author: Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

text:
    YBARRA v. ILLINOIS
    No. 78-5937.
    Argued October 9, 1979
    Decided November 28, 1979

      Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrennaN, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 96. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 98.

      Alan D. Goldberg argued the cause pro hac vice for appellant. With him on the briefs were Ralph Ruebner and Mary Robinson.

      Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Donald B. Mackay, Assistant Attorney General.

        Laurance S. Smith filed a brief for the State Public Defender of California as amicus curiae urging reversal.

        Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, Frank G. Carrington, Jr., James P. Manak, Richard J. Brzeczek, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, and Marc F. Racicot, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al., as amici curiae urging affirmance.

   Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

An Illinois statute authorizes law enforcement officers to detain and search any person found on premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant, to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant. The question before us is whether the application of this statute to the facts of the present case violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I

On March 1, 1976, a special agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation presented a "Complaint for Search Warrant” to a judge of an Illinois Circuit Court. The complaint recited that the agent had spoken with an informant known to the police to be reliable and:

“3. The informant related . . . that over the weekend of 28 and 29 February he was in the [Aurora Tap Tavern, located in the city of Aurora, Ill.] and observed fifteen to twenty-five tin-foil packets on the person of the bartender 'Greg’ and behind the bar. He also has been in the tavern on at least ten other occasions and has observed tin-foil packets on ‘Greg’ and in a drawer behind the bar. The informant has used heroin in the past and knows that tin-foil packets are a common method of packaging heroin.
“4. The informant advised . . . that over the weekend of 28 and 29 February he had a conversation with ‘Greg’ and was advised that ‘Greg’ would have heroin for sale on Monday, March 1, 1976. This conversation took place in the tavern described.”

On the strength of this complaint, the judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of “the following person or place: . . . [T]he Aurora Tap Tavern. . . . Also the person of ‘Greg’, the bartender, a male white with blondish hair appx. 25 years.” The warrant authorized the police to search for “evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance,” to wit, “[h]eroin, contraband, other controlled substances, money, instrumentalities and narcotics, paraphernalia used in the manufacture, processing and distribution of controlled substances.”

In the late afternoon of that day, seven or eight officers proceeded to the tavern. Upon entering it, the officers announced their purpose and advised all those present that they were going to conduct a “cursory search for weapons.” One of the officers then proceeded to pat down each of the 9 to 13 customers present in the tavern, while the remaining officers engaged in an extensive search of the premises.

The police officer who frisked the patrons found the appellant, Ventura Ybarra, in front of the bar standing by a pinball machine. In his first patdown of Ybarra, the officer felt what he described as “a cigarette pack with objects in it.” He did not remove this pack from Ybarra’s pocket. Instead, he moved on and proceeded to pat down other customers. After completing this process the officer returned to Ybarra and frisked him once again. This second search of Ybarra took place approximately 2 to 10 minutes after the first. The officer relocated and retrieved the cigarette pack from Ybarra’s pants pocket. Inside the pack he found six tinfoil packets containing a brown powdery substance which later turned out to be heroin.

Ybarra was subsequently indicted by an Illinois grand jury for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the contraband that had been seized from his person at the Aurora Tap Tavern. At the hearing on this motion the State sought to justify the search by reference to the Illinois statute in question. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the search had been conducted under the authority of subsection (b) of the statute, to “prevent the disposal or concealment of [the] things particularly described in the warrant.” The case proceeded to trial before the court sitting without a jury, and Ybarra was found guilty of the possession of heroin.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional “in its application to the facts” of this case. 58 Ill. App. 3d 57, 64, 373 N. E. 2d 1013, 1017. The court acknowledged that, had the warrant directed that a “large retail or commercial establishment” be searched, the statute could not constitutionally have been read to “authorize a ‘blanket search’ of persons or patrons found” therein. Id., at 62, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016. The court interpreted the statute as authorizing the search of persons found on premises described in a warrant only if there is “some showing of a connection with those premises, that the police officer reasonably suspected an attack, or that the person searched would destroy or conceal items described in the warrant.” Id., at 61, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016. Accordingly, the State Appellate Court found that the search of Ybarra had been constitutional because it had been “conducted in a one-room bar where it [was] obvious from the complaint . . . that heroin was being sold or dispensed,” id., at 62, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016, because “the six packets of heroin . . . could easily ¡[have been] concealed by the defendant and thus thwart the purpose of the warrant,” id., at 61, 373 N. E. 2d, at 1016, and because Ybarra was not an “innocent strange[r] having no connection with the' premises,” ibid. The court, therefore, affirmed Ybarra’s conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. There followed an appeal to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 440 U. S. 790.

II

There is no reason to suppose that, when the search warrant was issued on March 1, 1976, the authorities had probable cause to believe that any person found on the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern, aside from “Greg,” would be violating the law. The search warrant complaint did not allege that the bar was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs. It did not state that the informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern purchase drugs from “Greg” or from any other person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint even mention the patrons of the Aurora Tap Tavern.

Not only was probable cause to search Ybarra absent at the time the warrant was issued, it was still absent when the police executed the warrant. Upon entering the tavern, the police did not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any offense under state or federal law. Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a suspicious nature to the police officers. In short, the agents knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale.

It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But, a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-63. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the “legitimate expectations of privacy” of persons, not places. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138-143, 148-149; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351-352.

Each patron who walked into the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, was clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. That individualized protection was separate and distinct from the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection possessed by the proprietor of the tavern or by “Greg.” Although the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search “Greg,” it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers.

Notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to search Ybarra, the State argues that the action of the police in searching him and seizing what was found in his pocket was nonetheless constitutionally permissible. We are asked to find that the first patdown search of Ybarra constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. If this finding is made, it is then possible to conclude, the State argues, that the second search of Ybarra was constitutionally justified. The argument is that the pat-down yielded probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying narcotics, and that this probable cause constitutionally supported the second search, no warrant being required in light of the exigencies of the situation coupled with the ease with which Ybarra could have disposed of the illegal substance.

We are unable to take even the first step required by this argument. The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for weapons. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146; Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21-24, 27. When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized him as a person with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as Police Agen't Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that Ybarra was wearing a %-length lumber jacket, clothing which the State admits could be expected on almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. In short, the State is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous.

The Terry case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause, an exception whose “narrow scope” this Court “has been careful to maintain.” Under that doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra (at night, in high-crime district, lone police officer approached person believed by officer to possess gun and narcotics). Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized “cursory search for weapons” or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The “narrow scope” of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.

What has been said largely disposes of the State’s second and alternative argument in this case. Emphasizing the important governmental interest “in effectively controlling traffic in dangerous, hard drugs” and the ease with which the evidence of narcotics possession may be concealed or moved around from person to person, the State contends that .the Terry “reasonable belief or suspicion” standard should be made applicable to aid the evidence-gathering function of the search warrant. More precisely, we are asked to construe the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on “compact” premises subject to a search warrant, at least where the police have a “reasonable belief” that such persons “are connected with” drug trafficking and “may be concealing or carrying away the contraband.”

