author: Mr. Justice Blackmun Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    HUDDLESTON v. UNITED STATES
    No. 72-1076.
    Argued November 7, 1973
    Decided March 26, 1974

      BlacicmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 833.

      Harvey I. Saferstein argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

      Danny J. Boggs argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, .Assistant Attorney General Petersen, and Jerome M. Feit.

   Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether IS U. S. C. § 922 (a) (6), declaring that it is unlawful knowingly to make a false statement “in connection with the acquisition . . . of any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed dealer,” covers the redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop.

I

On October 6, 1971, petitioner, William C. Huddleston, Jr., pawned his wife’s Winchester 30-30-caliber rifle for $25 at a pawnshop in Oxnard, California. On the following October 15 and on December 28, he pawned at the same shop two other firearms, a Russian. 7.62-caliber rifle and a Remington .22-caliber rifle, belonging to his wife. For these he received loans of $10 and $15, respectively. The owner of the pawnshop was a federally licensed firearms dealer.

Some weeks later, on February 1, 1972, and on March 10, Huddleston redeemed the weapons. In connection with each of the redemptions, the pawnbroker required petitioner to complete Treasury Form 4473, entitled “Firearms Transaction Record.” This is a form used in the enforcement of the gun control provision of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 225, as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, of which the above-cited 18 U. S. C. § 922 (a) (6) is a part. Question 8b of the form is:

“Have you been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? (Note: The actual sentence given by the judge does not matter — a yes answer is necessary if the judge could have given a sentence of more than one year.)”

The question is derived from the statutory prohibition against a dealer's selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm to any person who “has been convicted in any court of ... a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U. S. C. §922 (d)(1). Petitioner answered “no” to Question 8b on each of the three Forms 4473. He then affixed his signature to each form's certification that the answers were true and correct, that he understood that a person who answers any of the questions in the affirmative is prohibited by federal law from “purchasing and/or possessing a firearm,” and that he also understood that the making of any false statement with respect to the transaction is a crime punishable as a felony.

In fact, Huddleston, six years earlier, had been convicted in a California state court for writing checks without sufficient funds, an offense punishable under California law by a maximum term of 14 years. This fact, if revealed to the pawnshop proprietor, would have precluded the proprietor from selling or otherwise disposing of any of the rifles to the petitioner because of the proscription in 18 U. S. C. § 922 (d) (1).

Huddleston was charged in a three-count indictment with violating 18 U. S. C. §§922 (a) (6) and 924 (a). He moved to dismiss the indictment, in part on the ground that § 922 (a)(6) was never intended to apply, and should not apply, to a pawnor’s redemption of a weapon he had pawned. This motion was denied. Petitioner then pleaded not guilty and waived a jury trial.

The Government’s evidence consisted primarily of the three Treasury Forms 4473 Huddleston had signed; the record of his earlier California felony conviction; and the pawnbroker’s federal license. A Government agent also testified that petitioner, after being arrested and advised of his rights, made statements admitting that he had known, when filling out the forms, that he was a felon and that he had lied each time when he answered Question 8b in the negative.

Huddleston testified in his own defense. He stated that he did not knowingly make a false statement; that he did not read the form and simply answered “no” upon prompting from the pawnbroker; and that he was unaware that his California conviction was punishable by a term exceeding one year.

The District Judge found the petitioner guilty on all counts. He sentenced Huddleston to three concurrent three-year terms. The sentences were suspended, however, except for 20 days to be served on weekends. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the conviction. 472 F. 2d 592 (1973). The dissenting judge agreed that the statute was constitutional as applied, but concluded that what Huddleston did was to “reacquire” the rifles, and that “reacquire” is not necessarily included within the statute’s term “acquire.” Id,., at 593. We granted cer-tiorari, 411 U. S. 930 (1973), to resolve an existing conflict among the circuits on the issue whether the prohibition against making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm covers a firearm’s redemption from a pawnshop.

II

Petitioner’s assault on the statute under which he was convicted is two pronged. First, it is argued that both the statute’s language and its legislative history indicate that Congress did not intend a pawnshop redemption of a firearm to be an “acquisition” covered by the statute. Second, it is said that even if Congress did intend a pawnshop redemption to be a covered “acquisition,” the statute is so ambiguous that its construction is controlled by the maxim that ambiguity in a criminal statute is to be resolved in favor of the defendant.

We turn first to the language and structure of the Act. Reduced to a minimum, § 922 (a) (6) relates to any false statement made “in connection with the acquisition . . . of any firearm” from a licensed dealer and intended or likely to deceive the dealer “with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm.”

Petitioner attaches great significance to the word “acquisition.” He urges that it suggests only a sale-like transaction. Since Congress in § 922 (a) (6) did not use words of transfer or delivery, as it did in other sections of the Act, he argues that “acquisition” must have a narrower meaning than those terms. Moreover, since a pawn transaction is only a temporary bailment of personal property, with the pawnshop having merely a security interest in the pledged property, title or ownership is constant in the pawnor, and the pawn-plus-redemption transaction is no more than an interruption in the pawnor’s possession. The pawnor simply repossesses his own property, and he does not “acquire” any new title or interest in the object pawned. At most, he “reacquires” the object, and reacquisition, as the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals noted, is not necessarily included in the statutory term “acquisition.”

On its face, this argument might be said to have some force. A careful look at the statutory language and at complementary provisions of the Act, however, convinces us that the asserted ambiguity is contrived. Petitioner is mistaken in focusing solely on the term “acquisition” and in enshrouding it with an extra-statutory “legal title” or “ownership” analysis. The word “acquire” is defined to mean simply “to come into possession, control, or power of disposal of.” Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed., 1966, unabridged); United States v. Laisure, 460 F. 2d 709, 712 n. 3 (CA5 1972). There is no intimation here that title or ownership would be necessary for possession, or control, or disposal power, and there is nothing else in the statute that justifies the imposition of that gloss. Moreover, a full reading of § 922 (a) (6) clearly demonstrates that the false statements that are prohibited are those made with respect to the lawfulness of the sale • “or other disposition” of a firearm by a licensed dealer. The word “acquisition,” therefore, cannot be considered apart from the phrase “sale or other disposition.” As the Government suggests, and indeed as the petitioner implicitly reasoned at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, if the pawnbroker “sells” or “disposes” under § 922 (a)(6), the transferee necessarily “acquires.” These words, as used in the statute, are correlatives. The focus of our inquiry, therefore, should be to determine whether a “sale or other disposition” of a firearm by a pawnbroker encompasses the redemption of the firearm by a pawnor.

Clearly, a redemption is not a “sale” for the simple reason that a sale has definite connotations of ownership and title. Some “other disposition” of a firearm, however, could easily encompass a pawnshop redemption. We believe that it does.

It is the dealer who sells or disposes of the firearm. The statute defines the dealer to be:

“(A) any person engaged in the business of selling firearms or ammunition at wholesale or retail, (B) any person engaged in the business of repairing firearms or of making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms, or (C) any person who is a pawnbroker.” 18 U. S. C. § 921 (a) (11) (emphasis supplied).

It defines a “pawnbroker” as “any person whose business or occupation includes the taking or receiving, by way of pledge or pawn, of any firearm or ammunition as security for the payment or repayment of money.” 18 U. S. C. §921 (a) (12) (emphasis supplied).

