forum non conveniens dismissal on the waiver of jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign forum must first determine its own authority to adjudicate the case.

V

This is a textbook case for immediate forum non conveniens dismissal. The District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction presented an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, see 436 F. 3d, at 355, and was considered at some length by the courts below. Discovery concerning personal jurisdiction would have burdened Sinochem with expense and delay. And all to scant purpose: The District Court inevitably would dismiss the case without reaching the merits, given its well-considered forum non conveniens appraisal. Judicial economy is disserved by continuing litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania given the proceedings long launched in China. And the gravamen of Malaysia International’s complaint — misrepresentations to the Guangzhou Admiralty Court in the course of securing arrest of the vessel in China — is an issue best left for determination by the Chinese courts.

If, however, a court can readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper course would be to dismiss on that ground. In the mine run of cases, jurisdiction “will involve no arduous inquiry” and both judicial economy and the consideration ordinarily accorded the plaintiff’s choice of forum “should impel the federal court to dispose of [those] issue[s] first.” Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 587-588. But where subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, the court properly takes the less burdensome course.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    LANCE et al. v. COFFMAN, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE
    No. 06-641.
    Decided March 5, 2007
   Per Curiam.

The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). When Colorado legislators were unable to redraw congressional districts after the 2000 census to accommodate an additional Representative, a state court did it for them. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P. 3d 642 (Colo. 2002). The legislature was able to pass a redistricting plan in 2003, which Colorado’s Governor signed into law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §2-1-101.

Colorado’s attorney general, however, filed an original action in the Colorado Supreme Court to enjoin Colorado’s secretary of state from implementing this new plan, noting that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution limits redistricting to once per census. The Colorado General Assembly intervened in the action to defend its plan. The Colorado Supreme Court granted the injunction, holding that “judicially-created districts are just as binding and permanent as districts created by the General Assembly,” and that the court-drawn plan must remain in effect until the next decennial census. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221, 1231 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U. S. 1093 (2004). The court further held that this result did not offend the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution. 79 P. 3d, at 1232.

Immediately after Salazar was decided, four Colorado citizens — none of whom had participated in Salazar — filed the instant action in Federal District Court. They argued that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violates their rights under the Elections Clause.

The District Court initially determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but we vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). On remand, the District Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs had standing to bring their Elections Clause challenge. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154-1155 (2006). The court went on, however, to hold that the suit was barred by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs “stand in privity with the Secretary of State and the General Assembly,” who were on the losing side in the Salazar litigation. 444 F. Supp. 2d, at 1161. The concurring judge concluded that appellants lacked standing to sue in the first place. Id., at 1162 (Porfilio, J., concurring in result). Plaintiffs appeal once again.

Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” One component of the case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the now-familiar elements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992). “We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Id., at 573-574. See also Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 344 (2006) (refusing to create an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for challenges to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that taxpayer standing has been rejected “because the alleged injury is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally’ ” (citation omitted)).

Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized grievances has a lengthy pedigree. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 (1922), for example, a citizen sued the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to challenge the procedures by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. We dismissed the suit because it was “not a case within the meaning of.... Article III.” Id., at 129. The plaintiff sought to assert “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.” Ibid. “Obviously,” we held, “this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.” Id., at 129-130.

Similarly, in Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937) (per curiam), we dismissed a citizen suit claiming that Justice Black’s appointment to this Court contravened the Constitution’s Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2. We found that the petitioner had no interest in the suit “other than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court.” 302 U. S., at 634. That was not enough. To have standing, we observed, a plaintiff must have more than “a general interest common to all members of the public.” Ibid. See also Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (taxpayer standing cannot be predicated upon an injury the plaintiff “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally”). Cf. Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 406 (1900) (“[E]ven in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public ... [the plaintiff] must generally aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens”).

A pair of more recent cases further illustrates the point. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), a federal taxpayer challenged the Government’s failure to disclose certain CIA expenditures as a violation of the Constitution’s Accounts Clause, which requires that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. Relying on Lévitt, this Court dismissed the claim as a “generalized grievance” that is “plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’” Richardson, 418 U. S., at 176-177. See also id., at 191 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The power recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), is a potent one. Its prudent use seems to me incompatible with unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen standing”).

The same day, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), we addressed standing to bring a challenge under the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, which provides that “no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” Art. I, §6, cl. 2. Citizen-taxpayers brought a lawsuit contending that Members of Congress who were also members of the military Reserves violated the Incompatibility Clause. This Court dismissed for lack of standing. It “reaffirmed] Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.” 418 U. S., at 220. Refusing to entertain generalized grievances ensures that “there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review” in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies “no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court’s ruling would be applied.” Id., at 221-222. In short, it ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature.