Over 30 years ago, the Court rejected a similar argument in United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 583-587. In that case, a federal investigator had been told by an informant that a transaction in counterfeit gasoline ration coupons was going to occur at a particular place. The investigator went to that location at the appointed time and saw the car of one of the suspected parties to the illegal transaction. The investigator went over to the car and observed a man in the driver’s seat, another man (Di Re) in the passenger’s seat, and the informant in the back. The informant told the investigator that the person in the driver’s seat had given him counterfeit coupons. Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched. Among the arguments unsuccessfully advanced by the Government to support the constitutionality of the search of Di Re was the contention that the investigator could lawfully have searched the car, since he had reasonable cause to believe that it contained contraband, and correspondingly could have searched any occupant of the car because the contraband sought was of the sort “which could easily be concealed on the person.” Not deciding whether or not under the Fourth Amendment the car could have been searched, the Court held that it was “not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled.”

The Di Re case does not, of course, completely control the case at hand. There the Government investigator was proceeding without a search warrant, and here the police possessed a warrant authorizing the search of the Aurora Tap Tavern. Moreover, in Di Re the Government conceded that its officers could not search all the persons in a house being searched pursuant to a search warrant.’ The State makes no such concession in this case. Yet the governing principle in both cases is basically the same, and we follow that principle today. The “long-prevailing” constitutional standard of probable cause embodies “ 'the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often opposing interests’ in 'safeguard [ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy' and in ‘seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.' ”

For these reasons, we conclude that the searches of Ybarra and the seizure of what was in his pocket contravened the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

I join Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent since I cannot subscribe to the Court’s unjustifiable narrowing of the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). The Court would require a particularized and individualized suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous as a condition to a Terry search. This goes beyond the rationale of Terry and overlooks the practicalities of a situation which no doubt often confronts officers executing a valid search warrant. The Court’s holding is but another manifestation of the practical poverty of the judge-made exclusionary rule. “The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified at all only when the opposed private interest is supreme.” McMann v. SEC, 87 F. 2d 377, 378 (CA2 1937) (L. Hand, J.). Here, the Court’s holding operates as but a further hindrance on the already difficult effort to police the narcotics traffic which takes such a terrible toll on human beings.

These officers had validly obtained a warrant to search a named person and a rather small, one-room tavern for narcotics. Upon arrival, they found the room occupied by 12 persons. Were they to ignore these individuals and assume that all were unarmed and uninvolved? Given the setting and the reputation of those who trade in narcotics, it does not go too far to suggest that they might pay for such an easy assumption with their lives. The law does not require that those executing a search warrant must be so foolhardy. That is precisely what Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Terry stands for. Indeed, the Terry Court recognized that a balance must be struck between the privacy interest of individuals and the safety of police officers in performing their duty. I would hold that when police execute a search warrant for narcotics in a place of known narcotics activity they may protect themselves by conducting a Terry search. They are not required to assume that they will not be harmed by patrons of the kind of establishment shown here, something quite different from a ballroom at the Waldorf. “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 27.

I do not find it controlling that the heroin was not actually retrieved from appellant until the officer returned after completing the first search. The “cigarette pack with objects in it” was noticed in the first search. In the “second search,” the officer did no more than return to the appellant and retrieve the pack he had already discovered. That there was a delay of minutes between the search and the seizure is not dispositive in this context, where the searching officer made the on-the-spot judgment that he need not seize the suspicious package immediately. He could first reasonably make sure that none of the patrons was armed before returning to appellant. Thus I would treat the second search and its fruits just as I would had the officer taken the pack immediately upon noticing it, which plainly would have been permissible.

Under this analysis, I need not reach the validity of the Illinois statute under which the Illinois court sustained the search. Parenthetically, I find the Court’s failure to pass on the Illinois statute puzzling in light of the Court’s holding that the searches were not authorized by Terry.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmuh join, dissenting.

On March 1, 1976, agents of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation executed a search warrant in the Aurora Tap Tavern in Aurora, Ill. The warrant was based on information given by a confidential informant who said that he had seen heroin on the person of the bartender and in a drawer behind the bar on at least 10 occasions. Moreover, the informant advised the affiant that the bartender would have heroin for sale on March 1. The warrant empowered the police to search the Aurora Tap and the person of “Greg,” the bartender.

When police arrived at the Aurora Tap, a drab, dimly lit tavern, they found about a dozen or so persons standing or sitting at the bar. The police announced their purpose and told everyone at the bar to stand for a patdown search. Agent Jerome Johnson, the only officer to testify in the proceedings below, explained that the initial search was a frisk for weapons to protect the officers executing the warrant. Johnson frisked several patrons, including appellant Ybarra. During this patdown, Johnson felt “a cigarette pack with objects in it” in Ybarra’s front pants pocket. He finished frisking the other patrons and then returned to Ybarra. At that time, he frisked Ybarra once again, reached into Ybarra’s pocket, and removed the cigarette package that he had felt previously. The package, upon inspection, confirmed the officer’s previously aroused suspicion that it contained not cigarettes but packets of heroin.

Confronted with these facts, the Court concludes that the police were without authority under the warrant to search any of the patrons in the tavern and that, absent probable cause to believe that Ybarra possessed contraband, the search of his person violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because I believe that this analysis is faulty, I dissent.

The first question posed by this case is the proper scope of a policeman’s power to search pursuant to a valid warrant. This Court has had very few opportunities to consider the scope of such searches. An early case, Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), held that police could not seize one thing under a search warrant describing another thing. See also Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498 (1925) (warrant authorizing search of building used as a garage empowers police to search connecting rooms). Three other cases, Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967); United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974); and United States v. Donovan, 429 U. S. 413 (1977), examined the scope of a warrant in the context of electronic surveillance. A number of cases involving warrantless searches have offered dicta on the subject of searches pursuant to a warrant. See, e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394, n. 7 (1971) (Fourth Amendment confines officer executing a warrant “strictly within the bounds set by the warrant”). Closest for our purposes, though concededly not dispositive, is United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 587 (1948), a case involving the warrantless search of an occupant of an automobile. In that case the Court suggested that police, “armed with a search warrant for a residence only,” could not search “all persons found” in the residence.

Faced with such a dearth of authority, it makes more sense than ever to begin with the language of the Fourth Amendment itself:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

As often noted, the Amendment consists of two independent clauses joined by the conjunction “and.” See, e. g., Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 356-357 (1931). The first clause forbids “unreasonable searches and seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, and effects. ...” The second clause, describes the circumstances under which a search warrant or arrest warrant may issue, requiring specification of the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.