These definitions surely suggest that a “sale or other disposition” of a firearm in a pawnshop is covered by the statute. This, of course, does not of itself resolve the question as to exactly what “other disposition” by a pawnbroker is included. It should be apparent, however, that if Congress had intended to include only a pawnbroker’s default sales of pledged or pawned goods, or his wholesale and retail sales of nonpawned goods, and to exclude the redemption of pawned articles, then the explicit inclusion of the pawnbroker in the definition of “dealer” would serve no purpose, since part (A) of the definition, covering wholesale and retail sales, would otherwise reach all such sales. United States v. Rosen, 352 F. Supp. 727, 729 (Idaho 1973). At oral argument counsel suggested that the specific reference to a pawnbroker might have been intended to include “disposition” by barter, swap, trade, or gift. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7. This interpretation strains belief. Trades or gifts are not peculiar to pawnbrokers. Wholesalers and retailers may indulge in such dispositions. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that this interpretation prompted the specific mention of a pawnbroker in part (C) of the definition. To the contrary, the committee reports indicate that part (C) “specifically provides that a pawnbroker dealing in firearms shall be considered a dealer.” H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1968) (emphasis supplied). See also S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1968).

We also cannot ignore the explicit reference to a firearm transaction “by way of pledge or pawn” in the statutory definition of “pawnbroker” in §921 (a) (12). Had Congress’ desire been to exempt a transaction of this kind, it would have artfully worded the definition so as to exclude it. We are equally impressed by Congress’ failure to exempt redemptive transactions from the prohibitions of the Act when it so carefully carved out exceptions for a dealer “returning a firearm” and for an individual mailing a firearm to a dealer “for the sole purpose of repair or customizing.” § 922 (a)(2)(A). Petitioner contends that a redemptive transaction is no different from the return of a gun left for repair. His argument is that the pawned weapon is simply “returned” to the individual who left it and represents a mere restoration to its original status. We believe, however, that it was not unreasonable for Congress to choose to view the pawn transaction as something more than the mere interruption in possession typical of repair. The fact that Congress thought it necessary specifically to exempt the repair transaction indicates that it otherwise would have been covered and, if this were so, clearly a pawn transaction likewise would be covered.

Other provisions of the Act also make it clear that the statute generally covers all transfers of firearms by dealers to recipients. Section 922 (a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person, except a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer, to engage in the business of “dealing” in firearms, or in the course of such business “to ship, transport, or receive any firearm.” Section 922 (b)(1) makes it unlawful for a dealer “to sell or deliver” firearms of specified types to persons under 18 or 21 years of age. Section 922 (b) (2) makes it unlawful for a dealer to “sell or deliver” a weapon to a person in any State where “at the place of sale, delivery or other disposition,” the transfer would violate local law. Section 922 (d) makes it unlawful for a dealer “to sell or otherwise dispose of” a firearm to a person under a felony indictment, a felon, a fugitive, a narcotic addict, or a mental defective. Section 923 (g) requires that each licensed dealer maintain “records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition, of firearms.”

In sum, the word “acquisition,” as used in § 922 (a) (6), is not ambiguous, but clearly includes any person, by definition, who “come[s] into possession, control, or power of disposal” of a firearm. As noted above, “acquisition” and “sale or other disposition” are correlatives. It is reasonable to conclude that a pawnbroker might “dispose” of a firearm through a redemptive transaction. And because Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers in the Act, explicitly mentioned pledge and pawn transactions involving firearms, and clearly failed to include them among the statutory exceptions, we are not at liberty to tamper with the obvious reach of the statute in proscribing the conduct in which the petitioner engaged.

Ill

The legislative history, too, supports this reading of the statute. This is apparent from the aims and purposes of the Act and from the method Congress adopted to achieve those objectives. When Congress enacted the provisions under which petitioner was convicted, it was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest. Pub. L. 90-351, § 1201, 82 Stat. 236, as amended by Pub. L. 90-618, §301 (a)(1), 82 Stat. 1236, 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201. Congress determined that the ease with which firearms could be obtained contributed significantly to the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 (1968). The principal purpose of the federal gun control legislation, therefore, was to curb crime by keeping “firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.” S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968).

Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968 are thus aimed at restricting public access to firearms. Commerce in firearms is channeled through federally licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers in an attempt to halt mail-order and interstate consumer traffic in these weapons. The principal agent of federal enforcement is the dealer. He is licensed, §§922 (a)(1) and 923 (a); he is required to keep records of “sale ... or other disposition,” § 923 (g); and he is subject to a criminal penalty for disposing of a weapon contrary to the provisions of the Act, § 924.

Section 922 (a)(6), the provision under which petitioner was convicted, was enacted as a means of providing adequate and truthful information about firearms transactions. Information drawn from records kept by-dealers was a prime guarantee of the Act’s effectiveness in keeping “these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). Thus, any false statement with respect to the eligibility of a person to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer was made subject to a criminal penalty.

From this outline of the Act, it is apparent that the focus of the federal scheme is the federally licensed firearms dealer, at least insofar as the Act directly controls access to weapons by users. Firearms are channeled through dealers to eliminate the mail order and the generally widespread'commerce in them, and to insure that, in the course of sales or other dispositions by these dealers, weapons could not be obtained by individuals whose possession of them would be contrary to the public interest. Thus, the conclusion we reached above with respect to the language and structure of the Act, that firearms redemptions in pawnshops are covered, is entirely consonant with the achievement of this congressional objective and method of enforcing the Act.

Moreover, as was said in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 507 (1955), “There is no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted” (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the committee reports indicate that the proscription under § 922 (d) on the sale of other disposition of a firearm to a felon “goes to all types of sales or dispositions— over-the-counter as well as mail order.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1968). See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 (1968). As far as the parties have informed us, and as far as our independent research has revealed, there is no discussion of the actual meaning of “acquisition” or of “sale or other disposition” in the legislative history. Previous legislation relating to the particular term “other disposition” sheds some light, however, and prudence calls on us to look to it in ascertaining the legislative purpose. United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357 (1926). The term apparently had its origin in § 1 (k) of the National Firearms Act, Pub. L. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934). That Act set certain conditions on the “transfer” of machine guns and other dangerous weapons. As defined by the Act, “transfer” meant “to sell, assign, pledge, lease, loan, give away, or otherwise dispose of.” The term “otherwise dispose of” in that context was aimed at providing maximum coverage. The interpretation we adopt here’ accomplishes the same objective.

There also can be no doubt of Congress' intention to deprive the juvenile, the mentally incompetent, the criminal, and the fugitive of the use of firearms. Senator Tydings stated:

“Title IV, the concealed weapons amendment, is a very limited, stripped-down, bare-minimum gun-traffic control bill, primarily designed to reduce access to handguns for criminals, juveniles, and fugitives .... I can fairly say that this concealed weapons amendment does not significantly inconvenience hunters and sportsmen in any way. The people it does frustrate are the juveniles, felons, and fugitives who today can, with total anonymity and impunity, obtain guns by mail or by crossing into neighboring States with lax or no gun laws at all, regardless of the law of their own State.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1968).

Congressman Celler, the House Manager, stated:

“Mr. Chairman, none of us who support Federal firearms controls believe that any bill or any system of control can guarantee that society will be safe from firearms misuse. But we are convinced that a strengthened system can significantly contribute to reducing the danger of crime in the United States. No one can dispute the need to prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mental disturbances, and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or possessing firearms. This bill seeks to maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of such persons.” Id., at 21784.