The instant case parallels Fairchild, Lévitt, and their progeny. The plaintiffs here are four Colorado voters. Three days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in Salazar, they filed a complaint alleging that “Article V, § 44 of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted in Salazar, violated [the Elections Clause] of the U. S. Constitution by depriving the state legislature of its responsibility to draw congressional districts.” Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (2005). In light of the discussion above, the problem with this allegation should be obvious: The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law — specifically the Elections Clause — has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past. It is quite different from the sorts of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in voting rights cases where we have found standing. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 207-208 (1962). Because plaintiffs assert no particularized stake in the litigation, we hold that they lack standing to bring their Elections Clause claim.

Our two decisions construing the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause do not contradict this holding. Each of these cases was filed by a relator on behalf of the State rather than private citizens acting on their own behalf, as is the case here. See State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184 Minn. 647,238 N. W. 792 (1931) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916). In neither case did we address whether a private citizen had alleged a “concrete and particularized” injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is therefore vacated in part, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the Elections Clause claim for lack of standing. We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Petition Clause claim.

It is so ordered.

      Qur prior decision in this case did not violate this principle because Rooker-Feldman concerns a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basie Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 291 (2005), and “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 578 (1999).


text:
    TRAVELERS CASUALTY & SURETY CO. OF AMERICA v. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
    No. 05-1429.
    Argued January 16, 2007
    Decided March 20, 2007

      Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

      G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Rheba Rutkowski, Robert A. Brundage, and William C. Heuer.

      E. Joshua Rosenkranz argued the cause for resondent. With him on the brief were David B. Goodwin, Garren Shulman, Timothy S. Mehok, Gary M. Kaplan, and Thomas C. Goldstein

      Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Surety & Fidelity Association of America by Edward G. Gallagher; and for the American Insurance Association by Craig Goldblatt and Caroline Rogus.

        Robert M. Zinman filed a brief for Richard Aaron et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Justice Alito

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked to consider whether federal bankruptcy law precludes an unsecured creditor from recovering attorney’s fees authorized by a prepetition contract and incurred in postpetition litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, based on a rule previously adopted by that court, that such fees are categorically prohibited — even where the contractual allocation of attorney’s fees would be enforceable under applicable nonbankruptey law — to the extent the litigation involves issues of federal bankruptcy law. Because that rule finds no support in the Bankruptcy Code, we vacate and remand.

I

Respondent Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in April 2001, 11 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., and continued thereafter to operate its business as a “debtor in possession,” §§ 1107(a), 1108. The bankruptcy filing caught the attention of petitioner Travelers Casualty & Surety Company (Travelers), which had previously issued a $100 million surety bond on PG&E’s behalf to the California Department of Industrial Relations, guaranteeing PG&E’s payment of state workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees. In connection with the bond, PG&E executed a series of indemnity agreements in favor of Travelers. The indemnity agreements provide that PG&E will be responsible for any loss Travelers might incur in connection with the bonds, including any attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing, protecting, or litigating Travelers’ rights in connection with those bonds.

Although no default occurred, Travelers asserted a claim in the bankruptcy action to protect itself in case PG&E defaulted on its workers’ compensation benefits at some point in the future, requiring Travelers to make payments under its bond. In response to Travelers’ claim, and with the knowledge and approval of the Bankruptcy Court, PG&E agreed to insert language into its reorganization plan and disclosure statement to protect Travelers' right to indemnity and subrogation in the event of a default by PG&E.

Travelers claimed, however, that PG&E then unilaterally altered the negotiated language in a way that substantially diminished the protection it had been seeking. According to Travelers, that development resulted in additional litigation, but Travelers and PG&E ultimately resolved the dispute by entering into a stipulation that was later approved by the Bankruptcy Court. In addition to accommodating Travelers’ substantive concerns, the stipulation stated that Travelers “‘may assert its claim for attorneys’ fees under the [ijndemnity [ajgreements’” (subject to PG&E’s right to object) as a general unsecured claim against PG&E. Brief for Petitioner 17.

Travelers subsequently filed an amended proof of claim seeking to recover the attorney’s fees it incurred in connection with PG&E’s bankruptcy proceedings. PG&E objected, arguing that Travelers could not recover attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law.

The Bankruptcy Court agreed and rejected Travelers’ claim on that basis. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a-25a. Travelers appealed that ruling to the District Court. The District Court affirmed, relying on In re Fobian, 951 F. 2d 1149 (CA9 1991), which held that “where the litigated issues involve not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, attorney’s fees will not be awarded absent bad faith or harassment by the losing party,” id., at 1153. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, 17a.