Much of the modern debate over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has focused on the relationship between the reasonableness requirement and the warrant requirement. In particular, the central question has been whether and under what circumstances the police are entitled to conduct “reasonable” searches without first securing a warrant. As this Court has summarized:

“Some have argued that a determination by a magistrate of probable cause as a precondition of any search or seizure is so essential that the Fourth Amendment is violated whenever the police might reasonably have obtained a warrant but failed to do so. Others have argued with equal force that a test of reasonableness, applied after the fact of search or seizure when the police attempt to introduce the fruits in evidence, affords ample safeguard for the rights in question, so that ‘[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474 (1971), quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).

Mr. Justice Stewart explained the current accommodation of the two clauses in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967): “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” See also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (1973).

Here, however, we must look to the language of the Fourth Amendment to answer a wholly different question: whether and under what circumstances the police may search a person present at the place named in a warrant. In this regard, the second clause of the Amendment, by itself, offers no guidance. It is merely a set of standards that must be met before a search warrant or arrest warrant may “issue.” The restrictions on a policeman’s authority to search pursuant to a warrant derive, of course, from the first clause of the Amendment, which prohibits all “unreasonable” searches, whether those searches are pursuant to a warrant or not. See Go-Bart Co. v. United States, supra, at 357. Reading the two clauses together, we can infer that some searches or seizures are per se unreasonable: searches extending beyond the place specified, cf. Steele v. United States, supra, or seizures of persons or things other than those specified. Cf. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927). No such presumption is available to Ybarra here, however, because the second clause of the Amendment does not require the warrant to specify the “persons” to be searched. As this Court has noted in the context of electronic surveillance, “ ' [t] he Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” not the persons from whom things will be seized.’ ” United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S., at 155, n. 15, quoting United States v. Fiorella, 468 F. 2d 688, 691 (CA2 1972).

Nor, as a practical matter, could we require the police to specify in advance all persons that they were going to search at the time they execute the warrant. A search warrant is, by definition, an anticipatory authorization. The police must offer the magistrate sufficient information to confine the search but must leave themselves enough flexibility to react reasonably to whatever situation confronts them when they enter the premises. An absolute bar to searching persons not named in the warrant would often allow a person to frustrate the search simply by placing the contraband in his pocket. I cannot subscribe to any interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would support such a result, and I doubt that this Court would sanction it if that precise fact situation were before it.

Recognizing that the authority to search premises must, under some circumstances, include the authority to search persons present on those premises, courts and legislatures have struggled to define the precise contours of that power. Some courts, for example, have required an indication that the person searched had a “connection” with the premises. See, e. g., Purkey v. Maby, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79 (1920); State v. Massie, 95 W. Ya. 233, 120 S, E. 514 (1923). These courts do not explain, however, what form that connection must take or how it might manifest itself to the police. Some States have relied on the Uniform Arrest Act, which allows police executing a warrant to detain and question a suspicious person for up to two hours. See, e. g., State v. Wise, 284 A. 2d 292 (Del. Super. 1971). Proponents of this approach fail to explain, however, how detention for questioning will produce any hidden contraband. Moreover, in light of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the warrant specify the person to be “seized,” it is at least arguable that this approach substitutes a greater constitutional intrusion for a lesser. Several other States, Illinois included, have simply passed over the constitutional question by identifying the permissible purposes for a search without specifying the circumstances under which that search can be conducted. Illinois’ provision, for example, permits an officer to search persons present on the named premises

“(a) To protect himself from attack, or
“(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things particularly described in the warrant.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 108-9 (1975).

The generality of these attempts to define the proper limits of such searches does not mean, of course, that no limits exist. A person does not forfeit the protection of the Fourth Amendment merely because he happens to be present during the execution of a search warrant. To define those limits, however, this Court need look no further than the first clause of that Amendment and need ask no question other than whether, under all the circumstances, the actions of the police in executing the warrant were reasonable. Significantly, the concept of reasonableness in this context is different from the prevailing concept of reasonableness in the context of warrant-less searches. In that latter context, as noted earlier, there is a tension between giving full scope to the authority of police to make reasonable searches and the inferred requirement that the police secure a judicial approval in advance of a search. In the past we have resolved that tension by allowing “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 357. The rationale for drawing these exceptions closely is obvious. Loosely drawn, they could swallow the warrant requirement itself.

In this case, however, the warrant requirement has been fully satisfied. As a result, in judging the reasonableness of the search pursuant to the warrant, we need not measure it against jealously drawn exceptions to that requirement. Only once before, to my knowledge, has this Court been relieved of concern for the warrant requirement to the extent that we could give full scope to the notion of reasonableness. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), this Court considered the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to an on-the-street encounter between a policeman and three men who had aroused his suspicions. In upholding the ensuing “stop and frisk,” this Court found the warrant requirement completely inapposite because “on-the-spot” interactions between police and citizens “historically [have] not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.” Id., at 20. The conduct in question had to be judged solely under “the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ibid.

The petitioner in Terry had sought a “rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment,” a model allowing the police to search some individuals completely and other individuals not at all. Such a model, however, would have overlooked “the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police actions as a means of constitutional regulation.” Id., at 17. This Court, therefore, opted for a flexible model balancing the scope of the intrusion against its justification:

“In order to assess the reasonableness of [the challenged search] as a general proposition, it is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,’ for there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’ ” Id., at 20-21, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 (1967).

In the present case, Ybarra would have us eschew such flexibility in favor of a rule allowing the police to search only those persons on the premises for whom the police have probable cause to believe that they possess contraband. Presumably, such a belief would entitle the police to search those persons completely. But such a rule not only reintroduces the rigidity condemned in Terry, it also renders the existence of the search warrant irrelevant. Given probable cause to believe that a person possesses illegal drugs, the police need no warrant to conduct a full body search. They need only arrest that person and conduct the search incident to that arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (1969). It should not matter, of course, whether the arrest precedes the search or vice versa. See, e. g., United States v. Gorman, 355 F. 2d 151, 159 (CA2 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 1024 (1966) ; Holt v. Simpson, 340 F. 2d 853, 856 (CA7 1965).

As already noted, I believe it error to analyze this case as if the police were under an obligation to act within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement, yet this is precisely what Ybarra would have us do. Whereas in Terry the warrant requirement was inapposite, here the warrant requirement has been fully satisfied. In either case we should give full scope to the reasonableness requirement of the first clause of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in judging the reasonableness of a search pursuant to a warrant, which search extends to persons present on the named premises, this Court should consider the scope of the intrusion as well as its justification.