Congressman McCulloch, a senior member of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in referring specifically to § 922 (a)(6), stated, “[The bill] makes it unlawful . . . [f]or any person, in connection with obtaining a firearm or ammunition from a licensee, to make a false representation material to such acquisition.” Id., at 21789. Given these statements of congressional purpose, it would be unwarranted to except pawnship redemptions when, by virtue of the statutory language itself, such re-demptions would be covered. Otherwise every evil Congress hoped to cure would continue unabated.

IV

Petitioner urges that the intention to include pawn redemptions is so ambiguous and uncertain that the statute should be narrowly construed in his favor. Reliance is placed upon the maxim that an “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336,347 (1971). This rule of narrow construction is rooted in the concern of the law for individual rights, and in the belief that fair warning should be accorded as to what conduct is criminal and punishable by deprivation of liberty or property. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 348. The rule is also the product of an awareness that legislators and not the courts should define criminal activity. Zeal in forwarding these laudable policies, however, must not be permitted to shadow the understanding that “[sjound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will.” United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 542 (1943). Although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they “ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.” American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358, 367 (1829); United States v. Wiltberger, supra; United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (1840); United States v. Lacker, 134 U. S. 624 (1890); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S., at 510; United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 351.

We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act. The statute in question clearly proscribes petitioner’s conduct and accorded him fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. Huddleston was not short of notice that his actions were unlawful. The question he answered untruthfully was preceded by a warning in boldface type that “an untruthful answer may subject you to criminal prosecution.” The question itself was forthright and direct, stating that it was concerned with conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and that this meant the term which could have been imposed and not the sentence actually given. Finally, petitioner was required to certify by his signature that his answers were true and correct and that he understood that “the making of any false oral or written statement . . . with respect to this transaction is a crime punishable as a felony.” This warning also was in boldface type. Clearly, petitioner had adequate notice and warning of the consequences of his action.

Our reading of the statute cannot be viewed as judicial usurpation of the legislative function. The statute’s language reveals an unmistakable attempt to include pawnshop transactions, by pledge or pawn, among the transactions covered by the Act. And Congress unquestionably made it unlawful for dealers, including pawnbrokers, “to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm” to a convicted felon, a juvenile, a drug addict, or a mental defective. § 922 (d). Under these circumstances we will not blindly incant the rule of lenity to “destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to [and did] enact.” American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 293 (1907); United States v. Katz, 271 U. S., at 357.

Y

The petitioner suggests, lastly, that the application of § 922 (a) (6) to a pawn redemption would raise constitutional questions of some moment, and that these would not arise if the statute were narrowly construed. We fail to see the presence of issues of that import. There was no taking of Huddleston’s property without just compensation. The rifles, in fact, were not his but his wife’s. Moreover, Congress has determined that a convicted felon may not lawfully obtain weapons of that kind. Nor were petitioner’s false answers in any way coerced. United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 79 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64, 72 (1969). Finally, no interstate commerce nexus need be demonstrated. Congress intended, and properly so, that §§ 922 (a) (6) and (d)(1), in contrast to 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a)(1), see United States v. Bass, supra, were to reach transactions that are wholly intrastate, as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, “on the theory that such transactions affect interstate commerce.” 472 F. 2d, at 593. See also United States v. Menna, 451 F. 2d 982, 984 (CA9 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 963 (1972), and United States v. O’Neill, 467 F. 2d 1372, 1373-1374 (CA2 1972).

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

This case presents a minor version of the problem confronting the Court in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273. That case involved an ambiguity in a criminal law, an ambiguity that normally would be resolved in favor of life. A split Court in a tense period of American history unhappily resolved the ambiguity against life — a break with history which the conscience of our people will sometime rectify.

The present case is a minor species of the same genus. A person who took his gun to a pawnshop for a loan undoubtedly had “acquired” the gun prior to that time. It is therefore odd to think of the “acquisition” occurring when he redeemed his own gun from the pawnshop. I agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Laisure, 460 F. 2d 709, that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. That is what we have quite consistently done, except in Rosenberg, in the past. See United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348, and cases cited.

       “§ 922. Unlawful acts.
      “(a) It shall be unlawful—
      “ (6) for any person in connection with the acquisition ... of any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed dealer . . . knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . . intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm . . . under the provisions of this chapter.”

       “§ 922. Unlawful acts.
      “(d) It shall be unlawful for any . . . licensed dealer ... to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm ... to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person—
      “(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

       Cal. Penal Code § 476a (1970). The California complaint against Huddleston was in six counts and contained an allegation that he had been convicted previously in the State of Iowa of an offense which, if committed in California, would have been a violation of § 476 of the California Penal Code. He was eventually sentenced on the check charge to 30 days in jail.

       “§ 924. Penalties.
      “(a) Whoever violates any provision of this chapter or knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by the provisions of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter, . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole as the Board of Parole shall determine.”

       Huddleston at first testified that his California attorney and his probation officer there told him that when he completed his probation period and made restitution, “it would go on record as a misdemeanor,” and that the attorney had told him he “couldn’t get over a year.” App. 37, 39. Upon inquiry by the court, he testified that when he was arraigned he thought he “could get more than one year,” and was so informed. Id., at 41.

       In agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s decision is United States v. Beebe, 467 F. 2d 222 (CA10 1972). To the contrary is United States v. Laisure, 460 F. 2d 709 (CA5 1972).

       James Y. Bennett, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in Senate testimony offered a “case study” vividly illustrating non-sale situations that would qualify as a firearms “disposition” or “acquisition.” One of his illustrations was the following:
      “On September 26, 1958, a 20-year-old youth shot and seriously wounded a teller during the course of a bank robbery in St. Paul; only a week previously he had bought the revolver, a .357 Smith & Wesson, in a Minneapolis sporting goods store, pawned it the same day, and on the day of the robbery redeemed it with money obtained from check forgeries.”
      Mr. Bennett concluded his testimony with the observation, “No responsible and thoughtful citizen can, in my opinion, seriously object to measures which would discourage youngsters, the mentally ill, and criminals from coming into possession of handguns.” Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, pp. 3369, 3377 (1963).

       Testimony by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark also supports the rejection of petitioner’s suggestion that the language of the statute be given a restrictive meaning:
      “Mr. Donohue. Do you not think, Mr. Attorney General, to attain the real objective and purpose of this bill, it should not only deal with the sale, but whoever sells or delivers?
      “Mr. Clark. It covers delivery, too.
      “Mr. Donohue. Where?
      “Mr. Clark. Well, generally, through the bill when you talk about — well, it would be unlawful for any licensed importer to sell or deliver. Any licensed dealer to sell or deliver.
      “Mr. Donohue. It is not restricted to just sale for consideration?
      “Mr. Clark. No. The delivery, too.”
      Hearings on an Anti-Crime Program before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 260 (1967).

       It should be apparent from these statements that Congress was not so much concerned with guaranteeing no interference with the ownership of weapons as it was in distinguishing between law-abiding citizens and those whose possession of weapons would be contrary to the public interest. Hunting, target practice, gun collecting, and the legitimate use of guns for individual protection are not proscribed by the Act. Ownership of a weapon, however, may be interfered with by seizure and forfeiture under the Act for any violation of its provisions. Section 924 (d) incorporates the seizure and forfeiture provisions of the Internal Revenue Code when there is any violation of the provisions of the chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder. The Act itself thus contemplates interference with the ownership of weapons when those weapons fall into the hands of juveniles, criminals, drug addicts, and mental incompetents.