Travelers appealed again, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 167 Fed. Appx. 593 (2006). The panel acknowledged that, in at least some circumstances, a “ ‘prevailing party in a bankruptcy proceeding may be entitled to an award of attorney fees in accordance with applicable state law ....’” Id., at 594 (quoting In re Baroff, 105 F. 3d 439,441 (CA9 1997)). The panel nevertheless rejected Travelers’ claim based on the Fobian rule, which it cited for the proposition that “attorney fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues ‘peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.’” 167 Fed. Appx., at 594 (quoting Fobian, supra, at 1153). The panel explained that, because the fees claimed by Travelers were incurred litigating issues that were “governed entirely by federal bankruptcy law,” Travelers’ claim necessarily failed. 167 Fed. Appx., at 594.

Travelers sought review in this Court, noting a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the validity of the Fobian rule. Compare Fobian, supra, at 1153, with In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F. 3d 843, 848-849 (CA4 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve that conflict, post, p. 948.

II

Under the American Rule, “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975); see Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 490-491 (1880); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796). This default rule can, of course, be overcome by statute. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 717 (1967). It can also be overcome by an “enforceable contract” allocating attorney’s fees. Ibid.

In a case governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, we observed that “[t]he character of [a contractual] obligation to pay attorney’s fees presents no obstacle to enforcing it in bankruptcy, either as a provable claim or by way of a lien upon specific property.” Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U. S. 149, 154 (1928). Similarly, under the terms of the current Bankruptcy Code, it remains true that an otherwise enforceable contract allocating attorney’s fees (i. e., one that is enforceable under substantive, nonbankruptcy law) is allowable in bankruptcy except where the Bankruptcy Code provides otherwise. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 506.04[3][a], p. 506-118 (rev. 15th ed. 2006) (hereinafter Collier).

This case requires us to consider whether the Bankruptcy Code disallows contract-based claims for attorney’s fees based solely on the fact that the fees at issue were incurred litigating issues of bankruptcy law. We conclude that it does not.

A

When a debtor declares bankruptcy, each of its creditors is entitled to file a proof of claim — i. e., a document providing proof of a “right to payment,” 11 U. S. C. § 101(5)(A) — against the debtor’s estate. Once a proof of claim has been filed, the court must determine whether the claim is “allowed” under § 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code: “A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 ... is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest. .. objects.”

But even where a party in interest objects, the court “shall allow” the claim “except to the extent that” the claim implicates any of the nine exceptions enumerated in § 502(b). Those exceptions apply where the claim at issue is “unenforceable against the debtor . . . under any agreement or applicable law,” § 502(b)(1); “is for unmatured interest,” § 502(b)(2); “is for [property tax that] exceeds the value of the [estate’s] interest” in the property, § 502(b)(3); “is for services of an insider or attorney of the debtor” and “exceeds the reasonable value of such services,” § 502(b)(4); is for unmatured debt on certain alimony and child support obligations, § 502(b)(5); is for certain “damages resulting from the termination” of a lease or employment contract, §§ 502(b)(6) and (7); “results from a reduction, due to late payment, in the amount of. . . credit available to the debtor in connection with an employment tax on wages, salaries, or commissions earned from the debtor,” § 502(b)(8); or was brought to the court’s attention through an untimely proof of claim, § 502(b)(9).

Travelers’ claim for attorney’s fees has nothing to do with property tax, child support or alimony, services provided by an attorney of the debtor, damages resulting from the termination of a lease or employment contract, or the late payment of any employment tax. See §§ 502(b)(2) — (8). Nor does it appear that the proof of claim was untimely. See § 502(b)(9). Thus, Travelers’ claim must be allowed under § 502(b) unless it is unenforceable within the meaning of § 502(b)(1).

B

Section 502(b)(1) disallows any claim that is “unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.” This provision is most naturally understood to provide that, with limited exceptions, any defense to a claim that is available outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in bankruptcy. See 4 Collier ¶ 502.03[2][b], at 502-22 (explaining that § 502(b)(1) is generally understood to “make available to the trustee any defense” available to the debtor “under applicable nonbankruptcy law” — i. <?., any defense that the debtor “could have interposed, absent bankruptcy, in a suit on the [same substantive] claim by the creditor”).

This reading of § 502(b)(1) is consistent not only with the plain statutory text, but also with the settled principle that “[creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U. S. 15, 20 (2000). That principle requires bankruptcy courts to consult state law in determining the validity of most claims. See ibid.