Viewed sequentially, the actions of the police in this case satisfy the scope/justification test of reasonableness established by the first clause of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Terry. The police entered the Aurora Tap pursuant to the warrant and found themselves confronting a dozen people, all standing or sitting at the bar, the suspected location of the contraband. Because the police were aware that heroin was being offered for sale in the tavern, it was quite reasonable to assume that any one or more of the persons at the bar could have been involved in drug trafficking. This assumption, by itself, might not have justified a full-scale search of all the individuals in the tavern. Nevertheless, the police also were quite conscious of the possibility that one or more of the patrons could be armed in preparation for just such an intrusion. In the narcotics business, “firearms are as much ‘tools of the trade’ as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia.” United States v. Oates, 560 F. 2d 45, 62 (CA2 1977). The potential danger to the police executing the warrant and to innocent individuals in this dimly lit tavern cannot be minimized. By conducting an immediate frisk of those persons at the bar, the police eliminated this danger and “froze” the area in preparation for the search of the premises.

Ybarra contends that Terry requires an “individualized” suspicion that a particular person is armed and dangerous. While this factor may be important in the case of an on-the-street stop, where the officer must articulate some reason for singling the person out of the general population, there are at least two reasons why it has less significance in the present situation, where execution of a valid warrant had thrust the police into a confrontation with a small, but potentially dangerous, group of people. First, in place of the requirement of “individualized suspicion” as a guard against arbitrary exercise of authority, we have here the determination of a neutral and detached magistrate that a search was necessary. As this Court noted in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 39-1, 400 (1976), the Framers of the Fourth Amendment “struck a balance so that when the State’s reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue.” The question then becomes whether, given the initial decision to intrude, the scope of the intrusion is reasonable.

In addition, the task performed by the officers executing a search warrant is inherently more perilous than is a momentary encounter on the street. The danger is greater “not only because the suspect and officer will be in close proximity for a longer period of time, but also . . . because the officer’s investigative responsibilities under the warrant require him to direct his attention to the premises rather than the person.” W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9, pp. 150-151 (1978). To hold a police officer in such a situation to the same standard of “individualized suspicion” as might be required in the case of an on-the-street stop would defeat the purpose of gauging reasonableness in terms of all the circumstances surrounding an encounter.

Terry suggests an additional factor that courts must consider when confronting an allegedly illegal frisk for weapons. As this Court admitted in that case, “[t]he exclusionary rule has its limitations ... as a tool of judicial control.” 392 U. S., at 13. Premised as that rule is on the hypothesis that police will avoid illegal searches if threatened with exclusion of the fruits of such searches, “it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.” Id., at 14. Where, as here, a preliminary frisk is based on an officer’s well-honed sense of self-preservation, I have little doubt that “the [exclusionary] rule is ineffective as a deterrent.” Id., at 13.

Measured against the purpose for the initial search is the scope of that search. I do not doubt that a patdown for weapons is a substantial intrusion into one’s privacy. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 17, n. 13. Nevertheless, such an intrusion was more than justified, under the circumstances here, by the potential threat to the lives of the searching officers and innocent bystanders. In the rubric of Terry itself, a “man of reasonable caution” would have been warranted in the belief that it was appropriate to frisk the 12 or so persons in the vicinity of the bar for weapons. See id., at 21-22. Thus, the initial frisk of Ybarra was legitimate.

During this initial patdown, Officer Johnson felt something suspicious: a cigarette package with objects in it. The record below is not entirely clear as to the shape or texture of the objects, but it is clear that Officer Johnson had at least a subjective suspicion that the objects were packets of heroin like those described in the warrant. He testified, for example, that after patting down the other persons at the bar, he returned directly to Ybarra to search him “for controlled substances.” App. 49. At this point, he reached into Ybarra’s pants pocket, removed the cigarette package, and confirmed his suspicion.

While the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is necessarily objective as opposed to subjective, see Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 21-22, Officer Johnson’s subjective suspicions help fill out his cryptic description of the “objects” that he felt in Ybarra’s pocket. The objects clearly did not feel like cigarettes. In this case we need not decide whether, as a general rule, an officer conducting an on-the-street frisk under Terry can carry his search into the pockets of a suspect to examine material that he suspects to be contraband. We are dealing here with a case where the police had obtained a warrant to search for precisely the item that Officer Johnson suspected was present in Ybarra’s pocket. Whether Officer Johnson’s level of certainty could be labeled “probable cause,” “reasonable suspicion,” or some indeterminate, intermediate level of cognition, the limited pursuit of his suspicions by extracting the item from Ybarra’s pocket was reasonable. The justification for the intrusion was linked closely .to the terms of the search warrant; the intrusion itself was carefully tailored to conform to its justification.

The courts below reached a similar conclusion. The trial court noted correctly that “[i]t might well not be reasonable to search 350 people on the first floor of Marshall Field, but we’re talking about, by description, a rather small tavern.” See App. 43. The question, as understood by the trial court, was the “reasonableness” of the intrusion under all the surrounding circumstances. Ibid. The Illinois Appellate Court agreed. In an earlier case, People v. Pugh, 69 Ill. App. 2d 312, 217 N. E. 2d 557 (1966), the Appellate Court had concluded that the police acted reasonably in searching the brother of the owner of the named premises during the exe-cutían of a search warrant for narcotics. According to the Appellate Court in that case, “[t]he United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches . . . ; the search of Raymond Pugh under the circumstances of this case cannot be so classified.” Id., at 316, 217 N. E. 2d, at 559. In this case, the Appellate Court relied expressly on the holding and reasoning in Pugh and found no constitutional violation in the searches of Ybarra. These findings should not be overturned lightly.

I would conclude that Officer Johnson, acting under the authority of a valid search warrant, did not exceed the reasonable scope of that warrant in locating and retrieving the heroin secreted in Ybarra’s pocket. This is not a case where Ybarra’s Fourth Amendment rights were at the mercy of overly zealous officers “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). On the contrary, the need for a search was determined, as contemplated by the second clause of the Fourth Amendment, by a neutral and detached magistrate, and the officers performed their duties pursuant to their warrant in an appropriate fashion. The Fourth Amendment requires nothing more.

       The statute in question is Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §108-9 (1975), which provides in full:
      “In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain to search any person in the place at the time:
      “(a) To protect himself from attack, or
      “ (b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things particularly described in the warrant.”

       The warrant issued on March 1, 1976, did not itself authorize the search of Ybarra or of any other patron found on the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern. It directed the police to search “the following person or place: . . . the Aurora Tap Tavern. . . . Also the person of ‘Greg’. . . .” Had the issuing judge intended that the warrant would or could authorize a search of every person found within the tavern, he would hardly have specifically authorized the search of “Greg” alone. “Greg” was an 'employee of the tavern, and the complaint upon which the search warrant was issued gave every indication that he would be present at the tavern on March 1.

       Ybarra concedes that the warrant issued on March 1, 1976, was supported by probable cause insofar as it purported to authorize a search of the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and a search of the person of “Greg,” the bartender.