       What few references there are to pawnbrokers in the debates indicate that Congress was definitely interested in curbing firearms traffic between pawnbrokers and convicted felons. Senator Tydings, a strong proponent of the bill which became the Act, expressed his concern when he compared the bill to a proposal that was offered as an alternative:
      “[O]ne reading through the amendment for the first time would assume that pawnbrokers are covered by the critically important provisions of the affidavit-waiting period procedure. But, if a pawnbroker only receives secondhand weapons as security for the repayment of a loan and does not deal in new firearms, he is not transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce. Used weapons presumably will have come to rest in the hands of the borrower, and the transaction will be wholly intrastate. Such a pawnbroker would not need a Federal firearms license to conduct over-the-counter transactions in firearms. And, accordingly, he would not be a ‘licensed dealer’ required to comply with the affidavit-waiting period procedure for his over-the-counter sales in handguns. Now, if this analysis is correct, and I believe it is, this is no small omission. Surely the great bulk of criminally irresponsible purchasers of pistols and revolvers buy their weapons secondhand, and many of them from pawnshops. We all have seen the virtual arsenals displayed in the windows of pawnshop dealers in all of the major cities of the country. To say that we have effectively regulated traffic in firearms when we will not have touched the great bulk of these pawnbroker operations is a complete and utter hypocrisy.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13222 (1968).
      See also Memorandum placed in the record by Senator Dodd. Id., at 13320. Senator Tydings made this further comparison:
      “[I]t is obvious that many persons with criminal records purchase from pawnbrokers, and there are many occasions when the pawnbroker knows the criminal background of the client. Under Amendment No. 708, many of these pawnbrokers will not be required to be licensed. They would not need to comply with the affidavit procedure. And even if they were licensed, there would be no prohibition on their selling firearms to known criminals. Under title IV, on the other hand, all of these pawnbrokers would be required to be licensed — because all dealers and manufacturers must be licensed whether or not they ship, receive, or transport in commerce — and all of them would be under direct Federal sanction not to sell firearms to known criminals. I ask you, which bill is likely to be more effective?” Id., at 13223.
      It must be conceded that these remarks refer to “selling” firearms, but we do not credit this fact as significant for purposes of determining whether a pawnshop redemption is covered by the Act. The plain language of the statute as enacted prohibits a dealer from “selling or disposing of” firearms to felons, and petitioner’s counsel at oral argument intimated that a pawnbroker, under this language, could dispose of a firearm other than by sale and be covered by the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4r-5. References in the legislative debate, moreover, are replete with shorthand language and this is merely an instance of its use. Had the legislators been engaged in a colloquy on the actual meaning of “sale or other disposition of,” we might be more receptive to the interpretation proffered by the petitioner.
      We also note that the President of the Pawnbrokers’ Association of the City of New York testified during congressional hearings that almost all firearm transactions by pawnshops are by pledge and redemption, and contended, therefore, that pawnbrokers should not be included as dealers under the Act. Hearings on a Federal Firearms Act before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1062-1065 (1967). Thus, informed of the fact that almost all firearms transactions by pawnbrokers were through pledge and redemption, and faced with the argument that pawnbrokers should not be considered as “dealers,” Congress clearly chose to retain pawnbrokers as firearms dealers.
      Finally, the language of the committee reports indicates that a “sale or disposition” includes “all types of sales or dispositions.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1968).

       The decision today does not ignore the admonition of the Court in United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971), that “[i]n traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” This statute did affect the federal balance and it did so intentionally. As Senator Tydings explained:
      “This concealed weapons amendment does not violate any State’s right to make its own gun laws. Quite the contrary, title IV provides the controls on interstate gun traffic which only the Federal Government can apply, and without which no State gun law is worth the paper it is written on. . . . Without such Federal assistance, any State gun law can be subverted by any child, fugitive, or felon who orders a gun by mail or buys one in a neighboring State which has lax gun laws.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1968).

      Civil cases cited by the Court, e. g. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 293, are wide of the mark. For application of a law that sends people to prison for years where Congress has not made it clear they should be there, United States v. Bass, supra, at 346, is only another device as lacking in due process as Caligula’s practice of printing the laws in small print and placing them so high on a wall that the ordinary man did not receive fair warning.
      “When taxes of this kind had been proclaimed, but not published in writing, inasmuch as many offenses were committed through ignorance of the letter of the law, he at last, on the urgent demand of the people, had the law posted up, but in a very narrow place and in excessively small letters, to prevent the making of a copy.” Suetonius, The Lives of the Twelve Caesars 192 (Modern Lib. ed. 1931).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    February 4, 1974
    No. 73-532.
    American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Detroit Local v. Independent Postal System of America, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1110.] Writ of certiorari dismissed

under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    February 6, 1974
    No. 73-1053.
    Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    February 7, 1974
    No. 73-6105.
    Shadd v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. A-734.
    Briscoe, Governor of Texas, et al. v. Graves et al.
   D. C. W. D. Tex. Motions to vacate stay heretofore granted by

Mr. Justice Powell denied. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.


text:
    FEBRUARY 11, 1974
    No. 73-576.
    Cyzewski, aka Scalzi, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    February 19, 1974
    No. 73-297.
    Alliance for Consumer Protection, Hill District Branch, et al. v. Milk Marketing Board of Pennsylvania et al.
   Pa. Commw. Ct. Petition for writ of certiorari dismissed under Rule 60 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 73-812.
    Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. United States et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Pa.


text:
    No. 73-961.
    Wallace, Governor of Alabama, et al. v. Sims et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. M. D. Ala.


text:
    No. 73-766.
    Ledford et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-897.
    Phelps v. Covey, Referee in Bankruptcy.
   Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-940.
    Bogart v. State Bar of California.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-956.
    No. 73-957.
    Pittsburgh Coal Co., Division of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania; and Harmar Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania.
   Appeals from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Reported below: 452 Pa. 77, 306 A. 2d 308.


text:
    No. 73-993.
    Phelps v. Commissioners of the Supreme Court of Illinois et al.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-5879.
    Calaway v. West Virginia.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-5705.
    Dun Leavay v. Tenney, U. S. District Judge, et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.


text:
    No. 73-6004.
    Abercrombie v. Ohio.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Clermont County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.


text:
    No. 73-929.
    Del Paso Recreation and Park District et al. v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento et al.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Douglas would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-951.
    Webb v. Nolan.
   Appeal from C. A. 4th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1005.
    Ross v. Ohio.
   Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Marshall would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-1007.
    Franklin et al. v. Krause, Clerk, Board of Supervisors of Nassau County.
   Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Mr. Justice Brennan would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-232.
    Exxon Corp. v. Preston.
   Appeal from Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 9th Sup. Jud. Dist. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U. S. 1038.] Upon receiving and filing appellee’s waiver of his right to file an opposing brief with his representation that he no longer opposes change of venue of the litigation to Harris County, Texas, judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Ninth Supreme Judicial District, is vacated and case remanded to that court to consider whether venue issue has become moot.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


text:
    No. 73-285.
    Noreikis et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Upon representation of the Solicitor General as set forth in his memorandum for the United States filed January 30, 1974, certiorari as to petitioner George Hibma granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for reconsideration in light of position presently asserted by the Government. Certiorari denied as to Robert A. Noreikis and Robert Rothrock.


text:
    No. 52,
    Orig.
    United States v. Florida.
   Report of Special Master received and ordered filed. Exceptions, if any, may be filed by the parties within 45 days. Reply briefs, if any, may be filed within 30 days thereafter. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., 404 U. S. 998.]