Indeed, we have long recognized that the “ ‘basic federal rule’ in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having ‘generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.’” Ibid, (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 57, 54 (1979); citation omitted). Accordingly, when the Bankruptcy Code uses the word “claim” — which the Code itself defines as a “right to payment,” 11 U. S. C. § 101(5)(A) — it is usually referring to a right to payment recognized under state law. As we stated in Butner, “[property interests are created and defined by state law,” and “[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.” 440 U. S., at 55; accord, Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 161 (1946) (“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law”).

C

In rejecting Travelers’ claim for contractual attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals did not conclude that the claim was “unenforceable” under § 502(b)(1) as a matter of applicable nonbankruptcy law. Nor did it conclude that Travelers’ claim was rendered unenforceable by any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. To the contrary, the court acknowledged that, in at least some circumstances, a “ ‘prevailing party in a bankruptcy proceeding may be entitled to an award of attorney fees in accordance with applicable state law . . . .’ ” 167 Fed. Appx., at 594 (quoting Baroff, 105 F. 3d, at 441).

The court nevertheless rejected Travelers’ claim based solely on a rule of that court’s own creation — the so-called Fobian rule — which dictates that “attorney fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues ‘peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.’ ” 167 Fed. Appx., at 594 (quoting Fobian, 951 F. 2d, at 1153). The court explained that, because the fees claimed by Travelers were incurred litigating issues that were “governed entirely by federal bankruptcy law,” 167 Fed. Appx., at 594, Travelers’ claim necessarily failed.

The Fobian rule finds no support in the Bankruptcy Code, either in § 502 or elsewhere. In Fobian, the court did not identify any provision of the Bankruptcy Code as providing support for the new rule. See 951 F. 2d, at 1153. Instead, the court cited three of its own prior decisions, In re Johnson, 756 F. 2d 738 (1985); In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F. 2d 686 (1984); and In re Fulwiler, 624 F. 2d 908 (1980) (per curium). Significantly, in none of those cases did the court identify any basis for disallowing a contractual claim for attorney’s fees incurred litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law. Nor did the court have occasion to do so; in each of those cases, the claim for attorney’s fees failed as a matter of state law. See Johnson, supra, at 741-742; Coast Trading, supra, at 693; Fulwiler, supra, at 910.

The absence of textual support is fatal for the Fobian rule. Consistent with our prior statements regarding creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy, see, e. g., Raleigh, supra, at 20, we generally presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed. See 11 U. S. C. § 502(b). Neither the court below nor PG&E has offered any reason why the fact that the attorney’s fees in this case were incurred litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law overcomes that presumption.

Section 502(b)(4) is instructive on this point. That provision expressly disallows claims for a particular category of attorney’s fees — those “for services of an ... attorney of the debtor,” to the extent the claimed fees “exeee[d] the reasonable value of such services.” The existence of that provision suggests that, in its absence, a claim for such fees would be allowed in bankruptcy to the extent enforceable under state law. The absence of an analogous provision excluding the category of fees covered by the Fobian rule likewise suggests that the Code does not categorically disallow them. See 4 Collier ¶ 506.04[3][a], at 506-118 (concluding that Fobian “inverts the proper analysis” by allowing attorney’s fees only where they are expressly authorized by the Bankruptcy Code, and explaining that “a claim for attorney’s fees arising in the context of litigating bankruptcy issues must be allowed if valid under applicable state law”).

Congress, of course, has the power to amend the Bankruptcy Code by adding a provision expressly disallowing claims for attorney’s fees incurred by creditors in the litigation of bankruptcy issues. But because no such provision exists, the Bankruptcy Code provides no basis for disallowing Travelers’ claim on the grounds stated by the Ninth Circuit.

As we explained in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U. S. 293 (2003), “where Congress has intended to provide . . . exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it has done so clearly and expressly.” Id., at 302. Here, the Bankruptcy Code does not “clearly and expressly” compel courts to follow the Fobian rule; on the contrary, the Code says nothing about unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law. In light of the broad, permissive scope of § 502(b)(1), and our prior recognition that “[t]he character of [a contractual] obligation to pay attorney’s fees presents no obstacle to enforcing it in bankruptcy,” it necessarily follows that the Fobian rule cannot stand. Security Mortgage, 278 U. S., at 154; see Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998) (“We . . . ‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure’ ” (quoting Pennsylvania Dept, of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 563 (1990))).