       The Fourth Amendment directs that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Thus, “open-ended” or “general” warrants are constitutionally prohibited. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 311; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 480-482. It follows that a warrant to search a place cannot normally be construed to authorize a search of each individual in that place. The warrant for the Aurora Tap Tavern provided no basis for departing from this general rule. Consequently, we need not consider situations where the warrant itself authorizes the search of unnamed persons in a place and is supported by probable cause to believe that persons who will be in the place at the time of the search will be in possession of illegal drugs.

       Since we conclude that the initial patdown of Ybarra was not justified under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, we need not decide whether or not the presence on Ybarra’s person of “a cigarette pack with objects in it” yielded probable cause to believe that Ybarra was carrying any illegal substance.

        Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210.

         332 U. S., at 586.

        Id., at 587.

       “The Government says it would not contend that, armed with a search warrant for a residence only, it could search all persons found in it. But an occupant of a house could be used to conceal this contraband on his person quite as readily as can an occupant of a car. Necessity, an argument advanced in support of this search, would seem as strong a reason for searching guests of a house for which a search warrant had issued as for search of guests in a car for which none had been issued. By a parity of reasoning with that on which the Government disclaims the right to search occupants of a house, we suppose the Government would not contend that if it had a valid search warrant for the car only it could search the occupants as an incident to its execution. How then could we say that the right to search a car without a warrant confers greater latitude to search occupants than a search by warrant would permit?” Ibid.

        Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 208, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176.
      The circumstances of this case do not remotely approach those in which the Court has said that a search may be made on less than probable cause. In addition to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, see, e. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 643; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873; United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523.

       Our decision last Term in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, does not point in a different direction. There we held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments had not been violated by an arrest based on a police officer's probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed or was committing a substantive criminal offense, even though the statute creating the offense was subsequently declared unconstitutional. Here, the police officers acted on the strength of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 108-9 (1975), but that statute does not define the elements of a substantive criminal offense under state law. The statute purports instead to authorize the police in some circumstances to make searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants. This state lawy therefore, falls within the category of statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional searches. See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40; Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41.

       Technically, the police must temporarily “seize” a person before they can search him. Such incidental seizures, however, never have been nor could be subjected to the warrant requirement. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968). See also infra, at 104-105.

       The failure of the Fourth Amendment to require specification of the persons to be searched does not, of course, prohibit such specification. Thus, in the present case, the warrant specifically authorized the police to search Greg, the bartender.

       As even a critic of the approach employed by the court below admitted, “a realistic appraisal of the situation facing the officer executing a search warrant compels the conclusion that under some circumstances a right to search occupants of the place named in the warrant is essential.” LaFave, Search and Seizure: “The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run Smooth,” 1966 Law Forum 255, 272.

       In fact, Officer Johnson did testify that the objects felt exactly like what they were: heroin. See App. 9 (“I felt some objects that I felt to be heroin”). See also id., at 50 (“I felt objects in his pocket which I believed — ”). In both cases defense counsel interposed objections to Officer Johnson’s characterization of the objects, which objections the trial court sustained.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice White Mr. Justice Stevens,

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNITED STATES v. KUBRICK
    No. 78-1014.
    Argued October 3, 1979
    Decided November 28, 1979

      White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, BlachmuN, Powell, and RehNquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 125.

      Elinor Hadley Stillman argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, and William Ranter.

      Benjamin Ruby argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul N. Minkofj and Joan Saltzman.

   Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Act), 28 U. S. C. § 2401 (b), a tort claim against the United States is barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency “within two years after such claim accrues." The issue in this case is whether the claim “accrues" within the meaning of the Act when the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury or at a later time when he also knows that the acts inflicting the injury may constitute medical malpractice.

I

Respondent Kubrick, a veteran, was admitted to the Veterans’ Administration (VA) hospital in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., in April 1968, for treatment of an infection of the right femur. Following surgery, the infected area was irrigated with neomycin, an antibiotic, until the infection cleared. Approximately six weeks after discharge, Kubrick noticed a ringing sensation in his ears and some loss of hearing. An ear specialist in Scranton, Pa., Dr. Soma, diagnosed the condition as bilateral nerve deafness. His diagnosis was confirmed by other specialists. One of them, Dr. Sataloff, secured Kubrick’s YA hospital records and in January 1969, informed Kubrick that it was highly possible that the hearing loss was the result of the neomycin treatment administered at the hospital. Kubrick, who was already receiving disability benefits for a service-connected back injury, filed an application for an increase in benefits pursuant to 38 U. S. C. § 351, alleging that the neomycin treatment had caused his deafness. The VA denied the claim in September 1969, and on resubmission again denied the claim, on the grounds that no causal relationship existed between the neomycin treatment and the hearing loss and that there was no evidence of “carelessness, accident, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment or other fault on the part of the Government.”

In the course of pursuing his administrative appeal, Kubrick was informed by the VA that Dr. Soma had suggested a connection between Kubrick’s loss of hearing and his prior occupation as a machinist. When questioned by Kubrick on June 2, 1971, Dr. Soma not only denied making the statement attributed to him but also told respondent that the neomycin had caused his injury and should not have been administered. On Dr. Sataloff’s advice, respondent then consulted an attorney and employed him to help with his appeal. In rendering its decision in August 1972, the VA Board of Appeals recognized that Kubrick's hearing loss “may have been caused by the neomycin irrigation” but rejected the appeal on the ground that the treatment was in accordance with acceptable medical practices and procedures and that the Government was therefore faultless.

Kubrick then filed suit under the Act, alleging that he had been injured by negligent treatment in the VA hospital. After trial, the District Court rendered judgment for Kubrick, rejecting, among other defenses, the assertion by the United States that Kubrick’s claim was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations because the claim had accrued in January 1969, when he learned from Dr. Sataloff that his hearing loss had probably resulted from the neomycin. The District Court conceded that the lower federal courts had held with considerable uniformity that a claim accrues within the meaning of the Act when “the claimant has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged malpractice,” 435 F. Supp. 166, 180 (ED Pa. 1977), and that notice of the injury and its cause normally were sufficient to trigger the limitations period. Id., at 184. As the District Court read the authorities, however, a plaintiff could avoid the usual rule by showing that he had exercised reasonable diligence and had no “reasonable suspicion” that there was negligence in his treatment. Id., at 185. “[W]e do not believe it reasonable to start the statute running until the plaintiff had reason at least to suspect that a legal duty to him had been breached.” Ibid. Here, the District Court found, Kubrick had no reason to suspect negligence until his conversation with Dr. Soma in June 1971, less than two years prior to presentation of his tort claim.

The District Court went on to hold, based on the expert testimony before it, that a reasonably competent orthopedic surgeon in the Wilkes-Barre community, which the VA doctor held himself out to be, should have known that irrigating Kubrick’s wound with neomycin would cause deafness. It was therefore negligent to use that drug in that manner. Damages were determined and awarded.