text:
    No. A-664.
    Gellis v. City of Savannah et al.
   Application for vacation of order of United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia (Civil Action No. 3031) dated January 7, 1974, dismissing case for lack of prosecution, denied. Application for stay heretofore denied by

Mr. Justice Powell, now presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-712.
    New York on Behalf of New York County et al. v. United States et al.
   Application.for stay of order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, dated January 10, 1974, presented to

The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-742.
    Harris County Commissioners Court et al. v. Moore et al.
   D. C. S. D. Tex. Motion of respondents to vacate stay order heretofore granted by

Mr. Justice Powell on February 4, 1974, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would vacate the stay.


text:
    No. A-752.
    Brobeck v. United States et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Application for bail presented to

Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. A-760.
    Ackerman et al. v. Bogue, U. S. District Judge.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Application for stay presented to

Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-14.
    In re Disbarment of MacLeod.
   Motion to vacate order of disbarment of this Court dated January 21, 1974 [414 U. S. 1153], denied.


text:
    No. D-17.
    In re Disbarment of Englert.
   It having been reported to the Court that Charles E. Englert, of Boston, Massachusetts, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of Massachusetts, and this Court by order of November 12, 1973 [414 U. S. 1020], having suspended the said Charles E. Englert from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent, and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It is ordered that the said Charles E. Englert be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. D-19.
    In re Disbarment of McWhinney.
   It having been reported to this Court that Robert R. McWhinney of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of Pennsylvania, and this Court by order of November 19, 1973 [414 U. S. 1036], having suspended the said Robert R. McWhinney from practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent, and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It is ordered that the said Robert R. McWhinney be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. D-22.
    In re Disbarment of Rosner.
   It is ordered that Edmund Allen Rosner of New York, New York, be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.


text:
    No. 72-1490.
    No. 72-1491.
    Federal Power Commission v. Texaco Inc. et al.; and Dougherty, Executor, et al. v. Texaco Inc. et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 817.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 72-1513.
    Shea, Executive Director, Department of Social Services of Colorado, et al. v. Vialpando.
   C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 999.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument granted.


text:
    No. 72-1597.
    Beasley et al. v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 907.] Motion of Associated Industries, Inc., et al., for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied.


text:
    No. 72-1690.
    Spence v. Washington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U. S. 815.] Motion of appellant for leave to file supplemental brief, after argument, granted.


text:
    No. 73-206.
    Parker, Warden, et al. v. Levy.
   Appeal from C. A. 3d Cir. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 414 U. S. 973.] Motion of Richard G. Augenblick for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-235.
    DeFunis et al. v. Odegaard et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wash. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1038.] Motions of Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith and National Council of Jewish Women et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. Motions of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and American Bar Assn, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies for leave to adopt the amicus curiae brief of the State of Ohio denied.


text:
    No. 73-300.
    No. 73-480.
    Saxbe, Attorney General, et al. v. Bustos et al.; and Cardona v. Saxbe, Attorney General, et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1143.] Motion of the Solicitor General to waive printing of appendix and to proceed on original record granted.


text:
    No. 73-347.
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of Northern Natural Gas Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied.


text:
    No. 73-477.
    Gerstein v. Pugh et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1062.] Motion of the Attorney General of Florida for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Respondents allotted an additional 15 minutes for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-434.
    No. 73-435.
    No. 73-436.
    Milliken, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Bradley et al.; Allen Park Public Schools et al. v. Bradley et al.; and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1038.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted and a total of 15 minutes allotted for that purpose. Motion of National Education Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted.


text:
    No. 73-482.
    Michigan v. Tucker.
   C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1062.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Kenneth M. Mogill, Esquire, of Detroit, Michigan, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case and to argue pro hac vice.


text:
    No. 73-689.
    Maness v. Meyers, Judge.
   169th Jud. Dist. Ct. Tex., Bell County, Tex. Motion to dispense with printing petition denied with leave to file printed petition in conformity with Rule 39 of the Rules of this Court on or before March 21, 1974.


text:
    No. 73-717.
    Antoine et ux. v. Washington.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.


text:
    No. 73-786.
    Ross et al. v. Moffitt.
   C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1128.] Motions of respondent for leave to proceed herein in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Thomas B. Anderson, Jr., Esquire, of Durham, North Carolina, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case.


text:
    No. 73-831.
    Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero.
   C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1128.] Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.


text:
    No. 73-918.
    Pell et al. v. Procunier, Corrections Director, et al.
   [Probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U. S. 1155.] Motion of appellants for additional time for oral argument granted and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for oral argument in consolidated cases No. 73-754 [Procunier v. Hillery, probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U. S. 1127] and No. 73-918.


text:
    No. 73-1006.
    Martin-Trigona v. Supreme Court of Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion to dispense with printing petition denied but without prejudice to the Circuit Justice's considering the papers as an application for extension of time within which to file petition properly-printed under Rule 39 of the Rules of this Court.


text:
    No. 73-5939.
    No. 73-5975.
    No. 73-6065.
    No. 73-6087.
    No. 73-6120.
    No. 73-6160.
    Maempe v. Enomoto; Washington v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; Skinner v. Warden, Baltimore County Jail; Anderson v. Mississippi; Delespine v. Estelle, Corrections Director; and Conner v. Robuck et al.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied.


text:
    No. 73-5724.
    No. 73-5760.
    Cozzetti v. Thompson, U. S. District Judge; and Tate v. De Mascio, U. S. District Judge.
   Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 73-659.
    Indiana v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
   Motion of respondent Brooks [see Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F. 2d 383] for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus, prohibition, and/or certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-976.
    Johnson v. Wilmer et al.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus, prohibition, and/or certiorari denied. Treating the papers presented as a petition for certiorari,

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-744.
    Luongo, U. S. District Judge v. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
   Motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition and/ or mandamus denied.


text:
    No. 73-759.
    Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, et al. v. Healy et al.
   Appeal from D. C. E. D. La. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-5744 [immediately infra].


text:
    No. 73-5744.
    Taylor v. Louisiana.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. La. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 73-759 [immediately supra].


text:
    No. 73-762.
    Sosna v. Iowa et al.
   Appeal from D. C. N. D. Iowa. Probable jurisdiction noted. In addition to questions presented in the jurisdictional statement, parties requested to address themselves to question of whether the United States District Court should have proceeded to the merits of the constitutional issue presented in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) and related cases.


text:
    No. 73-776.
    Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Ballard.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Cal. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-848.
    Fusari, Commissioner of Labor v. Steinberg et al.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. Motion of appellee Miranda for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-898.
    Goss et al. v. Lopez et al.
   Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-938.
    Cox Broadcasting Corp. et al. v. Cohn.
   Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ga. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits.


text:
    No. 73-6033.
    Roe et al. v. Norton, Commissioner of Welfare.
   Appeal from D. C. Conn. Motion of appellants for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted.


text:
    No. 73-822.
    Fry et al. v. United States.
   Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-1004.
    Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-5845.
    Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted.


text:
    No. 73-696.
    No. 73-830.
    Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization et al.; and National Labor Relations Board v. Western Addition Community Organization et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument.