III

PG&E makes no effort to defend the Fobian rule. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28 (conceding that PG&E does not defend the Fobian rule, and acknowledging that “[t]he Fobian rule is wrong... as to the distinction that it draws between State law and Federal litigation”). Instead, PG&E argues that § 506(b) categorically disallows unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees and — noting that Travelers’ claim is unsecured — asks us to affirm on that basis. Section 506(b) provides as follows:

“To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which ... is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.” 11 U. S. C. § 506(b) (2000 ed., Supp. V).

According to PG&E, this provision authorizes claims for contractual attorney’s fees to the extent the creditor is over-secured, but disallows such claims to the extent the creditor is either not oversecured or (like Travelers) completely unsecured. This reading of the Code, PG&E argues, “is not a matter of negative implication, but of explicit negation.” Brief for Respondent 18. PG&E also argues that the structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, examined against the backdrop of pre-Code bankruptcy law, confirm that Congress did not intend to allow unsecured creditors to recover attorney’s fees. See id,., at 25-38.

PG&E did not raise these arguments below. Consequently, none of the lower courts had occasion to address them. Nor were these arguments presented in PG&E’s brief in opposition to certiorari. PG&E nevertheless insists that we should address these arguments as though they were “fairly included” within the question presented in Travelers’ petition for certiorari. See id., at 41. That contention appears to be premised on the theory that “the Fobian rule reaches the correct conclusion in this case,” but “doesn’t go far enough in . . . preventing creditors from requiring other creditors to pay for their attorneys’ fees.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.

We are not persuaded. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the lower courts regarding the Fobian rule, which is analytically distinct from, and fundamentally at odds with, PG&E’s reading of § 506(b).

In any event, we ordinarily do not consider claims that were neither raised nor addressed below, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 168-169 (2004), and PG&E has failed to identify any circumstances that would warrant an exception to that rule in this case. We therefore will not consider these arguments.

Accordingly, we express no opinion with regard to whether, following the demise of the Fobian rule, other principles of bankruptcy law might provide an independent basis for disallowing Travelers’ claim for attorney’s fees. We conclude only that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing that claim based on the fact that the fees at issue were incurred litigating issues of bankruptcy law.

* * *

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

       California law required PG&E to provide workers’ compensation benefits for its employees by either (1) purchasing workers’ compensation insurance from a licensed provider of such insurance or (2) adopting a plan, with the State’s approval, to self-insure. PG&E chose the latter option, and was therefore required to post security with the State to ensure ongoing payment of mandatory workers’ compensation benefits. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 3700,3701 (West 2003). Travelers posted the required security by issuing a bond on PG&E’s behalf. The bond makes Travelers liable, up to $100 million, for workers’ compensation benefits in the event of a default by PG&E.

       The Court of Appeals incorporated by reference the reasoning employed in In re DeRoche, 434 F. 3d 1188 (CA9 2006), which was decided by the same panel that decided this case. 167 Fed. Appx., at 593. Although the DeRoche opinion is longer than its counterpart in this case, it adds very little to the panel’s explanation of the Fobian rule. See 434 F. 3d, at 1190-1192.

       In Johnson, the debtor sought attorney’s fees after the creditor unsuccessfully requested relief from the automatic stay under 11 U. S. C. § 862(d)(1). The debtor acknowledged that the contract between the parties entitled only the creditor to attorney’s fees, but the debtor claimed that a California statute extended that entitlement to both parties. The court rejected that argument, noting that the statute applied only in the context of an “ ‘action on a contract,’ ” and concluding that a request for relief from an automatic stay could not be considered an action on a contract. 756 F. 2d, at 741-742. Both Coast Trading and Fulwiler involved claims for attorney’s fees based on an Oregon statute similar to the statute at issue in Johnson; the court found the statute inapplicable in both cases. Coast Trading, 744 F. 2d, at 693; Fulwiler, 624 F. 2d, at 909-910.

       PG&E’s new reading of the Code would prohibit all unsecured creditors from recovering contractual, postpetition attorney’s fees in bankruptcy proceedings — even if those fees were incurred while litigating issues of state law. See Brief for Respondent 17-19. The Fobian rule, by contrast, would allow such a recovery — even by unsecured creditors — so long as the litigation resulting in the claimed fees did not involve “issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.” See In re Fobian, 951 F. 2d 1149, 1153 (GA9 1991).

       For similar reasons, we will not address PG&E’s argument that Travelers’ claim should be denied based on the theory that the fees at issue were incurred in connection with activities that were not reasonably necessary to preserve Travelers’ rights and, alternatively, were not authorized by Travelers’ contract with PG&E. See Brief for Respondent 42-49. This argument was not addressed below, was not raised in PG&E’s brief in opposition to certiorari, and bears no relation to the question presented. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”).