Except for remanding to resolve a setoff claimed by the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 581 F. 2d 1092 (1978). It ruled that even though a plaintiff is aware of his injury and of the defendant’s responsibility for it, the statute of limitations does not run where the plaintiff shows that “in the exercise of due diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that the treatment was improper.” Id., at 1097. We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of the administration of the statute, 440 U. S. 906 (1979), and we now reverse.

II

Statutes of limitations, which “are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence,” Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139 (1879), represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342, 349 (1944). These enactments are statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 322, n. 14 (1971); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1945); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 672 (1913) ; Bellv. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360 (1828).

Section 2401 (b), the limitations provision involved here, is the balance struck by Congress in the context of tort claims against the Government; and we are not free to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 617 (1895); Bell v. Morrison, supra, at 360. We should regard the plea of limitations as a “meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 136 (1938).

We should also have in mind that the Act waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the statute of limitations, which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 68-69 (1955). Neither, however, should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra.

It is in the light of these considerations that we review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Ill

It is undisputed in this case that in January 1969 Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable cause. Despite this factual predicate for a claim against the VA at that time, the Court of Appeals held that Kubrick’s claim had not yet accrued and did not accrue until he knew or could reasonably be expected to know that in the eyes of the law, the neomycin treatment constituted medical malpractice. The Court of Appeals thought that in “most” cases knowledge of the causal connection between treatment and injury, without more, will or should alert a reasonable person that there has been an actionable wrong. 581 F. 2d, at 1096. But it is apparent, particularly in light of the facts in this record, that the Court of Appeals’ rule would reach any case where an untutored plaintiff, without benefit of medical or legal advice and because of the “technical complexity” of the case, id., at 1097, would not himself suspect that his doctors had negligently treated him. As we understand the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff in such cases need not initiate a prompt inquiry and would be free to sue at any time within two years from the time he receives or perhaps forms for himself a reasonable opinion that he has been wronged. In this case, for example, Kubrick would have been free to sue if Dr. Soma had not told him until 1975, or even 1980, instead of 1971, that the neomycin treatment had been a negligent act.

There is nothing in the language or the legislative history of the Act that provides a substantial basis for the Court of Appeals’ construction of the accrual language of §2401 (b). Nor did the prevailing case law at the time the Act was passed lend support for the notion that tort claims in general or malpractice claims in particular do not accrue until a plaintiff learns that his injury was negligently inflicted. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that the general rule under the Act has been that a tort claim accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s injury, although it thought that in medical malpractice cases the rule had come to be that the 2-year period did not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered both his injury and its cause. But even so — and the United States was prepared to concede as much for present purposes — the latter rule would not save Kubrick’s action since he was aware of these essential facts in January 1969. Reasoning, however, that if a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff is aware of his injury and its cause, neither should it accrue until he knows or should suspect that the doctor who caused his injury was legally blameworthy, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that the limitations period was not triggered until Dr. Soma indicated in June 1971 that the neomycin irrigation treatment had been improper.

We disagree. We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment. That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask. If he does ask and if the defendant has failed to live up to minimum standards of medical proficiency, the odds are that a competent doctor will so inform the plaintiff.

In this case, the trial court found, and the United States did not appeal its finding, that the treating physician at the VA hospital had failed to observe the standard of care governing doctors of his specialty in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and that reasonably competent doctors in this branch of medicine would have known that Kubrick should not have been treated with neomycin. Crediting this finding, as we must, Kubrick need only have made inquiry among doctors with average training and experience in such matters to have discovered that he probably had a good cause of action. The difficulty is that it does not appear that Kubrick ever made any inquiry, although meanwhile he had consulted several specialists about his loss of hearing and had been in possession of all the facts about the cause of his injury since January 1969. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that Dr. Soma, who in 1971 volunteered his opinion that Kubrick’s treatment had been improper, would have had the same opinion had the plaintiff sought his judgment in 1969.

We thus cannot hold that Congress intended that “accrual” of a claim must await awareness by the plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted. A plaintiff such as Kubrick, armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations statute, which is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims against the Government. If there exists in the community a generally applicable standard of care with respect to the treatment of his ailment, we see no reason to suppose that competent advice would not be available to the plaintiff as to whether his treatment conformed to that standard. If advised that he has been wronged, he may promptly bring suit. If competently advised to the contrary, he may be dissuaded, as he should be, from pressing a baseless claim. Of course, he may be incompetently advised or the medical community may be divided on the crucial issue of negligence, as the experts proved to be on the trial of this case. But however or even whether he is advised, the putative malpractice plaintiff must determine within the period of limitations whether to sue or not, which is precisely the judgment that other tort claimants must make. If he fails to bring suit because he is incompetently or mistakenly told that he does not have a case, we discern no sound reason for visiting the consequences of such error on the defendant by delaying the accrual of the claim until the plaintiff is otherwise informed or himself determines to bring suit, even though more than two years have passed from the plaintiff’s discovery of the relevant facts about injury.

The District Court, 435 F. Supp., at 185, and apparently the Court of Appeals, thought its ruling justified because of the “technical complexity,” 581 F. 2d, at 1097, of the negligence question in this case. But determining negligence or not is often complicated and hotly disputed, so much so that judge or jury must decide the issue after listening to a barrage of conflicting expert testimony. And if in this complicated malpractice case, the statute is not to run until the plaintiff is led to suspect negligence, it would be difficult indeed not to apply the same accrual rule to medical and health claims arising under other statutes and to a whole range of other negligence cases arising under the Act and other federal statutes, where the legal implications or complicated facts make it unreasonable to expect the injured plaintiff, who does not seek legal or other appropriate advice, to realize that his legal rights may have been invaded.

We also have difficulty ascertaining the precise standard proposed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals seemed to hold that a Torts Claims Act malpractice claim would not accrue until the plaintiff knew or could reasonably be expected to know of the Government’s breach of duty. Ibid. On the other hand, it seemed to hold that the claim would accrue only when the plaintiff had reason to suspect or was aware of facts that would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that a legal duty to him had been breached. Ibid. In any event, either of these standards would go far to eliminate the statute of limitations as a defense separate from the denial of breach of duty.

IV

It goes without saying that statutes of limitations often make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose, and they remain as ubiquitous as the statutory rights or other rights to which they are attached or are applicable. We should give them effect in accordance with what we can ascertain the legislative intent to have been. We doubt that here we have misconceived the intent of Congress when § 2401 (b) was first adopted or when it was amended to extend the limitations period to two years. But if we have, or even if we have not but Congress desires a different result, it may exercise its prerogative to amend the statute so as to effect its legislative will.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

Normally a tort claim accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s injury. In most cases that event provides adequate notice to the plaintiff of the possibility that his legal rights have been invaded. It is well settled, however, that the normal rule does not apply to medical malpractice claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The reason for this exception is essentially the same as the reason for the general rule itself. The victim of medical malpractice frequently has no reason to believe that his legal rights have been invaded simply because some misfortune has followed medical treatment. Sometimes he may not even be aware of the actual injury until years have passed; at other times, he may recognize the harm but not know its cause; or, as in this case, he may have knowledge of the injury and its cause, but have no reason to suspect that a physician has been guilty of any malpractice. In such cases— until today — the rule that has been applied in the federal courts is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until after fair notice of the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal rights.