Reported below: 158 U. S. App. D. C. 138, 485 F. 2d 917.


text:
    No. 73-327.
    Woodbury et al. v. Spitler.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-487.
    Brewer v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-525.
    Cuevas v. Florida.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-565.
    Risley v. Mississippi.
   Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-585.
    Kuss et al. v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-612.
    DeVore et al. v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
   Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-613.
    United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada, Local 540, et al. v. Lusk.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-615.
    Prudhomme v. Al Johnson Construction Co.-Massman Construction Co. et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-616.
    Makris v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-619.
    Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-624.
    Lazaros v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-638.
    Jones v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-645.
    No. 73-651.
    Cardillo v. United States; and Economy v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Reported below: 481 F. 2d 1397.


text:
    No. 73-650.
    Rex v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-664.
    Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc., et al. v. Kleppe et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-666.
    Phillips et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-672.
    Smith v. California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-673.
    Winters v. Bohanon, U. S. District Court Judge, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-694.
    Tager v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-677.
    Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-703.
    Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Veeder-Root Co., a Division of Veeder Industries, Inc.
   Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-705.
    Baron v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Baron, real party in interest).
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-710.
    Smaldone v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-714.
    Imel et al. v. Zohn Manufacturing Co. et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-720.
    Warner et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-724.
    Interamerican Air Freight Corp. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-733.
    Wilson et al. v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-743.
    Martin Linen Supply Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-745.
    DiVarco et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-763.
    Hightower v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-764.
    Beth W. Corp. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-768.
    Local Union No. 229, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Affiliated Food Distributors, Inc.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-773.
    McNeill v. Fisher et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-780.
    Preux v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-798.
    Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-799.
    Bay Sound Transportation Co. et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-803.
    Leblanc v. Cardwell Manufacturing Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-807.
    Cylinder Gas, Chemical, Petroleum, Auto-Service & Accessory Drivers, Maintenance, Mechanics, Helpers & Inside Employees Local No. 283, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Ottawa Silica Co. et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-813.
    No. 73-821.
    City of Chicago et al. v. Hampton, Administratrix, et al.; and Hanrahan et al. v. Hampton, Administratrix, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 484 F. 2d 602.


text:
    No. 73-815.
    Roberts v. Arkansas.
   Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-816.
    No. 73-973.
    Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Dunlop Co., Ltd.; and Dunlop Co., Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 484 F. 2d 407.


text:
    No. 73-818.
    Bigger et al. v. City of Pontiac et al.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-836.
    Henderson, Warden v. Barrabino.
   Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-847.
    Jones v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-851.
    Bates v. Indiana.
   Ct. App. Ind. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-860.
    Minyard et al. v. Shirley.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-863.
    Hozie v. Hozie.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-866.
    Ross v. California.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-880.
    Lionel Corp. v. Republic Technology Fund, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-882.
    McGurren v. Ettelson et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-883.
    Franklin Steel Products, Inc. v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-884.
    Mendoza et al. v. United Farm Workers Organizing Committee et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-890.
    Erie Lackawanna Railway Co. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-rari denied.


text:
    No. 73-896.
    Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N. A. v. National BankAmericard Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-900.
    Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-904.
    DeBerry v. Kentucky.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-907.
    B & J Manufacturing Co. v. Solar Industries, Inc.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-910.
    Spence et al. v. Spence et al.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-919.
    Buxton v. Fugazi.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-920.
    Kerns v. Jordon et al.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-921.
    Grossman v. State Bar Grievance Board.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-946.
    Grossman v. State Bar Grievance Board.
   Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-923.
    Solo Cup Co. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (Illinois Tool Works, Inc., real party in interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-932.
    Skeen v. Valley Bank of Nevada.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-942.
    O’Neill et al. v. Craig.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 13th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-945.
    Jones et al. v. Gaines.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-947.
    DeSalvo v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-950.
    Megel et ux. v. City of Papillion et al.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-954.
    Standard Oil Company of California et al. v. Alaska et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-959.
    Friend v. Lippman et al.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-962.
    Phelps v. Covey, Referee in Bankruptcy.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-970.
    Brinkerhoff et al. v. Amfac, Inc.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-979.
    Kealey v. New York.
   Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-981.
    Elliott et al. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-986.
    Dotlich v. Dotlich.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-990.
    Sweet et al. v. Sweet, Ancillary Administrator.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-992.
    Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al. v. Farber et al.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1000.
    Wilson v. Krantz et al.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1001.
    Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, dba Garden Shell Station.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1010.
    Mitchell v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Lucas County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1020.
    Davis v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1025.
    Point East One Condominium Corp., Inc., et al. v. Point East Management Corp. et al.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1028.
    Skendzel et al. v. Marshall et al.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1037.
    Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Acel Delivery Service, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1042.
    Lambert v. Clark et al.
   C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1048.
    Rogers v. Burton et al.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 3d Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1059.
    Hamilton Manufacturing Co. v. Metal Buildings Insulation, Inc., et al.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5272.
    Jones v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5292.
    Tate v. Fauver, Principal Keeper.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5444.
    Boisseau v. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5450.
    Cutter et al. v. South Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5483.
    Good v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5498.
    Marroquin-Guerrero v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5532.
    Perrault v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5537.
    Allen, aka Hammond, et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5557.
    Pedley v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5559.
    Fallon v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5560.
    White v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5566.
    Muhammed v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5570.
    Pauldino v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5571.
    McCall v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5573.
    Fletcher v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5575.
    Shatz v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5577.
    Carter v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5580.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5584.
    Hastings v. Cardwell, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5585.
    Watts v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5586.
    No. 73-5590.
    Johnson v. United States; and Estes v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 U. S. App. D. C. 299, 485 F. 2d 1078.


text:
    No. 73-5591.
    Bonomo et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5592.
    Cockroft v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5593.
    Middleton v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5599.
    Powers v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5607.
    McWilliams et al. v. Texas.
   Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5610.
    Walling v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5612.
    Randall v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5613.
    Bennett v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5622.
    Parent et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5626.
    Rothwell v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5629.
    Arradondo v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5634.
    Fisher v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5635.
    Anderson v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5639.
    Thomas v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5648.
    Porter v. United States.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5649.
    Landers v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5653.
    Minnix v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5654.
    Lewis v. United States.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5658.
    Owens v. United States.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5659.
    Silvas v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5666.
    Smith v. Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5670.
    Laehn v. Schmidt et al.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5673.
    Ritter v. United States.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5676.
    Watson v. West Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5690.
    Leftwich v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5691.
    Norwoods v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5703.
    Wheat et al. v. Hall, Secretary, Human Relations Agency, et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5704.
    Espinoza v. Enomoto.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5708.
    Mason v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5737.
    Sajedas v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5762.
    Miller v. Wainwright, Corrections Director.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5798.
    Penigar v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5806.
    Vargas v. Metzger.
   Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5814.
    Johnson v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5816.
    Joyner v. Virginia.
   Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5824.
    Bridwell v. United States.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5837.
    Talley v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5843.
    Quinones v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5844.
    Cauthen v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5846.
    Dulles v. Dulles.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5847.
    Messinger v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5850.
    Alexander et al. v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5856.
    Snyder v. Maryland.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5861.
    Nichols v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5866.
    McKinney v. Missouri.
   Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5869.
    Bradley v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5880.
    Cook v. Blackledge, Warden.
   C. A. 4.th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5881.
    Tilley v. North Carolina.
   Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5882.
    Riffert v. Johnson, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5886.
    Alexander v. North Carolina.
   Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5887.
    Terrell et vir v. Garcia.
   Ct. Civ. App. Tex., 4th Sup. Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5898.
    Jones v. Jones.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5899.
    Alexander v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5905.
    De Toro v. Velez, Chairman, Industrial Commission of Puerto Rico.
   Sup. Ct. P. R. Cer-tiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5913.
    Najaib v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5915.
    Kaplan v. Continental Can Co., Inc.
   Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5917.
    Crowe v. South Dakota.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5922.
    Jones v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5924.
    Lopez et al. v. Luginbill et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5929.
    Cordova v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5931.
    Orr v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5934.
    Scott v. California.
   Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5935.
    Szabo v. Black, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5937.
    Mullen v. Georgia.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5940.
    Mumford v. Brofman, Judge.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5942.
    Bronson v. Bronson.
   Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5944.
    Moore v. Vincent, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5951.
    House v. California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5962.
    Richardson v. Missouri.
   C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5971.
    Heard et ux. v. Department of Motor Vehicles of the District of Columbia.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5976.
    Edwards v. Illinois.
   Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5978.
    King v. New Jersey.
   Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5979.
    Travis v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5981.
    Zenglein v. Masthoff et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5982.
    Mayberry v. Alabama.
   Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5983.
    Whatley v. Anderson, Warden, et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5984.
    Hurd v. Supreme Court of California.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5985.
    Richardson v. Arizona.
   Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5986.
    Jennings v. Illinois.
   App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5987.
    Minor v. Nicholson, Judge, et al.
   Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5994.
    Dunnaville v. Virginia.
   Cir. Ct., City of Roanoke, Va. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5997.
    Jutila v. Reshetylo, Hospital Superintendent.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5998.
    Clemmer v. Mazurkiewicz, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6002.
    Magee v. Nelson, Warden, et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6003.
    Dallas v. Vincent, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6014.
    Lineback v. Indiana.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6016.
    Bremer v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6019.
    Wait v. Washington.
   Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6028.
    Minovich v. Maryland.
   Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6029.
    Lott v. Oklahoma et al.
   C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6053.
    Mirsky v. New York.
   App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6071.
    Dawn, dba Game Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6091.
    Falkner et ux. v. Cullen, Judge, et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-6101.
    Hancock v. Rose, Warden.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-233.
    Slayton, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Speller.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certi-orari denied.