Essentially, there are two possible approaches to construction of the word “accrues” in statutes of limitations: (I) a claim might be deemed to “accrue” at the moment of injury without regard to the potentially harsh consequence of barring a meritorious claim before the plaintiff has a reasonable chance to assert his legal rights, or (2) it might “accrue” when a diligent plaintiff has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice of an invasion of his legal rights. The benefits that flow from certainty in the administration of our affairs favor the former approach in most commercial situations. But in medical malpractice cases the harsh consequences of that approach have generally been considered unacceptable/ In all events, this Court adopted the latter approach over 30 years ago when it endorsed the principle that “blameless ignorance” should not cause the loss of a valid claim for medical injuries. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Rutledge expressed the point simply:

“We do not think the humane legislative plan [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights.” Uñe v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 170.

This rule has been consistently applied by the Courts of Appeals in the intervening decades without any suggestion of complaint from Congress.

In my judgment, a fair application of this rule forecloses the Court’s attempt to distinguish between a plaintiff’s knowledge of the cause of his injury on the one hand and his knowledge of the doctor’s failure to meet acceptable medical standards on the other. For in both situations the typical plaintiff will, and normally should, rely on his doctor’s explanation of the situation.

The Uñe rule would not, of course, prevent the statute from commencing to run if the plaintiff’s knowledge of an injury, or its cause, would place a reasonably diligent person on notice that a doctor had been guilty of misconduct. But if he neither suspects, nor has any reason to suspect, malpractice, I see no reason to treat his claim differently than if he were not aware of the cause of the harm or, indeed, of the harm itself. In this case the District Court expressly found that “plaintiff’s belief that there was no malpractice was reasonable in view of the technical complexity of the question whether his neomycin treatment involved excessive risks, the failure of any of his doctors to suggest prior to June 1971 the possibility of negligence, and the repeated unequivocal assertions by the Veterans Administration that there was no negligence on the part of the government.” 435 F. Supp. 166, 174.

The Court is certainly correct in stating that one purpose of the statute of limitations is to require the “reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims against the Government.” Ante, at 123. A plaintiff who remains ignorant through lack of diligence cannot be characterized as “blameless.” But unless the Court is prepared to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the District Court’s findings were adequately supported by the evidence, the principle of requiring diligence does not justify the result the Court reaches today. The District Court found that “plaintiff exercised all kinds of reasonable diligence in attempting to establish a medical basis for increased disability benefits.” 435 F. Supp., at 185. That diligence produced not only the Government’s denials, but, worse, what may have been a fabrication. It was only after the Government told plaintiff that Dr. Soma had suggested that plaintiff’s occupation as a machinist had caused his deafness that plaintiff, by confronting Dr. Soma, first became aware that neomycin irrigation may not have been an acceptable medical practice. Plaintiff was unquestionably diligent; moreover, his diligence ultimately bore fruit. There is no basis for assuming, as this Court holds, that plaintiff could have been more diligent and discovered his cause of action sooner.

The issue of diligence in a negligence case should be resolved by the factfinder — not by the Supreme Court of the United States — and its resolution should depend on the evidence in the record, rather than on speculation about what might constitute diligence in various other circumstances. Since a large number of circuit judges have reached the same conclusion, and since I find nothing in the Court’s opinion that lessens my respect for their collective wisdom, I would simply affirm the unanimous holding of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirming the judgment of the District Court which merely applied well-settled law to the somewhat unusual facts of this case.

       Title 28 U. S. C. §2674 provides in part:
      “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”
      Title 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b) provides that the district courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
      Title 28 U. S. C. § 2401 (b), the limitations provision applicable to tort claims against the United States, provides:
      “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.”

       Title 38 U. S. C. § 351 provides that a veteran who suffers “an injury, or an aggravation of an injury, as the result of hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment” administered by the VA shall be awarded disability benefits “in the same manner as if such disability . . . were service-connected.” The regulations require the applicant for benefits to show that “the disability proximately resulted through- carelessness, accident, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgement, or similar instances of indicated fault on the part of the Veterans Administration.” 38 CFR §3.358 (c)(3) (1978).

       In 1975, upon reconsideration of its decision, the VA Board of Appeals not only found, as it had before, that Kubrick’s hearing loss may have been caused by neomycin irrigation but also concluded that there was fault on the part of the VA in administering that drug by irrigation. In the present litigation, the Government contested the allegation of malpractice despite the administrative finding of fault.

       Title 28 U. S. C. § 2675 (a) in pertinent part provides:
      “An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal Agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.”
      Kubrick did not file an administrative claim until after he filed his action in the District Court. This possible objection to his suit the District Court found moot when the VA denied the administrative claim on April 13, 1973. The United States did not pursue the issue on appeal.

       The VA Board of Appeals’ reconsideration of Kubrick’s case in 1975 entitled him to an increase in his disability rating as a result of the use of neomycin. By the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, respondent had received over $50,000 in augmented disability benefits. Under 38 U. S. C. § 351, the benefits payments must be set off against the damages awarded in tort; and the increment in future monthly benefits is not paid until the aggregate amount of the benefits withheld equals the damages awarded.

       Respondent concedes as much with respect to the legislative history. The Act was enacted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 60 Stat. 842. The Senate Report on the bill, S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946), merely states that the limitations period is one year but does not mention when a claim accrues. In 1949, the limitations period was extended to two years, Ch. 92, 63 Stat. 62, but the issue of accrual was not further addressed. H. R. Rep. No. 276, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1949), notes that the limitations period would enlarge the period for filing to two years from “the date of accrual” but does not explain how to determine the date of accrual. Indeed, to the extent that the Report touches the issue at all, the Report seems almost to indicate that the time of accrual is the time of injury. Thus, the Report states as the reason for the amendment, in addition to bringing the Act more in line with limitations periods for state tort actions and other federal statutes:
      “The 1-year existing period is unfair to some claimants who suffered injuries which did not fully develop until after the expiration of the period for making claim. Moreover, the wide area of operations of the Federal agencies, particularly the armed-service agencies, would increase the possibility that notice of the wrongful death of a deceased to his next of kin would be so long delayed in going through channels of communication that the notice would arrive at a time when the running of the statute had already barred the institution of a claim or suit.” Id., at 3-4.
      The Act was further amended in 1966, 80 Stat. 307, to require that every claim under the Act be presented in writing to the appropriate agency as a prerequisite to suit. The Act originally required presentation to the agency only if the claim was for $1,000 or less, 60 Stat. 845. An amendment in 1959 raised the amount to $2,500, Pub. L. 86-238, 73 Stat. 472. Prior to 1966, the limitations period was keyed to the filing of suit; the 1966 amendment made the time of filing the administrative claim the critical date for limitations purposes. But although the Reports indicate these changes with precision, they do not further explicate when a tort claim “accrues” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §2401 (b). S. Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 5 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 8 (1966).