text:
    No. 73-901.
    Henderson, Warden v. Hale.
   C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave, to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1045.
    Louisiana v. Newman.
   Sup. Ct. La. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-265.
    Semel v. Federal Supply Co.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-272.
    Reynolds et al. v. City of Sacramento et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-287.
    Borserine v. Florida.
   Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-344.
    Owen et al. v. Musick, Sheriff.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-492.
    Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Federal Republic of Germany et al.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certi-orari.


text:
    No. 73-529.
    Martinez v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-709.
    Canadian Parkhill Pipe Stringing, Ltd., et al. v. United States.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-719.
    Santana v. United States.
   C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-735.
    International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. Dow Chemical Co.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-876.
    Contreras et al. v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-892.
    Mann v. Smith et al.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-915.
    Moran v. Raymond Corp.
   C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1041.
    Lee v. Oklahoma.
   Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5347.
    Lemons v. United States.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5348.
    Gee et al. v. United States et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5561.
    Savage v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5572.
    Peck v. Wyoming et al.
   Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5621.
    Thrower v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5636.
    Weislow v. United States.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5651.
    Maisonet v. United States.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5722.
    Ferguson v. Gathright, Correctional Superintendent.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5751.
    Frte v. Doddrill et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5820.
    Lockett v. Henderson, Warden.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant, certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5890.
    Whiteside v. Ohio.
   Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-5946.
    Bazis v. Nebraska.
   Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-686.
    Telephone Users Assn., Inc. v. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-687.
    Telephone Users Assn., Inc. v. Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia et al.
   Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-778.
    Swoap, Director, Department of Social Welfare v. Hypolite et al.
   Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Motion of respondent Hypolite for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-835.
    White, Secretary of State of Texas v. Whatley et al.
   C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of LeRoy E. Symm, Voter Registrar of Waller County, Texas, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-879.
    California Independent Telephone Assn. et al. v. Public Utilities Commission et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Black-mun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-906.
    Patterson et al. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Vun Cannon, real party in interest).
   C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent Vun Cannon for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-928.
    Roeder et ux. v. General Motors Corp.
   C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-1017.
    United States v. Walt Disney Productions.
   C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari.


text:
    No. 73-1013.
    No. 73-1014.
    Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., for the use and benefit of Insurance Company of North America; and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., for the use and benefit of Insurance Company of North America.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

Reported below: 485 E. 2d 78.


text:
    No. 73-1067.
    Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Williams.
   Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.


text:
    No. 73-952.
    Ector v. City of Torrance et al.
   Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-971.
    D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia et al.
   C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Potomac Electric Power Co. and Washington Gas Light Co. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-1027.
    Indiana v. Adams.
   Sup. Ct. Ind. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied, it appearing that judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground.


author: Mr. Justice Douglas,

text:
    No. 73-5679.
    Wright v. North Carolina et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The petitioner in this case challenges the admission at his trial for rape of certain self-incriminating statements. The statements were the result of police interrogation preceded by warnings which the petitioner asserts to be inadequate in light of the requirements enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The warning petitioner received stated in pertinent part:

“You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if and when you go to Court.” (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner contends that the right to appointed counsel only “if and when he goes to court” is contrary to Miranda, supra, where we said:

“This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a 'station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.” Id., at 474 (emphasis added).

The validity of warnings which advise only of some in futuro right to counsel is an issue on which lower courts are divided. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all concluded that such warnings are inadequate compliance with Miranda. In this case the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in holding the warnings adequate. State courts are also widely-divided on this issue, with Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Washington finding the warnings insufficient while Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, and New York have reached a contrary result.

We are, of course, the only source of resolution for this conflict and it is our obligation to provide uniformity on such important federal constitutional questions. In reforming the Court’s jurisdiction in 1925 the purpose was to allow us to “hear and determine those cases which should alone engage [our] attention,” since under the prior law the Court was “hindered from . . . efficiently functioning in the performance of its highest duty of interpreting the Constitution and preserving uniformity of decision by the intermediate courts of appeals.” H. R. Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1925). Mr. Justice Van Devanter had told Congress that the prime consideration in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction was “whether the case is of such a character that the last word, the ultimate guiding rule, should be announced by the Supreme Court, so that there may be uniformity of decision in the several circuit courts of appeals, and also uniformity of decision in the State courts in so far as Federal matters are concerned.” Hearings on Procedure in Federal Courts before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30 (1924).

Because of the present conflict, the extent of one’s federal constitutional rights varies according to the State or Circuit in which the question is presented. I would grant certiorari in order to resolve the issue and provide uniformity.

        Williams v. Twomey, 467 F. 2d 1248 (CA7 1972); United States v. Garcia, 431 F. 2d 134 (CA9 1970); Coyote v. United States, 380 F. 2d 305 (CA10), cert. denied,. 389 U. S. 992 (1967).

         Massimo v. United States, 463 F. 2d 1171 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1117 (1973); United States v. Lacy, 446 F. 2d 511 (CA5 1971); Klingler v. United States, 409 F. 2d 299 (CA8 1969).

        Square v. State, 283 Ala. 548, 219 So. 2d 377 (1968); Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S. W. 2d 940 (1971); State v. Grierson, 95 Idaho 155, 504 P. 2d 1204 (1972) (dicta); State v. Carpenter, 211 Kan. 234, 505 P. 2d 753 (1973); Schorr v. State, 499 P. 2d 450 (Okla. Cr. App. 1972); State v. Creach, 77 Wash. 2d 194, 461 P. 2d 329 (1969).