       In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949), the Court held that a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act did not accrue until the plaintiff’s injury manifested itself. In that case, plaintiff Urie contracted silicosis from his work as a fireman on a steam locomotive. His condition was diagnosed only in the weeks after he became too ill to work. The Court was reluctant to charge Urie with the “unknown and inherently unknowable” and held that because of his “blameless ignorance” of the fact of his injury, his claim did not accrue under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act until his disease manifested itself. 337 U. S., at 169-170. Quinton v. United States, 304 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1962), applied the Urie approach to medical malpractice claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act. Other Circuits have followed suit. Hungerford v. United States, 307 F. 2d 99 (CA9 1962); Tool v. United States, 438 F. 2d 222 (CA2 1971); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F. 2d 257 (CA3 1973); Portis v. United States, 483 F. 2d 670 (CA4 1973); Reilly v. United States, 513 F. 2d 147 (CA8 1975); Casias v. United States, 532 F. 2d 1339 (CA10 1976).
      Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, Comment e, pp. 444r-445 (1979), reflects these developments:
      “One group of cases in which there has been extensive departure from the earlier rule that the statute of limitations runs although the plaintiff has no knowledge of the injury has involved actions for medical malpractice. Two reasons can be suggested as to why there has been a change in the rule in many jurisdictions in this area. One is the fact that in most instances the statutory period within which the action must be initiated is short — one year, or at most two, being the common time limit. This is for the purpose of protecting physicians against unjustified claims; but since many of the consequences of medical malpractice often do not become known or apparent for a period longer than that of the statute, the injured plaintiff is left without a remedy. The second reason is that the nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon.
      “There are still courts that proceed to apply the rule that the action is barred by the statute even though there has been no knowledge that it could be brought. . . .
      “In a wave of recent decisions these various devices have been replaced by decisions meeting the issue directly and holding that the statute must be construed as not intended to start to run until the plaintiff has in fact discovered the fact that he has suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. There have also been a number of instances in which a similar rule has been applied to other professional malpractice, such as that of attorneys or accountants and the rule may thus become a general one.”

       The Court of Appeals relied on three federal cases, all decided within the past five years, that held or indicated in dictum that a malpractice plaintiff under the federal Act must know the legal implications of the facts, as well as the facts themselves, before the limitations period will begin to run. Exnicious v. United States, 563 F. 2d 418, 420, 424 (CA10 1977); Bridgford v. United States, 550 F. 2d 978, 981-982 (CA4 1977) ; Jordan v. United States, 503 F. 2d 620 (CA6 1974). Since the holding below, another Circuit has endorsed these views. De Witt v. United States, 593 F. 2d 276 (CA7 1979).
      The dissent, like the respondent, relies on Urie and Quinton, but neither case controls this one. Both dealt with the discovery of the factual predicate for a malpractice claim, but neither addressed the question of plaintiff’s awareness of negligence on defendant’s part. Contrary to the implications of the dissent, the prevailing rule under the Act has not been to postpone the running of the limitations period in malpractice cases until the plaintiff is aware that he has been legally wronged. Holdings such as the one before us now are departures from the general rule and, as indicated above, are of quite recent vintage.

       The trial court found:
      “We credit the testimony of plaintiff’s experts that the medical literature as of April 1968 contained sufficient and sufficiently widespread information as to the ototoxicity and absorption properties of neomycin to have warned [the treating physician] of the dangerousness and hence the impropriety of his treatment.” 435 F. Supp. 166, 177 (ED Pa. 1977) (footnote omitted).
      It further concluded:
      “Those findings tell us that [the physician’s] lack of knowledge, and his concomitant treatment, violated the national standard for specialists because of the generalized knowledge in the national community of orthopedic specialists of the hazards of neomycin and of its potentiality for absorption in circumstances such as those created by [the physician’s] use of neomycin in 1% irrigating solution through a closed hemovac system (at least in such high and lengthy dosage). However, even if a similar locality standard were to be applied, our findings of fact support the conclusion that the information in question was available to or known by the average specialist in Wilkes-Barre to the samé or similar extent as the average specialist in Philadelphia. . . .
      “Finally, we conclude that what was involved was not mere error in judgment but a lack of skill or knowledge as measured, of course, by the level of medical knowledge in April, 1968.” Id., at 188-189.

       As the dissent suggests, post, at 128, we are thus in partial disagreement with the conclusion of the lower courts that Kubrick exercised all reasonable diligence. Although he diligently ascertained the cause of his injury, he sought no advice within two years thereafter as to whether he had been legally wronged. The dissent would excuse the omission. For statute of limitations purposes, we would not.

       See Gates Rubber Co. v, USM Corp., 508 F. 2d 603, 611 (CA7 1975).

       One should note not only the cases cited by the Court in its footnote 7, ante, at 120, but also the reference to “a wave of recent decisions” in the quotation from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in that footnote.

       In its discussion of the reasons why most jurisdictions have adopted a special rule for medical malpractice cases, the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes “that the nature of the tort itself and the character of the injury will frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is forced to rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, Comment e, p. 444 (1979).

       The factual predicate for the Court’s speculation is its assumption that if a patient who has been mistreated by one doctor should ask another if the first “failed to live up to minimum standards of medical proficiency, the odds are that a competent doctor will so inform the plaintiff.” Ante, at 122. I am not at all sure about those odds. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 164 (4th ed. 1971); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 520 (1965); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 Cath. U. L. Rev. 158 (1966). But whatever the odds are generally, I would prefer to have the issue of the diligence in exploring the reason for the unfortunate condition of this deaf plaintiff decided on the basis of evidence relevant to his particular injury.

       Not only do I dissent from the Court's result, but I also believe the decision to grant certiorari was ill-advised. The Court notes, ante, at 125, that Congress may change the rule announced today. I would add that Congress possesses certain options we do not have, such as creating a bifurcated statute, to temper the interest in repose when it threatens to cause an unfair result. See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F. 2d, at 611-612. But Congress possessed the same options before this decision as well as after it. There was nothing to prevent the Executive from notifying Congress that the omission of any statutory definition of the word “accrues” has created problems that need legislative attention. Reversal of a just judgment is an unnecessarily high price to pay in order to provide Congress with that notice.