        People v. Williams, 131 Ill. App. 2d 149,264 N. E. 2d 901 (1970); Jones v. State, 253 Ind. 235, 252 N. E. 2d 572 (1969); People v. Campbell, 26 Mich. App. 196, 182 N. W. 2d 4 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 945 (1971); Evans v. State, 275 So. 2d 83 (Miss. 1973); People v. Swift, 32 App. Div. 2d 183, 300 N. Y. S. 2d 639 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1018 (1970).


text:
    No. 73-5688.
    Hart v. Coiner, Warden.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari denied as untimely filed. 28 U. S . C. § 2101 (c).


text:
    No. 73-5900.
    Dawkins et al. v. Craig, Commissioner of Social Services of North Carolina, et al.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Petition for writ of certiorari denied as untimely filed. 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (c).


text:
    No. 73-5992.
    Mathis v. Alabama.
   Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-6762.
    Smilgus v. Bergman et al.,
   414 U. S. 842, 1052. Motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing and other relief denied.


text:
    No. 72-6576.
    No. 72-6790.
    No. 72-6930.
    No. 73-459.
    No. 73-621.
    No. 73-636.
    No. 73-663.
    No. 73-728.
    No. 73-5288.
    No. 73-5399.
    No. 73-5477.
    No. 73-5513.
    No. 73-5597.
    No. 73-5625.
    No. 73-5632.
    Dawn, dba Game Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., et al., Smilgus v. Letts, Judge, Ex parte Kent, New Rider et al. v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 1, Pawnee County, Oklahoma, et al., Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. v. City and County of Denver et al., Coker et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Wesson v. Levin et al., City of Miami v. Spicy, D’Orsay v. United States, White v. United States, Ring v. California, Frist v. Haynsworth, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals, et al., Serrano v. New York, Freed et al. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, Revenue Division, Lyons v. Indiana,
   414 U. S. 880;

414 U. S. 843;

414 U. S. 1077;

414 U: S. 1097;

414 U. S. 1088;

414 U. S. 1130;

414 U. S. 1112;

414 U. S. 1131;

414 U. S. 1070;

414 U. S. 1132;

414 U. S. 1072;

414 U. S. 1073;

414 U. S. 1075;

414 U. S. 1075; and

414 U. S. 1096.

Petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 72-6704.
    No. 73-5086.
    Dillard v. New York City Transit Authority, Whetton v. Turner, Warden,
   414 U. S. 839; and

414 U. S. 862. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 73-254.
    Dorl v. United States,
   414 U. S. 1032. Motion to dispense with printing petition for rehearing granted. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    No. 73-5467.
    Legion et al. v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al.,
   414 U. S. 1058. Motion to defer consideration denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant the motion.

Motions for leave to file briefs as amici curiae in support of rehearing filed by the following were granted: American Nurses Assn., American Orthopsychiatric Assn., Inc., National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Association of Black Psychologists, Black Psychiatrists of America, Inc., National Health Law Program, Congress of Racial Equality, National Conference of Black Lawyers, American Medical Assn., National Black Feminist Organization, National Urban League, Inc., and National Medical Assn., Inc. Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    February 20, 1974
    No. 73-660.
    Neff v. Moran.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.


text:
    No. 73-5868.
    Moran v. Neff.
   C. A. 4th Cir. Certi-orari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The petitioner brought this federal habeas corpus action to challenge his Virginia conviction for possession of controlled drugs with intent to distribute. The District Court granted the writ as to one ground, challenged here by the State in the related matter of Neff v. Moran, No. 73-660, certiorari denied today (immediately supra), but rejected the petitioner’s claim that evidence seized in a warrantless search should have been suppressed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in reliance upon the District Court’s opinion.

An informer who had given accurate information in the past called State Police Investigator Mitchell concerning the possession and sale of controlled drugs at a truck-stop motel. He provided Mitchell with a physical description of the petitioner and trailor-tractor rig, the license number of the rig, and the number of petitioner’s motel room. Mitchell made no attempt to secure a search warrant based upon this information. Rather, he called three other officers to his home where they arranged a plan whereby Mitchell would present himself to petitioner as a truck driver and attempt to purchase drugs. Two hours later the officers arrived at the motel, but found petitioner’s room unoccupied and his truck absent. Soon afterward they saw the described rig on a nearby freeway. Mitchell pulled the truck over and informed petitioner that he had probable cause to believe that he was transporting illegal drugs, and that his vehicle would be searched. Petitioner came down from the rig and a search of his person revealed a vial containing five pills. A subsequent search inside the cab, however, produced a considerable cache of drugs in the glove compartment, a cigar box, a briefcase, and a suitcase, all of which had to be opened by the officers.

Petitioner here does not contest the District Court’s conclusion that the officers had probable cause. But “no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 471. The District Court found, however, that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search, since here there was an “out-of-state truck on a highway leading out of the jurisdiction.” The petitioner argues that there were no exigent circumstances precluding the police from securing a warrant in the first instance, before going to the motel room, or after stopping the truck. He draws support from the District Court’s own findings. The informer provided the police with no information suggesting that petitioner would soon be leaving the motel, and it was not a perception of need for immediate action that led the police to choose their course. Rather, the District Court found that “Officer Mitchell admittedly desired to circumvent the warrant process in order to protect his informant’s identity.” Although the officer’s reasoning was erroneous, as there is no requirement that the informer be identified in obtaining a warrant, the District Court concluded that the police were acting “in good faith,” so that the “investigative tactics, although dilatory with reference to the procurement of a warrant, were not so unreasonable as to constitute a conscious disregard and avoidance of the warrant process.”

But “good faith” cannot under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search. An officer may in good faith believe there is ample probable cause to justify a search, but the Constitution requires that decision to be made by a “neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14. Nor can an officer’s good-faith belief that no warrant was required render unnecessary a judicial officer’s independent determination of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Nor can this search be justified as incident to a valid arrest, and the District Court so held, since “Mitchell had no intention of arresting or detaining '[petitioner] unless he discovered narcotics within his possession.” Thus, this is a simple case, presenting the question of whether a police officer with ample time to secure a warrant may deliberately circumvent this constitutional requirement on the basis of his judgment that the police will be more effective without judicial oversight of his decision to search. My views on the necessity for obtaining a warrant are detailed in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Matlock, ante, p. 178, decided this day. On that basis I would grant this petition for certiorari.


text:
    FEBRUARY 25, 1974
    No. 73-987.
    Guggenheim, Director, Department of Liquor Control, et al. v. Peto, dba Loop Carry Out.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Ohio.

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument.


text:
    No. 73-1087.
    Koscherak et al. v. Schmeller et al.
   Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.


text:
    No. 73-6036.
    Fischler v. ITT Federal Electric Corp. et al.
   Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied.


text:
    No. A-741.
    Davison v. Florida.
   Application for stay of mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida presented to

Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan would grant the stay.


text:
    No. A-793.
    Baker et al., Trustees of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. United States et al.
   D. C. E. D. Pa. Application for stay presented to

Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied.


text:
    No. D-21.
    In re Disbarment of Liddy.
   It having been reported to the Court that George Gordon Liddy, of Oxon Hill, Maryland, has been disbarred from the practice of law in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of November 19, 1973 [414 U. S. 1037], having suspended the said George Gordon Liddy from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him so show cause why he should not be disbarred;

And it appearing that the said rule was duly issued and served upon the respondent and that the time within which to file a return has expired;

It is ordered that the said George Gordon Liddy be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court.


text:
    No. 72-942.
    Hainsworth v. White, Secretary of State of Texas.
   Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 410 U. S. 965.] Motion of appellant for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted.